



NUNC COGNOSCO EX PARTE



THOMAS J. BATA LIBRARY  
TRENT UNIVERSITY







Papers Relating to the  
Foreign Relations  
of the  
United States

The Paris Peace Conference  
1919

Volume VII



United States  
Government Printing Office  
Washington : 1946

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PUBLICATION 2466


---

For sale by the  
Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D. C. - Price \$2.50 (Buckram)



# CONTENTS

	Page
NOTE CONCERNING THE MINUTES OF THE MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF HEADS OF DELEGATIONS . . . . .	VI
THE COUNCIL OF HEADS OF DELEGATIONS: MINUTES OF MEETINGS JULY 1 TO AUGUST 28, 1919:	
July 1, 4 p. m. (FM-28) . . . . .	1
July 2, 3:30 p. m. (FM-29). . . . .	8
July 3, 2:30 p. m. . . . .	17
July 5, 3 p. m. (IC-201A) . . . . .	20
July 7, 3:30 p. m. (HD-1) . . . . .	32
July 8, 3:30 p. m. (HD-2) . . . . .	45
July 8, 5 p. m. (HD-2A) . . . . .	56
July 9, 3:30 p. m. (HD-3) . . . . .	58
July 10, 3:30 p. m. (HD-4). . . . .	86
July 11, 3:30 p. m. (HD-5). . . . .	97
July 12, 3:30 p. m. (HD-6). . . . .	116
July 15, 3:30 p. m. (HD-7). . . . .	129
July 16, 3:30 p. m. (HD-8). . . . .	154
July 17, 3:30 p. m. (HD-9). . . . .	171
July 18, 10 a. m. (HD-10) . . . . .	191
July 18, 4 p. m. (HD-11) . . . . .	203
July 21, 3:30 p. m. (HD-12) . . . . .	233
July 25, 3:30 p. m. (HD-13) . . . . .	254
July 26, 10:30 a. m. (HD-14). . . . .	303
July 26, 3:30 p. m. (HD-15) . . . . .	315
July 28, 10:30 a. m. (HD-16). . . . .	342
July 28, 3:30 p. m. (HD-17) . . . . .	356
July 29, 3:30 p. m. (HD-18) . . . . .	369
July 30, 3:30 p. m. (HD-19) . . . . .	402
July 31, 3:30 p. m. (HD-20) . . . . .	434
August 1, 3:30 p. m. (HD-21) . . . . .	449
August 2, 3:30 p. m. (HD-22) . . . . .	480
August 4, 3:30 p. m. (HD-23) . . . . .	504
August 5, 3:30 p. m. (HD-24) . . . . .	528
August 6, 3:30 p. m. (HD-25) . . . . .	547
August 7, 3:30 p. m. (HD-26) . . . . .	603
August 8, 3:30 p. m. (HD-27) . . . . .	620
August 11, 3:30 p. m. (HD-28) . . . . .	646
August 12, 3:30 p. m. (HD-29) . . . . .	670
August 13, 3:30 p. m. (HD-30) . . . . .	677
August 14, 5 p. m. (HD-31) . . . . .	683
August 18, 3:30 p. m. (HD-32) . . . . .	694
August 19, 3:30 p. m. (HD-33) . . . . .	713
August 20, 3:30 p. m. (HD-34) . . . . .	730
August 21, 3:30 p. m. (HD-35) . . . . .	768
August 22, 3:30 p. m. (HD-36) . . . . .	780
August 23, 3:30 p. m. (HD-37) . . . . .	811
August 25, 3:30 p. m. (HD-38) . . . . .	835
August 26, 11 a. m. (HD-39) . . . . .	927
August 27, 11 a. m. (HD-40) . . . . .	941
August 28, 11 a. m. (H. D.-41) . . . . .	956
INDEX . . . . .	967



Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2019 with funding from  
Kahle/Austin Foundation

THE COUNCIL OF HEADS OF DELEGATIONS:  
MINUTES OF MEETINGS JULY 1 TO  
AUGUST 28, 1919

## NOTE CONCERNING THE MINUTES OF THE MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF HEADS OF DELEGATIONS

After the signing of the treaty with Germany on June 28, 1919, the principal governing body of the Peace Conference was the Council of Heads of Delegations of the five great powers.

The minutes were prepared by a joint secretariat and were duplicated and distributed in the same manner as those of the Council of Ten and the Council of Four (see notes, volume III, page 468, and volume V, page vi).

The designation of the minutes of the early meetings of the Heads of Delegations was somewhat irregular. Thus the meetings of July 1 and 2 appear as FM-28 (IC-200) and FM-29 (IC-201) respectively, the minutes of the July 3 meeting are without formal designation, and those of the meeting of July 5 appear as BC-63 (IC-201A). Beginning with the meeting of July 7 the minutes are designated by the letters "HD" followed by a number and run in a series from HD-1 of July 7, 1919, 3:30 p. m., through HD-125 of January 10, 1920, 11:30 a. m.

The present volume ends with HD-41 (August 28); HD-42 through HD-84 (August 29–November 5) will be found in volume VIII, and HD-85 through HD-125 (November 6, 1919–January 10, 1920) in volume IX.



# THE COUNCIL OF HEADS OF DELEGATIONS: MINUTES OF MEETINGS JULY 1 TO AUGUST 28, 1919

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03201/28

FM-28

## Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, July 1, 1919, at 4 p. m.

### PRESENT

#### AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Hon. R. Lansing.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

#### BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.

*Secretary*

Mr. H. Norman.

#### FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

*Secretaries*

M. Dutasta.

M. Berthelot.

M. de Bearn.

Capt. de St. Quentin.

#### ITALY

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. di Martino.

#### JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino.

### ALSO PRESENT

#### FRANCE

M. Pichon.

M. Loucheur.

#### JAPAN

H. E. Viscount Chinda.

### Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . .	Lieut. Burden.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Capt. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
JAPAN . . . . .	M. Saburi.
ITALY. . . . .	Lieut. Zanchi.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the first business the Council should deal with was to nominate a Committee to watch the execution of the clauses of the Treaty with Germany when ratified.

Nomination of  
Committee To  
Supervise the  
Execution of the  
Treaty With  
Germany

MR. BALFOUR said that he had intended to nominate Sir Eyre Crowe.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that his nominee was M. Tardieu. The Committee was to have no executive power but should

superintend the work of all Commissions dealing with the details of the provisions of the Treaty. The Committee would report to the Council from time to time what progress was being made and what further action might be needed.

MR. LANSING said that he would have to consider what nomination to make.

M. TITTONI said that he could give the name of the Italian member on the following day.

BARON MAKINO nominated M. Otchiai.

(It was agreed that the nominations should be made at the Meeting on the following day.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said he would ask M. Loucheur to explain the functions of a Committee to deal with the Reparation clauses of the Treaty and to explain the necessity for its labours to begin at once, seeing that the Germans had already made certain enquiries regarding the execution of the provisions concerning the occupied districts. (See Annex A.)

M. LOUCHEUR said the proposal was to nominate a Committee with one member and one assistant from each of the following five nations:—France, Great Britain, United States, Italy and Belgium.

M. TITTONI asked whether the Committee would deal with devastated districts of all fronts including the Italian.

M. LOUCHEUR replied in the affirmative, but added that it was not intended to form the Committee at once in its final shape. Each Government would be able to consider the question at leisure, especially as there would be a big staff and a very large organisation. What he proposed for the time being was a Committee to prepare the ground. It was to this Committee that he suggested that each of the Powers mentioned should nominate one delegate and one assistant. During the intermediate period between the nomination of this Committee and the formation of the ultimate organisation, he thought that this body should be authorised to converse with the Germans with the object of shaping a plan for procedure in the future. Sub-committees to deal with Finance, Rebuilding, etc. could be set up at a later time.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood that this Committee would have a double function:—

(1) To organise the future Reparation Commission provided for in the Treaty.

(2) To deal with the Germans and the problems raised by them in the meantime.

He further asked why Serbia was excluded.

M. LOUCHEUR said that it was intended that Serbia should take the place of Belgium whenever the question of Serbian devastated terri-

tory arose. Japan would take the place of Belgium in matters regarding the Far East and damage at sea. The preliminary organisation, however, should, he suggested, be done by nominees of the five Powers first mentioned. There would, therefore, be four permanent members in the final Commission and one changeable member. He would ask that the nominations should be made within 24 hours, and that the Committee should meet on the afternoon of the 3rd. July, 1919.

(It was agreed that the nominations should be made at the Meeting on the following day.)

3. MR. LANSING said that he had not brought a second American Delegate with him under the impression that this was to be a Council of Five.

Constitution of  
the Council

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was indeed to be a Council of Five, but he had asked M. Pichon to come as he would himself have to leave the Meeting.

MR. LANSING said that his experience was that in a Council of Ten, in practice one delegate spoke. The other did not, but by sitting in the Council he became acquainted with the whole course of the work, and was therefore prepared at any moment to take charge, should his colleague for any reason be unable to attend.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had no objection to raise if it were desired that two delegates from each nation be present.

MR. BALFOUR said that the mere presence of a large number made a physical difference. He thought conversation was simpler and more informal at a gathering of five. Even a silent Delegate interposed between each of the spokesmen cramped the conversation. There had been many objections no doubt to the procedure in the Council of Four, but there had been this great advantage.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Mr. Lansing insisted on his point of view. He himself shared Mr. Balfour's.

MR. LANSING said he would not insist, but he felt the advantage of having a second delegate present. The day's proceedings could be talked over with the second delegate with much advantage to both. He pointed out that there must always be others present in the room. He was strongly in favour of having enough secretaries present to make a full and agreed record of what took place.

M. TITTONI said that he saw good reasons for both points of view, but he was prepared to agree to a Council of Five if his colleagues desired it.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that a start be made with a Council of Five, subject to alteration if necessary.

(This was agreed to.)

4. MR. LANSING asked whether the decisions reached by the Council were final.

Finality of  
Council on  
Decisions

M. CLEMENCEAU replied in the affirmative.

5. MR. LANSING said that a number of Notes had been received from the Austrian Delegation. None of them had yet been replied to. He would suggest that Commissions be appointed to deal with each section of the Treaty affected by any of the Austrian Notes. He had prepared a draft resolution on this subject (see Annex B).

Reply to  
Austrian Notes

M. CLEMENCEAU said that what Mr. Lansing desired was being done.

MR. LANSING said that he did not allude to Committees employed on completing the unfinished portions of the Austrian Treaty. What he proposed was Committees to deal with the Austrian counter proposals to the portions of the Treaty which had been presented.

MR. BALFOUR said he understood that the same Committees which had prepared the answers to the German Notes were preparing answers to the Austrian Notes.

M. DUTASTA explained that there was a Section dealing with the Geographical questions, another dealing with the points relating to the League of Nations, another with the points raised concerning private property, in accordance with a decision taken by the Council of Four.

MR. LANSING observed that the American Delegation knew nothing of this. The American Experts on Austrian affairs were not the same as the Experts on German affairs.

M. DUTASTA said that the Secretariat-General had informed the Secretaries of the various Delegations asking each to nominate suitable delegates. Nominations had already been made for the Committee on Geographical questions, and the Committee was to meet on the following day.

(It was agreed that M. Dutasta should make a full report on the situation on the following day.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the following subjects had been suggested:—

Frontiers in the following areas:—

Agenda for  
Future Meetings

1. The Banat.
2. Bukovina.
3. Bessarabia.

M. DUTASTA said that the frontiers in the Banat had been fixed and the decision had been communicated to the Jugo-Slavs and to the Roumanians. The frontiers in Bukovina had also been settled but not yet communicated.

It was decided that the communication should be made.

M. TITTONI enquired whether the frontiers had been only recommended by Commissions or whether they had been fixed by decisions of the Council?



M. CLEMENCEAU said that they had been fixed by the Council.<sup>1</sup>

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether anything had been done regarding Bessarabia.

M. DUTASTA replied that as this subject concerned Russia, no decision had been made but the matter had been studied by the Roumanian Commission.

MR. BALFOUR thought that it was unnecessary to reach a decision concerning Bessarabia as no Treaty of Peace had to be made either with Russia or with Roumania. He thought that there were many questions of importance of which no doubt the Bessarabian question was one, but he thought the Council should first deal with whatever was required to bring about peace with the enemy States.

M. TITTONI thought that the Council should make an effort to eliminate elements of disturbance and that the area in question was very disturbed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed with M. Tittoni. Mr. Balfour's proposals followed the logical order, but facts were louder than logic. He thought the Council should attempt to suppress disorder as much as possible. He suggested that M. Tardieu should be heard on the following day for half an hour on Bessarabia. No decision need be taken there and then.

MR. BALFOUR said that if that half hour was not required for other purposes, he would be delighted to hear M. Tardieu.

MR. LANSING asked who would represent the Russians.

M. PICHON suggested that M. Maklakof<sup>2</sup> might be heard.

M. TITTONI said that if a Russian was to be heard, a Roumanian should also be heard.

MR. LANSING suggested that if this were done, they should be heard separately.

This was agreed to, and it was decided that M. Tardieu be asked to make a report on the following day regarding Bessarabia and that M. Maklakof on behalf of Russia, and a Roumanian delegate be heard separately on the same subject.

MR. BALFOUR observed that there could be no peace with Bulgaria without determining Bulgarian frontiers. He suggested that this subject be examined by a Committee. No Committee, however, could deal with the frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey since the whole Turkish question was still unsolved and was to be solved as a whole hereafter. He would suggest that the Committee be instructed to consider pro-

Committee for  
Bulgaria

<sup>1</sup> See appendix IV to CF-79, vol. VI, p. 591.

<sup>2</sup> V. A. Maklakof, appointed Ambassador to France by the Russian Provisional Government; member of the Russian Political Commission at Paris.

visionally the Enos Midia line as the extreme frontier of Bulgaria on that side.<sup>3</sup>

It was agreed that on the following day nominations should be made for the special Commission regarding Bulgaria.

The Agenda for the following day was therefore:—

1. Nominations for Committee to supervise the execution of the Treaty with Germany.
2. Nomination of organising Committee for Reparation.
3. Nominations for Committee on Bulgarian affairs.
4. Report of M. Dutasta regarding procedure in dealing with Austrian Note.
5. Hearing of M. Tardieu, M. Maklakof and a Roumanian Delegate regarding Bessarabia.

MR. LANSING said that he would like to add two short proposals to the Agenda. He had prepared two draft resolutions (see Annex "C" and "D".)

It was agreed that these draft resolutions should be considered and that the next meeting should take place at 3.30 on the following day.

PARIS, July 1, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to IC-200 [FM-28]

*[The Head of the German Delegation (Von Lersner) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]*

[Translation <sup>4</sup>]

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION,  
VERSAILLES, June 30, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: By order of the German Government, I have the honor to inquire of Your Excellency when and where the discussions relating to the occupied regions will begin.

Accept [etc.]

BARON VON LERSNER

---

<sup>3</sup> According to a correction issued on July 2, 1919, this paragraph should read as follows:

"MR. BALFOUR observed that there could be no peace with Bulgaria without determining Bulgarian frontiers. He suggested that this subject be examined by a Committee. The Greek Committee, however, could not deal with the frontier between Bulgaria and Greece without knowing the boundaries of Turkey. The whole Turkish question was still unsolved and was to be solved as a whole hereafter. He would suggest that the Committee be instructed to consider provisionally the Enos Midia line as the probable frontier of the future State of Constantinople."

<sup>4</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

## Appendix B to IC-200 [FM-28]

*Draft Resolution*

## IT IS AGREED

That Commissions of five members, one to be appointed by each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, shall be set up to consider and prepare suitable replies to the various notes presented by the Austrian Delegation in regard to the clauses of the Conditions of Peace with Austria;

That the numbers of these Commissions shall correspond to the number of sections of the Conditions of Peace with Austria;

That the member appointed by the French Delegation on each of these Commissions shall be empowered to convene his commission at such time as he may deem advisable or as he may be directed; and

That the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference shall be instructed to refer to the appropriate commission immediately each note submitted by the Austrian Delegation.

---

Appendix C to IC-200 [FM-28]*Draft Resolution*

## IT IS AGREED

That the modifications which were made in the Conditions of Peace with Germany as a result of the German counter-proposals or for any other reasons, shall, insofar as they may be applicable, be made *ipso facto* in the Conditions of Peace with Austria.

---

Appendix D to IC-200 [FM-28]*Draft Resolution*

## IT IS AGREED

That the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference shall notify the Austrian Delegation that it will be allowed a period of not more than ten days, counting from the date upon which it will receive the last section of the Conditions of Peace, in which to make such counter-proposals or observations as it may see fit.

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, July 2, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.**

**PRESENT****AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. R. Lansing.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P.

*Secretaries*

Mr. H. Norman.

Sir P. Loraine Bt.

**FRANCE**

M. Tardieu.

*Secretaries*

Capt. de St. Quentin.

M. de Bearn.

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretaries*

M. Paterno.

M. Bertele.

**JAPAN**

H. E. Baron Makino.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

**ALSO PRESENT****AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

Prof. Coolidge.

Dr. R. H. Lord.

Mr. A. W. Dulles.

Major D. W. Johnson.

Mr. Whitehouse.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

Mr. A. Leeper.

Hon. H. Nicolson.

Maj. Temperley.

**FRANCE**

M. Laroche.

**ITALY**

Comte Vannutelli-Rey.

Colonel Castoldi.

**RUSSIA**

M. Maklakof.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Lieut. Burden,
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Capt. Abraham,
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier,
ITALY . . . . .	Lieut. Zanchi.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. TARDIEU explained that M. Pichon was unavoidably prevented from attending the meeting. He asked Mr. Lansing to take the chair.

**Question of  
Bessarabia**

MR. LANSING asked M. Tardieu to take the chair himself.



M. TARDIEU did so. He said that he had been asked to open the discussion on Bessarabia by explaining the views of the Committee which had studied the question. He read the Report made by the Committee:—

“The Committee, after taking into consideration the general aspirations of the population of Bessarabia and the Moldavian character of that region from the geographical and ethnical points of view, as well as the historical and economic arguments, pronounces itself in favour of joining Bessarabia to Rumania.

It considers that this measure should be effected in a form which will safeguard the general interests of Bessarabia, more especially as concerns its relations with the neighbouring countries, and which will guarantee the rights of minorities in conformity with the provisions of the League of Nations.”

Since the Committee had reported, a protest had been received from M. Tchaikowsky<sup>1</sup> on behalf of the Russian Committees in Paris, protesting against any annexation by Roumania, and stating that Russia could not recognise any such act, and further alleging that the Roumanian troops had behaved in a very arbitrary manner in the country. M. Tchaikowsky ended by demanding a free plebiscite.

MR. LANSING said that the practical question was to know whether a decision regarding Bessarabia could find a place in any of the Treaties of Peace.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that he had made the same remark on the previous day. He had thought it was important to do all that was necessary to complete the Treaties first. M. Clemenceau, however, had thought the Bessarabian question pressing and had therefore urged that it be taken up. Mr. Lansing, however, had pointed out that no resolution could be adopted on the subject, and this statement had not been met by any dissent.

MR. LANSING observed that the powers accorded to him as plenipotentiary were limited to the negotiation of Peace. They did not enable him to deal with a conflict between two friendly Powers. President Wilson, no doubt, might have been able to deal with such a question. He himself was not in that position.

M. TARDIEU said that it had been decided on the previous day to hear a Russian and a Roumanian representative. They had been asked to come, and each would doubtless say what he thought should be the frontier line in Bessarabia. Should the two agree, which he admitted was not likely, Mr. Lansing would not be placed in the difficulty to which he alluded. Should they not agree, the Council would then be forced to see what further action could be taken. He would point out, however, that it was difficult to make a Treaty with Roumania if one

---

<sup>1</sup> N. V. Tchaikowsky, President of the Russian Provisional Government of the Northern Region (Archangel) and a member of the Russian Political Conference at Paris.

of her frontiers were left gaping. He suggested that M. Maklakof should be heard.

MR. LANSING agreed to this, but pointed out, however, that if any resolution were asked for, he could not take any share in it. He had given this warning in order that no false impression should be produced.

(At this stage, M. Maklakof entered the room, and was asked by M. Tardieu to express his views on Bessarabia.)

M. MAKLAKOF said that two memoranda had already been sent to the Peace Conference on the subject of Bessarabia; he would endeavour to give a gist of the argument. In the first place, he must point out that no portion of the domains of the Russian State could be disposed of by third parties without the consent of that State. Not even the Peace Conference could assume that power. He and his friends had no authority to speak for any constituted Government of Russia. He wished to make this point quite clear at the outset. As to the merits of the question, he would observe that there had never been any agreement between Roumania and Russia, authorising the former to demand Bessarabia. Roumania had entered the war on certain terms. These terms had not touched the question of Bessarabia. Roumania could therefore base no claim on any clause in any Treaty. Neither could Roumania claim the right of conquest. These two arguments being set aside, it was alleged that Bessarabia should go to Roumania by reason of the principle that peoples had a right to dispose of themselves. He would not discuss this principle, subject to limitations, though it might be. He would admit it, and he would further admit that if there were any Russian subjects of Roumanian nationality who wished to unite under one flag with the rest of their countrymen, Russia would be well-advised to permit it. Russia was big enough to make a sacrifice of this kind, but it was the very statement that Bessarabia desired to join Roumania that he challenged. Bessarabia was not a Roumanian country as a whole. Such demonstrations of a desire to join Roumania as had occurred among a portion of the population were mere camouflage. It was on the question of fact that he joined issue and refused to allow the legitimacy of the Roumanian claim. He would point out that the word Bessarabia was often wrongly used. He would not go back to remote antiquity. In the eighteenth century, Bessarabia had been part of Moldavia, which was then a Turkish province. The Christians in those parts had always been under the moral protection of Russia. In 1812, a few months before the Napoleonic invasion, Bessarabia became a Russian province, captured from Turkey. There were at that time some 300,000 inhabitants. At the present time there were some three millions.

Over forty years later, the Crimean war had taken place and in the Peace of Paris,<sup>3</sup> the territory captured from Russia had been restored to her, in exchange for small areas, and Ismail, and Akkerman had been added to Moldavia. The rest of the country, i.e. the major part, had remained Russian since 1812. Then, in 1878, at the Treaty of Berlin,<sup>4</sup> the Dobruja had been added to Roumania, giving her access to the Black Sea, and territory twice as large as the portion of Bessarabia she had held. This small portion was given back to Russia to secure Russia's access to the Danube. Ethnographically, the last census had not established a Moldavian majority in the country. There was no reason to allege that the statistics had been falsified in any manner. Parts of the country were completely Russian. There were, however, four districts in the centre which were mainly Moldavian. It was only in these districts that the question of a referendum arose. These districts might be united to Roumania should the population really wish it. He would not, in principle, raise any objection. The Roumanians, however, declared that Bessarabia had already expressed its will. This he denied. Immediately after the Russian revolution, municipalities elected by universal suffrage had been set up. They were the best organs for the expression of the popular will. They had not asked to be annexed to Roumania. These municipalities had since been dissolved by the Roumanians, and their representatives had protested against the Roumanian desire to annex the country. The vote, however, had since been secured from the Sfatul Tseri, which was an emanation of the Councils of Workmen and Soldiers, the latter largely composed of Moldavian deserters. This body had resolved to make Bessarabia part of a Russian Federated Republic. This was in December, 1917. In the following March, when Roumania had been forced to accept Peace, and M. Marghiloman<sup>5</sup> was in power, this statesman had got into touch with the Sfatul Tseri and obtained from it a vote in favour of joining Roumania, with guarantees of local autonomy. When Roumanian troops had entered Bessarabia, invited to do so, he admitted, even by Russians, in order to re-establish order, the same body, at an interval of six months, had voted for annexation to Roumania, but out of 160 Members, only 46 had voted. It was a matter for surprise that a revolutionary assembly should have voted in favour of its inclusion in a Monarchy. The whole vote, he submitted, was open to suspicion. It had been given during a military occupation of the country, and it was a minority vote of an arbitrarily

<sup>3</sup> Treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XLVI, p. 8.

<sup>4</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 895.

<sup>5</sup> Alexandre Marghiloman, President of the Council and Minister of the Interior of Roumania, March 12 to November 9, 1918.



self-appointed body. If he believed that the people backed this vote, he might be disposed to acquiesce in it, but he felt quite sure that a free plebiscite would yield a completely different result. Therefore, he asked that there should be a proper consultation of the people. He reminded the Council that there had been a time when the catastrophe in Russia imperilled the success of the Allied cause in the War. If the War had ended disastrously, and Roumania had sought compensation from Russia for the losses brought upon her by Russia's failure to continue the War, he would have understood the Roumanian claim. But Roumania had now come out on the side of the victors, among whom Russia was not. Roumania had got all she had fought for and all she had asked for before the War. Therefore, he protested with the greatest force against the claim now made by Roumania, especially as it was not founded, as alleged, on the desire of the majority of the population. Finally, he would say that if there were districts showing a small Moldavian majority, wishing to join Roumania, he would be disposed to let them go. As it was, he constantly received complaints even from Moldavians in Bessarabia, of the treatment they received at the hands of the Roumanians. The vote of the Sfatul Tseri was being used quite fallaciously to justify what a reasonably conducted plebiscite would undoubtedly upset. He pointed out that similar votes had been obtained in Lithuania and in Latvia, in favour of annexation by Germany. Any decision annexing Bessarabia to Roumania would be a source of permanent grievance, and would do harm to Roumania, which would not be in a position to absorb an unwilling population. The most he could admit, was a plebiscite in the district in which the Moldavian population was predominant.

(M. Maklakof explained his views with the help of a map, and then withdrew.)

M. TARDIEU suggested that M. Bratiano <sup>6</sup> should only be questioned regarding the vote alluded to by Mr. Maklakof.

M. TITTONI said that the Council was in full possession of ethnical statistics and that it was unnecessary to hear M. Bratiano on that subject.

(At this stage M. Bratiano, M. Misu,<sup>7</sup> M. Diamandy <sup>8</sup> and M. Pellivan <sup>9</sup> entered the room.)

M. TARDIEU addressing Mr. Bratiano said that the members of the Council had studied the ethnological question thoroughly. They

---

<sup>6</sup> Jean J. C. Bratiano, President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Roumania; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

<sup>7</sup> Nicolas Misu, Roumanian Minister at London, plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

<sup>8</sup> Constantin Diamandy, Roumanian Minister at Petrograd; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

<sup>9</sup> Jean Pellivan, Director of Justice in Bessarabia.

would like to know what degree of sincerity and authority M. Bratiano attributed to the vote obtained in the Sfatul Tseri.

MR. LANSING interposed that it mattered little how that vote had been obtained. It was more important to know how the consultation of the people could be carried out in the future.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought the question put by M. Tardieu arose from the statement made by M. Maklakof.

M. TARDIEU said that there was a connection between the two. He therefore asked M. Bratiano to reply.

M. BRATIANO said that he believed the vote alluded to did express the will of the people and had been given in full freedom. He admitted the assembly was a revolutionary assembly but similar assemblies had expressed the will of the people in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and elsewhere. The Roumanian occupation had found that assembly in power and in control of the country. Its authority had resulted from the various successive developments which had taken place in Russia since the downfall of Czarism. Mr. Lansing suggested a plebiscite. Bessarabia, he would point out, was a Roumanian country attached by force to the Russian throne for over 100 years. When Russian autocracy fell, Bessarabia had come back to Roumania. The Roumanians had been called in by the people and even by the only recognised Russian authority at the time, namely, the Ukrainian Government. Difficulties did not arise on the question of nationality. It was the social question that caused all the trouble. The Bolsheviks were dissatisfied with the Roumanian Government merely because it established Governmental order. The agrarian reforms introduced made the peasant pay for the land obtained by the expropriation of the land owners. The land owners on their side grumbled because they were expropriated.

MR. LANSING said that he wished to put a plain question to M. Bratiano. Would he object to a plebiscite?

M. BRATIANO replied that he did. He did so because the choice offered the people would be that between Bolshevism and order. It was dangerous to offer such a choice to a country on the border of disturbed Russia. Should the Roumanians withdraw their troops there would be endless tumult in the country.

MR. LANSING asked whether M. Bratiano, if given possession of the country, would agree to a plebiscite in two years.

M. BRATIANO said that he would not as only revolutionary agitation would result from the knowledge that a plebiscite would take place in that period.

MR. LANSING asked whether M. Bratiano would object to a plebiscite at any other specified time in the future.

M. BRATIANO said that he would object still more strongly, as it would only prolong the agitation. He further begged to be allowed

to state that the possession of Bessarabia by Russia was now an anachronism. It had been for the Russian Empire a march on the road to Constantinople. It could no longer serve that purpose. Russia owed Roumania a great debt as being largely responsible for her misfortune. Circumstances pointed very clearly to the best way in which Russia could discharge that debt. It would be by the cession of Bessarabia.

(At this point the Roumanian delegates withdrew.)

2. The following nominations were made:—

Appointment of Commission To Supervise the Execution of the Treaty of Peace With Germany	United States of America.	Mr. J. F. Dulles.
	Great Britain.	Sir Eyre Crowe.
	France.	M. Tardieu.
	Italy.	M. Scialoja.
	Japan.	M. Otchiai.

3. The following nominations were made:—

Appointment of Committee To Organise Repara- tion Commission Provided for in the Treaty of Peace With Germany	United States of America.	Mr. J. F. Dulles.
	Great Britain.	Col. S. Peel.
	France.	M. Loucheur.
	Italy.	M. Crespi.
	Japan.	M. Mori.

4. MR. BALFOUR said that he had an explanation to make regarding the form in which the question had been put on the Agenda. He understood that the Committee on Greek Affairs had been unable to deal with the frontier between Greece and Bulgaria without knowledge of the ultimate border line between Greece and Turkey. It was for this reason that he had suggested that the Enos-Midia line be assumed provisionally as a frontier between Greece and the future territory of Constantinople. This could be used as a working hypothesis.

M. TARDIEU suggested that the Co-ordinating Committee on Territorial Affairs should be asked to deal with this subject and to hear the various experts dealing with the different frontiers of Bulgaria.

(It was finally agreed that the Co-ordinating Committee on Territorial Affairs should be asked to delimit the frontiers of Bulgaria and to make a report to the Council.)

M. TITTONI gave notice that Colonel Castoldi would take the place of M. Salvago Raggi on the Committee.

5. The following resolution was proposed by MR. LANSING and adopted:—

“That the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference shall notify the Austrian Delegation that it will be allowed a period of not more than ten days, counting from the date upon which it will receive the last section of the Conditions of Peace, in which to make such counter-proposals or observations as it may see fit.”

Austrian Treaty:  
Resolution Pro-  
posed by the  
United States  
Delegation



6. MR. LANSING proposed the following resolution:—

Austrian Treaty:  
Resolution Pro-  
posed by the  
United States  
Delegation

“That the modifications which were made in the Conditions of Peace with Germany as a result of the German counter-proposals or for any other reasons, shall, insofar as they may be applicable, be made *ipso facto* in the Conditions of Peace with Austria.”

M. TITTONI said that he had a reservation to make. Germany had been given an option of furnishing labour as a means of reparation. Italy had a superfluity of labour and did not desire that labour be offered as a form of reparation.

MR. LANSING suggested that, if this were the only reservation, the text proposed, together with M. Tittoni's reservation, be sent to the Drafting Committee for suitable modification and incorporation in the Treaty.

(This was agreed to.)

7. MR. BALFOUR observed that he had pointed out on the previous day that the frontier between Austria and Hungary required speedy attention.

Austrian Treaty:  
Frontier Between  
Austria and  
Hungary

(It was agreed that the Committee newly set up to answer the Austrian notes regarding frontiers should endeavour to report on the following day.)

8. M. TARDIEU pointed out that there was a clause in the draft Treaty with Austria requiring Austria to recognise “the following frontiers of neighbouring countries.” As it was not likely that these frontiers would be completely settled before the signature of Peace with Austria, it was desirable to alter the wording and to require the assent of Austria to frontiers to be fixed later by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Austrian Treaty:  
Recognition of  
Frontiers of  
Neighbouring  
States

(This was agreed to, and the question was referred to the Drafting Committee.)

M. TITTONI remarked that he assumed it was established that the ultimate decision regarding frontiers was a matter not for the League of Nations but for the present Conference of Allied and Associated Powers. He wished to make the same reservation as had been made by the Italian Delegation regarding the Treaty with Germany.

9. MR. LANSING expressed the view that there should be a communiqué.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood the Council to be the lawful heirs of the Council of Four which had issued no communiqués. He suggested that this example be followed.

Question of  
Communication  
to the Press of  
the Proceedings  
of the Council

M. TITTONI said that he was indifferent.

M. MAKINO said that he agreed with Mr. Balfour.

M. TARDIEU asked Mr. Lansing if he insisted on his view.

MR. LANSING said that he thought it was preferable to issue a communiqué, which could be made brief. His experience was that information always leaked out, through one Delegation or another. The Delegation most faithful to secrecy suffered.

MR. BALFOUR said that if the communiqué was so judiciously framed as to contain no information, he was indifferent.

(After some discussion, it was decided that for the present no communiqué should be issued.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

PARIS, 2 July, 1919.

**Brief Notes on a Meeting Which Took Place in M. Clemenceau's  
Office in the Ministry of War at 2:30 p. m. July 3, 1919**

There Were Present:—

M. Clemenceau,  
Mr. Lansing,  
Mr. Balfour,  
M. Tittoni.

Professor Mantoux.

M. Clemenceau had called the meeting at the request of M. Tittoni.

I

M. TITTONI brought up the question in regard to the troops in Asia Minor. He proposed that the railway line running east and west should be controlled by the British, French and American authorities, and that it should constitute the boundary line between the Italian and Greek forces, but that both the Italians and Greeks should have the right to use it.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the Italians had gone into Asia Minor without authority from the Conference. He also suggested that M. Tittoni should draft some formula regarding the proposition of the use of the railroad and the suggestion that it be made the boundary between the Italian and Greek forces. He also pointed out that no matter what action should be taken in this regard, the settlement of the question of Asia Minor should not be made a separate question, but that it would be considered in connection with the settlement of the whole Turkish question.

M. TITTONI explained that Italy did not desire to obtain sovereignty over that portion of Asia Minor now controlled by her troops. Italy did, however, desire to secure certain concession to the coal mines at Heraklia and to the oil wells at Van.

MR. LANSING stated that he was sympathetic to the Italian desire to secure coal mines at Heraklia. On the other hand he thought that Armenia was too poor to be deprived of all her resources and that the oil wells at Van should not be taken from her.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed at [*out*] that the French had certain concessions at Heraklia, and that the Italians were now proposing to surround the French concessions.

MR. LANSING asked M. Tittoni whether Italy had any coal mines.

M. TITTONI replied that Italy had none.

MR. LANSING then asked M. Clemenceau what coal mines France had.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that of course Mr. Lansing knew what coal resources France possessed.

MR. LANSING then stated that under these circumstances Italy should also have coal mines.

Thereupon, M. CLEMENCEAU became somewhat excited and stated very emphatically that he could not bargain away the rights of his people.

## II

MR. BALFOUR inquired if M. Tittoni had anything to say regarding the Adriatic.

M. TITTONI stated that the Italian Delegation had based their position on the proposition that there was a Treaty of London.<sup>1</sup> He also explained that the Italian Government had to consider Italian public opinion as regards this question.

MR. LANSING asked M. Tittoni whether he would abide by the strict terms of the Treaty of London if the others consented to do likewise.

M. TITTONI avoided a direct answer by himself asking questions.

MR. BALFOUR observed that M. Tittoni was not answering Mr. Lansing's question.

MR. LANSING stated that he had no objection to M. Tittoni using what might be called "Yankee Methods".

M. TITTONI then asked Mr. Lansing whether the United States would accept the Treaty of London if his question were answered in the affirmative.

MR. LANSING expressed his entire willingness to do so insofar as the terms of the Treaty of London were just. Mr. Lansing repeated his question to M. Tittoni.

M. TITTONI stated that he was forced to consider Italian public opinion. To which, MR. LANSING replied that if public opinion varied the faith of treaties, then there would be endless trouble. For his part he would not venture to say what public opinion in Great Britain and France would do in varying the Treaty of London.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that he knew well what French public opinion would do.

After some discussion it was proposed to abandon entirely the Treaty of London as a basis of negotiation, and it was agreed that M. Tittoni should approach the question as if no treaty existed and prepare a plan which would then be discussed in a very confidential way between those present.

---

<sup>1</sup> Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915.*



MR. BALFOUR remarked to Mr. Lansing that President Wilson had expressed his willingness to leave the determination of sovereignty over any point on the Adriatic to a plebiscite.

In reply MR. LANSING stated that if this rule were to be applied at all it would have to be made applicable to all the Italian line which might cause trouble in the Tyrol.

It was agreed that M. Tittoni would submit to those present his views in writing as stated above.

### III

M. TITTONI called attention to the fact that the Jugo-Slavs were holding certain Italians as prisoners in the Klagenfurt Region. He suggested that his colleagues should agree to take certain steps to secure the release of these Italians.

MR. LANSING asked M. Tittoni what Italians were doing in the Klagenfurt Basin.

M. CLEMENCEAU supported this question.

M. TITTONI explained that the railroad had been torn up by the Jugo-Slavs for some 30 miles and that the Italian troops had been sent in to repair it.

MR. LANSING observed that the Jugo-Slavs would not have torn up the railroad if the Italian troops had not advanced.

No decision was taken but it was tacitly understood that M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lansing and Mr. Balfour would ascertain whether they had received any information in the matter.

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers  
Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Satur-  
day, July 5, 1919, at 3 p. m.<sup>1</sup>**

**PRESENT**

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Hon. R. Lansing.

*Secretary.*

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M. M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

ITALY

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. de Martino.

JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino.

**ALSO PRESENT**

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. H. Hoover.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir William Goode.

ITALY

M. Crespi.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Lieut. Burden.

BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . Capt. Abraham.

FRANCE . . . . . Capt. A. Portier.

*Interpreter*—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Presence of  
Experts at  
Meetings of  
the Council

1. (At M. Clemenceau's request, it was agreed that experts should not be present at the Meetings of the Council but should only enter the room if specifically requested to do so by the Chairman.)

(During the following discussion, Mr. Hoover, Sir William Goode and M. Crespi were invited to remain.)

Situation  
in Hungary

2. M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Hoover to explain the economic position in Hungary.

Mr. HOOVER said that the problem was that of the economic re-habilitation of Central Europe. As matters stood, there was no hope of removing and distributing the Hungarian harvest unless the Danube and the railways across Hungary were re-opened for traffic. The ques-

<sup>1</sup> No copy of minutes of this meeting found in Department files; copy supplied by the British Foreign Office as enclosure to letter of December 30, 1943, to the American Chargé in Great Britain (026 Foreign Relations Peace Conference 1919/100).



tion, therefore, was not merely an internal Hungarian question. It was one of external economic relations. The action of the Hungarians had tied up the Danube and with it a large proportion of the river craft used on it. Further, the withdrawal of the German Armies from South-Eastern Europe had left behind it in Hungary a large quantity of rolling stock and river craft. In order, therefore to set the economic life of Central Europe going again, it was necessary to have control of these essential means of transport. The third aspect of the question was largely political. Bolshevik ideas were impregnating the working classes throughout the area. Unless some means could be devised of abating the infection, the economic regeneration of Central and South-Eastern Europe would be difficult. Bela Kun's<sup>2</sup> government was spending a great deal of money on sending Bolshevik missionaries to industrial centres outside Hungary. This re-acted on production. Moreover, the military power of the Hungarian Government was growing. A kind of nationalist passion was thereby put at the service of the revolutionary theories advocated by the Government. It was not likely that Bela Kun would abstain from spreading his theories outside the borders of Hungary by the help of this military force. The next probable victim after Czecho-Slovakia was Austria. The social and political aspects of the question, Mr. Hoover said, were not his province, but he would like to observe that Bela Kun's party until the last three weeks had not represented methods of violence. Latterly, however, executions had increased, which indicated that opposition was growing in the country and that the methods of red terror were being resorted to. Previously, it might have been possible to treat the Hungarian revolutionary party with indulgence. Now that it showed a tendency to overflow its frontiers, it must be considered as an economic danger to the rest of Europe.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Hoover what he thought of the Szegidin group.

MR. HOOVER replied that this group appeared to him to be composed of extreme re-actionaries without any notable intellectual capacity. For instance, their deliberations of late had been devoted to the question of the resumption of the right of duelling. He did not expect much help from that party. It appeared, however, that discontent with the Bela Kun Government was growing among the working classes. Information from British sources had been received to the effect that the Trade Unions would gladly see the Government upset. Communism would not appear to have penetrated very deeply into the population and the Government was becoming, like that in Russia, a tyranny of a minority. Another difficulty applying to any solution that might be suggested was the obvious duplicity of Bela Kun. In support of

---

<sup>2</sup> Head of the Bolshevik Regime in Hungary; People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

this, Mr. Hoover quoted the following messages interchanged between Lenin and Bela Kun :—

1. *Message sent by Lenin from Moscow to Bela Kun at Budapest of 19th June, 1919, (includes following) :*

“It is necessary to make the fullest possible use of every opportunity to obtain a temporary armistice or peace, in order to give the people a breathing space. But do not trust the Entente Powers for a moment. They are deceiving you, and are only attempting to gain time in order to be able to crush you and us. Try and organise postal communications with us by aeroplane.”

2. *Message sent on June 21st by Bela Kun (Budapest) to Lenin (Moscow) in reply to his telegram of June 19th :*

“I thank you very much for your telegram in which you approve of my foreign policy. I am very proud of being one of your best pupils but I think in one point I am superior to you, namely, in the question of ‘mala fides.’ I think I know the Entente very well. I know that they will fight us to the end. In this war, only a state of armistice can occur but never peace. This is an out and out fight. Once more I thank you for your note.”

The authenticity of these messages was supported by the fact that they had been revealed first by British sources and subsequently intercepted by Austrian wireless. Of the various solutions proposed in the memorandum he had submitted (Appendix A), no doubt the military occupation of Budapest would be the best. He believed it would be welcomed by the population, but it was no doubt beset with difficulties. The alternatives to this policy were a more or less mitigated recognition of the Bela Kun Government. The plan he had suggested was that the various Inter-Allied Commissions working in the neighbourhood should establish economic relations with the Hungarians. There need be no direct recognition by the Governments, but by this side entrance it might be possible to obtain the opening of the river and the setting in motion of the means of transport and thereby the distribution of necessary supplies. He admitted that this might possibly strengthen Bela Kun’s Government, but, on the other hand, Bela Kun was supporting himself in favour with the working class on the back of the blockade. All the hardships of the situation were attributed to the Blockade. By removing it, the Powers would deprive him of this argument and he might find it more difficult to plead his case. Whether this would neutralise the advantage of semi-recognition, he did not know.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what was being done to re-victual Hungary?

MR. HOOVER replied that nothing at all was being done. At the time when Bela Kun came to power, the Economic Council was about to re-victual Budapest, as the situation there was thought urgent. The Communist Government, however, had, on coming into power, made

a stringent search for all supplies and had, by careful re-distribution, managed to feed the population tolerably well. It appeared clear that they would reach the next harvest without starvation. Communism, therefore, had saved the Allied and Associated Powers considerable expenditure on food and supplies, as, since the establishment of the Communist Government nothing whatever had been sent to Hungary.

M. TITTONI said that the question of Hungary was one of the most difficult the Conference had to deal with. The Bela Kun Government was a serious threat to the neighbouring countries, including Italy. There had been two periods in this movement. In the first a peaceful revolution had been brought about. The effect of this stage had been the most dangerous. The Russian Revolution had been represented to the people of Europe as being accompanied by carnage and general destruction. The Hungarian revolution had been quiet. It was, therefore, more attractive and more dangerous. It appeared to many in other countries that the sequestration of private fortunes for re-distribution and the re-allotment of house room were excellent measures which might be imitated to advantage in their own countries. The second period, however, appeared to reproduce the methods of the Russians. Not only were there executions but methodical and systematic massacres had been instituted. It was very necessary therefore, to suppress the volcano. The means of doing it, however, were not clear. He admitted he had no suggestions to make. The blockade obviously was not a solution. If rigidly enforced, all non-Bolsheviks would starve and Bolsheviks would eat. If, on the other hand, food were imported into the country the Government would only grow stronger. He would welcome any feasible solution that might be proposed, but he had none to make himself. There was one point, however, to which he wished to draw special attention, and that was the reported seizure of all securities in Budapest by the Bela Kun Government. Should these securities amounting to 6 milliards of francs be exported and sold abroad, it would be useless to demand reparation from Hungary. There would be nothing left to take possession of. He thought it was imperative to put a stop to this.

MR. BALFOUR said that, in his extremely lucid statement, Mr. Hoover had approached a question of which he recognised the great complexity from the economic side alone. The economic problem was how to make transit by all means of communication through Hungary serve the purposes of equitable distribution of means of subsistence in South-Eastern Europe. This could not be brought about unless the situation in Hungary were radically changed. Neither Mr. Hoover nor M. Tittoni offered any plan for a complete alteration of that situation. He believed, therefore, that the case must be approached from the military side. A short time ago the Council of Four had sent orders to the



Hungarian, Czecho-Slovak and Roumanian Governments with the object of promoting Peace among them. These orders had only been half carried out. Many things had happened since. M. Bratiano, in a private conversation, had told him that the Roumanians could not and would not retire from the Theiss until the Hungarians had been disarmed. The Hungarians were withdrawing from Czecho-Slovakia and massing their troops in Hungary. Universal armament had been ordered. If the Roumanians, therefore, retired from the Theiss which they could defend, they did not know what lines they could hold, seeing their commitments on other frontiers. He thought there was force in the argument put forward by M. Bratiano. He had caused further enquiries to be made and had discovered that the Hungarians had not carried out their Armistice engagements. They had not reduced their troops to six divisions; in fact, they appeared to have doubled their forces.

He therefore suggested that the Military Authorities be requested, through their agents on the spot, to order the Hungarians to disarm in accordance with the stipulations of the armistice. This was not only the right of the Allied Powers but their duty. It should be made known in Hungary itself that until this had been done there could be no kind of negotiations with the Hungarian Government. Should it persist in breaking the terms of the armistice, military action should follow. We had some hope that the threat alone would overthrow Bela Kun's Government. Should it not, the Powers were bound to do to Hungary what they would have done to Germany had she broken the armistice. To carry this out it would be necessary to organise the Roumanian, Czecho-Slovak, Serbian and French troops at hand. When the Hungarians had been disarmed there would then be no excuse for the Roumanians not to retire after this, when Hungary had been put into her right place, negotiations could be undertaken either with Bela Kun or his successors. By this means the evil of giving credit to Bela Kun, which Mr. Hoover had shown was to be feared, would be avoided. At the present time Vienna was in danger and perhaps Roumania. This could be stopped by prompt military action, which would be justified by Hungary's flagrant breach of the armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would like to state his opinion, though he feared it would not be a very clear one. He had agreed thus far with all the speakers. The situation reminded him of the La Fontaine fable in which a gathering of rats decided to hang a bell round a cat's neck. All agreed this was desirable but no one knew how to do it. He thought that the situation had been accurately described by Mr. Hoover. He acquiesced in all M. Tittoni had said, and he thought Mr. Balfour had said excellent things. But how were the Powers to do what he proposed? France was demobilising and could not stop the process. At the end of October there would be but three classes with the Col-

ours; that was to say the Army would be on a peace footing. The French Chamber was resolutely opposed to intervention in Russia. He thought the Chamber was right, seeing the results hitherto obtained; a milliard or so was being thrown away on the expedition in Siberia. This was an absurd expense and could not continue. If Parliament, therefore, decline[s] to fight Bolshevism in Russia, it would equally refuse to fight it in Hungary. Mr. Balfour's argument that the Hungarians had accepted the armistice and had then broken it and therefore deserved coercion was a strong one, if indeed they had accepted it. But what troops did Mr. Balfour mean to use to coerce the Hungarians? He had mentioned Czechs, Roumanians and French.

MR. BALFOUR added and Serbs.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they would require money. He for one could not supply any. Moreover, Germany for the time being seemed ready to fulfil her engagements and to behave well. Should the Germans, however, see the Entente thoroughly embarrassed in Hungary this attitude might change. The march on Budapest had been thought of before. In particular the Italians seemed disposed to go there, and he heard that General Segro had gone to Rome to advocate the policy.

M. TITTONI said that the Italian Parliament was of the same mind as the French.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that no strong economic argument could be brought to bear on the Hungarians. Whether the blockade were raised or not, little effect could be produced on internal policy. The population could hold out. He had some doubts about the capacity of the Czechs to fight the Hungarians. The Roumanians might or might not be willing. At the present time they seemed considerably dissatisfied with the Peace Conference. There were no British or American troops available. French and Italian troops therefore seemed called upon to do the work. He must state clearly that for his part he could not undertake it. He had consulted Marshal Foch and General Franchet d'Esperey, who had often wished to march on Budapest. He had asked for plans, and had been supplied with a plan more ambitious than that of Napoleon's march on Moscow. French, British and Italian contingents were required. The fact was that both the peoples and the Parliaments of the Entente countries were anxious to settle the crisis more quickly than was really possible. After the vast upheaval of the war and the pulverization of military forces, and, on top of it, the universal inclination towards social revolution, it was hardly possible to produce order in a short time. The Conference had tried to establish justice in the world. This was not the first time that such an attempt had been made. All know what had resulted before. It was now clear to all who had taken part in the Conference how difficult it was to draw even frontiers equitably. His Italian colleague would doubtless agree with him. People like the Russians, who had been slaves

under a terrible despotism, had thought that liberty could be exercised without self-control. They had betrayed their Allies and caused them immense losses. The evil had spread. Italy, though an old and wise community, had been shaken up. Great Britain and France had had their troubles. There had been disaffection in the French Navy and even in the Army. The world was sick of fighting. The Conference had therefore to deal with revolutions in military power, alterations of frontiers, and social revolutions inspired by no ideas. It had been thought that the Russian people would recover. That was a mistake; owing to the vastness of the Russian territory somehow the Russian people had survived its own disasters, but all intervention to assist them to establish a reasonable Government had been in vain. Now the evil had attacked Hungary, which had not been anticipated, as it was a country of peasants and relatively rich. The policy he had to offer was not one of which he was proud. It was simply this—to hold the issues and to wait. He said this after taking into consideration the feelings of the Entente Peoples, and of their Parliaments. All were in a hurry to cease fighting, and to resume normal life. They were probably wrong, but that feeling could not be gainsaid. This was not a noble policy, and might be said to look like impotence. He would not deny it. But, after losing hundreds of thousands of lives and spending the national treasure, he thought no other policy was possible. As to Hungary, he knew the country a little. Before the war the people had been the slaves of Germany, merely because they thought that Germany was the strongest power, but there was more common-sense there than in Russia. He had been struck in Mr. Hoover's statement by the fact that the trades unions were sick of the Communist Government. He would therefore follow Mr. Balfour's policy so far as to threaten Hungary with intervention should they not observe the armistice. Then he would consult the military experts. If military action had to be undertaken, all would have to help, and much money would have to be spent. In the meantime, however, he hoped that Providence might furnish some means of escape. It was not his nature to temporise, but in this case he would. Hungary could be surrounded by a "cordon sanitaire"; Communism would not last long in that country. If the Generals recommended a plan similar to that shown him some months ago by Marshal Foch he felt sure that no Government would undertake the task of coercing Hungary. It was not a showy policy that he recommended, but it was the best he could offer.

MR. LANSING observed that there was one question of urgent necessity, namely, that of making peace with Hungary. To do this it was necessary to have someone there to make peace with. Did the Council propose to make peace with Bela Kun? If not, with whom? If it could not be made with Bela Kun, pressure must be brought to bear on him to go. The only means of doing this appear to be military means.



(At this point General Bliss, General Sackville-West, General Thwaites, General Belin and General Cavallero entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU asked General Bliss to show what forces and what methods he thought would be necessary to compel Bela Kun's Government to respect the armistice if other means failed, and what hope of success he entertained.

GENERAL BLISS said that some six weeks ago, at the request of the Council of Four, the Military Representatives at Versailles had made a report on the means that might be taken to prevent a Hungarian attack on Czecho-Slovakia. The report had been to the effect that if military measures had to be resorted to, the troops used must be those on the spot, namely, Roumanian, Serbian and French troops. It was then believed that the troops available locally would be sufficient. This was the opinion of the French General Staff. Since then, however, Bela Kun's troops had increased from 150,000 to 220,000 armed men. The situation had also changed in other respects, and he was unable to say whether the troops then considered sufficient would be sufficient now. There had been an inconclusive discussion in the Council of Four on the report. Since that date he knew nothing of what had been decided. If the plan then recommended had been thought workable, it should have been submitted to General Franchet d'Esperey. This, as far as he knew, had not been done. Moreover, he could not say whether the Roumanians and Serbians would act. As far as he was concerned, he thought the question required study at Marseilles [*Versailles?*], in order that he might exchange views with his colleagues on the new situation.

GENERAL CAVALLERO agreed with General Bliss that a new study of the subject was necessary. The action now required was not quite the same as that contemplated previously, and in the meantime the Hungarian army had increased.

GENERAL BELIN said that all the Military Representatives had agreed that a demonstration of force would have been sufficient when they were previously consulted. He still believed that a demonstration by the forces locally available would be enough to overthrow the Bela Kun Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not wish the Military Advisers to restrict their recommendations to the employment of forces at present on the spot. If more were required, he expected them to say so.

GENERAL SACKVILLE-WEST said that he was in accord with his Military colleagues. He would like to re-consider the question.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how soon a report could be obtained.

GENERAL BLISS said that if all the information required were available, the report could be made within 48 hours.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether, in view of the flagrant breach of the armistice by Bela Kun's Government, it would not be well to warn him at once that he must observe the armistice. He would be ready,

however, if his colleagues preferred it, to wait 48 hours until the report of the Military Representatives had been received.

(It was agreed that the report be awaited.)

GENERAL BLISS pointed out that it would be necessary to consult the Commander-in-Chief on the spot.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it would be sufficient to consult Marshal Foch, who had all the necessary information from General Franchet d'Esperey.

MR. LANSING asked that the Military Representatives add to their report a brief account of the armament at the disposal of the Hungarian Army, and of their means of replenishing this armament. In particular, he would like to know whether it was made within the country or imported from without.

(The following resolution was then adopted:—

“It was decided that the Military Representatives at Versailles in consultation with Marshal Foch, should examine the military possibilities of enforcing on Hungary respect for the Armistice conditions accepted, and make a report to the Council in 48 hours. The Military Representatives were also asked to report on the means of munitionment at the disposal of the Hungarian Government.”)

(The Military Experts then withdrew.)

M. TITTONI then suggested that the Allies take steps to forbid the exportation of all the securities seized by the Bela Kun Government, as the disposal of these securities abroad would render nugatory any claim for reparation on Hungary.

(The following resolution was then adopted:—

“That the Financial Commission be asked to submit at a very early date to the Council, a proposal for preventing the sale abroad of securities seized by order of the Bela Kun Government in Hungary.”)

High Com-  
missioner for  
Armenia

3. At MR. LANSING's proposal (See Annexure “B”),  
the following resolution was adopted:—

“Colonel W. N. Haskell, U. S. A., is appointed by this Council to act as High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the United States, British, French and Italian Governments, it being understood that Colonel Haskell will be coincidentally appointed to take full charge of all relief measures in Armenia by the various relief organisations operating there. All representatives of the United States, British, French, and Italian Governments in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Constantinople are to be at once instructed to co-operate with and give support to Colonel Haskell.”

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, July 5, 1919.

## Annexure "A" to IC-201A

SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF RELIEF

No. 335

PARIS, 1 July, 1919.

HON. ROBERT LANSING, *Secretary of State,*  
*Hotel de Crillon, Paris.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: At the meeting of the Supreme Economic Council yesterday I was requested to lay before the Council of the Heads of States the pressing economic situation in South Eastern Europe which arises out of the political situation in Hungary. Due to the special geographical and economic position of the territory now held by Bela Kun's Government, the whole economic destiny of the surrounding States is almost absolutely in his hands, and it is therefore impossible to re-establish economic life or public order until this situation is dealt with.

With the coming arrival of peace in the surrounding States and of the harvest, it is critical that some solution should be found at once or there can be no economic rehabilitation upon which peace can be maintained. Furthermore, unless the various international traffics can be established across Hungary, it is hopeless to expect the surrounding territories to provide themselves with food or employ their people, thus necessitating continued charitable relief and outside financial support. I have had the advantage of conferences with not only the American representatives throughout the old Austrian Empire, the visit of Colonel Logan, who is the Chief of our Staff to that Territory, but with conferences with the Allied officials who are on the many economic missions which were maintained in this area. I have asked Colonel Logan to formulate a memorandum as to the facts as believed by these representatives with regard to Bela Kun, and to also formulate some suggestions made by the American representatives on the Danube River Commission as a possible solution. These memoranda are forwarded herewith.<sup>3</sup>

There appears to me to be four alternative courses open:

First. A military occupation of Budapest under the control of the principal Allies and the expulsion of Bela Kun's Government. If this course were adopted it should be done with a declaration that a freely elected National Assembly would be called at once to erect a government and to sign peace.

Second. To continue refusal to recognise Bela Kun's Government, but to open economic negotiations through the informal commissions, preferably the Danube River Commission and possibly also the Rail-

---

<sup>3</sup>Memoranda not attached.



ways Mission, which we have installed in the old Austrian Empire, and as a result of so doing to abandon the blockade, but not formally to recognise the Bela Kun Government.

Third. To undertake a middle course, such as outlined in the attached memorandum, of opening the country by economic agreement with Bela Kun and at the same time policing it with troops under Allied direction to see that order was maintained and agreements carried out.

Fourth. To present the peace terms to Bela Kun, thus recognising fully and trusting him not to disturb the world outside of Hungary.

Some definite policy is critically necessary if the disorganisation of German-Austria is to be prevented, and if the economic collapse of the surrounding States is to be prevented.

Faithfully yours,

HERBERT HOOVER

---

Annexure "B" to IC-201A

W. C. P. 1094

*Copy of Letter From Sir M. Hankey to the Secretary-General,  
Peace Conference*

APPOINTMENT OF A RESIDENT COMMISSIONER IN ARMENIA

BRITISH DELEGATION,  
PARIS, 28 June, 1919.

MY DEAR COLLEAGUE: The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to-day had before them the attached letter from Mr. Hoover to President Wilson suggesting the appointment of a single temporary resident Commissioner to Armenia, who should have the full authority of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy in all their relations to the *de facto* Armenian Government as the joint representative of these Governments in Armenia.

Mr. Hoover's proposal was accepted and this afternoon it was agreed that the Council of Ten should be asked to concert the necessary arrangements to give effect to this decision.

I am directed to request that Your Excellency will lay the matter before the Council of Ten.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

M. P. A. HANKEY

His Excellency, MONSIEUR DUTASTA

## [Annex]

SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL  
PARIS, 27 June, 1919.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In accordance with your discussion with Mr. Morgenthau<sup>4</sup> and the several discussions with myself in connection with Armenia, we make the following joint recommendation to be brought to the attention of the Chiefs of States before your departure.

1. We suggest that a single temporary resident Commissioner should be appointed to Armenia, who will have the full authority of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy in all their relations to the *de facto* Armenian Government, as the joint representative of these Governments in Armenia. His duties shall be so far as he may consider necessary to supervise and advise upon various governmental matters in the whole of Russian and Turkish Armenia, and to control relief and repatriation questions pending the determination of the political destiny of this area.

2. In case the various Governments should agree to this plan, immediate notification should be made to the *de facto* Governments of Turkey and of Armenia of his appointment and authority. Furthermore, he will be appointed to represent the American Relief Administration and the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, and take entire charge of all their activities in Russian and Turkish Armenia.

The ideal man for this position would be General Harbord, as I assume under all the circumstances it would probably be desirable to appoint an American. Should General Harbord be unable to undertake the matter, I am wondering whether you would leave it to us to select the man in conjunction with General Pershing.

I assume that the personnel of this Mission would be necessarily comprised of army and navy officers who would retain their rank and emoluments and I understand from the Commission for the Near East that they would be prepared to supply such funds as were required for incidental expenses until such other arrangements could be made.

Faithfully yours,

HERBERT HOOVER

His Excellency, THE PRESIDENT,  
11 Place des Etats-Unis,  
Paris.

---

<sup>4</sup> Henry Morgenthau, American Ambassador to Turkey, 1913-16.

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, July 7, 1919, at 3: 30 p.m.**

**PRESENT**

AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF

Hon. R. Lansing.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

ITALY

M. Tittoni.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

*Secretaries*

Mr. L. Harrison.  
Mr. H. Norman.  
M. Paterno.  
M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Lieut. Burden.  
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . Capt. E. Abraham.  
FRANCE . . . . . Capt. A. Portier.  
ITALY . . . . . Lieut. Zanchi.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that before beginning the subjects on the Agenda he had a statement to make on what was going on in Italy. He did not wish to make difficulties worse, but the situation was such that it was to be feared that massacres might occur. He had received dispatches, which he could show his colleagues, regarding the position at Fiume. Disturbances had taken place there, caused it was alleged by the misconduct of a French soldier. This was the Italian account and he would not dispute it. It might be true, and in any case similar things had happened elsewhere without leading to any serious consequences. There had followed in the Italian press a virulent attack on France and on Great Britain, but especially on France, and it could readily be believed that it was inspired by German influence. The French Ambassador had made a protest to M. Nitti.<sup>1</sup> M. Nitti had declared that he could not control the press. It was surprising that M. Nitti could not control the Italian

Situation  
in Italy

<sup>1</sup> Francesco S. Nitti, President of the Council and Minister of Interior of Italy from June 23, 1919.



press, seeing the power he had over the press outside his own country. At Fiume things had gone from bad to worse, and there was a movement tending to the expulsion of French and British troops. When the Allied Council had addressed a memorandum to M. Tittoni,<sup>2</sup> President Wilson had wanted to ask the Italian Government to evacuate Fiume. He had begged President Wilson not to insist on this, as it appeared to him that all the Allies had an equal right to maintain troops there. As there were French and British troops in Fiume, it was only fair that Italian troops should be there, provided they remained as representatives of the Alliance. He recalled he said this in order to show that he was not anti-Italian. The latest news from Fiume was that the condition there was going from bad to worse. French fatigue parties passing through the streets had been attacked with grenades and revolvers. Attacks had been made on British troops, but not so openly. Isolated men had been maltreated. The Italian general said he could not put a stop to these disturbances as long as French and British troops remained in the town. This was not all. At Genoa French soldiers had been knifed, and similar things had happened in other Italian towns. French consuls at Milan and elsewhere had sent him newspaper cuttings threatening a renewal of the Sicilian Vespers.<sup>3</sup> In addition to this there was evidence of Government action. Supply trains for Poland and Czecho-Slovakia were being detrained [*detained?*] at Modane on some futile pretext of paying customs dues. These supplies were urgently required and it was obvious that they were stopped by Government action. Further, the French Consul at Rhodes reported that, at the very time when the Peace Conference was asking M. Tittoni to withdraw Italian troops from Southern Asia Minor, 3,300 men had been sent two days ago to occupy a further point in Asia Minor. The French Ambassador in Rome, who had been most violently attacked had been told by General Albricci that these attacks would cease if better news came from Paris. This was an attempt to bring pressure on the Peace Conference. Against this attempt he now made the strongest protest. He would not deliberate under threats and he would not tolerate pressure of this kind. From an official person specially qualified, whose name he did not wish to give, but would if necessary, he learnt that Admiral Thaon di Revel<sup>4</sup> had put a stop to mine-sweeping, and had ordered that new mines be kept in readiness in case of war with France. He was

---

<sup>2</sup> See CF-96B and CF-99A, vol. VI, pp. 738 and 759.

<sup>3</sup> The great massacre of the French in Sicily by the natives in 1282, which began at Palermo on Easter Monday, at the hour of vespers. It was in revenge for the cruelties of the French under Charles of Anjou and resulted in the expulsion of the king from Sicily, and the introduction of Aragonese rule.

<sup>4</sup> Commander in chief of the Italian naval forces.

prepared to show this information, if they wished it, to Mr. Balfour and to Mr. Lansing. It was further hinted that this news should not be taken too seriously, but that it might be allowed to leak out in order to influence the Conference. He had hitherto resisted two things. First, abominable attacks by the Italian Press, and secondly, the temptation to make a reply to attacks in the French Press which was being manoeuvred on behalf of Italy against the French Government. He could, by making a public statement put a stop to all this but he had restrained himself in order not to make things worse. If these things did not cease however, he would be forced to answer. This would produce a disastrous diplomatic situation which he wished to avoid. It was for this reason that he addressed M. Tittoni in the Council. He wished to know what was at the bottom of all this. Why, when the Council was deliberating about Asia Minor, were fresh Italian troops sent there? Why was there no official protest by the Italian Government against the virulent Press campaign conducted against Fiume? He did not suggest the Italian Government should apply the censorship; but it could make a statement in refutation of what was alleged. In any case he would not be influenced by pressure. If he had to make a choice, he would [not?] allow French soldiers to be murdered in Fiume. He had ordered back French troops from Italy where they had once been welcome in times of stress, but were now no longer well received. Nothing, however, would stop him from keeping French troops in Fiume where they had a right to be.

M. TITTONI said that he thought the Fiume incidents most deplorable. He was deeply concerned at the outbreak of dissensions among troops which had bled in the same cause. He also had received dispatches which he would not quote as they might give explanations of the origin of the outbreak not altogether in accord with those mentioned by M. Clemenceau. He thought there should be an enquiry into the incidents and suitable punishment for those responsible. At all costs friendship must be restored between the Allies. He suggested that an Inter-Allied Commission be appointed to enquire into the events at Fiume and that its findings should be awaited before any decision was taken.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the Commission would also enquire into what had taken place at Genoa.

M. TITTONI said that his proposal was confined to Fiume. The Italian Government had shown its anxiety to put matters right by sending General Caneva immediately to make an enquiry. General Caneva was an army commander, a senator and a man of judicial temper. He would certainly do his very best.

M. CLEMENCEAU interposed that no complaint was made against General Grazioli in person.<sup>5</sup>

M. TITTONI continuing said that as regards the events in Genoa an enquiry was taking place. He would inform the French Government of the result as soon as possible. Irresponsible acts should not be allowed to compromise the good relations of the Governments. It was essential that the Governments should remain closely united.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French Consul at Milan reported danger of massacres.

M. TITTONI said that he was going there on the following day. This showed the importance he attached to the subject. During his absence M. Crespi<sup>6</sup> would take his place. But he would beg the Council to await his return before dealing with questions specially concerning Italy. M. Clemenceau had spoken of threats aimed at the Conference. He felt bound to deny matters formally that there was any ground for such a belief. It would be puerile on the part of the Italian Government to attempt to coerce the Conference. Italy was represented by himself at the Conference and he trusted that the spirit of friendship and conciliation shown by him would be recognised. As to the statements attributed to General Albricci and to Admiral Thaon di Revel, he felt certain that whatever they might have said had been greatly distorted. He could, if necessary, ask these officers for explanations, but he was bound to say that he could not believe what was attributed to them. As to the Italian Press, it was certainly true that M. Nitti could not muzzle it. The same papers that attacked France were also conducting a most violent attack on him. Party feeling in Italy was very strong and the violence of expression in the Italian Press at the present time had never been equalled. As to the alleged influencing of the French Press, he felt bound to deny that anything of the sort was going on. Since joining the Delegation he had seen all that took place and could find no evidence to that effect. He was ready, however, to do anything that might satisfy M. Clemenceau. He would also point out that the censorship had just been abolished in Italy. As regards Asia Minor he was not aware of the events alleged. To make sure that no misunderstanding took place he had summoned General Bongiovanni<sup>7</sup> to Paris in order to give him his instructions personally. These instructions would be entirely in accordance with the confidential interview he had had with his colleagues a few days ago. As to the transit of supply trains to Serbia he was informed that certain customs dues were legitimately required. These dues Serbia promised

---

<sup>5</sup> Gen. Francesco Grazioli, commander of Italian forces at Fiume.

<sup>6</sup> Silvio Crespi, Italian plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference from June 23, 1919.

<sup>7</sup> Gen. Luigi Bongiovanni, commander of the Italian forces in Asia Minor.



to pay but her present attitude made it reasonable to doubt whether she would pay. Not only food was being shipped, but arms and munitions as well. There was a report that the Serbians had asked the Czecho-Slovaks to join them in an attack upon Italy. He would at a later date give fuller information in writing on this subject to his colleagues.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had no wish to continue the debate and that M. Tittoni's proposal for an Inter-Allied Enquiry at Fiume gave him satisfaction for the moment, provided it be made at once.

MR. LANSING said that he agreed. He thought it would be necessary to select a military man and he would like to consult General Bliss. He thought it would be better to select an officer from Headquarters rather than one serving on the spot.

MR. BALFOUR said that he also was in favour of a Commission to enquire into the events at Fiume. It was the first duty of the Council to prevent the development of these unfortunate incidents into matters of international concern. He thought the method suggested by M. Tittoni a good one. He could not immediately nominate an officer and he was inclined to agree with Mr. Lansing that the best selection would be an officer not serving in Italy nor in the Adriatic. He would have to consult his military advisors. He felt it was scarcely necessary to say that he entirely agreed with his colleagues regarding the folly and wickedness of attempting to influence the decisions of the Conference by pressure from without. The effect would be exactly the reverse of that desired by anyone employing such methods.

MR. LANSING said that he had a suggestion to make regarding the work of the Commission. It should not only make an enquiry, in order to determine the immediate responsibilities for what had occurred, but should also make recommendations regarding what should be done in the future. He could see no reason himself why the forces maintained by the Allies in Fiume should not be reduced to equal contingents of police.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that each of the Delegations should designate their officers on the following day and give them their instructions.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was not sure he could arrange to have the officer present on the following day.

MR. LANSING expressed the same opinion.

M. TITTONI said that he agreed to the extension of the duties of the Commission suggested by Mr. Lansing, but he would stipulate that no suggestions be made to the Commissioners and that they be left to propose their own solutions.



M. CLEMENCEAU said that, to speak plainly, it could not be tolerated that Fiume should continue to be governed in the name of the King of Italy.

M. TITTONI said that this was not done by the Italian Authorities but by the local municipality.

(It was decided that an Inter-Allied Commission of military officers should be appointed to make an enquiry into the incidents at Fiume and to recommend means of improving the situation for the future.

It was agreed that the American, British, French and Italian Delegations should nominate their respective commissioners on the following day and that these should receive collective instructions from the Council.)

The Members of the Drafting Committee entered the room.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Fromageot<sup>8</sup> to tell the Council in what state the Austrian Treaty was.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the Treaty was ready, its articles and its pages numbered. It only required a last revision which could be completed by the following evening.

Date and Manner  
of Handing the  
Conditions of  
Peace to the Aus-  
trian Delegation

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the question of frontiers was solved.

M. FROMAGEOT said that all that had been sent to the Drafting Committee had been put into shape.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the Council wished to know what was missing.

M. FROMAGEOT replied that he was unable to answer this as he was not aware of the intentions of the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had hoped M. Fromageot would be able to tell him what the Council had omitted.

M. FROMAGEOT said that Article 27 of the Treaty provided a frontier entirely surrounding Austria. On some points it was stipulated that the exact line should be fixed at a later time. The Drafting Committee at one time had been told that they would have to insert the frontiers of the neighbouring States. Later the Committee had been told to insert a clause requiring Austria to recognise such frontiers as might be laid down thereafter.

MR. LANSING said he wished to know whether the Treaty in its present form was final.

M. FROMAGEOT said he was unable to answer this question.

MR. BALFOUR said that after examining Article 27 he observed that the old frontier between Austria and Hungary was maintained. He understood that the question of altering this frontier had been referred to a Commission. This Commission had not yet reported, and its conclusions therefore had not been accepted by the Council.

<sup>8</sup> Henri Fromageot, of France, president of the Drafting Committee.

MR. LANSING said that certain portions of the Treaty had been handed to the Austrians. There remained other portions—Financial, Economic and the Reparation Clauses which had not been handed to them. He wished to know whether these were completed. If so, he suggested that these portions be sent to the Austrian Delegation.

M. FROMAGEOT argued that for ease of reference it would be better to present the whole Treaty to the Austrians at one time with all the articles in due series.

(After some further discussion it was decided that the Commissions considering the boundaries of Austria should report to the Council on the 9th July, 1919.)

3. M. FROMAGEOT pointed out that in all other cases of new frontiers a stipulation had been introduced appointing Boundary Commissions to establish the exact line on the ground. Only in the case of the frontier between Austria and Italy was there no such provision.

Boundary Com-  
mission for  
Frontier Between  
Austria and Italy

M. TITTONI said that if the Article were left in its present state the inference would be that the line must be settled between the Italians and the Austrians. He further asked how many members were appointed to the other Boundary Commissions mentioned. He would prefer a small Commission. For instance, one of three, with one Italian, one Austrian and one other member.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the numbers varied. They were either 7, 5, or 3. There were 3 for Dantzic and 5 for the Saar Valley.

(After some further discussion it was decided to insert in the Treaty of Peace with Austria a provision to establish a Boundary Commission of 5 members to draw the frontier between Austria and Italy.)

4. The Council had before it the following document:—

“The French Delegation have informed the Commission on Baltic Affairs of a telegram from the French High Commissioner in Siberia, from which it appears that Admiral Koltchak’s<sup>9</sup> Government have asked the Allied Governments to support at Helsingfors the request which they have addressed to General Mannerheim<sup>10</sup> to commence operations against Petrograd as soon as possible.

Participation of  
Finnish Troops  
in Advance on  
Petrograd

The Commission do not consider that they can recommend the Allied Governments to take the responsibility of involving the Finns in warlike operations whose chances of success it is difficult for them to judge at a distance. They feel, however, that the Finnish Government have been stopped several times in their desire to take action against

<sup>9</sup> Admiral Alexander Vasilevich Kolchak, on November 18, 1918, at Omsk, proclaimed Supreme Governor of Russia.

<sup>10</sup> Gen. Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, Regent of Finland from December 12, 1918.

the Bolsheviks of Petrograd by the fact that they do not know how any initiative of this kind would be viewed by the Allied Governments.

The Commission therefore think they can recommend the following suggestion to the Council of Ten:

A joint telegram should be addressed to the British, United States, Italian and French *Chargés d'Affaires* at Helsingfors requesting them to inform General Mannerheim's Government that in case they felt able to grant the request to act made to them by Admiral Koltchak, the Allied Governments, without bringing any pressure on the Finnish Government, would have no objection to that operation."

(It was agreed that a joint telegram to the above effect be drafted in the name of the Council by M. Pichon).

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that as President of the Peace Conference he had received from the Norwegian Minister in Paris a request for a hearing regarding certain Norwegian claims relating:—

Norwegian  
Claims:  
(a) Spitzbergen

- (a) to Spitzbergen
- (b) to the Northern frontier between Norway and Finland.
- (c) to reparation for Norwegian shipping sunk by the Germans during the war.

MR. LANSING said that he would prefer to entrust the Spitzbergen question to a Sub-Commission rather than to refer it to the Baltic Commission. He recalled that in 1914 there had been a Commission in Christiania on this subject,<sup>10a</sup> whose labours had been interrupted by the outbreak of war. The matter was a complicated one, both from the political and from the economic aspect. The American representative at the Christiania Conference was happily now in Paris.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he accepted Mr. Lansing's proposal.

M. TITTONI said that he was informed that there were extensive coal deposits in Spitzbergen. He asked that the coal situation in Italy be taken into consideration in any decision taken regarding these coal deposits. The future of Italy in respect to coal was very unpromising. Since the acquisition of the Saar Valley coal-field by France, France could obtain coal at 50 francs or 60 francs a ton. Coal in Italy cost 250 francs a ton. The prospect for Italian industries dependent on coal fuel was therefore hopeless unless this situation could be remedied.

(It was agreed to appoint a Sub-Commission consisting of one representative each of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy to consider the claims of various Powers in Spitzbergen, and to make a report to the Council.

M. Pichon was asked to invite all the neutral Powers interested to present their views to the Commission.)

<sup>10a</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1914, pp. 974 ff.



(It was agreed that it would be difficult for the Peace Conference

(b) Frontier  
Between Norway  
& Finland

to intervene in a frontier question between two neutral States, and no decision for the time being was taken on this subject.)

(c) Norwegian  
Claim for Repa-  
ration Against  
Germany

(It was decided to refer the Norwegian claims against Germany for damage to Norwegian shipping at sea to the Reparation Commission.)

6. M. MANTOUX read the proposed reply. (Annexure A.)

M. BALFOUR thought that a somewhat over eager invitation was extended to Austria to come into the League.

Reply to Aus-  
trian Note on  
League of  
Nations

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would consent to any alteration in wording Mr. Balfour would care to make.

MR. LANSING expressed the view that it was perhaps desirable to encourage the Austrians, both by reason of the threat of Bolshevist Hungary at their very doors, and also in order to dispel their tendency to join Germany.

MR. BALFOUR said that if soft words were likely to give the Austrians encouragement, which might be true, he would withdraw his criticism.

(The draft reply proposed by the Sub-Committee of the Commission on the League of Nations was approved.)

7. M. TITTONI expressed the view that commercial censorship was

Removal of  
Commercial Cen-  
sorship at the  
Same Time as  
Blockade on  
Germany

part and parcel of the blockade. It must, therefore, logically cease at the same time. It might be maintained by an arbitrary act, but could not be maintained legally.

(It was agreed that the commercial censorship as being part of the measures constituting a blockade on Germany should be abolished at the same time as the blockade.)

Request of  
Jugo-Slav Dele-  
gation for Aus-  
trian Notes  
Concerning  
Jugo-Slavia

8. (It was agreed that the Jugo-Slav Delegation should receive copies of the Austrian Notes and counter proposals concerning Jugo-Slavia.)

9. MR. LANSING said that he had a proposal to make regarding the repatriation of certain Armenians, in order that they should be able to sow the next crop. (See Annexure B.)

Repatriation of  
Certain  
Armenians

MR. BALFOUR said that so far as he remembered, on the previous day a Commissioner had been appointed

for Armenia.<sup>11</sup>

MR. LANSING observed that what was now proposed was different. It was necessary to bring exiled Armenian agriculturalists back to the country, and to dispossess the Turkish usurpers of their land.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante.* p. 28.



His proposal was that General Milne<sup>12</sup> be consulted as to the possibility of doing this.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would certainly agree to consulting General Milne as to the possibility of repatriating a certain number of Armenian refugees. He did not think, however, that he could accept the responsibility laid down in the second sentence of the proposal, namely, that their protection should devolve upon the British forces.

MR. LANSING said that all he wished was that General Milne should report as to this also.

MR. BALFOUR said he would agree if a slight modification of the text were made.

(It was then agreed that the British Government should consult General Milne as to the possibility of repatriating immediately a certain number of Armenian refugees, and as to the possibility of ensuring their protection by British forces until Armenia received a mandatory. In the meantime their food would be supplied as at present by the American Relief Organisation.)

10. MR. BALFOUR said that he would like to draw attention to a matter which had not been put on the Agenda. General Gough<sup>13</sup>

represented the Allies in the Baltic Provinces. Orders had been given for the Germans to withdraw from the Baltic Provinces; this order they were carrying out but imperfectly. For instance they had been ordered to withdraw from Riga. They had removed five miles outside Riga and there halted. General Gough complained that he could only get into touch with the Germans by circuitous methods. He could not hasten the process of German evacuation very much. He asked whether he could be given authority to treat direct with the German Command on this matter.

MR. LANSING said that he agreed in principle, but would like before giving an answer to consult his military advisers.

(It was agreed that this question be put on the Agenda for the next meeting.)

11. (It was decided that the proceedings of the Council be recorded by the Joint Secretariat, and that the procès-verbaux be distributed on the same scale as those of the Council of Heads of States.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, July 7, 1919.

<sup>12</sup> Gen. Sir George Francis Milne, commander of the British forces in the Near East.

<sup>13</sup> Lt. Gen. Sir Hubert Gough, of the British Army, chief of the Inter-Allied Mission to the Baltic States.

Question of  
Direct Relations  
Between General  
Gough and the  
Germans

Record of Pro-  
ceedings of  
Council and  
Distribution  
of Minutes

## Annexure "A" to HD-1

WCP-1089A

COMMISSION ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS  
SUB-COMMITTEE*Draft Reply to the Austrian Note Concerning the League of Nations*

1. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers note with satisfaction the adherence of the Austrian Delegation to the project of a League of Nations, and to the principles upon which such a League of Nations has been founded by the Covenant embodied in the Conditions of Peace. They are glad to know that the Austrian Government share their view that the establishment of such a League will conduce to the maintenance of peace in those parts of the world which hitherto have been centres of international friction and misunderstanding.

2. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers have taken into careful consideration the demand of the Austrian Delegation for the admission of their country as an original Member of the League of Nations. It has never been their intention to exclude Austria for any long period from the League; on the contrary, they wish to reiterate that it is their hope and conviction that the League will at the earliest possible date include all nations that can be trusted to carry out the obligations accepted by Members of the League. They must point out, however, that in urging the claim of Austria to Membership of the League as immediately necessary to the safety of their territory, the Austrian Delegation have used some arguments which appear to indicate that they have not fully appreciated the provisions of the Covenant. But they recognise nevertheless the strength of the claim put forward by the Austrian Delegation. They fully appreciate the evidence which, by the attitude which she has hitherto observed, Austria has given of her good intentions. They see no reason why she should not apply for admission to the League, in accordance with the provisions of Article I of the Covenant, at the earliest opportunity that may present itself after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace. As soon as they are assured that Austria possesses a responsible Government and that this Government has both the will and the power to fulfil its international obligations, they are prepared to support Austria's candidature for admission to the League.

3. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers have carefully studied the interesting proposals with regard to the settlement of international disputes and the details of the organisation of a Permanent Court of International Justice put forward by Dr. Lam-

masch<sup>15</sup> in Annexes A and B to the Austrian Note. They are impressed with the value of some of Dr. Lammasch's suggestions; but while they consider the immediate establishment of a Permanent Court to be of the highest importance, they have not thought it possible or expedient to embody in the Covenant itself the detailed provisions required for its constitution. They will submit Annexes A and B of the Austrian Note for the consideration of the Council of the League when it undertakes the preparation of a plan for the establishment of a Permanent Court in accordance with Article 14 of the Covenant.

4. Furthermore, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are not of opinion that an addition to the Covenant of the sort proposed in Annex C regarding Article XXIII (*e*) is at the present time necessary or possible. They would point out that Article XXIII stipulates that "freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League" shall be secured "*subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon*". They feel confident that when the Members of the League proceed to formulate the General International Convention foreseen in this Article, the proposals of the Austrian Delegation contained in Annex C will receive due consideration.

PARIS, 4 July, 1919.

---

Annexure "B" to HD-1

5 JULY, 1919.

To: The Commissioners.

From: W. H. Buckler.<sup>16</sup>

1. The question of Armenian Relief is now being dealt with as follows:

(a) Colonel William N. Haskell<sup>17</sup> is to be the local Commissioner in charge of food distribution and relief;

(b) General Harbord<sup>18</sup> is to proceed to Armenia to report on repatriation and general military and economic problems.

2. A further question is the feasibility of repatriating a certain number of refugees before September 1, so that they may sow their fields. This might possibly be accomplished through British officers on the spot, and the repatriation of even a few thousand men

---

<sup>15</sup> Dr. Heinrich Lammasch, Austrian jurist; Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister, October 28 to November 13, 1918.

<sup>16</sup> Specialist on Asia Minor and the Caucasus in Russian Division of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

<sup>17</sup> Member of the American Relief Administration.

<sup>18</sup> Gen. James G. Harbord, Chief of Staff, American Expeditionary Forces.

would materially reduce starvation next year. There will be no time for General Harbord to arrange for this before the winter begins.

Having consulted Mr. Vansittart of the British Delegation, I therefore recommend:

That the British authorities be requested to consult General Milne as to the possibility of immediately repatriating a certain number of Armenian refugees. Their protection, until Armenia receives a mandatory, would devolve upon the British forces, while their food would be supplied, as at present, by the American Relief Organisation.



Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, July 8, 1919, at 3: 30 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. R. Lansing.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	M. Clemenceau.
ITALY	JAPAN	
M. Crespi.	M. Matsui.	

Secretaries

Mr. L. Harrison.  
Mr. H. Norman.  
M. Paterno.  
M. Ashida.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Lieut. Burden.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lieut. Zanchi.

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had bad news to give to the Council. He had a report of a still graver incident in Fiume. Nine French soldiers had been killed. The day before, General Grazioli had requested the French General to withdraw from the city with his troops. The same request was apparently made to the Serbians. What the Serbians replied, he did not know. The French General refused. It was on the morrow of this that the mob, encouraged by an Italian officer, had attacked a small French post. Sailors from the Fleet had come ashore to join in the assault and warships in the Harbour had fired on the post. This had led to the death of nine men.

Situation  
in Italy

MR. LANSING said that he had had a report on the previous afternoon, which he had communicated to M. Tittoni, to the effect that a French post of Annamite troops had been attacked by the mob. Then forces had been landed from Italian ships and the Barracks of the Annamites had been surrounded. It was at this stage that some of the latter had been killed. The report quoted a British observer who had seen three Annamites stabbed to death while holding up their

hands in token of surrender. In addition to this, a French packet boat had been fired on by Italian volunteers.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this was more than could be endured. No one in France would submit to treatment of this sort. Therefore, his first act was to ask his colleagues what should be done. He assumed that they were ready to defend the rights of France as he was ready to defend theirs. The Italian Government had installed in Fiume a gang of men, known as volunteers, who controlled the city in the name of the King of Italy. It was to help these volunteers that the Italian General asked his Allied colleagues to withdraw from the city. He therefore proposed to retire with his British and American colleagues and to make his decision after consultation with them.

M. CRESPI said that he wished to express on behalf of his Government the sincerest regret for what had taken place. He was deeply impressed by the reports received by his colleagues. He, himself, had no news later than that which had been on the previous day in M. Tittoni's hands. He was therefore taken by surprise. He hoped and believed that the reports referred to the same incident as has been mentioned on the previous day, namely, to the incident of Sunday. The information in the hands of the Italian Delegation was to the effect that after provocation caused by a French soldier, rioting began. It was alleged that a French soldier had fired first. He had been supported by other men who came from a small post and fired on the crowd. Italian soldiers had then intervened to restore order, then French sailors had fired from ships. The information, therefore, was not quite the same as that in the hands of M. Clemenceau.

MR. LANSING said that he had no other information than that of which he had given an account. It was therefore possible that it was a new version of the Sunday incident mentioned on the previous day.

MR. BALFOUR said that by every account it was a deplorable affair. He, himself, had no information. He had no means, therefore, of judging whether there had been one incident or two. He asked M. Clemenceau whether his dispatches related to events of Sunday or to subsequent events.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the event described had taken place on the 6th.

MR. BALFOUR said it might then perhaps be assumed that everything had taken place on one day.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this might be true. On the previous day he had not known how serious the matter was. He had then been content with a Commission of Enquiry. Now he thought this was not enough. He could not allow French soldiers to be murdered. It must also be borne in mind that on the day before the incident or incidents, the Italian General had desired the French troops to be removed ten kilometers west of the Town in order to avoid trouble.

The Italian General had no right to demand anything of the sort and the French General had rightly refused. The dispatch he had received concluded by asking that Allied warships should be sent to Fiume.

M. CRESPI pointed out that according to M. Clemenceau's news, the Italian General had not given any orders to his French colleague but had only made a proposal. Moreover, General Grazioli, the day before the incident, had driven through Fiume in the same car with General Savy,<sup>1</sup> in order to show the good understanding existing between the two Commanders. He had done everything he could to avoid disturbances. Incidents of this kind where troops of various nations were gathered were liable to occur everywhere.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that incidents of this kind had not occurred elsewhere. There was no instance of British or American ships firing on French troops nor of French ships firing on British troops. On the previous day, he had not known that the Italian warships had acted in this manner. He must therefore insist on consulting his British and American colleagues separately as to the action to be taken. He proposed that they should withdraw together.

M. CRESPI said that he would, himself, withdraw. (At this point the Italian members of the Meeting withdrew.)<sup>1a</sup>

2. M. CLEMENCEAU nominated General Naulin as French representative.

MR. LANSING nominated Major-General C. P. Summerall.

Appointment of  
Inter-Allied  
Commission To  
Enquire Into  
Incidents at  
Fiume

MR. BALFOUR said that he was unable to nominate an officer at that moment.

M. CRESPI said he would make his nomination on the following day.

3. The following instructions were accepted:—

That the inter-allied Commission of Enquiry for Fiume shall investigate and report the facts as to the incident or incidents of violence, which have recently taken place in that town, and record their opinion on the responsibility therefor. They should further submit to the Supreme Council as soon as possible their recommendations as to the best means of preserving peace and safety hereafter.

Instructions  
to Commission  
of Enquiry

4. M. CLEMENCEAU handed M. Crespi a Note regarding the stoppage of trains at Modane.<sup>2</sup>

Stoppage of  
Supply Trains  
at Modane

M. CRESPI said that it was a technical matter and that he would reply on the following day.

<sup>1</sup> Commander of the French forces in Fiume.

<sup>1a</sup> For notes of this separate meeting of the heads of the American, British and French delegations, see HD-2A, p. 56.

<sup>2</sup> The note does not accompany the minutes.



5. MR. BALFOUR said that he had prepared the following draft resolution:—

Question of  
Direct Relations  
Between General  
Gough and the  
Germans. (See  
HD-1 para-  
graph 10.<sup>3</sup>)

In order to expedite the evacuation of the Baltic States by Germany in accordance with the decision taken by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on June 13th <sup>4</sup> and communicated to the German Government by Marshal Foch, *vide* his telegram No. 3029 dated June 18th to the President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission at Spa, it is **RESOLVED**:

(a) that General Gough shall be authorised to deal directly with local enemy commanders in the Baltic States on matters arising from the above decision;

(b) that General Gough shall have similar powers with regard to the execution of any subsequent decisions of the Allied and Associated Governments in connection with the German troops now in the Baltic States, all such decisions being in the first instance communicated to the German Government through the usual channels;

(c) that Marshal Foch will be informed of this resolution and will be requested to communicate its substance to the German Government, with a request that the German Commanders in the Baltic States may be given the necessary instructions.

There was also a resolution of the Commission on Baltic Affairs:—

The Baltic Commission having been informed of the contents of the telegram[s] from General Gough and Colonel Tallents <sup>5</sup> of 25th, 26th and 27th June respecting the necessity of an immediate credit of £500,000 in order to pay Russian and Lettish troops in Libau required for maintenance of order, consider that it is urgently necessary that this sum should at once be placed at the disposal of General Gough on grounds of military necessity as otherwise the position of the Inter-allied Mission and of General Gough will become shortly untenable in Latvia, and it will be impossible to enforce the evacuation of the German troops.

The Commission, however, desire to draw attention to the fact that this £500,000 is only sufficient to meet immediate military necessities and they therefore recommend that enquiries should be made as to what securities in the way of timber, flax or other raw materials the three Baltic States can give for a loan.

In case such a loan can be raised either from one or more of the Allied and Associated Governments or from private banking institutions on the basis of such security it is recommended that the above advance of £500,000 should ultimately be merged in this loan.

The first was intended to place General Gough in direct relation with the Germans in order to ensure their retirement from the Baltic Provinces.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 41.

<sup>4</sup> CF-63, minute 5, vol. VI, p. 373.

<sup>5</sup> Chief of the British Economic Mission to Latvia.



The second related to a different point though it was also connected with the retirement of the Germans. It appeared that the Germans had been paying the Russian Forces in those parts. Those forces must be maintained, therefore paid. General Gough required £500,000 to do this. He supposed that there was no choice but to agree. He confessed that it was news to him that the Germans had hitherto paid those troops. If, however, the Allies had to become the Paymasters of those forces, he thought it best to entrust the money to General Gough, the Allied Representative, on the spot for proper disbursement.

MR. LANSING observed that this was a new proposal. The United States were in a difficult position in matters of this kind. He knew of no fund out of which such a cost could be defrayed. American laws were very stringent on the subject of spending money. Until July 1st, while the President was in Paris, there had been funds which he could spend at his discretion. At present there were no funds available. The only means of raising money for such a purpose that he could think of was a loan. Seeing that there was no recognised Government in the Countries in question, it did not appear possible to raise a loan.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was not clear to him how the French contribution could be raised.

(It was decided to accept the first resolution and to refer the second for report to the Financial Commission.)

Report of  
Committee on  
Repatriation of  
Austrian Prison-  
ers of War

(6) The proposed reply of the Committee (see Annex 1) was accepted.

(7) After some discussion the French text (see Annex II) was accepted with slight alterations. The adjective "German" was suppressed in connection with the expression "Austria" or "Austrian" and the sentence regarding the boycotting of Serbian cattle was struck out.

Reply to the  
Austrian Note  
on the 'Economic  
Clauses of the  
Treaty

(7) [*sic*] (It was decided that the answers accepted by the Council regarding economic questions, the League of Nations and Consular and Diplomatic Agents in South America should be handed to the Austrian Delegation on the 9th July, and that the replies should be given to the Press on the evening of the 9th July, so as to be published on the morning of the 10th.)

Communication  
of Replies to  
Austrian Notes  
and Publication  
in the Press

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 8 July, 1919.

## Annex I to HD-2

*Report of the Prisoners of War Commission on the Observations Submitted by the Austrian Delegation Regarding the Conditions of Peace*

The Chairman of the Delegation of the Austrian Republic requested in his letter of 27th May<sup>6</sup> that General Slatin<sup>7</sup> might be allowed to approach the Peace Conference, so as to be able to study with it the questions concerning Austrian prisoners. The Supreme Council having decided to accede to this request, the Prisoners of War Commission visited St. Germain-en-Laye on the 10th June, in order to confer with General Slatin.

The Austrian Delegate submitted two series of requests to the Commission—the first for the purpose of obtaining, without any delay, measures intended to hasten the repatriation of prisoners, the second relating to the text of the Conditions of Peace themselves, and intended to obtain the alteration thereof.

The Austrian Delegate made the following general demands, viz:—

(1) That the first convoys of prisoners to be repatriated be formed immediately. In his opinion, as hostilities are at an end, it is very important, from a humanitarian point of view, that an end be put to the suffering entailed by prolonged captivity, and from a political point of view, that the increasing anxiety of more than a million families be allayed.

(2) That, in any event, the Commission and Sub-Commissions referred to in Article 2 of the Conditions of Peace (Prisoners of War Section) be formed immediately and put in the way of beginning their search without the least delay.

(3) That the Austrian Government be immediately authorized to send delegates to prison camps, for the purpose of rendering material help and moral consolation, and more especially that a delegate be authorized to proceed to Siberia for the purpose of setting repatriation in train.

The Commission has not found it possible to accede to these requests.

As regards the first two, they aim at nothing less than the carrying out of certain clauses of the Conditions of Peace before such conditions have been finally accepted by the Austrian Government. The means of hastening such execution lie ready to the Austrian Delegation's hand—it has only to render the Treaty definitive by signing it. The Treaty forms a single whole and it would be dangerous to permit only those clauses which are favourable to our enemies to come into force.

As regards the third demand, it must be remembered (*a*) that ad-

<sup>6</sup> Appendix I to CF-37B, vol. VI, p. 86.

<sup>7</sup> Gen. Rudolph Slatin, expert adviser on prisoners of war, Austrian delegation to the Peace Conference.

mission of Austrian Delegates to camps in the Allied and Associated countries might result in the introduction of enemy nationals within our territories before the conclusion of peace; it would be dangerous and unjustifiable from any valid point of view. Austrian prisoners continue to be visited by delegates of the Protecting Power and by representatives of the International and the neutral Red Cross. (b) That in Siberia the work of such a Delegation would not be understood, and the latter practically would be unable to fulfill its mission. It seems to the Commission inadmissible from every point of view that the representatives of an enemy power should receive special authorization to enter into relations with authorities not representing either an Allied or Associated Power. If Austrian prisoners captured by the Allied and Associated armies are concerned, the Sub-Commissions mentioned in the Treaty will see to their repatriation; if Austrian prisoners captured by the Russian armies are concerned, the Austrian Government will be obliged to wait until some Russian Government shall be officially recognized and delegates thereof admitted as members of the Commission and Sub-Commissions provided for in the Treaty of Peace.

B. [*sic*] The Austrian delegate further submitted certain observations and formulated requests for alterations of various conditions of the Treaty of Peace itself, viz:—

(1) With regard to Article 2, the Austrian delegate requested that it be specified that this Article should apply to all Austrian prisoners, including those interned in Siberia and Turkestan.

The Commission considers that the contents of this Article are of a general nature, and that its application would be in accordance with the conditions specified above.

(2) With regard to Article 4, the Austrian Delegate requested that the cost of repatriation be borne by the Austrian Government from the frontier of the captor state only.

It is impossible for the Commission to consider this suggestion. There is no reason why any distinction should be made in this respect between Germany and Austria. It would, moreover, be dangerous not to ensure that the Austrian Government should be interested financially in the supply to the Allied countries of all means of transport which that Government may still be in a position to provide for repatriation.

(3) With regard to Articles 5 and 6, it was asked that it should be clearly set forth that only prisoners guilty of offences against civil law are excluded from repatriation.

The same remark had already been submitted by the German Delegation.<sup>8</sup> The liberal interpretation of this clause ought to reassure

<sup>8</sup> Appendix III to CF-9, vol. v, p. 574.



the Austrian Delegation sufficiently as to the manner in which it will be applied.

(4) With regard to Articles 9 and 10 which provide for the Commission to search for missing men, and the restitution of objects, valuables and papers belonging to prisoners, General Slatin requested that reciprocity be provided for.

On that point also the German Delegation submitted a similar request,<sup>9</sup> and the reply made thereto by the Supreme Council<sup>10</sup> applies to the present demand.

Facilities for searching for missing men have always been afforded in Allied countries, and the restitution of individual property is an obvious obligation which the Allied Powers intend to respect. By mentioning them in the Treaty with Austria, it was the intention of the Allied and Associated Powers to impose on her the fulfilment of duties which she has sometimes disregarded.

(5) A single remark appeared to the Commission to be worthy of note. The date of 1st. May settled by Article 5 as the latest date for punishment of offences against discipline which do not necessitate the detention of offenders, is the same for Germans as for Austrian prisoners. General Slatin asked that, as regards the latter, this date should be altered to June 15th. or 1st. June at least, seeing that the Conditions of Peace were communicated to the Austrian Delegation a month after their communication to the German Delegation.

This remark appeared to be reasonable. By specifying an outside date the Commission wished to be in some measure secured against lack of discipline among prisoners of war made aware, by the Treaty of Peace, of their comparative immunity. The requisite conditions would be sufficiently fulfilled, if the date of May 1st. specified for German prisoners were altered to 1st. June for Austrians.

In view of above, the Prisoners of War Commission begs to suggest to the Supreme Council that, out of the observations and demands set forth in the Report of the Austrian Delegation, only the one concerning the substitution of 1st. June for 1st. May (in Article 5 of the Conditions) be retained.

---

<sup>9</sup> Appendix III to CF-9, vol. v, p. 574.

<sup>10</sup> Appendix IV to CF-20, vol. v, p. 749.



## Annex 2 to HD-2

[Translation <sup>11</sup>]*Reply to the Notes of the Austrian Delegation Relating to Economic Conditions*

PARIS, July 8, 1919.

To: His Excellency, M. Renner, President of the Austrian Delegation.

From: The President of the Peace Conference.

The notes of June 10, 12, 16, 23, and 25 have been given careful examination by the Allied and Associated Powers.

These notes pertain to two main questions, as regards matters of an economic nature;

1. The liquidation of Austrian property in the states formed from the former Dual Monarchy, or in the states receiving territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

2. The non-reciprocity of Articles 1 to 4 of Part X (Economic clauses).

On these two points, the Allied and Associated Powers feel bound to present both complementary explanations and new texts.

1. They believe it their duty to take into consideration the remarks contained in the Austrian note of June 23 insofar as concerns the probable effect upon the economic life of Austria of the rights which the states holding territories which formerly belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would have of retaining and liquidating all the property which Austrian nationals or companies controlled by them possessed in these territories, on the date of November 1, 1918.

They consider that the remarks in question are not without value, and in consequence they have decided to suppress Article 49 of Part X (Economic clauses) of the Draft of the Treaty previously submitted, and to substitute for it the following article, which gives complete satisfaction to the desire which the Austrian Delegation expressed in this matter, in the above mentioned notes:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 32 of the annex to Section IV of Part X (Economic clauses), all the property, rights and interests of Austrian nationals or of companies controlled by them, situated in the territories which formed part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy will not be subjected to retention or liquidation through application of said provisions.

The property, rights and interests mentioned here do not include the property considered in Article XII of Part X [IX] (Financial clauses)”.

---

<sup>11</sup> The French text which accompanies the file copy of the minutes is the text of the note as transmitted; this translation of it is filed under Paris Peace Conf. 185.22/59 and has been slightly revised by the editors.

The present article in no way affects the provisions contained in Chapter [*Part*] VIII (Reparations), Section I, Annex 3, insofar as the property of the Austrian nationals in the way of ships and boats is concerned.

2. The second claim of the Austrian Delegation concerns the non-reciprocity of Articles 1 to 4 of Part X (Economic clauses).

Certain arguments in the way of facts which the Austrian Delegation opposes to these clauses cannot, it seems to us, be admitted:

In the first place, the objection raised by the Austrian Delegation on the question of monopolies is not justified by the text of the articles. It is in no way the intention of the Allies to do anything further than demand that the Austrian Government make identical contracts with each country for the furnishing of products which would form the object of a state monopoly. All that is demanded is that a monopoly be not systematically used, either to favor one state at the expense of another, or to institute a systematic difference in the treatment of the products of the Contracting Powers which would oppose the object which these articles have in view.

Moreover, concerning the restrictions of imports necessitated by the existence of epizootics, it is recognized that the treatment of live stock imported from a country suffering from an epidemic must necessarily be different from that accorded to the countries not suffering from it. All that is asked is that all the laws in the matter be uniformly applied to the countries in similar conditions, and that no legislative or administrative measure of this nature be made in the future, as has sometimes happened in the past, the subject of discrimination to the detriment of products of one of the Allied or Associated States unless the circumstances justify it.

Concerning the general thesis of the Austrian Delegation, in virtue of which it claims that the absence of reciprocity for clauses 1 to 4 endangers the economic life of the country, it must be remarked that this fact is nullified by the provisions of Article 6.

Article 6 provides, in fact, for the conclusion between Austria on one hand and Czecho-Slovakia or Hungary on the other of special customs agreements, the benefit of which will not extend to the other Allied and Associated States. The effects of these agreements, which may be concluded immediately after the signing of the Treaty, is to make it possible for Austria to insure for herself, within the limit of these agreements, not only the treatment of the most favored nation in Czecho-Slovakia, but even an exceptionally favorable treatment which Czecho-Slovakia will be able to accord to her without extending it to her neighbors.

The provisions of Article 6 are destined to make it possible for Austria to effect commercial exchanges with the countries from which

she drew her principal resources and to which she sent her products for the most part. The possibility of these preferential exchanges destroys the force of the Austrian claims.

The Allied and Associated Powers desire nevertheless that Austrian exports should not be exposed to unfriendly restrictions, and that moreover the essential interest of the new states be respected in such a way that they may, for a period of five years at least, insure the introduction of their products to the Austrian markets under reasonable conditions.

Circumstances resulting directly from the war, and which affect many of the Allied and Associated Powers, absolutely exclude, on the other hand, the possibility of their opening their markets *at once* to Austrian products under conditions as favorable in all respects as they can do for other nations.

Under these conditions, the Allied and Associated Powers are led to the conclusion that, if the period during which Articles 1 to 4 of Part X must remain in force is not to be modified, it is not inadmissible that before the expiration of the period above provided, the States which seek to obtain the benefit of these articles should fulfill certain correlative conditions.

Under these conditions, the Allied and Associated Powers are ready to accept the addition to Article 15 of Part X of a supplementary paragraph in the following form:

“It is nevertheless understood that the obligation imposed on Austria by Articles 1 to 4 of Part X will not be invoked, unless the League of Nations decides differently, after the expiration of a time limit of three years from the date when the present Treaty goes into force, by an Allied or Associated Power which does not accord to Austria a correlative treatment.”



**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of American, British and French Delegations Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, July 8, 1919, at 5 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. R. Lansing.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Lieut. Burden.

BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . Capt. E. Abraham.

FRANCE . . . . . Capt. A. Portier.

*Interpreter*—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that what he proposed to do was to send a French warship to Fiume. He wished to know whether his colleagues would agree. There was a French warship at Constantinople which could reach Fiume in four days. He would prefer to act in complete agreement with his colleagues.

MR. LANSING said that there were no American troops in Fiume. There were, however, some Naval officers. He thought, perhaps it would be wise to obtain a report on the incidents from the British Admiral.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that France had been insulted and that the French flag must be shown.

MR. LANSING said that the Italian troops were, unfortunately, very much in the majority at Fiume. It was for this reason that the crowd had been encouraged to attack the French. He had this in his mind on the previous day when he suggested that the Allied troops should be reduced to equal contingents of police.

MR. BALFOUR said that he saw no objection to the sending of a French man-of-war. In the meantime, he would do all he could to obtain the evidence of the British Admiral.

MR. LANSING agreed. He thought, himself, that the Italians were to blame. American troops had also been insulted, but it might appear, on further investigation, that there were extenuating circumstances. Should this prove to be the case, M. Clemenceau would, no doubt, stop his warships by wireless.



M. CLEMENCEAU said that the ship must appear at Fiume. It could be withdrawn, if necessary, after 48 hours stay there, but the French flag must be shown.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought both the British and American Governments would act in a similar manner in similar circumstances.

MR. LANSING said that he thought perhaps they would have done so without consulting their colleagues.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood that this action would not put a stop to the enquiry which had been proposed on the previous day.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not mean in any way to interfere with that decision. All he wished to maintain was that an enquiry alone would not be sufficient after what had occurred.

(After obtaining the agreement of his colleagues, M. Clemenceau gave orders for the despatch of a French Warship to Fiume.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 8 July, 1919.

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, July 9, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF

Hon. R. Lansing.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-  
four.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.  
M. Pichon.

ITALY

M. Crespi.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

*Secretaries*

Mr. L. Harrison.  
Mr. H. Norman.  
M. Paterno.  
M. Ashida.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Lieut. Burden.  
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . Capt. E. Abraham.  
FRANCE . . . . . Capt. A. Portier.  
ITALY . . . . . Lieut. Zanchi.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. For Great Britain, General Watts was appointed.

Appointment of  
Inter-Allied  
Commission To  
Enquire Into  
Incidents  
at Fiume

M. CRESPI said that he could not at present nominate an Italian officer. He thought that there would be an officer on the spot and it was agreed that he should join his colleagues at Fiume and be sent the same instructions as were given to them.

(It was agreed that the officers nominated should attend the Council the following day at 3.30 p.m. to receive their instructions. As it was not possible for General Watts to be present, it was agreed that General Thwaites<sup>1</sup> should attend to receive instructions in his stead. It was also agreed that General Cavallero<sup>2</sup> should attend to receive instructions in place of the Italian officer to be nominated.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU asked if any of his colleagues had any news from Italy.

Situation  
in Italy

MR. BALFOUR said he had nothing save what he had shown the Chairman on the previous day. Though

<sup>1</sup> Maj. Gen. Sir William Thwaites, director of Military Intelligence Service of the British Army; military technical expert, British delegation.

<sup>2</sup> Gen. U. Cavallero, Italian military representative on the Supreme War Council.

there was a British Admiral and a British colonel commanding a battalion in Fiume, he had received no news from them. He had telephoned to London, asking for more news to be sent him.

M. CRESPI said that he had received a despatch from M. Nitti and one from Fiume. It appeared from these despatches that no incidents had occurred since Sunday. In any case, the Italian Government was determined to maintain order.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French Military Attaché in Rome again reported the words of General Albricci, to which he had previously alluded. The French Ambassador was also of the opinion that an attempt was being made to influence the Conference.

M. CRESPI said that he was quite sure this was a complete misunderstanding.

3. M. CRESPI said that he was not able to reply at once to the document handed to him by M. Clemenceau on the previous day.<sup>3</sup> He would, however, furnish a reply at the next meeting.

Stoppage of  
Trains at  
Modane

4. MR. LANSING said that, before taking up the subjects on the Agenda, he wished to draw attention to a despatch (Appendix "A") he had received two days previously from Warsaw. It was to the effect that the retiring German troops were removing, as they left, horses, cattle, agricultural implements and everything necessary for the cultivation of the next harvest. This might be the act of irresponsible soldiery, but it was necessary to put a stop to it.

Action of  
German Troops  
Withdrawing  
From the East

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that M. Dutasta<sup>4</sup> should proceed at once to the Germans at Versailles and make a formal complaint to them on behalf of the Council.

(This was agreed to.)

5. (On MR. BALFOUR's proposal, it was agreed to summon the Bulgarian Government to send a Delegation to Paris to receive the Peace Terms. The Secretary-General was asked to take the necessary steps.)

Treaty of Peace  
With Bulgaria:  
Summoning of  
Bulgarian Dele-  
gation to Paris

6. MR. LANSING proposed that this question should be taken up before the first question on the Agenda. He thought the two questions were connected and that the means of action should be determined before addressing any communication to Bela Kun.

Military Means  
To Oblige the  
Hungarians To  
Respect the  
Armistice

(At this stage, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites entered the room.)

<sup>3</sup> See HD-2, minute 4, p. 47.

<sup>4</sup> P. Dutasta, Secretary General of the Conference.

GENERAL BLISS was asked to make a statement and said that all that was necessary was mentioned in the report. (Appendix "B.")

The report was then read by M. MANTOUX.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not doubt that the appreciation of the Military Representatives was accurate. If the Allied Powers, France, Great Britain, Italy, Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia and Serbia, were too weak to deal with one recalcitrant power, the position was one of great humiliation. That, perhaps, did not matter much, but Bela Kun was turning Hungary into a military stronghold of revolution. Buda-Pest had become an armed camp and all the factories were making munitions. Propaganda was being carried on in the most dangerous fashion in the neighbouring countries. If the Allies must sit still and see the Armistice broken before their eyes, they were bound to lose prestige. Central Europe was likely to lose more than prestige. The Bulgarians had just been summoned to Paris to hear the Peace Terms. Was it likely that they would obey if they saw that the Allies could not even coerce a fragment of the late Austro-Hungarian monarchy? The Bulgarians were only half disarmed and would feel that they could defy the Conference. The situation in Central Europe was both difficult and critical. The wave of disturbance might go west as well as east. The situation would, he thought, grow more critical if it were manifest that the Conference could not control a small and defeated nation, which was not only breaking the terms of the Armistice, but, in alliance with the Russian Soviet Government, attempting to cause general revolution. He did not favour wild military adventures, but he did not like a confession of impotence.

MR. LANSING said that he had nothing to add to what Mr. Balfour had said. He thought Allied prestige should be maintained. Bolshevism would spread to Austria, if it appeared to be successful in Hungary. He wondered whether the contribution suggested for Serbia in the report of the Military Representatives was not underestimated. He was not aware that Serbia was fighting or anticipated fighting on any other front. He therefore suggested that the Military Representatives should get into touch with the authorities of Czecho-Slovakia, Serbia and Roumania, in order to find out what these States could do to help.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he must remind Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing that there were neither British nor American troops at hand. The French had two divisions, but other help would be required. He suggested that the Military Representatives, after conferring as suggested by Mr. Lansing, should return, together with Marshal Foch, and tell the Council what results they had obtained. He felt sure that Marshal Foch would ask for British and American troops.



MR. BALFOUR said it would be necessary for him to summon Sir Henry Wilson.<sup>6</sup> Only the British Cabinet could decide whether any British troops were to be employed. He would ask Sir Henry Wilson to consult the Cabinet before coming over to Paris, in order that he might be in a position to state what could be done.

GENERAL BLISS observed that it would not be of much use for the Military Representatives to consult the Czech, Serbian and Roumanian military authorities as to the number of troops at their disposal, unless there were means of knowing whether their Governments would consent to give troops for this purpose or not.

MR. LANSING said that, perhaps, the best course would be to confer with the heads of the Czecho-Slovak, Yugo-Slav and Roumanian Delegations in Paris.

(It was then agreed that the Heads of the Czecho-Slovak, Yugo-Slav and Roumanian Delegations be invited to attend the Council on Friday, 11th July, and that Marshal Foch and Sir Henry Wilson be also asked to be present, in order to discuss the possibility of military action against Hungary.)

(At this stage, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites withdrew.)

7. The Council had before them the following documents:—

Sale of  
Securities  
by Govern-  
ment of  
Bela Kun

1. A Report of the Financial Commission.
2. A draft Joint Note of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the Allied, Associated and Neutral Powers and to the Government of the German Empire and of Austria.

3. A draft Joint Note of the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to Bela Kun.

4. A draft communication to the Press.

(All these documents are contained in Appendix "C".)

MR. LANSING thought that the result of the previous discussion showed that no action could usefully be taken at present.

MR. BALFOUR thought that there could be no harm in telling Bela Kun, on behalf of the Conference, that he was considered to be a thief. He might take no notice of it and put the communication in the waste paper basket, but it could do him no harm. He thought Bela Kun should be warned that his right to steal funds for his own political purposes was not recognised. He did not think that the letters drafted were very suitably worded, but, in substance, he thought they might be adopted.

MR. LANSING said that his objection referred specially to the note addressed to Bela Kun. He did not like threats which could not be followed by action. He thought the less the Conference had to do

---

<sup>6</sup> Chief of the British Imperial General Staff and member of the War Cabinet since 1918.

with him the better, and the less he was regarded as a power the better. The letter addressed to other Governments and that addressed to the Press, he did not object to. He thought they would produce the desired effect without a direct threat to Bela Kun. He also pointed out that the expressions "bolshevik" and "communist" should be expunged from these letters.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would not object to the omission of the document addressed to Bela Kun, which he admitted was not likely to have much effect on him.

M. CRESPI said that the question had been closely examined in the Commission. It had been recognized that the letter addressed to Bela Kun would not produce much effect, but it was necessary, before taking action in Allied countries regarding the sales of securities, to furnish such action with a legal ground. The only legal ground in this instance could be an official protest against the anticipated action of the Hungarians. The letter was therefore proposed for its legal rather than for its political effect.

MR. LANSING said that he could not agree with this point of view. A lawless government, unrecognized by any other government, had no legal standing at all. He thought the Allies would have as strong a legal position whether they informed an outlaw that he was doing wrong or whether they addressed no remonstrances to him at all.

M. CRESPI then suggested that the three letters should be sent back to the Commission to be re-drafted in such a manner as to contain a clear declaration that the Allied Powers defined Bela Kun's proceedings as thefts. The drafting would be done in accordance with the views expressed by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing.

(This was agreed to, and M. Crespi undertook to obtain a re-draft by the Financial Commission.)

8. (At this point, M. Tardieu, Mr. Nicolson, and Mr. Leeper and M. Vannutelli-Rey entered the room.<sup>7</sup>

Frontiers Between the Serb-Croat-Slovene States and Hungary

The Council had before them the recommendations of the Yugo-Slav Committee (Appendix D). These recommendations were adopted.

(The Experts then withdrew.)

9. MR. LANSING said that he was unable to act on this subject. He must take the Convention to Washington. The Economic side of the question had not been discussed in America. He suggested that as the matter did not really concern the Peace Conference it might be carried through by ordinary diplomatic methods.

Approval of Air Convention

<sup>7</sup> André Tardieu, French representative, Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs; Harold Nicolson, British representative, Sub-Commission on Territorial Questions; Alexander Leeper, British representative, Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs; and Count Vannutelli-Rey, Italian representative, Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs.

After some further discussion Mr. Lansing agreed that the Convention might be discussed inasmuch as it concerned European Powers—American adhesion being reserved.

(It was decided that the subject be put on the Agenda for the following day on this understanding.)

10. (At this point the Military Representatives entered the room.)

GENERAL BLISS said that a short time ago the Council of Four had sent to the Military Representatives at Versailles a project of Mr. Winston Churchill's<sup>8</sup> for repatriating the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia.<sup>9</sup> These troops numbered some 60,000 men. The proposal combined

Repatriation  
of Czech-  
Slovak Forces  
From Siberia

the repatriation of these troops with a movement regarded as useful to the Allied cause. One group of 30,000 men at present in the neighbourhood of Omsk was to operate on Koltchak's right flank and to gain contact with the North Russian forces, and thus to reach Archangel. The other portion was to be repatriated by sea in American ships from Vladivostok. The Military Representatives were asked to examine this proposal together with Czecho-Slovak authorities. He, himself had an interview with M. Benes—as a consequence of which M. Benes had attended a meeting at Versailles. Before agreeing to the movement of Czecho-Slovak troops to Archangel, M. Benes wished to know whether Allied troops would remain in Northern Russia or whether they would be removed before winter, irrespective of the arrival of the Czechs in time for shipment from Archangel before the port was icebound. Thus the matter could not be proceeded with until it was known whether or not the Allied forces in North Russia would await the arrival of the Czecho-Slovaks. He had written a letter to that effect which hitherto had remained unanswered.

MR. BALFOUR said that at the time of Mr. Winston Churchill's proposal there had been, he understood, a fair prospect of a junction of the Czecho-Slovak forces with the Inter-Allied troops in North Russia. Since Koltchak's reverses this junction appeared less probable; in fact there now seemed to be little chance for the Czecho-Slovaks of reaching the White Sea before the ice set in. The question for them, therefore, was whether the Allied troops would wait for them. He was informed that the British Government meant to withdraw its troops before the winter. If the Czechs therefore were unable to reach Archangel before November, he could not promise that they would find British troops awaiting them. He believed that the same applied to the other Allied contingents in North Russia. If this was so it appeared to follow that all the Czech troops must be repatriated from Vladivostok.

<sup>8</sup> British Secretary of State for War and Aviation; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

<sup>9</sup> Appendix VI to CF-92, vol. vi, p. 684.



The result of this would be that part of the Siberian Railway would be deprived of the troops guarding it and Koltchak would have to fill the gap. Therefore, the only point to be dealt with immediately was the question whether Allied troops would stay in North Russia through the winter. As far as Great Britain was concerned, the answer was "No".

M. PICHON said that the French Government also meant to recall the French troops from Archangel. He pointed out that the withdrawal of the Czecho-Slovaks had a very serious result on the whole situation in Siberia.

GENERAL BELIN stated that these troops were guarding 1300 kilometres of railway. If withdrawn they must be replaced. It appeared that Japan and the United States must be called upon to fill the gap. The Czechs were at present along the central portion of the line. The Japanese and American troops lay to the east of them. As the Czechs were moved towards Vladivostok the American and Japanese might move westward into their place. There were at the present time 5,000 Czechs in Vladivostok. Their immediate shipment would give some satisfaction to opinion in Czecho-Slovakia.

M. CRESPI said that Italian action would be in conformity with French and British action.

M. MATSUI said that Mr. Churchill had enquired some time ago whether Japanese troops could replace the Czecho-Slovaks on the Siberian Railway. He was now informed that it was the question of finding troops to guard 1300 kilometres. The Japanese General had not felt authorized to reply without consulting his Government. He doubted whether there were enough Japanese troops in Siberia to undertake so large a task. If more were required he was not at present able to say what view the Japanese Government would take. He had already telegraphed to his Government on the subject and would do so again.

MR. LANSING said that the problem now before the Council appeared to be a military one with which he could not deal. The political question was whether the Czecho-Slovaks should be evacuated from Siberia. The answer to this was in the affirmative, provided it were militarily possible.

M. PICHON said it would be possible if the Americans would send a few troops to reinforce the Japanese.

GENERAL BLISS said he thought this could not be done. American troops had been sent to Siberia to help the Czecho-Slovaks to leave it. Once the Czecho-Slovaks had left there would be no pretext to justify the retention of American troops in the country.

M. PICHON said that if the United States would not take on the task it remained for the Japanese to do so; otherwise the whole country would become a prey to Bolshevism.



M. MATSUI said that he was not in a position to state whether the Japanese Government would undertake so much. He would consult it and say that the Conference desired that Japan should be responsible for the guarding of the Siberian Railway.

MR. BALFOUR said that the question now being discussed was not the one on the Agenda. Without knowing how much the American and Japanese Governments were prepared to do it was difficult to see any solution to the military difficulty which had been raised.

MR. LANSING said that the question on the Agenda was whether the Czechs could be shipped from Archangel. The answer to this was in the negative. They must, therefore, be shipped from Vladivostok.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as Mr. Lansing expressed no hope of American assistance it was desirable to know whether the Conference wished to invite Japan to undertake the defence of the Siberian Railway.

MR. LANSING said that before giving a final answer he would like to consult Washington. He suggested that the Government at Washington should be consulted by the President of the Conference.

(It was then agreed that the Military Representatives at Versailles should prepare a draft dispatch to be sent by M. Clemenceau to the American and Japanese Governments regarding the necessity of providing for the defence of the Siberian Railway after the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak troops.)

Report of  
Military  
Representa-  
tives Regard-  
ing Military,  
Naval and  
Air Control  
Commissions

11. (The Report of the Military Representatives (Appendix "E") was accepted.)

12. MR. LANSING observed that this question was one between France, Great Britain and Italy, and that America was not concerned.

Army of  
Occupation in  
Bulgaria

M. CLEMENCEAU, alluding to documents appended (Appendix "F"), asked M. Crespi how many troops Italy were prepared to send.

M. CRESPI said that Italy would send two battalions if Great Britain sent two.

MR. BALFOUR said he was not prepared to say how many British troops would be sent.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not support the proposals made by General Franchet d'Esperey<sup>10</sup> that there should be three British battalions and two Italian, while there were two French divisions in the country. France had no special interest in Bulgaria. He personally did not care who possessed Cavalla. He did not agree to maintain two French Divisions in Bulgaria while Great Britain had

<sup>10</sup> Commander in chief of the Allied Armies in the East.

only one platoon, and Italy two battalions. The French Army was being demobilised, and a number of the troops in Bulgaria would be automatically recalled. In his opinion, there should be an Inter-Allied occupation in equal shares, or none.

GENERAL BLISS said that on the 9th June the Military Representatives had made recommendations,<sup>11</sup> which had been approved on the 16th June by the Council of Four.<sup>12</sup> It had been agreed that two French Divisions should be maintained, and that Great Britain and Italy should both be represented. On consultation, Great Britain had offered one platoon, and Italy one battalion. Now General Franchet d'Esperey called attention to the insufficiency of the British and Italian contribution.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the situation had changed, as he was now forced to demobilise, and remove his troops from Bulgaria, unless his Allies took their share. The only Great Power which had not been demobilised was Italy. Why they had not done so was their business. The only people with interests at stake in Bulgaria were the Greeks, and they sent their troops to Smyrna.

M. CRESPI said that M. Clemenceau had more than once declared that Italy had not demobilised. He wished to make a formal and official statement that Italy had demobilised as much as France, and had even demobilised one class more than France.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if that was so, Italy could take her share of the watch on Bulgaria. Meanwhile, she was sending 40,000 troops across the Black Sea to Baku.

M. CRESPI said that the British Government had requested that the British troops in the Caucasus be relieved by the Italians. He was not aware that Italy had as yet decided to send even one man.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had nevertheless received official telegrams in support of what he said.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that he had just given General Thwaites a statement in complete contradiction of the information mentioned by M. Clemenceau.

(It was then decided to refer to the Military Representatives at Versailles the question of devising means for an equal Inter-Allied occupation of Bulgaria.)

13. M. CLEMENCEAU announced that, according to the Havas Agency, the Weimar Assembly had ratified the Treaty, the Rhine Convention, and the Protocols of the Treaty, by 208 votes against 115.

Ratifica-  
tion of  
Treaty  
With  
Germany

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, July 9th, 1919.

<sup>11</sup> Appendix IV to CF-71, vol. VI, p. 498.

<sup>12</sup> CF-71, vol. VI, p. 487.

## Appendix A to HD-3

[*The American Minister at Warsaw (Gibson) to the Secretary of State*]

The American Minister at Warsaw reports under date of 3rd July that he had been informed by Colonel Grove,<sup>13</sup> who received the information from the Polish Delegation from West Prussia, that the German troops in withdrawing from the west bank of the Vistula were clearing out horses and farm implements from Polish and German inhabitants alike. It would seem that these seizures were possibly the work of soldiery without orders. Should this continue it will be impossible to reap this year's harvest. It would also prevent seeding their next year's crop and result in this district having to import rather than export foodstuffs.

---

Appendix "B" to HD-3

SVC-438

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL  
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

*Report on the Measures To Be Taken Regarding Hungary*

On July 5th the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers charged the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council:<sup>14</sup>

(a) To examine from the military point of view the means at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers to compel Hungary to comply with the conditions of the armistice accepted by her;\*

(b) To give the Supreme Council information regarding the manufacture and the stocks of munitions at the disposal of the Hungarian Government.

In their Joint Note No. 43 of June 7th, 1919,<sup>15</sup> the Military Representatives already considered the military measures to be taken eventually against Hungary in order to put an end to the Hungarian attacks against the Czecho-Slovaks.

---

<sup>13</sup> Col. W. R. Grove, director for the American Relief Administration in Poland.

<sup>14</sup> *Ante*, p. 28.

\* The Italian Military Representative said that he must repeat the declaration which he had already made before, namely that he could only consider the armistice of November 3rd, 1918 (Armistice of the Villa Giusti), as the military convention of General Franchet d'Esperey had not been recognised by the Italian Government. [Footnote in the original. For the armistice of November 3, 1918, see vol. II, p. 175; for the military convention between the Allies and Hungary, see *ibid.*, p. 183.]

<sup>15</sup> This document was mentioned in the meetings of the Council of Four on June 7 and June 9, 1919, but does not accompany the minutes of these meetings. See CF-52, minute 2, and CF-53, vol. VI, pp. 240 and 254.



At that time the greater part of the Hungarian forces was concentrated on the Czecho-Slovak front; the Hungarian Command had only left weak covering forces in the East (Rumanian front) and in the South (Franco-Serbian front.)

The execution of the Military operation set forth in its broad lines in the Joint Note above mentioned would seem therefore to have been capable of realisation without any great difficulties if it had been undertaken immediately.

Since the 7th June, however, the military situation in Hungary has appreciably changed.

#### DISPOSITIONS OF THE HUNGARIAN ARMY

On the intervention of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, the Government of Bela Kun agreed to stop its attacks against the Czecho-Slovaks, and moreover to order its troops to evacuate Czecho-Slovak territory under the conditions laid down by General Pellé <sup>16</sup> in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers.

From the latest information received from General Pellé it would appear:—

That the evacuation of the above-mentioned territory by the Hungarian troops has been carried out within the time limit prescribed.

That the greater part of the Hungarian troops who were on the Slovak front and who have been liberated as a result of this evacuation, are in process of concentration in the regions of Miskolcz (150 kilometres N. E. of Buda Pesth), Cegled and Kecskemet (80 to 100 kilometres S. E. of Buda Pesth), where they are in a position to threaten both the Rumanian and the Franco-Serb forces.

It appears also that the Government of Buda Pesth is at the present moment forming 2 new divisions of infantry, which will bring the total number of the Hungarian forces up to 8–10 divisions of infantry and 2 divisions of cavalry, or 100,000 to 120,000 combatant troops. Recent information points to these troops being disciplined, well-equipped, provided with numerous machine-guns and considerable artillery, and to their supplies of ammunition, though no precise information is forthcoming,† allowing them to offer considerable resistance; and lastly to their being animated by a very strong national feeling.

---

<sup>16</sup> Gen. Maurice C. J. Pellé, of the French Army, commander in chief of the Czecho-Slovak Army.

†From the latest returns received by the British and French Military Representatives the Hungarian Army has at its disposal material and stocks of munitions from the old *Honved*, from the Mackensen Army, which was disarmed in Hungary, and an unknown quantity of arms and munitions which have been sent from Austria.

The possibility of manufacturing war material in Hungary is little known.



Under these conditions, and taking into consideration the force that the Hungarian Command would in the ordinary course of events be obliged to maintain on the Czecho-Slovak front, it does not seem an exaggeration that on the Rumanian and Franco-Serbian fronts alone the Armies of the Entente, in case of offensive action against the Hungarian Army, would have to fight a force of a least 90,000 to 100,000 good troops.

It must be added that Buda Pesth, the seat of the Hungarian Government and the final objective of the Entente Armies, appears now to have been transformed into a veritable fortress provided with successive lines of defence extending to a great distance and a strong defensive organisation, the capture of which would without doubt entail a great effort if the Hungarian Government had not beforehand asked for peace.

### DISPOSITIONS OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

The Allied and Associated Powers could oppose to the Hungarian Army:—

(1) *Conditional on the agreement of the Rumanian and Serbian Governments*

6 Rumanian Divisions.	}	60,000 men.
1 " Cavalry Division.		
2 French Divisions.		16,000 "
1 Serbian Division.		8,000 "

in all, 84,000 men of which two-thirds belong to the Rumanian Army.

It must moreover be noted that the Rumanian troops have been forced to evacuate, after the initial success of the Hungarian offensive against the Czecho-Slovaks, the bridge-heads which they had occupied on the right bank of the Theiss, and are consequently in a disadvantageous position to undertake operations against the Hungarians.

(2) *Conditional on the agreement of the Government of Prague*

Such weak Czecho-Slovak forces as it has been possible to re-organise up to date after the reverses of last month, amounting to at the most:—

2 Divisions . . . . . 20,000 men.

A great effort would appear to have been made and 6 or 7 factories appear to be in full working order, of which

- 1 is for the manufacture of guns,
- 1 for the manufacture of small arms,
- 2 for the manufacture of explosives (20,000 shells per day?),
- 1 for the manufacture of aeroplanes,
- 1 for the manufacture of monitors, gun-boats and material for river craft.

There is no indication of the manufacture of ammunition for infantry; this does not, however, appear to be deficient. Hungary is drawing from the mines of Salgo-Tarjan and from the region of Miskolcz 550 wagon loads of raw material (lignite and iron) per day. [Footnote in the original.]

The remainder of the Czecho-Slovak Army will probably not be available for action for two months.

In any case the Entente would have at its disposal for the proposed operation only a total force, including Czecho-Slovaks, of

100,000 to 110,000 men

with which to oppose

100,000 to 120,000 Hungarians.

### CONCLUSIONS

In consideration of the above, the Military Representatives are of opinion that the proposed operation is possible, but presents a great element of risk if measures are not taken to ensure the reinforcement of the Allied forces in time.

The Military Representatives further consider they should draw the attention of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers to the following points:—

(1) The possibility of undertaking this action depends absolutely on the consent of the Serbian, Rumanian and Czecho-Slovak Governments.

(2) Serious difficulties must be expected in the carrying out of the operation, viz:—

(a) Changes in the dispositions of the Hungarian Army in process of concentration between the Theiss and the Danube to the South of Budapest and in the region of Miskolcz.

(b) The loss by the Rumanian forces of the bridgeheads which they had occupied on the right bank of the Theiss.

(c) The defensive organisation carried out round Budapest.

(3) If the operation is contemplated it is of importance to postpone the retirement of the Rumanian troops from the region East of the Theiss.

With these reserves and if a military operation against the Hungarian Army is decided on by the Supreme Council in spite of the difficulties set forth above and the large expenditure involved, the general plan of operations contemplated by the Military Representatives in their Joint Note No. 43 of June 7th still appears capable of execution in its broad lines. It would be for the General Commanding-in-Chief the operating Armies to modify the plan as circumstances may dictate.

In any case the Military Representatives insist, if the success of the operation is to be assured, on the necessity of the operations being under the direction of one Commander accepted by the Rumanian, Serbian and Czecho-Slovak Governments. The General Commanding-in-Chief, the Allied Armies of the East is the sole Commander who appears for the moment to be in a position to make the necessary dis-

positions without loss of time and consequently to ensure the necessary co-ordination of action.

G<sup>al</sup>. BELIN

*Military Representative,  
French Section,  
Supreme War Council.*

C. SACKVILLE-WEST

*Major General,  
Military Representative,  
British Section,  
Supreme War Council.*

UGO CAVALLERO

*Military Representative,  
Italian Section,  
Supreme War Council.*

TASKER H. BLISS

*Military Representative,  
American Section,  
Supreme War Council.*

Given at VERSAILLES on the 8th July, 1919.

---

Appendix "C" to HD-3

WCP-1116

Translation

FINANCIAL COMMISSION,  
PARIS, July 7, 1919.

The President of the Financial Commission

To the President of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference

The Supreme Council at its meeting of July 5th, 1919, decided that the "Financial Commission of the principal Allied and Associated Powers should propose immediately to the Supreme Council measures intended to prevent the sale on foreign markets of deeds and bonds seized by order of the Government of Bela Kun in Hungary."<sup>17</sup>

The Financial Commission met on the call of Mr. Crespi on July 7th, 1919, and decided to submit to the Supreme Council the following considerations.

The decision taken by the communist Government to seize all the bonds and values now deposited in the Banks of Hungary, thus procuring for itself from four to six milliard crowns, is very prejudicial to the interests of the Allied and Associated Powers and to those of their nationals:

1.—It enables the Government of Bela Kun to form an important fund with which to subsidize bolshevist actions not only in Hungary but also in Allied and Neutral Countries.

2.—The sale of the bonds deposited with Hungarian Banks deprives the Allied and Associated Powers of part of the pledge assured them by the Treaty with Germany and the draft treaties with the other enemy powers for the payment of reparations for losses due to the war.

3.—Lastly, this measure is a real theft prejudicial to individuals, some of whom are nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers.

---

<sup>17</sup> *Ante*, p. 28.



The Financial Commission considers the only really effective means of protecting the interests threatened would be that suggested by the Colonel, Chief of the Italian Military Commission at Budapest, who proposes to sequester for purposes of conservation all the bonds deposited in Hungarian banks and to place these Banks under the control of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers. But it believes that these measures can only be carried out if the Allied and Associated Governments have at their disposal the military forces required for enforcing them on the Hungarian communist government and for ensuring their maintenance.

The decisions which the Supreme Council will take on this subject will determine the possibility of preventing Bela Kun from carrying out his purpose of seizing all the assets deposited in the Hungarian Banks and sending them abroad.

Anyhow, the Financial Commission suggests to the Supreme Council the following measures which it believes are such as to at least mitigate the effects of the orders given by Bela Kun even if they do not afford complete protection to Allied and Associated interests.

First of all, a note should be sent to the Hungarian Communist Government by the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

This would back up and re-enforce the note which the Colonel, Chief of the Italian Military Commission in Budapest, has already taken the well-advised initiative of sending to Bela Kun.

This note of protest against the order given to the Hungarian banks would clearly state that the Allied and Associated Powers consider that the assets seized are the security for their war reparation credits, or for the property belonging to their nationals, and that they cannot consent to its being disposed of. All measures of confiscation will therefore be held as null and void and the Hungarian Government will be held personally responsible for all losses incurred by the nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers.

In the second place, a circular note could be addressed to the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers and to Neutrals informing them of the step taken by Bela Kun in the matter of the Hungarian banks.

It could draw their attention to the danger involved for all the nations by the formation of a bolshevist propaganda fund, and it could ask these Powers to assist in mitigating the effects of Bela Kun's orders and in frustrating his intentions.

Such assistance might consist in measures similar to those taken by the Scandinavian and Swiss Governments with regard to bank-notes coming from Russia; in prohibition of the entry, or in special super-



vision of Hungarian securities and of all securities coming from Hungary.

The same note might be sent to the German and Austrian Governments which are interested in protecting themselves against the bolshevist danger.

In the third place, the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers may require their nationals to make a declaration of all securities deposited with Hungarian banks of which they are the owners. This declaration might subsequently be completed by opposition to the sale of such securities in all the countries which have adopted legislation allowing of such opposition.

The Supreme Council will not fail to see that the first of these measures would only have the value of a protest if it were not backed up by force of arms.

---

WCP-1116A

Translation

FINANCIAL COMMISSION OF THE  
PRINCIPAL ALLIED & ASSOCIATED POWERS

JULY 7, 1919.

*Joint Draft Note of the Principal Allied and Associated Governments  
to the Governments of the Allied, Associated and Neutral Powers  
and to the Governments of the German Empire and of Austria*

According to information received by the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, the communist Government of Budapest has ordered the banks in Hungarian territory to deliver up to it all securities and values held by them on deposit, and it would appear that this order has already begun to be carried out.

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers have agreed a formal protest to the Communist Government.

The Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Governments draw the attention of the Government of . . . . . to the danger involved for all nations by the formation of a fund for subsidising bolshevist action not only in Hungary but also in foreign countries.

It appears to them that joint action is essential, on the one hand, for opposing the propaganda of Bela Kun, and on the other for mitigating, in respect of all depositors, both Hungarian and foreign the consequences of a measure of spoliation.

WCP-1116B

Translation

FINANCIAL COMMISSION OF THE  
PRINCIPAL ALLIED & ASSOCIATED POWERS

JULY 7, 1919.

*Joint Draft Note of the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to Bela Kun*

According to information received by the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers the Communist Government of Budapest has given order to the banks on Hungarian territory to deliver up to it all bonds and securities and values held by them on deposit; and it would appear that this order has already begun to be carried out.

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers consider that these securities and values, in as much as they are not the property of their nations, are the security for the credits on account of war reparations.

They make formal protest against all measures aiming at disposing of the same.

They also declare that they consider as a qualified theft all seizure of securities and values belonging to their nationals.

They warn the communist government that they consider as null and void all measures which it has decreed for their confiscation, and that they hold the Hungarian Government responsible for all loss which may result from same to themselves and to their nationals.

WCP-1116C

Translation

JULY 7, 1919.

*Draft Communication to the Press*

According to information received, the Communist Government of Budapest has ordered the banks on Hungarian territory to deliver up to it the securities and values which they hold on deposit; and it would seem that steps have been taken to carry out this order.

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers have addressed to Bela Kun a formal protest, stating that they consider as a qualified theft the seizure of all securities and values belonging to their nationals, and warning the communist Government that they will hold as null and void all measures of confiscation, and that they will hold the Hungarian Government responsible for all losses which may result therefrom to them and to their nationals.

The (French) owners of securities deposited in Hungary are requested to declare same to (the Commission of Claims Ministry of Foreign Affairs) as soon as possible; which they have already done.

Moreover, owners of such securities are advised to make the decla-

rations foreseen by the Law of June 15th, 1872 on oppositions,<sup>18</sup> to the Syndical Chamber of Brokers of Paris.

---

Appendix D to HD-3

*Frontier Between Yugo-Slavia and Hungary in the Prekomurje*

A. DEMAND OF THE SERBO-CROAT-SLOVENE DELEGATION

The Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation no longer claim the eastern districts inhabited by a compact Magyar population and the northern districts which are connected with the valley of the Raab by their economic interests.

B. DECISION OF THE COMMITTEE

(1) *Principles*

(a) The Committee considers that from the geographical point of view the new frontier claimed by the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation is of an artificial character like the former one, as indeed is unavoidable in any delineation of the Yugo-Slav salient to the north of the Mur.

(b) It notes that this salient, thus reduced, is inhabited by a population of which three-quarters are Slovene.

(c) It recognises that from a general political point of view the fate of the Slovene race, united under the Austro-Hungarian domination and in its resistance to Germanisation, but now inevitably destined to be split up as a result of the partition of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, is worthy of all attention.

(2) *Conclusions*

The Committee proposes to assign to Yugo-Slavia the part of the Prekomurje now claimed by the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation.

The geographical boundary is as follows:—

The *talweg* of the Lendva upstream to a point to be determined on the ground to the south of point 265.

Thence, a line, to be determined on the ground, running in a north-north-westerly direction to point 209 (3 kilometres west of Nemesnep) and leaving Pincze, Csente, Hidveg, Gönterhaza, Zsitkőcz and Kebeleszentmarton to Yugo-Slavia; and Lendva-Ujfalú, Dedes, Gaborjanhaza, Bödehaza and Lendva-Jakabfa to Hungary.

Thence, in a north-westerly direction as far as point 295, approximately the crest line separating the basins of the river Nemesnepi in the north and the river Kebele in the South.

Thence a line, to be determined on the ground, running in a northerly direction to point 313 (about 10 kilometres to the south of Szt. Gotthard) passing over points 291-319 and leaving Kisszerdahely,

---

<sup>18</sup> Duvergier *Collection complète des lois, décrets, ordonnances, règlements et avis du conseil d'état* (Paris, 1872), tome 72, p. 263.

Domonkosfa, Kapornak, Domafold with its railway station, and Nagydolany to Yugo-Slavia; and Szomorocz and Kotormany to Hungary.

Thence, in a westerly direction as far as point 371 (about 10 kilometres to the south-south-east of Fehring) approximately the crest-line separating the basins of the Raba [*Raab?*] in the north and the Mur in the south.

Thence, a line, to be determined on the ground, running in a south-westerly direction to the old frontier between Austria and Hungary to the east of point 400, and leaving Gedoudvar to Yugo-Slavia and Bonisfalva to Hungary.

A. W. A. LEEPER

SWC-437

### Appendix E to HD-3

#### *[Report of the Military Representatives on the Supreme War Council Regarding Military, Naval and Air Control Commissions]*

#### PRESENT

FRANCE	GT. BRITAIN	ITALY	AMERICA	JAPAN
Gen. Belin.	Maj-Gen. Hon. C. J. Sackville-West, K. B. E., C. M. G.	Gen. Cavallero.	Col. S. D. Embick, C. M. G.	Maj-Gen. Tanaka.
Rear-Admiral Grasset.	Vice-Adm. Sir E. F. B. Charlton, K. C. M. G., C. B.	Admiral Grassi.	Rear-Adm. H. S. Knapp.	Admiral Jeda.
Gen. Duval.	Brig-Gen. P. R. C. Groves, D. S. O. Also Representing BELGIUM—Major Van Egroo.	Admiral Orsini.	Rear-Adm. H. A. Wiley.	Col. Sato.

#### *In Attendance*

Maj. Lacombe.	Brig-Gen. H. W. Studd, C. B., C. M. G., D. S. O.	Lt-Col. Toni.	Capt. McNamee.	Commdr. G. Nakajima.
Capt. Boehl.	Maj-Gen. Hon. Sir F. R. Bingham, K. C. M. G., C. B.			Lieut. R. Sugiyama.
Captain Levavasseur.	Lt-Col. W. L. O. Twiss, M. C.			Major Katsuki.
Captain Boissiere.	Paymaster-Capt. W. F. Cullinan, C. M. G.			
Lieut. Robert.	Lt-Commdr. A. R. J. Southby.			

#### *Secretariat*

Lieut. Fould.	Capt. C. L. Wicks.	Capt. Majnoni.	Col. U. S. Grant, C. M. G.
	Capt. T. F. Powell.	Lieut. Bosio.	

#### *Interpreter*

Lieut. Sergeant.

#### ORGANISATION OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL REFERRED TO IN ARTICLES 203-210 OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY

#### GENERAL FORMATION OF INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

#### PART I

##### *Article 1*

Three Inter-Allied Commissions of Control shall be created, viz:—

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

These Commissions shall enter upon their duties as from the date of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.



*Article 2*

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall represent the Principal Allied and Associated Governments with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Military Clauses (Article 208).

The President of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be a French General.†

*Article 3*

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall represent the Principal Allied and Associated Governments with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Naval Clauses (Article 209).

The President of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be a British Admiral.

*Article 4*

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall represent the Principal Allied and Associated Governments with the German Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Aeronautical Clauses (Article 210).

The President of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be a British Brigadier-General.

*Article 5*

The General Officers and Admiral referred to in Articles 2, 3, and 4 shall mutually detail a permanent representative (assisted if necessary by other Officers) for the purpose of maintaining liaison between them.

## PART II.—POWERS OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

*Article 6*

The powers of each of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control are defined in Articles 203 to 210 of the Treaty of Peace.

In addition to the application of the Military Clauses (Articles 159 to 180), the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control shall enforce Articles 195 (paragraph 1) and 196 (paragraphs 2 and 3) of the Naval Clauses.

*Article 7*

The general clauses (Articles 211–212 of the Treaty of Peace) shall be under the supervision of the President of the Military, Naval or Aeronautical Commissions of Control as the case may be.

---

†In view of the great importance of this Commission, the Military Representatives are of opinion that its President should be a General Officer chosen with special reference to his military standing and reputation, as well as his energy and activity. They recommend that he should be selected from the General Officers in Command of Army Corps. [Footnote in the original.]

## PART III.—EXPENSES OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

*Article 8*

The maintenance and expenses of the Commissions of Control and their working expenses are chargeable to Germany in accordance with Article 207 of the Treaty of Peace.

These expenses shall be paid direct, through the President of the Commissions, to the parties concerned, by the Allied and Associated Governments, who shall obtain repayment of such expenses from the German Government.¶

*Article 9*

The German Government will be notified of the accommodation required for the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, and will provide such accommodation in accordance with Article 206 (paragraph 1) of the Treaty of Peace.

## PART IV.—DURATION OF ACTIVITIES OF INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

*Article 10*

The duration of the activities of each commission shall be limited to the complete execution of the Military, Naval or Air Clauses under its supervision, for which a time limit is fixed in the Treaty of Peace; and in case the execution be not completed within the period fixed, this fact will be reported by the Commission concerned to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for a decision as to the action to be taken.

Until a decision is reached the Commission will continue to supervise the execution of the particular clause in question.

## ORGANISATION OF THE MILITARY INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

*Article 11*

The General Officer presiding over the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be assisted by a Staff which shall include Officers of each of the Armies of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and of Belgium.

He shall moreover be assisted by the necessary technical personnel (legal, financial and other experts). It will sit at Berlin.

*Article 12*

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall include three Sub-Commissions:—

(a) A Sub-Commission for Munitions, Armament and Material.

---

¶The American Representatives make a reservation on this paragraph to the effect that legislative action by Congress will be necessary before the United States can adopt the procedure proposed. [Footnote in the original.]

(b) A Sub-Commission for Establishments, Recruiting and Military Training.

(c) A Sub-Commission for Fortifications.

*Article 13—Sub-Commission for Munitions, Armament, and Material*

This Sub-Commission shall supervise the execution of Articles 164–172, 180, 195 (paragraph 1) and 196 (paragraphs 2 and 3) of the Treaty of Peace.

It shall be presided over by a British General Officer, assisted by Officers of the various Allied and Associated Armies; and shall sit at Berlin.

The Sub-Commission shall be represented by Officers at Munich, Dresden and Stuttgart and at such other places as may be found necessary. The total number of officers necessary for this Sub-Commission will be decided by the President; it will probably not exceed about 20 Officers. It will be assisted by a technical staff of about 4–8 Officers, specially entrusted with the execution of Articles 168 and 169.

*Article 14—Sub-Commission for Establishments, Recruiting and Military Training*

This Sub-Commission shall supervise the execution of Articles 159–163 and 173–178 of the Treaty of Peace, particularly as regards the abolition of military schools provided for in Article 176.

It shall be presided over by a French General Officer assisted by Officers of the various Allied and Associated Armies; and shall sit at Berlin.

The Sub-Commission shall be represented by Officers at Munich, Dresden and Stuttgart and at such other places as may be found necessary.

The total number of Officers necessary for this Sub-Commission will be decided by the President; it will probably not exceed about 30 Officers.

*Article 15—Sub-Commission for Fortifications*

This Sub-Commission shall supervise the execution of Articles 180, 195 (paragraph 1) and 196 (paragraphs 2 and 3) of the Treaty of Peace.

It shall be presided over by an American General Officer and divided into two sections:—

(1) The Section making the returns (*faisant le reconsement* [*reconnaissance?*]) of fortifications to be maintained (Articles 180 and 196) which shall sit at Berlin and have delegates at Munich, Dresden, Stuttgart and Königsberg.

(2) The Section dealing with dismantling which shall operate from Kiel (Article 195) with a branch at Stettin, and from Mayence (Article 180) with Branches at Strassburg and Cologne.

The Sub-Commission shall consist of about 15 Officers in all, 5 in the first and 10 in the second Section (exact numbers to be decided by the President). The second Section shall be provided with a large subordinate personnel to superintend the work of dismantling.

#### *Article 16*

The Officers representing each nation on the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control might be provided as far as possible in the following proportions:—

United States of America . . . . .	3 in 20.
Great Britain . . . . .	4 in 20.
France . . . . .	5 in 20.
Italy . . . . .	4 in 20.
Belgium . . . . .	2 in 20.
Japan . . . . .	2 in 20.

### ORGANISATION OF THE NAVAL INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

#### *Article 17*

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control which is charged with the supervision of the execution of the Naval Clauses of the Peace Treaty will consist of:—

The Main Commission with necessary Staff, with Headquarters in Berlin.

A Sub-Commission (A) consisting of Professional and Technical Officers for dealing with matters set forth below.

A Sub-Commission (B) similarly composed and constituted for a similar purpose.

It is important that the execution of Article 115 of the Treaty of Peace which deals with the destruction of the fortifications of Heligoland shall be entrusted to a Sub-Commission of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

A Sub-Commission (C) shall be constituted for this purpose.

#### *Article 18*

The Main Commission will consist of:—

Vice Admiral Sir E. F. B. Charlton, K. C. M. G., C. B.,  
 Contre Admiral M. F. A. Grasset,  
 Rear Admiral P. Orsini, R. I. N.,  
 Rear Admiral H. A. Wiley, U. S. N.,  
 Commander M. Sakonji, I. J. N.

or such Officers as may be designated by their respective governments to succeed them.

#### *Article 19*

Sub-Commission "A" will consist of about 8 Officers of the Allied and Associated Navies and will be presided over by a Captain of the British Navy.



Sub-Commission "B" will consist of about 9 Officers of the Allied and Associated Navies and will be presided over by a Captain of the French Navy.

Sub-Commission "C" will consist of about 4 Officers of the Allied and Associated Navies and will be presided over by a Captain of the British Navy.

An Interpreter will be attached to each Sub-Commission.

#### *Article 20*

As soon as possible after the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, the Main Commission shall proceed in men-of-war to Germany and travel to Berlin to meet the representatives appointed by the German Government and notify them of the procedure which will be adopted by the Commission of Control.

#### *Article 21*

The date of the proposed visit to Berlin will be arranged in conjunction with the Commissions for the execution of the Military and Air Clauses.

#### *Article 22*

With regard to the allocation of responsibilities to the Sub-Commissions "A" and "B"—

Sub-Commission "A" shall deal with:—

- (1) The surrender of ships.
- (2) The breaking-up of ships under construction.
- (3) The allowance of ammunition on board ships still in commission.
- (4) The reduction of personnel.

Sub-Commission "B" shall deal with:—

The surrender of all other stocks of munitions and war material and the stoppage of manufacture.

The foregoing allocation is tentative and not to be regarded as arbitrary, as experience may show it to be desirable to amend it. It is based on the geographical situation in so far as Sub-Commission "A" will deal with the Naval Ports and the Admiralty in Berlin, while Sub-Commission "B" will be required to exercise supervision in various centres in Germany.

#### *Article 23*

Should it be found desirable or necessary, the personnel of Sub-Commissions "A" and "B" shall be interchangeable.

## ORGANISATION OF THE AERONAUTICAL INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

*Article 24*

The Headquarters of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission shall be at Berlin.

*Article 25*

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall consist of 6 Sub-Commissions:—

- 1 Sub-Commission on Production.
- 1 Sub-Commission on Naval Aircraft and Dirigibles.
- 4 Sub-Commissions on Military Aircraft.

*Article 26*

The Sub-Commission on Production shall supervise particularly the execution of the Clauses contained in Article 201.

It shall sit at Berlin, and be presided over by a French Colonel, assisted by the necessary technical staff.

*Article 27*

The Sub-Commission on Naval Aircraft and Dirigibles shall supervise as regards those types of Aircraft, the Clauses contained in articles other than Article 201.

It shall be presided over by a British Lieutenant-Colonel.

*Article 28*

The Sub-Commissions on Military Aircraft shall supervise as far as this class of aircraft is concerned, the execution of clauses other than those contained in Article 201.

A Sub-Commission at Berlin shall be presided over by an American Brigadier-General.

A Sub-Commission at Stuttgart shall be presided over by a French Lieutenant-Colonel.

A Sub-Commission at Munich shall be presided over by an Italian Lieutenant-Colonel.

A Sub-Commission at Dresden shall be presided over by a Belgian Lieutenant-Colonel.

*Article 29*

The details of the organization of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control are set forth in the attached Table which is put forward as an indication. The total numbers involved are:—

Officers 196.  
Other Ranks 381.  
Interpreters 25.

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL AND TRANSPORT

Personnel					Transport					
Distribution	Nationality	Officers	Interpreters	Other ranks	Landau- lettes	Touring cars	Motor-cycles with side-cars	Motor cycles	Heavy tenders	Light tenders
Berlin.	British	46	9	106	1	14	3	.....	1	3
	France.	39	9	98	1	15	.....	3	.....	2
	U. S. A.	15	.....	24	.....	7	.....	.....	.....	.....
	Italy.	21	4	34	.....	7	1	.....	.....	2
	Japan.	6	1	4	.....	2	.....	.....	.....	.....
	Belgium.	12	2	25	.....	6	.....	.....	.....	.....
Totals to Berlin		139	25	291	2	51	4	3	1	7
Wurtenburg (Stuttgart).	British.	7	.....	9	.....	2	.....	.....	.....	.....
	France.	8	.....	15	.....	2	1	.....	.....	1
	U. S. A.	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	Italy.	1	.....	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	Belgium.	1	.....	4	.....	1	.....	.....	.....	.....
Totals to Stuttgart		18	.....	30	.....	5	1	.....	.....	1
Bavaria (Munich).	British	7	.....	9	.....	2	.....	.....	.....	.....
	France.	7	.....	13	.....	2	.....	1	.....	1
	U. S. A.	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	Italy.	4	.....	4	.....	2	.....	.....	.....	.....
	Belgium.	1	.....	4	.....	1	.....	.....	.....	.....
Totals to Munich		20	.....	30	.....	7	.....	1	.....	1
Saxony (Dresden).	British.	7	.....	9	.....	2	.....	.....	.....	.....
	France.	7	.....	13	.....	2	.....	1	.....	1
	U. S. A.	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	Italy.	2	.....	4	.....	1	.....	.....	.....	.....
	Belgium.	2	.....	4	.....	1	.....	.....	.....	.....
Totals to Dresden		19	.....	30	.....	6	.....	1	.....	1
Totals to Germany		196	25	381	2	69	5	5	1	10

\* Including 4 Fords. [Footnote in the original.]

## Appendix F to HD-3

Ciphred Telegram

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 7, 1919, 11:30 a. m.

From: General Franchet d'Esperey.

To: War Minister—Paris.

Nos. 2156 and 2157.

2156            8184/3.

1. By note number 44 from the Supreme War Council<sup>19</sup> you informed me that it would be advisable to create an Allied Force in Bulgaria including two detachments, one Italian and one British.

2. General Mombelli<sup>20</sup> has already reported to me that according to orders received from the Italian Government his detachment would include 1 battalion whose stationing I have provided for in Southern Dobroudja.

2157.

3. General Milne<sup>21</sup> can place at my disposal 1 battalion that would be stationed in Bulgarian Thrace, but no orders have been received from his government.

4. I beg you to request the British Government to be good enough to issue instructions to General Milne so that I may forthwith proceed with the organisation of the occupation of Bulgaria.

---

JULY 7, 1919.*Note Concerning the Troops of Occupation in Bulgaria*

I. In their joint note No. 44, dated June 9th,<sup>19</sup> the Permanent Military Representatives, after considering the situation in Bulgaria and finding it was necessary to maintain order at all events, at the time when the decisions of the Peace Conference are being notified have agreed on the immediate creation of an *interallied* military force of occupation to be placed directly and completely under the orders of the General Commanding in Chief the Armies of the East and consisting of:

“French Troops (2 divisions)

An Italian detachment, representing the Italian army

A British detachment representing the British Army”.

---

<sup>19</sup> See appendix IV to CF-71, vol. VI, p. 498.

<sup>20</sup> Gen. Ernesto Mombelli, head of the Italian Military Mission in Hungary.

<sup>21</sup> Gen. Sir George Francis Milne, commander of the British forces in the Near East.



This note was approved by the Supreme Council at its meeting of 16th June.<sup>22</sup>

II. On the 21st June, the British and Italian Military Representatives were asked to state the exact strength of their troops. On 25th June, the British Military Representative answered in writing "that in any case not more than one platoon would be available including one officer and forty other ranks for the purpose". The Italian Military Representative stated orally that the strength contemplated for the Italian force would be a battalion.

III. These forces are both obviously inadequate. It is true that the Italian and British Governments have put forward the requirements of demobilization. Still, such requirements exist to the same extent as far as the French Government is concerned.

But first of all, the contemplated occupation must be *interallied* in character. France can no longer be the only one to bear all the material and moral inconveniences entailed by occupation and eventually by military intervention, should order happen to be disturbed and should the decisions of the Entente fail to be carried out.

Finally, it is necessary to note that for purposes of preventative policing which it is necessary to insure, one cannot rely on Greek or Serbian forces, since their mere appearing in Bulgaria would be sufficient to such troubles as must be avoided.

IV. In order that the occupation should be truly interallied in character and in order to be in a position to add to the two French Divisions such forces as is necessary to complete the total strength it is requested that the Italian and British detachments should be *tactical units capable of a military role*, that is to say, they should *at least* consist of:

an Italian regiment including 3 battalions.  
a British Brigade including 2 battalions.

---

<sup>22</sup> CF-71, minute 2, vol. VI, p. 487.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, July 10, 1919, at 3 : 30 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF

Hon. R. Lansing.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-  
four.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.  
M. Pichon.

ITALY

M. Crespi.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

*Secretaries*

Mr. L. Harrison.  
Mr. H. Norman.  
M. Paterno.  
M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Col. Grant.  
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . Capt. E. Abraham.  
FRANCE . . . . . Capt. A. Portier.  
ITALY . . . . . Lieut. Zanchi.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had a question to submit to his colleagues. In the Council of Four there had been a question, before President Wilson left, about the secrecy of the minutes of proceedings in the Council. President Wilson had taken the view that these Minutes could not be communicated. Mr. Lloyd George had not adopted a very firm attitude on the subject. He, (M. Clemenceau) had said that he would not be able to refuse them to a Parliamentary Committee. At the present moment the Parliamentary Committee was asking for the Proces-Verbaux of the Commission on the League of Nations. These proces-verbaux had been printed and kept secret. He thought there could be no objection to showing these documents to the Parliamentary Committee but this raised a question of the communication of other similar records. He would like to know from his Colleagues whether they would agree to the communication of records of discussions other than those of the Council of Four.

Communication  
of Proces-  
verbaux to  
French Parlia-  
mentary Com-  
mittee

MR. LANSING said that personally he had no objection whatever but he did not know what the feelings of the President might be. He would like to have the opportunity of finding out.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether he might give his Parliamentary Committee the Minutes of the League of Nations.

MR. LANSING said that he did not feel sure.

MR. MANTOUX then gave an account of the conversation on this subject which had taken place in the Council of Four on the 28th of June, at the Senate, at Versailles.<sup>1</sup>

MR. BALFOUR said that he could not believe that any harm would result from the communication of the record in question to a Committee of the French Chamber. This, however, might create a precedent which might be inconvenient. For instance, he questioned whether it would be desirable to communicate the records of the present Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that that was not in question. The present Council was the successor of the Council of Four and these Minutes must remain secret. He referred for the present to the proceedings of commissions.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether he proposed to communicate the proceedings of the Council of Ten.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied in the negative.

MR. LANSING said that even in respect to the deliberations of Committees embarrassing questions arose. For instance, concerning responsibilities there had been very frank discussions. It might be imprudent to communicate all that was consigned in the Minutes on that matter. President Wilson had been chairman of the Commission on the League of Nations and before the Minutes were communicated he ought to be consulted.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Lansing if he would consult President Wilson regarding the request he had made about the Minutes of the Commission on the League of Nations.

MR. LANSING agreed to do so.

(At this point M. Loucheur<sup>2</sup> entered the room.)

2. M. LOUCHEUR said that he wished to submit a proposal regarding the Inter-Allied Commission to negotiate with Germany on the subject of the Rhineland agreement, slightly different from that put forward on the previous day by the British Delegation. He proposed the following:—

“An Inter-Allied Commission should be appointed to discuss with the Germans the details of the Convention in accordance with the terms of the letter ad-

Draft Resolution  
Relating  
to Negotiations  
With Germany on  
the Subject of  
the Rhineland  
Agreement

<sup>1</sup> CF-99, minute 3, vol. vi, p. 752.

<sup>2</sup> Louis Loucheur, French representative and president, Inter-Allied Commission on the Left Bank of the Rhine.

dressed on the 27th June by M. Clemenceau to the German Delegation at Versailles.<sup>3</sup> The Commission shall be composed of one representative for Great Britain, for France, for the United States, and for Belgium. In case of need this Commission shall consult on military matters the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies”.

(The above proposal was accepted.)

M. LOUCHEUR further pointed out that the British Member, Mr. Wise, had been nominated. He would be glad to know the names of the other Commissioners.

M. CLEMENCEAU nominated M. Loucheur for France.

MR. LANSING said that he would notify the Secretariat later.

M. LOUCHEUR asked that Belgium be approached through the Secretariat General.

(This was agreed to.)

M. LOUCHEUR then withdrew.

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said that according to news he had received the Poles had made an advance in Lithuania in defiance of the orders of the Conference. He thought that Marshal Foch should be requested on behalf of the Council to order the Poles to withdraw.

Polish Advance  
in Lithuania

(It was agreed that the dispatch received by M. Clemenceau should be sent to Marshal Foch in order that the latter should take suitable action.)

4. M. CRESPI said that on the previous day he had submitted three notes, one addressed to Bela Kun, another to various Governments, and a third to the Press.<sup>3a</sup> Mr. Lansing had objected to the first, and the other two had been sent back to the Financial Commission for re-drafting. He now submitted two re-drafts.

Sale of  
Securities  
by the Govern-  
ment of Bela  
Kun

(After some discussion, the following drafts were adopted:—

1. According to information received, Bela Kun has ordered all Banks established in Hungarian territory to hold at his disposal all kinds of securities deposited with them. It appears that steps are already being taken to enforce this order.

Joint Note  
of the  
Principal  
Allied & Associ-  
ated Govern-  
ments to the  
Governments  
of the Allied,  
Associated &  
Neutral Powers  
and to the Gov-  
ernments of the  
German Empire  
and of  
Austria

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers hereby declare that this action is nothing less than robbery. They consider all these measures of confiscation as null and void.

The Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers desire to draw the attention of the Government of . . . . . to the danger which may be incurred to all countries by the constitution of a fund created for the purpose of a destructive propaganda in foreign countries.

<sup>3</sup> For a description of this letter, see CF-96, minute 12, vol. vi, p. 730.

<sup>3a</sup> *Ante*, pp. 73-75.



It appears to them that common action is required to defeat this policy and to protect depositors threatened with spoliation.

They therefore propose to the Government of . . . . . to forbid or at all events to supervise the importation and negotiation of all securities coming from Hungary. It would also be useful to establish a control over all Hungarian securities.

*Communication to the Press*

2. According to information received, Bela Kun has ordered all Banks established in Hungarian territory to hold at his disposal all kinds of securities deposited with them. It appears that steps are already being taken to enforce this order.

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers consider this to be nothing less than robbery. They consider all these measures of confiscation as null and void.

They call the attention of the Governments of all the Associated and Allied and Neutral Powers and also the Governments of the German Empire and Austria to the danger which may arise for all countries from the constitution of funds for the purpose of supporting propaganda in foreign countries. They request that all those Governments will take the necessary steps to prevent the realisation or sale within their territories of the securities stolen by Bela Kun.

MR. LANSING asked in relation to these proposals, whether the censorship on Hungarian Mails was to be maintained.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that as a state of war still existed with Hungary censorship would automatically remain in force.

M. CRESPI said that he had just received from Austria a complaint that 15,000,000 kroner had been introduced into the country and that these were probably the product of sales of securities in Hungary.

5. (It was decided that all Commissions dealing with matters necessary for the Treaty with Bulgaria be asked to report not later than July 25th. It was further decided that the Bulgarian Government be asked to send a deputation to Paris on that date.)

Treaty of  
Peace With  
Bulgaria

6. (At this stage General Naulin, General Summerall, General Thwaites (representing General Watts) General Cavallero (representing General di Robilant) entered the room.)

Instructions  
to Representa-  
tives of the  
Inter-Allied  
Commission for  
Fiume

M. CLEMENCEAU, addressing the Generals, said that they were being sent to Fiume to enquire into the events that had taken place there. They were requested to proceed to Fiume as quickly as possible and to devote all their efforts to discovering the truth about the incidents. Their enquiry was of the greatest importance to the maintenance of good relations among the Allies. The Italian member of the Commission, General di Robilant would join it on its way and the British Representative, General Watts would follow very shortly. The Commission should report to the Council and apply for assistance should it find any difficulty in carrying out its task.

MR. LANSING asked whether the instructions drafted on the 8th <sup>3b</sup> had been given to the Generals.

(It was agreed that these instructions should be given in writing to each member of the Commission.)

(The Generals then withdrew.)

7. (General Sykes, General Groves, Mr. Hurst, General Duval, General Cavallero, Rear Admiral Knapp entered the room.<sup>4</sup>)

MR. LANSING said that the American Representatives had no authority to negotiate an agreement.

Approval of  
Air Con-  
vention

MR. BALFOUR suggested that Mr. Hurst be heard on the legal aspect of the question.

MR. HURST said that Article 319 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany foreshadowed an early acceptance of the air convention. He had been informed of the difficulty experienced by the American Delegation in agreeing to the convention. He pointed out that similar difficulties had arisen at the Hague in 1907, and the solution adopted then was to leave the question of signature open for eleven months. It would be easy in this instance to permit the postponement of signature until June 1920. This would give time for full discussion and would entail no alteration in the draft. It would also permit the fulfilment of what was provided for in the treaty with Germany.

MR. LANSING said that he had made a similar proposal on the previous day but since then he had learned that the American experts had made certain reservations. On reference to America, should Congress uphold these reservations it would be impossible to get the American signature to the Convention in its present form. There had not yet been an opportunity to discuss the economic side of the Convention with the heads of American industry. There were questions of customs and patents which required to be examined. America might therefore be deprived of the possibility of adhering to a very important Convention. For this reason he did not think the method proposed by Mr. Hurst a suitable one.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood it would be in accordance with international practice to make reservations at the time of signature. The Convention in its present form had been largely assented to and it would be a great misfortune if nothing were done to carry out the arrangements foreshadowed in the Treaty. He thought, therefore, it might be possible to adopt the plan proposed by Mr. Hurst, providing

<sup>3b</sup> HD-2, p. 47.

<sup>4</sup> Maj. Gen. Sir Frederic Sykes, British representative, Aeronautical Commission; Brig. Gen. P. R. C. Groves, British representative, Aeronautical Commission; C. J. B. Hurst, British representative, Drafting Committee; Gen. Charles Duval, French representative, Aeronautical Commission; Gen. U. Cavallero, Italian military representative, Supreme War Council; and Rear Admiral H. S. Knapp, United States representative, Aeronautical Commission.

that the deferred signatures might be accompanied by reservations to the substance. This could not be done in a Treaty of Peace but might be done in a Treaty of this kind. He hoped that this method might reconcile the two views.

MR. LANSING said that the document before him appeared to be a report. He was prepared to accept the report with the reservations expressed by the American expert. What was being discussed was the proposed rules. These he could not accept.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that if any change were made in the Convention he could not guarantee that the numerous Powers concerned in drawing it up would adhere to it in its new shape. The consent of each must be given on its own initiative.

MR. LANSING said that he was not himself endowed with full powers to sign such a Convention. He asked Mr. Balfour if he was.

MR. BALFOUR said that he believed that he was possessed of such powers.

MR. HURST suggested that the Drafting Committee be asked to prepare the Convention for signature. The question of full powers was one for each Government to determine. The treaty with Germany seemed to suppose that the Convention would be signed in a short time. The formula he had suggested would enable full powers to be issued and further consideration to be taken by any Government concerned.

GENERAL DUVAL pointed out that the project had been completely drafted with the exception of the preamble.

MR. LANSING quoted Article 18 of the Convention as one of those to which he objected.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Lansing how long he thought it would take him to obtain the agreement of his Government should it be willing to accept the Convention.

MR. LANSING replied that he thought this might be done in three weeks.

GENERAL DUVAL said he thought this delay would be regrettable. At the present time aircraft were confined within frontiers and it would be very discouraging to the industry to find the Convention had been postponed. The whole incentive to establishing long-distance commercial air navigation might disappear and each State might establish preferential rules in favour of its own nationals.

MR. LANSING observed that the reservations made by the American Experts required discussion. He was prepared to discuss them on the following day. If agreement could be reached the process would be hastened. He did not like the disposition shown to press the American Delegation to accept what it did not approve.

MR. BALFOUR said he sympathised with Mr. Lansing's view but he would ask him in return to sympathise with the British and French



view. In the United States it was possible to fly thousands of miles within one national territory. In Europe it was difficult to fly 500 miles without crossing a frontier. If commercial flying was to be of any value it was vital that frontiers should be crossed without difficulty. He would therefore ask Mr. Lansing to help in this matter in order that European material interests should not suffer.

MR. LANSING said he understood the principal reason alleged for speedy signature was that the industry interested in flying should know exactly how it stood and so avoid loss on its enterprises. In this connection he asked whether the reservations made by the United States directly affected the question.

GENERAL DUVAL said he thought they did not.

MR. LANSING suggested that while the United States Government were considering the Convention, European industry might be told that their Governments meant to sign the Convention.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the delay of three weeks proposed by Mr. Lansing be accepted.

MR. BALFOUR said that though this represented a loss of three weeks of summer weather he would consent if this were likely to lead to an agreement.

(It was agreed that the subject be brought up again in three weeks.)<sup>5</sup>

MR. BALFOUR said that the House of Commons was anxious to see this Convention. He would like to know whether his Colleagues had any objection to the Convention being shown.

(It was agreed that the proposed Convention might be published.<sup>6</sup>)

8. M. CRESPI said that he had looked through the document handed to him by M. Clemenceau.<sup>6a</sup> This document declared that trains carrying military material for Czecho-Slovakia, Serbia, Roumania, Poland and the French Army in the East had been held up. It concluded, however, by stating that supplies for the French troops had passed unhampered. He wished to draw attention to this admission. The note made no mention of consignments of food. Presumably therefore food had been allowed to proceed. Difficulties, however, had arisen by reason of the state of things on the Eastern Frontier of Italy. There was considerable tension of feeling among the Jugo-Slavs and conflicts of patrols had been frequent. He had received news on the previous day of a fight between a Jugo-Slav patrol on the one hand and a patrol on the other composed of four

Report by  
M. Crespi  
on the Stop-  
page of  
Supply Trains  
at Modane

<sup>5</sup> See HD-51, minute 1, vol. VIII, p. 173.

<sup>6</sup> For text of the aerial convention, signed at Paris, October 13, 1919, see *Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910-1923*, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol. III, p. 3768.

<sup>6a</sup> See HD-2, minute 4, p. 47.



Italians and one Frenchman which had resulted in the death of two Jugo-Slavs. The Italian Military authorities had discovered on a train declared to be a food train a wagon full of machine guns. Lately a whole train composed of 32 trucks had gone to Serbia carrying heavy bombing aeroplanes. Three trains of this character had been observed proceeding to Serbia. These were French trains and there were French soldiers on them.

MR. LANSING asked whether there was anything improper in the dispatch of arms from one Ally to another. As far as he was concerned he was prepared to sell arms to the Serbians as Allies.

M. CRESPI said that 14 tanks had also been dispatched in the same direction. The Italian Military Authorities thought that the Serbs were mobilising against Italy. He therefore proposed that the Inter-Allied Military Representatives at Versailles should lay down some limit to the armaments sent in that direction. He would like to know why it was necessary for Serbia to receive so much equipment. He therefore proposed that some supervision should be exercised by Marshal Foch and by the Military Advisers at Versailles.

MR. LANSING asked whether M. Crespi proposed that the enquiry should extend to mobilisation on both sides of the Italian frontier.

M. CRESPI replied that it was necessary for Italy to take precautions.

MR. LANSING observed that the Serbs perhaps also thought alike.

M. CRESPI said that he could prove that Italy was demobilising. Moreover she had demobilised two classes more than France. He had with him the decree ordering demobilisation.

MR. LANSING asked how many Italian troops there were in Istria.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that on the armistice frontier from the Tyrol to Istria there were from 700 to 800 thousand men. He did not know how many of these were concentrated in Istria. There might be 100 thousand. There was in addition perhaps half a million men in the interior. Italy had demobilised two and a half million men.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Crespi to furnish him with a reply in writing. He had been much struck by the assertion in M. Crespi's remarks of a right to impede the passage of arms from one Ally to another.

(M. CRESPI agreed to furnish the written reply on the following day.)

9. MR. BALFOUR said that he had no time to consider this reply.

MR. LANSING suggested that the Drafting Committee be asked to draft a reply in case the Council should decide to send one.

(It was agreed that the Drafting Committee should be asked to put up a draft for consideration on the

Reply to Ger-  
man Note on the  
Subject of the  
Evacuation of  
Poland<sup>7</sup>

following day.)

<sup>7</sup> Appendix A to HD-5, p. 108.

10. M. TARDIEU gave an explanation of the report of the Commission (Appendix "A"). He pointed out that the American proposal involved reopening the question of the frontiers between Austria and Czecho-Slovakia. As there had been no agreement in the Commission, he begged leave to make a personal suggestion. He thought that Czecho-Slovakia could do without most of what had been conceded at Gmünd, and the bulk of the territory attributed to her at Feldsberg. Thus with a very slight alteration the historic frontier of Bohemia would be maintained. The very slight addition to this frontier, which he suggested, would be sufficient to safeguard the economic situation. In compensation for this, Czecho-Slovakia might be given the bridge-head of Pressburg. All needful precautions might be taken against the militarisation of the ground on the right bank of the Danube. In any case this strip was so shallow as to be militarily indefensible.

MR. BALFOUR thought that on the face of it there was much to recommend M. Tardieu's proposal.

M. TARDIEU added that the political effect in Czecho-Slovakia of altering the frontier announced on June 2nd, without any ostensible reason save counter-proposals from Austria, must be taken into consideration. It might encourage undesirable tendencies in the country.

MR. LANSING said that this would appear to be an argument against any change. If so, it would apply to Pressburg as well.

M. TARDIEU said that it was for this reason he proposed to neutralise the effect of altering the frontier between Austria and Czecho-Slovakia by offering the latter Pressburg as a compensation.

MR. LANSING suggested that M. Tardieu should formulate his proposal and illustrate it by a line on the map on the following day in order that time should be given to consider the new proposal.

(This was agreed to.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 10 July, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-4

[Translation <sup>8</sup>]

*Report of the Commission Instructed To Prepare the Reply to the Austrian Notes on the Territorial Clauses*

#### I. FRONTIERS OF AUSTRIA WITH HUNGARY

The Commission instructed to prepare the reply to the Austrian notes on the territorial questions expresses, after having heard Messrs. Kramar and Benes, the following opinion:

---

<sup>8</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

1. The American, British, French, and Japanese delegations are of the opinion that the frontier should be fixed at the blue line drawn on the inclosed map.<sup>9</sup>

This new line will have as result:

On one hand, the attaching to Austria of about 260,000 Germans, as well as of a territory 40 per cent of whose food products have up to the present been consumed in lower Austria;

On the other hand, to leave in Hungarian territory, in conformity with the observations of Messrs. Kramar and Benes, the railroad from Presbourg to Agram by Szentjanos, Csorna, and Nagy-Kanisza, as the other railroad going from Presbourg south through Wiener-Neustadt is already in Austrian territory, and as the Czecho-Slovak Government requests that its two railroad outlets toward the Adriatic be not in the hands of a single state.

2. The Italian delegation, while recognizing the strength of the arguments which motivate the above conclusion, is of the opinion that the considerations of an ethnic, economic, and military nature by which it is inspired may find an adequate guarantee if there are imposed upon Hungary economic and other obligations of a nature to comply with the needs of Austria. With the exception of obligations of this sort, a change of sovereignty appears neither necessary nor desirable to the Italian delegation, whose opinion is that, considering the severe territorial conditions already imposed upon Hungary, it would not be desirable to exact of Hungary new territorial sacrifices.

3. Regarding the tracing of the above-mentioned line from north of Kittsee up to Presbourg, and the territory south of this latter city, including the suburb of the city, the station and the junction of the two railroads: Presbourg-Agram and Presbourg-Wiener-Neustadt;

(a) The British, French, and Japanese delegations are of the opinion that the territory in question should be awarded to the Czecho-Slovak state.

(b) The American delegation does not object to this on condition that satisfaction be given with respect to its observations concerning the frontier between Austria and Czechoslovakia (region of Feldsburg and Gmünd).

(c) The Italian delegation is hostile to every cession of territory, fearing the political repercussion of such a cession on relations between Hungary, Austria, and the Czecho-Slovak state, but it consents, either that the Czecho-Slovak state receive in Hungarian territory the control of the station and of the junction or that the territory under consideration be placed under the sovereignty of the League of Nations for a length of time to be determined.

The other delegations, without admitting the Italian point of view, would agree provided the said territory were not utilized for any military purpose.

---

<sup>9</sup> Map not reproduced.



## II. FRONTIER OF AUSTRIA WITH THE CZECHO-SLOVAK STATE

The Commission charged with preparing the reply to the Austrian notes on territorial questions expresses, after hearing Messrs. Kramar and Benes, the following opinion:

1. The French and Japanese delegations recommend the maintenance of the line notified on June 2nd to the Austrian delegation.

2. The American delegation recommends that the historic frontier be adopted, with the single exception that the variations of the course of the Thaya and the Morava be taken into consideration.

3. The British delegation, which holds for the original line if no transaction should intervene, would agree if necessary to the American proposition, on condition however that the Czecho-Slovak state receive on the one hand the territory situated to the south of Presbourg on the right bank of the Danube, and on the other hand positive guarantees for the free use of the Thaya River and the Feldsberg Railroad.

In any case, the British delegation considers that the frontier should follow the mid channels of the Morava and Thaya as those two rivers are to be internationalized along this part of their course.

4. The Italian delegation, just as attached, in principle, to the maintenance of the original line, would accept if necessary modifications of detail in the region of Feldsberg but refuses to consider the cession of the bridgehead of Presbourg as compensation. It also agrees with the British delegation with regard to the determination of the frontier along the mid channels of the Morava and Thaya and concerning the internationalization of these rivers.



**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, July 11, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF

Hon. R. Lansing.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.  
M. Pichon.

ITALY

M. Crespi.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

*Secretaries*

Mr. L. Harrison.  
Mr. H. Norman.  
M. Paterno.  
M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Lieut. Burden.  
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . Capt. E. Abraham.  
FRANCE . . . . . Capt. A. Portier.  
ITALY . . . . . Lieut. Zanchi.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. PICHON took the Chair and explained that M. Clemenceau was detained in the Peace Commission of the Chamber of Deputies. He sent his apologies and would come later.

Frontier  
of Austria  
With Hungary  
& Czecho-  
Slovakia

At this stage M. Tardieu, General Le Rond, M. Laroche, Mr. Leeper, M. Stranieri, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Hudson entered the room.<sup>1</sup>

M. TARDIEU said that he had been asked on the previous day to mark on a map the compromise he had suggested. This compromise gave back to the Austrians half of the ground given to the Czecho-Slovaks in the neighbourhood of Gmünd, only leaving the junction of the railways within Czecho-Slovakia. In the region of

<sup>1</sup> André Tardieu, French representative and president, Central Territorial Committee; Gen. Le Rond, French representative and president, Sub-Commission on Territorial Questions and Sub-Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs; Jules A. Laroche, French representative, Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs; Alexander Leeper, British representative, Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs; A. Stranieri, Italian representative, Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs; Allen W. Dulles, United States representative, Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs; and Dr. Manley O. Hudson, United States representative, Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways.

Feldsberg two-thirds of the territory was returned to Austria, only the railway and river remaining in Czecho-Slovakia. In compensation to Czecho-Slovakia for this reduction of territory, he proposed to attribute to her the Bridgehead at Pressburg and the railway junction. He would add that in the area round Feldsberg left to Czecho-Slovakia, there were a number of Czechs, which was not the case in the rest of the territories mentioned.

M. CRESPI said that the Italian Delegation had made reservations particularly in respect to the Bridgehead. He could see no reason for bringing Czecho-Slovakia across the Danube. There were no military reasons and he thought it would be a cause of perpetual dissension between the two States. The possession of an isolated bridgehead had an offensive appearance both against Austria and against Hungary. Politically therefore there was little to recommend the transaction. The Italian Delegation would prefer to satisfy the Czechs in any other region than this.

MR. LANSING asked what Mr. Crespi thought of the other changes suggested by M. Tardieu.

M. CRESPI said that the Italian Delegation thought that it would be best to leave the frontier as previously decided, and also that no change should be made at Pressburg.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood M. Crespi's feeling about the possession of the Bridgehead. Against this, he would set the consideration that nowhere else had a town been cut in two by a national frontier. There was an integral part of the town on the right bank of the Danube. If the river were taken as a boundary, an economic and social unit would be arbitrarily divided—moreover from the main town, the railway station, the electric works and the public gardens would be cut off, and a customs barrier would be established on the bridge connecting the two parts of the city.

M. CRESPI said that he was told that the portion on the right bank of the river was not an integral part of the city but a suburb.

MR. LANSING said that the United States had considerable experience of divided cities on the Mexican border. This kind of arrangement caused the greatest possible friction. He thought it was a mistake to make a river divide in two a Town, both parts of which had grown up together under one Municipal authority, and had never been separate. If, therefore, changes were to be made in other parts of the frontier, he would be disposed to allow the whole of Pressburg on both sides of the river to go to Czecho-Slovakia. Compensation could be given to the German population by frontier rectification elsewhere.

M. PICHON asked whether he was right in believing that Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing accepted M. Tardieu's proposal which M. Crespi rejected.

MR. LANSING said that he was not quite in agreement on all points. M. Tardieu wished to give the railway junction near Gmünd to Czecho-Slovakia. He did not think this necessary.

M. TARDIEU said that this Junction exclusively served Czecho-Slovak interests. His proposal withdrew one line entirely from the boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia. He considered, therefore, the retention of this Junction as economically essential.

MR. LANSING said that he was informed that 99 per cent of the population in the Gmünd area was German. He therefore proposed that the historic line should be reverted to.

M. TARDIEU said that on the previous day he understood that a compromise was to be sought. His instructions were that if a compromise could not be reached, the frontier announced on June 2nd was to be adhered to. He would add that according to the Czechs, a good deal of the population was Czech though he did not make himself personally responsible for this statement. Undoubtedly the majority was of German speech, whether or not of Czech origin. Further, the Czecho-Slovak Government had somehow learnt that an alteration of frontier was contemplated and M. Kramarcz had already made a protest. It must be remembered that there was a new Government at Prague inclined to seek a balance between the Allied and Associated Powers and German influence. If the compromise he suggested were accepted, the Czechs would no doubt complain.

MR. LANSING said that he would like to give Pressburg to the Czechs but not without full compensation, namely, the return of the German speaking inhabitants around Gmünd. As to the Feldsberg area, with the exception of four villages, containing he was told, 4,000 Germans and only 260 Czechs, which might without disadvantage be restored to Austria, he was content with M. Tardieu's proposal. In the Gmünd region he would like to return to the historic frontier. He disliked the salient created by the proposal.

MR. BALFOUR said that M. Tardieu's compromise was like all compromises, open to criticism. Nevertheless, he accepted and supported it as the best way out of a difficult situation. In effect the Council was taking from the Czechs something already officially given to them. The problem was therefore, not quite an open one. It involved undoing something already done. He thought that if the portion of Pressburg on the right side of the Danube be given to the Czechs while the bulk of the German speaking people near Feldsberg and near Gmünd were restored to Austria, neither side ought to complain.

MR. LANSING said that he would prefer to avoid the use of the word "bridgehead". He would prefer to say that a suburb of Pressburg was restored to the city. The line proposed in Feldsberg with



the exception of the four villages in the South East of the district, to which he had referred, he would accept. In order to obtain agreement he would also accept the line proposed in the region of Gmünd.

M. TARDIEU said that he would like to add two remarks. The Committee thought that the course of the Morava and Thaia which now became a frontier line should be internationalised. The second remark was that the railway going south from Pressburg which was attributed to Hungary should have a servitude imposed on it ensuring free circulation for the Czecho-Slovak State. He would suggest that in the Treaty with Austria an addition be made to Article 313 to the following effect:—

After the first railway mentioned, the second should be:—

“from Bratislava (Presbourg) towards Fiume via Hegyes-halom-Csorna-Hegyfalu-Zapabér-Zala Szent I v a n - M u r a Keresztur and the branch line from Hegyfalu-Szembathely and from Mura Keresztur to Pragerhof.”

The second as at present mentioned should become the third.

Similar provision should be made in the Treaty with Hungary regarding the railway which was to be within the Hungarian boundary.

(It was decided to accept for the Austrian frontier the compromise proposed by M. Tardieu, subject to a slight modification proposed by Mr. Lansing.

The Slices of territory attributed to Czecho-Slovakia in excess of the former administrative frontier should be reduced in the regions of Gmünd and Feldsberg to a minimum by way of compensation for the suburb of Presbourg situated on the right bank of the Danube.

M. Tardieu's Commission was asked to define the new frontier line and to forward it to the Drafting Committee.

It was further decided that the cost [*course?*] of the Morava and of the Thaia insofar as they became frontier lines should be internationalised.

It was also decided to modify Article 313 of the Treaty with Austria by the addition; after the first railway mentioned of a second

“from Bratislava (Presbourg) towards Fiume via Hegyes-halom-Csorna-Hegyfalu-Zapabér-Zala Szent I v a n - M u r a Keresztur and the branch line from Hegyfalu-Szembathely and from Mura Keresztur to Pragerhof.”

The second Railway at present mentioned should become the third. And to insert a similar provision to Article 313 in the treaty with Hungary.)

2. (After a short discussion, the recommendation of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways made at its Meeting of July



Note From Commission on Ports, Waterways, and Railways, on Frontier Stations in Austria

9th, was accepted, and it was decided that the following insertion be made in Article 33 of Part 12, as paragraph 2 of that Article:—

“The establishment of all the new Frontier Stations between Austria and the contiguous Allied and Associated States, as well as the working of the lines between those stations, shall be settled by agreements similarly concluded.”)

3. With reference to a letter from the German Delegation of June 25th (see Appendix “A”), it was for consideration whether an answer should be sent.

Answer to German Delegation Regarding Evacuation of Polish Territory

MR. BALFOUR expressed the opinion that it was undesirable to send any answer. His colleagues concurred in this opinion, and it was decided that no answer should be sent.

4. M. CRESPI begged that this question be adjourned.

Treaty Between Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia

MR. LANSING agreed, as he wished to have the differences between this Treaty and that with Poland examined.

M. CRESPI said that on the 17th of June Baron Sonnino had suggested certain additional clauses of general application.<sup>2</sup> (See Appendix “B.”) This had been referred by the late Council of Four to the Council of Foreign Ministers.<sup>3</sup> The Council of Foreign Ministers had now ceased to exist. He presumed that the question might be referred to whatever body now represented the Council of Foreign Ministers. The decision to refer the question to the Council of Foreign Ministers had been taken because the Commission on New States thought the proposals were outside their competence. He explained that the proposals were to the effect that the political clauses inserted in the Treaty with Austria should be generalised in such a way as to apply to all the New States formed out of the former Dual Monarchy.

(After some discussion, it was decided to refer to the Committee on Political Clauses in Europe, Baron Sonnino’s proposal tending to apply the political clauses of the Treaty with Austria to all the States formed from the territories of the late Dual Monarchy.)

(At this point the Experts withdrew.)

M. CLEMENCEAU entered the room and the members of the Drafting Committee were summoned.

5. M. HURST read the following:

*“On the Ratification by Germany of the Treaty of Peace—Note for the Supreme Council*

Article 6 of the law, dated February 10th, 1919,

Ratification of Treaty by Germany

<sup>2</sup> For Baron Sonnino’s remarks and note concerning the need for additional articles, see CF-74, minute 4 and appendix III, vol. vi, pp. 530 and 541.

<sup>3</sup> CF-77, minute 2 and appendix II, vol. vi, pp. 570 and 574.

of the German Empire,<sup>4</sup> relating to the provisional exercise of the Imperial Power, provides that:—

“The affairs of the Empire are conducted by an Imperial President. The Imperial President will represent the Empire in international matters, will conclude in the name of the Empire Treaties with foreign Powers, and will accredit and receive ambassadors.

Declaration of war and Treaties of Peace are made in conformity with the law of the Empire.

The instrument of ratification signed by President Ebert, and countersigned by Bauer, President of the Council of Ministers, mention being made of the approval of the “legislative bodies”, appears to fulfil the above stipulation.

It may be deemed that Article 4 of the same law, dealing with the preparation of the future constitution of the Empire, lays down that the territory of the German States cannot be altered without the consent of those States, but this provision appears only to restrict the powers of the National Assembly on this subject.

In these circumstances, the instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Peace of June 28th, 1919, forwarded by the Government of the German Empire, is not in the opinion of the Drafting Committee open to objection, but may be regarded as complete, and in due form, from the international point of view.”

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it followed from this opinion of the Drafting Committee that the blockade on Germany must be raised from the 12th of July, in accordance with a letter received by him from the Inter-Allied Blockade Committee. (See Appendix “C”.)

(It was decided to accept the interpretation given by the Drafting Committee, and to terminate the blockade on Germany from the 12th July, 1919.)

6. MR. BALFOUR said that in connection with this subject he wished to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that a blockade on Russia had been conducted under the guise of a blockade on Germany. The latter being now removed, it was for consideration whether any form of blockade could be continued with the object of preventing the passage of supplies and arms to the Russian Soviet Government. This Government had not been recognised and the Allies were not at war with it. It did not seem possible, therefore, legally to declare a blockade on it. Nevertheless, it was obviously a serious matter to allow Sweden and other countries to furnish Soviet Russia with the means of fighting our friends. He suggested this matter be considered and discussed at a very early date.

(It was decided to put on the Agenda for the following meeting the question of the consequences of the termination of the Blockade on Germany on the unofficial blockade of Russia.)

Question of  
Blockade in  
the Baltic

<sup>4</sup> Germany, *Reichs-Gesetzblatt*, 1919, No. 33, pp. 169, 170.

Military  
Measures To Be  
Taken Against  
Hungary:  
Hearing of  
Czecho-Slovak,  
Serbian &  
Roumanian  
Representa-  
tives With  
Marshal Foch

7. At this stage M. Misu, M. Vaida-Voevod and M. Plessia of the Roumanian Delegation; M. Patchitch and M. Vesnitch of the Serbian Delegation; and M. Kramarcz and M. Benes of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation; Marshal Foch, General Weygand, the Versailles Military Representatives and General Thwaites entered the room.

M. PICHON gave the delegates a short account of what had taken place in Council at previous meetings on this subject. He also read to them the report made by the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles regarding the military measures to be taken to enforce respect for the armistice on Hungary.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch to say what he thought of the projected operation.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles contained no projected operation. It merely stated what forces were available for action. He understood the purpose was to make Hungary respect the conditions of the armistice. In the meantime Hungarian forces had increased from six to nine divisions, and the success obtained over the Czechs had improved the morale of these forces. If Hungary was to respect the armistice, she must be forced to reduce these troops to six divisions, and also to withdraw from certain territories. 84,000 men were said to be available for use to effect this. This number was small for the purpose. The main contributor to this number was Roumania. Not only was the total not great, but there was no cohesion between the various elements contributing to it. The Roumanian Army was under Roumanian Command, the Serbian army was under Serbian Command, the Czech Army was under a French General, and the French troops under French Command. A single Command was obviously the first requisite for a successful campaign. Moreover, the probable length of the operations must be taken into account. It seemed unlikely that the desired end could be obtained by one rapid stroke. If this were the case the troops above mentioned would require reinforcement. Obviously assistance must be looked for in this from the neighbouring states. Before making a plan it must be known what these States would do, how much they would contribute, and whether they would agree to act under one Command. The desired results were:—first to defeat the Hungarian army, and second to occupy Budapest. The first alone was difficult with the forces locally available. The second was still more difficult, as Budapest was the central fortress of the Hungarian plain. It was a considerable city, and if taken would re-

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 59, 67.



quire a large occupying force. Before embarking on the adventure there must first be a political understanding between the States taking part in it. Secondly a military understanding. Thirdly, a plan of operations.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch whether he required more troops than were placed at his disposal. If so, would he name a figure.

MARSHAL FOCH said he would have to study the question. The whole operation was conditioned, first by the terms of the agreement that might be made between the states concerned, and secondly by the probable length of the operations.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked the Roumanian representatives to state the view of their Government.

M. MISU said that the Roumanian Government would certainly take into consideration the desires of the Conference. Roumania was greatly interested in the condition of Hungary by reason of its neighbourhood. Roumania was already bearing a heavy burden and maintaining seven divisions in Hungary. Two army corps were forming in Transylvania and were not yet ready. Four divisions were maintained on the Russian front, and two more were being mobilised with the help of equipment supplied by the Allies. He agreed with Marshal Foch that the first requisite was an understanding between the Governments concerned. On behalf of the Roumanian Government he felt entitled to say that a very willing spirit would be shown.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked the Serbian representatives to express the views of their Government.

M. VESNITCH said he entirely agreed with Marshal Foch that a single Command was necessary. With this proviso he thought that the forces at present available, if assisted with arms and munitions, could achieve success without much difficulty. It should also be impressed on the Government at Budapest that the Allied and Associated Powers were absolutely at one, and seriously intended to have their will respected. This would produce a moral effect perhaps even greater than the military effect of the forces employed.

As to Serbia's share, he had no instructions from the Serbian Government, but he thought he could go so far as to say that Serbia would make her contribution and he was prepared to advise his Government to do so. He must point out that Serbia herself was threatened at certain points and he would ask that, during the campaign, Serbia be guaranteed by the Powers against threats from without. He mentioned, for example, that the Bulgarians had not yet been disarmed.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how many troops Serbia would contribute?

M. VESNITCH replied that Serbia would contribute what the Military Representatives at Versailles had asked for, namely, one division.

M. PICHON said that he hoped Serbia might contribute more.



M. VESNITCH said that perhaps the Serbian Government might see its way to making a larger contribution, but he could make no undertaking on its behalf.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how far he thought the Serbian Government would go?

M. VESNITCH replied that this depended on general circumstances.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that an Army could not be made of general circumstances.

M. VESNITCH said that the Military Representatives at Versailles had considered one division necessary.

GENERAL BELIN explained that the report made by the Military Representatives had merely stated what troops were believed to be available. The figure mentioned was not a desideratum but a statement of what was ready for immediate use. The report had also stated that the troops locally available would require reinforcements.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was evidently desirable to have exact figures. Once they were obtained, Marshal Foch could be asked if they were sufficient. M. Vesnitch had said that Serbia would contribute a division, but, if so, must be protected against the Bulgarians. In other words, what he offered with one hand he withdrew with the other.

M. VESNITCH said that he had declared Serbia's readiness to help. Nevertheless, the precarious condition of the country must be taken into account. He was prepared to offer the whole of the Serbian Army on condition that, while it was away from home, the house should not be burgled. One division had been mentioned in the report of the Military Representatives; he had understood that they desired one division. He now understood from General Belin that more, if possible, would be acceptable. It was necessary, however, for the Serbian Military Authorities to judge what could be done under the circumstances. The first business of Serbia was to ensure her own existence. She was being asked to make an effort in the common cause and on her behalf he had expressed her readiness to do her best. Marshal Foch had said that action must be preceded by political agreement between the countries concerned, namely, Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia, and Roumania. He would like to observe that, as a Military action was required and that as, for success, it ought to be rapid, a great deal of valuable time would be lost in conducting negotiations at Belgrade, Budapest, and Prague. He thought it would be best to place the available forces directly under Marshal Foch's command.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Vesnitch if he could inform the Council of the present distribution of the Serbian Army.

M. VESNITCH gave the following information:—

1. The Morava division in the Banat.
2. The Drina division in Batchka and Slavonia.

3. The Danube division in Croatia and Slovenia.
4. The Choumadia division in Belgrade (one regiment) and on the Bulgarian frontier.
5. The Timok division in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Fiume.
6. The Yugo-Slav division in the Sandjak, on the Albanian frontier, in old Serbia and in Montenegro.
7. The Vardar Brigade in Macedonia.

M. CLEMENCEAU then asked the Czecho-Slovak representatives to state the case for their Government.

M. KRAMARCZ said that the Hungarian situation was undoubtedly a threat to Czecho-Slovakia. His Government did not desire Hungary to have a larger Army than that allowed to her in the armistice, but, the present moment was not propitious for action by Czecho-Slovakia against Hungary. When Czecho-Slovakia was attacked, the moment was more propitious. At that time, Czecho-Slovakia had mobilised 150,000 men, but munitions and equipment were lacking. The Conference had then imposed an armistice between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary. The Hungarians had observed this armistice and had evacuated Czecho-Slovakian territory. What pretext, therefore, was there for the Czechs to attack the Hungarians? The proposal now was to demand the reduction of the Hungarian forces to the number stipulated, but so far as Czecho-Slovakia was concerned, the Hungarians had fulfilled the conditions of the armistice required of them. He agreed with M. Vesnitch that a political agreement between the three States was not desirable. The question was one concerning the Entente. It related to the armistice negotiated between Hungary and the Allied and Associated Powers. No doubt Czech troops, if employed, would do their duty, but before they could be employed the Government at Prague must be consulted.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired what contribution from Czecho-Slovakia had been suggested in the Versailles report?

M. KRAMARCZ replied 20,000 men. He did not conceal that Czecho-Slovakia had more men than this available, but he could not say whether the Government at Prague would consent to act. As the Council knew, the Government had lately changed.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had just received a letter from General Pellé<sup>6</sup> dated 8th July. He read this letter to the Council. (Appendix "D"). It followed from this letter that Hungary was determined to re-act against fate. It would seize its opportunity when the Allied nations had demobilised and disarmament had set in. He would like to explain that the preliminary understanding he had referred to was the kind of understanding that could be

---

<sup>6</sup> Gen. Maurice C. J. Pellé, of the French Army, commander in chief of the Czecho-Slovak Army.

obtained in the Council. He did not suggest that the negotiations be carried on in Prague, Bucharest and Belgrade.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Balfour whether any British help could be expected?

MR. BALFOUR replied that he had repeated to the British War Cabinet the argument he had set forth to the Council. He thought the Powers could not submit to a continued breach of the armistice by Hungary. This affected central Europe and perhaps even the whole of Europe. Unless this were put a stop to, there was no hope of peace or of restoring the economic condition of central Europe. It was of the utmost importance to act quickly. He thought an effort must be made and that all Allied countries must contribute. A decision on this subject was one of a very momentous character. Up to the present time, he had received no answer from the British War Cabinet. He did not know whether General Thwaites had received any answer from the War Office.

GENERAL THWAITES said that he had received no answer.

M. CRESPI said that he had telegraphed to Rome in the same sense as Mr. Balfour. He thought all were agreed in regarding the question as one of European importance. He had so far received no answer. The question, however, was being considered. Italy was passing through a critical time. Demobilisation had proceeded even further than he had stated on the previous day. (M. Crespi handed to M. Clemenceau a paper on this subject—Appendix "E".<sup>7</sup>) Italy was threatened by her own Bolsheviks. A general strike was possible if Italy acted against the Bolsheviks, whether in Russia or elsewhere. He expected M. Tittoni to be back in Paris on the following Sunday. He would then be able to make a statement on the subject.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the result of the discussion did not appear to furnish Marshal Foch with a very coherent force.

MARSHAL FOCH said that, if the military resurrection of Hungary was to be prevented, action should be rapid. If all the Governments co-operated, he thought success could be achieved.

M. BENES said that one precaution must be taken if a campaign against Hungary were started. When the Magyars had attacked Czecho-Slovakia, it was found that there was considerable Austrian connivance with the Hungarians. It would be necessary to take all precautions that Austria did not hamper the military action undertaken by the Allies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, to sum up, there appeared to be six Roumanian divisions, two French, one Serbian and a doubtful quantity of Czecho-Slovaks.

---

<sup>7</sup> Appendix "E" does not accompany the file copy of the minutes.



M. BENES said there were troops in Czecho-Slovakia, but a scarcity of equipment. He was therefore not prepared to state a figure.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would be glad to know what contribution Great Britain would make. Perhaps Mr. Balfour would be able to state this on the following day.

MR. BALFOUR said that he hoped this might be so. There were no British troops at present on the spot.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the question was whether any could be sent.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not know.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch whether he could act on this information.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that preparations could be made. After discovering what each could contribute and the dates on which the contributions could be made, he thought that he would be able in a fortnight to elaborate the first outlines of a plan.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Marshal Foch should give a sketch of the plan of operations in a week, in order that the matter should be kept before the Council's attention.

MARSHAL FOCH said that, if he were to do this, he must be authorised to treat with the Governments concerned and find out from them what they could undertake to supply and at what period they could fulfil their undertakings.

M. KRAMARCZ said that he did not know whether his Government would contribute to the operations, but should it do so he must ask that action be taken at Vienna, in order that munitions and arms stored there be delivered to Czecho-Slovakia.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that this point should be explained to Marshal Foch.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch after consulting the authorities of the countries concerned, should formulate the plan of operations and report progress to the Council in a week's time.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, July 11, 1919.

---

#### Appendix "A" to HD-5

WCP-1125

[*The Secretary of the German Delegation (Von Haniel) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*]

No. 122

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION,  
VERSAILLES, 25 June, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: The Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs has instructed me to communicate the following to you.

"The German Government is informed that among the Oriental territories that Germany must cede in accordance with the Peace Treaty as well as among the administrations and minor military authorities there, doubt exists and wrong views are held as to the time when this cession must take place. In order to avoid misunderstandings and disagreeable incidents, and in the interests of the two parties, it seems necessary to inform the interested circles immediately that the Treaty of Peace will not come into force as soon as it is signed, but only at the time stated in the different Clauses of the Treaty, and until then, the actual state of affairs are still in force. As to that which concerns the territories situated within the line of demarcation, all that is necessary has been done on the German side. The Allied and Associated Powers are requested, without delay, to take corresponding measures in connection with the territories situated beyond this line."

Accept [etc.]

VON HANDEL

---

Appendix B to HD-5

CONVENTION WITH THE NEW STATES

*Clauze Relative to the Reciprocal Relations of the Ceded Territories*

ARTICLE 1

Separate agreements between the High Contracting Parties will provide for the regulation of the interests of persons remaining in territories detached from the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and transferred to each Contracting Party, with special regard to their civil rights, their trade, and the exercise of their profession, including the establishment and up-keep of emigration agencies.

ARTICLE 2

Insurance Companies which had their business head-quarters in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties formerly belonging to the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, will have the right for a period of ten years to carry on their business in the detached portion of said Monarchy transferred to the other High Contracting Parties, and their change of nationality shall not in the least affect the juridical status which they previously enjoyed.

During the aforementioned period the business of said Companies may not be subjected by these High Contracting Parties to any tax or due higher than those affecting the business of their own national Companies nor can any action be taken with regard to their property which is not equally applicable to the property, rights and interests

of national insurance companies, and suitable indemnities will be paid in those cases in which such measures may be taken in the territory of one or other of the High Contracting Parties.

The above provisions will be enforced within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties only in as much as and for so long as the Insurance Companies of said High Contracting Party are in enjoyment of the same right of carrying on their business in said territory, even if their business head-quarters are outside said territory.

It is agreed that after the expiration of the ten year period above referred to the Insurance Companies as above will enjoy the treatment of the most favoured nation, with special regard to the exercise of their business, the regulations and restrictions which might directly or indirectly affect this right, and the assessment of direct or indirect charges, dues and taxes, and no restriction may be placed on these companies which was not applicable to them on July 1st, 1914, unless same restriction is likewise placed on the national companies of said State.

N. B. The purpose is to maintain for a certain period the relations already existing in the matter of insurance in the territories of the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

### ARTICLE 3

Persons habitually residing with[in] the territories of the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy transferred to one or other of the High Contracting Parties, and who, during the war, were outside the territories of the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or who were imprisoned, interned, or evacuated, will enjoy in full the provisions as under articles 300 and 301 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria within the territories of the High Contracting Parties.

### ARTICLE 4

A Special Convention to be drawn up between Austria, Hungary, and the other Allied and Associated States arising from the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or cedees of its territories, will determine the conditions of repayment in Austrian currency of the special war expenditure anticipated during the war by the territories of said Monarchy transferred to each of the High Contracting Parties, or by collective bodies of public interest in said territories, on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in accordance with Austro-Hungarian law, such as allowances to families of mobilised soldiers, requisitions, billeting of troops, subsidies to refugees, etc.

In the assessment of these sums account will be taken of the share said territories have contributed, with regard to Austria-Hungary,



to the cost of said repayment, said contribution being reckoned on the basis of the proportional contribution to the revenues of the Monarchy made by said territories in 1913.

#### ARTICLE 5

In those cases in which the property referred to under article 12 of the financial clauses of the Peace Treaty with Austria belonged to an association or public corporation carrying on its work in territories which have come to be separated as a result of said Treaty, special Conventions shall regulate the assessment of such property.

#### ARTICLE 6

Records, registers, plans, deeds and documents of all kinds bearing on the civil, military, financial, judicial or other administration, existing within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties and concerning ex-Austro-Hungarian territories transferred to another of the High Contracting Parties will be handed over to same without delay.

If any of the documents, records, registers, deeds or plans have been displaced they will be returned on the request of the Government concerned.

#### ARTICLE 7

Contracts drawn up between ex-Austrian nationals who have become nationals of one of the High Contracting Parties on the one hand and ex-Austrian nationals who have become nationals of another of the High Contracting Parties on the other hand, are valid except contracts for the purchase or sale of goods entered into before August 1st, 1914 and not yet carried out, which are annulled.

N.B. This clause corresponds to that foreseen under art. 50 of Sec. VIII of Part X of the Treaty with Austria, except that the uni-lateral cancellation of contracts between Allied States cannot be recognised. Nevertheless with regard to pre-war contracts the general interest makes it advisable that they be mutually cancelled in view of the long period which has elapsed since they were entered into.

#### ARTICLE 8

All railway rolling-stock which, in violation of the terms of art. 3 of the Armistice of November 3rd, 1918<sup>8</sup> (Villa Giusti) has been transported beyond the armistice frontier during and after the negotiations for said armistice, must be returned to Italy within a period of two months, apart from the material which will be due to

---

<sup>8</sup> Vol. II, p. 175.

her under the reparation clauses of art. 311 of the Peace Treaty with Austria.

The quantity and quality of the rolling-stock to be thus returned will be determined for engines in accordance with direct ascertainment, and for cars and trucks in the ratio of twenty for each engine, one tenth of same to be passenger cars and one twenty fifth goods trucks.

#### ARTICLE 9

A special convention to be drawn up between the High Contracting Parties will regulate the payment of all civil, ecclesiastical and military pensions due to ex-Austrian nationals who by the Peace Treaty with Austria become nationals of one or other of the High Contracting Parties.

#### ARTICLE 10

Without prejudice to the provisions of article 6 of part XII of the Peace Treaty with Austria, the High Contracting Parties undertake to maintain on their own lines the railway rates in force before the war for traffic with the Adriatic ports and the Black Sea in relation to their competition with German North Sea ports, with special reference to the pre-existing relation between the railway rates for traffic with the Port of Trieste on the one hand and the Port of Fiume on the other.

Persons, goods, ships, means of transport, and postal, telegraphic and telephonic services coming from or going to the port of Trieste on the one hand and of Fiume on the other hand will be treated in all the ports and on all ways of communication in the territories of the High Contracting Parties formerly belonging to the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, on a footing of perfect equality with special reference to matters affecting the freedom of transit, sanitary control, customs and police, dues and taxes of all kinds and the conditions made, the facilitations granted and the restrictions imposed on trade and traffic in general.

#### ARTICLE 11

As an exception to the provisions of article. . . . (Art. 4 of the Peace Treaty with Poland) and for a period of five years from the enforcement of the present Treaty, each of the States to which under the Treaty of Peace with Austria and Hungary Adriatic ports belonging to the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy have been ceded, shall recognise to any other of these same States the right to carry on coasting trade between these ports in conditions of complete reciprocity.

## ARTICLE 12

While expressly maintaining, in principle, for the nationals of Adriatic riparian States the exclusive right to fish along their respective coasts, said States will, for a period of three years from the enforcement of the present Treaty, reciprocally grant to the inhabitants of the Adriatic coast of one State the right to fish along the coast of the other States. Coral and sponge fishing will, however, be excepted from this rule, as also fishing within one sea mile of the coast, which is exclusively reserved to the inhabitants of the country.

## ARTICLE 13

As an exception to the provisions of article. . . . (article 3 of Part XII of the Peace Treaty with Austria) and for a period of three years from the enforcement of the present Treaty, goods imported into Yugoslavia through ports, or in transit through ports which, before the war, belonged to the ex-Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, will be entitled to proportionate reductions of duties corresponding to those applied to the same products under the Austro-Hungarian customs tariff of February 13th, 1906 when imported into Austro-Hungary through said ports.

## ARTICLE 14

Objects of all kinds, and more especially antiquities, works of art, documents, records and scientific and bibliographical material which during the war, or in the imminence of hostilities, were removed from invaded regions or from territories transferred by the Peace Treaty with Austria, and which are now in other territories placed under the jurisdiction of one of the High Contracting Parties, will be repatriated by these same High Contracting Parties within six months from the date of the enforcement of the present Treaty.

---

Appendix C to HD-5

[Translation <sup>o</sup>]

*Note to the Council of the Heads of Delegations*

REPUBLIC OF FRANCE,  
PARIS, July 11, 1919.

Raising of the Blockade.

The Allied and Associated representatives on the Inter-Allied Blockade Committee, having taken into consideration the note of July

---

<sup>o</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



10 from the German delegation with regard to the ratification of the treaty of peace and requesting the immediate raising of the blockade, deem, that, if this communication is considered by the Council of the Heads of Delegations as the official notice "of the regular and complete ratification" envisaged in the letter sent June 27 to the German delegation by the President of the Peace Conference,<sup>11</sup> the blockade of Germany should be raised from the 12th of July.

They inquire whether this opinion is shared by the Council of the Heads of Delegations.

---

#### Appendix D to HD-5

[Translation <sup>12</sup>]

PRAGUE, July 8, 1919.

General Pellé,  
To the President of the Council  
Minister of War  
(E.M.A.) *Paris*.

As I have had the honor of recounting to you, the Hungarian troops before the evening of July 4 withdrew from the border demarcating the territory of the Czecho-Slovak Republic to the frontier designated by the radiogram of June 13 from the president of the Peace Conference.<sup>13</sup> A neutral zone of four kilometers—two kilometers on each side of the frontier—has been established.

Whatever the exact reason may be that dictated this retreat for the Hungarian Army, there is reason to believe the truce which resulted will be only momentary.

In spite of the difficulties of the internal situation the Hungarian Government continues to produce armaments.

During the recent retreat a number of French, English, and American officers were in contact with the Magyar troops. They were able to talk with civil and military officials of all ranks of the former regime serving the Bolshevik government, with the leaders of the Bolshevik movement of Buda-Pest, and with the working people, laborers converted into leaders of bands or commanders of regiments.

All these officers give the same testimony. They did not meet any Hungarian who is not determined to fight to the end in order to restore his country within its former frontiers, or at least to reconquer Slovakia. The cultured Hungarians, in particular the officers of the

---

<sup>11</sup> See CF-95, minute 2, vol. VI, p. 720.

<sup>12</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>13</sup> Appendix V (E) to CF-65, vol. VI, p. 413.

old Army, tried to create in these foreigners a good impression of the discipline and courage of their troops; at the same time they were intent upon proving to them the justice of their national claims. Bolsheviks of every degree revealed themselves no less fanatical and even more passionate in asserting their rights and they do not recoil before any violent means of Magyarization.

The Hungarian people are confident of the future. In a few months the armies of the Entente will have been demobilized and the Hungarian military forces will be ready; the fate of Slovakia will be quickly settled.

But as I have already indicated in my note of June 11, the frontier drawn for Czecho-Slovakia by the Peace Conference gives to Hungary all the strategic advantages; it cannot be defended by the Czecho-Slovak Army, or more exactly, the sole means of defense would be to anticipate the enemy if possible and to take the initiative in operations.

The situation would become still more unfavorable if the Hungarians, rulers of Vienna, should hem in Western Slovakia on three sides.

If bolshevism takes root and grows in Hungary with the aid of the tolerance which it has enjoyed up to the present from the Entente, it would not delay much in seizing Vienna, whence it will threaten Italy and Switzerland or rejoin Bavaria.

If the bolshevism of Budapest yields its place to a government less inimical to the social order, but equally dominated by nationalist opinion, war will come again to Central Europe in another form, but always against our vital interests.

Today, as yesterday, military intervention against Hungary by the Entente appears to me as an inevitable necessity. In the absence of any other reason, the plain violation by the Hungarian state of the conditions of disarmament established by the armistice convention justifies this intervention. The effort to carry this out will be more costly tomorrow than it would have been several weeks ago; it will be still more so if it is postponed again.

PELLÉ

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, July 12, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. Henry White.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	M. Clemenceau. M. Pichon.

ITALY	JAPAN
M. Crespi.	M. Matsui.

*Secretary-General*

M. Dutasta.

*Secretaries*

Mr. L. Harrison.  
Mr. H. Norman.  
M. Paterno.  
M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . .	Colonel U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Lieut.-Commdr. Bell.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lieut. Zanchi.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

(At this point M. Cambon<sup>1</sup> entered the room.)

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council had before them a proposal of Mr. Lansing to the effect that the Polish and Tzecho-Slovak Governments should be given 10 days to arrive at an understanding between themselves on the Teschen question. He requested M. Cambon to explain his point of view.

M. CAMBON said that the Teschen question had been much discussed: no particular solution had been accepted; for it was hoped that MM. Paderewski and Benes would be able to come to an understanding. They had not been able to do so, with the result that conflict continued in the area in question. It was therefore necessary to arrive at some solution and he thought that Mr. Lansing's proposal was a good one.

<sup>1</sup> Jules Cambon, French representative and president, Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs.



(After some discussion it was decided to accept Mr. Lansing's proposal and to grant a period of 10 days to the Governments of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia to arrive at an agreement between themselves on the question of Teschen.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Lansing had submitted a proposal to the effect that the Orava question should be referred to the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees, in order that they might correct the frontier previously adopted, in a manner which should conform to the ethnographical data on the subject. He therefore asked the experts to accept the ethnographical frontier and asked M. Cambon for his opinion.

M. CAMBON said that the Czecho-Slovak Committee had examined the question with care: the Committee in question had decided to grant Orava to Czecho-Slovakia as a compensation. At present the populations affected were stated to be dissatisfied and Mr. Lansing had asked for a re-examination of the question.

MR. WHITE said that two peasants had visited President Wilson on the 28th June and that they had spoken to him on behalf of 50,000 inhabitants of the region in question.

M. CAMBON thought that the two Committees might meet and submit a new proposal.

MR. BALFOUR said that President Wilson desired strongly that the question should be examined afresh.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question should be referred to the Committees, which should be asked to make a new examination of the question, without being bound by any obligation to return to the ethnographical frontier line.

(It was therefore decided that the question of the frontier between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia should be referred to the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees for examination and report.)

(At this point M. Cambon withdrew.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council had to look into the effect upon the Russian Blockade of the termination of the Blockade of Germany.

MR. BALFOUR said that whilst he recognised how urgent and important the question was, he had found that it raised points of such difficulty that he would be grateful if the Council would put off the discussion to its next meeting.

(Mr. Balfour's proposal was agreed to.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was proposed that a Committee of Experts should examine the Italian demand for the cession of the Austro-Hungarian Concession in Tientsin to them.

MR. WHITE said that he was obliged to remark that

The Orava  
Question

Blockade of  
Russia

Question of  
Tientsin

the Government of the United States had always been opposed to any new concessions at Tientsin being made by China.

M. CRESPI said that it was not a question of a new concession but simply of an extension of the existing Italian concession. The Note submitted by the Italian Delegation to the Council<sup>2</sup> showed that the Italian concession only consisted of 124 acres whilst those granted to other countries were more extensive.

M. PICHON said that the question should be summarised as follows. There was an article in the German treaty by virtue of which German concessions were restored to China. Germany had ratified the Treaty. It was to be observed that none of the concessions in question had been given to the Allied and Associated Powers, but that they had been restored to China, on the simple condition that the latter country should open its ports to international Commerce. The clauses in question were contained in Articles Nos. 128 to 132. The Italian proposal was therefore no less than an abrogation of the principle accepted by the Conference.

M. MARSU said that he entirely agreed with M. Pichon. The return of the concessions to China was part of the Treaty with Germany. The same thing applied to Austria; and the Austrian Government had received a copy of the text of the Treaty. It was therefore equitable to return the Austro-Hungarian concessions to China.

MR. WHITE said that in spite of his keen desire to satisfy the Italian claims, it seemed impossible to him to grant to Italy what belonged to China.

M. CRESPI said that the Italian Government had long been asking for an improvement in their concession from China.

The concession in question was very limited and surrounded by marshy ground. It did not even contain any land suitable for setting up a hospital for the sick and wounded. The Conference was very cognizant of Chinese methods and the discussions had been so drawn out that the Italian Government had received no satisfactory reply. It had therefore been decided to put the question before the Conference, with a view to making the concession a question of reparation. The Italian concession was too small to allow of any economic development and he was of opinion that the Chinese Government would not oppose the enlargement of the concession in question.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he proposed to nominate a Committee.

MR. WHITE said that he opposed any Committee being nominated, since the question before it would be that of ceding Chinese property. He did not see any objection to the Italian Government raising the question direct with China; but if Austria-Hungary were deprived

---

<sup>2</sup> This document does not accompany the minutes.

of the concession by virtue of the Treaty, it must inevitably be returned to China.

M. CRESPI proposed that the question should be referred to the Reparation Committee.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he preferred that it should be examined by experts. He reminded Mr. White that no decision would be taken unless he authorised it, since every member had a right of veto. But it seemed difficult and not very conciliatory to oppose the nomination of a Committee.

MR. WHITE said that he agreed under the reservations which he had already made.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that the representative of the American Delegation would always be able to refuse to accept the decisions of the Committee in question.

MR. WHITE stated that he agreed to the nomination of a Committee, but that he would be opposed to its decisions. The United States had renounced all claims to any concession and was, moreover, opposed to concessions in principle. He could not, therefore, recognise the necessity of nominating any Committee.

M. CRESPI said that he did not wish to press the discussion further, but that he begged Mr. White to agree to the nomination of a Committee without thereby engaging himself in any way.

MR. WHITE stated that under these circumstances, he agreed.

MR. BALFOUR stated that he agreed to the proposal but that he did not see what good would come of it in view of the American right of veto. The work of the Committee would be without effect, but if it could give any satisfaction to the Italian Delegation, he would not be opposed to the nomination of the Committee.

MR. WHITE stated that he thought the question should be dealt with by direct negotiation and read Article 3 of Section IV, Part III, of the Peace Treaty with Austria:—

“Austria cedes to China all her rights over the buildings, wharves and pontoons, barracks, forts, arms and munitions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless telegraphy installations and other public property which belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and which are situated or may be in the Austro-Hungarian Concession at Tientsin or elsewhere in Chinese territory.”

M. CRESPI stated that the Article in question had not yet been submitted to the Austrian delegation and that it was only a project.

(It was decided to nominate a special Committee to examine the Italian demand that a clause which should cede to Italy the Austrian concession in Tientsin should be introduced into the Peace Treaty with Austria.)



(The American Delegation accepted the proposal whilst making a reservation that it would not be bound by the findings of the Committee appointed.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he was obliged to submit to the Council a document which had been communicated officially by the Serbian delegation (see Appendix A). It had been found in Klagenfurt in the Office of the Senior Officer of the District. The document seemed to show that the Austrians had been informed of the movements of the Serbian army by the indiscretion of the Italian Authorities.

A Document  
Communicated  
by the Serbian  
Government

(It was decided to communicate the document to the various Delegations for their scrutiny.)

6. M. CLEMENCEAU produced a document addressed to him directly by Bela Kun.

Wireless  
Message From  
Bela Kun

M. MANTOUX then read it aloud (see Appendix B).

MR. BALFOUR stated that it seemed to him that the Council was in a very difficult position with regard to the document in question. It should be remembered that the Allied and Associated Powers had approached Hungary with a view to making that country withdraw its troops from Czecho-Slovakia on the condition that an analogous order should be imposed upon Roumania. Hungary had accepted and had withdrawn its troops. Roumania had not obeyed the order. M. Bratiano had said in a private conversation with him that it would be impossible for Roumania to withdraw her troops before Hungary had disarmed. The argument was strong. Roumania was threatened by Russian Bolshevism on its eastern frontier and by Hungarian Bolshevism on its western frontier. Up to the present time the country had managed to hold its own, owing to the fact that on the Hungarian side, it was protected by the line of the Theiss which could easily be defended. The Roumanians stated that if they were to abandon this line and attempt to defend themselves further back, they would have no guarantee against an attack from Bela Kun which, if made, would make it difficult for Roumania to defend herself. Although M. Bratiano had not made a precise statement to that effect, he had given the impression that if Hungary had disarmed according to the conditions of the Armistice, Roumania would carry out the wishes of the Allies and would retire to the line which had been laid down. M. Bratiano had further explained that Hungary by withdrawing its forces from Czecho-Slovakia had not lessened the danger to Roumania, which was on the contrary more than ever menaced by the Hungarian movement.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he supposed that Bela Kun's ready

obedience to the orders he had received could be explained in this way.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought the Roumanians would be justified in not withdrawing their army so long as the Hungarians were not prevented from re-enforcing theirs and from manufacturing munitions and war materials.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he proposed that Mr. Balfour should prepare a reply.

M. CRESPI said that new facts had to be taken into consideration, which had occurred since the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops. Massacres and looting subversive of human rights had taken place. The Italian representative, who was President of the Interallied Armistice Commission, had formally protested to the Government of Bela Kun and had been able to prevent certain executions.

MR. BALFOUR proposed that a reply should be given to the effect that no discussion could be undertaken with Bela Kun so long as he did not comply with the Armistice conditions.

M. PICHON said that the Italian representative had evidently done everything within his power. He drew the attention of the Council to a telegram received by him. (See Annex C.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought that Mr. Balfour's proposal was the best.

(It was therefore decided to send the following telegram in reply to the wireless telegraphic message sent by Bela Kun to M. Clemenceau :—

“The Peace Conference cannot discuss any matter with you whilst you do not carry out the conditions of the Armistice.”)

6. [*sic*] M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether M. Crespi had the report on this subject asked for by the Conference.

Supply Trains  
at Modane

M. CRESPI said that the report in question would be ready during the afternoon. The examination that had been made showed that the trains had not been held up at Modane except for a few hours on account of customs formalities.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would examine the report.

7. M. CRESPI said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to the following note on the subject of the actions of the Greeks in Asia Minor. (See Annex D.)

Greeks in  
Asia Minor

M. CLEMENCEAU said that even though the Greeks had passed the lines of demarcation laid down, they were none the less in the country with the authorisation of the Peace Conference, and this could not be pleaded for the Italians, who, in spite of our wishes and of our decisions, had occupied the country. In a full Conference, at which M. Orlando and M. Sonnino were present, Italy

had been asked to withdraw her troops.<sup>3</sup> She had not done so. If the Greeks had acted in the manner described, in the note, it was regrettable, but how could they be blamed for it? He therefore proposed that Mr. Balfour should send a despatch to the British Commodore on the spot, instructing him to report on the situation.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would do so, but was the Commodore to confine his enquiry to the actions of the Greeks in the region in question, without taking note of the actions of the Italians?

M. CLEMENCEAU said that what the Italians had done was well-known. The Italian forces were in the region in violation of a formal decision of the Conference. M. Orlando and M. Sonnino had taken no notice of the requests made to them, nor of the decisions made. Together with Mr. Balfour, he had sent a memorandum to M. Tittoni,<sup>4</sup> to which a reply had just been received. It had been agreed that the Italians should send no more troops into the regions in question, and in spite of this, three thousand more had been sent. He therefore proposed that an enquiry should be made by the British Commodore, but he did not see how he could place any blame upon the Greeks.

M. CRESPI said that M. Tittoni would soon be back, and that he, personally, did not wish to enter into the discussion, more particularly as a memorandum had been sent. He would confine himself to saying that the Italian Government thought that it possessed rights over the region in question by virtue of Article 9 of the Treaty of London.<sup>5</sup> He none the less thanked the Council for the proposal for an enquiry, which he agreed to.

(It was decided that Mr. Balfour should direct the British Commodore in command on the Coast of Asia Minor to send in a report on the subject of the incidents that had occurred between the Greeks and Italians in the region in question.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 12 July, 1919.

---

<sup>3</sup> For previous discussion of this subject, see CF-9, CF-10, CF-17, CF-19, vol. v, pp. 570, 577, 686, 716, and CF-37B, CF-93A, vol. vi, pp. 83 and 712.

<sup>4</sup> Apparently a reference to the declaration by Great Britain and France to the new Italian delegation, June 28, 1919. For text, see appendix I to CF-99A, vol. vi, p. 760.

<sup>5</sup> Great Britain, Cmd. 671 Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915.*



## Annex A to HD-6

HEADQUARTERS OF THE SERBIAN ARMY  
OPERATIONS DIVISION  
No. 40,941

From: Volvode Michitch, Chief of the Staff of the Serbian Army.  
To: General Pruneau, Head of the French Military Mission.

The Serbian Headquarters Staff has been informed on several occasions, that the Italian Military Authorities were giving the Austrians information upon the positions of our Army, and upon the movements of our troops in Slovenia and Carinthia.

During the events which have taken place recently on the Carinthian front, our authorities discovered when they occupied Klagenfurt, a document which proves the existence of relations between the Italian and Austrian Military authorities, upon the table of the Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian troops in Carinthia, who was then stationed at Klagenfurt.

I have the honour to transmit to you two photographs of the document in question, the original of which is at Headquarters; it will be shown to you if you so desire. I further beg you to be so good as to transmit a copy to the Commander-in-Chief, and to keep the other for your own use.

The Headquarters Staff has sent several copies of the photograph to the Delegation of the Jugo-Slav Kingdom at Paris, begging it to do what is necessary to cause the Italian Military Mission to be sent away from Lioubliana as soon as possible, since it can no longer be doubted that the Mission in question receives information about our troops and conveys it to the Austrians by means of code telegrams which it has permission to use.

I beg that you will ask the General Commander-in-Chief to cause the Italian Mission to be withdrawn from Lioubliana since it has exceeded its functions, and our authorities can no longer have any confidence in it. It should be noted that the document in question is dated 29th May, and that our attack had begun on the 28th May, which facts will show how prejudicial it was to us.

VOLVODE MICHITCH  
*Chief of the General Staff*

BELGRADE, 4 July, 1919.

Transmitted to the General Commander-in-Chief for necessary action.

I am taking a copy of this letter to Paris and a photograph of the document under consideration.

PRUNEAU

BELGRADE, 6 July, 1919.

No. 385

PARIS, 23 June, 1919.  
4, rue Boccador.From: General Pechitch, Chief of the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene  
Military Mission.

To: General Alby, Chief of the General Staff, Paris.

I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of the document referred  
to in my letter of the 18th June (No. 373).PECHITCH  
*Commander-in-chief of the Mission*

[Enclosure—Translation\*]

INTELLIGENCE SERVICE  
VILLACH DIVISION  
INTELLIGENCE NO. 281  
S. H. S.—SITUATIONTo the Bureau of Intelligence of the Provincial German Austrian  
Commandant at Klagenfurt.

VILLACH, May 29, 1919.

In reply to code telegram Intelligence No. 594 confidential of May  
23, report that K1 24 under military orders charged with this mission,  
up to the present has not returned.K1 19, under military orders, sent May 26 to obtain information,  
reports on this subject, May 28, 1919, as follows:

In the region Wurzen-Krainburg-Radmansdorf, there are not more than 4000 men. In this radius, there are about 3 battalions, comprising: *1 battalion of legionnaires*: 1 company, Wurzen; 1 company, Assling; 1 company, Radmansdorf and 1 company, Ratschach. *1 battalion, 17th Regiment, infantry*: 1 company, Kronau; 1 company, Assling; 2 companies in the positions "Rozica" Rosenbacher-Sattel and "Golica" MaElender-Sattel. *1 battalion, Serbian 22nd Regiment, infantry*: ½ company, Wurzen; ½ company, Lengenfeld, 1 company, Birnbaum; 2 companies, Assling. *1 battalion, Serbian 26th Regiment, infantry*: 2 companies, Ratschach; 2 companies, Krainburg. *1 battalion, Serbian 27th Regiment, infantry*: 1 company, Lengenfeld; 1 company Alpen Planira, number 993; about a ½ company, Krainburg. South of Krainburg, reserves are massing: Effectives per company estimated at about 200 men.

Per battalion, 8 machine guns, artillery: Ratschach, 21 cannons; Assling, 12 cannons; Krainburg, 8 cannons, 4 of which are heavy. The Serbian 4th Regiment, infantry, was transferred about May 20th, probably to Unterdrauburg. Traffic on all railroad lines in Serbia, Croatia Slovenia.

\* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Similar information has been forwarded to the Bureau of Intelligence at Klagenfurt and to the officer of Italian intelligence at Paris, Tenento Parenti.

*Lieutenant Parenti reports:* A Serbian division arrived this noon at Eisenkappel. After the capture of this place, the division was divided into two parts, one brigade of which headed in the direction of Kühnsdorf; the second brigade toward Villach. The enemy possesses a considerable quantity of artillery. The effectives of all the enemy troops to be found at the Carinthian front are estimated to be from 20 to 25 thousand men. The Italian military forces can be ready to move within five hours. The two dispositions were dispatched by telephone to the Bureau of Intelligence at Klagenfurt, May 29, 1919.

Please kindly check the veracity of the information furnished by Kl 19 and indicate amount of remuneration to be paid this person who up to now has not been recompensed.

CAPTAIN RIMITZ, M. P.

---

HEZERSKO DETACHMENT

O. NO. 243

To the Commander of the Division of the Drave, I transmit the above information on our forces and positions rendered by enemy spies. This document was found June 8 on a table in a house which was the headquarters of the Provincial Commandant of Klagenfurt.

KLAGENFURT, June 11, 1919.

The Commandant

COLONEL DOBR. MILENKOVÍÉ, M. P.

Copy verified by

Lieutenant-Colonel

Signature illegible.

---

Appendix "B" [to HD-6]

Wireless From Budapest

SSS No. 121 from Budapest W. 840 11/7 at 21.15.

To:—M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference, Paris.

MR. PRESIDENT: In your dispatch of 13th June<sup>7</sup> you assured me that as soon as our troops had evacuated the territories ceded to the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia, and had retired behind the frontiers assigned to the federated socialist republic of Hungary, the Roumanian troops would make an analogous movement of evacuation, and would retire behind the frontiers laid down in great detail in

---

<sup>7</sup> Appendix V (A), V (B), and V (F) to CF-65, vol. VI, pp. 411, 412, and 416.



your note. In the reply which I then gave,<sup>8</sup> as well as in the dispatch which I sent subsequently,<sup>9</sup> I stated that the federated socialist republic of Hungary was desirous of showing how anxious it was to avoid any useless bloodshed, and would therefore agree to your demand. And that I have kept my word has been proved by facts. At the same time I took the liberty of requesting, that you would give us the necessary guarantees that the Roumanian troops should carry out the orders of the Allied and Associated Powers. I was also of the same opinion as you, when you stated that frontier lines acquired by force of arms could not be held. As I did not receive the guarantees, I stated in my last dispatch, that I accepted as a personal guarantee, or assurance, that the Roumanian troops would evacuate the regions to the East of the Theiss, which were completely devastated. You have doubtless been informed, Mr. President, that our troops broke off the fighting in which they had become engaged, with the troops of the Czecho-Slovak Republic by the action of these latter. On the 24th June our troops occupied the lines which marked the neutral zone established by General Pellé. The Roumanian troops should, therefore, have conformed to the orders and instructions issued by the Allied and Associated Powers, contained in your dispatch of the 13th June; they should have retired behind the lines laid down, thereby giving some evidence of a desire for peace on their part and of a wish to accede to your desires in the matter of frontiers acquired by force of arms. In spite of your promise the Roumanian troops have made no movement of withdrawal, but, subsequently, to the 24th June have made several violent attacks more particularly at Tisza-luc; these attacks were beaten off with serious loss by the Red Army. However much we may regret the shedding of blood, we consider it to be a duty imposed on us by your very word, to prevent the Roumanian troops from re-opening such conflicts, in defiance of the formal instructions of the Allied and Associated Powers. We do not wish to dilate on the exactions and the bad conduct which characterise the daily doings of the Roumanian troops. On this point it will be sufficient to tell you, Mr. President, that the devastations of General Hindenburg in the invaded departments of Northern France are perfect oases when compared to the conditions brought about by the savagery of the Roumanian troops in the economic life of the countries that they have occupied. Allow me to ask you, Mr. President, whether your word, and the engagements of the Allied and Associated Powers are sufficient to cause the Roumanian troops to retire behind the frontiers assigned to them in your despatch of 13th

---

<sup>8</sup> Appendix II to CF-73, vol. vi, p. 518.

<sup>9</sup> Appendix III to CF-93, vol. vi, p. 706.

June. We believe that you have means of preventing unnecessary shedding of blood, even though you address your instructions to persons whose desire for peace has not been proved, so strongly as the wishes of the federated socialist republic of Hungary, which, after conducting a series of successful engagements, was willing to cause all useless shedding of blood to cease.

With regard to the republic of Czecho-Slovakia we beg you, Mr. President, to make your wishes and those of the Allied and Associated Powers effective in the matter of the hostile attitude taken up by the Roumanian troops. The federated socialist republic of Hungary brought about a cessation to the hostilities opened up by the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia despite the fact that the Hungarian troops were successful. We beg that you will repeat your instructions of the 13th June and make the wishes of the Allied and Associated Powers respected. It is only in this way that the federated socialist republic will be able to justify its conciliatory attitude in the eyes of its supporters, by having accepted the guarantees given in your declaration. I hope that the Allied and Associated Powers will be able to impose respect for their wishes, and maintain their prestige in the eyes of the Roumanian troops.

BUDAPEST, 11 July.

BELA KUN

*Commissary for Foreign Affairs*

---

Appendix "C" [to HD-6]

*[Telegram Presented to the Council of Heads of Delegations  
by the French Plenipotentiary (Picbon)]*

We are informed by a telegram from Budapest, that the judicial sentences passed after the last anti-Bolshevist movement included: 11 death sentences, 6 sentences to hard labour and about 60 punishments, which vary from 1 to 15 years imprisonment. There is a rising indignation in the town against this recrudescence of Bolshevik procedure. A note has been sent to Vienna by Bela Kun's emissary. This note refers to the accusations which the journals in Vienna have made against the Bolshevik Government in Hungary and demands that satisfaction be given.

The Secretary for Foreign Affairs has replied that it is impossible for him to act as requested.

Bauer<sup>10</sup> requests that Bela Kun shall recall Czobel, the Hungarian Minister to Vienna. He further remarks that the Austrian Government was not consulted on the appointment.

---

<sup>10</sup> Dr. Otto Bauer, Austrian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, November 12, 1918–July 27, 1919.

## Appendix "D" [to HD-6]

[*Memorandum Presented to the Council of Heads of Delegations  
by the Italian Plenipotentiary (Crespi)*]

MEMORANDUM

dated 12 July, 1919.

It is known that the Greeks were obliged by the Turks to evacuate Aidin on the 1st July, but they were able to re-occupy it on the 5th. After this date they have continued to advance to the South of the line laid down by the Council of Four at its meeting of the 19th May (Ayasoluk-Aidin).<sup>11</sup>

It should be noted that the Council of Four laid down that the Greeks should not be allowed to occupy any territory outside the Sandjak of Smyrna, and the Kaza of Aivali, without being authorised to do so by the Senior Naval Officer, that is to say, by the British Commodore. It follows, that, as the Commodore opposed the re-occupation of Aidin by the Greeks with a view to avoid useless blood-shed, it was only right that he should have been obeyed. But on the other hand, as we have said, the Greeks had not only re-occupied Aidin but have gone to a distance of 20 to 25 kilometres to the south of the line laid down; in consequence of this, they have been brought face to face with the Italian troops, on whose patrols they have fired. The Greek aeroplanes have directed machine-gun fire against the Italian troops marching from Giroba towards the Meander; whilst the Greek artillery has fired on the Italian positions. In view of these considerations the British Commodore has uselessly ordered the Greek Commissioner to respect his orders, which are, that the Greek troops should immediately withdraw to the North of the Aidin railway. It would seem that orders have come from Paris, at the same time, telling the Greek Commissioner at Smyrna to re-occupy Aidin, in spite of the contrary orders given by the British Commodore, who, on several occasions, has given evidence of his indignation at the disregard of his instructions. I have therefore the honour to demand that the Supreme Council shall give it to be understood to the Greek Delegation that the orders of the British Commodore are to be respected.

---

<sup>11</sup> CF-19, vol. v, p. 716.



**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, July 15, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. H. White.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.	M. Clemenceau.
<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretaries</i>
Mr. L. Harrison.	Mr. H. Norman.	M. Dutasta. Capt. de St. Quentin.
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Tittoni.	M. Matsui.
	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>
	M. Paterno.	M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Lieut. Burden.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lieut. Zanchi.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a communication from Bela Kun, which was a reply to that sent him on behalf of the Council according to the decision taken on July 12th. (See *Correspondence With Bela Kun* H. D. 6. Minute 5 [6].)<sup>1</sup>

M. MANTOUX read the communication from Bela Kun. (Appendix "A".)

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the opinion that Bela Kun had right on his side. He had been told that, if his troops evacuated Czecho-Slovakia, the Roumanians would be ordered to evacuate the part of Hungary they had invaded, but they had not done so. Mr. Balfour had since informed the Council that the Roumanians could not safely carry out the order. It was a pity this point of view had not been explained before the order was made. Nevertheless, whatever reasons the Roumanians might allege, if the Conference did not order them to withdraw and could not enforce the order, the Council would be in a bad position.

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 120.

MR. BALFOUR admitted there was force in M. Clemenceau's remarks. He believed that the Council of Four would not have taken the decision it took on June 12th,<sup>2</sup> to arrange an Armistice involving the withdrawal of the Roumanians, had they known that the Hungarians were breaking the most essential terms of the original Armistice. This had not been known until both President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George had left Paris. M. Clemenceau had not been aware of it, as he had expressed doubt when the matter was first brought to his notice. No doubt the Council was in an unsatisfactory position, but it would be in a worse [one?] if it were to order the Roumanians to withdraw. M. Bratiano, in his farewell visit, had expressed himself very firmly and concisely. He said that the Powers had no authority to demand of Roumania a retreat which they could not protect. Unless the Powers could guarantee the safe withdrawal of the Roumanian troops and the secure holding of another line of defence against a superior enemy, it would be unfair to enforce the demand on Roumania. According to the military advice he had received, in view of the increase of the Hungarian army, Roumanian national existence might be at stake if this were done. In his communication, Bela Kun alleged breaches of the Armistice by the Czecho-Slovaks and by the Roumanians. It was the business of the military authorities to see that the Armistice was carried out. He thought that the military authorities had not treated the politicians very well, as they had not kept them informed of the breaches of the Armistice whether by one side or by the other. He would, therefore, propose to send Bela Kun's letter to Marshal Foch before any reply was made, and to ask the latter for a report regarding the way in which both the Hungarians and our own Allies had respected or broken the Armistice. He thought it might be possible to reply that, when the Council had addressed Bela Kun in June, it was not aware that Hungary was breaking the Armistice in doubling her army. If, however, the Hungarians now agreed to respect the terms of the Armistice, the Council would obtain the withdrawal of the Roumanians. It might further be stated that the frontier between Hungary and Roumania had already been fixed by the Peace Conference and that no amount of local fighting would alter this decision to Hungary's advantage or detriment. He wished to draw attention to a communication he had had from General Greenland, to the effect that the Hungarian population on the eastern side of the Theiss were greatly alarmed at the prospect of the Roumanians withdrawing, lest they be left thereby to the tender mercies of Bela Kun.

(It was decided to refer the communication received from Bela Kun to Marshal Foch for a full report on the observances and non-observ-

---

<sup>2</sup> CF-62, minute 8, vol. VI, p. 351.

ances of the original Armistice Conditions by all parties concerned.)

2. At M. Clemenceau's request, M. Mantoux read a lengthy document (Appendix "B"), which it was decided should be circulated and discussed at a future meeting.

Armistice on  
Esthonian Front

3. The Council had before it a Joint Note by the Allied Blockade Committee and the Eastern Blockade Committee (W. C. P. 1133) and a Note by the British Delegation (W. C. P. 1133.A.) (Both of these documents are contained in Appendix "C".)

Question of  
Blockade in the  
Baltic

(At this point, Sir W. Mitchell Thomson, Mr. Waterlow, Captain Fuller, M. Seydoux and Mr. J. F. Dulles entered the room.<sup>3</sup>)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council was considerably embarrassed in dealing with this question. He read paragraph 7 of the Joint Note.

M. SEYDOUX said that the question had been raised by the Supreme Economic Council, which had received in reply a communication of the decision taken on June 17th by the Council of Four, in the following terms:—

"After the acceptance of the Conditions of Peace by Germany, measures are not still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevist Russia or Hungary. On the recommendation of the Supreme Economic Council it was approved that there should be an abstinence from any positive measures or public announcement indicating the resumption of such trade. The Supreme Economic Council is asked, however, to examine whether, consistently with this decision, means could be found for preventing war material from being carried by sea from Germany to Bolshevist Russia."

This decision was communicated by Sir Maurice Hankey in a letter to Mr. McCormick.<sup>4</sup> (Appendix "D".)

Sweden had now opened the question and it was necessary to find some solution. The solution suggested was contained in the terms of the last clause of paragraph 7 of the Joint Note. This applied only to the Baltic. In the Black Sea, the position was less acute. There were few countries anxious or able to import much into Russia. In Petrograd, however, the situation was critical. It is but a few hours' steam from Stockholm and Copenhagen. The means suggested were, he admitted, opportunist methods, based on the fact that naval hostilities were taking place in the Baltic. It might be possible without declaring a blockade, which was legally impossible, to proceed on the

<sup>3</sup> Sir William Mitchell Thomson, British representative, Superior Blockade Council and Supreme Economic Council; Sydney Philip Waterlow, British representative, Committee on Blockade of the East; Capt. Cyril Thomas Fuller, head of Naval Section, British Delegation; Charles L. A. J. Seydoux, French representative, Superior Blockade Council, Committee on Blockade of the East, and Supreme Economic Council; and John Foster Dulles, United States representative, Supreme Economic Council.

<sup>4</sup> Vance C. McCormick, United States representative and chairman of the Superior Blockade Council; also chairman of the Supreme Economic Council.



ground of these hostilities to enforce an embargo which should only be raised at the discretion of the Allied Powers. There was, however, another way out. The Allied and Associated Powers had offered help to Admiral Koltchak<sup>5</sup> on certain terms. If this help was to be given to him, it must be given at all points. If neutrals were to be allowed to furnish supplies to the Bolsheviks whom he was fighting, Allied assistance elsewhere would be neutralised. The neutrals might therefore be told that the Allied and Associated Powers would consider it an unfriendly act on their part should they send supplies to Bolsheviks. This could now be stated with more confidence since help had been promised to Admiral Koltchak. He suggested that the Council adopt one or other of the two plans proposed.

MR. BALFOUR said that M. Seydoux's statement was very clear. The question was an extremely embarrassing one. The Council was being hampered at every turn by difficult questions of international law, both in relation to new States and to unrecognised or *de facto* Governments. There were two areas to be considered, first the gulf of Finland, and second the Black Sea. The White Sea was already provided for. Trade with the Baltic States of Finland, Latvia etc., need cause no concern because trade with them would not lead to the percolation into Soviet Russia of any arms or ammunition. Of the two doors into Soviet Russia, one would be closed by ice at the end of November. Until that date, the means of stopping trade from passing through it, which had been suggested amounted to this—that neutral States be informed that the Allied and Associated Powers were not making a formal blockade on Soviet Russia; but, seeing that active hostilities were in progress in the Gulf of Finland, they must insist on the right of turning back trading vessels from the zone of operations. The waters in question were mined, and operations must for success be provided with secrecy. He did not suggest that trading vessels should be subject to capture, sunk or proceeded against in Prize Courts; only that they should be sent back to their port of origin. This course was no doubt open to objection, but less so, he thought, than any other, and it seemed the best that could be done to carry out the policy laid down by the Council of Four. As to the Black Sea, he understood there was a proposal to recognise a blockade to be declared by Koltchak and Denekin.<sup>6</sup> These methods he would be inclined to accept.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as temporary expedients the proposals put forth by M. Seydoux might be adopted.

M. SEYDOUX said it must be clearly understood that no legal right could be appealed to. In order to endow Koltchak and Denekin with

<sup>5</sup> Admiral Alexander Vasilevich Kolchak, proclaimed on November 18, 1918, at Omsk, Supreme Governor of Russia.

<sup>6</sup> Gen. Anton Ivanovich Deniken, commander in chief of the armed forces of South Russia.

some powers to enforce the blockade, he suggested that they might be supplied with a Destroyer or two by the Allied Powers.

MR. TITTONI said that the proposals were expedients, but as he could see no better, he would accept them.

MR. WHITE said that all that had been suggested amounted to a pacific blockade. The American Government was extremely sensitive regarding matters of this kind. Without special instructions he would hesitate to accept any proposal tending to stop traffic on the High Seas in time of Peace.

MR. BALFOUR said that in his view, what was proposed was not quite a pacific blockade. The régime in the Gulf of Finland was not peace. Even though it might not legally be war, active hostilities were being waged. As the Soviet Government had not been recognised these hostilities could not lawfully be considered war, since it appeared that war could only be waged against a recognised Government. The military operations going on had an object accepted by all the Allied and Associated Governments, namely, to preserve the small border Republics which had sprung up in the north-west of Russia. Commerce, therefore, should not be allowed to interfere with these operations. He thought the suggestion made in the last paragraph of the Addendum by the British Delegation to the Joint Note might be adopted.

MR. TITTONI observed that the Powers could not escape the anomaly of assisting Koltchak in one quarter, and allowing his enemies to be assisted in another.

MR. CLEMENCEAU observed that President Wilson had offered his help to Koltchak.

MR. WHITE said that he was willing to send a cable message to Washington, explaining the views of his colleagues, but he could not accept them without reference to his Government. Theoretically there was peace with Russia. He would ask whether he might join in the proposal before the Council which he understood his Colleagues all accepted.

MR. BALFOUR said that he fully understood Mr. White's position, but the question addressed to the British Government by the Swedes had to be answered. He did not know how long the answer could be postponed.

MR. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Mr. White inform the Council of the views of his Government within two days.

MR. DULLES said that it would be necessary to explain to President Wilson why the question was re-opened. At the time when the Council of Four had made its decision, it was well aware that the present situation was bound to come about. The question had been considered first in the Blockade Council, then in the Supreme Economic

Council, and lastly, in the Council of the Heads of Governments. No aspect of the situation, therefore, had been lost sight of and the very contingency now being discussed was that in view when Sir Maurice Hankey sent his Note to the Supreme Economic Council. It would, therefore, be necessary to inform President Wilson of whatever new circumstance might exist which justified the re-opening of the question.

MR. BALFOUR said that it was no doubt quite accurate to say that the Council of the Heads of Governments had decided that nothing could be done, and it was doubtless reasonable to say that President Wilson must be informed of the reason why the present Council desired a different decision. He would point out that, in the decision of the Council of Four, Hungary was coupled with Russia. Nevertheless, a blockade on Hungary had been imposed. At the time of the latter, there was some hope that Petrograd would fall; this would have removed all necessity for a blockade. It might, further, be pointed out that the Soviet Government was conducting active hostilities against the small Baltic States. Should the Powers not protect the latter, the Soviet Government could land troops in the rear of their forces and destroy them. Hence it was necessary for the Powers to maintain maritime control of the Baltic. This could not be done without active operations, as the Soviet had ships and showed fight. It was impossible to carry on naval operations in narrow waters and to allow merchant shipping to go through with food and arms. The removal of the blockade was, therefore, inconsistent with the conduct of the policy unanimously favoured by the Powers.

MR. DULLES observed that the blockade on Hungary was maintained because the Powers were still at war with Hungary. They had never been at war with Russia.

(It was agreed that Mr. Dulles should draft a telegram to be sent in the name of the Council to President Wilson explaining the reasons for maintaining in the Baltic and the Black Sea an embargo on merchant shipping trading with Soviet Russia.

It was further agreed that the subject should again be put on the Agenda on the 17th instant.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a communication stating that the Belgian and Dutch Governments had nominated their representatives for the Commission which was to revise the Treaties of 1839.<sup>6a</sup> It was, therefore, desirable to summon the Commission. The Belgian Government asked that the first meeting should be fixed for Tuesday, July 29th, as the two Belgian representatives, M. Orts, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and M. Segers, Minister of State, were detained in Brussels until the 28th, for the festivals in honour

Revision of  
Treaties of 1839

<sup>6a</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xxxvii, p. 1370.



of the President of the Republic. The British and Italian representatives on the Commission had already been nominated. The American and French remained to be appointed. On behalf of France, M. Clemenceau nominated M. Laroche—on behalf of the United States of America, Mr. White nominated Mr. Hudson.

(It was agreed that the first meeting should take place on 29th July, at 10.30 a. m. at the Quai d'Orsay.)

5. The Council had before it the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles. (Appendix "E".)

(At this point, the Military Representatives and their Chiefs of the Staff, entered the room.)

Mr. BALFOUR said that he had read the report. The only difficulty he found was in finding 13,000 men.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had none to offer. He counted on Mr. Balfour.

Mr. BALFOUR said he had none to offer. He counted on General Bliss.

GENERAL BLISS said that it was not beyond the limits of possibility that Allied troops might be entirely dispensed with. The Inter-Allied Commission which was to conduct the plebiscite, was to spend six months studying the country. It would be able to report whether order could be maintained without armed forces. It had been provided that there should be neither German nor Polish troops in the area. He suggested, therefore, that the Commission, together with its staff, which would be numerous, should go to the country and report later whether it required an Allied force or not.

Mr. BALFOUR quoted paragraph "D" of the general consideration set forth in the report and pointed out that it seemed to have been the intention that the Commission should have an Allied force until local police could be organised. If, however, General Bliss considered that the risk of doing without an Allied force could be taken, he would not insist on a pedantic adherence to the original intention.

GENERAL BLISS said that the plebiscite was not to take place until six months after the coming into force of the Treaty. This would give the Commission plenty of time to find out whether an armed force could or could not be dispensed with.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what would happen should the Commission find that they required troops.

Mr. BALFOUR drew attention to the provision excluding any participation of the Germans in the forces of occupation. He asked whether this should be held to apply to police forces.

GENERAL BLISS thought that it did not apply to police forces.

Mr. BALFOUR asked when the Commission was to proceed to Silesia. He also asked whether members had been nominated.

Allied Army of  
Occupation in  
Silesia During  
Plebiscite

MR. WHITE said that he understood the Commission was to proceed to Silesia 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty. As to nomination, so far as the United States were concerned, no American member could be appointed until the American Senate had ratified the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was informed that the Commission to supervise the execution of the clauses of the Treaty had examined this question and that it could furnish a report at the next meeting.

(The question was therefore postponed till the following day.)

6. The Council had before it a Report from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council. (Appendix E [*E bis*].)

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that in spite of the platon-  
 ionic recommendations of the Military Representa-  
 tives, it appeared from the footnote that Italy would  
 contribute one battalion, Great Britain 40 men, Amer-  
 ica none, while France had in the area two divisions,  
 two-thirds of which he proposed to demobilise. The only way out  
 of the difficulty that he could think of was to ask the Italians who  
 were on good terms with the Bulgarians to stand surety for their  
 good behaviour.

M. TITTONI said that he was not aware of any special intimacy between Italy and Bulgaria.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he could show M. Tittoni evidence to that effect. He made no complaint, in fact he would be glad if Italian policy could produce in Bulgaria the results desired by the Conference. The only end in view was to make the Bulgarians behave peacefully towards the Greeks.

M. TITTONI said that Italian policy was to conform with the policy of the Allies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had dreamt that Italy was inaugurating a new policy, and was now seeking to make friends with her neighbours in the Adriatic, applying in case of misunderstanding to her Allies for arbitration, which would be most willingly undertaken.

M. TITTONI said that he was quite willing to conform with M. Clemenceau's dream.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if an agreement between the Bulgarians and the Greeks could be arranged through Italy it would be a great service to the Allied cause. The Bulgarians had been summoned to be in Paris on the 25th. There remained only ten days. If in this period M. Tittoni could give the Allies a foretaste of the new policy, the situation on the arrival of the Bulgarians would be much easier.

M. TITTONI said he would be very pleased to do his best.

Occupation of  
Bulgaria by  
Great Britain,  
France, and  
Italy in Equal  
Proportions

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that M. Tittoni should have private conversations on behalf of the Council with M. Venizelos.

MR. BALFOUR asked to what extent disarmament had proceeded in Bulgaria.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the situation unsatisfactory. He did not think that General Franchet d'Esperey<sup>7</sup> had controlled events very successfully according to the instructions given him. He had the impression that the Bulgarians meant to resort to force should they be dissatisfied with their new frontiers. He was asking General Franchet d'Esperey's opinion on Bulgaria and its present condition from the military point of view. If, meanwhile, M. Tittoni would have a talk with M. Venizelos, good results might be obtained.

MR. BALFOUR said that he presumed that M. Tittoni's conversation with M. Venizelos would be on the basis of what had been decided at the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it must undoubtedly be on the basis that the Entente was victorious, and that Bulgaria had been defeated.

M. TITTONI asked that he might be supplied with the requisite information by his colleagues.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the intention was that M. Tittoni should discuss frontiers with M. Venizelos.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he suggested no plan whatever. He left the whole matter to M. Tittoni's ingenuity. He had heard among other things that Greece thought of giving Bulgaria a share in the port of Kavalla. If so this was a good beginning which deserved encouragement.

(M. TITTONI agreed to engage in conversation with M. Venizelos, and report the results obtained daily to the Council.

It was further decided that General Franchet d'Esperey should furnish as soon as possible all available information regarding the military situation of Bulgaria.)

7. The Council had before it a Report from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council. (Appendix "F.")

M. CLEMENCEAU asked General Belin what the conclusion of the Report was.

GENERAL BELIN said that it was proposed that the Frontier Delimitation Commission should begin to function at once instead of waiting for the time appointed, namely, 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not think there was any authority to set the Commission at work before its time. This could only be done by agreement with the Germans. Should they refuse the Coun-

Assistance To Be  
Given to Poland  
in the Area  
Ceded by  
Germany

<sup>7</sup> Commander in chief of the Allied Armies in the East.



cil could do nothing. It was important not to exceed Treaty rights. In this connection he wished to inform the Council that the Germans had approached him with a request for permission to occupy Frankfurt with troops by reason of disturbances expected there. On the strength of the Treaty he had refused this request. It was therefore hardly possible to ask Germany for favours. He suggested that the Report expected from the Commission to supervise the execution of the Treaty be awaited.

(It was therefore decided to postpone the consideration of this question till the following day, when the Report of the Commission to Supervise the Execution of the Treaty would be heard.)

8. M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to read a despatch he had received from General Franchet d'Esperey. (Appendix G.)

M. TITTONI said he would immediately make an enquiry into the allegations made in this despatch.

9. M. CLEMENCEAU caused a letter from M. Venizelos to be read. (See Appendix H.)

M. TITTONI said that he denied in a most formal manner the allegations made in this letter. Greek troops were refusing to obey the orders of the British Admiral on the ground that they were receiving direct instructions from the Peace Conference sent to them by M. Venizelos. It would be necessary for the Conference to settle this matter. The British Admiral's powers would have to be increased. The Italian Commander was in complete accord with the British Commadore at Smyrna. He had himself summoned General Bongiovanni<sup>8</sup> and given him personal instructions that no further Italian troops should be landed, and that no new localities should be occupied. He was, moreover, to act only in concert with the British Admiral. It was necessary to enforce a similar line of conduct on the Greeks. The Turks at present believed that they were being invaded by the Greeks, and that they must fight them. The Greeks must conform to a common plan, and must realise that they formed part of the forces of the Allied Powers. The Greeks must therefore first halt on their present positions.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that M. Venizelos be asked to attend the Council in order to give a frank explanation of what was going on. He would like to ask the Military Experts what they thought of the allegation made in the letter read by M. Clemenceau that there were 300,000 well-armed Turkish troops in the field. The British Military Experts were of the opinion that this was far from the mark.

<sup>8</sup> Gen. Luigi Bongiovanni, commander of the Italian forces in Asia Minor.

GENERAL BELIN replied that he thought that these figures very much exaggerated. He agreed that there were perhaps some 60,000 men in all Anatolia.

(It was agreed that M. Venizelos should be invited to attend the Council on the following day to discuss the situation in Asia-Minor.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, July 15, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-7

[Translation <sup>a</sup>]

Radio from Budapest

To the President of the Peace Conference, Paris.

In reply to our radio telegram of July 11,<sup>10</sup> the Peace Conference, instead of ordering the Roumanian troops to retreat, has just sent us a telegram saying that because of our failure to observe our part of the armistice conditions, it is impossible to deal with us for the moment.<sup>11</sup> We should have been glad to see the precise facts by which the armistice conditions were violated by us. We experience so much satisfaction in seeing these facts stated precisely that we are sorry we must bring up immediately a whole series of violations of the armistice conditions committed by the Allied and Associated Governments and principally by those of the Kingdom of Roumania, and of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. We are contented to note very briefly that the Royal Roumanian troops still continue to occupy the line of the Tisza, although, according to the terms of the military convention of November 13,<sup>12</sup> the demarcation line should be that of the Maros river.

Entire regions have been devastated, all the mobile means of production, as well as all the alimentary productions taken away. The military convention of November 13 does not recognize the Danube line as a line of demarcation: this however does not prevent the Czecho-Slovak troops from occupying the line of the Danube. The Rousska-Kraina, the federative party of the Republic of Hungarian Councils is under the domination of the Czech and Roumanian armed forces. We remind the Peace Conference that the troops of the Czecho-Slovak Republic had already advanced, contrary to the armistice conditions, as far as the south of Miskolcz, when our troops, to defend the vital interests of the country, took the offensive in turn, in victoriously putting to rout the Czecho-Slovak troops. Notwithstanding, we withdrew our troops from the territory retaken from the Czecho-Slovaks relying upon Monsieur Clemenceau's promise that in this case, The Royal Hungarian troops will withdraw in their turn to the line fixed

---

<sup>a</sup> Translation is that filed under Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/7.

<sup>10</sup> Appendix B to HD-6, p. 125.

<sup>11</sup> HD-6, minute 6, p. 120.

<sup>12</sup> Vol. II, p. 183.

by the Peace Conference in its telegram of July [*June*] 13th addressed to the Government of the Hungarian Councils.<sup>13</sup> It can be clearly shown that the violations of the stipulations of the armistice and of the renunciation to bloodshed took place contrary to our wishes. The Czecho-Slovak and Roumanian troops were those who crossed the line of demarcation and everything which happened afterwards is the direct consequence of this offensive. The above mentioned countries have not respected and what is more do not now respect the treaty of armistice concluded in the name of the Allied and Associated States, which they violate at every moment up to this point and which because of their attitude contrary to the principles of the right of peoples, can be considered non-existent as a treaty.

Having stated all the foregoing, we are forced to put once more the question before the Peace Conference, whether the order of Monsieur Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, is obligatory or not for the troops of the Royal Roumanian Government. Must they execute Monsieur Clemenceau's order to withdraw from the Tisza on the line designated in the July [*June*] 13th telegram? Can we count on the fulfillment of Monsieur Clemenceau's promise by the Royal Roumanian troops? We send the observation to the Peace Conference that it is not a question of negotiations but of the observance of Monsieur Clemenceau's promise, or rather of the order of the Peace Conference, on the part of the Royal Roumanian troops.

The Government of the Republic of the Hungarian Councils, having done all in its power in order that the armistice stipulations be carried out in the sense of the military convention of November 13th, in no way opposes further negotiations. It desires however in taking its stand on the promise of Monsieur Clemenceau, that the order be given to the Royal Roumanian troops to commence without delay the evacuation of the territory designated in the telegram of June 13.

BELA KUN

*Commissioner of the People for Foreign Affairs*

---

#### Appendix "B" to HD-7

[Translation <sup>14</sup>]

*Report Dated July 9, 1919 From French Military Attaché du Parquet at Stockholm, on the Armistice Conditions Concluded on the Esthonian Front*

Ordered by Allied missions to negotiate armistice between belligerents on Esthonian front. I . . .<sup>15</sup> Riga July 1st. First, I examined

---

<sup>13</sup> Appendix V (A), V (B), and V (F) to CF-65, vol. VI, pp. 411, 412, and 416.

<sup>14</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>15</sup> Omission indicated in the original French.



conditions . . .<sup>16</sup> Von der Goltz.<sup>17</sup> Then I crossed German and Esthonian lines alone with two German soldiers carrying white flags and tri-color. Bombardment and rifle and machine gun fire from Esthonians when we started. Very badly received by Esthonians and various commanders, except General Peder. I had to use all my energy to reach my goal in defiance of bad feeling and rudeness. Peder told me he was astonished that I reached him. It was possible to modify greatly these armistice conditions which were at first very hard but they refused to compromise on the question of the occupation of Riga (doubtful) by Esthonian troops.

I was provided with full powers by the Allied missions and by Von der Goltz to sign an armistice but I did not consider myself able to do it on this basis without further consultation. I arrived near the German line on the morning of July 2. I was bombarded twice by Germans on the way but they stopped firing when they saw white flag. I asked Von der Goltz to give iron cross to two German soldiers who accompanied me and acted bravely. My intervention on the Esthonian front produced great impression at Riga . . .<sup>18</sup> Riga bombarded by Esthonians July 1 and 2; victims among civil population, destruction and fires. Evening July 2 on German front and at Strassenhof farm, 12 kilometers east of Riga meeting of representatives of Allied Mission, Esthonians, Germans, Landwehr, Lett troops, for conclusion of armistice which was signed July 3 at 3:00 a. m.

*Clauses:* 1. Cessation hostilities land, sea, air July 3, noon.

2. German troops withdraw from Lettonia as soon as possible in accordance with peace treaty. No advance by German troops except against Bolsheviks of Russian Soviet Republic, in accordance with peace treaty.

3. German officers and troops will immediately leave Riga and suburbs, evacuation to be finished 6:00 p. m., July 5 except officers and troops necessary to empty and guard German warehouses.

4. Allied officers will make sure that non-military warehouses will remain as they are.

5. Landwehr will leave Riga bridge and district and will withdraw beyond Duna; evacuation to be completed 6 p. m., July 5.

6. Esthonians in occupied positions at 3:00 a. m., July 3.

7. Germans will reestablish free communication by railway and telegraph between Riga and Libau.

8. Allied mission temporarily insures administration of Riga with Lett Government.

9. Details to be arranged under direction of chief of the Allied mission.

Armistice well executed up to evening July 5, when Germans and Landwehr had completely evacuated city and suburbs. I left Riga

<sup>16</sup> Omission indicated in the original French.

<sup>17</sup> Gen. Rudiger von der Goltz, commander of the German Armies in the Baltic Provinces.

July 6 to enter Libau by American steamer. Perfect order at Riga, population relieved. Lett troops insure order, service and protection in city. Municipal police have assumed municipal functions. Ulmanis<sup>18</sup> Ministry left Libau for Riga morning July 8 on steamer *Saratow*. British mission left for Riga evening July 7. French mission will leave as soon as notice is sent. Russian concentration in Latvia constitutes a danger at present because the effectives are large; supplies not assured and difficult. Under these conditions there is a danger that the Russians will pillage and resort to bolshevism. Embarkment of German troops at Libau will constitute a danger for the safety of the city which is perfectly quiet since the Germans [arrived?]. However, they should be brought at the last moment only to the military port and they should be absolutely forbidden access to the city. Disorders by German troops are to be feared. It is advisable to require evacuation of Germans to south and west of Mitau where great concentration constitutes present danger for Riga and national government. Rumor of plotted conspiracy at Mitau by Germans and Nédra party.

PARQUET

---

#### Appendix "C" to HD-7

WCP-1133

#### TRADE WITH BOLSHEVIK RUSSIA

##### *Note for Supreme Council of Principal Allied and Associated States*

[1.] The Allied Blockade Committee and the Comité de Blocus de l'Orient Paris, who are charged by the Supreme Blockade Council with the executive control of Blockade, find it necessary to call the urgent attention of the Supreme Council to the question of commerce with Bolshevist Russia.

2. The Committees venture to recall to the Council that on June 7th a Note was presented by the Blockade Council to the Council of Four<sup>19</sup> pointing out that it had in fact been possible during the Blockade of Germany to maintain, as part of such Blockade, effective restrictions upon commerce with Bolshevist Russia, either by means of agreements with neutral States or by the actual exercise of naval control; but that with the raising of the German Blockade, it would be difficult to continue to apply such restrictions to Bolshevist Russia, unless measures were directly framed towards that end. They there-

---

<sup>18</sup> Karlis Ulmanis, Latvian Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Supplies.

<sup>19</sup> This document was referred to in the meeting of the Council of Four on June 17, 1919, 4 p. m., but it does not accompany the minutes of the meeting. See CF-74, minute 5, vol. VI, p. 530.

fore enquired whether the Council of Four desired that upon the raising of the Blockade of Germany.

(a) A formal blockade of Bolshevik Russia ports in the Baltic and Black Sea should be proclaimed by the Allies, or

(b) That negotiations should be entered into with the neutrals to secure the maintenance of guarantees against re-export to Bolshevik Russia.

3. The Council of Four replied on June 17th<sup>20</sup> that they did not desire that either (a) or (b) should be adopted, but that no further announcement should be made as to the possibility of trade with Bolshevik Russia, and that they trusted that in fact the physical difficulties in the way of commerce would prevent its resumption.

4. The Committees were in hopes that, as regards the Baltic and the Black Sea, which are the two zones of difficulty, the question might have been rendered more simple by the events which seemed at the time quite likely to occur before the raising of the German Blockade. These events were (a) the fall of Petrograd, and (b) the Proclamation by Admiral Koltchak of a blockade of the Bolshevik ports in the Black Sea, and the recognition of such a blockade as effective. The occurrence of either of these events would have gone far to solve the difficulty in the respective zones.

5. It has now, however, become apparent that neither event is likely to antedate the raising of the German Blockade, and the Committees respectfully point out that in these circumstances absence of a definite policy will place the executive authorities in an impossible position. Already enquiries are being made—not only by Allied nationals, but also by neutrals, such as Sweden and Denmark, as to the treatment likely to be given to goods shipped to destinations in Bolshevik Russia,—and, upon the raising of the German Blockade (which is now probably only a matter of days, if not of hours) the executive authorities must be enabled to reply to such enquiries.

6. The Committees therefore respectfully, but very earnestly, beg for an immediate statement as to the pleasure of the Supreme Economic Council upon the following enquiries:—

7. Upon the raising of the Blockade of Germany:

(a) Are the nationals of the Allied States to be free to trade with Bolshevik Russia?

(b) If not, are neutrals to be free to conduct such trade?

(c) If (a) and (b) are answered in the negative, how are the contemplated restrictions to be enforced?

(d) In particular, having regard to the naval hostilities which are actually occurring at this moment, especially in the Gulf of Finland, it is still regarded as undesirable for the Allies to proclaim a local blockade of the Neva ports.

---

<sup>20</sup> See appendix D to HD-7, p. 144.



WCP-1133A

## TRADE WITH BOLSHEVIST RUSSIA

*Addendum by British Delegation to Joint Note on Russian Blockade by Allied Blockade Committee and Eastern Blockade Committee*

1. The methods hitherto used to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevik Russia included every weapon known to the Blockade. They may be summarised as:—

(a) Physical, e. g. control at Constantinople by Allied Naval Command who refuse permits for vessels to proceed to Black Sea ports in the occupation of Bolsheviks and enforce their control through patrols: and

(b) Conventional, e. g. agreements with neutral governments, under which these governments agreed to add Bolshevik Russia to the destinations to which export was prohibited under their agreements with the Associated Powers. These agreements will terminate with the raising of the German Blockade tomorrow.

2. Two possible courses were suggested to the Council of Four on the 7th June.

(i) To proclaim a Formal Blockade of all Bolshevik Russia, thus regularising the continued exercise of physical control.

(ii) To invite the neutral governments to enter into special arrangements to retain their prohibitions against export to Bolshevik Russia after the termination of the main agreements upon the raising of the German Blockade, thus securing the retention of conventional control.

Both proposals were rejected by the Council of Four on the 17th June.<sup>21</sup>

It is now suggested for consideration that a physical control might be at least adopted as regards the Gulf of Finland, where active hostilities exist at present, and that this might be regularised by a notification by the Allies that under existing circumstances traffic into and out of ports in the Gulf of Finland can only be conducted under permit from the Allied Naval Command there.

W. MITCHELL-THOMSON

PARIS, 11 July, 1919.

---

Appendix "D" to HD-7

## BLOCKADE OF HUNGARY AND BOLSHEVIK RUSSIA

*Decisions of Council of Heads of States*

BRITISH DELEGATION,  
PARIS, 17 June, 1919.

SIR: I am directed to inform you that the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, this afternoon, considered the note from the Supreme Economic Council on the subject of the Blockade of

---

<sup>21</sup> CF-74, minute 5, vol. VI, p. 530.

Hungary and Bolshevik Russia, forwarded in your letter of June 7th.

It was decided that, after the acceptance of the Conditions of Peace by Germany, measures are *not* still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevik Russia or Hungary. In addition, the recommendation of the Supreme Economic Council was approved that there should be an abstinence from any positive measures or public announcement indicating the resumption of such trade.

It was further decided that the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to examine as to whether, consistently with the above decisions, means could be found for preventing war material from being carried by sea from Germany to Bolshevik Russia.

The Council also considered the second note<sup>22</sup> forwarded in your letter of June 7th, proposing an agreement by Austria regarding trade with Hungary and Germany.

In regard to this, the Council felt that they could take no decision without fuller explanations.

I am [etc.]

M. P. A. HANKEY  
*Secretary*

VANCE McCORMICK, Esq.

*Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council,  
Hotel Crillon, Paris.*

---

#### Appendix "E" to HD-7

SWC-440 (77MR)

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL  
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

#### *Report on the Composition and Size of the Army of Occupation in the Plebiscite Area of Upper Silesia*

On June 25th [26th],<sup>23</sup> the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers decided to ask the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles to examine the following question:—

"Composition and size of the Army of Occupation in the Plebiscite Area of Upper Silesia, and the method of occupation of this Area".

#### GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Area in question is defined by Article 88 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

On the other hand, by the terms of the annexure which was made to that article:—

---

<sup>22</sup> Appendix IV to CF-74, vol. VI, p. 541.

<sup>23</sup> CF-93, minute 21, vol. VI, p. 703.

(a) The German troops and authorities must evacuate the area submitted for a Plebiscite after the coming into force of the Treaty and within a maximum period of 15 days (para. 1).

(b) This Area shall be occupied by troops of the Allied and Associated Powers—(Para. 2).

(c) The Plebiscite Area shall be immediately placed under the authority of an International Commission composed of 4 members to be appointed by the United States of America, France, the British Empire and Italy. (Para. 2.)

(d) It shall be the duty of the Commission to maintain order with the help of troops to be placed at its disposal and, to the extent which it shall consider necessary, of a police force to be recruited from the native inhabitants of the country. (Para. 3.)

#### CHARACTER OF THE FORCES OF OCCUPATION

From the terms of the Treaty, which it seemed useful to recall above, it results that any participation of the Germans in the forces of occupation is excluded.

It is equally indispensable not to admit any Polish units, if there is not to be a danger of the result of the plebiscite losing its character of sincerity which is essential.

#### SIZE OF THE FORCES OF OCCUPATION

In fixing their strength, consideration must be taken of the following particulars:—

(1) The population of the plebiscite area is estimated at about 1,632,000 inhabitants (of which 570,000 are Germans and 1,062,000 Poles).

(2) There are present in this area two elements in the population of such different mentality and tendencies that they will only accept the new condition of affairs with reluctance. This may provoke serious trouble if the forces available do not allow of all necessary measures being taken in time.

(3) This situation will assuredly continue up to the day of the plebiscite; it is even possible that it will tend to increase as the date approaches for taking the vote which is to definitely decide the future of the country.

(4) The existing local police, composed mostly of Germans, would not seem to offer any guarantee of impartiality, however, at the present time or during any of the period preceding the plebiscite; consequently, this police should be probably disbanded as soon as possible, and reconstituted and increased.

(5) The territory in question includes important industrial centres in which the total population attains 450,000 and which can easily become centres of disturbances.

(6) Serious social movements have already arisen in this country; Councils of Workmen and Soldiers have been set up, which the Treaty of Peace with Germany has ordered to be dissolved (Paragraph 1 of the Annexure of Article 88 of the Treaty).



Consequently, the Military Representatives are agreed in considering that an armed force of 1 Division (about 13,000 men) is, at least for the time being, indispensable to guarantee the maintenance of order and ensure the authority of the Inter-Allied Commission.

It will be for the President of the International Commission to propose either a reduction of this force or their repatriation as soon as the creation and increase of the police force and *gendarmerie*, organised on the spot, shall permit.

G<sup>al</sup>. BELIN

*Military Representative,  
French Section,  
Supreme War Council*

C. SACKVILLE-WEST

*Major General,  
Military Representative,  
British Section,  
Supreme War Council*

UGO CAVALLERO

*Military Representative,  
Italian Section,  
Supreme War Council*

STANLEY D. EMBICK

for

*Military Representative,  
American Section,  
Supreme War Council*

Given at Versailles the 10th July, 1919.

Certified to be a true copy of the original document.

W. N. WICKS, Capt.  
*Secretary, British Section,  
Supreme War Council*

VERSAILLES, 10 July, 1919.

---

[Appendix E bis <sup>24</sup>]

[Translation <sup>25</sup>]

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL  
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

VERSAILLES, July 11, 1919.

*Report on the Strength and Organization of the Occupation  
Force in Bulgaria*

On July 9, 1919,<sup>25a</sup> the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers decided to request from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council a report on the strength and organization of the occupation force in Bulgaria, on the basis of equal participation by the three Powers directly concerned.

---

<sup>24</sup> This report appears to have been inadvertently omitted from the present set of minutes. A copy in French was found under file No. 874.00/131.

<sup>25</sup> Translation supplied by the editors.

<sup>25a</sup> HD-3, minute 12, p. 65.

In their collective note No. 44 of June 9, 1919, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council have set forth the importance of the "inter-Allied character that the measures to be taken in Bulgaria ought to have, and the necessity of not permitting, until further notice, any military intervention by the neighboring powers directly concerned (Greece, Serbia, Roumania), in order to eliminate all grounds for premature agitation."

They believe they should reaffirm these two principles:

*Whereas, moreover—*

(a) A total force of about 25,000 men appears sufficient to ensure the maintenance of order and the execution of the decisions of the Peace Conference;

(b) The Greek forces in Macedonia could, as the Military Representatives have pointed out in their collective note No. 44, make up a reserve ready to intervene, upon the invitation of the Allied Governments, if events took a more serious turn.

*The Military Representatives believe—*that it is necessary to provide for the employment of three (3) divisions, each comprising a force of 8,000–9,000 men.\*

The French Military Representative

Signed: GEN. BELIN

The British Military Representative

Signed: SACKVILLE-WEST

The Italian Military Representative

Signed: CAVALLERO

The American Military Representative

Signed: EMBICK†

---

\* Although entirely in agreement with the principle of an equal inter-Allied contribution, the British Military Representative considers himself obliged to make the following reservation: The British Ministry of War has already laid down that the only force which it could furnish would be one platoon (1 officer and about 40 men).

The Italian Military Representative believes himself obliged to declare that, so far as the assistance to be given by the Italian Army is concerned, this could not exceed one infantry battalion—which is in line with communications previously made. [Footnote in the original.]

† The American Military Representative makes the following reservation: Since the United States is not concerned with this question, the American Military Representative has no objection to any of the solutions reached by the Military Representatives in the interest of the powers concerned—it being well understood that the United States will not be bound to any participation. [Footnote in the original.]

## Appendix "F" to HD-7

SWC-444 (79MR)

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL  
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES*Report on the Help To Be Given to Poland in the Event of Trouble  
in the Area Ceded by Germany*

In two Resolutions; dated June 26th and 27th, 1919,<sup>28</sup> the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers charged the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles:—

(1) To enquire how the Poles could best be assisted to establish their authority in the area ceded by Germany to Poland, in the event of trouble arising in that area;

(2) To determine:—

- (a) The needs of the Polish Army in equipment and supplies;
- (b) The means of satisfying these needs;
- (c) From what sources these needs could best be made good.

## FIRST QUESTION

In the course of their enquiry, the Military Representatives have found that the troubles likely to occur in the territories in question might arise:—

- (a) Either from a direct armed attack by Germany;
- (b) Or from excesses committed by the German troops during their retirement, or from purely local disturbances, as a result of the country being carried away by local propaganda organisations for many months past, or from the too abrupt taking over by the Poles of the territories the population of which was still permeated by German influence and administrative Customs.

In the first case an armed attack by Germany would be a violation of the Treaty of Peace which she has signed and ratified. In this instance the Allied and Associated Powers appear to have at their disposal only the following means of punishment:—

- (1) Restoration of the blockade.
- (2) Inter-Allied naval action.
- (3) Military action by the Allied Armies of the Left Bank of the Rhine, with a view to an occupation of especially important points in Germany as a Guarantee, such as the Ruhr Basin and the Frankfurt region, etc. This action, as also the employment of all other available troops against Germany would be directed and ordered according to the plan which the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies would be called upon to furnish.

In the second case (excesses committed by German troops and purely local disturbances etc.) the Military Representatives consider

<sup>28</sup> CF-93, minute 21, and CF-96, minute 5, vol. VI, pp. 703 and 726.



that the assistance to be given to the Poles to allow them to establish their authority in the territories ceded by Germany could include:—

- (a) Preventive measures.
- (b) Assistance in material.

(a) *Preventive measures*

From the information given to the Military Representatives by General Dupont with the Mission at Berlin, it appears that an intervention on the spot and at the right time by a few capable Allied officers of sound judgment would ensure a certain moral authority and would prevent in all probability most of the excesses to be feared, or at any rate the aggravation of those excesses.

These Officers could be taken from among those nominated to form part of "The Commission of Delimitation" to be constituted 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Germany to "determine on the spot the frontier line of Germany".

(Article 87 of the Treaty).

It would be indispensable, however, for this Commission to be on the spot the day after the coming into force of the Treaty. While preparing the work of delimitation, which must be started on the 15th day, it would superintend the operation of taking over and evacuation, and would protect the Polish and German populations against any excesses. In this case, the Commission must have a considerable personnel and sufficient means of transport to enable it to travel quickly from place to place and settle the differences which are bound to arise, and to smooth over difficulties of every kind.

A General Officer to be appointed by the French Government, and well acquainted with German and Polish affairs, would appear in every way suited to be President of this Commission and to organize its work.

The Military Representatives call the attention of the Supreme Council to the urgency of taking a decision on this particular point.

(b) *Material assistance*

In this case all necessary measures must be taken to hasten the sending to Poland of the numerous important orders placed in Allied countries by the Polish Army for material, as also orders which are now being carried out for material, the delivery of which will apparently be delayed owing to insufficiency of transport.

It would seem, therefore, apparent that sea transport to Dantzic must be used (as well as railways).

## SECOND QUESTION

The military representatives of the Supreme War Council consider that they should point out that a Convention dated June 14th, 1919, concluded between the Governments of the Allied and Associated

Powers and the Polish Government, confers on Marshal Foch the Chief Command of Polish Armies.<sup>27</sup>

Under these circumstances and in accordance with the recommendations which they have addressed to the Supreme Council concerning the supplies for the forces of the Baltic States,

The Military Representatives Consider:—

(1) that Marshal Foch should be asked to determine, through General Henrys, his delegate at Warsaw, the nature and amount of supplies of all sorts which may be necessary for the Polish Army in addition to the orders already placed;

(2) that if it is necessary later to divide between the Powers the extra supplies considered necessary, this division should only be made when the exact nature and total quantity of the supplies is known;

(3) that at this moment all facilities must be given to the Polish Requisitioning Commissions accredited to the Governments to carry out their work.

G<sup>al</sup>. BELIN

*Military Representative,  
French Section,  
Supreme War Council*

C. SACKVILLE-WEST

*Major-General,  
Military Representative,  
British Section,  
Supreme War Council*

UGO CAVALLERO

*Military Representative,  
Italian Section,  
Supreme War Council*

STANLEY D. EMBICK

for

*Military Representative,  
American Section,  
Supreme War Council*

Given at Versailles on 11th July, 1919.

Certified to be a true Copy of the original Document.

W. N. WICKS, Capt.  
*Secretary, British Section,  
Supreme War Council*

VERSAILLES, 11 July, 1919.

---

#### Appendix G [to HD-7]

[Translation<sup>28</sup>]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF  
THE ALLIED ARMIES IN THE EAST,  
July, 1919.

General Franchet d'Esperey  
To the President of the Council.

In passing through Sofia on my return from Hungary I insisted to the president of the Bulgarian Council that Bulgaria accept the consequences of her defeat, and demobilize her Army effectually.

<sup>27</sup> See CF-57, minute 6, vol. VI, p. 295.

<sup>28</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

The present Government appears to be disposed to obey the Entente, but it is not so with the Army.

The Communist Party, which takes national integrity as its platform, is working actively among the young Bulgarian officers. Negotiations with the Turks are being begun in order that Bulgaria and Turkey may lend one another mutual support. Italy openly proclaims her sympathy for Bulgaria. General Bertramon, commanding the Ivres Brigade, at a private dinner toasted the Bulgarian Army and nation and recognized the legitimacy of its cause.

It is possible that Bulgaria in such an ambient situation may resist the peace conditions imposed upon her.

It will be easy to repress this resistance with the forces at our disposition if it manifests itself in the form of a popular movement at Sofia. But the repression will be more difficult if it is a question of military sedition extending throughout the country; this sedition must be foreseen and if possible anticipated.

The Smyrna incident<sup>29</sup> must be a warning to us. No limit was imposed on the Greek advance and the Turks were not warned; the result of this lack of precaution was to be expected.

Furthermore it would be essential that I should be notified sufficiently in advance of the peace conditions for Bulgaria and of the date when this peace will be given out. As I have telegraphed, it will be necessary at this time to send sufficiently large Allied missions, within which the English and Italian flags should be seen at the side of the French flag. Under our supervision, the Greek advance should make progress.

I hope thus to be able on one hand to intimidate Bulgaria whose principal centers and coal mines we occupy, and on the other to prevent massacres like those in Asia Minor.

GENERAL FRANCHET D'ESPEREY

---

#### Appendix H [to HD-7]

*[The Head of the Greek Delegation (Venizelos) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]*

[Translation<sup>30</sup>]

GREEK DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE,  
PARIS, 10 July[, 1919.]

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor of informing you that, according to the news which comes to me from Constantinople, military prepara-

---

<sup>29</sup> See HD-8, minute 1, p. 154.

<sup>30</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



tions are being continued by Turkey in an undeniably aggressive spirit, and are assuming such a magnitude that one risks seeing the war kindled again in all Anatolia and the settlement of the affairs of the East rendered impossible.

Nearly 60,000 men are already concentrated at Konia. Mobilization continues throughout the country and it is probable that a total force of 300,000 men will soon be on a war footing. The leaders of this organization, with whom the Minister of War himself collaborates, will have at their disposal material and munitions in sufficient quantity for such an army.

This information is known by the Allied Military Command at Constantinople.

I am forced to say that the gravity of this news is increased by the fact that the Turks appear to be encouraged in their designs by the Italian authorities.

Indeed, it has been proven that the zone occupied by the Italian forces south of Aidin served as a base of operations for the Turks in their successive aggressions against the Greek troops north of the Meander. The first Greek division has just seized Turkish proclamations dated July 4, in which was printed a telegram sent from Mylassa by the Italian general reassuring the Turks that they had nothing to fear from the Greeks because their troops were obliged to withdraw to the north of the Meander and that in case they did not, the Italian forces would take the necessary measures.

Moreover, two distinguished young Turks who are very influential, Mahmoud Essad and Chukri, have just gone from Lausanne to Milan, for the purpose of directing the attentions of the Italian authorities to a position on the coast of Smyrna. It is likely that they were accompanied by their friend Kiazim Nourri, deputy of Aidin, relative of the ex-vale of Smyrna, Rahmi Bey.

Under these conditions, I believe, Mr. President, that the situation will be aggravated to the point of compromising the settlement which the Peace Conference plans in the East, if prompt and energetic measures are not taken by the Allied and Associated Powers to restrict the mobilization of the Turkish Army and to put an end to the encouragement encountered up to now from the abettors of dissension.

Please accept [etc.]

E. K. VENIZELOS

His Excellency Mr. CLEMENCEAU

*President of the Peace Conference*

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, July 16, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. H. White.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour,  
O. M., M. P.

*Secretary*

Mr. H. Norman.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.

*Secretaries*

M. Dutasta.  
Capt. de St. Quentin.

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

**JAPAN**

Baron Makino.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . .	Colonel Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lieut. Zanchi.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

(M. Venizelos was introduced.)

(Captain Fuller, Major Temperley, Captain Macindoe, and Mr. Butler, entered the room.)

1. M. VENIZELOS said that on the 18th June he had sent a letter to the President of the Peace Conference calling attention to the concentration of Turkish troops in various places, notably the Smyrna region. On June 23rd the situation had appeared to him to be so disquieting that he had told the Greek General to take such action as was necessary in order that he should not be driven into the sea. What he must ask the Council to grant him was either a definite line or liberty of action for his troops. He pointed out that there were three railway lines converging on Smyrna. His suggestion would be that Greek troops should occupy these lines up to a fixed point. He would further suggest that in the space left between the Greek and Turkish

Statement by  
M. Venizelos  
Regarding the  
Situation in  
Anatolia

advance posts small detachments, for instance a company, of Allied troops, be placed. The moral effect of this would be great and would probably render any conflict unlikely. He wished to put an end to the present situation in Smyrna. This situation was such that he was compelled to keep a whole army there. There were five Greek divisions in the area. He wished to reduce them to two. This would enable him to reinforce his troops in Macedonia against the Bulgarians.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Venizelos to indicate on the map the area in Anatolia occupied by Greek troops.

M. VENIZELOS did so. He further stated that if there were real collaboration between the Greek and the Italian troops and if this collaboration were manifest to the Turks the situation would be completely remedied.

M. TITTONI agreed.

M. VENIZELOS said that he did not wish to extend Greek occupation. All that he wanted was to be safe in Smyrna and to maintain his hold on certain places the population of which was entirely Greek. He was well aware that no conquest would influence the decisions of the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he understood the Greek population was entirely on the coast.

M. VENIZELOS replied that it extended to 80 or 100 kilometres inland.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Venizelos for his estimate of the number of Greeks in Smyrna.

M. VENIZELOS replied that there were 230,000 Greeks and 95,000 Turks and the rest of the population was of other nationalities. A large number of Greeks lived on the land and cultivated figs and grapes, in fact these Anatolian Greeks were among the best Greek cultivators.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Venizelos apparently considered the Greeks in Smyrna formed a majority.

M. VENIZELOS said he did.

MR. BALFOUR said that without going far back into the history of the case, he would like to put the present situation on a sound basis. There were three separate armies in the area; one Greek, one Italian and one Turkish. The last was of uncertain size, largely composed, presumably, of irregulars, formidable for attacks on lines of communication but not for a set battle. How this had come about was not very material. M. Venizelos had sent troops to Smyrna and beyond at the invitation of the Council of Four.<sup>1</sup> Italy had sent troops because of her local interests and because she interpreted the Treaty

<sup>1</sup> For the decision of the Council of Four authorizing M. Venizelos to land Greek troops at Smyrna, see IC-181C, minute 17, vol. v, p. 484.



of London as giving her certain rights. Unquestionably much of the trouble arose not from the action of the Turks but from the mutual distrust of the Greek and Italian troops. There were, therefore, three bodies of troops all afraid of attack from each other. According to his information the Turks were undoubtedly actuated by fear in all that they had done. They saw the Greeks at Smyrna spreading out to Aidin and elsewhere. This seemed to them the prelude of a great advance; this might lead to massacres. If it were made clear to the Turks that there would be no advance beyond a definite line it might be possible to control them, especially if they realised that it would not be armed action but the deliberations of the Council that would prescribe the final settlement. As to the relations between the Greeks and Italians M. Venizelos had just stated and M. Tittoni had previously more than once stated that he would base no claim to territory on armed occupation. Both agreed that the Peace Conference alone had the right to determine frontiers. M. Tittoni, while recognising this, had made an appeal to the Council begging that he be not asked to withdraw Italian troops entirely from Asia Minor by reason of the effect this would produce in Italy. M. Venizelos was in Asia Minor at the request of the Council, but no limit had been laid down to his advance. It was clear that the machinery for the co-operation of the Greek Commander and the British Commodore had not worked smoothly. It would therefore be best to lay down the principle that there were definite lines within which the Greek and Italian troops must remain and the Turks could then be told that there was to be no trespass beyond this line if they maintained a proper attitude. He would like to remind the Council that General Allenby<sup>3</sup> was still technically in authority over the whole of Turkey in Asia on behalf of the Allied Powers. This fact had been lost sight of and he had not been consulted either by the Council of Ten or by the Council of Four, nor had the Italians or Greeks referred to him. Nevertheless, he still remained the Military Representative of the Powers in Asiatic Turkey. He suggested that General Allenby be asked to send Officers to investigate the situation at Smyrna and to mark out the boundaries of each force. Thus any difficulty as between Greece and Italy or Greece and Turkey would be avoided and the scheme would be in harmony with the general course employed elsewhere for managing conquered territory during the armistice.

M. TITTONI said that he agreed in the main with Mr. Balfour. All advance should be stopped and the Turks should be convinced that there was no intention to declare war on them and that the Armistice

---

<sup>3</sup> Gen. Edmund H. H. Allenby, commander in chief of the British Expeditionary Forces in Egypt and Palestine.

continued. Both the Greeks and the Italians should stay where they were. He would also favour the interposition of Allied troops between the Greeks and the Turks.

Regarding the collaboration of the Greek and the Italian Armies, MR. BALFOUR suggested that the delimitation of their spheres should be carried out by General Allenby. He, himself, thought that direct agreement between the two would be more rapid and more satisfactory. Should no agreement be reached, another authority could then be called in.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was disposed to favour M. Tittoni's plan. If need be, he might even agree to the employment of General Allenby should M. Tittoni and M. Venizelos fail to reach an agreement. Happily this seemed unlikely. As to the means of reassuring the Turks, he thought this could best be done by the Conference directly. He hoped that on the following day M. Tittoni and M. Venizelos would be able to bring a definite agreement to the Council. It would then be possible to send the Turks a message telling them exactly what to expect and that the ultimate solution would not be prejudged by any military occupation.

MR. WHITE asked who would deliver the message on behalf of the Conference. He thought perhaps this should be General Allenby, as the Turks had the greatest respect for military authority.

MR. BALFOUR agreed as General Allenby was Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the Powers.

M. TITTONI asked whether Admiral Calthorpe, High Commissioner in Constantinople, would not be the right authority.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not quite agree with Mr. Balfour. General Allenby commanded in Syria and Mesopotamia, not, he thought, in Anatolia. When the Greeks had been sent to Smyrna, General Allenby had not been consulted. Admiral Calthorpe had been informed. The Conference could correspond with the Turks and had already done so. Surely a direct message from the Council would have more effect on the Turkish Government than anything else, especially if it be made clear to the Turks that the Italians and Greeks would stop their advance.

MR. BALFOUR said perhaps the advance would not be arrested for long.

M. TITTONI said that if he and M. Venizelos made themselves personally responsible, he thought there would be no further advance of their respective forces.

MR. WHITE said that it was of great importance that the communication to the Turks should be made in the name of the Conference, otherwise they would think that the Italians and Greeks had plotted

to partition the country. He doubted, however, whether the authority of the Sultan really controlled events in Anatolia.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this was perhaps true as the rebellion of the Turks had been spontaneous and not controlled in Constantinople.

M. TITTONI said that the General in command had nevertheless come from the capital.

M. VENIZELOS observed that it might be necessary for the Greek troops to make certain movements. It was therefore desirable that some military authority should lay down exactly in what conditions it would be safe for the Greek advance to be halted. Where Greek and Italian troops were neighbours, both could safely halt on the same line; where the Greeks faced the Turks, it might be necessary to occupy a few additional points.

M. TITTONI said he thought the whole front should halt, otherwise the Turks would not believe in the message sent to them.

(It was decided that M. Tittoni and M. Venizelos should seek an agreement regarding the delimitation of the Italian and Greek zones of occupation in Asia Minor and that they should submit the result of their conversation to the Council as soon as possible.)

In case an agreement were reached, a communication would be made in the name of the Council to the Turkish Government informing the latter of the decision taken and offering assurances regarding the intentions of the Allied Governments.)

At this stage M. Venizelos and the experts withdrew.

(2) (At this point the Drafting Committee entered the room.)

M. FROMAGEOT explained that the Drafting Committee has been asked by the commission on New States to modify the provisions in the Austrian Treaty, as handed to the Austrian Delegation, in order to make them conform with similar provisions regarding Minorities in the Treaty with Poland. This amounted to an aggravation of the terms. He therefore asked for orders from the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the opinion that the Commission on Minorities had no authority to direct the Drafting Committee to make this alteration.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that it had previously been decided that every mitigation made in the Treaty with Germany after considering the German Counter-Proposals, should be introduced into the Treaty with Austria without discussion.<sup>4</sup> Any aggravation of the terms would therefore be inconsistent with this policy.

(It was decided not to accede to the request of the Commission on New States and to maintain without modification Section 6 of Part III (Protection of Minorities) of the Treaty as presented to the Austrian Delegation on the 2nd June.)

Treaty With  
Austria: (a) Pro-  
tection of Minor-  
ities

<sup>4</sup> FM-29, minute 6, p. 15.



M. FROMAGEOT said that the Treaty with Germany (Article 373) contained a general provision regarding the obligation of Germany to allow the construction of certain railways on her territory. The Treaty with Austria (Article 212 [312]) had been endowed with a similar provision concerning the special cases of railway lines over the Reschen and Predil passes. The Treaty with Germany had been modified and the present Article 373 had been substituted for the previous one and only stipulated for the construction of certain lines interesting to Czecho-Slovakia at the cost of the latter. The Council had issued instructions on July 2nd that all concessions made in the German Treaty should be inserted in the Treaty with Austria.<sup>4a</sup> An attempt therefore had been made by the Drafting Committee to modify Article 312 accordingly. There had not, however, been unanimity and the Drafting Committee therefore asked for instructions. The proposed Article read as follows:—

“Within five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, Italy may require the construction or improvement on Austrian territory of the new Trans-Alpine lines over the Reschen and Predil passes. The cost of construction or improvement shall be borne by Italy”.

M. TITTONI said that there was no analogy between the two cases. The lines which the Treaty with Germany required to be constructed on German soil were exclusively for Czecho-Slovak interests and were very trifling in extent. In the other case the lines were far more costly and though they were very necessary to Italy, they were also of great importance to Austria. He would prefer that arbitration should decide the allotment of the cost. He could see no reason for saddling Italy with all the cost without any enquiry. Should it be shown after arbitration that only Italy was interested, Italy would pay. If Austria were interested, why should Italy bear all the cost? He therefore proposed that the text on the lines of the original draft be maintained.

(General Mance and Mr. Hudson entered the room.<sup>5</sup>)

MR. BALFOUR said that the original provision in the Treaty with Germany had demanded of Germany that she should construct lines on her territory at the request of her neighbours and at her own expense. The German Delegation had protested and their protest had been accepted. The general clause had been suppressed and a special clause introduced enabling the Czecho-Slovaks to build two small lines on German territory at their own expense. His feeling

<sup>4a</sup> FM-29, minute 6, p. 15.

<sup>5</sup> Respectively British and United States representatives, Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways.

was that it would be wrong to impose on Austria anything more severe than what had been imposed on Germany. Austria would undoubtedly be poor and even though the lines in question might be advantageous to her, she might think her resources insufficient for the enterprise. If M. Tittoni's plan were adopted, Austria might be forced into an expense which she herself judged to be beyond her means.

M. TITTONI suggested that the arbitrator might decide whether or not Austria's resources justified any expenditure on the railways.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would be prepared to agree to a formula which entitled the Austrians to plead before the League of Nations that they could not afford these lines.

M. FROMAGEOT expressed the opinion that a clause could be drafted to cover this case.

M. TITTONI said that the arbitrator might also be empowered, even should the initial cost be furnished by Italy, to decide whether or not profits had accrued to Austrian lines, as a consequence of the construction, and to apportion to Italy out of these profits, if any, something towards the cost of construction.

(It was decided that the cost of constructing the railways mentioned in Article 312, if desired by Italy, should be borne by Italy. If, however, the construction of these lines should subsequently prove to have increased the profits of Austrian railways, part of the cost of construction should be made good to Italy out of the increased profits above mentioned, in accordance with the decision of an arbitrator, to be nominated by the League of Nations.)

The Drafting Committee was asked to draft an Article in the above sense.

### (3) (a) *General Recommendations.*

M. TARDIEU read and explained the General Recommendations contained in Appendix "A".

(The report was accepted.)

### (b) *Schleswig.*

M. Tardieu read and explained the report contained in Appendix "B".

With the exception of the passage at the end of paragraph 8, requiring the German Government to issue certain orders to its military and civil authorities in the third zone and under certain conditions to evacuate the area, the report was accepted.

It was pointed out that these provisions went beyond the stipulations of the Treaty.

(It was therefore agreed to suppress these passages, and only to ask the German Government to abstain from making any arrests for political reasons in the area concerned.

With this exception, the report was accepted.)

M. TITTONI said that should the Inter-Allied Commission consider that the voting had been influenced by German action in the third zone, the result might be declared void.

(This was agreed to.)

With regard to Article 3 of the report, MR. BALFOUR said that he understood that the American and British arrangements were complete. There was some difficulty about the French arrangements, but the British Admiral had undertaken to step into the breach and furnish the required number of troops should French troops be lacking. He suggested, therefore, that the arrangements made by the Americans and British be allowed to proceed and that French help be called for only in case of need.

(This was agreed to.)

(c) *Poland, East Prussia and Dantzig.*

M. TARDIEU read and explained the report given in Appendix "C".

The proposals contained in it were accepted, and it was agreed that the nominations for the Commission should be made on the 18th instant.)

On the subject of the supply of an Inter-Allied force, M. TARDIEU expressed the hope that it might be possible to do without. In any case, the Commission could proceed to the spot without troops, and report at a later date whether it required any.

4. M. TARDIEU pointed out that the Committee over which he presided had been asked to provide for the execution of the political and territorial clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. M. Loucheur presided at a Committee to supervise the execution of the Reparation Clauses. There remained economic and colonial clauses, the execution of which was at present supervised by no Committee. He suggested that the former be entrusted to the Supreme Economic Council. The latter, might perhaps, be dealt with by the Committee which had just met in London to consider the question of Mandates.

(It was agreed that this question should be brought up on the following day.)

The meeting then adjourned.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 16 July, 1919.

Committee To  
Supervise Exe-  
cution of Eco-  
nomic and Co-  
lonial Clauses of  
the Treaty  
With Germany



## Appendix A to HD-8

[Translation <sup>e</sup>]COMMITTEE ON THE EXECUTION  
OF TERRITORIAL CLAUSES*Report to the Supreme Council*

## RECOMMENDATIONS OF A GENERAL NATURE

In view of the great number of commissions of various kinds which are to come into being either immediately after the Treaty goes into force or at a date shortly after:

In view of the necessity of preparing these different organs at once, if it is desired to have them in a condition to function at the date fixed:

In view of the impossibility, on the other hand, of proceeding to any appointment or asking for credits until the Treaty has been ratified by the Parliaments:

The Committee has the honor to recommend that:

1) Each Government create a special service charged with preparing the constitution of the said organs;

2) This preparation deal with the estimation of expenses, the enlistment of personnel, the collection of material and the drafting of the project of a law demanding the opening of credits.

## Appendix B to HD-8

[Translation <sup>r</sup>]COMMITTEE ON THE EXECUTION  
OF TERRITORIAL CLAUSES*Report to the Supreme Council*

## PART III

SECTION 12—*Schleswig*

The Committee has the honor to make the following recommendations to the Supreme Council:

*1. Constitution of the Commission*

Article 109, providing for the entrance into function of the Commission as soon as the Treaty goes into force, it is necessary to prepare the personnel and the material at once.

<sup>e</sup> Translation is that given as annex B to S-H Bulletin No. 497, July 16, 1919 (Paris Peace Conf. 184.611/548).

<sup>r</sup> Translation is that given as annex C to S-H Bulletin No. 497, July 16, 1919 (Paris Peace Conf. 184.611/548).

## *2. Presidency of the Commission*

On account of the practical advantage there is in facilitating liaison with the English Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the naval forces sent by the various governments concerned to guarantee the freedom of the plebiscite in the two zones of Schleswig, the Committee is of the opinion that the presidency of the Commission should be assigned to the English representatives. (Article 109, Paragraph 1.)

## *3. Military Forces at the disposal of the Commission*

Since the Committee has learned that the Committee of admirals, assisted by generals, has been instructed to make proposals on this subject, it does not think that it should formulate any. (Article 109, Par. 1.)

## *4. Expenses of the Commission and of the Plebiscite*

The Committee proposes that the second half of the expenses (the first half being charged to Germany) should be charged to Denmark and that the Danish Government be notified of this decision. (Article 109, Par. 1.)

## *5. Persons allowed to take part in the vote*

The Committee proposes that:

a) The German Government be requested to prepare to return to their native place the officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of the German army who have been born in the part of Schleswig subject to the plebiscite. (Article No. 109, 2° b.)

b) The same request be addressed to the German Government concerning the persons that the said Government has expelled from the part of Schleswig subject to the plebiscite and who are living in Germany. (Article 109, Paragraph 2° b.)

c) The Allied and Associated Governments make sure that all prisoners of war natives of Schleswig have been sent home, or will be sent home as soon as the Treaty goes into force.

## *6. State property*

Pursuant to the letter of the Minister of Denmark to the President of the Conference, dated June 22, calling attention to fraudulent sales of state property, the Committee proposes to notify the German Government and the Danish Government that the Allied and Associated Powers will consider as null and void all sales of state real estate that have taken place since November 11, 1918, in the part of Schleswig subject to the plebiscite.

## *7. Abusive Requisitions*

Since the Committee notes that, contrary to the case of the other sections of the Treaty relative to plebiscites, the section relative to Schleswig does not prohibit the German troops and authorities, at the moment of evacuation, from making requisitions in kind and in

specie, it proposes that the German Government be warned that no such requisitions will be tolerated in the part of Schleswig subject to the plebiscite.

#### *8. Concerning the third zone*

The plebiscite in the third zone (as far as the Eider-Schlei line) inscribed in the draft of the Treaty handed to the Germans on May 7 has been suppressed in the definitive text at the request of the Danish Government.

However, the reply to the German memorandum dated June . . . notes that the evacuation will take place as far as the line above mentioned, and this regulation, of which the Danish Government requests the maintenance, has no equivalent in the articles of the Treaty.

While the Committee recognizes the fact that the temporary evacuation of the said zone by the German troops and higher authorities would contribute to the fairness of the vote in the other two zones, it does not think that, in view of the definitive text of the Treaty, the Allied and Associated Governments have the right to exact it of Germany.

Nevertheless it proposes that the German Government be asked (to prescribe the strictest reserve to its military and civil authorities in the said zone notably) to abstain from all arrests for political reasons, such as those that have been made in recent weeks, (it being understood that if the International Commission noted any move on their part calculated to prejudice the result of the vote, evacuation would be exacted at once.)<sup>8</sup>

#### *9. Résumé*

The present report therefore concludes:

a) that four decisions are to be taken by the Allied and Associated Governments.

b) that 5 communications are to be addressed by them to the German Government, and a copy of these communications is to be sent to the Danish Government.

c) That a communication is to be addressed to the Danish Government.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMITTEE

---

<sup>8</sup> Parentheses are inserted as they appear on French text which bears the notation in English: "Note: The passages within the brackets were not accepted."



## Appendix C to HD-8

[Translation<sup>9</sup>]COMMISSION ON THE EXECUTION  
OF THE TERRITORIAL CLAUSES

JULY 11, 1919.

*Report to the Supreme Council*

POLAND—EAST PRUSSIA—DANTZIG

## I

## Article 87

*1. Date of the Commission's Arrival*

The treaty provides for the creation of a commission of 7 members, 5 appointed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, 1 by Germany and 1 by Poland, to establish the west frontier of Poland.

This Commission shall be created 15 days after the Treaty goes into force.

But as soon as this Treaty does go into force, the presence of the Commission on the spot seems to be indispensable, in order that,—as it is provided for Silesia—it may superintend the evacuation, as well as the passage of the territory and the population from German sovereignty to Polish sovereignty. The note sent by the German Delegation on July 8th seems to show that Germany recognizes the advantage of this proposition.

Hence the Committee recommends that the Commission be created in time to be on the spot when the Treaty goes into force. The German and Polish Governments will be informed of it.

*2. Composition of the Commission*

The Committee is of the opinion that all facilities should be furnished to the Commission to accomplish its work as rapidly as possible, first on account of the disturbed conditions in these regions, and then because, since the preparation for the vote, in the territories subject to a plebiscite, is to begin (except in Silesia) on the 15th day, the frontier must be traced as quickly as possible between these territories and the countries purely and simply annexed. Now the frontier to be established by the Commission is 800 kilometers long.

Hence the Committee recommends that the Commission include, for each delegation, a sufficient number of officers to allow its sub-division

---

<sup>9</sup> Translation is that given in S-H Bulletin No. 488, July 15, 1919 (Paris Peace Conf. 184.611/539).

into at least two sub-commissions, working simultaneously, whose conclusions the Commission will merely co-ordinate and revise.

Each delegation shall then include:

A titular commissioner, chief of mission,  
An adjutant,  
Two technical officers.

For each Power each subcommission would be constituted by the commissioner or his adjutant, and one technical officer. The adjutant would be delegated by the commissioner, chief of mission, to vote in his name.

### *3. Presidency*

Since for the last six months all German-Polish affairs have been treated, in the name of the Allies, by General Dupont, chief of the French Mission in Berlin, the Committee recommends that the Presidency of the Commission be intrusted to this officer.

Each nation has a right to one vote. If therefore the President votes in a sub-commission, the French Commissioner will not vote.

### *4. Action of the Sub-Commissions*

The Committee suggests to the Commission:

1. That the first sub-commission be charged with establishing the east and west frontiers of the zone to be annexed without plebiscite, north of the Netze, including the part of this river which serves as the limit;

That it establish itself at [Graudenz] on the second day after the Treaty goes into force, to superintend the execution of the transfer of sovereignty;

That it begin its work of establishing the frontier on the 16th day at the frontier of the countries subject to the plebiscite [in the East], then pass to the western portion north and south of Konitz, where no administrative limit serves as demarkation, and end by the sectors where the frontier coincides with Circle (Kreis) or province boundaries.

2. That the second-subcommission be charged with the frontiers south of the Netze, from this river as far up, as Krenz to the frontier, inclusive, of the Silesian territory subject to a plebiscite;

That from the 2nd day to the 15th day it establish itself at Lissa, in order to superintend over the execution of the transferral of sovereignty;

That it begin its work of establishing the boundaries, on the 16th day, by the particularly delicate part of the frontier between Birnbaum and Rawitch; that it continue by the region of Kempen and the boundary of that part of Silesia where the plebiscite is not to begin

for six months, and that it deal finally with the portions defined by the administrative limits.

The Committee recalls the fact that the functioning of the Commission is defined by the instructions to the Inter-allied Geographic Commission on June 21, 1919 and that its composition is determined, from the technical point of view, by this Geographic Commission.

## II

### Article 88 and Annex

#### *1. Appointment of the Administrative Commission*

The Committee recommends that this Commission be constituted in such a way that it can enter into action as soon as the Treaty goes into force, for the same reasons as those given above.

#### *2. Necessary Troops*

The Committee refers to the report which the Military Council of Versailles was instructed to draw up.

#### *3. Boundary of Upper Silesia, subject to the plebiscite*

Although the Treaty does not indicate it explicitly, the Committee thinks that this boundary should be established by the Commission provided in Art. 87.

## III

### Article 95

#### *1. Date of the Plebiscite*

The treaty does not fix any, and the Committee thinks that it should be left to the Commission to fix. Nevertheless it calls attention to the fact that, without postponing the plebiscite unduly, it might be well to give the Mazurian Poles time to rid themselves of their aristocratic and ecclesiastic leaders, before requiring them to vote.

#### *2. Date When the Commission Begins to Function*

The Committee notes that the Commission is not to begin to function until 15 days after the Treaty goes into force.

Now, for this 15 days, during which the evacuation is to be effected, the Treaty provides for no superintendence. Therefore, the Commission will arrive on the 15th day in a country where no authority is functioning, and where they will not even have taken the precaution to break up the laborers and soldiers' councils and the military societies, possible organisms of opposition.

Hence the Committee recommends that the Commissioners provided for by Art. 95 arrive on the spot the second day, as in Silesia. Until the 15th day, the date at which they will begin to function for the administration of the territories and the organization of the vote,



they will exercise control over the evacuation provided by the said articles. They may prescribe the maintenance in office of certain authorities, and break up councils and societies whose action is dangerous. In the exercise of these functions they shall conform to the prescriptions provided for Silesia in the Annex to Article 88, and shall install themselves at Allenstein.

### *3. Military forces*

The Treaty puts no Allied military force at the disposal of the Commission. If the precautions indicated in the preceding section are taken, troops would not seem to be necessary. If the Commission thinks otherwise, it may call for them.

### *4. Establishment of Boundaries*

Since the eastern boundary of the zones subject to the plebiscite coincide entirely with the administrative limits, a special commission for its establishment is not necessary.

## IV

### Article 97

#### *1. Date and Conditions of Plebiscite.*

Same remark as for Article 95.

#### *2. Date when the Commission begins to function*

Same remark as for Art. 95. The Commission might install itself the second day at Marienwerder.

#### *3. Military forces*

The Treaty provides for Allied forces which may accompany the Commission. But, as in the case dealt with in Art. 95, these forces do not seem to be indispensable. Nevertheless, by the terms of the Treaty, East Prussia is not demilitarized, and the number of German forces maintained there is not limited in respect to the total effective of the German army.

#### *4. Establishment of boundaries*

Same remark as for Article 95.

## V

### Article 99

The Committee notes that the Treaty provides no organ for the temporary administration of the territory of Memel, until a decision is reached concerning its sovereignty.

The Committee makes no proposal on this subject, in view of the report that has been requested of the military and naval experts on the

occupation of Memel, and thinks that it belongs to the Supreme Council to take action directly on the basis of this report.

## VI

### Articles 100 and 104

Since the determination and organization of the territory of Dantzig are regulated in detail by Articles 100 and 104 of the Treaty, and entrusted to a Special High Commissioner, no proposal is necessary.

Nevertheless, a certain confusion may arise from the fact that Article 101 provides for the appointment by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers of a High Commissioner to preside over the Commission to establish the boundaries of the territory, and that Article 103 provides that a High Commissioner of the League of Nations shall give its assent in the drawing up of a constitution of the Free City:

The High Commissioner of Article 101, being charged merely with the technical task of establishing the frontier, it seems necessary that an administrative functionary be temporarily appointed by the Allied and Associated Powers until the League of Nations has appointed the High Commissioner provided in Art. 103.

For practical reasons, the Committee recommends that this temporary administrator be appointed as soon as possible and belong to the same nationality as the commander of the Naval forces charged with insuring to Dantzig free communication by sea. It is understood that the choice of this temporary administrator shall in no way prejudice the choice of the High Commissioner.

## VII

### MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS

#### *1. Questions to be treated with the German Government*

The problems of evacuation and of transfer of sovereignty to be solved in the territories dealt with in the preceding articles will probably bring up certain questions which will have to be treated at Berlin with the German Government, in whatever form the Allied and Associated Powers may determine.

Moreover, in spite of the difference of the regions, there will necessarily be, from the point of view of the relations with the German Government concerning the evacuation and transfer of sovereignty, a unity of matter between the various parts of East Prussia and West Prussia.

Hence the Committee thinks that it might be advantageous for the President of the Commission provided in Art. 87 to be informed, during the period of evacuation, and transfer of sovereignty, of the

activity of the various commissions on boundaries and centralize the communications that they may have to make, with the Allied and Associated authorities charged with communications with the German Government.

It is understood that its activity, thus defined, will come to an end as soon as the territories subject to the plebiscite are completely evacuated, and that the administration commissions may begin preparations for the vote.

### *2. Polish Prisoners in Allied countries*

The Committee, desirous of presenting various recommendations relative to prisoners of war of Polish origin, has deemed it its duty to transmit to them the Commission of Prisoners of War, instructed to study the question in its entirety.

In any case, it points out that the Allied Commissions on boundaries and plebiscites must be informed of the departure of the prisoners, in order to provide for their arrival.

### *3. Note from the Polish Delegation*

The Commission recommends that the note of the Polish Delegation of July 5th and all notes of the same nature be transmitted to the Commissions on boundaries and plebiscites as an annex to their instructions.



Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, July 17, 1919, at 3: 30 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. H. White.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	M. Clemenceau. M. Pichon.
<i>Secretary</i> Mr. L. Harrison.	<i>Secretary</i> Mr. H. Norman.	<i>Secretaries</i> M. Dutasta. Capt. de St. Quentin.
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Tittoni. <i>Secretary</i> M. Paterno.	Baron Makino. <i>Secretary</i> M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . .	Lieut. Burden.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lieut. Zanchi.

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux

1. (The Members of the Commission on Tientsin entered the room.)  
The following Report was before the Meeting:—

Report of Commission To Examine Italian Claims in Tientsin

The Commission entrusted with the examination of the Italian claim for the Austro-Hungarian concession at Tientsin, considering on the one hand that

- 1. the demand of the Italian Government that the Austro-Hungarian concession at Tientsin should be handed over to them is contrary to the principle laid down by the Allied and Associated Powers in Article 260 [132], of the Treaty of Peace signed on the 28th of June 1919 by the Allied and Associated Powers and the German State,
- 2. the said principle has been embodied after deliberation by the Allied and Associated Powers in Article 22 [4], Section IV, Part IV, of the conditions drafted for re-establishing peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria, and that this Article was submitted to the Austrian Delegation at St. Germain-en-Laye on the 2nd June last,
- 3. the principle of restoring to China her full rights of sovereignty over former enemy concessions was unanimously adopted by the Allied and Associated Powers in spite of the fact that certain of them might have derived advantages from acquiring possession of enemy conces-

sions bordering their own, in order to give evidence of the confidence which the high contracting parties are disposed to place in efforts towards improvement made by China, who, through declaring war against the enemy Empires, showed her determination to side with the Nations which defend the cause of right,

considering on the other hand that the objects of the Italian claim are deemed justifiable in the following respects:

i. As regards the urgent work which should be carried out for clearing the marshy portions of the former Austrian-Hungarian concession bordering the Italian concession,

ii. As regards the works which should be carried out in the Austro-Hungarian concession for regulating the course of the Hei-Ho river and preventing the recurrence of floods damaging to the Italian concession,

is of opinion,

I. that it is inadvisable to modify the principle embodied in Article 22 [4] of Part IV (section IV) of the draft Treaty of Peace with Austria;

II. that it would be expedient that the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers should request from our Chinese Allies a formal promise that within a period of one year from the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Austria the necessary works of sanitation in the late Austro-Hungarian concession and the necessary works of improvement in the course of the river shall be undertaken with all desirable promptness and shall be entrusted to the Hei-Ho Commission which has already given proof of its competence and activity.

M. TITTONI said he wished to make the following declaration:—

The Italian Delegation expresses the wish that the minutes of today's sitting of the Supreme Council should show that His Majesty's Government, while giving its assent to what is set forth in Art. 22 [4], Part IV, Section IV, of the draft text of the Conditions of Peace with Austria, insists, nevertheless, on the soundness of its claims submitted in 1917 by the R. Legation at Peking to the Chinese Government for a rectification of the boundary line separating the Italian concession of Tient-Tsin from the former Austro-Hungarian concession.

M. PICHON said that the Report of the Commission would be adopted, and no alteration would be made in Article 22 [4]. M. Tittoni's declaration, however, would be inserted in the Minutes.

MR. BALFOUR questioned whether the declaration referred to the same subject as the Report of the Commission.

M. GOUR explained that the Italian concession was separated from the river by a small strip of the Austrian concession. The Italian Government in 1917 had asked for an alteration of the boundaries in order to obtain easier access to the river. The Commission had asked for fuller information on this subject than was available. The Italian delegate had undertaken to obtain it, but it had not yet been

received, and the Commission therefore had reserved judgment on the subject.

M. PICHON said that the Council was therefore asked for no decision on this matter. It would, however, be necessary to fix a time limit within which the works of sanitation should be undertaken. He thought it might be sufficient to state that the work should be undertaken within a "reasonable time".

MR. BALFOUR thought perhaps the matter might be left to the League of Nations.

M. PICHON observed that there was a Health Section of the League of Nations which might take an interest in the matter.

BARON MAKINO observed that the sovereignty over the ground in question was Chinese; the Chinese Government would, therefore, have to be approached on the subject.

M. GOUT said that if the Chinese Government took steps within a year to set the enterprise going, there need be no complaint. Once the Hei-Ho Commission had taken the work in hand, it would certainly complete it thoroughly well.

BARON MAKINO observed that if the Chinese Government were asked by the Powers to execute a sanitary measure it would surely agree. The determination of the time limit would appear to be a sort of imposition.

M. PICHON said that it might be difficult to get the Chinese Government to undertake the work. Once it had undertaken it, it would no doubt execute it.

After some further discussion it was agreed to fix a time limit of one year for the undertaking of the work.

BARON MAKINO said that as his objection was a matter of form he would agree.

(The Report of the Commission as above quoted was therefore adopted, and it was decided that no alteration need be made to Article 22 [4], and that the Chinese Government should be asked in the name of the Powers to undertake the sanitary work required by the Italian Delegation within a year.)

(The Members of the Commission withdrew.)

2. (Mr. Hoover, M. Seydoux, M. Crespi<sup>1</sup> and Mr. Gorvin<sup>2</sup> entered the room.)

Report From  
Mr. Hoover on  
the Revictualling  
of Austria

MR. HOOVER gave a summary and explanation of the memorandum annexed in Appendix "A".

M. PICHON asked how much in Mr. Hoover's estimation, had been spent on the revictualling of Austria?

<sup>1</sup> Respectively United States, French, and Italian representatives on the Supreme Economic Council.

<sup>2</sup> John H. Gorvin of Great Britain, executive officer in Paris for the Relief Section of the Supreme Economic Council.



MR. HOOVER said that he estimated that to complete the present programme up to the 15th of August, Eighty Million Dollars would have been spent.

M. PICHON asked whether Mr. Hoover thought there were securities in Austria enough to cover the cost of the scheme he proposed to undertake.

MR. HOOVER said that he doubted whether the sums already spent could be recovered for three or four years. Everything that could be realised had already been realised. The Austrian Authorities latterly had gone so far as to offer the National Art Galleries in payment for food.

M. PICHON said that under these circumstances it seemed hardly possible to advance money.

M. TITTONI said that the alternative was Bolshevism.

MR. HOOVER said that his hope was if priority were given to payment for food, even over payment of reparations, the Austrian Government might take heart and set to work in order to meet its liabilities. This was the only means of giving the present Government enough encouragement for it to hold on. Should the harvest succeed in Hungary, there would be a surplus of food in that country. It was only Allied help that had hitherto kept Austria from Bolshevism. The Hungarians were employing most active propaganda. Should they take the place of the Allies in the supply of food, it could hardly be expected that the Austrians would not join them and become Bolshevik. It seemed clear that the Austrian Delegation sincerely wished to keep a moderate Government in Power in Austria. If they could be assured by the Powers that the help he suggested would be given them, he thought they might resist Bolshevism.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought Mr. Hoover had made out a most serious case. He was not quite sure that the Bolsheviks in Hungary would have much food to spare. He was told that Bela Kun had quarrelled with the peasants, who would be inclined to resist requisition. The main point was that it was desirable to set up Austria economically. She could not be left to starve. Food must be advanced to her either on such securities as existed, or she must be put in a way to earn money. She could not produce the food she required, as the territory left her by the Treaty was insufficient. Mr. Hoover's proposal was first to encourage the Austrians by a promise, and secondly, to tell the Reparation Committee to think first of making Austria a paying concern before getting money out of her. This appeared to him to be the most statesmanlike method. If a man were kept alive by charity, he could not be asked to pay his debts. He was not quite sure, however, what the functions of the Reparation Commission were, or whether the Council could give it orders as suggested by Mr. Hoover.

MR. HOOVER said the wording of the German Treaty enabled the Reparation Commission to furnish food and raw material to Germany, and to obtain payment for these in priority to payment of reparation. In any case, as the Reparation Commission had complete control of all resources,—no other body could intervene.

M. CRESPI said that the Reparation Commission had the right to raise resources with the object of obtaining food. The Reparation Commission could certainly be given orders by the Governments as it was itself merely an Agent of the Government.

(At this point M. Clemenceau entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how payment for food would be obtained?

M. CRESPI said that money could be raised by taxation. Hungarian food might turn Austria Bolshevik. It was for this reason that Italy had sent food into Austria.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was ready to accept Mr. Hoover's plan, but he would take the opportunity of telling the Austrians that they must give up the arms and ammunition in Austria to the Czechs.

MR. HOOVER suggested that the Austrians might be told that the food supplies would cease unless they did so.

M. TITTONI considered that the question of the delivery of the arms should be kept quite separate from the question of food. These arms represented one of the securities in Austria for the payment of Reparation. He did not say that the arms should not be delivered, but an equivalent in value should be available for the Reparation fund.

MR. BALFOUR said that it was most urgent to send the arms to Czecho-Slovakia at once.

MR. HOOVER said that this difficulty had already arisen. Trade had been arranged between Austria and Serbia. Five steel bridges were to be given to Serbia in exchange for food. The same objection had been raised, that these bridges represented a security for the payment of reparation. The Czechs were prepared to exchange coal for arms, but once the Czechs had given coal and the Serbians food, there was no means of making them contribute anything towards the reparation fund.

MR. BALFOUR said that if M. Tittoni's thesis were carried to its logical extremity, all Austrian trade would be put a stop to. Austria could get neither food nor anything else. He had no wish to reduce the reparation fund to Italy's detriment. He thought it imperative that Austria should be fed, and Czecho-Slovakia armed.

M. TITTONI said that he acquiesced regarding food, which was a matter of primary necessity. It was not so vital a matter to arm the Czechs. Italy and the other Allies should get some equivalent for the liquidation of a valuable Austrian security. If the Czechs were ready

to give coal in exchange, Italy should obtain her share of this coal, for the coal situation in Italy was as bad as that in Austria.

MR. BALFOUR said that in his opinion it was to Allied interests that the Czechs should be armed. If so, it was nearly as important that commerce between Austria and Czecho-Slovakia should be carried on as between Austria and Serbia for food. He thought nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of the passage of arms from Vienna to Prague.

M. TITTONI said that Italy recognised the need of Austria for food, but, as to coal, Italy needed it just as badly. Italy must therefore have her share in the coal which paid for the arms.

MR. HOOVER said that the amount of the surplus of Bohemian coal was infinitesimal, and barely enough to supply the needs of Vienna. Moreover, the Czechs had ceased to export coal because they received no arms from Austria. Austria was afraid of exporting these arms out of fear of the Hungarian Bolsheviks. By a threat to withhold food, the Austrians could be prevailed on to deliver the arms. They could also be promised, in case they did so, Bohemian coal. The Italians, short as they were of coal, had realised Austrian needs, and had themselves supplied coal to Vienna.

M. CRESPI observed that it was the duty of the Reparation Commission to see that all Austrian securities were not one by one spent to the detriment of the common reparation fund.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would be content to allow the arms to go, and to find out afterwards in what way payment could be obtained. So long as they were delivered to the Czechs, he did not mind in what way the re-adjustment was made for the benefit of the reparation fund.

MR. HOOVER suggested that if his formula were adopted, a few lines might be added regarding the sending of arms to Czecho-Slovakia.

(It was therefore agreed that the following reply should be made to the Austrian Delegation:—

“In respect to the Request laid before the Supreme Economic Council from the Austrian Delegates that provision of further food supplies should be immediately undertaken by the Allied and Associated Governments, this request has been laid before the Council of Five and the Council wishes to state that as food and raw materials for Austria during the forthcoming year are fundamental to her recuperation and her ability to make reparation, the method of provision of such food and raw material will be one of the first considerations of the Reparations Commission.

The Council wishes, however, to make this assurance contingent on an undertaking by the Austrian Government. The delivery of arms to Czecho-Slovakia has been greatly delayed despite the offer of coal in exchange. It must be understood that the continuation of the present supplies of food to Austria, as well as the above assurances, depend on



the execution by Austria of the delivery of the arms and ammunition required by Czecho-Slovakia."

The question raised by M. Tittoni was remitted for further study to the Supreme Economic Council.)

3. (At this stage, Marshal Foch, General Weygand, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, M. Benes, M. Kramarcz, M. Pachitch, M. Misu, and M. Vaida Voevod entered the room.)

Report of Marshal  
Foch on Plan for  
Military Opera-  
tions Against  
Hungary

MARSHAL FOCH read a memorandum annexed to these Minutes in Appendix "B". He also quoted from

a telegram sent on the 10th. July to the British War Office by Colonel Cunningham from Vienna to the effect that the red army was composed of 9 divisions, one of which, the 4th infantry division, had been disbanded. Each division could only muster a small number of rifles. For instance, the 9th division had only 2 to 3,000 rifles. To liberate Hungary from Communism in one week a force of 8 infantry divisions, one cavalry division, 100 aeroplanes and as many armoured cars as possible would suffice.

MR. BALFOUR said that one statement in the very remarkable report read by Marshal Foch gave him some apprehension. He referred to the passage in which Marshal Foch alluded to the necessity of establishing in Hungary a Government with which the Entente could negotiate peace. Such a Government would not appear to be a Hungarian Government, but one set up by the Entente Powers. The Peace would be represented for all time, not as one between the Powers and the Hungarian people, but as a Peace between the Powers and their own puppets. This would furnish a weapon to all the enemies of the Entente. He would not ask Marshal Foch to say how this difficulty could be avoided, as the Marshal would doubtless reply, with justice, that that was the business of the politicians.

M. TITTONI said that the Hungarian situation was a very difficult one. As to the military proposals, he had nothing to say, but, regarding the political side, he had some observations to make. Hungary was ruled by a small minority. 80 per cent. of the Hungarian troops were against Bela Kun, so were the peasants and the *bourgeoisie*. At Szeged, there was an opposition Government which was a nationalist centre. If the Council determined to have Hungary attacked by Czech, Roumanian and Serbian troops, Bela Kun would be able to drape himself in the national colours, and pose as a patriotic Hungarian. In the end, it would not be Bela Kun who would be destroyed, but the Hungarian nation. If the Allies, on the other hand, could act in concert with the Szeged Government, they would appear as the deliverers of the country from tyranny. All the Governments had to contend with the criticism and opposition of the Labour parties

in their own countries. It was therefore, highly opportune to appear to act on behalf of the majority in Hungary. He made no criticism of the military means proposed by Marshal Foch, but he thought they should be accompanied by political action of the kind he had described.

MR. WHITE asked in what manner M. Tittoni would suggest that this political action should be begun?

M. TITTONI said that he would send Allied Agents to get into touch with the Government at Szeged before any military action began.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had, in his report, asked for Governmental instructions. When the armies set out for Budapest, they would be preceded by proclamations conveying the intentions of their Governments. It was for the Governments to determine what these proclamations should be.

M. BENES said that he thought M. Tittoni's proposals were based on wrong premises. From information he had received, the Hungarian Officers, though not sharing Bela Kun's opinions were loyal to him, because they thought the Communist Government would give them means of fighting their neighbours. All of them were passionately attached to the integrity of Hungary. They would like to win back for it Transylvania, Croatia, and Slovakia. There was no hope of seducing these Officers. As to the civilians, no doubt the *bourgeoisie* parties would like to be rid of Bela Kun, but they would not co-operate with the neighbouring nations to that end. If the Powers began to negotiate with the Magyars, they must count with the suspicions and mistrust of the Roumanians, of the Yugo-Slavs and of the Czecho-Slovaks. The Magyars did not admit their defeat. They remained Imperialist in spirit and they would use any conversation they might have with the Great Powers to turn the tables on their neighbours. He thought for these reasons that there were strong objections to the course of negotiating with any Hungarian Party.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Benes whether he agreed to Marshal Foch's plan?

M. BENES said that he did but not to M. Tittoni's.

M. KRAMARCZ said that the armies must march under the banner of "Respect for the Armistice". The existence of a Hungarian army forced the neighbouring countries to remain armed. They were anxious to disarm and demobilise. Enforcement of the Armistice Conditions was a complete and sufficient justification for action, and it would serve as an answer to criticism. He had the same fears and interests as M. Tittoni, but he was convinced that there should be no talk with any Hungarian parties, as this would only revive Hungarian nationalist ambition. Action should be taken on military grounds if only to uphold the decrees of the Conference.

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD said that he agreed with M. Kramarcz and M. Benes. He thought it was necessary not to give Bela Kun a pretext for posing as a defender of his country. The majority of the Hungarian population wished to remain quiet and to be ruled neither by a communist nor by a re-actionary government. When the Allied armies had taken Buda-pest, they might proclaim to the people that it was open to them to choose their own Government. The Allied Commander-in-Chief, however, should consult non-Magyar elements as well. There were Roumanians, Serbs and Slovaks of Hungary who knew the devices of the parties and who could help the Commander-in-Chief.

GENERAL BLISS said that the general purpose aimed at was one he would gladly see carried out, but only the Head of his Government could decide on any action in this respect. In spite of all disguises it was manifest that what was proposed was a renewal of war on Hungary with the object of destroying its present Government. If action was to be based on the pretext of a breach of the Armistice by Hungary, the Allies must be quite clear that the fault was entirely on the side of the Hungarians. In the Armistice arranged by General Franchet d'Esperey on the 13th. November at Belgrade,<sup>3</sup> a certain line had been fixed by Article I. North and west of this line the Serbians and Roumanians respectively were not to advance. The second Article required the demobilisation of the Hungarian Army down to six Infantry Divisions and two Cavalry Divisions. It was alleged that the Hungarians had broken Article II.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether there was anything in Clause I forbidding the Serbians and Roumanians to cross the line.

GENERAL BLISS said that the Roumanians should not have crossed west of the line. When they had been relieved of German domination,—they had crossed the line in spite of General Franchet d'Esperey. He had then tried to stop them on another line further west, but without avail. The matter had been discussed in Paris and the discussions had lead to the establishment of a neutral zone approximately representing the line fixed in the Treaty of 1916.<sup>4</sup> Even this, however, had not stopped the Roumanian advance. At a Meeting held by the Military Representatives at Versailles on the 25th. February, 1919, General Charpy, Chief of Staff to General Franchet d'Esperey had given the following evidence:—

On November 7th, 1918, General Franchet d'Esperey and Count Karolyi had met at Belgrade to sign a supplementary armistice with Hungary on the same lines as General Diaz had signed with Austria.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. II, p. 183.

<sup>4</sup> Italy, R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *Trattati e convenzioni fra il regno d'Italia e gli altri stati*, vol. 23, p. 412.



At that time Roumania was still under German domination and therefore only French, Serbian and Hungarian representatives were present at Belgrade. They all knew the terms of the Hungarian armistice. A certain zone was to be definitely occupied and further zones could be occupied for strategic reasons. The armistice was signed on November 13th, and the Hungarians had made no difficulties and had carried out all the conditions. The French and Serbians advanced as agreed. The only difficulties occurred with Roumania.

Without informing General Franchet d'Esperey, the Roumanians had advanced, especially in the region of Klausenburg. The Hungarians at once protested that this was a breach of the armistice conditions. The Roumanians replied that they were in agreement with the Hungarians. This was not correct, but eventually an agreement was reached. The Roumanians were allowed to advance up to a line well in advance of the armistice line. This was reported to the Allied Governments.

Unfortunately, the Roumanians advanced still further with the result that certain incidents took place; the Roumanians oppressed the local population and the Hungarians became incensed. Up to that time the position had not become serious, however.

The Roumanians stated that they feared an attack by Hungarian armies; that was absolutely impossible. Hungary had no organised troops, whereas the Roumanian army was well organised. Naturally there was much unrest in Hungary and some Bolshevism, but nothing important, and Bolshevism in Transylvania was not apparent. The Roumanians had for some time tried to advance to the Treaty line, but General Franchet d'Esperey had refused so far though he had sent a mission to make enquiries into alleged atrocities. The information received was that the local situation was quite quiet.

Taking these facts into consideration the Roumanians should remain on their present line as all the trouble had been caused by their advance. It was not for him to give advice on a political question, but the Roumanians should not be allowed to cross the line Arad-Grosswardein-Szatmar-Nemeti and it would be preferable to send Allied troops there; a neutral zone would be of no advantage as there were not sufficient Allied troops to guard it.

To maintain order it would be sufficient to garrison Grosswardein and Stulimar [*Szatmar?*] with Allied troops; there were already some at Arad.

In spite of this the neutral zone had been accepted. The Roumanians had advanced to the Eastern limit of this zone and finding it empty had proceeded as far as the Theiss. An American observer had informed him that as soon as the Hungarians came to know of the decision taken on March 12th, the Karolyi Government would go. He had written a letter to this effect to the Council. The Hungarian Government had only received information on the 19th. On that very date the Karolyi Government resigned and handed over its powers to Bela Kun. Bela Kun had succeeded in raising an Army solely to repel the unwarranted invasion of the Roumanians. The violation of the armistice was first made by the Roumanians in spite of the Powers

and at a time when the Hungarian Army had gone to pieces. If the Council meant to take action on the ground that the Armistice had been violated, it should examine carefully at what date the Hungarian Army had been re-constituted. He was confident that it would be found that this had taken place after the violation of the armistice by the Roumanians.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had three observations to make on General Bliss's very important statement. In the first place he agreed with him that the American delegates and he himself as British representative could not initiate a considerable military policy without consulting the Governments at home. He personally could not authorise a new war, or the resumption of an old war, without reference to London. In the second place he begged to dissent entirely, as far as he was concerned, from the allegation made by General Bliss that the breach of the armistice was merely alleged as a pretext for attacking the Communist Government of Hungary. He wished it to be understood that he was not animated by any consideration of Hungarian internal politics, little though he might approve of Bela Kun. He agreed with M. Kramarcz that it was intolerable to allow the Hungarian State to become a military stronghold, from which economic and political disturbances radiated over Central Europe. When he insisted on the disarmament of Hungary by reason of her breach of the armistice, he was not disguising his intention, but stating exactly what he wished. Without the disarmament of Hungary, there could be no peace or settlement of frontiers in Central Europe. On the third point he spoke with more diffidence. General Bliss' argument was based on the view that the Allied Powers were precluded from sending troops across the line beyond which the Hungarians were not to advance, according to Article I of the Armistice. He was surprised at this view. The Article forbade the Hungarians to go beyond the line, but did not explicitly forbid the Allies to cross it. Clause III moreover gave the Allies the "right of occupying all places and strategic points which may be permanently fixed by the general Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies." It was difficult to reconcile this with General Bliss' interpretation of Article I. (For the military Convention see Appendix C.) There was another small point on which he did not wish to rely, namely, that when the Convention was signed, Roumania was not a belligerent. He would like to be told by experts in military jurisprudence whether the Roumanian advance, regrettable though it might have been, amounted to a breach of the Armistice in the same sense as the obvious and important breach made by Hungarians.

GENERAL BLISS said that the interpretation of Article I of the Armistice did not require a lawyer. The very word Armistice meant

the laying down of arms by both sides on a given line in order that civil plenipotentiaries should negotiate. It could not impose a purely unilateral obligation. As to Article III, giving the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies the right to occupy strategic points, no such provision had been made in the Armistice with Germany. But it had been feared that hostilities with Germany might begin again, and when the Armistice Convention with Austria had been negotiated, it had been stipulated that the Allied Armies should have passed through Austrian territory in order to threaten Germany from the South. A similar provision had also been made in the Convention with Hungary. The provision, however, did not mean that any Allied Commander could occupy any point he liked without reference to the Commander-in-Chief. Roumanian action had been taken in defiance of the wishes of General Franchet d'Esperey.

M. KRAMARCZ said he did not wish to enter into the legal question. Czecho-Slovakia was threatened by the Hungarians. The Army of the Hungarians kept Czecho-Slovakia and other countries armed and mobilised. This was the only question for consideration.

M. PACHITCH said he agreed with M. Kramarcz, M. Benes, and M. Vaida. Action ought to be taken to force Bela Kun to fulfil Hungary's engagements under the Armistice. The Yugo-Slavs had reason to expect that they would be the third victim of Hungary. Hungarians undoubtedly desired to re-establish Hungary in her historic frontiers.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that all concerned had now expressed their views. Two Governments, however, had to be consulted before action could be taken.

MARSHAL FOCH observed that on July 11th,<sup>5</sup> when he had been asked to study a plan of operations, the principle of action itself had not been in question. If it was questioned now, it would seem that the Council was in contradiction with itself.

MR. BALFOUR said that he dissented entirely from what Marshal Foch had just said. He could not consult his Government on the propriety of military operations, unless he knew what their nature was and what chance of success they offered.

MR. WHITE said that as he understood the case, Marshal Foch had been asked to make a report to send to the Governments. Marshal Foch had made a most able report. He could not commit his Government and even the President would have to be assured that the proposal did not involve a new war before he could assent, without consulting the Senate.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this was not a subject that could be discussed. Each of the members of the Council was free to consult

---

<sup>5</sup> For the discussion of this subject on July 11, see HD-5, minute 7, p. 103.



his Government. Marshal Foch had presented a remarkable report showing that success could be hoped for without a great expenditure of effort. General Bliss had put forward certain questions which deserve close examination. He would remind the Council that Mr. Balfour had lately drafted a telegram in which the Council had informed Bela Kun that it could not hold any conversations with him as long as he did not respect the Armistice. No one had then raised any objection.

MR. WHITE said that he wished that he had followed his usual method, and asked for time to consider the matter.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would like to point out that a state of war with Hungary still existed and there could be no question of a new war.

M. TITTONI asked that the greatest secrecy be observed regarding the discussion.

(It was agreed that the discussion should be resumed on the following day at 10:30 by the Members of the Council.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, July 17, 1919.

---

Appendix "A" to HD-9

WCP-1147

REVICTUALLING OF AUSTRIA

*Report From Mr. Hoover*

SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL,  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RELIEF,  
July 11, 1919.

The Honorable ROBERT M. LANSING,  
*Secretary of State,*  
*Hotel de Crillon, Paris.*

MY DEAR MR. LANSING: As you are aware, we have been for many months providing large food supplies for the State of German-Austria. The financial cycle that we have set up between Allied and Associated Governments for this end will have exhausted itself by the end of August, with the provision of about \$80,000,000 of supplies. Austria must receive continuous relief in food thereafter and it must also be provided with raw materials during the whole of next year. The conditions of the Treaty are such that the entire financial resources of Austria are placed at the disposal of the Reparations Commission. It is therefore utterly impossible to arrange any credits or finance to Austria except by the activities of this Commission.

It is also necessary to give some assurance to Austria at the earliest moment that further food is going to be provided or that Government

is likely to collapse before the Treaty can be signed. The Supreme Economic Council therefore yesterday directed me to lay before the Council of Five the suggestion that a communication should be given to the Austrian Delegates in Paris to somewhat the following effect:

"In respect to the request laid before the Supreme Economic Council from the Austrian Delegates that provision of further food supplies should be immediately undertaken by the Allied and Associated Governments, this request has been laid before the Council of Five and the Council wishes to state that as food and raw materials for Austria during the forthcoming year are fundamental to her recuperation and her ability to make reparation, the method of provision of such food and raw material will be one of the first considerations of the Reparations Commission."

For the information of the Council of Five, I enclose herewith, first, a note from myself on the economic situation of Austria, and, second, copy of the communications to the Supreme Economic Council from the Austrian delegates in respect to this matter.

Faithfully yours,

HERBERT HOOVER

[Enclosure 1]

JULY 11, 1919.

#### AUSTRIA

It is obvious to the most superficial observer that the present economic resources of the State of German-Austria are incapable of supporting the population of seven and one-half million people for at least another year. A large part of this population has for generations lived on the empire with its centralization of political life, finance, economic and educational institutions, and a population has been thereby created totally incapable of supporting itself when denuded of its hinterland. Its future, lies not only in full production of such resources as exist but also in the establishment of an economic equilibrium by migration. To restart the established industries involves credits, reorganized currency, raw material, etc. The establishment of such equilibrium cannot take place for a year at least, and the very insistent fact stands out that to prevent sheer starvation the population will need to be fed and furnished raw materials on credit continuously. The food production of this year's harvest in Austria would not, even if it could be uniformly distributed, last the population more than three months. As the peasant population will undoubtedly retain its twelve months' supply, it means that the probable food intake to the city population from the state itself does not exceed six or eight weeks. With the completion of the present relief programme, at the first of September, foodstuffs will have been furnished to Austria, since the Armistice, aggregating a total value of nearly 80 millions of dollars.

The programme for the next twelve months will cost probably 150 million dollars, and even this would be insufficient to maintain order unless raw material can also be found and as much of the population as possible returned to production. *Without this assistance the ultimate payment of reparation by Austria does not seem to be very probable.*

It is necessary, therefore, to give some consideration at an early moment to the fate of these people, and if any reparation is to be expected their economic situation must be taken in hand at an early date with the hope that it can be ultimately built up to a point where their surplus production may yield something for indemnities. The economic rehabilitation of Austria cannot be effected without establishing equitable relationship between Austria and the surrounding states as to communications and customs union.

If this problem is to be accomplished, there must be some central authority whose position is such that it can enforce its economic will not only in Austria but in the surrounding states and who can secure for Austria the necessary credits for raw material, food, etc. Under the terms of the treaty, this authority not only exists in the Reparation Commission but it would be impossible for any form of organization to operate outside of the Commission. It is therefore of acute importance that as quickly as the Austrian Treaty is signed the Reparation Commission should be set up so that it may secure the initiation of the necessary measures.

The matter is one of extreme urgency as all of the funds available for Austrian relief will have been expended by the first of September, and there will scarcely be more than the sequent month to make arrangements for further supplies if collapse in this state is to be prevented.

HERBERT HOOVER

[Enclosure 2]

[*Note From the President of the Austrian Delegation (Renner)*]

ST. GERMAIN-EN-LAYE

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE  
SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL,  
*Paris*

SIR: The enclosed Bills concerning the securities for the credits for provisions were passed by the German Austrian National Assembly on the 8th. July. They will immediately be executed; the foreign securities and gold coins of private individuals will be requisitioned and the list of the requisitioned values will be submitted as soon as possible to the Supreme Economic Council. The proceeds of the exportation of timber will be delivered to the Central Office for the Supervision of



Exchange (*Divisenzentrals*) and will by the latter be forwarded to whatever place shall be indicated to us.

Since, in conformity with the request of the Supreme Economic Council, we have put at the disposal of the latter all foreign securities in the inland as well as in neutral countries, while our foreign securities available in the Allied and Associated States are under sequestration, we are at present totally unable to procure for ourselves in good time, from another source, credits for the purchase of foodstuffs. The credits granted us by the Supreme Economic Council are being quickly exhausted. Even at the present moment we only obtain grain and flour, while the provisioning with meat, fats, rice and condensed milk has ceased. Our alimentation position has therefore become considerably worse again and is already now very critical. In the month of August the credits for grain and flour will be exhausted. If in consequence the imports should cease, a large portion of our population, especially the population of Vienna and the industrial centres would be exposed to starvation. The new crop can only cover one-fourth of our requirements; moreover, since with us small holdings prevail, it will only be available in the course of a few months. Even with the greatest efforts it will not be possible to raise in the inland even the small rations on which the population of Vienna is living at present. We further absolutely need meat, fats, rice and condensed milk from abroad. If the supplies on the part of the Allied Great Powers cease, the famine, which for a time was mitigated by these supplies, would fall upon us again with full vigour, and it would be impossible to maintain social order.

That we cannot, in spite of all our efforts, hope to get regular supplies from the other States emerged from the former Monarchy, the delegates of the Interallied Commission, who have assisted us in a very much appreciated way, will confirm.

Since we have put at the disposal of the Supreme Economic Council all the realisable assets, we are obliged to make the urgent appeal that further credits be provisionally granted us, at least for the months of August and September. By that time we shall have carried through the demanded requisitioning of foreign values, which proceeding we will expedite with the greatest speed, and the Supreme Economic Council will be in a position to judge what credits it can grant us for the bonds given by us or what bonds it can release for our use elsewhere. As the Supreme Economic Council is well aware, we are, up to that time, unable to help ourselves. The moment, in which the credits granted us will be entirely exhausted is already in dismal proximity. The suspension of the food supply would lead to a catastrophe and would destroy all the effects of the relief action of the Supreme Economic Council. We therefore, beg the Supreme Council

once more, to be kind enough to take immediate steps that the food supply be for the present continued.

Awaiting your favourable reply, I am [etc.]

RENNER

---

Appendix B to HD-9

[Translation \*]

JULY 17, 1919.

*Note on Possible Action in Hungary*

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers decided, July 11, that Marshal Foch, "after consulting the authorities of the several interested governments, should formulate the plan of operations against Hungary and report progress to the Council in a week's time."

To execute this decision:

General Pellé, for the Czecho-Slovak Army,  
General Pechitch, for the Serbian Army,  
General Prezan, for the Roumanian Army;

were asked to indicate the forces which the Czecho-Slovak, Serbian, and Roumanian Governments respectively would be able to contribute to the contemplated operation.

For his part, General d'Esperey was requested to indicate the conditions under which he would be able to reinforce the offensive power of the French Army in Hungary.

According to the information already received, the situation appears on July 16th as follows:

*Czecho-Slovak Army*—M. Masaryk puts at the disposal of the Entente all the armed forces of the Republic, namely:

6 divisions of infantry on the front, ready to go into action;  
2 divisions of infantry forming, ready July 18th.  
Approximate total effective force 100,000 men.

These forces have been reorganized and made up again under the direction of the French Military Mission. They are now in good condition to resume offensive operations.

However, the need for artillery ammunition is urgently felt. The magazines are nearly empty. The production is insignificant.\* Only Austria is ready with the necessary stocks. It is therefore indispen-

---

\* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

\*Actually four charges a day per cannon, which will be increased to eight about August 15. [Footnote in the original.]

sable and urgent to intervene at Vienna so that the sending of ammunition will begin immediately.†

*Serbian Army*—The Serbian Government is able to place, at present, at the disposition of the Entente:

14 battalions	} equal to 11½ divisions of infantry and 1 division of cavalry.
12 squadrons of cavalry	
12 batteries	

numbering 18 to 20 thousand excellent soldiers who are ready and on a war footing from July 18.

The Serbian Government requests, however, as a condition of its cooperation, the benevolent support of the Entente in order to put an end to all cause of friction with Italy, and to assume the protection of Serbian territory against Bulgarian troops and *comitadjis*.‡

*Roumanian Army*—A definite reply has not yet arrived concerning the possibilities of the Roumanian Government.

It would appear admissible to count, for the present, on the total forces of the Roumanian Army of the West, stationed on the Theiss, namely:

6 divisions of infantry and 1 division of cavalry, representing about 75,000 men.

This force will probably be strengthened so as to place the units completely upon a war footing by drawing upon the depots in the Transylvania region which have about 20,000 men.

The Roumanian Army of the West, after its recent success against the Hungarian Army, is in good physical and moral condition to resume the fight.

It is to be anticipated, however, that Roumania, in order to engage all its forces of the West outside of its frontiers, will want to be prepared to reconstitute new reserves for the interior by mobilizing new divisions. Without doubt, it will then be necessary to furnish them with equipment and clothing for which they have great need.

This material aid could be given them by England and America (whose contingents are not participating in the proposed operation) by continuing the shipments previously sent or still en route.

*French Army in Hungary*—It is at present free with its two divisions of infantry, its brigade of cavalry, its mechanized parts

†For this purpose, ask General Segré and General Hallier to expedite the shipment of orders already placed at Vienna by the Czecho-Slovak Government and not yet delivered. Likewise communicate with the Austrian Delegation at St. Germain in order to demand that they intervene with their Government so that all facilities are provided for these shipments. [Footnote in the original.]

‡ The arrival in Bulgaria of the French 30th and 156th Divisions of Infantry coming from the Dniester will make it possible to give this latter guarantee to the Serbian Government (Movements will be completed by the end of July.) [Footnote in the original.]



(3 groups of heavy guns, 2 companies of armored cars, and a small squadron of tanks.)

Effective force 25,000 men, of whom about 20,000 are combatants.

The infantry has its full complement. The artillery and the services are now being refilled with personnel.

The material resources would also be augmented by drawing on the surpluses of the Army of the East.¶

Upon the whole, and with the reservation of confirming the information about the Roumanian Army, the total effectives which would be possible to have on a war footing against Hungary within several days, would add up to:—

Czecho-Slovak Army	8 divisions of infantry		100,000 men
Serbian Army	1½ divisions of infantry	1 division of cavalry	20,000 "
Roumanian Army	6 divisions of infantry	1 division of cavalry	75,000 "
French Army in Hungary	2 divisions of infantry	½ division of cavalry	25,000 "
Total	17½ divisions of infantry	2½ divisions of cavalry	220,000 "

of which about 160,000 are combatant troops.

Against these forces, the Hungarian Army numbers, according to the latest information:

8 divisions of infantry  
3 brigades of infantry  
4 brigades of frontier guards  
2 divisions of cavalry (?)

amounting to 10 to 11 divisions of infantry and 2 divisions of cavalry, a total of 150 thousand effectives, about 100 to 120 thousand of which are combatant troops, of an undetermined value.

In the comparison of opposing forces, it appears that the Entente possesses on the spot considerable numerical superiority with reference to Hungary.

Even the disposition of these forces, which encircle the Hungarian forces, constitutes also an advantageous situation for offensive operations.

But it is important to point out at this time that these troops, comprising four different nationalities, can hope for success only if directed by a common command.

It is therefore necessary to place them under one supreme commander accepted by the Roumanian, Serbian, and Czecho-Slovak Governments.

¶General d'Esperey has not yet answered the inquiry that was sent to him on this subject. [Footnote in the original.]

This command will determine the military plan of action.

Now is the time to organize this command and to make the necessary agreements with the general staffs of the several participating armies.

It is to be supposed, moreover, that an Allied operation, arranged in this way, with a joint effort of the Allied Armies resulting from a single command, will bring these Armies within a short time to the gates of Budapest.

In this situation, there will be the question of setting up in Hungary a government of order, with which the Entente will be able to sign a peace corresponding with its intentions. As a consequence, it is necessary now to prepare a program of political action, succeeding the military operation, and stating for the commander the instructions of the Conference for establishing a new Hungarian Government.

Furnished with these instructions the commander will be able to determine the provisional regime for occupation of the country and to arrange to move the Allied troops which have become unnecessary back beyond their respective frontiers.

In conclusion :

The forces which are available for the Entente would appear to be adequate to undertake, within a short time and with chances of success, a military operation against Hungary under the following conditions :

1. A single supreme command for operations is organized ;
2. The Conference gives instructions which permit the supreme command to establish a new government agreeing with the views of the Entente ; and which determine the conditions of the subsequent occupation of the country ;
3. The material resources of the troops are completed by :

Intervention with the government of Vienna, and with its delegation at Saint-Germain, in order to furnish munitions to the Czecho-Slovaks ;

The delivery of material, equipment, and clothing to Roumania by the powers of the Entente.

4. Finally, there is considered also the organization of relief for the Hungarian civil population ; relief which will be assured and controlled by the English organization placed in charge of operating the line of river communication of the Danube.

---

#### Appendix C to HD-9

WCP-441

*Text of Military Convention Between the Allies and Hungary, Signed at Belgrade, November 13*

[Text of convention is printed in volume II, page 183.]

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, July 18, 1919, at 10 a. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. H. White.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour,  
O. M., M. P.

*Secretary*

Sir Percy Loraine, Bt.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.  
M. Pichon.

*Secretaries*

M. Dutasta.  
Capt. de St. Quentin.

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

**JAPAN**

Baron Makino.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . . Lieut. Burden.  
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . Capt. E. Abraham.  
FRANCE . . . . . Capt. A. Portier.  
ITALY . . . . . Lieut. Zanchi.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said he had received a dispatch stating that the Greeks had committed atrocities in Smyrna and its neighbourhood.

Proposal To Send  
Commissioners To  
Enquire Into  
Disorders in  
Anatolia

(Appendix A.) The Sheikh-ul-Islam formally accused them. He wished to propose to his Colleagues that they should send a Commission of Enquiry. The Council was not without responsibility, seeing that

it had sent the Greeks to Smyrna.

MR. BALFOUR said he had been much concerned about the reports from Asia Minor. A question had been asked in the House of Commons. It had been found on investigation that the Greeks had in fact committed atrocities. M. Venizelos had been greatly perturbed, and had himself been forced to admit the truth of the allegations.

M. TITTONI said that fighting between the Turks and Greeks must be put an end to. It was very bitter, and no quarter was given on either side.



M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether his colleagues would be prepared to agree at once to the dispatch of the Commission.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would prefer, before deciding to do this, to discuss the whole question of Asia Minor. He did not object to the proposal in itself, though he would point out that if Commissions of Enquiry had to be sent to investigate all charges of atrocities throughout the world, he did not think he would be able to lay his hand on a sufficient number of officers.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he proposed to send French Commissioners, even if his Colleagues appointed none. He would, however, prefer, that they should do so.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had no objection, but that it was more important to prevent recurrences of atrocities in the future than to investigate those which had already taken place. Control could only be exercised by the Conference through the local Commander-in-Chief.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Balfour's plan would only result in the issuing of a proclamation, which would have no effect at all. The Allies would have to deal with the Turks hereafter, and it must be made clear to them they did not send the Greeks to Smyrna merely to commit atrocities.

M. TITTONI said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau. It was very important to make the Turks feel that the Allies did not propose to have them massacred.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the atrocities complained of had been committed by soldiers. They should be checked by the Commander-in-Chief in Anatolia. Orders of the Council could be sent and executed through him. He would have certain proposals to make on this subject, and he thought that M. Clemenceau's plan would fit in with his own.

(It was decided that the question of appointing a Commission of Enquiry should be postponed till the Meeting in the afternoon.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received an account of proceedings at Dédéagatch which, seeing that Italy as well as the other Allies was still at war with Bulgaria, deserved comment and perhaps action by the Italian Government. (For this information see Appendix B.)

M. TITTONI said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau that the behaviour of the Italian officers in fraternising with the Bulgarians was, if correctly reported, highly reprehensible. He undertook to have an enquiry made into the matter, and asked that M. Clemenceau's information be handed to him.

Fraternisation  
of Italian &  
Bulgarian Officers

3. MR. WHITE informed the Council that he had received the following telegram from President Wilson, and asked his colleagues what answer he should give on their behalf:—

Telegram From  
President Wilson  
Regarding  
Policy in  
Turkey

“Respecting the decision announced in your telegram of June 30th, to postpone further discussion of the Treaty with the Ottoman Government until the Government of the United States is in a position to say whether it will be able to undertake a mandate for a part of Turkish territory, I am afraid that the delay which this will involve will be very considerable and should like to know what attitude towards Turkey the Powers propose to take in the meantime.”

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the only attitude the Powers could adopt as far as he knew was one of expectancy. He was for certain reasons not ready to talk about Asia Minor. He did not know what kind of declaration the President expected the Council to make.

MR. WHITE said he thought perhaps the President had the maintenance of order in his mind.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that on this subject the Council would take the necessary measures in concert. As to the future he could at present enter into no pledges. If the Greeks, Turks, and Italians were fighting it was not his fault.

MR. WHITE asked if M. Clemenceau's intention was to wait until the Government of the United States was in a position to say whether it would undertake a mandate.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would not undertake to wait indefinitely. For the time being he could make no statement. When other work had been done, the Council would do its best to settle the affairs of Turkey. All he could say in reply to the President's message was that the Council had taken note of it. President Wilson knew full well what the difficulties were. He wished to obtain a mandate in Armenia and an American Commissioner had been appointed. He asked for part of Cilicia, and was favourably disposed towards accepting a mandate for Constantinople. The question of Constantinople was one of the greatest importance for Europe. It had caused wars in the past, and required the closest study.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that no definite answer could at present be given to President Wilson. The President was unfortunately prevented by the American Constitution from undertaking anything for the time being. Meanwhile the Council would try and maintain order in Turkey.

(It was agreed that Mr. White should reply in the above sense to the President's telegram.)

4. M. TITTONI read the following agreement between himself and M. Venizelos:—<sup>1</sup>

Agreement  
Between M.  
Tittoni &  
M. Venizelos  
Regarding  
Greek and  
Italian Zones  
of Occupation  
in Anatolia

"The line of division between the Greek and Italian occupations in Asia Minor begins from the mouth of the river K. Menderez: thence it will follow the course of the river up to the Ayassoluk-Scala-Nova road: thence it will follow the line of the Greek occupation of Ayassoluk and old Ephesus.

From old Ephesus it will follow a line at an average distance of 600 meters from the railway Smyrna-Aidin to the west, then to the south of the said railway, the line to be fixed on the spot by the Greek and Italian Governments in order to allow the Greek troops to protect the railway from sudden attacks from *Comitagis*.

The line will then reach the river Muschluk-Deresi which will be followed to its junction with the Menderez.

Thence it will follow the bed of the Menderez to the east as far as Keuehk.

The two Governments agree not to pass beyond the line above established. Moreover this occupation has only a provisional character corresponding to the actual state of affairs, the consideration of the definite regime for these regions being reserved to the Conference.

Each of the two Governments agrees to afford in the territory which it occupies full and complete protection to the co-nationals of the other.

Instructions will be given to the commands in order that the officers of the two armies may maintain towards each other most friendly relations."

He explained that the expression "occupation" implies occupation at the present time.

MR. BALFOUR said that the question must be considered from a larger aspect than that of a friendly agreement between the Greeks and the Italians. The Entente had told the Greeks to go to Smyrna. Since their arrival there was a divergence of opinion as to whether they had or had not obeyed the instructions of the British Naval Authority on the spot. Commodore Fitz-Maurice<sup>2</sup> considered that they had exceeded their orders, which were not to go beyond the Sandjak of Smyrna. This might not be the fault of M. Venizelos, but nevertheless it would seem that the harm was done. As to the Italians (he knew this was not M. Tittoni's policy) they had gone to Asia Minor without informing their Allies, and they had made successive advances into the country, also without informing them. The Council of Three had informed M. Orlando that there could be no possible conversations until the Italian troops had been entirely withdrawn.<sup>3</sup> Then a change of Government had taken place in Italy, and there had been a friendly

<sup>1</sup> An English text of the agreement which appears in appendix A to HD-80, vol. VIII, p. 861, has been substituted here for the French text.

<sup>2</sup> Commodore M. S. Fitz-Maurice, commander of the British Aegean Squadron.

<sup>3</sup> For previous discussion of this subject, see CF-9, CF-10, CF-17, CF-19, vol. v, pp. 565, 576, 686, and 716 and CF-37B, CF-93A, vol. vi, pp. 82 and 710.



meeting with M. Tittoni. M. Tittoni had said that the Italian Government would be put into a very serious difficulty if the British and French Governments insisted on the total withdrawal of the Italian troops. No formal decision had been taken as a result of this declaration, but the French and British Governments had not insisted.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that it had been decided to send M. Tittoni an answer.

MR. BALFOUR, continuing, said that, in effect, nothing had been done. There were, therefore, in Anatolia, Greek troops who were disobeying orders, and Italian troops who were there without orders. From this resulted a difficult and confused situation. He was anxious that no national susceptibilities should be hurt, but he supposed that the Council also had susceptibilities. He thought, therefore, that he might suggest that the whole method of procedure should be altered. The Greeks had been told to consult a naval officer before making any movement. It was not the business of a naval officer to know all the intricacies of land operations. This system had not worked well. The Italian troops, on the other hand, acted in an irresponsible manner, and were under no Allied control. Would it not be better for the orders of the Council to be conveyed to all the troops in Asia Minor through its local Commander-in-Chief? In Eastern Europe, General Franchet d'Esperey was the medium for the Council's policy and Marshal Foch in the rest of Europe. Why should the same procedure not be adopted in Asia Minor, where the Commander-in-Chief was General Allenby? It was not because General Allenby was a British officer that he suggested this, but because he was Commander-in-Chief. There might even be some advantage in his being British, seeing that the British Government had no interests in the region affected. He suggested, therefore, that General Allenby be utilised as an agent of the Council just as Marshal Foch and General Franchet d'Esperey in other parts of the world. If this were done, the Turks would realise that the Conference did not approve of outrages, and that they were to be put a stop to. The face of both Greeks and Italians would be saved, and order would be established in Turkey. This solution would not only be logical, but would conduce to sound administration. This method could not injure Italian pride, as there were Italian troops at Konia already under General Allenby's command. A very difficult situation could thus be regularised and some order could be made to reign over the trespasses of the Greeks and the unauthorised presence of the Italians.

M. PICHON said that he thought that General Milne <sup>4</sup> was directly in command.

---

<sup>4</sup> Gen. Sir George Francis Milne, commander of the British forces in the Near East.

MR. BALFOUR said he thought that was the case, but that General Milne was under the superior authority of General Allenby.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that to speak his mind freely, though he had great respect for General Allenby, he felt that, in Turkey, he acted as a British officer receiving orders from the British Government rather than as an Allied Commander-in-Chief. The effect of his activities was distinctly anti-French. This ambiguous situation was unsatisfactory. General Allenby commanded British troops as a British General. As an Allied Commander-in-Chief he refused to allow French troops to be relieved. He refused to allow them to enter Syria. He placed them in Cilicia, knowing that the mandate of Cilicia was likely to go to the Americans. All his agents were consistently against the French. On every occasion, he said that the unpopularity of the French troops rendered their relief or their stationing in Syria undesirable. There was a pyramid of files on this subject, and he could prove what he said. General Hamelin<sup>5</sup> had telegraphed that he did not dare celebrate the 14th of July, to which he (M. Clemenceau) had replied, ordering that the day should be celebrated. It had been done and there had been no trouble. In Damascus, the French had been welcomed, in spite of all General Allenby had said. As a result of all this, a condition of confidence did not exist. He would have more to say on the subject later, but he was so anxious to make peace, that he did not absolutely refuse Mr. Balfour's proposals, provided some assurance would be given that General Allenby would consider himself not a British, but an Allied agent.

MR. BALFOUR said that he regretted M. Clemenceau had raised the vexed question of Syria. He did not believe that his charges against General Allenby would be sustained. M. Clemenceau said that he had provoked agitation against the French.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that General Allenby's agents had done so even if he had not. He had also refused to allow the relief of French troops already in the country.

MR. BALFOUR said that he felt sure that no responsible British officer desired to impair French popularity in Syria. They know that, under no circumstances, would Great Britain accept a mandate in Syria. The British Government, therefore, had no motive for creating difficulties in the path of others. He did not wish to pursue this matter, but only to enter his caveat against these allegations. M. Clemenceau might be thoroughly assured that any officer, British or other, to whom the work was entrusted, would be impartial. He thought, in fact, the officer in charge would be General Milne, acting under the directions of General Allenby. This said, he did not think he need add anything to the arguments he had previously used.

---

<sup>5</sup> Gen. Jules C. Hamelin, commander of the French forces in the Levant.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had not disagreed with the proposal, but had felt it necessary to make a reservation.

MR. WHITE said that he was inclined to approve of Mr. Balfour's proposal. An arrangement made only between the Italians and Greeks would not reassure the Turks. The proposal would regularise the position of the Italians, who had gone to the country without the authority of the Conference. The Commander-in-Chief would be able to issue orders to Turks, Greeks and Italians, and thus the Conference would be put in charge of the situation.

M. TITTONI said that (as Mr. White had observed), the proposal under discussion would amount to an official recognition of Italian presence in Asia Minor. He took note of this, as he thought that this ultimately must be done. Italian troops were there. They could not physically be there and officially not be there. He, personally, had not sent them there, but he was, nevertheless, in an equivocal position and he would like it regularised.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that though M. Tittoni was not responsible for sending Italian troops to Asia Minor, he seemed disposed to take advantage of their presence there. He trusted that whatever arrangements were made, M. Tittoni would not base any claim on this situation again.

M. TITTONI said that he undertook not to plead accomplished facts, but to rely entirely on justification, based on title.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that provisionally the Council should accept the arrangements made between the Greeks and the Italians, and that it should also accept Mr. Balfour's proposal as giving the Council a means of being obeyed, provided only that the question of substance was entirely reserved. On this understanding only would he accept these arrangements. He suggested that M. Venizelos be asked to come into the room to express his formal adhesion to the arrangement made with M. Tittoni.

(M. Venizelos then entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU, addressing M. Venizelos, said that the Council was about to take two decisions, to one of which he was a party.

M. VENIZELOS said that he was in full agreement with M. Tittoni.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the agreement was accepted by the Council subject to the proviso that it did not affect the ultimate decision either on Greek or on Italian rights. Furthermore, the local Commander-in-Chief would be in control of all troops—Turkish, Greek and Italian. They would have to obey the orders of General Milne. It was probable also that Commissioners would be sent to enquire into the atrocities which it was reported had been committed by Greek troops. M. Venizelos was doubtless aware of what had taken place.

M. VENIZELOS said that he fully understood. He would, however, observe that the Government at Constantinople was not in full control



of the situation. Action at the Capital therefore might not produce all the effect desired in Anatolia. The Committee of Union and Progress still had more power than appeared on the surface.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that M. Venizelos himself did not always control the actions of his countrymen.

M. VENIZELOS said that whenever excesses had been complained of, he had caused the culprits to be severely punished. There had been two executions. He did not wish to conceal anything and was quite ready to accept the Commission of Enquiry. He wished, however, to leave a note with the Council, asking for the execution of two Clauses of the Armistice, namely the disarmament of Turkey and the control of railways either by Allied troops or failing them by Greek troops and Allied Officers. (See Appendix C.) He further asked that he might be heard when the Council came to determine the southern frontier of Bulgaria.

(This was agreed to.)

(M. Venizelos then withdrew and it was decided that his note should be submitted to the Experts.)

(It was decided provisionally to accept the agreement reached between M. Tittoni and M. Venizelos as given above.)

It was further decided to adopt the following Resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour:—

1. Resolved that the Conference shall communicate to the Turkish Government their intention of immediately marking out the limiting lines beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops will be permitted to move, all rights secured to the Allies under the armistice being of course reserved. The Turkish Government is required to withdraw its troops to a position which will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief. The Turkish Government shall be at the same time informed that the limiting lines above referred to, have no relation to the ultimate territorial arrangements which will be imposed by the Peace Conference.

2. The Commander-in-Chief of the forces belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers in the Asiatic possessions of Turkey shall be directed to send officers who, after communicating with the Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna, and the Italian and Greek Generals, shall fix the military lines above referred to.

3. Any future movement of the Allied forces shall be under the supreme direction of the Commander-in-Chief who is responsible to the Conference for military operations in the Asiatic portion of the Turkish Empire.

5. M. CLEMENCEAU questioned whether it would be useful to discuss this matter before Mr. Balfour and Mr. White had obtained the views of their Governments.

MR. WHITE said that he would like more precise information before he consulted his Government.

MR. BALFOUR said that the policy he would like to see carried out was:—

(1) that the execution of the Armistice by Hungary was required by the Conference.

(2) that if the Armistice were carried out, Roumanian troops should withdraw to the original frontier.

(3) that the Allies could not negotiate Peace with those who were breaking their engagements.

(4) that the Conference could not tolerate the continuation of conditions which would make Peace, Commerce and disarmament in Central Europe impossible.

Unless satisfactory evidence of compliance were obtained the necessary steps should be taken to enforce the will of the Conference. His attention had been drawn that morning to certain figures given on the previous day by Marshal Foch regarding the forces at the disposal of Bela Kun (See H.D. 9 para. 3, first statement by Marshal Foch.<sup>6</sup>) His own hypothesis had been that the Hungarians were trying to collect an aggressive force to attack their neighbours. If this was untrue, the policy built upon it naturally must be abandoned, but if the hypothesis were true, he would recommend his Government to agree to military action.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that four Officers representing each of the Powers concerned should be sent to Hungary to verify the military situation and that Bela Kun be asked to allow them to make their investigation. Should he refuse, he would be admitting his guilt. Should he accept, the Council would be in a position to form an accurate judgment. A short time ago the Council had addressed him and said that no further conversation could be held with him because he had broken the Armistice. He had replied that a breach of the Armistice had been committed not by him but by the Roumanians. The Council before acting, wished to know the exact truth.

M. TITTONI said that he had no objection but he would like to re-enforce this action. The Council was dealing with a man whose ill-faith was proverbial. He had already used such communication as he had had with the Powers for his own advantage. He represented a small minority ruling an immense majority which was deprived of the means of rebelling. If his permission were solicited, this would increase his prestige. The Commission should be sent to Hungary without asking for his consent.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he entirely agreed.

MR. WHITE drew attention to the resolution of the Council recorded in H. D. 7 Para. 1,<sup>7</sup> taken on July 15th:—

“It was decided to refer the communication received from Bela Kun

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 177.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, D. 129.

to Marshal Foch for a full report on the observances and non-observances of the original Armistice conditions by all parties concerned."

M. CLEMENCEAU said that information obtained direct from the country would be more valuable than any information accessible to Marshal Foch.

M. TITTONI said that the Commission should be numerous in order that it should produce a great moral effect.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that four General Officers would be sufficient. Instructions could be given to them, before they started, by the Council.

MR. WHITE said that he would prefer to reserve his opinion until the afternoon's meeting.

(It was agreed that the decision should be postponed until the next meeting at 4 p. m. on the same day.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, July 18, 1919.

---

#### Appendix "A" to HD-10

[Translation<sup>a</sup>]

#### *Telegram From Sheikh-ul-Islam*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 15, 8:45 p. m.

Received July 16, 7 p. m.

His Excellency M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference. After the occupation of the city of Smyrna, an occupation which was quite unjustified, the Greek troops gradually spread into the other parts of the vilayet. There they occupied various localities whose populations are in large majority or entirely Mohammedan.

The entry of Greek troops into each of these localities has been followed by all kinds of violence and atrocities against the Mohammedan elements, atrocities in which the native Greeks also participate.

The Mohammedan quarters are burned and their inhabitants put to death without mercy; children and women are not spared. The latter are violated and killed with refinements of cruelty. Such has been the death of the city of Aidin, one of the principal cities of the province, as well as other localities where the vast majority of the population is Mohammedan.

Thousands of Mohammedans have perished and more than 150,000 have been obliged, in order to escape the massacres and horrors, to leave their homes and to seek refuge in the interior of the country,

---

<sup>a</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



where they now are without shelter and in a state of complete destitution.

These facts could be determined easily by a commission of inquiry, which we request be sent immediately to the spot.

Moreover, the Greek authorities have brought into the province, to settle them there, a great number of Greeks from other provinces of Turkey or from the exterior to replace the natives who are driven away.

This fact, added to those which precede, leaves no room for doubt that the object pursued is obviously to cause the Mohammedans to perish by systematically exterminating them or by forcing them to leave their homes under the influence of terror, and to replace them with Greeks.

Profoundly moved by the danger which menaces the Mohammedan populations of the vilayet of Smyrna, the Imperial Government believes it to be its duty to present it to the attentive good will of the great Allied Powers.

The Imperial Government is persuaded that these powers will not fail, in their just and high appreciation, to take all the measures which they will judge effective in putting an end to a situation which, it has the firm conviction, does not correspond with their intentions nor to the sentiments of justice and equity by which they are animated with regard to all peoples.

The most just of these provisions and that which at the same time corresponds best with the principles of President Wilson, would be, obviously, the prompt evacuation by the Greeks of the territories which they have occupied in Asia Minor and to which they have no valid claim.

Signed : THE GRAND VIZIER AD INTERIM,  
SHEIKH-UL-ISLAM MOUSTAFA SABRI

---

#### Appendix B to HD-10

[Translation \*]

[*Note Presented to the Council of the Heads of Delegations by the President of the Council (Clemenceau)*]

JULY 18, 1919.

According to information communicated by the French Military Commission at Dedeagatch to General Franchet d'Espérey, the Italian officers on July 7 gave a *soirée* which was attended by a large number of officers of the Bulgarian Army and Navy. Commandant

---

\* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Perretti of the 61st Italian Infantry Regiment presided at this festivity, at which music was supplied by the Bulgarian 40th Infantry Regiment band. Toasts were pronounced in the Bulgarian and Italian languages in which the words "Salonica, Greece, Bulgaria" recurred. They were greeted by repeated cries of "Viva Italy! Viva Bulgaria!"

---

Appendix C to HD-10

[Translation <sup>10</sup>]

*Notice Sent by M. Venizelos to the Supreme Council of the Peace  
Conference on July 17, 1919*

The state of anarchy which reigns in the Ottoman Empire, and especially in Anatolia, does not permit one to hope that the government at Constantinople, whatever the good will that one may ascribe to it, might be in a position to compel respect for the decisions that the Allied and Associated Powers should agree upon in order to prevent new conflicts between the Turkish forces and the Greek troops of occupation.

It would seem indispensable, then, to take a number of supplementary precautions, which might be the following:

(1) Make effective the control which the Allies reserved to themselves under Article 15 of the Armistice of October 30, 1918, with Turkey,<sup>11</sup> over all the railroads, by the occupation of the lines converging towards Smyrna, at least to Balikesri on the North and to Alashehr on the East.

If the Allied and Associated Powers do not consider themselves able to assign contingents of their own troops to this service, the Greek Government would be willing to place at their disposition the necessary contingents, which could be employed for this purpose under the command of officers to be designated by the commanding general of the Allied armies in Asia Minor.

(2) Require the delivery of Turkish war material to the Allied Powers, in conformity with Article 20 of the armistice.

---

<sup>10</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>11</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 441.

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, July 18, 1919, at 4 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. H. White.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	M. Clemenceau. M. Pichon.
<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretaries</i>
Mr. L. Harrison.	Sir Ian Malcolm, K. C. M. G. Mr. H. Norman	M. Dutasta. Capt. de St. Quentin.
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Tittoni.	Baron Makino.
	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>
	M. Paterno.	M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . .	Colonel Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Lieut. Com. Bell.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lieut. Zanchi.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would ask M. Loucheur<sup>1</sup> to explain the problem of the Austrian railways.

M. LOUCHEUR said that every year the Italian Government paid in a sum of 29,000,000 francs to the Sudbahn Company. The payment had been suspended since the outbreak of hostilities. The Italian Government had considered that it had a right to keep the annual payment of the 29,000,000 francs in question by way of reparation. The French Delegation did not agree. It had thought itself bound to protect the interests of shareholders of all nationalities, including German and Austrian Bondholders. The problem was not applicable for these latter, however. With regard to the other shareholders, the Italian Government had agreed to continue to pay in the sum in question to Paris. It had been further decided that a complete reorganisation of the Sudbahn was necessary and that this reorganisation would be both financial and

<sup>1</sup> Louis Loucheur, French representative, Commission on Reparation Clauses in the Treaties with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.



technical, in view of the fact that the railway line in question now passed through several States. The shareholders will therefore be heard in the event of disagreement; they will be in a position to call for arbitration and the arbiter can be nominated by the League of Nations. Each person's rights were therefore protected and all could participate in the reorganisation that had been foreshadowed.

MR. BALFOUR said that the question included two problems: the first one which was financial had been settled. The second one was a question of transportation between the five countries concerned: had it been settled?

M. LOUCHEUR said that it had not been settled up to the present but that it had been decided that in the three months following the signature of the Treaty, a general meeting would be convened in order to settle the question arising out of the reorganisation. No special clause for insertion in the Austrian Treaty had yet been thought of although possibly it would be preferable to insert one in order to be able to act at greater advantage in the case of Jugo-Slavia and the other countries concerned. If the Council so decided it could be drawn up and when decided upon, sent to the Drafting Committee.

(This proposal was accepted and M. Loucheur and General Mance<sup>2</sup> withdrew to draw up the text of the Article in question. When the text of the Article had been prepared, M. Loucheur and General Mance re-entered the room.)

M. LOUCHEUR said that in collaboration with General Mance he had taken the text drawn up by the Italian Delegation and accepted by the Experts, and that they had decided to add the following paragraph:—

“This arbitration might, as far as the southern railway lines in Austria are concerned, be demanded either by the Administrative Committee of the Company or by a representative of the Shareholders.”

M. TITTONI asked whether the Italian Experts had been consulted and whether the text was in agreement with what they had consented to.

M. LOUCHEUR said that they had not been able to find M. Crespi: that the text presented differed slightly, since it gave to the Representative of the Shareholders the right to demand arbitration.

M. TITTONI said that the point was a new one and that he desired it to be laid before M. Crespi.

(After a short discussion it was decided to accept the text given hereunder subject to its being accepted later on by M. Crespi: the text

---

<sup>2</sup> Brig. Gen. H. O. Mance, British representative, Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways.

was to be sent to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Austrian Treaty:—

“With the object of ensuring regular utilisation of the railroads of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, owned by private companies, which, as the result of the stipulation of the Treaty, will be situated in the territory of several States, the administrative and technical reorganisations of the said lines shall be regulated in each instance by an agreement between the owning companies and the States territorially concerned. Any differences on which agreement is not reached, including questions relating to the interpretation of contracts concerning the expropriation of lines shall be submitted to an arbitration designated by the Council of the League of Nations. This Arbitration may, as regards the Company, be required either by the Board of Management or by the representatives of the bond holders.”)

2. M. LOUCHEUR<sup>3</sup> said that the question only concerned France, Great Britain, the United States and Belgium. The Representatives of these countries had received the Report (see Annex A).

Report by  
M. Loucheur  
on the Rhine-  
land Convention

M. TITTONI asked whether the Commission dealt with the economic questions.

M. LOUCHEUR said that it did not do so, but that a Report had been accepted unanimously by the Experts: it was based on the two German notes annexed to the Report. In order to summarise the question it was sufficient to say that the Germans in their note had always desired to modify the text of the Treaty as submitted to them, and that they had further attempted to interpret it in their own way. Our Commission had always rejected the modifications asked for, but it had always taken up a conciliatory attitude in questions of interpretation. The Commission thought that in acting in this way it was following the political lead which had been given to it. Amongst the modifications asked for, it had been thought necessary to reject the one which dealt with an Imperial Commission. The Commissioner who would have been nominated by the Germans ought, according to them, to be consulted by the Inter-Allied Commission which ought only to act in agreement with him. The Germans had also given a wrong interpretation to certain terms in the Convention; they had thought the terms in question full of pitfalls. They thought that the Allies desired to intervene in questions of primary education and in religious problems. They had been reassured and told that such a thing had never been in the intentions of the Allies. During the discussions there had only been one difficult point. The Germans had stated that the Imperial Commissioner had been nominated: they had been told in

<sup>3</sup> French representative and president, Inter-Allied Commission on the Left Bank of the Rhine.

reply that the Commissioner should be acceptable to the Allies. In addition to this it had not been possible to agree to the Commissioner being a Representative of the Federal States.

The Germans had been told that if all the Federal States agreed to nominate the same person he would be accepted.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the German Constitution had been examined.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that the German Constitution had been carefully examined. The remarks made to the German Delegates on the subject of the Commissioner had been suggested to them by the members of the Commission for the Rhine Convention. In addition, by one of the Clauses of the Convention given we had the right of having delivered to us persons who having committed crime on the left bank of the Rhine, had taken refuge on the right. The Germans replied that they could not accept this clause on account of the question of extradition. They had been told that the question of extradition did not arise since both the banks of the Rhine were German territory. The proposals had therefore been rejected and the clause in question upheld. If the report were accepted, it was proposed that it should be sent in the form of a note to the German Delegation by the President of the Peace Conference.

(The reply to the German notes on the Rhine Convention unanimously recommended by M. Loucheur's Commission was therefore accepted, and it was further decided that an English text should be presented along with the French one after examination by the Drafting Committee.)

3. M. TITTONI said he wished to present the following note in the name of the Italian Government:—

Reservation by  
the Italian Dele-  
gation on the  
Subject of the  
Austrian Peace  
Treaty

“The Italian Delegation reminds the Conference in the following terms of the reservation which it had made previously in similar terms with regard to the Peace Treaty with Germany: the first reservation had been accepted by the Supreme War Council at its meeting of the 16 June.<sup>4</sup> The Italian Delegation thinks that the stipulations contained in the Convention of the League of Nations do not apply to territorial questions, or to such arrangements as may arise out of them; for these latter have been part of the duties of the Peace Conference, and have not yet been definitely settled.”

MR. BALFOUR said that M. Tittoni's statement amounted to this: the Italian frontiers have not yet been settled. If, therefore, the Italian Delegation agreed to sign the Treaty without reservation, as this latter includes the Covenant of the League of Nations, they might be compelled to accept decisions which they did not fully know

<sup>4</sup> CF-70, minute 9, vol. VI, p. 472.



before hand. It would not be just, and for this reason the Italian reservation had been made.

M. TITTONI said that the reservation only applied to frontiers not yet settled. He thought that the duty of settling such frontiers fell to the Peace Conference, and not to the League of Nations.

MR. BALFOUR said he agreed entirely, but that he wished to ask a question. If the reservation were accepted and an agreement arrived at with regard to frontiers, could Italy at some future time, ten years hence possibly, raise the question again on the plea that it had made reservations? He therefore asked that the reservation should lapse at the date of the settlement of the frontier question.

M. TITTONI said that the text of his reservation allowed for that, since it dealt with frontiers "not yet definitely settled". When once the frontiers were settled the reservation lapsed.

MR. WHITE said that they were only called upon to take note of a reservation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that possibly they might be called upon to take note of it under Mr. Balfour's interpretation.

M. TITTONI said that all that was asked for was that the frontiers between Italy and Jugo-Slavia should be settled by the Council and not by the League of Nations.

(Cognisance was taken of the following reservation made by M. Tittoni on behalf of Italy:—

"The Italian Delegation desired to recall and to renew in the following terms the reservation made by it on the subject of the Treaty with Germany which the Supreme Council accepted at its Meeting on June 16th."

"The Italian Delegation is of the opinion that stipulations of the Covenant of the League of Nations are not applicable to territorial questions and to the arrangements connected therewith, which having been made the subjects of consideration by the Peace Conference have not yet been settled."

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that they were called upon to send out a Commission of Enquiry into Asia Minor.

Nomination of  
a Commission  
of Enquiry in  
Asia Minor

MR. WHITE said that he had examined the question, and that he did not think he was able to reply to it without first referring it to his Government.

MR. BALFOUR said that he accepted the principle of the Committee of Enquiry, but that he could not nominate his representatives before Monday.

M. TITTONI said that he was in the same position as Mr. Balfour.

(It was decided to send a Commission to Asia Minor consisting of one Commissioner each from Great Britain, France and Italy. The participation of the United States in this Commission was referred to the American Government.)

5. The question of nominating a Military Commission to enquire into the situation in Hungary was adjourned until Monday, so as to await Mr. Balfour's and Mr. White's acceptances.

Commission of  
Enquiry for  
Hungary

6. At this moment the experts, General Bliss, Mr. Hoover, General Belin, General Cavallero, Col. MacReady, Col. Kisch, and Commandant Lacombe entered the room.

Question of  
Russian Pris-  
oners in Ger-  
many: Mr.  
Hoover's Report

MR. HOOVER summarised the report contained in Annex B.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question involved shipping.

MR. HOOVER said that M. Clemenceau's remark was true, but that a decision had to be arrived at as to the port into which the boats were to be sent and the method of transport by railway. The repatriation of the prisoners might take two to three months, and they would have to be fed during the period.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the question was a military one, and that it should be studied by the military experts at Versailles.

MR. BALFOUR said that the British Red Cross had spent nearly a million pounds in the up-keep of these prisoners. This would have to be discontinued on account of the approaching demobilisation, but that the Red Cross organisation was willing to devote its stores to this purpose, they would suffice to feed the prisoners for 15 days.

MR. HOOVER remarked that the stock in question would only feed the 35,000 prisoners in the charge of the British Red Cross, and that it would not supply the other prisoners.

MR. BALFOUR asked why the Germans should not be approached in this matter. We have undertaken the feeding of these prisoners for seven months without having been obliged to do so. The Allies have done it in order to prevent the Germans from repatriating the prisoners under circumstances disadvantageous to themselves. Ought not, therefore, the Germans to be invited to take charge of the feeding of the prisoners. He was told by his experts that Marshal Foch might quite well deal with the question.

MR. WHITE said that a plan of repatriation had been accepted by the Council of Ten in the month of June.<sup>5</sup> He thought that the Ukrainians and the Poles had prevented the plan from being put into execution.

MR. HOOVER said that the military authorities ought, therefore to investigate the means of transport necessary, and study the question of feeding the prisoners. It should not be forgotten that a political question also arose, since the Allies had maintained the prisoners in Germany in order to prevent them joining the Bolsheviks.

<sup>5</sup> Probably a reference to the plan of repatriation accepted by the Council of Foreign Ministers, May 14, 1919. See FM-15, minute 3, vol. iv, p. 706.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not think Marshal Foch could deal with the question, which was a political and financial one. The Allies were not dealing with prisoners taken by themselves, but with prisoners made by an enemy army. He, therefore, proposed to deal with the political and financial questions. Once they were decided upon, the manner in which they could be carried out could be investigated. He desired to have the opinion of his Military Experts on the point in question, which was, after all, a problem of military politics. It had been desired to avoid sending the Russian prisoners lest they should reinforce the Bolshevik Army or spread themselves out over Poland. The danger to-day was not so great as far as Poland was concerned, and Military Experts could deal with it.

GENERAL BLISS said that the question did not seem to him to be in a condition to be submitted to Versailles. It contained two problems. Mr. Hoover had stated that there were no funds available for feeding the prisoners. How could they be supported, therefore, if the Germans refused to have anything to do with it? After that, the question arose as to how they should be repatriated and this raised the following problems; Firstly, were the prisoners to be repatriated immediately? Secondly, were they to be repatriated through Poland to the nearest Russian territory. Thirdly, were they to be repatriated to Black Sea Ports? Fourthly, if one of these alternatives is accepted, who would undertake to execute it? Fifthly, who would undertake to send the supplies and the personnel necessary in the interval? Could not the proposal made by the Economic Commission on the 17th June, be accepted? In any case, it was necessary to take immediately the necessary measures for repatriating the prisoners. Some solution had to be adopted rapidly, because the operations would require a good deal of time and must be concluded before Winter. If the proposal is accepted, our own Delegation and the Allied Delegations could telegraph to their Governments to obtain the necessary powers. The repatriation must be carried out as rapidly as possible. The Military Authorities could then be put in touch with the question and may study the best means of carrying out the repatriation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it involved a great danger for Poland. As far as the Russian prisoners were concerned, the question was not one of feeding 35,000 under the charge of the British Red Cross, but of supplying all.

GENERAL BLISS said that some decision must be arrived at, because the repatriation will take a long time.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question should have been presented to the Council at an earlier date.

MR. BALFOUR said that Marshal Foch had received a communication on the subject four months ago.



MR. HOOVER said that the Council had been put in touch with the question four months ago, and that it was noted that nothing had been done. There was a solution possible. There were Armies of Occupation in Germany with the necessary Army Service Corps Units attached. The Armies of Occupation had been reduced in number on account of demobilisation with the result that the Army Service Corps Units could take charge of the prisoners.

MR. BALFOUR said that Mr. Hoover's solution was very ingenious, but that it only settled one of the two questions, that of feeding. The repatriation question remained open, and to settle it more tonnage was necessary together with the consent of the Polish Government with regard to the passage across that country of the prisoners in question. The method of repatriation was the most difficult. Were the Military Authorities at Versailles competent to resolve the question? If they were not, a special Committee would be necessary in which the Versailles Experts should be represented, together with Naval Experts and possibly political Experts.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council could decide on political questions.

MR. BALFOUR said that at the present time 500 Americans were dealing with the supplies and feeding stock. It had been said to him that these 500 Americans were about to be withdrawn, but that the Army Service Corps Units in the Armies of Occupation could carry on the work. The Commission would, therefore, only be concerned with the question of railways, ports, etc.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, under these circumstances, the question could very well be dealt with by the Military Experts at Versailles, to whom Naval Experts could be joined. His proposal was accepted.

(It was therefore agreed

(a) That upon the failure of the supplies already provided for the feeding of Russian prisoners now in Germany, they should be fed and supplied by the Military Authorities of the Armies of Occupation until repatriated.

(b) That the means of repatriation of the Russian prisoners now in Germany and maintained at the cost of the Allies should be referred for study to the Military Representatives at Versailles with whom would be associated for this purpose the Naval Advisers.)

7. MR. HOOVER made a short résumé of the memorandum contained in Appendix "C". He drew the attention of the Council, moreover, to the fact that the Georgian Authorities had only agreed to allow the supplies to pass through their territory on condition of a certain proportion being given to them. They now demanded one-half of the supplies. This demand was not from necessity, because they did not lack food, but was made simply for the purpose of speculation. For

Communication  
From Mr.  
Hoover With  
Regard to Rus-  
sian Armenia

this reason, the Council was asked to send a menacing telegram to the Georgian Authorities, in order to facilitate the transport of supplies during two or three months. The future destiny of Georgia depended on the Conference, and there was every hope that they would yield to our wishes.

(It was therefore decided that M. Clemenceau, as Chairman of the Peace Conference, should send the following telegram in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Government of Georgia:—

“The Council has been made aware of the interference of the Georgian Authorities when food supplies were sent into Armenia in an endeavour on the part of the Allied Governments to stem the tide of starvation and death amongst these unfortunate people. The Council cannot state in too strong terms, that such interference and that such action taken by the Georgian Authorities together with the continuation of such action must entirely prejudice their case. The Council therefore expects that the Authorities in Georgia shall not only give the privileges of transportation over the Railway routes at which they at present control, but will devote themselves to assisting in the transmission of these supplies at no more than the normal charge and remuneration for such service. The Council awaits the reply of the Authorities in Georgia as to whether or not they are prepared to acquiesce in this arrangement.”)

8. M. PICHON read an extract from a report of the military authorities dated 11th July, who had studied the question.

Repatriation of  
the Czecho-Slovak  
Forces in Siberia

BARON MAKINO said that he wished to make a remark. It had been decided some time back by the Supreme Council that the Czecho-Slovaks should be evacuated through Omsk to Archangel, and that the Japanese Government should then be asked to protect the railway.<sup>6</sup> He had telegraphed to his Government in that sense. Their reports tended to show that since the Czecho-Slovaks did not accept the proposal the Japanese Government had suspended its decision. The question now was of repatriation by Vladivostock. This was a new proposal which must be submitted to the Japanese Government. It was probable that it would wish to obtain all the information possible and possibly would desire to consult the local authorities. The examination would take several days during which it would be impossible for him to reply to the Supreme Council.

(After a short discussion it was decided that with regard to the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovaks from Siberia, that M. Clemenceau should send a copy of the following telegram to the American Government and that Baron Makino should send the same telegram to the Japanese Government:—

“In view of the condition and wishes of the Czecho-Slovak troops

<sup>6</sup> For previous discussion of this subject, see CF-86, minute 1 and CF-92, minute 14, vol. VI, pp. 635 and 674; also HD-3, minute 10, *ante*, p. 63.

in Siberia, the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers consider it urgently necessary that arrangements should be made for the systematic repatriation of the troops from Vladivostock.

This involves the replacement of those troops along that portion of the trans-Siberian railway which is at present guarded by them. Information is therefore requested as to whether the American Japanese Government will furnish the necessary effectives or will co-operate with the Japanese American Government to this end. A similar telegram has been addressed to the Japanese American [Government?].")

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 18 July, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-11

#### *Reply to the German Note Regarding the Occupation of the Left Bank of the Rhine*<sup>7</sup>

Paragraphs 1 and 2.—*Preliminary Observations.*—The Allied and Associated Governments have always intended to make the occupation as little burdensome as possible to the civilian population of the left bank of the Rhine, subject to Germany strictly carrying out the terms of the Peace Treaty.

Paragraph 3.—*Articles 3 and 5 of the Agreement.*—*Application of German legislation.*—Under the Agreement the German Government has agreed to recognise the power of the High Commission to issue ordinances having the force of law to secure the maintenance, the safety and the requirements of the Allied and Associated military forces.

It is agreed that, subject to this reservation, the actual or future legislation of the German Empire and of the federal States, including legislation passed since the German revolution, is applicable in the occupied territories. It will be the duty of the High Commission to judge in each particular case the extent to which the legislation in question does not prejudice the safety and requirements of the Allied and Associated military forces.

Paragraph 4.—*Exercise of the legislative powers of the High Commission.*—There is no objection to recognizing that, subject to the above reservations, the population shall enjoy the free exercise of its personal and civic rights, of religious freedom, of freedom of the press, of voting and of association; and that the political, legal, administrative and economic relations of the occupied territories with unoccu-

---

<sup>7</sup> The document printed here is filed under Paris Peace Conf. 181.22401/7 and is the English text of the final reply. It has been substituted here for the French text of the draft reply which was modified by the Drafting Committee in a few minor respects before it was delivered on July 29, 1919.



pied Germany shall not be hampered, and that there shall be freedom of movement between the occupied territories and unoccupied Germany. The Allied and Associated Governments, however, cannot recognise any obligation to enter into a preliminary agreement between the High Commission and the representative of Germany as regards the drawing up of ordinances. The German representative may be heard whenever a question coming within his sphere is concerned, except in cases of urgency.

Paragraph 5.—*Establishment of a Civil Commissioner of the Empire.*

(a) The establishment of a Civil Commissioner of the Empire representing the Government of the Empire can be recognized by the Allied and Associated Governments.

(b) Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that this measure is not provided for in the text of the Agreement, and that the person chosen for the office must be previously approved by the Allied and Associated Governments, who may recall their approval at any time.

(c) The competence of the Commissioner of the Empire can only extend to matters which, in accordance with the terms of the German constitution, come under the authority of the Government of the Empire.

The Allied and Associated Governments are in fact unable, without a violation of international law, to accept a formal provision that the Commissioner of the Empire is necessarily to be the representative of the States, republics or provinces, the internal legislation of which must be respected and is subject to variations or changes.

Nevertheless, if the competent authorities of the various federal States agree between themselves to nominate one and the same Commissioner, the Allied and Associated Governments will raise no objection. But the High Commission will always retain the right to enter into relations with any local authority whatsoever as regards matters within the competence of the local authority in question.

Paragraph 6.—*Strength of the troops of occupation.*—The Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right to make known at a suitable moment the strength of the troops maintained in the occupied territories.

Paragraph 7.—*Strength of the police force.*—There is no objection to the High Commission consulting the German authorities concerned, but the High Commission is responsible for determining the organisation of the police force.

Paragraph 8.—*Drafting of ordinances by the Commission.*—The High Commission may find it useful to ascertain in advance, except in cases of urgency, the opinion of the Commissioner of the Empire, or of the competent German authorities, but there can be no obligation, not provided for under the Agreement, for the Commission to do so.

Paragraph 9.—*Privileges as regards jurisdiction conferred by army commanders.*—The statement that the scope of this privilege might be more clearly defined is correct. It is recognized in principle that the privilege cannot be conferred upon German nationals.

On the other hand the Allied and Associated Governments, who are anxious to avoid the introduction of a disturbing element in the occupied territories, cannot admit that legal proceedings should be instituted by the competent German authorities in respect of political or commercial acts relating to the Armistice period, when these acts have not given rise to legal proceedings on the part of the Allied and Associated authorities.

Paragraph 10.—*Privileges as regards jurisdiction in civil cases.*—The text of the Agreement formally stipulates that military persons or persons duly accredited by the military authorities shall be subject exclusively to the jurisdiction of the Allied and Associated military courts, not only in criminal matters, but in civil matters also.

Nevertheless, in so far as contracts are concerned which are entered into in a private capacity, either by military persons or by their families, it may be admitted, in accordance with the request made in the German note, that these cases are to be brought before the German courts, subject to a right of evocation reserved to the High Commission in cases of abuse.

This observation does not apply to the case covered by Article 3 (b) of the Agreement.

In any event, cases which are at the same time civil and criminal must be judged by the military courts.

Paragraph 11.—*Criminal law.*—The German courts, in cases in which they have jurisdiction, will apply the German penal code. But, in accordance with the principles of international law, the Allied and Associated military courts can only apply the law of the country to which they belong.

Paragraph 12.—*Delivery of accused persons.*—The proposal of the German note is inadmissible. The text of the Agreement is formal and logical. It requires that persons charged with crimes or misdemeanours against the persons or property of the Allied and Associated forces are to be delivered up to the Allied and Associated authorities, even if the accused persons have taken refuge in unoccupied territory. Moreover, there is no question of extradition in the legal sense of the word, since the occupied territories are part of German territory.

Paragraph 13.—*Administrative and political districts (Article 5).*—The German note displays some anxiety lest the ordinances of the High Commission should change the German administrative and political districts in the interests of the requirements of the occupation.

There is nothing on this subject in the Agreement. It is not the intention of the Allied and Associated Governments that the Commission should change German administrative and political districts.

Paragraph 14.—*Finance*.—It is understood that the civil administration includes the financial administration, and that the revenues of the Empire and the States will be collected in the occupied territory and dealt with by the competent German administrations.

Paragraph 15.—*Right of dismissal of officials*.—The request put forward in the German note would involve an alteration in the text of the Agreement.

Nevertheless, it may be admitted that, except in cases of urgency, officials may, on the orders of the High Commission, be dismissed without undue delay, either by the Commissioner of the Empire or by the competent German authority. The High Commission reserves in all cases its right itself to dismiss officials whenever necessary.

Paragraph 16.—*Payment for requisitions*.—The Allied and Associated Governments intend to retain the right given to them by Article 6 of the Agreement, but they do not refuse to examine regulations for its application in concert with the competent German authorities.

Paragraph 17.—*Billeting of troops and administrations*.—This is a question of fact which can only be decided by an examination of concrete cases. The Allied and Associated Governments will carry out this examination in a conciliatory spirit to give satisfaction to the legitimate needs of the public administrations.

Paragraph 18.—*Exemption from taxes*.—It is understood that exemption from taxes cannot be extended to property taxes payable on transactions or acts performed in a private capacity and apart from official duties.

On the other hand, it is recognized that a system of control will require to be established by the Inter-allied High Commission as regards the privileges and exemptions from customs duties conferred by Article 9 on the troops of occupation and on their civil and military personnel.

Paragraph 19.—*Customs clauses*.—At the present date the Allied and Associated Governments do not consider that they have occasion to avail themselves of the provisions of Article 270 of the Peace Treaty. They formally reserve to themselves the right to judge in the future whether the application of this Article will or will not be desirable.

Paragraph 21.—*Posts and telegraphs*.—In accordance with the request made in the German note, the regulations in force can be modified. This will be done by an ordinance of the High Commission. Freedom of communication by letter, telegraph and telephone will be re-established between the occupied territories and unoccupied Germany, subject to a general reservation of the rights of the High Com-



mission or of the consequences of a state of siege, whenever a state of siege is declared.

Paragraph 22.—*State of siege.*—The state of siege being an immediate function of the security of the armies, it is impossible to undertake that the Commissioner of the Empire shall be consulted in all cases, and particularly in cases of urgency.

It is understood that the Allied and Associated Governments, relying upon a loyal co-operation on the part of the German authorities, will not fail to consult the latter whenever the circumstances permit.

Paragraph 24.—*Decrees issued by the various military authorities.*—In principle, and in accordance with the request made in the German note, it is the intention of the Allied and Associated authorities to regard the various decrees issued by the military authorities in the occupied territory during the Armistice as having lapsed after the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace. Nevertheless, it belongs exclusively to the High Commission to decide on the necessary transition measures.

The High Commission will issue an ordinance dealing with the abrogation or the adaptation of the decrees in question.

This ordinance will be issued within the shortest possible period after the date of the coming into force of the Treaty.

Paragraph 25.—*Expulsions.*—Certain persons have been forbidden to reside in the occupied territories for reasons connected with the necessity of maintaining public order and of causing the decisions regularly taken by the Allied and Associated military authorities during the Armistice to be respected.

It cannot be admitted that expelled persons shall be allowed to return to their homes merely in virtue of the fact that the Treaty of Peace has come into force.

Persons wishing to return should communicate with the High Commission, who will examine each particular case in a conciliatory spirit.

Paragraph 26.—*Jurisdiction.*—Reference is made to the observations set out above on paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 of the German note.

Paragraph 27.—*Administrative districts.*—It is contemplated in the Agreement that the local German administrations, both those of districts and those of provinces, shall retain their legal status.

Paragraph 28.—*Authority of the governments of the federal States.*—It is quite impossible to agree to the suggestion contained in this paragraph, viz., that the expression “under the authority of the Central German Government” is to be interpreted as follows: “under the authority of the Central German Government and of the Governments of the federated German States”.

Article 3 of the Agreement annexed to the Treaty of Peace is precise, and the expression “Central German Government” does not admit of any wider interpretation.

It is, of course, understood that the hierarchy of powers as established by law will be respected, but it is impossible for the Allied and Associated Governments, who have signed peace with the Central German Government, and who have no intention of interfering in the internal organisation of Germany, to maintain by force the organisation of States which may be changed under the German constitution itself.

As pointed out above in regard to paragraph 5 (Establishment of a Civil Commissioner of the Empire), the Allied and Associated Governments are unable, without a violation of international law, to accept a formal provision by which they undertake to maintain an organisation and an internal legislation which the German people themselves may seek to modify.

Paragraph 29.—*Officials*.—As pointed out in the German note, there will, after the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, be no officials charged with the duty of supervising the German authorities in the local administrative divisions.

But, in the interest of the population, the High Commission has the power to maintain fixed representatives with the duty of securing liaison between the local German administrations, the local military authorities and the High Commission itself.

As regards officials, the German note admits that the right of dismissal is vested in the High Commission. It follows that the High Commission has the power to veto the nomination of officials whose introduction might stir up disorder.

Paragraph 30.—*Education*.—Public education, as pointed out in the German note, is part of the civil administration and will be regulated by the German laws.

The German Government therefore has no cause to fear that the teaching of foreign languages will be introduced by order of the occupying Powers.

Paragraph 31.—*Legislation*.—This question has been dealt with above it [*in*] replying to paragraph 3 of the German note.

Paragraph 32.—*Requisitions*.—The German Government asks that the exercise of the right of requisition shall be limited so far as possible.

The Allied and Associated Governments are entirely in agreement with the German Government in considering that requisition ought to be seldom practised, and then only for special reasons.

The High Commission will take into consideration on this subject any observations which may be made to it, and will issue regulations in a spirit of equity and conciliation.

Nevertheless, it is not possible to agree to the request made in the German note at the end of paragraph 32, viz., that requisitions should be made only through the channel of the Commissioner of the Empire.

Paragraph 33.—*Distribution of troops.—Billeting.*—The distribution of troops and questions concerning the billeting of officers and their families will be carefully studied by the High Commission, and the results made known in due course.

All the above observations are formulated subject to reservation of the rights vested in the High Commission, and subject to the possibility of a state of siege being declared, and subject to the strict execution of the Treaty of Peace by Germany.

---

*First German Note*

[Translation \*]

GENTLEMEN :

[Paragraph 1.] The agreement concerning the military occupation of the Rhineland has been ratified by the German Government together with the treaty of peace. Germany realizes that the wording of these provisions can now in no wise be changed. An exact study and the knowledge of what has happened in the divers Rhenish territories, especially in the different zones of occupation show that the putting into practice of these scantily worded provisions will in many respects still necessitate particular mutual understandings about questions of detail. This is the reason why the German Government has requested the governments of the occupying powers to enter upon conferences about the said questions.

[Paragraph 2.] For the population of the occupied Rhenish territory it is of fundamental importance soon to be informed as to what shape their political, social and economic life is going to take during the long duration of the occupation. Germany has seen herself compelled to acquiesce in the military occupation of these regions and by so doing to put—although with a heavy heart—especial burdens upon the population of the Rhineland, burdens which unoccupied Germany has not to bear. Out of this results the obligation for the Government of the German Republic not to leave for her part anything undone to facilitate to the Rhineland the bearing of these especial burdens. My Government is convinced that it will be possible to execute the agreement, without impairing the military guarantees aimed at by the Allied and Associated Powers through their occupation, in such a way as to enable the population of the occupied regions to enjoy the blessings of peace, of which after the severe trial of the war and the armistice they stand in sore need, and to participate, according to their importance, together with the

---

\* The translation is that found under 763.72119/5949, with minor revisions by the editors.



rest of Germany in the reconstruction of the country and in the redeeming of the heavy obligations incurred by the treaty of peace.

[Paragraph 3.] I shall now permit myself to enter upon the discussion in detail of the questions contained in the different articles of the agreement.

*Article 5:* provides that the civil administration of the provinces, government departments (*Regierungsbezirke*) etc. shall remain in the hands of the German authorities and that the civil administration shall continue under German law and under the authority of the Central German Government. My Government assumes that this regulation does not merely refer to the already promulgated laws of the German Empire or its member states, but applies in a like manner to the future legislation of the German Empire and its constituent states and especially comprises all those laws and ordinances also which have been promulgated since the German revolution and have been sanctioned in the meantime by the German National Assembly and the National Assemblies of Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, Hesse, and Oldenburg.

This right of Germany to legislate for the territories of the Rhine, a right acknowledged by the Allies, is affected by the fact that in *article 3* the Allies have reserved to themselves the right to issue ordinances so far as may be necessary for securing the maintenance, requirements and safety of the Allied and Associated forces. These ordinances shall have the force of law from the day they are published and, therefore, take precedence over all laws or ordinances issued by the Empire or the member states. The idea, "maintenance, requirements and safety" covers such an exceedingly wide field and has such a general meaning that any economic, social or juridical question may be classed among them. For instance, in Germany the working time in the coal mines has now been fixed at 7 hours, in agriculture as in all branches of industrial and commercial activity at 8 hours. I asked myself whether the High Commission would be authorized by article 3 to change these provisions by way of ordinance for the reason that a working time diminished in this way would no more give full satisfaction to the requirements of the military forces.

On the other hand, I do not at all fail to recognize that the right to issue ordinances cannot be withheld from the Allied Governments. It will, therefore, be necessary to come to an arrangement and to secure an assurance that this power of issuing ordinances will only be used insofar as it does not interfere with the political, economic, and social reconstruction of Germany. For this reason my Government places the greatest value on the laying down of a first principle—for the execution of the legislative, jurisdictional and administrative rights

of the Allies—by means of a supplementary agreement. This first principle would have to be as follows:

[Paragraph 4.] 1. that the free exercise of their personal and civic rights be guaranteed to the population, principally the free exercise of public religious worship, the liberty of voting, of the press, of the clubs and associations,

2. that the political, juridical, administrative and economic connection of the occupied with the non-occupied parts of Germany be restored and safeguarded,

3. that the passenger—and goods traffic, as well as the news—service between the occupied and non-occupied territories be in no way prevented.

If this first principle be acknowledged by the Allied Governments, the ordinances issued by them will be nothing more than executions of this principle, which might contain certain restrictions for special cases. Regarding such restriction in special cases, there ought to be a previous understanding between the High Commission and the representative of Germany.

[Paragraph 5.] My Government has noted with satisfaction that the Allies have created in the High Commission a civil organism, which is the highest representative of the Allies. In order to facilitate the task of the High Commission and to create a uniform organ for the German population and the divers authorities in the occupied territory, my Government has appointed a National Commissioner, who is to be the first representative of the Central Government and the member states concerned. For I may recall the fact that, according to the German constitutional structure, the German Central Government is only competent in certain respects, whereas in other important respects are competent the Government of Prussia, the Government of Bavaria for the Palatinate, that of Hesse for Rhenish Hesse, that of Baden for the bridge-head of Kehl, and that of Oldenburg for the principality of Birkenfeld.

The National Commissioner would alone be authorized to communicate with the High Commission. He would—as it were—have to execute diplomatic functions, if one may speak of such in one's own territory.

For this high function has been designated by the German Government, Mr. von Starck, up to now president of the government in Cologne.

I beg, therefore, the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to declare themselves agreed upon the appointment of this National Commissioner.

[Paragraph 6.] If I now may enter on the several articles in a short survey, it is of decisive importance for my Government to know the number of the troops of occupation, their strength also in officers and

in horses, which the Allies after the demobilisation and after the establishment of a state of permanence mean to maintain in the Rhenish territories. Without exact information about the numerical strength of these troops and consequently about the costs of their maintenance my Government would find it impossible to lay down a correct budget—basis of the life of every state—and to balance beforehand the revenues and expenditures.

[Paragraph 7.] *Article 1*: further provides that the strength of the police forces is to be determined by the Allied and Associated Powers. In this connection I beg the High Commission to enter into communication with the National Commissioner, who will give all requisite information as to the number of gendarmery and State or Municipal Police indispensable for insuring order. In view of the criminality due to the sufferings of the war, and the unrest among the working population caused by the wild strikes, the number of gendarmes and of policemen must be considerably higher than before the war.

[Paragraph 8.] Regarding *article 3, paragraph a*, I ask that the High Commission will agree in principle to consult the opinion of the National Commissioner before issuing ordinances. This would be in the interest of the good working of the administration. Laws of the Empire, federal laws promulgated by five member states, in Wiesbaden also older laws from the Nassovian period before 1866 and provincial ordinances are in force in the territories of the Rhine—in short, the whole complexity and lack of clearness of the public law in force in Germany. The French members of the High Commission will, in view of the simplicity and clearness of the French law, find great difficulty in forming an idea of the intricacy of the German public law.

[Paragraph 9.] The provisions in *article 3, paragraph d and e* are particularly important. I agree that the armed forces of the Allied and Associated Powers should take a special position with the regard to jurisdiction. It is, however, necessary to make it clear what is meant by “the persons accompanying them”, to whom the general officers commanding the armies of occupation shall have issued a revocable passport and “any persons employed by or in the service of such troops”. My Government supposes that the persons in question are solely nationals of Allied and Associated Powers and not German citizens. My Government feels certain that German nationals shall remain under its full and unrestricted jurisdiction. It would impair a good juridical practice, if extraterritoriality were conferred upon German nationals by the issue of a revocable passport or by entry into military service. Thereby, two classes of German citizens would be created, one of which would be under German jurisdiction and the other of which would escape it. International law only recognizes



extritoriality for foreign nationals and by no means for one's own nationals. The consequences of a different conception could also be stated should occasion arise.

[Paragraph 10.] I am also to ask for an explanation as to whether by "military law and jurisdiction" one would also have to understand civil jurisdiction, and whether the troops, their personnel, the families of the officers and civil functionaries shall be withdrawn from the German jurisdiction also in reference to any contracts, purchases, loan transactions, order, etc. made for their private requirements. This appears to me impossible. If legal disputes should arise from a purchase or exchange, or from an order, these civil legal disputes should be brought before the German judge. Regarding the execution of the sentence, a special agreement should be made.

[Paragraph 11.] My Government further supposes that for all punishable actions the German penal code will be used in accordance with the general principles of law.

[Paragraph 12.] Furthermore, *article 4* requires a thorough explanation. This article 4 provides a regulation, which will cause profound unrest in Germany. One of the pillars of the German law is that a German national may not be extradited to a foreign government for the purpose of persecution or punishment. This principle has been violated in article 4. The German authorities shall arrest and hand over any person who commits any offence or crime against the persons or property of the armed forces of the Allied and Associated Powers. I take it that it is to be an essential condition for the competence of the Courts Martial that the accused person was within the occupied territory while committing the offence or crime, of which he is accused. It is necessary exactly to fix the procedure to be employed.

[Paragraph 13.] *Article 5* does not affect the organization of the administration so long as the High Commission do not consider requisite by ordinance to adapt the administration to the needs and circumstances of military occupation. I should be much obliged to know what is meant by this. According to the text, the state boundaries between Prussia and Bavaria, between Bavaria and Hesse might be changed by a simple ordinance. I am sure this is not intended, since by this the civil rights of the inhabitants would be interfered with most seriously.

[Paragraph 14.] I beg you to confirm me in the view that under civil administration is also to be understood the financial administration, so that the revenues for nation and state, which are collected in the occupied district can be forwarded without hindrance to the Central Treasury of the nation and to those of the separate states, i. e. to Berlin, Munich, Karlsruhe, Darmstadt, Oldenburg. I lay value upon establishing this, because under the state of war such a forwarding was often forbidden.

[Paragraph 15.] A certain provision creates a very unpleasant impression, viz. the one stipulating that the German authorities are obliged, under punishment of removal, to adapt themselves to all ordinances. It is a matter of course that every German official obeys an ordinance regularly promulgated. Moreover, I beg that the revocation may take place through the mediation of the National Commissioner and that therefore the possibility be given him of investigating and of making matters clear.

[Paragraph 16.] To *article 6*: it is felt as extraordinary that after the re-establishment of the state of peace The Hague Convention, which regulates the customs of warfare on land,<sup>9</sup> and is only adapted to the case of war, is made applicable. The regulation in paragraph 2, concerning the establishment of requisitions is in contradiction with the law of the Empire enacted on March 2nd of this year. I should be very thankful if a special arrangement could be made, by which the provisions of this law of the Empire, taking into account the wishes of the population to the widest extent, might find application. In fact, since Germany is obliged to bear the whole cost of the maintenance it should be left to her to determine in what way she will compensate her own nationals. It would only be requisite that officers of the occupation army cooperate in order to establish the nature of the damages caused. How she will make compensation may be left to Germany to determine. The questions are so difficult and comprehensive that only experts from both sides can regulate them. Especially must a scale of rates be arranged and care must be taken to observe as great a uniformity as possible in the occupied district in order that one part of the population may not be put in a better or worse position than another.

[Paragraph 17.] To *article 7*: it is to be investigated whether a considerable number of localities at present occupied might not be handed over again to the severely tried civil population.

To *article 8, paragraph a*: a military expert will be attached to the National Commissioner. The German Government assumes that in the laying out and use of the territory the greatest consideration will be exercised towards the necessitous economic condition of the population. The same holds good of the rights of the Allies to take into possession every public or private institution. At present claims are made upon large sanatoriums for pulmonary diseases and sanatoriums for nervous complaints and accordingly the possibility of healing just these diseases is rendered problematic. The struggle against tuberculosis is an international one and not limited by political boundaries. I appeal to men of such high competence as Mr. Leon Bourgeois, the President of the International Association for resisting

---

<sup>9</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204.

tuberculosis, who, a few years before the war, showed full appreciation of our German institution, which he visited under my guidance. It is necessary that the sanatoriums be made free as soon as possible for people of small means and be restored again to their proper purposes.

[Paragraph 18.] *Article 9* needs an elucidation of its first paragraph. I assume that only exemption from personal taxes, not, however, from real estate taxes is desired, i. e., if for example, an officer or official acquires during the term of occupation a piece of ground, the tax upon this and other taxes upon property or trade taxes are to be paid by him. Likewise, a stipulation will have to be made that no German or neutral may belong to the personnel exempt from taxes. It could not be tolerated that a German by getting himself incorporated into the personnel of the occupying troops should acquire the privilege of exemption from taxes. No objection will be raised to the fact that provisions of food, arms, clothing, equipment and supplies of all kinds intended for the use of the Allied troops or of the High Commission enjoy exemption and free importation. The wording that all those wares also, if only addressed to canteens and officers' messes, shall enter duty-free appears incredible. By this the whole working of the customs of Germany would be thrown over. It would be like a great leak in the bottom of the German ship, through which the water would freely flow in and cause the vessel to sink. That cannot be the intention of the Allies, who cannot but wish for the reconstruction of Germany. This, however, can only take place, if the customs protection on the German frontier be maintained to its full extent. For security against smuggling it would be necessary that all goods intended for the Allies should be statistically registered, so that it might at any time be established whether they are not being introduced under a false flag or whether they are actually intended for the Allied troops. Here also the particulars of the procedure would have to be regulated.

[Paragraph 19.] The German Government is fain to believe that no use will be made of the provision of article 270 of the conditions of peace and that the customs frontier will coincide with the frontier of the country.

[Paragraph 20.] Concerning *article 10*: I interpret it in this way that the commander-in-chief will make use of his right of supreme command only for military purposes, and that for the rest the railways and the steamship connections will remain under the central administrations in Berlin, Munich and Karlsruhe. Especially it is essential that undisturbed railway traffic should take place between the occupied and the unoccupied districts and that the time tables be regulated by the administrations concerned, as in time of peace. A special



agreement will have to be made concerning the issuing of free tickets for officers.

[Paragraph 21.] Concerning *article 11* an especial agreement should be concluded between expert commissioners of the Allies and of the postal administration of the German Empire. Here also I emphasize that special rights can exclusively be claimed for military purposes. Particularly it is indispensable that there should be free postal, telegraphic, and telephonic intercourse between the occupied and the unoccupied districts and that together with this all presently existing restrictions, notably the post censor should be abolished.

[Paragraph 22.] *To article 13* I make the request that the state of siege only be declared after previously consulting with the National Commissioner. I trust that when the number of the police force is great enough, when the free and unrestricted intercourse between the occupied and the unoccupied districts is established and when the economic reconstruction of Germany will have made progress, then the declaration of the state of siege will be shown to be superfluous.

[Paragraph 23.] I beg to be allowed to sum up my arguments in a few sentences:

My Government has the impression that the agreement does not sufficiently take into account the radical change of the general situation from the state of war to that of peace. The military headquarters of the Allies have repeatedly replied to the German Armistice Commission: "We still are at war."—Now, however, that the German National Assembly have ratified the conditions of peace and that the legal instruments of ratification will ere long be exchanged, we fairly pace onward into the state of peace.

The enormous burdens and obligations Germany has charged herself with and which she will to the uttermost limit of her power endeavor to meet and redeem in an absolutely straightforward and loyal way can be borne merely on condition of the occupied Rhenish territories with their highly developed industry, agriculture, and trade also helping to the full to bear them. This necessitates a free development of all resources. This necessitates a re-establishment of the state of peace, despite the military occupation. The interests of the Allies in this respect coincide with those of Germany. The more freedom will have been granted in shaping the conditions of existence in the occupied territories, the less oppressive the occupation will prove, the more completely Germany will be able to meet her obligations.

Fully confident that this mode of thinking will be appreciated and taken into account by the Allied Governments, we Germans enter into these conferences.

LEWALD<sup>10</sup>

DR. MICHAELIS BASCH

VERSAILLES, July 12, 1919.

<sup>10</sup> Theodor Lewald, Member of the German Delegation.

[*Second German Note*<sup>11</sup>]

[JULY 12, 1919.]

## ARTICLE 3

[Paragraph 24.] During the Armistice, many orders having the force of law were issued on the basis of the War Decree of The Hague, not only by the High Command of the Allied and Associated Troops, but also by the various army commanders, commanding generals, town-commanders, etc., so that at the present time an extremely piebald justice exists, which destroys the uniformity of justice and has caused the greatest uncertainty in business life. It must be remarked that all these orders will lose their effectiveness with the coming into force of the Peace Treaty and the establishment of the High Commission.

[Paragraph 25.] The same legal situation was permitted to exist with regard to the individual orders of the above-named military authorities, particularly as regards the exiling from the occupied territories, through which many inhabitants have been driven from house and home. Attention is called to the fact that these persons may now return undisturbed to their homes, and that neither the High Commission nor the military services will, in the future, have the right to issue orders of this kind.

[Paragraph 26.] Since Paragraph (e) declares the war courts of the Occupation troops competent only for the judging of crimes or misdemeanors against the persons or property of the military forces of the Allied and Associated Powers, it must be inferred that the judging of such offences against the orders issued by the High Commission, in accordance with Paragraph (a), as do not concern the protection of the persons or property of the military forces, are not under the jurisdiction of said courts.

## ARTICLE 5

[Paragraph 27.] The division of administration in the Provinces, Administrative Districts, Municipal and Rural Circles, and Communes, is a special Prussian arrangement, which does not exist in this gradation in the bordering states forming part of the Union, for example, Bavaria has no provinces, but has instead District-Unions. In the Prussian Rhine Province, over the *Landgemeinden* (Rural Communes) there are also *Landbuergermeistereien* (Canton). Several special administrations have a particular division of administration, which does not coincide with the jurisdiction of the ordinary country administration, for example, in Prussia, the

---

<sup>11</sup> The text of this German note is not attached to the file copy of appendix A to HD-11. This translation is filed under 763.72119/5965.

administration of the direct taxes, the Railway Administration, the General Commissions.

[Paragraph 28.] The words, "under the supreme authority of the German Central Government" are to be so interpreted as to include the Governments of the German Federated States.

[Paragraph 29.] The arrangement made in certain of the sectors of occupation, in adding special "Administrators" or "Controllors" to the German authorities, should no longer be permitted after the coming into effect of the Arrangement. With a reservation as to the right of the High Commission, to request the recall of officials, the German Government, in the future, is to have free sway in the appointment, transfer and recall of its officials, without regard as to whether they come from the occupied or unoccupied territory.

[Paragraph 30.] The School Administration forms a part of the Civil Administration and is consequently to be directed according to German laws. The forced introduction of language instruction can no longer be permitted after the Arrangement.

[Paragraph 31.] Nothing now stands in the way of the entry into force of laws of the German Empire or of the Federated States, the extension of which to the Occupied Territory has been hindered by the Occupation Authorities, because they were enacted after the Armistice, so that, for example, in the Occupied Territory, the elections to the Parish Boards may at once be undertaken on the basis of the new democratic electoral rights.

#### ARTICLE 6

[Paragraph 32.] A strict application of this provision might cripple the whole economic life in the Occupied Territory, since no dealer or manufacturer can make definite plans or calculations when he is constantly under the fear that perhaps the very next day everything may be disrupted by a requisition of his goods or the working of his factory. In the same way, no farmer could dare to import cattle and particularly horses from abroad, or even from unoccupied Germany, if he is constantly subjected to the danger of having his cattle, imported at great cost, immediately removed by requisition. It therefore seems irremissible to apply these provisions in such a way that the security of economic life may not suffer too much thereby.

For the estimate of the requisition charges and of the damages caused by the occupation troops, Article 6 provides for special local committees, of mixed composition, under the presidency of a person appointed by the High Commission. The Article is silent regarding the material right, according to which these estimates are to be undertaken, although this is particularly of the greatest importance for



the people concerned. The German Government has regulated the question of the estimate and payment of the requisitions made by the Occupation Authorities in the Rhineland, including the war damages caused by the latter, by a special law, enacted on March 2, 1919, and published on Page 261 of the Imperial Record of Laws for the current year. The law is in full application in the English Zone of Occupation, nor has any fault been found with it, either by the English Occupation Authorities or by the population. On the contrary, the authorities of the other Zones of Occupation have forbidden the execution of this law and have, on their side, begun the independent estimate and payment of the indemnification of requisitions. In this way, very different principles and very different tariffs have been used as a basis for action in the different zones of occupation. Discontent is caused among the people by the divergency in these systems. It has reached the point where, apparently some of the Occupation Authorities are applying their home laws, which do not meet German conditions. For example, according to a decree of the General Staff of the Xth French Army, 4, Bureau of Civil Affairs, under date of March 28, 1919, no requisition claims shall be paid if the real or personal property used belongs to the following associations:—

- (1) . . . . To the German Federated States, (Federals)
- (2) Public Civil or Military Administrations.
- (3) Provincial or Communal Associations.
- (4) General Railway—, Lake—, River—, or Land Transportation Companies.
- (5) Mining or Lighting Companies.
- (6) All other companies of public utility or serving public interests.

According to German Law, the Treasury of the German Empire is bound to bear all expenses connected with the Armistice, and the Peace Treaty obligations. The Treasury of the Empire, however, is not identical with the Treasury of the individual states. The idea gained from the French Administrative Law regarding companies, which are of public utility or serve a public interest, is unknown to German law. The occupation authorities, however, could have no interest in preventing the German Empire from indemnifying the Federated States Railway Administrations, and the other Treasury Offices, the Provincial and Communal Associations, the Gas, Water and Electric Works, in accordance with the German decisions. Under the present situation in the French sector of occupation, namely, on one side the prohibition against carrying out, in any way, the German Imperial law of March 2, 1919, and on the other side, the instructions given by the French to their own authorities, not to indemnify the

above-mentioned war administrations, a gap exists, which must lead to permanently unbearable conditions. The situation is similar in the Belgian sector of occupation. The following is to be understood from a notice of April of this year:—

(1) Neither a payment, nor an estimate will be made on the part of Belgium of the requisitions carried out prior to May 1, 1919.

(2) Likewise, payment will not be made for all lodgings, either prior to or after May 1, 1919.

(3) The Communes will not be indemnified for the disbursements made, in the name of the Belgians, for requisitions. A three-fold gap exists here also.

It would be in the interest of all, if uniformity in the establishment and payment of indemnities could be insured by the application of the German Law, drawn up as it should be for German conditions. Should the occupation authorities consider it desirable to have the companies participate in the ascertainment of the damages, a means could easily be found in the shape of an administrative order, without it being necessary on that account, to alter the German Law.

Requisitions should only be undertaken through the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated troops, or the Commander-in-Chief of the contingents of the individual Powers, and, in demands of an important nature, explicitly through the intermediary of the Reichskommissar (Imperial Commissioner), whose task it would be to issue the necessary orders for the carrying out of the requisitions.

#### ARTICLE 8

[Paragraph 33.] Since civil officials, officers and their families may be lodged, according to the provisions now in effect regarding quarters, in each individual army, Germany is anxious to receive these provisions immediately. Since provisions regarding the claims to be made on the part of the families, may be lacking, in the different armies, special agreement may be needed. Also, just what is meant by "family" needs closer explanation.

The troops of occupation should be assembled in the garrisons designated as soon as possible, and should not be scattered over the whole country. At the time of this dislocation, attention would have to be paid as soon as possible to the existing conditions of accommodations and to the extreme scarcity of lodgings in many towns. It is of great importance to soon receive the names of the prospective garrison towns, to be occupied for a long duration, in order that, in case of need, the necessary arrangements may be made to avoid having officers' messes in private houses.

[No signature on file copy]

## Appendix "B" to HD-11

WCP-1146

## FEEDING OF RUSSIAN PRISONERS IN GERMANY

*Memorandum by Mr. Hoover*

It will be recollected that the Allied Governments made certain agreements with the Germans for the retention of Russian prisoners in Germany, and made undertakings for the support of these prisoners by the Allied Governments. Their food supply and support has been carried out through the French Government, the British Red Cross, the American Red Cross, with a personnel of about 800 Allied officers, doctors, etc., under the general direction of the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Berlin. The Supreme Economic Council has appealed to arrange for such food supply, and the measures above recited were finally, to a considerable degree, instituted at the inspiration of that Council.

The British Red Cross have already notified of the withdrawal of their entire personnel on the first of August. This will immediately leave some 35,000 of the prisoners without supervision. The American Army will necessarily demobilize their entire personnel some time in the month of August. The Red Cross Societies are withdrawing their financial support and the funds for the provision of food and clothing (except those provided by the French Government) are absolutely exhausted, and I understand that even these are about to be withdrawn. The Supreme Economic Council has no means by which any further provision can be made in this matter.

The retention of these prisoners was primarily a military measure instituted under the Allied Military authorities and it would appear to me must now become a proper concern of the various War Departments. There are apparently over 200,000 prisoners left, of whom it is desired to repatriate approximately 25,000 as recruits to the Russian Northern Army. Of the balance, some 40,000 should be repatriated to Southern Russia and the remainder to Central Russia. The prisoners are not entirely free from Bolshevik ideas, which may have a political bearing on the destinations to which they are repatriated. The large majority have no desire to fight either for or against the Bolsheviks, and their sole desire is to return to their families whom they have not seen for five years. In any event, it is necessary to provide at once some measure of food, clothing, and personnel to supervise distribution pending repatriation, and beyond this it is necessary to immediately provide for their repatriation. This latter operation will require some months, but they must be repatriated before winter.

I understand the German authorities are demanding the immediate repatriation of these prisoners, as it required a force of some 18,000



German troops to guard them. The prisoners themselves are demanding their repatriation. I understand that their boots and clothing are in such condition that they cannot be marched to any destination, and, in any event, they would probably indulge in brigandage unless repatriated under military supervision. The points therefore to be decided are:

1. Are the prisoners to be repatriated at once?
2. Are they to be repatriated to the nearest Russian point through Poland?
3. Are they to be repatriated by sea to Black Sea ports?
4. If either of these alternatives, who is to pay for the cost thereof, and who is to undertake it?
5. Who is to furnish the food and personnel for their care in the meantime?

I would like to emphasize that the relief agencies under co-ordination through the Supreme Economic Council have now practically exhausted their resources and cannot take part in this matter, so that other arrangements must be set up at the earliest possible moment.

HERBERT HOOVER

16 JULY, 1919.

---

Appendix "C" to HD-11

WCP-1145

SITUATION IN RUSSIAN ARMENIA

*Memorandum by Mr. Hoover*

The Relief Administration, co-operating with the various Allied authorities, has been for months striving to meet the terrible situation of starvation in Russian Armenia. Some 50,000 tons of food have been provided and the only method of access to this area is over the railway from Batum, and this railway is in the territory of the so-called Georgian Government. The railway is operating partially under the direction of the British Military Authorities, who have given every co-operation in endeavouring to move the supplies. However, the Georgian authorities have constantly interfered with the movement,—has repeatedly demanded that they should be given a portion of the food-stuffs, and has latterly stopped the movement of the traffic four or five days at a time, despite the protests of all of the local Allied officials.

It is impossible to depict the situation in Armenia for up until the last sixty days the population has been eating the dead. During this last two months the movement of relief supplies has been sufficient to somewhat stem the tide but there has never been ten days' supplies ahead of actual starvation. There is no acute necessity for foodstuffs

in Georgia, although in an endeavour to secure some co-operation from the Georgian Government we have allowed ourselves to be blackmailed from time to time in the matter. I will not repeat the correspondence on the question between our officials and the Georgian Government. It is sufficient to say that their attitude has been entirely that of brigandage, against a population dying in their door. The last advices which we have indicate that these authorities have stopped our transport for a week at a time.

I quite realise that the situation is one beyond the strength of the Allied military forces at present in occupation in the Caucasus, but I am well aware of the aspirations of the Georgian authorities for consideration before the Supreme Council. I believe it might do some good if the Council could despatch a very strongly worded telegram to the Georgian authorities through their own representatives, and if the Georgian representatives in Paris were given information to the same import. My suggestion is that the telegram should be phrased in somewhat the following manner:—

“The Council has been made aware of the interference of the Georgian authorities with food supplies being sent into Armenia in an endeavour on the part of the Allied Governments to stem the tide of starvation and death amongst these unfortunate people. The Council cannot state in too strong terms that it will not tolerate such interference and that the action taken hitherto by the Georgian authorities and the continuation of such action must entirely prejudice the case of the Georgian authorities, not only before this Council but before the court of public opinion of the world. The Council therefore expects that the authorities in Georgia shall not only give the privilege of transportation over the railway routes which they at present control, but will devote themselves to assisting in the transmission of these supplies without more than the normal charge and remuneration for such service. The Council awaits the reply of the authorities in Georgia as to whether or not they are prepared to acquiesce in this arrangement.”

HERBERT HOOVER

16 JULY, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, July 21, 1919, at 3 : 30 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA		BRITISH EMPIRE		FRANCE	
UNITED STATES OF					
Hon. H. White.		The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal- four, O. M., M. P.		M. Clemenceau.	
<i>Secretary</i>		<i>Secretary</i>		<i>Secretaries</i>	
Mr. L. Harrison.		Mr. H. Norman.		M. Dutasta.	
				M. Berthelot.	
				M. de St. Quentin.	
ITALY		JAPAN			
M. Tittoni.		Baron Makino.			
<i>Secretary</i>		<i>Secretary</i>			
M. Paterno.		M. Kawai.			

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF. . . . .	Capt. Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE. . . . .	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE. . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY. . . . .	Lieut. Zanchi.

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. (a) MR. BALFOUR said that before starting with the subjects on the Agenda, he would like to observe that there was not a single item on it touching Peace with Bulgaria, or indeed touching any Treaty of Peace at all. The subjects for discussion were no doubt important subjects, but the Bulgarians were to come to Paris on the following Friday. He thought it would be discreditable if the Conference were not ready to hand them a Treaty on their arrival, or shortly after it. He understood that the delay came from the re-opening of the frontier question. The Reparation and Financial Clauses were delayed in consequence. Unless the ultimate size of Bulgaria were known, it was difficult to estimate what sums she would be able to pay. Another question that was delayed was that of responsibilities, and the method of procedure to be adopted against persons who had broken the laws of war. He had enquired why Clauses similar to those inserted in the Treaties with Germany and with Austria were not adopted for the Treaty of Bulgaria, and he had been given the following explanations.

Question of Hastening Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria



In the other Treaties it had been stipulated that if the crime had been committed to the detriment of a Frenchman, the trial should be in a French Court, and if against an Englishman, in an English Court. If against Nationals of several countries, in a mixed Court. It appeared, however, that a Greek, Serbian, or Roumanian Court would not be regarded as offering a fair trial to a Bulgarian who had committed an offence against a Greek, Serbian or Roumanian. This might or might not be, but whatever the merits of the case, he thought the Council should insist that the work be terminated rapidly. He would suggest that M. Clemenceau should request the Commissions to expedite their labours.

MR. WHITE said that he would like to add a word to Mr. Balfour's remarks. He wished to propose that the Council should give authority to the Commission on New States to take up the protection of minorities clauses for the Treaty with Bulgaria. He understood that the Economic Clauses and the clauses prepared by the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission were ready.

MR. BALFOUR thought that Mr. White's information was not quite accurate. The Port question for instance, was held up, pending a decision as to whether or not Bulgaria was to have Dedeagatch.

MR. WHITE said that in any case the Commission on New States might get to work on Clauses for the protection of minorities.

(It was agreed that the Commission on New States be asked to prepare for the Treaty with Bulgaria Clauses for the protection of Minorities.)

(b) M. TITTONI said that in accordance with the request of his colleagues, he had discussed the question of frontiers between Greece and Bulgaria with M. Venizelos. The latter demanded the whole of Eastern and Western Thrace, and declined to reduce his claims in any respect. It was therefore impossible to obtain any concession and the question must be decided by the Council. Consequently he considered his mission ended as he could obtain nothing further from M. Venizelos.

(c) M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would ask M. Tardieu to explain the situation regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria.

(M. Tardieu entered the room.)

Report by M.  
Tittoni of Result  
of His Conference  
With M. Venizelos

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Bulgarians were expected to arrive in four days. He asked him, as President of the Commission dealing with Bulgaria, to explain to what extent the Treaty was ready for them.

M. TARDIEU said that he was only President of the Commission dealing with the frontier question. In that Commission, the result obtained was total disagreement between the American and Italian Delegations on the one hand, and the British, French and Japanese

Delegations on the other. M. Tardieu then read and explained the report contained in Appendix "A". He said that he would like to add a few words in support of the opinions he had himself backed in the Commission. In western Thrace there was no choice between Greece and Bulgaria on ethnological grounds. The vast majority of the population was Turkish. The country, however, was not to be given to the Turks. The next most numerous population was, according to French statistics, Greek—according to other statistics, Bulgarian. It was very likely that the war had brought about alterations in the relative proportions of the population. As to the possession of a Port, the Bulgarians had a good Port on the Black Sea. The internationalisation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles would give them free access to the open sea. As to discontent, there would undoubtedly be discontent in Bulgaria, but the Balkans were the natural home of discontent, and the only question was whether discontent should be chiefly on the side of those who had fought against us, or mainly, among the Balkan Nations who had fought for us. He would remind the Council that the impossible desire to produce union in the Balkans had wasted precious months during the war. It led to the Allied defeat at the Dardanelles, and to numerous troubles in Salonika. The mistakes made in the war should not be repeated in the Peace. As to the ultimate disposal of Eastern Thrace, he did not wish to prejudice the question. It might perhaps be most fitting to attribute it to the territory of Constantinople should the Council decide not to give it to Greece. The point was, not who got it, but who lost it.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question was evidently one which the Council must solve. He was prepared to discuss it at once, but he was afraid that Mr. White would not be able, without consulting his Government, to reach a decision immediately.

MR. WHITE said this was so.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that unfortunately he could not be present in the Council on the following day, and that M. Pichon also would be unavoidably detained in Brussels. He was not sure that a meeting could be held on Wednesday. He hoped that by Thursday Mr. White could obtain the views of his Government.

MR. WHITE said that he would send a second telegram that very evening to endeavour to obtain instructions by Thursday.

MR. BALFOUR said that he regretted the delay as he regarded the matter as very urgent. He would, however, as it was necessary, assent to a postponement until Thursday.

(In view of the importance of terminating at the earliest possible moment, the preparation of the Treaty of Bulgaria, it was decided that the first item on the Agenda for Thursday, July 24th, should be the determination of the frontiers of Bulgaria.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had just received a communication from Bela Kun announcing that he proposed to attack the Roumanians, in order to enforce upon them respect for the

Appointment of an  
International  
Committee of En-  
quiry for Hungary

Armistice arranged by the Powers. (Appendix "B".)

M. Clemenceau added that he did not know whether the Roumanians would be able to resist the attack.

They had two divisions with which to oppose it. French troops were not far off and General Franchet d'Esperey had ordered them to fire if attacked. This news perhaps rendered the appointment of the Committee unnecessary.

MR. BALFOUR said that he considered himself authorised to nominate a General to go to Hungary. The General in question was Major-General Gorton.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Generals might proceed to the front and report on what was going on there.

MR. WHITE said that he had, as yet, received no orders from Washington.

M. TITTONI said that, according to news from a good source, General Boehm, who had been Commander of the Hungarian Red Army, had paid a visit to Vienna. He had ceased to be Commander-in-Chief but appeared to be still in touch with Bela Kun. It would seem, from what he had said in Vienna, that an effort was being made to convert the Communist Government of Hungary into a Socialist Government. He suggested that the Allied Representatives at Vienna be asked to enquire into this report and inform the Council of the results of their enquiry.

(It was decided not to nominate the Committee of Enquiry until such time as Mr. White should have obtained the views of his Government. It was further decided that the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers in Vienna should be asked for information regarding the visit of General Boehm to that city, and to investigate the report that he had declared that he was trying to bring about a movement in Hungary aiming at the transformation of the present Communist Government of Bela Kun into a Socialist Government. The truth and eventual importance of the alleged scheme should be verified.)

(At this point, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites entered the room.)

3. The Council had before it a report of the Military Representatives on the Army of Occupation in Upper Silesia. (Appendix "C".)

Report of the Military  
Representatives on Army of  
Occupation in  
Upper Silesia

GENERAL BELIN read the conclusions of the report to the effect that 1 division of 13,000 men would be required.

MR. BALFOUR asked whence this division could be obtained.



GENERAL BELIN said that, in the first draft of the report, it had been suggested that the division should be drawn from the troops employed in the occupation of the Rhinelands. He would suggest, therefore, that Marshal Foch be asked if he could spare the troops. These troops would not be lost to Marshal Foch's command: they would be stationed on the confines of Poland and Prussia, and, should any trouble arise requiring armed intervention, these troops, which would remain under Marshal Foch's orders, could be utilised to co-operate with any movements made in the west.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch's estimate for the troops of occupation was 150,000 men. He would certainly be able to spare 13,000 from this number. He entirely agreed with the judicious remarks of General Belin. The division, would, no doubt be composed of international elements.

(It was agreed that the report of the Military Representatives, together with the suggestion that the necessary troops should be furnished by the Army of Occupation on the Rhine, be approved in principle and be submitted to Marshall Foch for his views regarding the possibility of furnishing the divisions required and on its composition.)

4. The Council had before it a report of the Military Representatives. (Appendix "D".)

GENERAL BELIN read the conclusions of the Report under the heading "Material Assistance."

Report of the Military Representatives on Assistance to Poland in the Ceded Territory in Case of Disturbance

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the means of transport to Poland were unsatisfactory. An inter-allied train, laden with munitions on its way to Poland, had been blown up on German territory. The German Government did not appear to be involved. The train was guarded by Polish soldiers, who had apparently been neglectful. It would perhaps, therefore, be advantageous to organise transport by sea.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the only port available was Dantzic and that Allied control over it was not very good.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the situation at Dantzic had improved. The turbulent elements were quieter and the German Government appeared to be resigned to losing the port. He suggested that the best plan would be to ask Marshal Foch to telegraph to General Nudant in Berlin to open negotiations with the German Government regarding transport by sea.

(It was decided that Marshal Foch be asked to initiate negotiations with the German Government for the transport of material for Poland to Dantzic.)

GENERAL BELIN then read the conclusions of the report under the heading "Preventive Measures." He explained that there were

Allied officers serving in the Polish Army. Some of these might be nominated in advance to posts on the Delimitation Commission, which, as such, was only to be appointed 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty. These officers might, in anticipation of their future duties, undertake to supervise the handing over of the ceded districts.

(This proposal was agreed to.)

It was decided that Marshal Foch be requested to report on the possibility of appointing Allied Officers serving in the Polish Army, who would ultimately be nominated to the Delimitation Commission, to supervise the transfer of the ceded territory from Germany to Poland.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a letter from M. Venizelos regarding the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry.

Appointment of  
Inter-Allied Com-  
mission of Enquiry  
in Asia Minor

(See Appendix "E".) M. Venizelos desired that a Greek Commissioner be appointed. This proposal did not appear to be very acceptable.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the Council had sent French and Italian officers to investigate the incidents at Fiume.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the case was different. At Fiume the incidents had occurred as between Nationals of the Great Powers. In Asia Minor the incidents concerned Greeks and Turks. It appeared to him unreasonable to appoint a Greek to investigate a case of that kind. If his colleagues disagreed with him, however, he would not press this point of view.

M. TITTONI said that he was of the same opinion as M. Clemenceau. The investigating Commission would be the direct emanation of the Council. It should, therefore, conform to the composition of the Council. If a Greek officer were to be appointed to the Commission in Asia Minor, it might be argued on the same lines that M. Venizelos should have remained in the room, at a previous meeting, when the Council deliberated on the subject of the Greek occupation in Anatolia.

MR. BALFOUR said that in the early days of the Conference, it had been laid down that Powers with limited interests should be represented when matters directly affecting them were discussed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they were heard on matters regarding their interests, but the deliberations were conducted by the Five Powers.

MR. WHITE said that he thought the argument on both sides was strong, and that he had no very definite preferences.

MR. BALFOUR asked the military experts present in the room whether they thought the collaboration of a Greek officer would be conducive to a sound finding.

GENERAL THWAITES expressed the opinion that it was undesirable to appoint a Greek officer.

GENERAL BLISS said that the presence of officers of all Allied Nations would give an appearance of impartiality. He did not feel strongly on the subject, but he was inclined personally to think that there should be officers from each of the Allied Nations on the Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the presence of a Greek officer on the Commission would doubtless not matter much.

M. TITTONI objected to it as creating a precedent, which challenged the whole mechanism of the Conference.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the Greek officer would go as a representative of the Powers.

(After some further discussion it was agreed that M. Venizelos be informed that he might appoint a Greek officer to follow the labours of the Commission. This officer would not, however, have a vote on the Commission and would take no part in its finding.)

The following nominations were then made:—

For Italy	General Dallolio.
For France	General Franchet d'Esperey to nominate an officer.
For Great Britain	General Milne to nominate an officer.
For United States of America.	An officer to be appointed after a reply from Washington had been received.

It was decided that the Commission should begin its labours at once, and should gather as early as possible at Constantinople.)

**Appointment of a Commission of Administration in the Plebiscite Zone of Upper Silesia** 6. (It was agreed that nominations to this Commission should be communicated to the Secretary-General on the following day.)

**Report of Financial Commission Regarding the Financial Assistance to the Baltic States** 7. MR. BALFOUR said that the report (Appendix "F") was to the effect that the Commission was unable to say whether the money required by General Gough was really necessary, whether the Allied Governments could furnish the money and what security existed for repayment. For all the assistance given to the Council, the Commission might as well not have reported at all. He quoted from a telegram from General Gough to the effect that the Germans were paying 15 million marks a month to support the Baltic Landwehr and the troops of Prince Lieven,<sup>1</sup> and suggesting that to deliver Latvia and Russia from financial obligation to Germany, the Germans be ordered to continue payment into a British bank to the account of the Ulmannis<sup>2</sup> Govern-

<sup>1</sup> Prince Anatole Lieven, a Balt, in command of the Russian detachment of volunteers fighting the Bolsheviks in the Baltic regions.

<sup>2</sup> Karlis Ulmannis, Latvian Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Supplies.



ment as a portion of the reparation due from Germany. Mr. Balfour added that it was surprising that the Germans should be able to pay such a sum while all the Entente Powers together could not afford half a million a month.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the matter could not be settled at that meeting.

(The question was therefore postponed.)

8. M. TARDIEU said that, as he had previously explained, there was a Commission to supervise the execution of the Territorial and Political Clauses of the Treaty, and another to supervise the execution of the Reparation and Financial Clauses. There were, however, two other important chapters in the Treaty requiring similar Commissions, namely, the Economic and Colonial. He pointed out that the existing Committees could not perform this work. He, therefore, proposed that a Committee be appointed to supervise the execution of these Clauses of the Treaty.

Appointment of  
Commissions To  
Supervise Execu-  
tion of Economic  
and Colonial  
Clauses of Treaty  
With Germany

BARON MAKINO said that, as regards the Colonial Clauses, the most important of these were covered by the work of the Reparation Commission, and the remainder by the Committee dealing with Mandates. The work of these two bodies appeared to cover the main part of the Articles dealing with German colonies. If anything were left over, there might be a reason for appointing a new Commission, and he would be glad to know what remained over.

M. TARDIEU said that he agreed. The Reparation Commission could, he thought, in a few hours deal with all questions which the Committee on Mandates left untouched. All he wished was that some body should be required to do the necessary work on behalf of the Council.

BARON MAKINO suggested that the Committee on Mandates should be asked to make a report.

(After some further discussion, the two following resolutions were then adopted:—

1. That the supervision of the execution of the Economic Clauses of the Treaty with Germany should be entrusted to the Economic Commission. The Commission was asked to report to the Council at an early date.

2. That the supervision of the execution of the Colonial Clauses of the Treaty with Germany should be entrusted to the Mandates Committee. The Committee was asked to report to the Council at an early date.)

9. M. TARDIEU said that he had just seen a letter which had not been communicated to the Commission dealing with the question of  
Klagenfurt. (Appendix "G".)

The Evacuation  
of Klagenfurt

M. TITTONI observed that the question relating to war material was totally different from that of the Armistice line.

M. TARDIEU said that the Council had required a line to be drawn behind which the two belligerent parties could withdraw. It had then been thought right that this line should, as nearly as possible, be the boundary between the plebiscite areas. This had been done. An argument was now raised by the Yugo-Slavs against withdrawing behind the line on the plea that there was a certain stock of arms and munitions captured by them from the Austrians which they were entitled to remove. He thought this excuse for not withdrawing should not be tolerated.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had imagined that it had been arranged that the Serbs should retire leaving behind them a small guard under Allied officers to watch those stores, to which it appeared they had a legitimate title. There appeared to be no serious objection to the execution of this plan. The stores belonged to the Serbs and should they have to abandon them they would have a real grievance.

M. TITTONI said that the matter was not as clear to him as it seemed to be to Mr. Balfour. Mr. Balfour seemed convinced that these stores belonged to the Serbs. The Serbs had occupied the territory in which these stores were after the armistice. They had no right, therefore, to claim as war booty material taken after the armistice. These stores represented a security for the reparation due from Austria. In it the Serbs were entitled not to the whole, but to one-fifth. The whole question should therefore be handed over to the Reparation Commission. If all the armaments in Austria were bartered away, there would finally remain nothing in the country to pay reparation. Further, he thought the presence of Serbian troops, even in small numbers, was incompatible with the due observance of the plebiscite. As it was, the inhabitants complained that the Serbians threatened them. The same plan therefore should be adopted in this territory as was adopted in the areas in dispute between Germans and Poles. A police force was required, but not one representing either claimant.

MR. BALFOUR said that M. Tittoni's argument was a strong one, but it could hardly apply to a very small section of Serbian troops posted to guard a building. This he thought was all that the proposed force amounted to. He would like to ask at what date the plebiscite was to take place.

M. TARDIEU said that M. Tittoni's observation might have force at the time when the plebiscite was to occur, but this was to be from three to six months after the coming into force of the Treaty. The Treaty had not yet been signed.

MR. BALFOUR said that long before this the munitions would have been removed, and the Serbian guard would have gone with them.

M. TARDIEU said that he would suggest a slight modification of Mr. Balfour's proposal, namely, that instead of a Serbian guard, the

Allied generals in the area be asked to take charge of the stores, and to give the Serbians a receipt.

(The following Resolution was then adopted:—

“It was decided that the troops of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes be required to evacuate the whole of zone “B” in the Klagenfurt Basin, in conformity with the boundary already communicated to them. The arms and stores claimed by them will be handed over for custody to the Allied Generals, who will furnish a receipt for the same.”)

10. M. CLEMENCEAU said that there was a complaint communicated by M. Paderewski that the Germans were removing from Dantzic all that was necessary for the working of the factories. The complaint emanated from a Committee of the working population of Dantzic. (See Appendix “H”.)

Removal of Mate-  
rial From Danzig  
by Germans

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that Marshal Foch be asked to deal with the question.

(It was decided to refer the document communicated by M. Paderewski regarding German action in Danzig to Marshal Foch for suitable action.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, July 21, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-12

[Translation <sup>3</sup>]

#### *Report on the Boundaries of Bulgaria Presented to the Supreme Council by the Central Territorial Committee*

The Central Territorial Committee, entrusted by a decision of the Supreme Council under date of July 2<sup>4</sup> with the proposal of a boundary line for Bulgaria, has the honor to formulate the following opinion:

#### I.—BOUNDARY OF DOBRUDJA

Unanimity could not be obtained. The following opinions were expressed:

(1) The Committee, with the exception of the American delegation, considers that it is not possible, by a decision of the Conference, to impose upon Roumania a change of the boundary existing in 1914;

(2) The American delegation does not believe that it would be wise to separate the different elements of the question in the settlement regarding Roumanian territories. It considers, moreover, that the

<sup>3</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>4</sup> FM-29, minute 4, p. 14.



powers are qualified, in the interest of a peace that they have to guarantee, to demand of Roumania that she return the territories which she annexed by force in 1913, since she receives now at the hands of these powers much more extensive territories taken from Austria, thanks to the military efforts of the Allied and Associated Powers.

(3) The Committee, except for the American delegation, considers that the Conference could simply interrogate the Roumanian Government regarding its intentions as to the maintenance or eventual change of the boundary of 1914, without making a suggestion in the matter to that Government.

(4) Consequently, for the moment, the Committee, except for the American delegation proposes the maintenance of the 1914 boundary.

## II.—NORTHERN BOUNDARY (WITHOUT DOBRUDJA)

The Committee unanimously proposed the maintenance of the existing boundary.

## III.—WESTERN BOUNDARY

The Committee unanimously proposes the boundary described in the report of the Commission on Yugo-Slav Affairs dated April 6, subject to the following amendment regarding the region of Timok:

(Report No. 2 of April 6, 1919, regarding the boundary of Yugo-Slavia, page 16, line 9.)

following the old boundary to a point to the east of Vksvor where it meets the river Bezdanica;

from there toward the northeast and to a point on the course of the Timok River to be selected near hill 38 to the west of Bregowo;

a line to be determined on the ground, following in a general manner the line of the watershed between the valleys of the Timok to the northwest and of the Topolovitsa and of the Delejna to the southeast, passing through hills 367 and 374 and leaving to the Serb-Croat-Slovene state the localities of Halovo, Sipikovo (as well as the road connecting these two localities), and Kojilovo, and to Bulgaria the localities of Kosovo, Rakitnica, and Bregovo;

from there to the Danube, the former boundary between Bulgaria and Serbia.

This amendment is not motivated by military considerations, but with a view to rendering possible the policing of the railroad. It relates, at the maximum in round figures, to an area twenty kilometers long and three wide.

## IV.—SOUTHERN BOUNDARY

Unanimity could not be obtained. The British, French, and Japanese delegations propose the blue line on the map attached to the

report of the Commission on Greek Affairs dated March 30. The American and Italian delegations propose the frontier of 1913, amended to the profit of Bulgaria by the Turko-Bulgarian treaty of 1915.<sup>5</sup>

The British, French, and Japanese delegations recall that the American delegation on the Commission on Greek Affairs accepted, without making a reservation, the above-mentioned blue line, and that the Italian delegation, while formulating a reservation on the attribution of all of Eastern Thrace to Greece, declared itself in agreement, in principle, on the blue line.

The British, French, and Japanese delegations express, in this connection, their regret that, on practically the same question but in two different commissions, the American and Italian delegations in a period of four months have issued two different opinions.

The American delegation points out that in the report of the Commission on Greek Affairs, the American delegation explained its acceptance of the Greek demands, in the following terms:

"The United States delegation reserves the right to change the boundary, which it accepts, following the eventual assignment of the territory of Eastern Thrace."

The American delegation observes that this reservation was dictated by the belief that if Eastern Thrace was attached to the International State, there would be no serious reason for annexing to Greece the territory of Western Thrace which is not Greek; it points out, in addition, that, in the first report of the Central Territorial Committee to the Supreme Council, the American delegate refused his adhesion to the boundary proposed by the Commission on Greek Affairs, and, on the contrary abstained from formulating any proposals based on the report of the Commission on Greek Affairs on the subject of the region in question.

Basing its position on these expressed and implied reservations, and, in addition, on the fact that the Central Territorial Committee, to which is assigned the duty of drawing the boundaries of Bulgaria, has the duty of approaching the task with larger views than those of the special territorial committees and with the sole aim of arriving at a decision which will best contribute to the establishment of a just and durable peace, the American delegation cannot adopt the point of view of the British, French, and Japanese delegations.

The Italian delegation associates itself with this observation and refers to the formal reservations which it has already presented

---

<sup>5</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CIX, p. 879.

on this subject and which are mentioned in procès-verbal No. 16 page 3 of the Central Territorial Committee.

These observations having been made on the conditions of the disagreement, this disagreement, basically, is as follows:

*1. American and Italian Viewpoints*

The American delegation expresses the following opinion:

(a) Bulgaria did not acquire Western Thrace by right of conquest, but in consequence of a cession consented to voluntarily by Greece and her allies, enemies of Bulgaria, who, even though they were the victors, recognized the wisdom of according to vanquished Bulgaria this natural outlet to the sea. The country was occupied by Greek, and not Bulgarian troops; and Bulgaria entered into possession only after the voluntary withdrawal of the Greek forces. The right of Bulgaria to the possession of Western Thrace was not made the subject of any contest at the beginning of the present war. The only point still under discussion at Bucharest was to learn whether Bulgaria ought not to obtain rather more than less territory on the Aegean Sea. The American delegation thinks that one would be ill-advised to inflict on a nation, with the object of punishing it, the loss of territory to which it has just claims from the legal, ethnic, and economic points of view.

(b) The report of the Commission on Greek Affairs contains a fundamental error when it states, as the first argument in support of its conclusions, that:

"The non-Mohammedan population of Bulgarian Thrace is more Greek than Bulgarian", and that: "The ethnic rights of Greece are therefore superior to those of Bulgaria."

The statistics on which these assertions are based are anterior in date to the cession of Western Thrace to Bulgaria; consequently, only the past tense of the verb could be used. The non-Mohammedan population *was* Greek more than Bulgarian, to a very slight degree, before the territory had passed to Bulgaria. However, it is a well-known and uncontested fact that in proportion as the Greek troops withdrew from Western Thrace after its cession to Bulgaria, a part of the Greek population evacuated the region; and this exodus has continued since, while a flood of Bulgarians arrived to replace the Greeks. Testimony bearing on the alleged deportations of Greeks from this region is contradictory. In any case, the relatively light majority on the side of the Greeks should have been, inevitably, replaced by a relative Bulgarian majority thanks to natural causes following the cession of this territory to Bulgaria.

The evidence is contradictory on the question of whether the Mohammedan majority would prefer to be under Bulgarian or Greek author-



ity, in case it should be impossible to have a Turkish Government. The depositions of the eight Mohammedan deputies are not entirely convincing. One should note that the mother tongue of a large proportion of these Mohammedans is Bulgarian, while few among them speak Greek; it is, therefore, difficult to believe that these Bulgarian language populations would prefer to be under the authority of Greece rather than under that of Bulgaria. The two principal arguments that the Commission on Greek Affairs advanced in support of its conclusions thus lose their force.

(c) The lack of all direct access by land to the Mediterranean will seriously compromise the economic development of Bulgaria. The promise made by Greece not to interfere in any way with transit and to grant facilities in ports on Greek territory does not represent the equivalent of direct access to the sea, even in time of peace; in time of war it would have no value. This principle was fully recognized by the powers when they undertook to assure this access to the sea in the case of Poland. The route through the Black Sea and the Dardanelles does not take the place of direct access, since that is an indirect way which, consequently, will be longer and more expensive.

(d) Even if one could in fact overcome the economic inconveniences, it would be impossible to convince the Bulgarian people that its future development is not hindered by the loss of that which all nations value most highly. They would nurse a profound resentment for the injustice committed in imposing on them these boundaries; and this feeling would be an inevitable menace to the future peace of the world.

(e) The cession by Turkey to Bulgaria in 1915 of territory adjoining Adrianople rectified a grave injustice inflicted on Bulgaria in 1913, when Turkey closed the natural outlet of the valley of the Maritza, and cut the only railroad line leading to the Bulgarian port on the Aegean Sea. It is essential to maintain this rectification, since it would be useless to give Bulgaria a position on the sea, if the natural route giving access to this position must remain blocked.

Ethnographical, economic, and political arguments, as well as possession certainly supported by valid claims, all favor the maintenance of the Bulgarian boundaries as they are at the present time.

Consequently, the American delegation makes the following proposal:

"The southern boundary of Bulgaria will be that which existed after the cession by Turkey in 1913 [1915] of territory adjoining Adrianople, under the reservation of the right of the principal Allied and Associated Powers to attach to the International State such part of the said territory as seems desirable."

The Italian delegation associates itself with the observations and conclusions of the American delegation.

## 2. *English, French, and Japanese Viewpoints*

(a) From the historical or moral point of view, Bulgaria has no claim to Western Thrace. This territory was given to her after the Second Balkan War by Greece and Serbia as proof of their desire to live on friendly and unsuspecting terms with an ally who had just betrayed them. Bulgaria flagrantly abused this generosity; she entered into this war solely with a view to plunder; she conducted this war in a most barbarous manner, and for the second time was thoroughly beaten.

Under these conditions, the three delegations consider that Bulgaria has not justified the confidence which was originally placed in her, nor that it would be wise to reward her for her entrance into the European war by an increase in territory, as permitted by the American program.

(b) Bulgaria, from an ethnical point of view, is not justified in claiming Western Thrace, a territory in which the Bulgarian element ranks only third according to the latest Turkish statistics (1910). The three delegations consider that the value of these statistics has not been at all changed by the fact that deportations or mass emigrations of the Greek population have taken place since the occupation by Bulgaria. To admit such a criterion would be to put a premium on the persecution of foreigners and to establish a precedent which, in other cases, for example that of Armenia, would lead to very unjust results.

Concerning the aspirations of the Mohammedan population of Western Thrace, there is the testimony of eight of the twelve Mohammedan deputies in the Bulgarian Parliament who, in a recent communication addressed to General Franchet d'Esperey, expressed themselves as follows: "It would be unjust to leave us under the most cruel and pitiless of yokes, the yoke of Bulgarian domination."

For these reasons, the three delegations maintain that the conclusions of the Commission on Greek Affairs were completely justified.

(c) Regarding Bulgaria's access to the sea, the three delegations consider that the economic situation of Bulgaria will benefit from the treaty of peace such as in fact they propose to impose upon her.

On the one hand, her outlet on the Black Sea will be made better and more certain by the internationalization of the Straits and of the Danube.

On the other hand, the natural outlet of Bulgaria into the Mediterranean is not situated in Western Thrace, but in Greek territory, either at Cavalla or at Salonika. Moreover, the Greek Government has offered to grant Bulgaria special privileges and facilities in one of these two ports, and the Commission on Ports and Waterways has elaborated special provisions to make this offer effective.

The case of Poland is not comparable with that of Bulgaria since, whatever the solution may be, Bulgaria will always have free access to the sea by way of its northern and eastern boundaries.

(d) The three delegations admit without argument that, in case of war between Greece and Bulgaria, the rights obtained by the latter at Cavalla or at Salonika will be without effect. But they, nevertheless, do not consider that a purely military or strategic argument could outweigh other considerations.

They also admit that to take Western Thrace from Bulgaria would give rise in Bulgaria itself to bitter resentment. They maintain, however, that this solution is just in itself, and that the resentment caused in Greece and Serbia by the gift to Bulgaria of this territory to which she has no right would be at least equivalent to that which the loss of this territory would awaken in Bulgaria.

(e) The three delegations also admit that the boundary rectifications obtained by Bulgaria from Turkey in 1915 have great economic value for Bulgaria. They point out, however, that the territory in question is inhabited almost entirely by Greek and Turkish populations; but these delegations are reluctant to violate the ethnical principle with the object of giving to Bulgaria the economic advantages which constitute exactly the price paid to Bulgaria for her entrance into the war against the Allied Powers. They are convinced that the militaristic spirit in Bulgaria would only be encouraged by such action, and that Bulgarian opinion would be led to believe that a war, however unjustified, inhumane, and disastrous it might be, is, in the last analysis, an advantageous means of satisfying her appetites.

The three delegations, confining themselves to the precise question raised by the Supreme Council, and reserving the problem of the attribution of Eastern Thrace, conclude, therefore, in the most formal manner, that this province, with what was added to it in 1915, ought to be ceded by Bulgaria to the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The President of the Committee:  
ANDRÉ TARDIEU

---

#### Appendix B to HD-12

[Translation <sup>10</sup>]

*Radio from Budapest No. 237 to 55 July 21 at 1:30 to M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference*

In the face of the attitude of the Roumanians, who have become aggressive in defiance of the will of the Entente, we were forced to

---

<sup>10</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



cross the Tisza and to try to make the will of the Entente respected by the Roumanians.

BELA KUN  
*Commissar for Foreign Affairs*

---

Appendix C to HD-12

SWC-440 (77MR)

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL  
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

*Report on the Composition and Size of the Army of Occupation in  
the Plebiscite Area of Upper Silesia*

[The text is the same as appendix E to HD-7, page 145.]

---

Appendix D to HD-12

SWC-444 (79MR)

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL  
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

*Report on the Help To Be Given to Poland in the Event of Trouble  
in the Area Ceded by Germany*

[The text is the same as appendix F to HD-7, page 149.]

---

Appendix "D" [E] to HD-12

*[The Head of the Greek Delegation (Venizelos) to the President  
of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]*

[Translation <sup>11</sup>]

GREEK DELEGATION  
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, July 19, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: The Supreme Council of the Conference decided, in its session of yesterday, to send to Smyrna a Commission to inquire into the events which have occurred in Asia Minor during the past two months.

This Commission shall be composed of four representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

I beg that your excellency permit me to explain to him the reasons according to which in my opinion it would be neither just nor in

---

<sup>11</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

conformity with the usages hitherto followed in analogous cases, that the part of the inquiry treating of the conduct of the Greek Army of Occupation should be conducted without the participation of a representative of Greece.

No one more than the Greek Government desires only that an impartial inquiry throw a full light on the events which have unfolded during recent weeks in Anatolia, because it has the firm hope that, if certain regrettable excesses could be proven against several Greek military men, whose exemplary punishment will follow immediately, there will be established at the same time the provocative circumstances and general disorder in the midst of which these excesses were committed, and the extent of the cruelties on the part of the Turks of which the Christian populations have once again been the victims.

But an unmerited loss of morale would be inflicted on the Greek Army if, considering it in its totality as responsible for incriminating acts, one would not permit it to be represented in the investigation ordered.

This would be to disregard the right in virtue of which it finds itself in Asia Minor whither it has gone at the invitation of the Allied and Associated Powers, and with the mandate which they have done it the honor to confer upon it.

This would be to forget that, in contradistinction to the Turkish forces, it belongs to a friendly Allied state, that it is joined with the armies of the great powers by the bonds uniting brothers in arms and by the memories of engagements gloriously fought in common for a common cause, that wherever it has been called upon to fight at their sides, in Macedonia as in Russia, it has distinguished itself by a valor and discipline and by a steadiness which have won it the esteem and consideration of all.

The Greek Army proudly claims these titles in order to request the Allied and Associated Powers to spare it the wound which it would feel very keenly if the investigation ordered concerning isolated facts and involving only personal responsibilities should, as a result of the absence of a Greek representative, seem to have been instituted against it.

I have the honor, Mr. President, to submit this request to your kind examination, and, confident of your sentiments of justice, I flatter myself with the hope that you would formally recommend it for adoption by the Supreme Council of the Conference.

Kindly accept [etc.]

E. K. VENIZELOS

## Appendix F to HD-12

M-359

## FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE BALTIC STATES

*Report of Financial Commission*[Translation <sup>12</sup>]FINANCIAL COMMISSION OF THE PRINCIPAL  
ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS

JULY 11, 1919.

The President of the Financial Commission  
To the President of the Supreme Council.

The Supreme Council has referred to the Financial Commission for examination, a resolution by the Commission on Baltic Affairs relating to the financial assistance to be given to the three Baltic states.<sup>12a</sup>

According to this resolution there would be an urgent necessity, on military grounds, for placing immediately at the disposal of General Gough, chief of the Interallied Mission in Latvia, a credit of 500,000 £ for the payment of Russian and Latvian troops employed at Libau for the maintenance of order. This credit of 500,000 £ would, moreover, only suffice to meet immediate military needs, and the sums needed later could not now be determined.

It would be a question, therefore, of financial assistance regarding which it is at the moment impossible to foresee the importance.

If the members of the Supreme Council consider that there are important political and military advantages in immediately advancing funds to the Baltic states or in authorizing loans which these states could issue, they will doubtless think it opportune to pledge their governments to obtain from the respective Parliaments the necessary authorizations and the indispensable credits.

Regarding the financial side of the question, the Financial Commission believes it should point out that, in its opinion, it could only be considered by the finance ministers of the interested governments, and that it [the Commission] would be stepping out of its role in substituting itself for the different treasuries in judging either the possibility or the method of extending financial aid to the Baltic states.

---

<sup>12</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>12a</sup> HD-2, minute 5, p. 48.



## Appendix G to HD-12

[Translation <sup>23</sup>]

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
OFFICE OF POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS  
FRENCH REPUBLIC

PARIS, July 21, 1919.

*The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the President of the Council,  
Minister of War, General Staff*

## WAR MATERIAL SEIZED BY THE YUGO-SLAVS AT KLAGENFURT

It appears from the telegrams from General Hallier,<sup>14</sup> confirmed by information communicated to me by the British delegation, that the Yugo-Slavs are expressing the intention of evacuating the Klagenfurt sector only when a decision shall be reached on the subject of the disposition of the war materials taken by them from the Austrians. They claim this material for themselves, and intend not to leave Klagenfurt before the arrival of Interallied detachments assigned to guard it, and among which they request to be represented in the proportion of one-fifth.

It seems to be difficult to establish to whom, Austrians or Yugo-Slavs, belongs the responsibility for the hostilities which recently broke out in this region, and which called forth the intervention of the Conference. It is, therefore, equally difficult to base a decision on this responsibility in deciding the disposition of the war material in question.

According to information which will come to you, moreover, the material involved is not important. On the other hand, the Yugo-Slavs are precisely in need of war material; they are experiencing the greatest difficulty in having delivered to themselves any material of the former Austro-Hungarian Army, the greatest part of which has been preempted by the Italian Government.

Finally, it seems that we have an interest in increasing their resources in this respect to meet the case in which their intervention in Hungary would be considered.

For all these reasons, it seems to me that there would be occasion to accede to the request of the Yugo-Slavs, and to assign to them the material which they claim. By way of compensation they should withdraw immediately from the Klagenfurt sector, behind the line of demarcation traced by the Conference. If the material could not be carried away, the Interallied Mission could indeed consider meas-

---

<sup>23</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>14</sup> French representative, Inter-Allied Military Commission at Klagenfurt.

ures of conservation, not being in any way obliged to take the character of an Interallied occupation, since the territory north of the line of demarcation would be occupied by the Austrians. Nevertheless, a decision of the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers is necessary.

Referring to your letter of July 16, No. 6851, BS/J, I have, therefore, the honor to state that, in my opinion, it is fitting for you urgently to promote this decision by presenting the Council with a proposal in this regard, and by having it put on the agenda of one of the earliest sessions. There is, indeed, every interest in settling this question with the least delay possible.

I should be happy to be advised of the effect which you may think proper to give to the present dispatch.

---

Appendix H to HD-12

DANTZIG, 7. 7. 19.

To the Council of Four

The Dantzig working classes are faced with a problem threatening their very existence (as?) the local Authorities can arrange no prospects of work for the future. Part of the factories, etc., are being, and will be, closed, owing to lack of materials and power. The working classes will very shortly be starving, and riots among the workers are to be feared, which will not be in the interests of the new Free Town.

Time presses, and the working classes therefore appeal to the Council of Four to safeguard their working interests.

THE COMMITTEE OF THE WORKING POPULATION OF DANTZIG

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, July 25, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. H. White.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour,  
O. M., M. P.

*Secretary*

Mr. H. Norman.  
Sir Ian Malcolm, K. C. M. G.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.  
M. Pichon.

*Secretaries*

M. Dutasta.  
M. Berthelot.  
M. de St. Quentin.

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

**JAPAN**

Baron Makino.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . . Capt. Chapin.  
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . Lieut.-Commander Bell.  
FRANCE . . . . . Capt. A. Portier.  
ITALY . . . . . Colonel Jones.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. MR. WHITE stated that before dealing with the questions on the Agenda he would like to communicate to the Council some information that had been received with regard to General Boehm's visit to Vienna. The information in question had been transmitted through Mr. Hoover whom he requested the Council to ask for information.

Allied Action  
in Hungary

(At this moment Mr. Hoover entered the room.)

MR. HOOVER stated that the proposal in question had been submitted to the Allied representatives at Vienna by General Boehm, who had been the Commander-in-Chief of the Bolshevik Hungarian armies. General Boehm had stated that if he could be suitably supported by the Allies and given certain assurances, more particularly on the subject of raising the blockade, and the importation of foodstuffs, together with the re-opening of traffic on the Danube, he on his part, would be ready to set up a social democratic government with himself as temporary dictator. Bela Kun would be deposed from



power; all terrorist actions would cease, and order would be restored.

MR. BALFOUR stated that he had seen Mr. Hoover on the previous evening who had communicated the contents of the telegram to him, and that, moreover, he had had the advantage of discussing the matter with his Military Experts. He now wondered whether the best way of getting rid of Bela Kun was by means of military intervention. It was now possible that the best solution lay in adopting the suggestions contained in Mr. Hoover's telegram. As the Hungarians had now assumed the offensive and had crossed the Theiss they opened their flank to an attack from the south by the Serbian and French armies. It was evident that it would be preferable to conduct military operations with Hungarian assistance, but the following question presented itself. Was it possible to place full confidence in General Boehm? Even though it were possible to place full confidence in him, he would not be disposed to enter into an elaborate political arrangement with him. He thought that it would be best to direct General Boehm to carry out his promises by means of the army which he stated was under his control, and to tell him to confine his action to establishing some kind of military dictatorship with a view to calling a Constituent Assembly which should be in a position to express its will freely. Such a solution had a great advantage. In each of our countries there are sections of opinion which, without being actually Bolshevik, have none the less a certain sympathy for Bolshevik programmes. Those portions of the public were most strongly opposed to military action against the Bolsheviks. All these disadvantages would be avoided by proceeding through General Boehm. He would be given the moral support of the Allies, who would promise him the guarantees demanded, if he was actually in a position to set up his dictatorship and to convene the Assembly which would determine the future of Hungary. The one question which had to be determined was whether confidence could be placed in General Boehm's promises. Before deciding, it was necessary to have a formal assurance to the effect that he was able to carry out his promises, because, if he were not, fresh delay would be caused by entering into further discussions, which would prejudice the opportunity of successful military action which now presented itself.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he believed it would be well to take this question up again on the following day, in order that the Council might have time to reflect upon it. He considered it would be well to have Marshal Foch at the meeting in order that he might give his advice on the military situation.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the important question was to know whether the Allies could have complete confidence in General Boehm.

MR. COOLIDGE<sup>1</sup> stated that he had with him a copy of a telegram which he had personally sent three months ago. In this he had stated that General Boehm was very popular in Hungary, that he had a strong political party supporting him, that his political views did not tend to the extremists and other parties of the Left, but rather inclined to those of the Right. He further observed that General Boehm was not a military man, but was none the less popular in army circles and with the working classes and that, if the situation had not changed since the time in question, he still had a powerful political faction behind him.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Council had any reason to believe that General Boehm was solely actuated by personal ambitions, and was working for his own selfish interests.

MR. COOLIDGE stated that he did not believe this to be the case, for the reason that General Boehm had mentioned in the course of his conversations, three men whom he, Mr. Coolidge, knew personally, and whose names he had mentioned in his telegram and in whom he had the greatest confidence.

MR. HOOVER asked whether the Supreme Council could not at once establish a general principle, and declare that it was ready to sustain any non-terrorist Government and furnish supplies of food to it. By doing this the Council would in no way bind itself adversely, even though the movement instituted by General Boehm should fail. Military operations should always be preceded by a political declaration. The important thing he believed was to make such a declaration at once.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the proposition tended [*extended?*] to raising the blockade and furnishing food supplies to the country without undertaking military operations.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the difficulty was not in going to Budapest, but as to what steps should be taken thereafter.

MR. WHITE stated that he would prefer to have the military operations carried out by the Hungarians themselves.

MR. BALFOUR observed that he would prefer to see a written proposition before taking a definite decision on the matter, and asked whether Mr. Hoover could not submit a report to the Council on the following morning.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he would request Marshal Foch to be present at the meeting which could be fixed for 10.30 the following morning, and that the proposals of Mr. Hoover could then be examined.

MR. BALFOUR observed that he would like to know what was the decision from the point of view of international law in which Hungary

---

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Archibald Cary Coolidge, chief of the Coolidge Mission to Austria.

now stood in regard to the armistice. She had accepted the Allies conditions, and yet at the present moment was attacking one of the Allied Powers, and he felt that in acting thus she had re-opened hostilities against all the Allies.

(It was decided that the question of further action on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments in Hungarian affairs, in view of the latest information received with regard to General Boehm's proposals, should be discussed by the Council on the following day, and that Marshal Foch and Mr. Hoover should attend.)

2. (M. Cambon<sup>2</sup> entered the room.)

M. CAMBON said that the Supreme Council had granted the governments of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia a period of ten days in which to attempt to settle between themselves the question of Teschen, and that this period expired to-day. The representatives of these governments had not yet reached a satisfactory solution. A dispatch received from Warsaw indicated that the Polish Government wished to obtain an extension of time. He had brought this matter to the attention of the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Sub-Committees, and these bodies were disposed to grant the extension. He had also taken the matter up with M. Benes and M. Moski [*Dmowski?*], and these latter were also disposed to grant the extension but believed that the same should be short. He stated that it was therefore proposed to grant an extension of ten days. If, on the expiration of this, no agreement had been reached the matter should be decided by the Supreme Council. He believed that the Governments at Prague and Warsaw were doing everything in their power to reach an agreement, as they had already constituted two small committees for the matter, and these were at present studying the question.

MR. WHITE stated that he thought that the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Committees ought to take advantage of the extension of time by themselves examining the question and preparing a solution for the Supreme Council, in the event of the two governments concerned not being able to come to an agreement.

(It was decided that a further period of ten days should be granted to the Governments of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, to arrive at an agreement between themselves on the Teschen question.)

It was further agreed that the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Committees should in the meantime examine the question in order that the Council should be in a position to decide, if no agreement should be reached by the aforesaid Governments.)

<sup>2</sup> Jules Cambon, French representative and president, Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs and Commission on Polish Affairs.

Extension to the  
Poles and Czecho-  
Slovaks Regarding  
Question of  
Teschen



3. (At this point the military representatives of the Supreme War Council and General Thwaites entered the room.)

Military, Naval &  
Aerial Clauses of  
the Bulgarian  
Treaty

(Mr. Hoover and Mr. Coolidge left the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the Council had received the proposed Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty, which had been prepared by the Supreme War Council at Versailles. (Appendix A.) He requested General Belin to inform the Council regarding the matters upon which the experts had differed.

GENERAL BELIN stated that no differences of opinion between the military experts existed with one exception, that the Italian military representative had made one reservation, which was indicated on the draft, regarding the method of recruiting. Briefly the Italian military representative insisted upon the reservation which he had already made for the Austrian and Hungarian States, namely:—that the Bulgarian army should be organised on a basis of one year compulsory service.

M. TITTONI said that this was a question of detail which he did not wish to press.

(It was decided that the report of the Military Representatives with regard to the Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria should be accepted.)

4. (At this point the Military Representatives left the room, and M. Larnaude<sup>3</sup> entered.)

Clauses of the Bul-  
garian Peace  
Treaty Relating to  
Responsibilities

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Larnaude to explain the question.

M. LARNAUDE stated that he merely wished to outline the manner in which the Committee had discussed the question. They had found themselves faced by Articles 227, 228 and 229 of the German Peace Treaty, and the question had come up whether these Articles should be adopted as they stood in the Bulgarian Treaty. The Greek, Serbian and Roumanian Governments had opposed this, as indicated in the Report presented by the Committee. (Appendix "B".) They feared that their good faith would be questioned adversely and therefore preferred that persons guilty of crimes against their citizens should be brought to judgment before international tribunals and not before national military tribunals of each of the Powers whose citizens had been injured, as was the case in the German Treaty. The American Delegates had made certain reservations and the French Delegates, whom he represented, had merely requested that note be taken of the position which they held with regard to this proposal. The French Delegates believed that it

<sup>3</sup> Fernand Larnaude, French representative, Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties.

would be difficult and dangerous to adopt a different method of punishing the same criminal acts, should they agree to the proposal to grant to Bulgaria international guarantees of impartiality, which they had refused to grant to Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that it would be well to know whether the same differences of opinion existed in the Council.

M. LARNAUDE stated that the United States and France had made certain reservations, but that the British Government supported the Greek, Serbian and Roumanian proposals.

BARON MAKINO observed that the Japanese Delegates had also made reservations, having reiterated those which they had already made regarding the Treaty with Germany, and that he wished to take the same position as his experts on the Committee.

M. LARNAUDE stated that the Japanese Delegates had merely renewed the reservations which they had previously made, in regard to the prosecution for breaches of the laws and customs of war of enemy Heads of States, before a tribunal constituted by the opposite party.

M. TITTONI said that, if the question arose theoretically as to a choice between two tribunals, the Council might hesitate, but, as the Greek, Serbian and Roumanian Governments themselves believed that they might be suspected of bad faith, and therefore requested the support from an international government, it seemed to him difficult for the Council to refuse them its support.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that another question was involved, namely, that of the precedent established in the German Treaty.

M. TITTONI answered that, in the case of Germany, the good faith of the Allies' judgment was not questioned and no one of the Allies thought of it. In the case of Bulgaria, the very Powers themselves who were interested in the matter had brought the question up.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had had the courage to undertake their responsibilities, and that the Council should reply that the Governments now in question should take theirs.

M. TITTONI stated that he did not wish to carry his point of view as the solution of the matter. It did not vitally concern him.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Council must not lose sight of the fact that the Greek, Serbian and Roumanian Governments considered themselves competent to try the Bulgarian prisoners actually in their hands before military courts, but that they did not believe themselves competent to try persons who might be turned over to them under the terms of the Treaty.

M. LARNAUDE said that the point in question had not been missed and that he had drawn the attention of the representatives of these

various Governments to the fact that they were open to the charge of inconsistency. One of these latter, however, M. Politis,<sup>4</sup> had stated that the number of persons to be brought before military courts was not great.

MR. WHITE stated that it was for this reason that they wished to place the responsibility of trying the numerous persons who were to be handed over to them by the Treaty upon the Great Powers. It had been stated that the Serbians had a list comprising from 15,000 to 20,000 persons.

M. LARNAUDE stated that he did not wish to enter into a discussion, but only to explain the point of issue. He did not see why there should be any difference between the two countries, and that justice should be applied everywhere in the same manner.

MR. BALFOUR stated that the proposal originally submitted to the Council of Four with regard to Germany was that an international tribunal, such as was now demanded by the Greek, Serbian and Roumanian Governments, should be set up. In spite of the favourable view taken by the Committee, the Council had actually decided otherwise. He did not know why the modification had been adopted, but it must certainly have been based upon strong arguments. For this reason, he was not inclined to adopt a contrary principle.

M. TITTONI said that the decision would be a matter of indifference to him.

M. CLEMENCEAU then stated that he proposed to adopt the same formula as had governed the German Treaty.

(It was decided that the Clauses relative to Responsibilities in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria should be drafted on the same principle as that governing the corresponding clauses in the Peace Treaty with Germany (National Military Tribunals competent to judge the crimes committed by the Bulgarians.) See Articles 228-230 of the German Peace Treaty.)

5. (At this point M. Larnaude left the room and M. Tardieu entered.)

M. TARDIEU stated that the Committee supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany did not foresee any difficulty in the nomination of five members by the Allied and Associated Powers to the Committee of Seven Members, who, by virtue of Article 35 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, should lay down locally the new frontier between Belgium and Germany. There was, therefore, no special recommendation to be made. It would be sufficient if the Allied and Associated Powers would nominate their

The Report of the Committee Supervising the Execution of the Peace Treaty With Germany on the Subject of Belgium

<sup>4</sup>Nicolas Politis, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs and plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.



representatives, in order that the Committee might start work as soon as possible.

(It was decided that, at the next meeting of the Supreme Council, each Delegation should nominate its representative on the Committee provided for under Article 36 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, for the purpose of determining, locally, the new boundary line between Germany and Belgium.)

6. M. TARDIEU stated that Article 48 of the Peace Treaty provided for the nomination of three members by the League of Nations, who could act in a Commission of five members, which should be charged with the duty of delimiting locally the boundary line of the Saar Territory as laid down in the Treaty. He admitted that it was not impossible, theoretically, for the League of

Report of the  
Committee Super-  
vising the Execu-  
tion of the Peace  
Treaty With Ger-  
many on the De-  
limitation of the  
Saar Basin

Nations to make the necessary nominations within the fifteen days following the signature of the Treaty. The Convention in question was part of the Treaty, and the Powers represented on the Council of the League of Nations were named; the Committee supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty thought, however, that it would be difficult in practice for nations whose members were on the Council of the League of Nations, and who should not have ratified the Treaty, to be able to nominate representatives to the Committee. If such a participation were impossible, the Delimitation Committee might be nominated in the manner foreseen in the Peace Treaty, but the Supervising Committee thought that the necessary nominations might be made temporarily by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Such a procedure would make an agreement with Germany necessary, since nominations made in this manner were not foreseen in the text in the Treaty. The ratification of the Pact of the League of Nations would take place as soon as possible. The Committee therefore recommended that the Supreme Council should come to a decision on the subject.

MR. BALFOUR stated that the League of Nations had certain defined duties with regard to the Basin of the Saar, but the League could only act after ratification. It followed that the American Government, which did not appear to be able to give the necessary ratification in a short time, would be prevented from taking its place on the Commission for some while. It was therefore proposed that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should make a temporary nomination; it was open to question, however, if they had the right to do so.

M. TARDIEU stated that they had not such a right without arriving at an agreement with Germany.

MR. BALFOUR stated that he did not favour any request being made of Germany, but, that in the case in question, he thought no difficulty would arise.

M. TARDIEU stated that at the present moment there was no use in

approaching the German Government, but that the Council could agree to the principle which should be applied when the time came.

MR. WHITE stated that he could not take any decision with regard to the ratification without referring to President Wilson.

M. PICHON stated that the point was important, since the American Government had the duty of convening the Council of the League of Nations.

M. TARDIEU stated that the text of the telegram to be sent to President Wilson could be made out.

(It was decided:—

That M. Tardieu, at the next meeting of the Supreme Council, should present a draft telegram for transmission to President Wilson, on the subject of the Commission for the delimitation of the Saar Basin.)

7. M. TARDIEU stated that the Committee had submitted a Note (see Appendix "C"), which had been sent to the various Delegations.

Note From the  
Drafting Committee  
on the Subject  
of the Sale of  
State Property in  
Slesvig

The Committee proposed a slight modification to the text submitted to the Supreme Council. A formal assent was all that was necessary. (It was decided:—

That the Drafting Committee's proposed modification in the text of the notification to be sent to the German and Danish Governments on the subject of the sale of State property in Slesvig should be adopted.)

6. M. TARDIEU suggested that a Note dated 8th July had been received from the German Delegation on the subject of the preparatory measures which should immediately follow the

Evacuation of Ter-  
ritories Ceded by  
Germany to  
Poland

ratification of the Peace Treaty, in order that the clauses of the Treaty with regard to the Eastern Provinces of Germany, should be carried out. (See

Annex "D".)

The Committee supervising the execution of the Treaty submitted a draft reply (see Annex "E").

(It was decided that the draft reply to the German Delegation, submitted by the Committee to supervise the execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany, with regard to the opening of negotiations between the Allied and German Governments, on the subject of the preparatory measures to be taken for enforcing the provisions of the Treaty dealing with the cession of the Eastern Provinces of the German Empire, should be accepted.)

9. M. TARDIEU stated that the German Delegation had sent a Note dated 16th July 1919 (see Annex "F") asking that the names and powers of the Allied Commissioners for Eastern Prussia, should be communicated to the German Government. The Committee had drafted a reply (Annex "G").

Allied Commis-  
sioners for East  
Prussia

(It was decided that the draft reply to the German Delegation, submitted by the Committee, to supervise the execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany, with regard to furnishing the German Government with the names and powers of the Allied and Associated Commissioners in East Prussia, be accepted.)

10. (At this point M. Tardieu left the room and Mr. Ignace<sup>6</sup> entered.)

Clauses in the  
Peace Treaty With  
Bulgaria With Re-  
gard to Prisoners  
of War

MR. IGNACE stated that the clauses inserted into the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria and submitted by the Committee (see Annex "H") were only a repetition of similar clauses in the Austrian Treaty with the exception of Article 9, which provided for an Inter-Allied Committee of Enquiry to examine the question of subjects of the Allied and Associated Powers not yet repatriated. The Inter-Allied Committee would further examine the cases of those persons who desired to remain in Bulgaria, and would investigate criminal actions which might be punished. The Article provided for the manner in which the Committee should be constituted. It lays down also that its enquiries shall be communicated to each Government concerned, and after that, to the Tribunal provided for in Article 3 of the Treaty. He had just learned that the Supreme Council had decided that there should be no Inter-Allied Tribunal, but that each Government should judge actions coming under the above head, by means of a Military Court.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that it had been decided to act in the same way as had been done in the case of Germany.

MR. IGNACE stated that it would be sufficient to make a slight modification in the text of Article 9, and to suppress the second paragraph, numbered 2.

(It was therefore decided

That the proposed Articles for the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, presented by the Prisoners of War Committee should be accepted with the exception of the second paragraph numbered 2 in Article 9, which should be deleted.)

(At this point Mr. Ignace left the room.)

11. M. CLEMENCEAU read the Austrian Note dated 21st July, (see Annex "I"). He drew attention to the statement in the Note:—

Austrian Reply on  
the Subject of the  
Delivery of Arms  
and Munitions to  
the Czecho-  
Slovaks

"That all arms and munitions demanded hitherto are being handed over to the Royal Italian Armistice Mission at Vienna. The Mission in question has undertaken to transmit the materials to the Czecho-Slovakia Government, which procedure has been decided upon with the full consent of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Vienna".

<sup>6</sup> Edouard Ignace, French representative and president, Commission on Prisoners of War.



He drew attention to the fact that he had no knowledge of this.

MR. BALFOUR stated that he also had no information and would like to have certain points cleared up. He asked whether the arms and munitions had been handed over to the Head of the Italian Mission only, or to the French and Italian representatives conjointly?

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the arms and munitions belonged to all the Allies.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would like to know how long it was since the delivery of arms and munitions had been taking place, what quantity had been handed over, and how much was still to be delivered.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that it was also necessary to know who had consented to the procedure.

(It was decided:—

To send the following telegram to the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Vienna with regard to the delivery of arms and munitions to the Czecho-Slovaks:—

“The Austrian Delegation has replied to a communication from the Peace Conference, wherein the aforesaid Government was directed to deliver up its war material in the following terms:—

All the arms and munitions demanded up to date are at present being handed over to the Royal Italian Armistice Mission at Vienna. This Mission has undertaken to transmit the materials in question to the Czecho-Slovak Government with the knowledge and consent of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Vienna. The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers therefore request that it may be informed:—

1. Who gave the consent referred to in the Austrian reply and in what form?

2. Whether the arms and munitions delivered by the Austrian Government have been handed over to the Royal Italian Mission only, or to the French and Italian representatives conjointly.

3. Since what date has this delivery taken place.

4. What are the total amounts of the different classes of war material, and what proportion of them have been delivered.”)

12. After a short discussion it was decided that the texts of the following draft instructions for the Interallied Commission of Enquiry into the events in Asia Minor should be accepted. The enquiry of the Committee should take as its subject matter the acts which had taken place during and after the occupation of Smyrna, Aidin, Aivali and the adjacent regions by the Greek troops. These acts had been reported in the form of a complaint by the Sheikh-ul-Islam.<sup>7</sup> The enquiry was to be extended to all events relative to the above from the date of occupation to the present moment. The Committee was to determine the responsibilities and to submit its report to the

Instructions To Be  
Given to Committee  
on Enquiry  
Into the Events in  
Asia Minor

<sup>7</sup> Appendix A to HD-10, p. 200.

Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, together with such conclusions as it might consider relevant as soon as possible.

13. (At this moment M. Seydoux entered the room.)

M. SEYDOUX stated that the question had to be resumed from where it had been left off at the last discussion.<sup>7a</sup> The American reply had not been received.

Blockade of  
Russia

MR. WHITE stated that the American Government thought that it could not collaborate with the Allies in the Blockade of Russia since it was not in a state of war with Bolshevik Russia. The President had sent him a reply (see Annex J) in the above sense. The President thought that the practical difficulties of commerce would prevent any suitable assistance being given to Soviet Russia.

M. SEYDOUX said that the President's reply put the Supreme Council into a difficult position for it had been desired to block the Gulf of Finland. The Scandinavian Governments had made requests to be authorised to renew commercial relations with Petrograd. No reply had been given, since it was thought that Petrograd would soon fall. This, however, had not taken place. Since that date Koltchak had been informed that the Allied and Associated Powers were ready to support him;<sup>8</sup> this had, in fact, been done. He asked whether it was now possible to authorise certain nations to assist Koltchak's enemy by their commerce. The Swedish Government had demanded quite openly that it might be allowed to re-open commercial relations with the Government of Lenin. By acceding to this, Lenin would be assisted, and by taking the measures necessary, might distribute what he received in whatever manner he chose. The excuse of assisting unfortunate peasant populations could not be brought forward. A new note had been received moreover to the following effect: The French Minister at Copenhagen who has been informed of the questions laid before the Supreme Council by the Blockade Committees in Paris and in London, on the subject of commercial relations with Bolshevik Russia, reports that the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs stated, in an official letter addressed to the English Minister, that the Danish Government would not assist the exportation of any merchandise from Denmark to Soviet Russia, before the deliberations on the subject, now going forward in Paris, had been concluded.

MR. BALFOUR stated that he knew nothing of this communication.

M. SEYDOUX said that information had been received from Stockholm to the effect that the Swedes had not renewed their request and had not despatched vessels since they knew that they would be stopped. They had not been undeceived. The questions might be

<sup>7a</sup> HD-7, minute 3, p. 131.

<sup>8</sup> Appendix I to CF-37, vol. VI, p. 73.

raised again at any time however, and it would be difficult to know how to deal with them.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the discussion with President Wilson should be taken up again since new arguments could now be brought forward. Everyone had to undertake a certain amount of responsibility. Should they not, therefore, submit the questions afresh and wait for his reply.

M. TITTONI stated that it was known from an authoritative source that the Soviet Government was making a large number of Allied bank notes. If commercial relations were renewed it would facilitate the circulation of these false notes.

MR. BALFOUR stated that Mr. White's remarks submitted to President Wilson were very complete. On the other hand one or two important points had been omitted.

Mr. White had spoken of Koltchak and of the assistance that should be given to him. In his opinion the question was much more serious for at that moment British forces were fighting at Archangel. In addition to this the populations of the Baltic States were being organised and armed in order that they might fight against Bolshevism. So at the moment we were asked to assist our enemies by allowing them to receive arms, munitions and material of every kind, which although they were not sent to men with whom we were legally at war, were none the less being despatched to persons who were fighting against us. What would be the position of the League of Nations if it were in existence? Supposing that it had existed and decided, as the Supreme Council had decided, to assist Koltchak, Denikin and the Baltic States to fight against the disorder of Soviet Russia. How would it operate? Undoubtedly it would declare a blockade for no other means would be at its disposal. Englishmen, and soldiers in Koltchak's and Denikin's armies were being killed daily in the fighting against the Bolsheviks. If a state of war did not exist legally, it existed none the less in point of fact. The position of the Allied and Associated Powers was, however, difficult. If the question were examined from the political point of view, was it possible to ask peoples already pressed by heavy taxes to make new sacrifices in order that arms should be sent to our friends; whilst at the same time, arms were being allowed to pass into the hands of those against whom we were fighting.

MR. WHITE stated that he would have to consult an expert in international law. He desired, however, to draw attention to President Wilson's reply. What the President had said was not an article of a Treaty binding upon all, and the other Powers were free to set up a blockade without American help.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that before arriving at any solution, he thought President Wilson should again be approached and he pro-



posed that Mr. Balfour should draw up a telegram in the sense of his remarks.

MR. BALFOUR stated that in reply to Mr. White, he recognised that President Wilson in his reply did not bind us, but he asked what position should we be in if an American vessel were to carry munitions.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that, if it became necessary to act without American assistance, President Wilson would have to be asked to give an undertaking to send no ships.

M. SEYDOUX stated that, in his opinion, this was a point which should be insisted upon. Assistance to the Bolshevik Government could not be justified by the argument that relief was being given to an unfortunate populace. The Government of Lenin was such that his agents centralised all foodstuffs and distributed them as they wished. Little or no food would be sent to the populace. The only result would be that Lenin's Government would be strengthened.

(It was decided that Mr. Balfour should prepare, for the next meeting of the Supreme Council, a new dispatch to be sent to President Wilson on the subject of the Blockade of Russia.)

(At this point M. Seydoux left the room.)

14. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that a declaration which was to be signed by the Austrian Plenipotentiaries had been submitted to the Conference. (Appendix "K".)

(After a short discussion, the draft declaration was accepted.)

15. M. TITTONI stated that, as the Agenda had been worked off, he wished to draw attention to the grave situation in Italy with regard to coal. The stocks of that material would be practically exhausted in a fortnight. During the war an Inter-Allied body had

decided on the manner in which coal should be distributed amongst the Allies. This body no longer existed. He asked whether it would be possible to re-constitute it and asked, further, that this should be done, because the situation in Italy was of the utmost gravity.

MR. BALFOUR stated that it was one of the most urgent questions of the immediate future.

MR. WHITE said that Mr. Hoover was in agreement with Mr. Balfour.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he proposed that M. Tittoni in collaboration with Mr. Hoover should make a proposal in writing.

MR. BALFOUR stated that Mr. Hoover had reported on the coal situation in Europe in an extremely pessimistic sense. He thought that the cause of the evil was that workmen were no longer working. This was more particularly the case in Central Europe and Upper Silesia. The reduction of the number of hours had made the situation even worse. It had been improved by the fact that the German authorities

Agreement by the  
Austrian Govern-  
ment With Re-  
gard to Vessels  
Sunk by Their  
Naval Forces

Coal Question  
in Italy

had threatened to cut off the provisions from mining districts where production diminished. This measure had increased the quantity of mineral taken from the mines, but the progress had been short. It was, therefore, not a question of war but a social crisis.

(It was decided that M. Tittoni should submit to the next meeting of the Supreme Council his proposals with regard to the re-constitution of the Inter-Allied Committee for the distribution of coal.)

16. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the Drafting Committee had brought the following note before them:—

Languages of the  
Treaties

The Drafting Committee would be obliged if the Supreme Council would give information as to whether Treaties with the Serbian, (Croat-Slovene) State, and with Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania, all of which are to be signed at the same time as the Treaty with Austria should, like this latter, be drawn up in English, French, and Italian. The French text being authoritative in case of divergence.

(After a short discussion, it was decided that the proposal of the Drafting Committee to the effect that the Peace Treaties with the Serbian (Croat-Slovene) State, with Czecho-Slovakia, with Roumania and with Bulgaria, should be drawn up in three languages, the French text being authoritative in cases of divergence.)

17. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French Delegation had submitted a note with regard to the credentials of the German Diplomatic Agents. (Appendix "L".) It had drafted a letter to the President of the German Delegation. (Appendix "M"). (This draft was accepted.)

Credentials of the  
German Diplo-  
matic Agents

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 26 July, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-13

#### CONDITIONS OF PEACE (BULGARIA)

#### *Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses*

#### MILITARY CLAUSES

#### CHAPTER I.—*General*

#### *Article 1*

Within three months of the coming into force of the present Peace Treaty, the military forces of Bulgaria shall be demobilized to the extent prescribed hereinafter.

*Article 2*

Universal compulsory service shall be abolished in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Army shall in future only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistments.\*

*CHAPTER II.—Effectives and Cadres of the Bulgarian Army**Article 3*

The total number of military forces in the Bulgarian Army shall never exceed 20,000 men, including Officers and depot troops.

The formations composing the Bulgarian Army shall be fixed in accordance with the wishes of Bulgaria, subject to the following reservations:—

(1) The effectives of units shall be compulsorily fixed between the maximum and minimum figures shown in Table 4 attached.

(2) The proportion of officers, including personnel, staffs, and special services, shall not exceed one-twentieth of the total effectives with the colours, and that of N. C. O.'s shall not exceed one-fifteenth of the total effectives with the colours.

(3) The number of machine guns, guns, and howitzers shall not exceed those fixed in Table 5 attached per thousand men of the total effectives with the colours.

The Bulgarian Army shall be exclusively employed for the maintenance of order within Bulgarian territories and for the control of the frontiers.

*Article 4*

In no case shall units be formed of greater than a division, the latter being in accordance with Tables 1, 2 and 4 attached.

The maximum size of the staffs and of all formations are given in the attached Table; these figures need not be exactly followed, but they must not in any case be exceeded.

The maintenance or formation of any other group of forces, as well as any other organization concerned with military command or war preparation, is forbidden.

Each of the following units may have a depot:—

- A regiment of Infantry.
- A regiment of Cavalry.
- A regiment of Field Artillery.
- A battalion of Pioneers.

*Article 5*

All measures of mobilization or appertaining to mobilization are forbidden.

---

\*The Italian Military Representative nevertheless maintains his reservation already expressed in the case of the state of Austria and of Hungary that the Bulgarian Army should be organised on a basis of 1-year compulsory service. [Footnote in the original.]



Formations, administrative services and staffs must not in any case include supplementary cadres.

It is forbidden to carry out any preparatory measures for the requisition of animals or any other means of military transport.

#### *Article 6*

The number of gendarmes, customs officials, forest guards, local or municipal police, etc., shall be fixed by a Commission of Inter-Allied Officers and shall not as a rule exceed the number of men employed in a similar capacity in 1911 within the territorial limits fixed for Bulgaria by the present Treaty.

In no case shall the number of these officials who are armed with rifles exceed 10,000, so that the total number of rifles in use in Bulgaria shall not exceed 30,000.

The number of these officials may only be increased in proportion to the increase of population in the localities or municipalities which employ them.

These officials, as well as those employed in the railway service, must never be assembled for the purpose of taking part in any military exercises.

#### *Article 7*

Any other military formation not dealt with in the above Articles is forbidden, and those which exist shall be abolished within the period laid down in Article I of the present Clauses.

### CHAPTER III.—*Military Recruiting and Training*

#### *Article 8*

All Officers including the *gendarmerie*, customs and forest services, etc., must be regulars (*officiers de carrière*). Officers at present serving who are retained in the army, *gendarmerie*, or the above-mentioned services, must undertake to serve at least up to the age of 40. Officers at present serving who do not join the new army, *gendarmerie*, or the above-mentioned services, shall be free from any military obligations. They must never take part in any military exercises, theoretical or practical.

Officers newly appointed must undertake to serve on the active list of the army, *gendarmerie*, or the above-mentioned services, for at least 20 consecutive years.

The proportion of officers leaving the service for any cause before the expiration of their term of engagement must not exceed in any year 1/20th of the total effectives of Officers provided by Article 3 of the present Clauses.

If this percentage is unavoidably exceeded, the resulting deficit in the cadres shall not be filled up by new appointments.

*Article 9*

The total length of engagement of N. C. O.'s and men shall never be less than 12 years' consecutive service with the colours.†

The proportion of men dismissed before the expiration of their term of service for reasons of health, disciplinary or any other reasons, must not exceed in any year 1/20th of the total effectives fixed by Article 3 of the present Clauses. If this number is unavoidably exceeded, the resulting deficit shall not be filled by fresh enlistments.

CHAPTER IV.—*Schools, Educational Establishments, Military Clubs, etc.*

*Article 10*

On the expiration of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, there must only exist in Bulgaria one Military school, strictly set apart for the recruitment of officers for the authorised units.

The number of students admitted to instruction in the said school shall be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled in the officer cadres.

The students and the cadres shall be reckoned as part of the effectives fixed by Article 3 of the present Treaty.

Consequently, within the time fixed above, all military colleges or similar institutions in Bulgaria, as well as the various schools for officers, student officers, cadets, N. C. O.'s or student N. C. O.'s other than the school above provided for, shall be abolished.

*Article 11*

Educational establishments, other than those referred to in Article 10 above, the universities, societies of discharged soldiers, touring clubs, boy scouts' societies, and associations or clubs of every description must not occupy themselves with any military matters. They will on no account be allowed to instruct or exercise their pupils or members in the use of arms.

These educational establishments, societies, clubs, etc., must have no connection with the Ministry of War or any other military authority.

*Article 12*

In all schools and educational establishments of every description, whether under State control or private management, the teaching of

---

†The Italian Military Representative maintains his reservation on the subject of recruitment, (See page 1). [Footnote in the original. The reference is to the footnote on p. 269.]

gymnastics shall not include any instruction or drill in the use of arms or training for war.

## CHAPTER V.—*Armament, Munitions and Material, Fortifications*

### *Article 13*

On the expiration of three months from the coming into force of the present terms, the armament of the new army of Bulgaria shall not exceed the figures fixed per thousand men in Table 5 attached. Any excess in relation to effectives shall only be used for such replacements as may eventually be necessary.

### *Article 14*

The stock of munitions at the disposal of the Bulgarian Army shall never exceed the amounts fixed in Table 3 attached.

Within three months from the coming into force of the present conditions the Government of Bulgaria shall deposit any existing surplus of armament and munitions in such places as shall be notified to it by the principal Allied and Associated Powers.†

No other stock depot, or reserve of munitions shall be formed.

### *Article 15*

The number and calibre of guns constituting the fixed normal armament of fortified places existing at the present moment in Bulgaria shall be immediately notified to the principal Allied and Associated Powers, and will constitute maximum amounts which may never be exceeded.

Within three months of the coming into force of the present Terms the maximum stock of ammunition for these guns will be reduced to and maintained at the following uniform rates:—

1,500 rounds per gun for those, the calibre of which is 105 mm. and under.

500 rounds per gun for those of higher calibre.

No new fortifications or fortified places shall be constructed in Bulgaria.

### *Article 16*

The manufacture of arms, munitions and of war material, shall only be carried on in one single factory, which shall be controlled by and belong to the State, and whose output shall be strictly limited to the manufacture of such arms, munitions and war material as is neces-

---

† The Acting American Military Naval and Air Representatives make the following reservation:—"The use of the term "Allied and Associated Powers" in the text of the Military, Naval and Aerial terms shall not be construed to infer that the United States of America will be represented on the Commissions of Control, or otherwise participate in the enforcement of any of those articles." [Footnote in the original.]



sary for the military forces and armaments referred to in Articles 3, 6, 14 & 15 above.

In three months from the coming into force of the present terms, all other establishments for the manufacture, preparation, storage, or design of arms, munitions, or any other war material, shall be abolished or converted to purely commercial uses.

Within the same length of time, all arsenals shall also be suppressed except those to be used as depots for the authorised stocks of munitions, and their staffs discharged.

The plant of any establishments or arsenals, existing in excess of the needs of the authorised manufactures, shall be rendered useless or converted to purely commercial uses, in accordance with the decisions of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

#### *Article 17*

Within three months from the coming into force of the present Conditions, all arms, munitions and war material, including any kind of anti-aircraft material, of whatever origin existing in Bulgaria, in excess of the authorised quantity, shall be handed over to the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

This will also apply to special plant designed for the manufacture of military material with the exception of that which shall be considered necessary for authorised manufactures.

This delivery shall take place at such points in Bulgarian territory as may be appointed by the said Powers, who shall also decide on the disposal of such material.

#### *Article 18*

The importation into Bulgaria of arms, munitions and war material of all kinds is formally forbidden.

The manufacture for foreign countries and the exportation of arms, munitions and war material, shall also be forbidden.

#### *Article 19*

The use of flame throwers, asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all similar liquids, materials or processes being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Bulgaria.

Material specially intended for the manufacture, storage, or use of the said products or processes is equally forbidden.

The manufacture and importation into Bulgaria of armoured cars, tanks, or any similar machines suitable for use in war, are equally forbidden.

TABLE 1

## COMPOSITION AND MAXIMUM EFFECTIVES OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION

Units	Maximum effectives of each unit		Remarks
	Officers	Men	
Headquarters of an Infantry Division.	25	70	(a) Each Regiment comprises 3 Battalions of Infantry, each Battalion comprises 3 Companies of Infantry and 1 machine gun Company.
Headquarters of Divisional Infantry.	5	50	
Headquarters of Divisional Artillery.	4	30	
3 Regiments of Infantry (a) (on the basis of 65 Officers and 2,000 men per Regiment).	195	6,000	(b) Each Battalion comprises 1 Headquarters, 2 Pioneer Companies, 1 Bridging Section, 1 Searchlight Section.
1 Squadron.....	6	160	(c) Each Regiment comprises 1 Headquarters, 3 Groups of Field or Mountain Artillery, comprising 8 batteries, each Battery comprising 4 guns or howitzers (field or mountain).
1 Battalion of Trench Artillery, (3 Companies).	14	500	
1 Battalion Pioneers (b) (3 Companies).	14	500	(d) This detachment comprises:— Telephone detachment 1 Listening section 1 carrier pigeon Section.
Regiment Field Artillery (c).....	80	1,200	
1 Battalion Cyclists (comprising 3 Companies).	18	450	
1 Signal Detachment (d).....	11	330	
Divisional Medical Corps.....	28	550	
Divisional Parks and Trains.....	14	940	
Total for an Infantry Division.	414	10,780	

TABLE 2

## COMPOSITION AND MAXIMUM EFFECTIVES FOR A CAVALRY DIVISION

Units	Maximum number authorised	Maximum effectives of each unit		Remarks
		Officers	Men	
Headquarters of a Cavalry Division.	1	15	50	(a) Each Regiment comprises 4 Squadrons.
Regt. of Cavalry (a).....	6	30	720	
Group of Field Artillery (3 Batteries).	1	30	430	(b) Each group comprises 9 fighting cars, each carrying one gun, 1 machine gun and 1 spare machine gun, 4 communications cars, 2 small lorries for stores, 7 lorries, including 1 repair lorry, 4 motor cars.
Group of motor machine-guns and armoured cars (b).	1	4	80	
Miscellaneous Services.....		30	500	
Total for a Cavalry Division.	.....	259	5,380	

NOTE:—The large Cavalry Units may include a variable number of regiments and be divided into independent brigades within the limit of the effectives laid down above.

TABLE 3

## COMPOSITION AND MAXIMUM EFFECTIVES FOR A MIXED BRIGADE

Units	Maximum effectives of each unit		Remarks
	Officers	Men	
Headquarters of a Brigade.....	10	50	(a) Each Regiment comprises 3 Battalions of Infantry, each Battalion comprises 3 Companies of Infantry and 1 Machine gun Company.
2 Regiments of Infantry (a).....	130	4, 000	
1 Cyclist Battalion.....	18	450	
1 Cavalry Squadron.....	5	100	
1 Group Field Artillery.....	20	400	
1 Trench mortar Company.....	5	150	
Miscellaneous services.....	10	200	
Total for Mixed Brigade....	198	5, 350	

TABLE 4

## MINIMUM EFFECTIVES OF UNITS WHATEVER ORGANISATION IS ADOPTED IN THE ARMY (DIVISIONS, MIXED BRIGADES, &amp;c.)

Maximum effectives (for reference)		Units	Minimum effectives		Remarks
Officers	Men		Officers	Men	
414	10, 780	Infantry Division.....	300	8, 000	
259	5, 380	Cavalry Division.....	180	3, 650	
198	5, 350	Mixed Brigade.....	140	4, 250	
65	2, 000	Regiment of Infantry.....	52	1, 600	
16	650	Battalion of Infantry.....	12	500	
3	160	Company of Infantry or machine-guns.....	2	120	
18	450	Cyclist Group.....	12	300	
30	720	Regiment of Cavalry.....	20	450	
6	160	Squadron of Cavalry.....	3	100	
80	1, 200	Regiment of Field Artillery.	60	1, 000	
4	150	Battery, Field Artillery....	2	120	
3	150	Company of Trench Mortars.....	2	100	
14	500	Battalion of Pioneers.....	8	300	

TABLE 5

## MAXIMUM AUTHORISED ARMAMENTS AND MUNITION SUPPLIES

Material	Quantity for 1,000 men	Amount of Munitions per arm (rifles, guns &c.)	Remarks
Rifles or Carbines.....	1, 150	500 rounds	Automatic rifles or carbines are counted as light machine guns.
Machine guns, heavy or light..	15	10, 000 rounds	
Trench Mortars, light.....	.....	1, 000 rounds	
Trench Mortars, medium.....	2	500 rounds	
Guns or howitzers (field or mountain).	3	1, 000 rounds	

NOTE:—No heavy gun, i. e. of a calibre greater than 150 mm. is authorised with the exception of the normal armament of fortified places.



## NAVAL CLAUSES

*Article 20*

From the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, all Bulgarian warships, submarines included, are declared to be finally surrendered to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

*Article 21*

All warships, including submarines, now under construction in Bulgaria shall be broken up.

The work of breaking-up these vessels shall be commenced as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty.

*Article 22*

Articles, machinery and material arising from the breaking-up of Bulgarian warships of all kinds, whether surface vessels or submarines, may not be used except for purely industrial or commercial purposes.

They may not be sold or disposed of to foreign countries.

*Article 23*

The construction or acquisition of any submarine, even for commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in Bulgaria.

*Article 24*

All arms, ammunition and other naval war material, including mines and torpedoes, which belonged to Bulgaria at the date of the signature of the armistice of 29 September, 1918,<sup>9</sup> are declared to be finally surrendered to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

*Article 25*

During the three months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the high-power wireless telegraphy station at Sofia shall not be used for the transmission of messages concerning naval, military or political questions of interest to Bulgaria or any State which has been allied to Bulgaria in the war, without the assent of the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. This station may be used for commercial purposes, but only under the supervision of the said Governments, who will decide the wavelength to be used.

During the same period Bulgaria shall not build any more high-power wireless telegraphy stations in her own territory or that of Germany, Austria, Hungary or Turkey.

---

<sup>9</sup> Vol. II, p. 241.

## AIR CLAUSES

*Article 26*

The armed forces of Bulgaria must not include any military or naval air forces. No dirigible shall be kept.

*Article 27*

Within two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the personnel of the air forces on the rolls of the Bulgarian land and sea forces shall be demobilized.

*Article 28*

Until the complete evacuation of Bulgarian territory by the Allied and Associated troops the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in Bulgaria freedom of passage through the air, freedom of transit and of landing.

*Article 29*

During the 6 months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the manufacture, importation and exportation of aircraft, parts of aircraft, engines for aircraft, and parts of engines for aircraft, shall be forbidden in all Bulgarian territory.

*Article 30*

On the coming into force of the present Treaty, all military and naval aeronautical material must be delivered by Bulgaria and at the expense of Bulgaria, to the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Delivery must be effected at such places as the said Governments may select, and must be completed within 3 months.

In particular, this material will include all items under the following heads which are or have been in use or were designed for war-like purposes:—

Complete aeroplanes and seaplanes, as well as those being manufactured, repaired, or assembled.

Dirigibles able to take the air, being manufactured, repaired or assembled.

Plant for the manufacture of hydrogen.

Dirigible sheds and shelters of every kind for aircraft.

Pending their delivery, dirigibles will, at the expense of Bulgaria, be maintained inflated with hydrogen; the plant for the manufacture of hydrogen, as well as the sheds for dirigibles may, at the discretion of the said Powers, be left to the State of Bulgaria until the time when the dirigibles are handed over.

Engines for aircraft.

Nacelles and fuselages.

Armament (guns, machine-guns, light machine-guns, bomb-dropping apparatus, torpedo-dropping apparatus, synchronisation apparatus, aiming apparatus).

Munitions (cartridges, shells, bombs, loaded or unloaded, stocks of explosives or material for their manufacture).

Instruments for use on aircraft.

Wireless apparatus and photographic or cinematograph apparatus for use on aircraft.

Component parts of any of the items under the preceding heads.

The material referred to above shall not be removed without special permission from the said Governments.

#### AIR NAVIGATION

##### *Article 31*

The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall have full liberty of passage and landing over and in the territory and territorial waters of Bulgaria, and shall enjoy the same privileges as aircraft belonging to Bulgaria, particularly in case of distress by land or sea.

##### *Article 32*

The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall, while in transit to any foreign country whatever, enjoy the right of flying over the territory and territorial waters of Bulgaria without landing subject always to any regulations which may be made by Bulgaria, and which shall be applicable equally to the aircraft of Bulgaria and those of the Allied and Associated countries.

##### *Article 33*

All aerodromes in Bulgaria open to national public traffic shall be open for the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers, and in any such aerodrome such aircraft shall be treated on a footing of equality with Bulgarian aircraft as regards charges of every description, including charges for landing and accommodation.

##### *Article 34*

Subject to the present provisions, the rights of passage, transit and landing, provided for in Articles 31, 32 and 33 are subject to the observance of such regulations as Bulgaria may consider it necessary to enact, but such regulations shall be applied without distinction to aircraft belonging to Bulgaria and to the aircraft of Allied and Associated countries.

##### *Article 35*

Certificates of nationality, air worthiness, or competency and licenses, issued or recognised as valid by any of the Allied and Associated Powers, shall be recognised in Bulgaria as valid and as equivalent to the certificates and licenses issued by Bulgaria.



*Article 36*

As regards internal commercial air traffic the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in Bulgaria most favoured nation treatment.

*Article 37*

Bulgaria undertakes to enforce the necessary measures to ensure that all Bulgarian aircraft flying over her territory shall comply with the rules as to Lights and Signals, Rules of the Air, and Rules for Air Traffic on and in the neighbourhood of aerodromes, which have been laid down in the Convention relative to Aerial Navigation concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers.

*Article 38*

The obligations imposed by the preceding provisions shall remain in force until the 1st January, 1923, unless before that date Bulgaria shall have been admitted into the League of Nations or shall have been authorised by consent of the Allied and Associated Powers to adhere to the Convention relative to Aerial Navigation concluded between those Powers.

## INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

*Article 39*

All military, naval and air clauses contained in the present Treaty and for the execution of which a time limit is prescribed, shall be executed by Bulgaria under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions (Military, Naval and Air) appointed for this purpose by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The above mentioned Commissions will represent the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in dealing with the Bulgarian Government in all matters concerning the execution of Military, Naval or Air clauses. They will communicate to the Bulgarian Authorities the decisions which the Allied and Associated Powers have reserved the right to take or which the execution of the Clauses may necessitate.

*Article 40*

The Inter-Allied Commissions of Control may establish their organisations at Sofia, and shall be entitled as often as they think fit to proceed to any point whatever in Bulgarian territory or to send sub-Commissions or to authorise one or more of their Members to go to any such point.

*Article 41*

The Bulgarian Government must furnish to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control all such information and documents as the latter

may think necessary to ensure the execution of their mission, and all means (both in personnel and in material) which the said Commissions may need to ensure the complete execution of the Military, Naval or Air Clauses.

The Bulgarian Government must attach a qualified Representative to each Inter-Allied Commission of Control with the duty of receiving the communications which the Commission may have to address to the Bulgarian Government and of furnishing it with or procuring all information or documents demanded.

#### *Article 42*

The upkeep and cost of the Commissions of Control and the expenses involved by their work shall be borne by Bulgaria.

#### *Article 43*

It will be the special duty of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control:—

(i) To fix the number of gendarmes, customs officials, forest guards, local or municipal police, etc., which Bulgaria shall be authorised to maintain as laid down by article 6 of these Clauses.

(ii) To receive from the Bulgarian Government any information relating to the location of the stocks and depots of munitions, the armament of the fortified works, fortresses and forts and the location of the works or factories for the production of arms, munitions and war material and their operations.

It will take delivery of the arms, munitions, war material, and plant intended for war construction; will select the points where such delivery is to be effected and will supervise the works of destruction and of rendering things useless or the transformation of material which are to be carried out in accordance with the present Treaty.

#### *Article 44*

It will be the special duty of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control to take delivery of arms, munitions, and other naval war material, and to supervise the destruction and breaking up provided for in Article 21.

The Bulgarian Government must furnish to the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and documents as the Commission may deem necessary to ensure the complete execution of the Naval Clauses, in particular the designs of the warships, the composition of their armaments, the details and the models of the guns, munitions, torpedoes, mines, explosives, wireless telegraphic apparatus, and in general everything relating to Naval war material, as well as all legislative or administrative documents or regulations.

*Article 45*

It will be the special duty of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control to make an inventory of the aeronautical material which is actually in possession of the Bulgarian Government, to inspect aeroplane, balloon (including airship) and motor manufacturing and factories producing arms, munitions and explosives capable of being used by aircraft, to visit all aerodromes, sheds, landing grounds, parks, and depots situated in Bulgarian territory and to authorise where necessary the removal of material and to take delivery of such material.

The Bulgarian Government must furnish to the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and legislative, administrative, or other documents which the Commission may think necessary to ensure the complete execution of the air clauses, and in particular a list of the personnel belonging to all Bulgarian Air Services and of the existing material as well as of that in process of manufacture or on order, and a complete list of all establishments working for aviation, of their positions and of all sheds and landing grounds.

## GENERAL CLAUSES

*Article 46*

After the expiration of a period of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Bulgarian laws must have been modified and shall be maintained by the Bulgarian Government in conformity with this part of the present Treaty.

Within the same period all the administrative or other measures relating to the execution of this part of the Treaty must have been taken by the Bulgarian Government.

*Article 47*

The following portions of the Armistice of the 29th September, 1918:—

Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 & 6.

Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 & 4 (Military Conventions—Secret Articles)

remain in force in so far as they are not inconsistent with the above stipulations.

*Article 48*

Bulgaria undertakes from the coming into force of the present Treaty not to accredit to any foreign country any military, naval or air mission, and not to send or allow the departure of any such mission; she undertakes moreover to take the necessary steps to prevent Bulgarian nationals from leaving her territory in order to enlist in the Army, fleet or air service of any foreign Power, or to be



attached to any such Power with the purpose of helping in its training, or generally to give any assistance to the military, naval or air instruction in a foreign country.

The Allied and Associated Powers undertake on their part that from the coming into force of the present Treaty they will neither enlist in their armies, fleets, or air services, nor attach to them any Bulgarian national with the object of helping in military training, or in general employ any Bulgarian national as a military, naval or air instructor.

The present arrangement, however, in no way hinders the right of France to recruit the Foreign Legion in accordance with French military laws and regulations.

#### *Article 49*

So long as the present Treaty remains in force Bulgaria undertakes to submit to any investigation which the League of Nations by a majority vote may consider necessary.

---

### Appendix B to HD-13

#### CONDITIONS OF PEACE WITH BULGARIA

#### *Report Presented by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties*

The Commission on Responsibilities was requested by the Secretariat-General of the Conference to meet for the purpose of examining the bases of a report to be presented to the Supreme Council of the Conference as regards the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

Meetings of the Commission were accordingly held on the 15th and 17th July for the purpose of drafting the text of a provision or provisions applicable to the same object as Articles 227 to 230 of the Treaty with Germany, and designed to take the place of those Articles in the Treaty with Bulgaria.

With this object the Delegations of the three States bordering on Bulgaria, i. e. Greece, Roumania, and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, had already elaborated a preliminary draft which they communicated at the end of June to the President of the Conference.

The Commission considered this preliminary draft, in formulating which its authors, as stated in their covering letter to his Excellency M. Clemenceau, "followed as closely as possible the text of the above-mentioned Articles (227 to 230 of the Treaty with Germany), and were guided in other respects by the conclusions adopted by the

Commission on Responsibilities with the unanimous consent of the Delegates of all the States who should apparently be signatories of the Treaty with Bulgaria."

The Delegates of the United States expressed, as regards this communication, certain objections of a general character, from which it appears that the United States only accepts the proposals which are in conformity with Articles 228, 229, and 230 of the Treaty with Germany, and makes reservations as regards those parts of the proposals which are contrary to or inconsistent with those Articles.

The French Delegates on the Commission, for their part, while noting that the system proposed simply reproduces that previously adopted by the Commission, to which they had adhered, but which was not adopted in the Treaty with Germany, observed that it was a matter for regret that the Commission should be led to depart from uniformity in this respect between the various Treaties of Peace. In reply, it was pointed out that the special considerations set forth below justify this new departure.

While taking note of the reservations and observations of the Delegates of the United States and of France respectively, the Commission proceeded to discuss the proposal made by the Delegates of Greece, Roumania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and as a result agreed upon a draft of eight Articles to be substituted in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria for Articles 227 to 230 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. The text of this draft is annexed hereto (Annex I).

In framing this draft, the Commission took into account the opinion expressed by the representatives of the Balkan States to the effect that there was no occasion to give special treatment to the case of the ex-Tsar of Bulgaria, as his responsibility should be judged according to the general rules laid down in the draft.

The Delegates of Japan recalled and renewed in this connection the reservations which they had previously made in regard to "the prosecution for breaches of the laws and customs of war of enemy heads of States before a tribunal constituted by the opposite party" (the 4th April, 1919, Annex III to the Report of the Commission).

The Commission's draft diverges in two respects from the system of responsibilities and penalties set up by the Treaty with Germany.

In the first place, with the special object of settling more promptly the thousands of cases in which the penal responsibility of Bulgarian subjects is involved, the Balkan States proposed and the Commission agreed to entrust to an international tribunal the trial of persons accused of having committed or ordered acts in violation of the laws and customs of war, or who, though having authority to intervene,

did not oppose these acts. The reasons adduced by the Delegations interested in support of this system are chiefly of a practical nature. There are so many cases in which the penal responsibility of Bulgarian subjects is involved that, if the initiative as regards prosecutions and the trial of these cases were entrusted solely to the military tribunals of the Balkan States, the result would be that for a very long time the relations of those States with Bulgaria would thereby be injuriously affected; great harm would thus be done to the common interest, which requires that the passions aroused by the war, and aggravated by the manner in which Bulgaria conducted it, should quickly be assuaged. The Delegations concerned observed, moreover, that their respective Governments, under the pressure of public opinion in their own countries, could not themselves make the choice (which could only be done by an international body) between cases requiring absolutely to be kept in hand and cases which could be set aside with a view to expediting matters. The Delegations added that real harm would be done if account were not taken of the fact that the sentences resulting from the prosecutions, if pronounced by local tribunals, ran the risk of appearing, however unjustly, to bear the stamp of acts of political vengeance; these sentences would, however, be cleared of such an imputation, and would be recognised by all men as true sentences of justice, if they were pronounced by an international tribunal. In the second place, the draft provides, by means of a special organ called the "Commission on Prosecutions," that the designation of individuals supposed to be guilty, and as such to be handed over by the Bulgarian Government, shall not remain in suspense for a long time.

In other cases the draft preserves, as regards breaches of the laws and customs of war, the system of prosecution by military tribunals of the Allied Powers set up in the Treaty with Germany: that is to say, that the only exception made is as regards accused persons who will be handed over by Bulgaria and as such will come within the jurisdiction of the international tribunal.

In accordance with the above, the first of the draft Articles reproduces with a slight variation the first sentence of Article 228 of the Treaty with Germany and recognises the right of the Allied and Associated Powers "to bring to *justice* all persons accused of having committed or ordered acts in violation of the laws and customs of war."

Article 2 reproduces the whole system for trial by *military tribunals* of the Allied Powers as laid down in Article 228 (first paragraph) and Article 229 of the Treaty with Germany; but an exception is made as regards the persons mentioned in Article 3. As will be seen, this concerns persons who are to be handed over by the Bulgarian Government.



The last paragraph of Article 2 reproduces word for word the last sentence of the first paragraph of Article 228, providing that the whole of this system, i. e., trial by the military tribunals of the Allied Powers, shall apply "notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Bulgaria or in the territory of her allies." In this connection it is necessary to recall that the term *proceedings or prosecution* (in French "*procédures ou poursuites*") means in this place, as was expressly stated in connection with the German Treaty, not merely the preliminary judicial steps, but also the sentences pronounced by the Courts of Bulgaria or her allies; the rights of the tribunals of the Allied Powers will therefore not be affected even if sentences have been passed by tribunals of Bulgaria or by those of the Powers allied with her.

Article 3, unlike Article 2, is specially concerned with accused persons who will only come into the power of the Allies by means of the obligations to surrender them which is imposed upon the Bulgarian Government. These persons shall be brought before a tribunal composed of seven judges, appointed respectively by the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

In this connection, the Delegates of the United States having enquired whether Belgium had been in a state of war with Bulgaria, the Belgian Delegate replied that Belgium had never been in a state of *declared* war with Bulgaria, and that there had only been a rupture of diplomatic relations. The Commission decided that, whatever the supposition were, Belgium should be requested to appoint one of the seven judges on the tribunal.

Article 4 embodies a useful provision in the previous Report of the Commission regarding the Treaty with Germany, and specifies that the [high]<sup>12</sup> tribunal shall regulate its own procedure (Chapter IV, Section (b), Sub-Section 5 in the Report of the Commission). It also provides for a case being referred to a judicial authority of the three Allied Powers bordering on Bulgaria, but solely "for examination in first instance, for inquiry or for report" and not for the purpose of passing sentence as the Commission had previously proposed.

Finally, this Article deals with the seat of the tribunal, which is to vary according to the circumstances.

Article 5 likewise embodies a recommendation in the Report of the Commission (cp. Chapter IV, Section (b), Sub-Section 3), and states that "the law to be applied by the [high] tribunal shall be the principles of the law of nations as these result from treaties and usages established among civilised peoples." Further, in accordance with

---

<sup>12</sup> Brackets enclosing "high" throughout this document appear on the original.

the terms of Article 228 and in the exact language of the previous conclusions of the Commission (Chapter IV, Section (b), Sub-Section 4), it provides that the punishments to be imposed shall be such "as may be imposed for such an offence or offences by any court in one of the countries represented on the [high] tribunal or in Bulgaria itself."

Finally, the last paragraph of Article 5 provides, as is also stated in Article 2 in regard to the military tribunals, that the [high] tribunal can exercise its authority notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Bulgaria or in the territory of her allies, and also excludes all consequences that might result from an order for amnesty. In this place, as in Article 2, it must be understood that the term "proceedings or prosecution" includes also any *sentence* which may have been pronounced by a tribunal in Bulgaria or in the territory of her allies.

Article 6 of the draft meets the desire expressed that the designation of the persons supposed to be guilty and to be handed over by the Bulgarian Government may not remain in suspense for a long time. With this object the draft embodies in accordance with the previous proposals of the Commission, the idea of setting up a "Commission on Prosecutions," international in its composition like the tribunal itself, which is to draw up within three months the list of persons to be brought before the [high] tribunal and to bring this list to the notice of the Bulgarian Government. After this period of three months the list is to be closed. This system is clearly at variance with that set up in the Treaty with Germany (Article 228, paragraph 2); but the reason is that objections were raised on this point in connection with the German Treaty, and the Allied and Associated Powers took these objections into account in Clause 3 of the Protocol of the 28th June annexed to the Treaty with Germany.

Article 7 of the draft contains a necessary provision regarding the execution of the sentences, which is entrusted to the Government of the country in which the [high] tribunal pronounces judgment. The Article stipulates, moreover, that the costs of proceedings shall be borne by the Bulgarian Government and regulated by the Reparation Commission under the supervision of the [high] tribunal.

In conclusion, Article 230 of the Treaty with Germany, regarding the documents and information to be furnished by Bulgaria, is reproduced verbatim in Article 8 of the draft; it is clearly understood that this clause applies not only as regards the [high] tribunal, but also as regards the military tribunals for which provision is made in Article 2.

Apart from the general reservation made by the Delegates of the United States and the special reservation made by the Delegates of

Japan, and while taking note of the observation made by the French Delegates, the Commission on Responsibilities and Penalties decided unanimously that the eight draft Articles annexed to the present Report should be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria instead and in place of Articles 227 to 230 in the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

United States of America—

(Subject to the reservations set forth in the declaration annexed hereto (Annex II).)

JAMES BROWN SCOTT

HENRY G. CROCKER

British Empire—

ERNEST M. POLLOCK

France—

F. LARNAUDE

R. MASSON

Italy—

VITTORIO SCIALOJA

GUSTAVO TOSTI

Japan—

M. ADATCI

SAKUTARO TACHI

Belgium—

ROLIN-JAEQUEMYS

Greece—

N. POLITIS

Poland—

L. LUBIENSKI

Roumania—

C. ANTONIADE

Serb-Croat-Slovene State—

S. YOVANOVITCH

JULY 22, 1919.

Annex I

*Treaty With Bulgaria.—Penalties.—Preliminary Draft*

ARTICLE 1

The Bulgarian Government recognises the right of the Allied Powers to bring to justice in the manner hereinafter provided all persons accused of having committed or ordered acts in violation of the laws and customs of war, or who though having authority to intervene did not oppose these acts.



## ARTICLE 2

These persons will be brought before the military tribunals of the Allied Powers, except in the cases referred to in Article 3 below.

Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the Allied Powers will be brought before the military tribunals of that Power.

Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of more than one of the Allied Powers will be brought before military tribunals composed of members of the military tribunals of the Powers concerned.

In every case the accused will be entitled to name his own counsel.

Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law.

These provisions will apply notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Bulgaria or in the territory of her Allies.

## ARTICLE 3

The persons referred to in Article 1, who are to be handed over by the Bulgarian Government, shall be brought before a tribunal composed of seven judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers, namely: Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Roumania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

## ARTICLE 4

The tribunal shall determine its own procedure, including the arrangements for prosecution and for the guarantees essential to the defence.

It will sit, according to circumstances, in Greece, in Roumania, or in the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

It shall have power to refer any case for examination in the first instance, for enquiry, or for report to any judicial authority of these three Powers.

## ARTICLE 5

The law to be applied by the tribunal shall be the principles of the law of nations as these result from treaties and usages established among civilised peoples, and the tribunal shall impose on the persons found guilty such punishments as may be imposed by any Court in one of the countries represented on the tribunal or in Bulgaria itself.

This provision will apply notwithstanding any order for amnesty or any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Bulgaria or in the territory of her allies.

## ARTICLE 6

The duty of deciding what cases are to be brought before the tribunal for trial shall be undertaken by a Commission on prosecutions appointed by the Governments of the States represented on the tribunal.

The Commission on prosecutions shall, within three months from the date of its appointment, draw up the lists of persons to be brought before the tribunal and shall notify the Bulgarian Government thereof.

The Bulgarian Government shall hold the persons thus designated at the disposal of the tribunal so that they may be handed over to the latter as and when the procedure may so require through the agency of the Government in whose territory these persons are to be tried.

## ARTICLE 7

The execution of the judgments of the tribunal shall be entrusted to the Government of the country where the tribunal shall have delivered its sentence.

The costs of the proceedings which result in convictions shall, after examination and approval by the tribunal, be borne by the Bulgarian Government and settled by the Reparation Commission.

## ARTICLE 8

Whatever may be the tribunal called upon to deal with each case, the Bulgarian Government undertakes to furnish all documents and information of every kind, the production of which may be considered necessary to ensure the full knowledge of the incriminating acts, the discovery of offenders and the just appreciation of responsibility.

## Annex II

*Declaration by the Delegation of the United States of America*

The Delegates of the United States of America are unable to accept the Report of the majority of the Commission on Responsibilities containing the Articles on Penalties to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria for the reasons set forth at length in the memorandum which the American Delegates felt obliged to present to the Commission on Responsibilities, and which is appended as Annex II to the Report of the Commission, dated the 29th March, 1919, containing the provisions to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

The Delegates of the United States recognise that the present Commission has adopted for some cases the system of trial before Military

Commissions of Allied and Associated belligerent Governments contained in the Treaty with Germany, but they call attention to the fact that even in such cases the persons to be tried before such Commissions are not only those accused of having committed, but also those accused of having ordered, without adequate definition or limitation, acts contrary to the laws and customs of war, and that the laws to be applied are "the principles of the law of nations as these result from treaties and usages among civilised peoples," not singly and solely the laws and customs of war as required by the submission of the Conference of the 25th January, 1919."

The Delegates of the United States further call attention to the fact that the provisions of the present project adopted by the Commission are, in so far as they differ from those of the Treaty with Germany, similar to those previously adopted by the Commission and recommended in its Report of the 29th March, 1919, to the Conference, but rejected by the Supreme Council in favour of the provisions which were actually inserted in the German Treaty.

The Delegates of the United States of America therefore feel themselves constrained to recall and to confirm the statement entered in the proceedings of the Commission on the 17th July, 1919, that—

"The United States accepts so much of the proposals as are in accord with Articles 228, 229, and 230 of the Treaty with Germany, and reserves as to those parts of the proposals contrary to or inconsistent with those Articles."

JAMES BROWN SCOTT  
HENRY G. CROCKER

---

#### Appendix C to HD-13

[Translation <sup>16</sup>]

[*Note From the Drafting Committee to the Supreme Council*]

JULY 23, 1919.

In its report addressed to the Supreme Council on the question of Schleswig,<sup>14</sup> the Committee on the Execution of the Territorial Clauses of the Treaty of Peace proposed "to notify the German Government and the Danish Government that the Allied and Associated Powers consider as null every sale of real property of the State occurring since November 11, 1919 [1918] in that part of Schleswig subject to plebiscite." (Paragraph 6, page 2 of the report.)<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> Annex 2 to Protocol No. 2, Preliminary Peace Conference, Plenary Session of January 25, 1919, vol. III, p. 202.

<sup>15</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>16</sup> Appendix B to HD-8, p. 162.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 163.



The Drafting Committee of the Conference pointed out that in making this notification in the terms which have just been reported, the powers would invoke a principle which was not sanctioned by the armistice nor by the treaty, and that they would expose themselves to receiving from the Germans a justified exception. It has drafted the text of the notification that the powers, according to it, have the right to address to the German and Danish Governments as follows:

“In conformity with the principle laid down by article XIX of the armistice of November 11, 1918,<sup>18</sup> by the terms of which ‘while the armistice lasts, no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery of reparation for war losses.’ Every sale of public properties occurring since November 11, 1918 in that part of Schleswig subject to plebiscite shall be, for the purposes of the application of the treaty of peace, considered null and void.”

---

#### Appendix D to HD-13

*[The President of the German Delegation (Von Lersner) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]*

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION,  
VERSAILLES, July 8, 1919.

SIR: The execution of the Treaty of Peace in the Eastern Provinces of Germany requires that immediately after ratification important preparatory measures should be taken. The sudden withdrawal of all German Authorities in the provinces to be returned would undoubtedly cause great confusion, and the internal administration and the working of justice and of the transport system would especially suffer therefrom. Security and order seem all the more gravely threatened owing to the fact that in the territories in question national antagonism has already caused great excitement amongst the entire population. For these reasons the German Government considers it indispensable that direct negotiations should at an early date be entered upon with the Polish Government. The object of these negotiations would be, by appealing in the first instance to the different Prussian ministerial departments concerned, to ensure that these various administrations should be handed over to Poland in good order: they would moreover settle the details of the methodical withdrawal of Prussian officials. In view of the important part which the Prussian Bureaux will play and of the necessity of consulting original documents, the best solution would

---

<sup>18</sup> Vol. II, p. 1.

be to select Berlin as the seat of these negotiations. The Polish delegates would in such case receive all the necessary facilities.

It is requested that an early reply may be given as to whether the Polish Government agrees to this proposal and whether it be ready to appoint its representatives with the least possible delay, and that I may be informed of the date of their arrival at Berlin.

I have [etc.]

FREIHERR VON LERSNER

#### Appendix E to HD-13

#### *Proposed Reply to German Note of July 8th Regarding the Opening of Negotiations at Berlin between the Polish and German Governments*

Translation

JULY 23, 1919.

From: President Clemenceau.

To: President Von Lersner.

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers has made note of the communication of the German Delegation, under date of July 8, 1919,<sup>19</sup> relative to the preparatory measures which should immediately follow the ratification, for the execution of the Treaty referring to the Eastern provinces of Germany.

The Supreme Council is favourable, in principle, to the opening of negotiations with the Polish Government in Berlin, but considers that the Allied and Associated Powers, as guarantors of the Peace Treaty, should participate in these negotiations and be represented.

It is only under these conditions that the request of the German Delegation could be considered.

#### Appendix F to HD-13

[Translation <sup>20</sup>]

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION,  
VERSAILLES, July 16, 1919.

To: M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference, etc.

MR. PRESIDENT:—According to communications from East Prussia, a Commissioner of the Allied and Associated Powers has arrived in Memel, in order to assume the administration of the territory north of Memel. The German Government has, up to the present, received no official information of the arrival of this commissioner, nor has it as yet received a statement of his powers. The German

<sup>19</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>20</sup> The translation is that found under Paris Peace Conf. 185.1141/9.

Government takes the view point, and has explained this view point in the note of July 8,<sup>21</sup> that it is desirable to open negotiations as soon as possible regarding the transfer of the territory to be assigned to Poland. It also considers it desirable that preliminary steps be taken as rapidly as possible for similar negotiations with regard to the Free Town of Dantzig and District, and the District north of Memel. It considers it imperative, however, that the name and powers of the commissioners concerned be communicated to it prior to the arrival of these commissioners at their place of duty, since only in this way can the negotiations commence in good order immediately.

The German Government takes the liberty, accordingly, of asking whether Commissioners with full powers have already been appointed for the territory north of Memel and for the Free Town of Dantzig, and requests that the names and full powers of these Commissioners be communicated to it, in case such Commissioners are soon to be appointed. In view of the wide range of the necessary fundamental questions and of the services concerned, Berlin is considered the most suitable place for these negotiations.

Accept, etc.

FREIHERR VON LERSNER

---

#### Appendix G to HD-13

[Translation <sup>22</sup>]

JULY 23, 1919.

From: President Clemenceau.

To: President Von Lersner.

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers has taken note of the communication received from the German Delegation under date of July 16, 1919,<sup>23</sup> requesting that the names and credentials of the Representatives of the Allied Powers to Eastern Prussia be communicated to the German Government before the arrival of these Representatives.

The Supreme Council estimates that these nominations cannot be made before the ratification and entry into force of the Peace Treaty. At the proper time, the German Government will be, through the mediation [*medium?*] of the German Delegation, informed of the names and credentials of the said Representatives.

---

<sup>21</sup> *Ante*, p. 291.

<sup>22</sup> The translation is that found under Paris Peace Conf. 185.1138/39.

<sup>23</sup> *Supra*.



## Appendix H to HD-13

[Translation<sup>24</sup>]

## CONDITIONS OF PEACE WITH BULGARIA

*Report Submitted to the Supreme Council by the Committee on Prisoners of War*

Most of the provisions that the Commission has the honor to submit for the approval of the Supreme Council are identical with those which have already been adopted by it for Austria; the same grounds of law and fact suggest them; and the same necessities justify them. Only one article has been changed—article 9. Its new wording tends to enlarge its import. This was brought about by the petitions of the Greek, Roumanian, and Serbian delegations for whom the Commission has on several occasions held hearings. It has seemed necessary to the Commission to request that the Greek, Roumanian, and Serbian representatives collaborate directly in drafting the clauses of the treaty with Bulgaria. These three countries were, indeed, especially affected in the course of hostilities with the Bulgarian Army and are especially interested in the settlement of the serious questions raised by the conclusion of peace.

The petitions presented by the three delegations related especially to the following points:

1. The atrocities committed by the Bulgarian troops and the crimes committed at the instigation of this country call for sanctions. The Allied and Associated Powers should therefore establish a procedure and provide sanctions.

2. Numerous civilians of Greek, Roumanian or Serbian nationality have been deported into Bulgaria, many Allied prisoners of war have been concealed there. Because of these facts, of which they have cited numerous examples, the three delegations have requested the organization of special missions and the institution of exceptional guarantees.

3. The three delegations have requested that it be specified that the prisoners could not to any degree be kept in captivity for political crimes or misdemeanors.

On this last point, the Commission on Prisoners thought that it had no changes to make in the text of the conditions of peace with Austria. The stipulations provided therein are sufficient, indeed, to remove all ambiguity.

But the other two propositions presented by the three delegations have engaged its attention, and it has believed that it could give satisfaction to them.

The new wording of article 9 substitutes for the Commissions To Search for Missing Persons established by each of the Allied and

---

<sup>24</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Associated Powers, a single Inter-Allied Commission whose composition and powers have been extended.

Its mission is threefold:

1. It should proceed to search for all nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers now in Bulgarian territory and provide for their repatriation;

2. If there are among them those who desire to remain in Bulgaria, it shall identify them, and it will thus be led to verify the sincerity and the free expression of their desire;

3. It will have to ascertain on Bulgarian territory, where it shall function, the atrocities committed on the persons of prisoners, interned persons, or deportees. Its mission is not limited, therefore, to a search for missing persons; it consists of a general investigation of atrocities, and admits of the protection of those who could still be victimized. By reason of the importance of the tasks which shall thus devolve upon them, the members who compose it should possess appropriate authority; therefore it shall include a representative of each of the Great Powers,—with the exception, however, of the Japanese Government which declared that, because of the very limited number of delegates which it had at its disposal, it would forego being represented,—and, in addition, a representative of the three Powers more specially interested: Greece, Roumania, and Serbia.

This Commission should be established immediately after the coming into force of the treaty. Its designation will clearly demonstrate the intention of the Allied and Associated Powers to put an end to the violent acts committed or encouraged by the Bulgarian authorities, and their determination to enforce, by means of the necessary sanctions and punishments, respect for the laws and customs of war.

The Commission shall have free access everywhere. The Bulgarian Government should furnish it with all useful means of transportation, and put at its disposal all the documents which it shall call for. The Roumanian delegation requested that it be specified that the Commission could enter all "public and private premises." The Committee considered that the formula "in all other premises" was sufficient to cover private homes as well as public establishments, and it seemed useless to make a change in this formula which could be interpreted as an exception applicable exclusively to the conditions of peace with Bulgaria. The Interallied Commission of Inquiry and Control should, therefore, have every facility for investigation necessary to the pursuit of the purposes which are assigned to it.

The Committee thought that it could propose to the Supreme Council the establishment of this exceptional organ without encroaching upon the competency of the Commission on Responsibilities, which should present to it all proposals on the nature of the sanctions to be taken, and on the procedure to be followed to render them effective.

Moreover, the Commission on Responsibilities, when consulted,

raised no objection thereto; it merely offered the opinion that the result of the investigations of this Interallied Commission, to the extent that it could give rise to sanctions, be transmitted:

1. To each of the interested governments;
2. To the International Court proposed by the Commission on Responsibilities to, take cognizance of crimes against the laws and customs of war.

A special provision was inserted in the text in response to this suggestion.

Consequently, the Committee on Prisoners of War has the honor to submit for the approval of the Supreme Council the set of provisions appended hereto.

---

[Translation <sup>25</sup>]

*Draft Articles To Be Inserted in the Preliminaries of Peace With Bulgaria*

ARTICLE 1.

The repatriation of prisoners of war and interned civilians who are Bulgarian nationals shall take place as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present treaty, and shall be carried out with the greatest rapidity.

ARTICLE 2

The repatriation of Bulgarian prisoners of war and interned civilians shall, in accordance with article 1, be carried out by a commission composed of representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part, and of the Bulgarian Government on the other part.

For each of the Allied and Associated Powers a subcommission, composed exclusively of representatives of the interested power and of delegates of the Bulgarian Government, shall regulate the details of carrying into effect the repatriation of the prisoners of war.

ARTICLE 3

From the time of their delivery into the hands of the Bulgarian authorities the prisoners of war and interned civilians are to be returned without delay to their homes by the said authorities.

Those amongst them who before the war were habitually resident in territory occupied by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers are likewise to be sent to their homes, subject to the consent

---

<sup>25</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



and control of the military authorities of the Allied and Associated armies of occupation.

#### ARTICLE 4

The whole cost of repatriation from the moment of starting shall be borne by the Bulgarian Government who shall also provide the means of transport and working personnel considered necessary by the commission referred to in article 2.

#### ARTICLE 5

Prisoners of war and interned civilians awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offences against discipline shall be repatriated irrespective of the completion of their sentence or of the proceedings pending against them.

This stipulation shall not apply to prisoners of war and interned civilians punished for offences committed subsequent to June 1, 1919.

During the period pending their repatriation all prisoners of war and interned civilians shall remain subject to the existing regulations, more especially as regards work and discipline.

#### ARTICLE 6

Prisoners of war and interned civilians who are awaiting trial or undergoing sentence for offences other than those against discipline may be detained.

#### ARTICLE 7

The Bulgarian Government undertakes to admit to its territory without distinction all persons liable to repatriation.

Prisoners of war or Bulgarian nationals who do not desire to be repatriated may be excluded from repatriation; but the Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right either to repatriate them or to take them to a neutral country or to allow them to reside in their own territories.

The Bulgarian Government undertakes not to institute any exceptional proceedings against these persons or their families nor to take any repressive or vexatious measures of any kind whatsoever against them on this account.

#### ARTICLE 8

The Allied and Associated Governments reserve the right to make the repatriation of Bulgarian prisoners of war and Bulgarian nationals in their hands conditional upon the immediate notification and release by the Bulgarian Government of any prisoners of war

and other nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers who may still be retained in Bulgaria against their will.

#### ARTICLE 9

An Interallied Commission of Inquiry and Control shall be formed for the purpose of:

1. searching for non-repatriated nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers;
2. identifying those who have expressed their desire to remain within Bulgarian territory;
3. establishing criminal acts punishable by the penalties referred to in articles . . . . . of the present treaty, committed by Bulgarians against the persons of prisoners of war or Allied and Associated nationals during their captivity.

This Commission shall consist of a representative of each of the following powers, viz: the British Empire, France, Italy, the United States of America, Greece, Roumania, Serbia.

The result of its inquiries shall be transmitted:

1. To each of the interested governments;
2. To the High Court provided for in article 3 of the present treaty (art. 3 of the clauses relating to penalties).

The Bulgarian Government undertakes:

1. To give every facility to the Interallied Commission, to furnish it all necessary means of transportation, to allow it free access to camps, prisons, hospitals, and all other places; and to place at its disposal all documents, whether public or private, which would facilitate its inquiries.
2. To impose penalties upon any Bulgarian officials or private persons who have concealed the presence of any nationals of any of the Allied or Associated Powers, or have neglected to reveal the presence of any such after it had come to their knowledge.

#### ARTICLE 10

The Bulgarian Government undertakes, from the coming into force of the present treaty, to restore without delay all articles, money, securities and documents which have belonged to nationals of the Allied or Associated Powers and which have been received by the Bulgarian authorities.

#### ARTICLE 11

The High Contracting Parties waive reciprocally all repayment of sums due for the maintenance of prisoners of war in their respective territories.

SECTION II.—*Graves*

## ARTICLE 12

The Allied and Associated Governments and the Bulgarian Government will cause to be respected and maintained the graves of the soldiers and sailors buried in their respective territories.

They agree to recognize any commission appointed by any one of these Governments for the purpose of identifying, registering, caring for, or erecting suitable memorials over the said graves, and to facilitate the discharge of its duties. Furthermore they reciprocally agree to afford, so far as the provisions of their laws and the requirements of public health allow, every facility for giving effect to requests that the bodies of their soldiers and sailors may be transferred to their own country.

## ARTICLE 13

The graves of prisoners of war and interned civilians who are nationals of the different belligerent states and have died in captivity shall be properly maintained in accordance with article 12 of the present treaty.

The Allied and Associated Governments on the one part and the Bulgarian Government on the other part reciprocally undertake also to furnish to each other:

1. A complete list of those who have died, together with all information useful for identification;

2. All information as to the number and position of the graves of all those who have been buried without identification.

---

Appendix I to HD-13

[Translation <sup>26</sup>]

No. 799

## VERBAL NOTE

ST. GERMAIN-EN-LAYE, July 21, 1919.

From: Delegation of the German Austrian Republic.

To: General Secretary of the Peace Conference, Paris.

His Excellence, President of the Peace Conference, was kind enough, in a note of the 17th instant, to inform the German Austrian Delegation, at St. Germain-en-Laye, of a declaration made by the Supreme Economic Council on the subject of foodstuffs and indispensable raw materials to be furnished to the German Austrian people.<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> The translation is that given in S-H Bulletin No. 547, July 24, 1919 (Paris Peace Conf. 184.611/604).

<sup>27</sup> HD-9, minute 2, p. 173.



Noting with great satisfaction the friendly assurances given, the Delegation hastened to obtain information upon the delivery of arms and ammunition upon which will depend, according to terms of the said Note, the continuation of supplies.

Treating the information as confidential, the German Austrian Delegation begs to bring to the attention of the President of the Peace Conference, that *all* arms and ammunition asked for up to the present time are being delivered to the Royal Italian Armistice Mission at Vienna. This Mission has agreed to transmit the materials in question to the Czecho-Slovak Government, an agreement made with the full knowledge and consent of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Vienna.

Adding that grave interior political reasons render it impossible to deliver the materials mentioned directly to the Czecho-Slovak State, the undersigned Delegation begs to insist upon the confidential character of this communication.

---

#### Appendix J to HD-13

##### *Trade With Bolshevist Russia*

Immediately following the meeting of the Supreme Council at which this was last discussed,<sup>28</sup> Mr. White cabled the President,<sup>29</sup> describing in considerable detail the proposed notification to be given to neutrals with the object of preventing such trade and stating as reasons for reconsideration of the attitude formerly taken:

(1) That the action of June 17th<sup>30</sup> was taken in expectation of an early fall of Petrograd, which expectation had not been realised;

(2) That military and naval operations were active in and about the Gulf of Finland and that it would be difficult for the Allies to permit neutral shipping to proceed freely in the Gulf of Finland without thereby disclosing to the Bolshevists the naval disposition of the Allies, thereby permitting the Bolshevists to take the Anti-Bolshevists in the rear;

(3) That the prior action of the Supreme Council related both to Bolshevist Russia and Hungary and that the Supreme Council had itself modified the decision in respect to Hungary, thereby indicating that the decision as a whole should be regarded as having been provisional only;

(4) That the Allies, by virtue of their promise of aid and assistance to Koltchak, were under a moral obligation to prevent the Bolshevists from receiving aid.

The view was further expressed that it would be desirable for the United States to go as far as possible with our associates in assisting

---

<sup>28</sup> HD-7, minute 3, p. 131.

<sup>29</sup> Telegram No. 3152, July 15, 1919, *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 151.

<sup>30</sup> CF-74, minute 5, vol. VI, p. 530.

Koltchak and preventing aid from reaching the Bolsheviks and that the only apparent objection to the proposed course of action was the precedent involved in a group of nations exercising a control over a portion of the high seas other than by virtue of recognised belligerent rights.

In reply to this telegram from Mr. White to the President, the President stated his view to be that the United States could not join in the proposed notification in view of the fact that the status of belligerency did not exist with respect to Bolshevik Russia.<sup>31</sup> It was added that it was felt that the practical difficulties in the way of trade with Bolshevik Russia would prevent any substantial relief being received by the Bolsheviks in this way.

---

#### Appendix K to HD-13

M-370 (Admiralty M. 21300)

#### *Draft of Declaration To Be Signed by the Austrian Plenipotentiaries*

With a view to minimising the losses arising from the sinking of ships and cargoes in the course of the war and to facilitating the recovery of ships and cargoes which can be salvaged and the adjustment of the private claims arising with regard thereto, the Austrian Government undertake to supply all the information in their power which may be of assistance to the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers or to their nationals with regard to vessels sunk or damaged by the Austrian naval forces during the period of hostilities.

---

#### Appendix L to HD-13

[Translation <sup>32</sup>]

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
DIRECTION OF POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS  
FRENCH REPUBLIC

PARIS, July 16, 1919.

#### *Note of the French Delegation*

The approaching resumption of diplomatic relations between the Allied States and Germany raises the question of relations between representatives of the Allied Governments and accredited German representatives to a same government.

Credentials of  
German Diplo-  
matic Agents

---

<sup>31</sup> For the President's reply, see telegram No. 2594, July 18, 1919, *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 153.

<sup>32</sup> The translation is that given in S-H Bulletin No. 548, July 24, 1919 (Paris Peace Conf. 184.611/605).

At Stockholm, for example, the Minister from Germany is senior to most of the Allied ministers; according to custom, it would be thus the Allied Ministers who should call first upon their colleague. The same situation will arise in many posts, if the representatives of Germany in foreign countries do not receive new credentials. It does not seem that the German Government has given them such credentials up to the present time. Now the voting of the German constitution should in any case bring about this renewal of credentials; otherwise, it would be necessary to conclude that the regime in Germany has not changed, since its diplomatic agents now in office hold their position from the Emperor.

It seems that it might be interesting to draw the attention of the German Government to the necessity of renewing the credentials of its diplomatic agents at present accredited to foreign countries.

From another point of view, the German Government might be invited to replace those of its diplomatic agents who had been invested by the Imperial Government, in such a way as to mark clearly the rupture between the old and new regimes.

---

#### Appendix M to HD-13

[Translation <sup>33</sup>]

#### *Draft of a Letter to the President of the German Delegation*

#### LETTERS OF CREDENCE OF THE GERMAN DIPLOMATIC AGENTS

MR. PRESIDENT: The Allied and Associated Governments wish to know if the German Government has furnished new letters of Credence to those of its Diplomatic Agents, at the present time on duty, who had received their foreign credentials from the former Imperial Government.

I believe it my duty to point out that it would be difficult for the Diplomatic Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers to carry on official relations with their German colleagues, after the resumption of diplomatic relations between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers, whose papers had been delivered by the collapsed Government.

The Allied and Associated Powers believe it to the interest of all concerned, that in the shortest time possible, precise information thereto be furnished, in view of the instructions they will have to give to their Representatives in the different Countries concerning the attitude they are to adopt towards the accredited German Diplomats in the same countries with them.

---

<sup>33</sup> The translation is that given in S-H Bulletin No. 548, July 26, 1919 (Paris Peace Conf. 184.611/606).



Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, July 26, 1919, at 10: 30 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. H. White.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	M. Clemenceau. M. Pichon.
<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretaries</i>	<i>Secretaries</i>
Mr. L. Harrison.	Mr. H. Norman. Sir Ian Malcolm, K. C. M. G.	M. Dutasta. M. Berthelot. M. de St. Quentin.
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Tittoni.	Baron Makino.
	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>
	M. Paterno.	M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . .	Capt. Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Lieut-Commander Bell.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Colonel Jones.

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. (At this point Marshal Foch, General Weygand, and the Military Representatives from Versailles entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that, before passing to the subjects on the Agenda, he would ask Marshal Foch to explain the dispute that had now arisen between the Poles and the Lithuanians with regard to the line of demarcation that had been laid down by the Allied and Associated Powers.

MARSHAL FOCH showed the demarcation line upon a map which he presented to the Council, and drew attention to the point at which the line in question had been violated. He pointed out that the question of the German evacuation of the territories under discussion was involved, and that, according to latest reports, General von der Goltz<sup>1</sup> had begun a general withdrawal.

<sup>1</sup> Gen. Rudiger von der Goltz, commander of the German Armies in the Baltic provinces.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that, as certain aspects of the problem were new to the Council, he would propose that the question should be adjourned until the afternoon's meeting, and that M. Cambon<sup>2</sup> should attend.

(It was therefore decided that the question should be re-discussed at the afternoon's meeting and that M. Cambon should be present.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU read two telegrams, dated July 7th and 24th respectively, relative to a rupture of communications through Warsaw between Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and other countries, and asked Marshal Foch whether he was familiar with the details of this matter.

Rupture of the  
Communications  
at Warsaw

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the question had not been brought to his attention.

(It was therefore decided to adjourn the discussion of this question until the afternoon's meeting, at which time Marshal Foch would have investigated the matter.)

3. (At this point Mr. Hoover and Mr. Coolidge entered the room.)

MARSHAL FOCH referred the Council to his military report of July 17th.<sup>3</sup> He reminded them, however, that the political side of the question still asserted itself, and that this could not be dealt with by him.

Hungarian  
Affairs

M. CLEMENCEAU drew attention to the fact that the question of General Boehm's action had now arisen.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that General Boehm's proposals were of a purely political nature, and that the military situation had altered to a certain extent by reason of the Hungarian attack upon the Roumanian forces. These latter had been prepared, however, and were in a position to resist. The situation, therefore, was in the same posture as it had been when he reported on July 17th.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether Marshal Foch knew anything about General Boehm.

M. TITTONI remarked that General Boehm was the Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Bolshevik forces.

MARSHAL FOCH said that, according to his latest information, General Boehm had held a Lieutenant's rank.

M. PICHON remarked that he was actually the Hungarian Minister at Vienna.

MR. BALFOUR stated that, whilst the problem was both military and political, one side of it was half way between the two. Boehm stated that he had sufficient influence with the Hungarian Armies to crush Bela Kun and set up a Constituent Assembly without the Allies being

<sup>2</sup> Jules Cambon, French representative and president, Commission on Polish Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> Appendix B to HD-9, p. 187.

called upon to strike a blow. This presented the question partly political and partly military. He would therefore like to know whether, in Marshal Foch's opinion, Boehm had the degree of military influence that he claimed and what were the probabilities of his being successful.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that he knew nothing about Boehm, nor of his military qualities. At the same time, the small countries surrounding Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Serbia and Roumania, would not keep a passive attitude for very long in the face of Hungarian aggression and would shortly take an initiative of some kind, since it was obvious that they could not keep their armies mobilised indefinitely.

M. TITTONI said he thought that the information received from Hungary during the past month gave a tolerable picture of the state of affairs in that country. It was clear that Bela Kun represented no more than a minority and that he had raised against himself internal and external enemies. It was even stated that 80 per cent. of the Bolshevik Armies in Hungary were hostile to him; if this were so, the offer of Boehm was only a manifestation of this discontent. Whatever was going to happen, it was evident that the Great Powers must lend some kind of assistance, either military or moral, since the reconstruction of Hungary from within was going to be a lengthy process. Two courses were now open. The first was to send out the Committee, as had been contemplated, and to support it with the promise of ultimate military force. The second course was to adopt immediately, and to put into effect, the military action proposed by Marshal Foch. All reports agreed in thinking that Austria would soon be affected by Bolshevism.

M. PICHON said that he agreed with M. Tittoni, but thought that the functions of the Committee must be kept distinct from the negotiations arising out of Boehm's proposals.

M. TITTONI remarked that, when the Committee had been decided upon, it had been agreed, at the same time, that it should not enter into relations with Bela Kun.

M. PICHON stated that the telegrams from the Allied Ministers proved that Boehm's proposals were being taken seriously. It was therefore for consideration whether the Committee should not, after all, be authorised to deal with him.

M. TITTONI stated that, if Boehm were actually in a position to overthrow Bela Kun, it was none the less certain that he required something from the Allied and Associated Governments. What was it, therefore, that he really wanted?

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Boehm had asked for nothing except moral support.

MR. WHITE stated that, by sending out the Committee, it might appear that the Allied and Associated Governments wished to enter



into negotiations either with Boehm or with Bela Kun; it was not desirable to give this impression. Mr. Hoover had a proposal to make which avoided this difficulty.

M. MANTOUX then read aloud Mr. Hoover's proposal.

MR. BALFOUR then read a draft proposal of his own, stating that it had the fault of coming to no definite conclusion.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, as M. Tittoni had observed, the Council was not entirely clear as to the requests and proposals which Boehm had made to the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that both the military plans and the proposals of Boehm had for their object the expulsion of Bela Kun.

M. TITTONI then said that the following distinct questions should be put to the Allied representatives at Vienna :

1. Was Boehm in good faith, or was he merely acting as an agent of Bela Kun?
2. Was Boehm able to carry out his promises, or did he want assistance?
3. What did he require?

MR. HOOVER said he thought Boehm had definitely asked that the blockade should be raised, foodstuffs sent into the country and navigation on the Danube reopened, if he, on his part, established himself as a temporary dictator.

MR. WHITE confirmed Mr. Hoover's point of view by reading a portion of Appendix A.

M. PICHON said that Boehm had made no demand, but had submitted proposals.

MR. WHITE stated that the Allied Representatives at Vienna evidently thought that Boehm was to be taken seriously.

MR. BALFOUR summarised M. Tittoni's questions, and stated that he thought they had been answered by the fact that our representatives at Vienna believed that Boehm was to be trusted, and was doing no more than asking for certain specific things.

M. TITTONI said that he was not of opinion that explicit answers had been given, and that more detailed replies should be obtained.

MR. BALFOUR then asked Mr. Hoover if he were not justified in saying that the questions had really been answered.

MR. HOOVER replied that, in his opinion, it was dangerous for the Allied and Associated Governments to open negotiations with secret agents. Would it not be possible to make a public declaration of policy and to allow Boehm to make his own deductions from it? Such a declaration might take the form of a statement to the effect that economic assistance would be given to a properly constituted government, and that such a statement would not bind the Conference to subsequent military action.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the fact that Bela Kun had not carried out the Armistice and had made war against our Allies stood out. He remarked that he would conclude his proposals by saying that, if any responsible government should be set up in Hungary, economic aid would be furnished it by the Allied and Associated Powers. He asked, however, whether the conclusion of the Council was that whether military action should be taken or the situation allowed to remain in its present state. He asked, in conclusion, how the declaration could be made public.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that it could be published in the press.

MR. WHITE read from a telegram to the effect that Colonel Cunningham had, on that day, interviewed Boehm, who would be ready to act in a month's time and undertook to overthrow Bela Kun in 48 hours, but that Boehm could not act until he knew whether the Allies would approve of his plans.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the capture of Buda-Pest seemed to be an easy matter, but that the questions which would follow it were most difficult. For instance, if the Roumanians entered Buda-Pest, a very strong feeling would be excited amongst the Hungarians. He then asked Marshal Foch for his opinion on the actual situation of the Hungarian Army.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that Hungary had actually not disarmed. The Army was still in the field and it mattered little whether its leader was Bela Kun or Boehm. Even though a political formula were adopted, as the basis of subsequent action, any person who received support from the Allies might subsequently adopt a new attitude with every prospect of success.

M. CLEMENCEAU then asked how Hungary could be disarmed.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that it could be done by laying down terms so severe that disarmament would be certain. The fact remained that, instead of the 6 divisions which had been allowed to the Hungarian Army, 12 were actually in the field.

MR. BALFOUR then asked whether Marshal Foch believed that an effective disarmament of the Hungarian Army could take place without an occupation of a portion of their territory.

MARSHAL FOCH answered that an ultimatum, backed by military force, could effect what was desired. The threat to attack must remain. He had already stated that the Allied Armies acting in Hungary must be commanded by a single General, who would possibly be a foreigner. Could not the civil government be instituted in the same way by the assistance of a Czecho-Slovak or Roumanian or other nominee? Some decision was none the less necessary.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that there was no inconsistency between the points of view of Mr. Hoover and Marshal Foch. In a public

notification it could be stated why the Allies could not deal with Bela Kun, and what kind of person they would consent to deal with.

(It was therefore decided that Mr. Balfour and Mr. Hoover should confer in the preparation of a public notification to be sent to Hungary, and that it should be presented to the Council at the afternoon meeting.)

(4) M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch to explain his report to the Conference.

**MARSHAL FOCH** then read the conclusions of his report (see Appendix B.) in which he had stated that the total strength of the Army of Occupation should be 6,500 Officers, 151,000 men and 35,000 horses. He stated that these figures had been reached in consultation with the Allied Military Representatives at Versailles. He had since received a letter from General Pershing in which the latter stated that the strength of the American Forces of Occupation would be approximately 6,800 men comprised of one regiment of infantry, one group of cavalry and certain auxiliary troops. He asked whether the proposals in his report were acceptable to the Council.

MR. BALFOUR then asked whether the proportion and numbers of troops to be supplied by each of the Allies in the Army of Occupation had been definitely fixed; because he himself was not aware of this having been done.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that the only question which had been discussed at Versailles was the total effective strength and not the proportion of the strength to be furnished by each Country.

GENERAL THWAITES remarked that the proportion to be furnished by Great Britain had not yet been considered by the War Office.

(After some discussion it was agreed that the proposals of Marshal Foch's report on the subject of the total eventual effective strength of the Armies of Occupation upon the Rhine should be accepted. It was further decided that the question of the proportions in which this total strength was to be furnished by each of the Allies should not be discussed until the War Offices of the Countries concerned had been able to examine the question.)

(5) **MARSHAL FOCH** submitted his reply (see Appendix C) to the question laid before him by the Council, with regard to the Allied Forces necessary in the plebiscite zone in Upper Silesia (see H. D. 12 para. 3).<sup>4</sup> In commenting upon his reply, he drew attention to the fact that the Division required must be an Allied Division, and that each Ally must furnish an equal quota. He

Army of Occupation  
on the Left  
Bank of the Rhine

Size of the Army  
of Occupation in  
the Plebiscite  
Zone of Upper  
Silesia

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 236.



further drew attention to the fact that there was a clause in the Peace Treaty providing for the armed Forces under consideration.

MR. BALFOUR said that the question of employing British troops was most difficult and that the War Cabinet must be consulted.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the question had been decided by the Council of the Heads of Delegations in the sense that an Inter-Allied Division would be necessary. He read the previous decision on the subject (see H. D. 12 para. 3).

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it had been decided that the Armies of Occupation on the Rhine should supply the troops.

MARSHAL FOCH said that such a decision had been arrived at but insisted that the force must be made up by equal numbers of Allied troops.

MR. WHITE remarked that in his opinion the former resolution of the Council had been inconsistent in that it contemplated the use of the troops taken from the Army of Occupation alone, whereas the clause of the Treaty, referred to by Marshal Foch, stated that troops of all the Allies should be used. Italy, one of the Allied Powers, had no troops in the Army of Occupation.

The question of the length of time during which the Army of Occupation of the plebiscite zone would be necessary, was then raised and it was stated that whilst it might be six to eight months, the long-term period contemplated was eighteen months.

MR. WHITE, further commenting upon the resolution of the Council, asked Marshal Foch whether the Division could be raised from the Armies of Occupation when they had been reduced to their ultimate strength of 150,000 men.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Division could be raised under those circumstances from the Army of Occupation, but that at the same time it was necessary to get it ready at once.

(Mr. Balfour again drew attention to the fact that it was necessary for him to refer the matter to Sir Henry Wilson<sup>5</sup> and after a short discussion it was agreed that the question should be adjourned until Mr. Balfour should have consulted with the British War Office.)

(6) MR. BALFOUR read aloud a draft of the telegram that he had prepared for President Wilson. (See Appendix D.)

(It was agreed that M. Clemenceau should communicate the despatch to the President of the United States.)

The Meeting then adjourned.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 25 July, 1919.

<sup>5</sup> Chief of the British Imperial General Staff and member of the War Cabinet since 1918.

## Appendix A to HD-14

[*Capt. Thomas T. C. Gregory of the American Relief Administration  
to the Director General of Relief (Hoover)*]

[VIENNA,] 25 July, 1919.

Received July 25.

Hoover Paris.

For Logan.<sup>6</sup>

Boehm one-time Commander-in-Chief Hungarian Armies, Socialist and most forceful figure in Hungarian Army, at present serving as Hungarian Minister at Vienna called on British Military representative to discover if Entente would be willing to resume relations with Hungarian people. On the 23rd a Conference of Entente representatives in Vienna took place and resulted in submitting to Boehm a plan of action for the overthrow of the present Bolshevik Government in Hungary and as a method which could set up a temporary Government that the Entente would be willing to support. The proposal was as follows:

First. That a dictatorship assuming complete powers of government should be composed of Haubrich, Agoston and Garami<sup>7</sup> these names to be discussed.

Second. The present Communist Government of Bela Kun to be disbanded. Communism to be repudiated and Communist propaganda discontinued.

Third. Pending formation of Government representatives of all classes this dictatorship to continue.

Fourth. Immediate discontinuance of all terroristic confiscation and seizure.

Fifth. That an Entente Advisory body be immediately requested.

Sixth. That the Blockade be discontinued and that steps be undertaken at once by the Entente to furnish coal and food and to assist in freeing navigation of the Danube.

Seventh. No political prosecutions.

Eighth. Final decision of socialization to be left for the permanent Government.

Boehm considered this formula and accepted it provisionally pending discussion with his colleagues. Now that things have gone this far think it imperative that Entente representatives be instructed as to whether Entente approves principles in general to an end that in the case of its approval by Hungarian representatives also we may go ahead. It is (?) reported that there is about to be sent into Hungary a Military Mission composed of four Generals who will

<sup>6</sup> Col. James A. Logan, Jr., member of the American Relief Administration at Paris; United States representative, Relief Section of the Supreme Economic Council.

<sup>7</sup> Joseph H. Haubrich, Hungarian People's Commissar of War; Peter Agoston, Hungarian People's Commissar, member of the moderate wing of the Communist Party; and Ernest H. Garami, Hungarian Social-Democratic politician.

investigate the possibility of a solution for existing conditions. It is urged that if the Entente desires to approve the carrying out of the project above set forth that the departure of this Mission be deferred pending receipt of final conclusions from Boehm for if this is not done the status of the present Hungarian Government will again be fortified by the construction that the Entente intends recognition and the possibilities of success for Boehm would badly suffer.

GREGORY

---

Appendix B to HD-14

[Translation <sup>a</sup>]

COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES  
GENERAL STAFF, FIRST SECTION  
ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

No. 3352

July 15, 1919.

Marshal Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies

To the President of the Council, President of the Peace Conference

The Military Representatives at Versailles, charged by the governments with the duty of drawing up proposals on the subject of the effective number of troops of occupation for the Rhine territories, have adopted the proposals previously established by the military members of the committee charged with the duty of studying the status of these Rhine territories.

These proposals permit 10 infantry divisions and 2 cavalry divisions, or a total effective of: 6,500 officers, 151,000 men, 35,000 horses.

If the governments ratify these proposals, the distribution among the Allied Armies could be as follows:

1 infantry division, Belgium. . . . .	13,000 men.
1 infantry division, U. S. . . . .	13,000 men.
Could be reduced to 1 regiment . . . . .	3,000 men.
2 to 3 infantry divisions, British. . . . .	26,000 to 39,000 men.
5 to 6 infantry divisions, French. . . . .	65,000 to 78,000 men.
1 to 2 cavalry divisions, French. . . . .	5,500 to 11,000 men.

In case the governments should decide to reduce the total effectives (150,000 men), the above distribution would be modified in a corresponding proportion.

I have the honor to request that you acquaint me with the decision of the governments at the earliest possible moment.

FOCH

---

<sup>a</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



## Appendix C to HD-14

[Translation <sup>9</sup>]

COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES  
GENERAL STAFF, FIRST SECTION  
ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

No. 3521

July 25, 1919.

Marshal Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies

To the President of the Council, President of the Peace Conference.

The Secretary General of the Peace Conference communicated to me the minutes of the session of July 21 in which the following resolution was adopted:

"It is decided that the report of the Military Representatives, as well as the proposal for levying the necessary troops from the armies of occupation of the Rhine, accepted this day in principle by the Supreme Council, shall be submitted to Marshal Foch, who shall make known his views as to the possibility of furnishing the division requested for Upper Silesia and its composition."

It is difficult for me to reply, at the moment, to the question raised, because of my lack of knowledge on the subject of the strength of the effectives which will be fixed by the Allied Governments for the occupation troops in the Rhine districts, as well as the distribution of these effectives among the Allied Armies.

In my letters No. 3,198 of July 2 and No. 3,352 of July 15, I requested that you intervene with the Allied Governments insisting upon the urgency of a decision.

In renewing this request, I am studying the eventual dispatch into Upper Silesia of a division to be formed of Allied elements and to be levied on the occupation troops in the Rhine districts.

FOCH

---

Appendix D to HD-14

*Proposed Telegram to President Wilson on the Subject of the  
Blockade of Russia*<sup>10</sup>

The British, French, Italian and Japanese Members of the Council of Five respectfully offer the following observations on the President's telegram relating to neutral trade in the Gulf of Finland. They do not desire to express any opinion upon the statement of International Law laid down in the telegram. It may well be true that where there is no state of belligerency there can be no legal blockade; but they

---

<sup>9</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>10</sup> Transmitted by the Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State for the President in telegram No. 3354, July 27, 1919, *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 154.

would point out that the situation in Russia and in the Gulf of Finland is at the present moment such as hardly to permit the rigid application of rules which in ordinary cases are quite uncontested. The language in which International Law is expressed is fitted to describe the relations between organised States, but is not so well fitted to deal with relations between organised States on the one hand, and unorganised chaos on the other. Russia, during this period of transition, is not a State, but a collection of "de facto" Governments at war with each other; and though it is quite true to say that the Allied and Associated Powers are not in a state of belligerency with Russia, it is also true that they are involved in Military operations with one of these "de facto" Governments, and that they are supplying arms and ammunition to the others.

It may not be proper to describe this condition of things as war, but it cannot be right to treat it as peace; nor can the international rules applicable to a state of peace be applied to it without qualification. The case is a special one, and must be specially treated.

We would venture to point out some of the ill consequences which in the present case would follow from neglecting this consideration.

Allied and Associated troops are defending themselves in circumstances of very great difficulty against Bolshevik attacks in Archangel. Yet we permit the Bolshevik troops who are making these attacks, to receive supplies which we could easily cut off. We are furnishing the Siberian Army of Koltchak with Military equipment; and at the same time we are permitting Military equipment to go to his enemies. We have gone far in the direction of recognising the Esthonians, and other non-Russian peoples, who are struggling to resist Bolshevik attacks; yet we leave neutral traders free to strengthen the Bolshevik Armies, and to convey unhindered information to a hostile Navy as to the number and disposition of our own ships of war.

It may be urged, indeed, that to interfere with neutral commerce will not so much have the effect of hampering the Military operations of those who are engaged in attacking us and our friends, as in aggravating the miseries under which the innocent civil population is already suffering. So far as our information goes, however, this will not be the result. Every cargo successfully brought through the Gulf of Finland to Petrograd supplies a new instrument to the Bolsheviks for adding recruits to their Army. None of it will reach anyone but soldiers and officials. Its distribution will be determined by considerations which are military and not philanthropic. It will not diminish the sufferings of humanity; it will add to them.

It has been suggested that it might be possible for the Four other Great Powers to maintain the control of imports into the Gulf of

Finland without the participation of the United States. We feel, however, the strongest objection to adopting any policy not accepted by all the principal Allied and Associated Powers; and, even apart from this overwhelming consideration, we cannot ignore the fact that if in such circumstances an American ship were to enter the Gulf, an incident might easily occur whose consequences would be well-nigh intolerable.

It is for these reasons that we would most earnestly request the Government of the United States to reconsider their decision; and to concur in a policy which, as it seems to us, is of so special and exceptional a character as to be quite outside the ordinary rules laid down by International Law for the conduct of maritime blockade.

A. J. B[ALFOUR]

25.7.19



**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, July 26, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. H. White.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Bal-  
four, O.M., M.P.

*Secretary*

Mr. H. Norman.  
Sir Ian Malcolm,  
K.C.M.G.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.  
M. Pichon.

*Secretaries*

M. Dutasta.  
M. Berthelot.  
M. de St. Quentin.

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

**JAPAN**

Baron Makino.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . .	Col. U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Colonel Jones.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

Marshal Foch, the Military Advisers, Mr. Hoover and the experts on Polish Affairs entered the room.

- (1) M. CAMBON said that the line proposed by Marshal Foch included in the Polish area the districts of Suwalki and Seiny. The population of this area was Polish. It was therefore preferable so to fix the line as to attribute those territories to Poland.

Line of Demarca-  
tion Between  
Polish and Lith-  
uanian Forces

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether these areas were still occupied by the Germans.

M. CAMBON said the Germans were evacuating the territories slowly.

MR. BALFOUR said he would like to know how the various lines which had been drawn had come about. He understood that the territory was Polish but that it had been deliberately excluded from Polish occupation by the Council of Five. If it were true that the Council had laid down a policy to which the Poles had refused to sub-

mit, it would not be very satisfactory to reverse the Council's policy in favour of the Poles merely because they had been insubordinate.

GENERAL LE ROND explained that when it had been a question of establishing a line of demarcation between Poles and Germans a line had been drawn north and east of the districts of Suwalki and Seiny, giving these to the Poles. This line had been notified but had never been acted on. It had been drawn in accordance with a recommendation of the Committee dealing with the eastern frontiers of Poland. The recommendations of the Committee had come up before the Council but had not been accepted. All the experts had agreed that the territory in question was Polish.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had been told that the territory was mostly Lithuanian. He would like to know what the opinion of the experts really was. (The American, British, French and Italian experts agreed that the population in these districts was mainly Polish.)

GENERAL LE ROND continuing, said that at a later date, according to the demands of the Lithuanian Military Mission, the question was brought before the Council and a line passing just north of Augustovo had been fixed as the line of demarcation between the Polish and Lithuanian forces. This was the green line on the annexed map (see Appendix A). The Poles had complained that there were distinctively Polish areas north of this line and on the 20th June they had proposed that the line of demarcation should be that shown in blue on the map. This line, not only enclosed Polish areas, but also a wide defensive zone in addition. The line since proposed by Marshal Foch, enclosed what were really Polish areas and only a shallow defensive zone in addition. This was the red line on the map.

(NOTE:—Map will be issued later.)

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the change from the green to the red line had been accompanied by or was the result of an offensive action taken by the Poles.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that this was not so. General Henrys<sup>1</sup> had been told to allow the Poles to occupy Polish territory evacuated by the Germans.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had been given the impression that the Poles had defied the orders of the Conference, but he was prepared to accept the explanation given and to agree to the line proposed by Marshal Foch, in view of the unanimous opinion that the territory which would be assigned to the Poles was Polish in character.

(Marshal Foch was then instructed to communicate through General Henrys, the line of demarcation between Polish and Lithuanian forces in the region of Suwalki, Grodno, and Vilna, in accordance with the red line on the annexed map.)

---

<sup>1</sup> Gen. Paul Henrys, chief of the French Military Mission at Warsaw.

2. MR. BALFOUR said that he had had a talk with Mr. Hoover and as a result of his conversation, had prepared a draft which he then read:—

Hungarian  
Affairs

“The Allied and Associated Governments are most anxious to arrange a peace with the Hungarian people, and thus bring to an end a condition of things which makes the economic revival of Central Europe impossible, and defeats any attempt to secure supplies for its population. These tasks cannot even be attempted until there is in Hungary a Government which represents its people, and carries out in the letter and the spirit the engagements into which it has entered with the Associated Governments. None of these conditions are fulfilled by the Administration of Bela Kun: which has not only broken the Armistice to which Hungary was pledged, but is at this moment actually attacking a friendly and Allied Power. With this particular aspect of the question it is for the Associated Governments to deal on their own responsibility. But if Peace is to be settled, if economic reconstruction is to be attempted, if the blockade is to be removed, if supplies are to be made available, the co-operation of the Hungarian people is required. It is only with a Government which really represents them that such a settlement can be arranged.

The Associated Powers think it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of Hungarian territory, as defined by the Peace Conference, will cease as soon as the terms of the Armistice have, in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, been satisfactorily complied with.”

Mr. Balfour, continuing, said that the last paragraph meant that the Roumanians would have to evacuate territory occupied in what was to be Hungary according to the Treaty, as soon as the Armistice had been carried out on the Hungarian side. The draft dealt with one half of the Allied policy. It would explain to the world and to the Hungarians the intentions of the Powers. What instructions should be given to Marshal Foch to carry out this policy remained to be decided. He was strongly of opinion that the Council could not allow the Armistice to be violated with impunity. Having ordered the Hungarians to reduce their troops to six divisions and by implication to remain at peace with the Allies of the Powers, the latter could not sit and watch the Hungarians double their forces and attack their Allies. If Marshal Foch could put an end to this with the forces available, it appeared clear that he ought to do so.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that when Mr. Balfour said that the Powers could not tolerate violation of the Armistice, he presumably meant all the Powers. It was noticeable, however, that there were no Italian, no British and no American troops available, but only the remnants of the two French divisions, together with Czecho-Slovaks, Roumanians and Jugo-Slavs. According to Marshal Foch, the initial effort



required would not be great, and the troops at hand might suffice, but the sequel must be considered.

M. TITTONI said that regarding Italian co-operation, he saw no difficulty in the region of foreign policy, but in respect to internal politics, the outlook was not so clear. Any campaign against Hungary would produce a general strike in Italy. The cost of living had reached heights unequaled in any other country. As to coal, there was only a fortnight's margin. He must therefore state, with great regret, that the economic situation in Italy and its political consequences would not allow Italy to contribute any force for action against Hungary, although action in this direction would suit his foreign policy admirably.

MR. BALFOUR said that two questions were raised by M. Clemenceau's remarks. One was a general question, and the other was a military one. As to the latter, he need say little, as Marshal Foch considered he had enough troops on the spot to undertake action. As to the general question, he would like to ask whether in M. Clemenceau's opinion, it was necessary, whenever Inter-Allied military action was required, that the troops be furnished by an equal contribution of all the Powers interested.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had not meant his remarks to be stretched to that extent. He would like to say, however that his situation, though not as serious as M. Tittoni's, had some analogies with it. There were two French divisions in Bulgaria who were expected to assist the Greeks, and there were two in Hungary, which were expected to act without any Allied assistance whatever.

MR. BALFOUR said the only question remaining then was whether Marshal Foch was right in saying that he had enough troops to proceed with.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had reported on July 17th.<sup>2</sup> Nothing had happened in the intervening week to make him alter his views, provided a definite policy were adopted and an agreement were reached between small States who would be called upon to furnish the main contingent.

MR. BALFOUR asked M. Clemenceau what alternative he had to the policy suggested.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that his alternative would be to allow Hungary to settle her own fate without military intervention. The war was over, the American Army had been withdrawn very rapidly, the British Army nearly as rapidly, and the French Army was being demobilised. He was forced to demobilise very quickly; it could not be helped. He could not, therefore, contemplate the sending of two French divisions into Hungary unsupported by their Allies.

---

<sup>2</sup> Appendix B to HD-9, p. 187.

There would shortly be only two classes under the colours in the French Army. Marshal Foch quite reasonably asked for a definition of the exact intentions of the Conference. This was a political question, and to tell the truth, it was hard to give him an answer. In any case, he was not ready to begin fighting again. He felt inclined to adopt the proposals made by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Hoover. He would encompass Hungary with a ring of hostile States, and rely on her to rid herself of the tyranny of a minority in her own way. Hence, it would be well, as Marshal Foch suggested, to consult the small Powers, who were, in any event, principally concerned. Their position was not clear. The Serbians would only act on certain conditions, the Roumanians also made reservations, and so did the Czechs. What was the net result?

MARSHAL FOCH said that it was for this reason that he recommended that the small Powers should be consulted, in order that the Conference might determine whether their terms could be accepted.

MR. BALFOUR said that he quite understood M. Clemenceau's position. It meant, however, that the Allied and Associated Powers confessed their impotence to enforce their will on a small nation. If what had been said in the Council were known outside, namely, that all the Powers had demobilised so fast under the stress of domestic necessity, it would certainly be regarded as absurd that the Powers, which, eight months ago, were the conquerors of the world, could not, at the present moment, impose their will on an army of 120,000 men. This inglorious situation he did not particularly mind, but he wondered how the Conference would be able to terminate its work successfully. An unpleasant Treaty would have to be imposed on the Bulgarians, and a still more unpleasant one on the Turks. Further, the new small States lately created, must be controlled, and prevented from attacking one another. If the Conference could not enforce its will on Hungary, could it do all these things? If the picture drawn by M. Clemenceau was accurate, the Conference would have to leave its work unfinished.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not take such a gloomy view. All that he wished to do was to adapt the means at the command of the Conference to the ends it had in view. He believed Mr. Hoover held the key of the situation. The offer of food in return for good behaviour would be a very effective weapon. The case was similar to that of Russia, but in the case of Russia, there were no means of coercion, against the Hungarians there were. They could be surrounded, and in time, would have to come to terms. This might be inglorious, but there was little glory in fighting without men, or in making threats that could not be carried out.

MR. BALFOUR said that there was not a very great difference be-

tween his policy and M. Clemenceau's. Marshal Foch might be requested to demand that the Hungarians at least observed the Armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that a reiteration of this demand would not be of much avail, as it had already been made and neglected. He would prefer to accept the proposal Mr. Balfour had read, to avoid issuing any ultimatum, to refrain from engaging Marshal Foch or any troops and to give General Boehm the month for which he had asked. At the end of this time, the situation would not be much worse than the present, one-third of the French troops would have been demobilised, but there would still be means of action, if absolutely necessary.

MARSHAL FOCH said that as long as there was no understanding between the great and the small Powers the situation would not be clear. It would not improve after the lapse of a month or even two or three months. It was even possible that the smaller Powers would get out of hand and destroy the edifice so laboriously set up by the Conference.

MR. BALFOUR said that if assured that the situation would not grow worse he would raise no objection. He presumed that if the Military Authorities said that they could settle the matter at once, failing which the situation would grow worse, M. Clemenceau would agree to act. If Bela Kun was going to fall there need be no anxiety, but on the other hand if he were going to have a military success the result might be grievous.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not prepared to prophesy what would happen. The world had just gone through a fearful war and had only secured fragments of peace. The people were looking out for means of starting their economic life again. He wished to do nothing to jeopardise this reasonable ambition. He could not ask his people to go to war again. They would not do it with the same readiness as they did in 1914. The situation appeared to him to require prudence. No doubt prudence involved some elements of risk but there was a greater risk in giving an ultimatum which, if rejected, would lead to war. Marshal Foch did not offer a clear solution. He made his action conditional on the definition of a certain policy and on the agreement of the lesser powers concerned. Any check would have very serious results in Italy, as M. Tittoni said, in France and also probably in Great Britain. He did not wish to run this risk. The plans of General Boehm offered for the moment a better outlook than existed a week ago. If the Hungarians were really in the majority opposed to Bela Kun they might under the stress of M. Hoover's blandishments overthrow the Bela Kun Government. There might then occur a favourable opportunity of which Marshal Foch could avail himself.



MR. BALFOUR said that he sympathised with M. Clemenceau as he also had no wish to plunge the world into war again. He would add that without a French Commander-in-Chief and without the co-operation of the two French divisions he thought there was little prospect of success. As M. Clemenceau said that neither of these conditions could be fulfilled the case was judged; but he would like to say in justification of the advice he had given that he was not animated by any spirit of adventure. He wished to get his own and other countries out of an adventure. He wished to avoid further misfortunes in the future. He wished the Conference to have the authority which power alone could give. He agreed that the economic weapon was still available. Nevertheless rapid demobilisation had put the Conference into a difficulty which was almost comic. Eight months ago the Allies had fifteen million men in the field; now it was difficult to lay hands on a single battalion. His fear had been that if Bela Kun were allowed to know that the Conference was militarily powerless he might use this knowledge to great effect and the evil might spread all over the world. If the French Government who had two divisions available declined to use them, it was not for him to press for the campaign. Possibly the prestige of past victories and economic power might enable the Allies to overcome this difficulty. He would therefore content himself with half of the policy he had proposed.

MR. WHITE said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau. According to his information Bela Kun was backed by a strong Nationalist movement. Military interference would only reinforce this sentiment which it was not desirable to inflame. The less national support Bela Kun had, the better. The action exercised by Mr. Hoover would therefore have, he thought, greater chances of success than military intervention.

After some further discussion it was decided to issue in the Press and by wireless the following declaration:—

“The Allied and Associated Governments are most anxious to arrange a Peace with the Hungarian People and thus bring to an end a condition of things which makes the economic revival of Central Europe impossible and defeats any attempt to secure supplies for its population. These tasks cannot even be attempted until there is in Hungary a Government which represents its people, and carries out in the letter and the spirit the engagements into which it has entered with the Associated Governments. None of these conditions are fulfilled by the administration of Bela Kun: which has not only broken the armistice to which Hungary was pledged, but is at this moment actually attacking a friendly and Allied Power. With this particular aspect of the question it is for the Associated Governments to deal on their own responsibility. If food and supplies are to be made available, if the blockade is to be removed, if economic reconstruction is to be attempted, if peace is to be settled it can only be done with a

Government which represents the Hungarian people and not with one that rests its authority upon terrorism.

The Associated Powers think it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of Hungarian territory, as defined by the Peace Conference will cease as soon as the terms of the armistice have in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, been satisfactorily complied with."

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in the meantime conversations might be undertaken with the smaller powers.

MR. BALFOUR thought that if it was intended to do nothing this was hardly desirable.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had not meant to convey that he would never act: on some favourable occasion he might. Meanwhile if possible he would like to see the success of General Boehm.

MR. BALFOUR said that if the smaller Powers were called in consultation, the state of demobilisation would have to be revealed to them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said they could be dealt with individually and asked to state under what conditions they would act should action be decided on. The Serbians, for instance, had certain desiderata.

M. TITTONI said that they desired that the Conference should intercede between them and the Italians.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the Conference would do so.

MR. BALFOUR asked what news Marshal Foch had received of the Roumanian Forces.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the news was not bad and that the Roumanians were not alarmed by the Hungarian attack.

MR. BALFOUR said that it would make a great difference if the Hungarian attack failed. Should Bela Kun fall of his own weight it would certainly be better than if he were overthrown by the Allies.

(It was then decided that Marshal Foch should continue negotiations with the Serbo-Croat-Slovene, Roumanian and Czecho-Slovak Delegations in order to obtain from them their exact views regarding the guarantees they required for military intervention in Hungary.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU read the telegram from General Henrys asking, in agreement with the Entente Military representatives, that energetic

action should be taken to force the Germans to cease hostilities in Silesia and in Posnania. The village of Wirruszom had been daily bombarded and partially destroyed. Women and children had been killed and the population was abandoning the village and the cultivation of the fields.

MARSHAL FOCH said that on the 24th, instructions had been sent to General Nudant<sup>3</sup> asking him to order the Germans to put a stop to this at once.

<sup>3</sup> Gen. P. Nudant, French representative and president of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission.

Steps To Be Taken  
To Compel the  
Germans To Cease  
Hostilities in  
Silesia

MR. BALFOUR suggested that it would be desirable to send a Mission immediately.

MR. HOOVER said the situation in Silesia was producing a very serious diminution of the output of coal. Most of central Europe depended on Silesia for coal. For instance, the parlous condition of Vienna resulted from this situation. The best hope resided in an early appointment of a Commission which might restore order. In view of the plebiscite, both Poles and Germans were conducting active propaganda which was having a demoralising effect on production.

M. TITTONI said he had already nominated the Italian member on the Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch, in consultation with the French War Office, to arrange for a designation of the French member.

(It was decided that each power should nominate one member for a Commission to undertake the administration of the plebiscite area of Silesia during the period of plebiscite.)

(It was further decided that the Commission for the delimitation of the Eastern frontiers of Germany be appointed as speedily as possible. It should be composed of four officers for each power (one Commissioner, Head of the Commission, one Assistant Commissioner, two Technical officers.) The nominations were to be made on the following Monday (see Appendix C to H. D. 8. para 2<sup>4</sup>).

MR. WHITE said that he could not make a nomination without reference to Washington; in fact, no American nomination would be possible before ratification of the Treaty by the Senate.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the other members could be nominated in the meantime.

(Marshal Foch and the Military Experts withdrew, and M. Clementel<sup>5</sup> and the Financial & Economic Experts entered the room.)

4. (After a statement by M. Clementel (see Appendix "B"), it was decided that the examination of the question should be resumed on the following Monday.)

Economic Clauses  
for Insertion in  
the Treaty With  
Bulgaria

BARON MAKINO gave notice of an amendment to Article 29, which he would propose at the next meeting. (See Appendix "C".)

5. COLONEL PEEL said that there was unanimous agreement about these clauses (see Appendix "D"). The gist of the proposals was that Bulgaria should undertake to pay two milliards and a quarter of francs in gold. This sum might be reduced by the Reparation Commission should it consider it excessive. An international body, distinct from the Reparation Commission, on which France, Great Britain and

Reparation  
Clauses for Inser-  
tion in the Treaty  
With Bulgaria

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 165.

<sup>5</sup> Etienne Clémentel, French representative and president of the Economic Commission.



Italy would be represented, would be established in Sofia to work out the details. It would have considerable powers, both of raising and controlling taxation in order that the Reparation clauses should be duly executed.

(The Reparation clauses submitted were then accepted.)

6. M. SERGENT said that there was complete agreement regarding the Financial Clauses. (See Appendix "E".)

**Financial Clauses  
for the Treaty  
With Bulgaria**

MR. WHITE said that the American Expert had a word to say.

MR. DULLES said that he thought the text of the Reparation and Financial Clauses should be communicated to the Serbians, Roumanians and Greeks, as they were concerned.

MR. BALFOUR asked what had been done regarding similar clauses in the Treaty with Austria.

MR. DULLES said that there had been a plenary meeting at which the smaller Powers had complained of the short time they had for considering the proposals.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether they were likely to wish to discuss the proposals or merely to hear them.

COLONEL PEEL said that he felt sure that they would be anxious to discuss them and that the discussion would be interminable. He agreed however that the clauses should be communicated to them.

(It was agreed that the Serbian, Roumanian and Greek Delegations should be informed by the President of the Committees, which had drafted the financial and reparation clauses for the Treaty with Bulgaria, of the provisions of these clauses. Should no modification of the present draft result, the text should be communicated forthwith to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Treaty.)

(The Experts then withdrew.)

**A Commission for  
the Delimitation  
of Frontier Be-  
tween Belgium  
and Germany**

7. It was agreed that the nominations of this Commission should be sent to the Secretary-General as speedily as possible.

8. Members of the Commission on Baltic Affairs entered the room.

The following document was read:—

"Considering the importance of maintaining ordered and stable Governments in the Baltic territories as a barrier against Bolshevism on the one hand and against German aggression on the other, and the necessity of close co-operation between these Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments which can only be secured if the Baltic peoples have complete confidence in the intentions of the Allies to protect their liberties in case of the re-establishment of a strong centralised Government in Russia, the Baltic Commission are of opinion that the time has

**Declaration Pro-  
posed by Commis-  
sion on Baltic Af-  
fairs To Be Ad-  
dressed to the  
Governments of  
Esthonia, Latvia,  
and Lithuania**

come when the Allied and Associated Powers should clearly define their policy towards these Governments and recommend that a joint declaration be made to them in the following sense:—

In response to the representation addressed to the Peace Conference by the Esthonian, Lettish and Lithuanian Delegations, the Allied and Associated Powers desire to draw the attention of the Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the fifth condition of their Note to Admiral Koltchak,<sup>6</sup> which runs as follows:—

'If a solution of the relations between Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognise these territories as autonomous, and to confirm the relations which may exist between their *de facto* Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.'

The Allied and Associated Governments are anxious and willing to do all in their power to assist the Baltic Governments to organise their local defences and to re-establish in the interests of general peace an orderly and stable government in these countries.

They further declare their intention to protect their liberties in the event of the re-establishment of a strong centralised Government in Russia.

At the same time it seems to them impossible to reach any definite solution which will guarantee a durable peace without a previous arrangement with a recognised Russian Government, and while reserving to themselves the right of collaboration either directly or through the League of Nations to obtain a settlement satisfactory to both parties, they cannot at the present moment take any steps which would bind them as regards a definite settlement pending the restoration of a recognised Russian Government.

The Allied and Associated Powers would add that they feel confident that if they assist the Governments of Esthonia, Lithuania and Latvia, they may rely on these Governments to accept such provisions as the Allied and Associated Powers may consider necessary for the protection of racial and religious minorities in these territories."

MR. BALFOUR said that the objections to these proposals were clear to him. Their advantages were not manifest.

M. DELLA TORRETTA said that no precise instructions had been given to the Commission on Baltic Affairs. It had therefore studied questions connected with the New States set up on the north west frontier of Russia. There were in these countries *de facto* Governments which had been encouraged by the Allied and Associated Powers to resist, both the Germans and the Bolsheviks, who were either intriguing against them or fighting them. The Commission had thought that these Governments required some moral support from the Entente. A dispatch had been sent to Admiral Koltchak from the Conference in which reference had been made to these New States. A satisfactory answer had come from Admiral Koltchak. The Commission

---

<sup>6</sup> Appendix I to CF-37, vol. VI, p. 73.

thought that it was opportune to do something to encourage these New States. They could not be offered independence, but they might be offered some guarantee for the preservation of their liberties without interfering with Russian sovereignty. In some way or other these *de facto* Governments must be recognised.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had some doubt concerning the Policy proposed. He did not see whom it would please but it would certainly displease the Russians who desired Russia to be restored to its old frontiers. It was unlikely even to please the new states. In one paragraph the telegram to Koltchak was quoted. This telegram was known to the Lithuanians, Letts and Esthonians. Nothing was therefore gained by restating it. The first paragraph added to this extract from the telegram no doubt expressed a truth; but unfortunately the Allied and Associated Powers could not do all they desired to do. There was not much money to give. As to arms and munitions they were being given. If this declaration were made, the Lithuanians, Letts and Esthonians might be led to suppose that they were about to receive more; but this was impossible. The declaration therefore would either merely restate what was being done or raise false hopes. The next paragraph was either not new or represented a somewhat formidable undertaking on the part of the Entente Powers to enter into antagonism with a strong centralised Government in Russia. Such a declaration would not help the Baltic States and might greatly embarrass the Allied Powers. The first sentence of the next paragraph appeared to him to go too far. He hoped that Russia would reconstitute itself, but for the time being he saw no elements tending in that direction. Was it desirable to tell the Baltic States that they must wait for the settlement of their fate until a very remote contingency had taken place? Such a statement could only discourage them. As to the last paragraph, desirable as the proposals suggested might be, it was not an opportune moment to ask for the acceptance of these provisions at a time when the Allied Powers could only offer a very slight assistance to the Baltic States. He could not help thinking that the proposal was a dangerous one and that it failed to convey the encouragement it wished to convey. He would not advise the Council to accept it.

M. DELLA TORRETTA said that the Commission had been unanimous and had considered that its proposals followed directly from the Allied Policy outlined in the telegram to Koltchak. There seemed to be no other way of reconciling the unity of Russia with an offer of autonomy to the Baltic peoples. Certain things had been done which had led these peoples to believe that their fate would be settled by the Conference. They were being supplied with money, arms and munitions. The declaration suggested made no essential alteration in the Allied attitude. All that was aimed at was a transitory



regularisation of the situation and a confirmation of the declarations previously made. The Commission was informed that the Baltic Governments required some encouragement of this kind to continue action against the Bolsheviki on one hand and the Germans on the other.

M. PICHON said that the Lithuanians, Esthonians and Letts had repeatedly asked the Governments of the Powers to recognise them. They had always been told that their efforts were sympathetically regarded and help had been given them as *de facto* Governments in their struggles against Bolsheviki. They had always been told, however, that the Powers could go no further. The ultimate solution must depend on the outcome of the Russian situation. The Council of Five had always kept these two considerations closely connected. The Baltic Delegates had asked whether the Conference would end without settling the question of Russia. He had replied that he hoped it would not but he could not undertake to make a definite statement. The declaration suggested by the Commission would not, he thought, give them any particular satisfaction nor would it please the Russians. What the Baltic States really wanted was separation. This the Conference could not for the time being offer them. Promises of autonomy would not satisfy them. No other declaration, however, could be made without producing a very difficult situation in regard to Russia.

M. DELLA TORRETTA said that the Commission recognised that the declaration would not entirely satisfy the Baltic States. It would, however, be a beginning. On the other hand it would not displease the Russians as it did not threaten the separation of the Baltic Provinces which they feared.

(After some further discussion the question was adjourned.)

(9) M. CLEMENCEAU read a telegram suggesting that three Karelian Delegates elected by an Assembly held at Olonetz be heard by the Peace Conference in order to express the wishes of the population of that region. The Finnish Government was greatly interested in the question and would like the affairs of Karelia to be explained to the Conference.

Despatch of a  
Karelian Delegation  
to the Peace  
Conference

(After some discussion it was decided to refer the question to the Commission on Baltic Affairs.)

(10) M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council of Transylvania had asked the French Representative at Bucharest to grant passports to five Swabians of the Banat anxious to come to Paris to explain to the Conference the desires of the populations they represented. M. Bratiano favoured their request. Before authorising the Delegation to pro-

Despatch of a De-  
legation of Swa-  
bians from the  
Banat

ceed to France the French Government wished to know the opinion of the Allied and Associated Delegations.

(It was decided that this question should be referred to the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, July 26, 1919.

#### Appendix A to HD-15

[Appendix A, referred to on page 316 as a map upon which are indicated the lines of demarcation between the Polish and Lithuanian forces, does not accompany the file copy of the minutes. The map is filed under Paris Peace Conf. 186.3116/4.]

#### Appendix B to HD-15

[Translation<sup>8</sup>]

#### *Observations on the Economic Clauses Inserted in the Peace Treaty With Bulgaria*

The economic clauses to be inserted in the treaty with Bulgaria were adopted unanimously by the Economic Commission. Later, three modifications were proposed, relating to articles 35, 36, and 51.

#### ARTICLE 35

Article 35, which was unanimously adopted by the Economic Commission, has been made the subject of reservations by the English delegation. The effect of this article is to confirm the substitution of Bulgaria in the obligations of Turkey with regard to concessionaires and beneficiaries of contracts in the territories ceded to Bulgaria under the 1912 [1913?] treaties.

This substitution was guaranteed by the Bulgaro-Turk treaty of September 16/29, 1913<sup>9</sup> and by the Greco-Turk treaty of November 1/4 [14], 1913.<sup>10</sup>

In order to accede to the requests of the English delegation, as well as to certain reservations which have been made in recent days by interested French groups, it would perhaps be expedient to suppress article 35 and to deal with the question in the treaty with Turkey.

<sup>8</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>9</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cvii, p. 706.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 893.

The necessary guarantee would be assured by the insertion in the treaty with Bulgaria:

(a) Of a general clause providing that:

"Bulgaria undertakes to adhere, in matters which concern her, to all the stipulations of the treaty which the Allied and Associated Powers will conclude with Turkey."

(b) A clause to be inserted in the treaty with Bulgaria providing that:

"the cession states of Bulgarian territories will assure to the nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers and to the companies controlled by them in the transferred territories, the advantages and guarantees which they enjoy under the Bulgaro-Turk treaty of September 16/29, 1913 or of the Greco-Turk treaty of November 1/14, 1913."

#### ARTICLE 36

(1) In the first two lines, it is a question of agreements between the Bulgarian Government and Allied companies which would seem to exclude concessions granted by Bulgarian authorities other than the Government. For this reason, it would seem expedient to replace the words: "The Bulgarian Government" by "The Bulgarian authorities", so as to include especially various concessions granted by the city of Sophia, and whose owners have been robbed of them.

#### ARTICLE 51

Article 51 was formulated before changes were made, on the one hand, in the treaty with Germany (article 297, paragraph (h) 2 and article 92), and on the other hand in the treaty with Austria (article 49 of Part X, Economic Clauses).

Article 51 becomes useless, since article 31 was put in harmony with the doctrine of the preceding treaties. According to this doctrine, Bulgarian property in the transferred territory could be liquidated only for the benefit of Bulgarian claimants, but the Reparations Commission could oppose the payment of the proceeds of these liquidations.

#### CLAUSES RESERVED

The four clauses (A) to (D) contained in the annex, are those for which the Economic Commission did not consider itself solely competent. The Economic Commission transmitted them to other Commissions. Clause (A) alone received favorable consideration from the Commissions consulted by the General Secretariat. A final decision could not be obtained to date on clauses (B) and (C).



## Appendix C to HD-15

[Translation <sup>11</sup>]*Draft of Article 29 for Insertion in the Peace Treaty With Bulgaria*

The privileges and immunities of foreign subjects as well as the rights of jurisdiction and of consular protection attaching to the Allied and Associated Powers in Bulgaria in virtue of capitulations and usages as well as of treaties can be made the subject of special conventions between each of the interested Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria. Concerning these matters, the principal Allied and Associated Powers will enjoy most-favored-nation treatment in Bulgaria.

The Allied and Associated Powers concerned undertake among themselves to formulate only conditions to the stipulations of the present treaty. In case of difference of opinion among them, the League of Nations will be called upon to decide.

---

Appendix D to HD-15*Bulgarian Treaty.—Reparations Clauses*

JULY 25, 1919.

## ARTICLE 1

Bulgaria recognises that, by joining in the war of aggression which Germany and Austria-Hungary waged against the Allied and Associated Powers, she has caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds, for which she ought to make adequate reparation.

On the other hand, the Allied and Associated Powers recognise that the resources of Bulgaria are not sufficient to enable her to make adequate reparation. Bulgaria, therefore, agrees to pay and the Allied and Associated Powers agree to accept, as being such reparation as Bulgaria is able to make, the sum of 2,250,000,000 (two and a-quarter milliards) francs gold.

This amount shall (except as hereinafter provided) be discharged by a series of half-yearly payments on the 1st January and the 1st July in each year, beginning on the 1st July, 1920.

The payments on the 1st July, 1920, and the 1st January, 1921, shall represent interest at the rate of 2 per cent. per annum on the total sum from the 1st January, 1920. Thereafter, each half-yearly payment shall include payment of interest at 5 per cent. per annum on the amount of the capital sum outstanding, and the payment of

---

<sup>11</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

a sinking fund at a rate sufficient to extinguish the total amount in 37 years from the 1st January, 1921.

These sums shall be remitted through the Inter-Allied Commission created under this Treaty to the Reparation Commission created by the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed on the 28th June, 1919 (hereinafter referred to as the Reparation Commission), and shall be disposed of by the Reparation Commission in accordance with the arrangements already made.

If the Reparation Commission desires at any time to dispose, either by sale or otherwise, of gold bonds based on the payments to be made by Bulgaria, it shall have power to do so. The nominal amount of the bonds shall be fixed by it after taking due account of the provisions of Articles 2, 3 and 8 of this Part in consultation with the Inter-Allied Commission, but shall in no case exceed the total capital sums then outstanding.

Bulgaria undertakes in such case to deliver to the Reparation Commission, through the Inter-Allied Commission, the necessary bonds in such form, number, denominations and terms as the Reparation Commission may determine. These bonds shall be free of all taxes and charges of every description established, or to be established, by the Bulgarian Government.

These bonds shall be the direct obligations of the Bulgarian Government, but all arrangements for the service of the bonds shall be made by the Inter-Allied Commission. The Inter-Allied Commission shall pay all interests, sinking fund or other charges connected with the bonds out of the half-yearly payments to be made by Bulgaria in accordance with this Article. The surplus, if any, shall continue to be paid to the order of the Reparation Commission.

## ARTICLE 2

The Inter-Allied Commission shall from time to time consider the resources and capacity of Bulgaria, and, after giving her Representatives a just opportunity to be heard, shall have discretion to recommend to the Reparation Commission either a reduction of any particular payment due or a postponement of such payment or a reduction of the total capital sum to be paid by Bulgaria. The Reparation Commission shall have power by a majority of votes to make any reduction or postponement up to the extent recommended by the Inter-Allied Commission.

## ARTICLE 3

Bulgaria shall have the power at any time, if she so desires, to make immediate payments in reduction of the total capital sum due over and above the half-yearly payments.

## ARTICLE 4

Bulgaria recognises the transfer to the Allied and Associated Powers of any claims by the Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey against the Bulgarian Government.

The Allied and Associated Powers, on the other hand, agree not to require from Bulgaria any payment in respect of claims so transferred arising out of the supply by Austria-Hungary and Germany of war material since the 1st August, 1914, as they have taken these claims into account in fixing the amount to be paid by Bulgaria under Article 1.

## ARTICLE 5

Bulgaria binds herself to discover and forthwith return to the Governments of Greece, Roumania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State respectively any records or archives or any articles of archaeological, historic or artistic interest which have been taken away from the territories of those countries during the present war.

Any dispute between the Governments above named and Bulgaria as to the ownership of any such articles shall be referred to an arbiter to be appointed by the Inter-Allied Commission, whose decision shall be final.

## ARTICLE 6

Bulgaria further binds herself to deliver to the Governments of Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, within six months from the coming into force of this Treaty, livestock of the descriptions and in the numbers set out in the Annex of this Article.

These animals shall be delivered at such places as may be appointed by the respective Governments. They shall be inspected before delivery by agents appointed by the Inter-Allied Commission, who shall satisfy themselves that the animals so delivered are of average health and condition.

No credit shall be made to Bulgaria in respect of their value, but the animals handed over shall be regarded as having been delivered in restitution for animals taken away by Bulgaria during the war from the territories of the countries named.

## ANNEX TO ARTICLE 6

	Greece	Serbia	Roumania
Bulls (18 months to 3 years).....	15	50	60
Milch Cows (2 to 6 years).....	1, 000	3, 000	4, 000
Horses and Mares (3 to 7 years).....	1, 500	2, 500	3, 500
Mules.....	300	500	700
Draught Oxen.....	1, 200	2, 000	2, 800
Sheep.....	4, 000	6, 000	10, 000



## ARTICLE 7

By way of special compensation for the destruction caused to the coal-mines situated on Serbian territory by the Bulgarian armies, the Bulgarian Government undertakes, subject to the proviso contained in the final paragraph of this Article, to deliver to the Government of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State during five years from the coming into force of this Treaty 50,000 tons of coal a year, from the output of the Bulgarian State mines at Pernik. These deliveries will be made free on rail on the Serbian frontier on the Pirot-Sofia railway.

The value of these deliveries will not be credited to Bulgaria, and will not be taken in diminution of the payment required under Article 1.

Provided, nevertheless, that these deliveries will only be made subject to the approval of the Inter-Allied Commission, which approval shall only be given if and in so far as the Commission is satisfied that such deliveries of coal will not unduly interfere with the economic life of Bulgaria. The decision of the Commission on this point shall be final.

## ARTICLE 8

The following shall be reckoned as credits to Bulgaria in respect of her reparation obligations:—

Amounts due to Bulgaria in respect of transfers under Part . . . (Financial clauses)\* (Economic), (Ports and Waterways).

## ARTICLE 9

In order to facilitate the discharge by Bulgaria of the obligations assumed by her under this Treaty, there shall be established at Sofia as soon as possible after the signature of this Treaty an Inter-Allied Commission, composed of three members to be nominated respectively by the Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy.

The Government of Bulgaria shall be represented by a Commissioner, who shall take part in the sittings of the Commission whenever invited by the Commission to do so, but shall not have the right to vote.

The Inter-Allied Commission shall be constituted in the form and shall possess the powers prescribed by the present Treaty, including the Annex to this Article.

The Commission shall continue in existence as long as any of the payments due under the terms of this Part of the present Treaty remain unpaid. Each Government represented on the Commission

---

\*Note to Drafting Committee.—This Article to be concluded later. [Footnote in the original.]

shall have the right to withdraw therefrom upon six months' notice filed with the Commission.

The Members of the Inter-Allied Commission shall enjoy the same diplomatic rights and immunities as the personnel of the Legations accredited to Bulgaria.

The Bulgarian Government agrees to provide by law, within six months of the coming into force of this Treaty, the necessary authority for the functioning of this Commission. The text of this law must be approved in advance by the Powers represented on the Commission. It must conform to the principles and rules laid down in the Annex to this Article and also to any other relevant provisions laid down in this Treaty.

#### ANNEX TO ARTICLE 9

1. The Commission shall elect a Chairman annually from its members, and it shall establish its own rules and procedure.

Each member shall have the right to nominate a deputy to act for him in his absence.

Decisions shall be taken by the vote of the majority (except when a unanimous vote is expressly required). Abstention from voting is to be treated as a vote against the proposal under discussion. In case of an equality of votes, when the difference of opinion among the members of the Commission cannot be solved by reference to their Governments, the question at issue shall be referred for decision to the Reparation Commission.

The Commission shall appoint such agents and employees as it may deem necessary for its work.

The cost of administration of the Commission shall be paid by Bulgaria and shall be a first charge on the revenues payable to the Commission. The salaries of the members of the Commission shall be fixed on a reasonable basis by agreement from time to time between the Governments represented on the Commission.

2. Bulgaria undertakes to afford to the members, officers and agents of the Commission full power to visit and inspect at all reasonable times any places, public works or undertakings in Bulgaria, and to furnish to the said Commission all records, documents and information which it may require.

3. The Bulgarian Government undertakes to place at the disposal of the Commission in each half-year sufficient amounts in francs gold, or such other currency as the Commission may decide, to enable it to remit at due date the payments on account of reparation; the Bulgarian Government also undertakes to pay to the Commission any other such amounts as may be necessary to meet obligations undertaken by Bulgaria under this Treaty.

In the law relating to the Commission, there shall be laid down a list of the taxes and revenues (now existing or hereafter to be created) estimated to be sufficient to produce the sums above referred to. This list of taxes and revenues shall include all revenues or receipts arising from concessions made or to be made for the working of mines or quarries or for the carrying on of any works of public utility or of any monopolies for the manufacture or sale of any articles in Bulgaria. This list of taxes and revenues may be altered from time to time with the unanimous consent of the Commission.

If at any time the revenues so assigned shall prove insufficient, the Bulgarian Government undertakes to assign additional revenues. If the Bulgarian Government does not assign sufficient revenues within three months of a demand by the Commission, the Commission shall have the right to add to the list additional revenues created or to be created, and the Bulgarian Government undertakes to pass the necessary law.

In case of default by Bulgaria in the performance of her obligations expressed in Articles 1 and 9 and in the Annex to Article 9 the Commission shall be entitled to the extent and for the period it may determine to assume the full control and management of and undertake the collection of such taxes and sources of revenue and to hold and disburse the proceeds thereof, and to apply any net proceeds after meeting the cost of administration and collection to the satisfaction of the reparation obligations of Bulgaria, subject to any priorities laid down in this Treaty.

In the case of such action by the Commission in consequence of a default by Bulgaria, Bulgaria undertakes to recognise irrevocably the authority and powers of the said Commission, to abide by its decisions and to obey its directions.

4. By agreement with the Bulgarian Government, the Commission shall have power to assume the control and management and the collection of any taxes, even if no default has occurred.

5. The Commission shall also take over any other duties which may be assigned to it under this Treaty.

6. No member of the Commission shall be responsible, except to the Government appointing him, for any action or omission of such member. No one of the Allied or Associated Governments assumes any responsibility in respect of any other Government.

#### ARTICLE 10

Bulgaria undertakes to pass, issue and maintain in force any legislation, orders and decrees that may be necessary to give effect to these provisions,



## Appendix E to HD-15

*Financial Clauses for Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria*

JULY 25, 1919.

## ARTICLE 1

Subject to the provisions of Article 7 and to such exceptions as the Inter-Allied Commission established by Article . . . , Chapter . . . , of the present Treaty may unanimously approve, a first charge upon all the assets and revenues of Bulgaria shall be the cost of reparation and all other costs arising under the present Treaty or any treaties or agreements supplementary thereto, or under arrangements concluded between Bulgaria and the Allied and Associated Powers during the Armistice.

Up to the 1st May, 1921, the Bulgarian Government shall not export or dispose of, and shall prohibit the export or disposal of gold without the previous approval of the Inter-Allied Commission.

## ARTICLE 2

There shall be paid by Bulgaria the total cost of all armies of the Allied Governments occupying territory within its boundaries, as defined by the present Treaty, from the date of the signature of the Armistice of the 29th September, 1918,<sup>12</sup> including the keep of men and beasts, lodging and billeting, pay and allowances, salaries and wages, bedding, heating, lighting, clothing, equipment, harness and saddlery, armament and rolling-stock, air services, treatment of sick and wounded, veterinary and remount services, transport services of all sorts (such as by rail, sea or river, motor lorries), communications and correspondence, and, in general, the cost of all administrative or technical services, the working of which is necessary for the training of troops and for keeping their numbers up to strength and preserving their military efficiency.

The cost of such liabilities under the above heads, so far as they relate to purchases or requisitions by the Allied Governments in the occupied territory, shall be paid by the Bulgarian Government to the Allied Governments in any legal currency of Bulgaria. In cases where an Allied Government, in order to make such purchases or requisitions in the occupied territory, has incurred expenditure in a currency other than Bulgarian currency, such expenditure shall be reimbursed in Bulgarian currency at the rate of exchange current at the date of reimbursement, or at an agreed rate.

All other of the above costs shall be paid in the currency of the country to which the payment is due.

---

<sup>12</sup> Vol. II, p. 241.

## ARTICLE 3

Bulgaria engages to pay towards the charge for the service of the external pre-war Ottoman Public Debt, both in respect of territory ceded by Turkey under the Treaty of Constantinople, 1913,<sup>13</sup> for the period during which such territory was under Bulgarian sovereignty, and in respect of territory the cession of which is confirmed by this Treaty, such sums as may be determined hereafter by the Commission to be appointed for the purpose of assessing the contributive parts of that debt amongst the Powers to which Ottoman territory is ceded.

## ARTICLE 4

The priority of the charges established by Articles 1, 2, and 3 shall be as follows:—

(i.) The first charge shall be for the cost of military occupation as defined by Article 2 of the present chapter of this Treaty.

(ii.) The second charge shall be for the service of such part of the external pre-war Ottoman Public Debt as may be attributed to Bulgaria under this or any other Treaty in respect of the cession to Bulgaria of territory formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire.

(iii.) The third charge shall be for the cost of reparation as prescribed by this Treaty or any Treaties or agreements supplementary thereto.

## ARTICLE 5

Bulgaria confirms the surrender of all material handed over or to be handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers in accordance with the Armistice Agreement of the 29th September, 1918, and recognises the title of the Allied and Associated Powers to such material.

There shall be credited to the Government of Bulgaria against the sums due from it to the Allied and Associated Powers for reparation, the value, as assessed by the Reparation Commission acting through the Inter-Allied Commission, of such of the above material for which, as having non-military value, credit should, in the judgment of the Reparation Commission acting through the Inter-Allied Commission, be allowed.

Property belonging to the Allied and Associated Governments or their nationals, restored or surrendered under the Armistice Agreement, in specie, shall not be credited to the Government of Bulgaria.

## ARTICLE 6

The right of each of the Allied and Associated Powers to dispose of enemy assets and property within its jurisdiction at the date of

<sup>13</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVII, p. 706.

the coming into force of the present Treaty is not affected by the foregoing provisions.

#### ARTICLE 7

All rights created and all securities specifically assigned in connection with loans contracted or guaranteed by the Bulgarian Government which were actually contracted or guaranteed before the 1st August 1914, are maintained in force without any modification.

#### ARTICLE 8

If, in accordance with Articles 235 and 260 of the Treaty with Germany, signed on the 28th June, 1919, and the corresponding Articles in the Treaties with Austria and Hungary, all rights, interests and securities held by any German, Austrian, or Hungarian national under the contracts and agreements regulating the loan contracted by Bulgaria in Germany in July, 1914, are taken over by the Reparation Commission, Bulgaria undertakes to do everything in her power to facilitate this transfer. Bulgaria likewise undertakes to hand over to the Reparation Commission within six months of the coming into force of this Treaty all such rights, interests and securities held by Bulgarian nationals under the contracts and agreements regulating the said loan. The rights, interests, and securities held by Bulgarian nationals will be valued by the Reparation Commission, and their value will be credited to Bulgaria on account of the sums due for reparation, and Bulgaria shall be responsible for indemnifying her nationals so dispossessed.

Notwithstanding anything in the preceding Article, the Reparation Commission shall have full power, in the event of the transfer to it of the interests mentioned above, to modify the terms of the contracts and agreements regulating the loan, or to make any other arrangements connected therewith which it shall deem necessary, without prejudice to the rights under the contracts and agreements of any persons interested therein other than German, Austrian, Hungarian, or Bulgarian nationals, and without prejudice to the rights of the holders of Bulgarian Treasury Bills issued in France in 1912 and 1913 to be reimbursed out of the proceeds of the next financial operation undertaken by Bulgaria. By agreement with the parties concerned, the claims referred to above may be paid off either in cash or in an agreed amount of the bonds of the loan. Any arrangement with regard to the loan and the contracts and agreements connected therewith shall be made after consultation with the Inter-Allied Commission, and the Inter-Allied Commission shall act as agent of the Reparation Commission in any matters connected with the loan, if the Reparation Commission so decides.



## ARTICLE 9

Nothing in the provisions of this Part of this Treaty shall prejudice in any manner charges or mortgages lawfully effected in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers or their nationals, respectively, before the date at which a state of war existed between Bulgaria and the Allied or Associated Powers concerned by the Government of Bulgaria or by Bulgarian nationals on assets in their ownership at that date, except in so far as variations of such charges or mortgages are specifically provided for under the terms of the present Treaty or any Treaties or agreements supplementary thereto.

## ARTICLE 10

Any power to which Bulgarian territory was ceded under the Treaty of Bucharest, 1913,<sup>14</sup> or under the Treaty of Constantinople, 1913, or is ceded under this Treaty, undertakes to pay in such manner as may be prescribed such contribution towards the charge for the Bulgarian Public Debt as it stood on the 1st August, 1914, as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, acting through the Inter-Allied Commission, may determine to be equitable, having regard to the ratio between the revenues of the ceded territory and the total revenues of Bulgaria for the average of the three complete financial years next before the Balkan War (1912).

## ARTICLE 11

Any State to which Bulgarian territory is ceded shall acquire all property and possessions situated within such territory belonging to the Bulgarian Government, and the value of such property and possessions so acquired shall be fixed by the Reparation Commission and placed by it to the credit of Bulgaria or Turkey and to the debit of the State acquiring such property or possessions.

For the purposes of this Article, the property and possessions of the Bulgarian Government shall be deemed to include all the property of the Crown.

## ARTICLE 12

1. Having regard to the provisions of Article 292 of the Treaty with Germany and the corresponding articles of the Treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Turkey, Bulgaria renounces any benefit disclosed by the Treaties of Bucharest, 1917 [1918],<sup>15</sup> and Brest-Litovsk,<sup>16</sup> and by

<sup>14</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVII, p. 658.

<sup>15</sup> Treaty of Peace between Roumania and the Central Powers, May 7, 1918, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 771.

<sup>16</sup> Treaty of Peace between Russia and the Central Powers, March 3, 1918, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 442.

the Treaties supplementary thereto, and undertakes to transfer either to Roumania or to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, as the case may be, any monetary instruments, specie, securities, and negotiable instruments or goods which she may have received under the aforesaid Treaties.

2. Any sums of money and all securities, instruments, and goods, of whatsoever nature, to be delivered, paid, and transferred under the provisions of this Article, shall be disposed of by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in a manner hereafter to be determined by those Powers.

#### ARTICLE 13

The Bulgarian Government undertakes to refrain from preventing or impeding such acquisition by the German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Turkish Governments of any rights and interests of German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Turkish nationals in public utility undertakings or concessions operating in Bulgaria as may be required by the Reparation Commission under the terms of the Treaties of Peace between Germany, Austria, Hungary and Turkey and the Allied and Associated Powers.

#### ARTICLE 14

Bulgaria undertakes to transfer to the Reparation Commission any claims she may have to payment or reparation by the Governments of Germany, Austria, Hungary, or Turkey, and in particular any claims which may arise now or hereafter in the fulfilment of undertakings made between Bulgaria during the war and those Governments. Any sums which the Reparation Commission may recover in respect of such claims shall be transferred to the credit of the Bulgarian Government on account of the sums due for reparation.

#### ARTICLE 15

Any monetary obligation arising out of the present Treaty shall be understood to be expressed in terms of gold, and shall, unless some other arrangement is specifically provided for in any particular case under the terms of this Treaty or any Treaty or agreement supplementary thereto, be payable at the option of the creditors in pounds sterling payable in London, gold dollars of the United States of America payable in New York, gold francs payable in Paris, or gold lire payable in Rome.

For the purpose of this Article, the gold coins mentioned above shall be defined as being of the weight and fineness of gold as enacted by law on the 1st January, 1914.

## ARTICLE 16 †

The High Contracting Powers declare that they renounce reciprocally all claims to reimbursement of sums due for the maintenance of prisoners of war within their respective territories.

---

† The Drafting Committee will doubtless consider whether this Article should be placed here or in the Chapter concerned with Prisoners of War. [Footnote in the original.]



**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 28 July, 1919, at 10: 30 a. m.**

**PRESENT**

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. H. White.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.	M. Clemenceau. M. Pichon.
<i>Secretary</i> Mr. L. Harrison.	<i>Secretaries</i> Mr. H. Norman. Sir Ian Malcolm, M. P.	<i>Secretaries</i> M. Dutasta. M. Berthelot. M. de St. Quentin.
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Tittoni.	Baron Makino.
	<i>Secretary</i> M. Paterno.	<i>Secretary</i> M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . .	Colonel U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lt. Colonel A. Jones.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that as his colleagues knew, he had informed the Chamber of Deputies that he could not communicate to them the records of the proceedings of the Council of Four. This had been in accordance with the wishes of his colleagues. The Minutes of the Council of Four had been given to the members of the Council only. The present Council, it had been agreed, should proceed in the same manner. He now heard that the British Delegation wished to distribute the Minutes to as many as twelve experts or departments, while the French and other Secretariats were interpreting the order more strictly. He thought that the Minutes should only be sent to persons present in the Council.

MR. BALFOUR asked how many copies of the Minutes were sent to French experts or departments.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that none were sent.

M. TITTONI said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau that the distribution should be very carefully restricted, and that only extracts be sent to the experts or departments concerned.

Distribution of  
Minutes of the  
Meetings of the  
Council

MR. BALFOUR explained that a request had been made from London that various Departments should receive copies of the Minutes, as they concerned the work in which they were engaged. As his colleagues desired that the circulation should be restricted, he would reply that this could not be done.

(It was agreed that a strict interpretation of the Resolution adopted on the 5th [7th] July—See H. D. 1, Minute 11<sup>1</sup>—should be adhered to.)

2. (At this point, M. Loucheur and Mr. Waterlow entered the room.)

Italian Proposal  
for the Creation of  
an Inter-Allied  
Organisation for  
the Distribution of  
Raw Materials

M. TITTONI put forward the following proposal:—

“In consideration of the fact that the persistent difficulties of provisioning Allied countries necessitate the continuation of a united and co-ordinated course of action in order to avoid the danger of famine.

*It is resolved*

that the Allied and Associated Powers shall form an organisation whose duty it will be to control and determine the respective requirements so far as concerns the most essential products (grain, coal, etc.) and to co-ordinate action so far as concerns purchases in the various producing countries and transport; and

*It is also resolved*

to refer the question to the Supreme Economic Council with a recommendation to the said Council to name a Commission which shall determine as speedily as possible the working details of the above-mentioned organisation and which shall render the said organisation effective.”

M. LOUCHEUR said that the French Delegation had always supported the continuance of the Supreme Economic Council, in spite of British and American opposition. The British opposition had since been modified, as Mr. Lloyd George had come to see the importance of a common purchasing policy. The American Delegation, however, seemed still firmly opposed to the proposal.

MR. WHITE said that the United States were, in fact, quite unwilling to sanction the continuance of the Supreme Economic Council.

M. TITTONI said that the question he had raised was one of extreme importance for Italy. Italy was in distress. This distress was a consequence of the war and should be treated in the same manner as it would have been treated had it come about during the war. As long as the Government could keep the people fed and supplied with work, it could maintain order. Without these conditions, it could not. He felt it necessary to make this statement. If Italy were left without succour, he would decline all responsibility as regards the future.

MR. WHITE said that he expected Mr. Hoover back from Brest on the following day. In the meantime, he did not object to the refer-

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 41.

ence of the question to the Supreme Economic Council, as it still existed.

M. LOUCHEUR said that, quite apart from any questions of the official constitution of the Council he and his colleagues had agreed to meet to see what measures could be taken to assist an Ally in distress. There was still a small sub-Committee dealing with coal. He was himself Chairman of this Committee, and he was ready, should the Council desire it, to call the Committee together to study the question raised by M. Tittoni.

MR. BALFOUR asked who the British Representative was.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he would be able to inform Mr. Balfour later.

MR. BALFOUR said that the question was not merely one of help from one country to another. It went deeper than that. The war was now over and new problems but equally difficult problems, had arisen. The situation resulting from the war had to be liquidated. The various Allied States were mutually indebted. Their only means of discharging their debts was by exports. Great Britain could only pay off her indebtedness by the production and exportation of coal. For coal was not only one of the principal British exports, but it was also the means necessary for every form of manufacture. The situation could not be solved, as during the war, by suppressing train services and doing away with superfluities. It went to the roots of the whole economic relations of all countries, not merely of the Allied countries between themselves. It was not simply a question of the rich helping the poor in any one particular commodity. It was for this reason that he had enquired who the British Representative on M. Loucheur's Committee was. It was necessary that a matter of this sort should be dealt with by a first-class Minister, intimately acquainted with the whole economic and financial situation. He understood that the future Economic Council, if created, would include first-class Finance Ministers from each of the countries concerned.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question, nevertheless, was one of life or death. Whether it be a peace question or a war question, it made little difference whether a man died by bullet wounds or by starvation. He, therefore, suggested that the matter be discussed on the following day, together with Mr. Hoover and M. Loucheur.

(This was agreed to.)

M. LOUCHEUR asked if he was authorised to examine the situation in the meantime with the Italian experts.

M. TITTONI said that he would be able to furnish him with all the figures showing the stocks at present existing in Italy.

(M. Loucheur's suggestion was approved.)



3. M. LOUCHEUR said that, before he left, he would like to draw attention to an item on the Agenda which was a Report of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways, affecting the distribution of rolling stock in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. This rolling stock represented a security in the hands of the Allied and Associated Powers on the same footing as other possessions of the Enemy States. The Commissions mentioned in Article 371 and 372 of the Treaty with Germany should not, in his opinion, act independently of the Reparation Commission. He was in no manner opposed to the nomination of the Committee of Experts, as suggested, but he thought this Committee should work in conjunction with the Reparation Commission.

Distribution of  
Rolling Stock in  
Germany, Austria-  
Hungary and  
Bulgaria

(Note was taken of M. Loucheur's views on the subject, and the question of the appointment of a Committee of Experts was postponed for a future meeting.)

(M. Loucheur then withdrew.)

4. (At this point, M. Seydoux entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he understood that the United States of America and Great Britain had resumed postal relations with Germany without informing France.

Re-establishment  
of Postal Commu-  
nication With  
Germany

MR. WATERLOW stated that a notification had been published in the British Press to the effect that postal relations might be resumed.

MR. WHITE said that, when it had been decided to put an end to the Blockade and to the Censorship, it had been understood that a resumption of postal relations followed automatically.

MR. BALFOUR said that the main decision had been to put an end to the Blockade and to the Censorship and that the logical consequence of these decisions was the resumption of intercourse.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, nevertheless, no warning had been given to France. Further, until ratification, the Allied and Associated Powers were still in a state of war with Germany.

M. SEYDOUX said that the Supreme Economic Council had been asked to study the question of resuming postal relations. It was obvious that some letters must be allowed to pass, if the Blockade and Censorship came to an end. Technical experts had, therefore, prepared the document before the Council. At the very same time, he had read, in the "Daily Mail", the notification alluded to by Mr. Waterlow and had since heard that the United States had taken similar action. He then read and commented on the following document:—

"The Special Committee charged by the Supreme Economic Council to study the question of the re-establishment of postal relations with Germany, has unanimously taken the following decisions:—which are

submitted for the approval of the Supreme Council of the Heads of Governments.

1. The Post Offices of the Allied and Associated countries are authorised to enter into direct relations with the German Post Office for the immediate re-establishment of postal relations both for ordinary and registered post, and for samples and parcels.

2. The question of transport of postal matter by Germany will be examined by the German Delegation at Versailles together with the Allied and Associated Delegates.

3. The telegraph offices of the Allied and Associated countries are authorised to enter into direct relations with the German telegraphic office for the provisional re-establishment of telegraphic and telephonic communication.

4. The public will be notified as soon as possible that postal and telegraphic relations with non-occupied Germany will be re-opened under the following conditions:—

- a) Commercial correspondence can be sent sealed.
- b) Private correspondence can only be sent by postcard.
- c) The above-mentioned correspondence can be registered.
- d) Telegrams should be written *en clair* and only in the following languages: French, English, Italian or German.
- e) Each administration will later publish the conditions under which the telephone service will be re-started.

5. The postal and telegraphic control services will be notified of the above decisions so that they may take any necessary measures.

6. In submitting the above propositions to the Supreme Council of the Heads of Governments, the Special Committee recommends that the resolution of the Communications Section concerning the immediate re-establishment of international railway services with Germany may be adopted, in order to render the lifting of the blockade effective, and that this resolution be passed for action to the Governments concerned."

M. CLEMENCEAU asked why private correspondence was restricted to postcards.

M. SEYDOUX replied that the Censorship had asked for this.

MR. WHITE asked how it would be possible to distinguish between a commercial and a private letter. If all sealed letters were presumed to be commercial, anyone wishing to make a private communication would enclose it in a sealed letter.

(It was agreed that this Article be omitted.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he considered the proposals excellent, but he noted that it was recommended that international railway services with Germany be started again. He thought this was going too fast, seeing that there was still a state of war. As to telegraphic and postal communications, there was nothing to be done, seeing that America and Great Britain had stolen a march on France.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood that France had allowed the resumption of commercial relations with Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Seydoux if this was the case.

M. SEYDOUX said that, when the Blockade had been raised, it had been declared that trade could be re-established under certain conditions. Had this not been done, only the Neutrals would have profited by the cessation of the Blockade. All commercial regulations consonant with the state of war were maintained, but certain licensed exceptions were being made. General exceptions in favour of certain categories had been established.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that a very curious situation appeared to result from this. The German Delegates were closely watched at Versailles by Colonel Henri's Mission, yet French frontiers were going to be opened to German traders, who would therefore be able to come freely to Paris, while the only Germans prevented from doing so would be the official Delegates of the country.

M. SEYDOUX said that the passport regulations still existed.

MR. WATERLOW observed that there was no question of allowing Germans to come to England or British subjects to enter Germany. Only goods were allowed to pass.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he understood the proposal was to allow free passage of letters, but not of persons.

MR. BALFOUR said that there was a small matter in this connection which he must bring to the notice of the Council. If the Council agreed, he would ask Mr. Waterlow to state the case.

MR. WATERLOW said that, under Article 289 of the Treaty with Germany, bi-lateral agreements could be revived by a notification within 6 months of the coming into force of the Treaty. Among these bi-lateral agreements was one between Great Britain and Germany concerning the parcel post and money orders. Great Britain was in a different situation in these matters from the other Powers. The latter had been parties to a general International Convention. Great Britain had made separate agreements. The British Government now proposed to take steps, without further delay, to revive the agreement with Germany regarding the parcel post and the money order service in advance of the coming into force of the Peace Treaty. It was suggested that the agreement be revived by means of direct communication between the British Post Office and the German postal authorities. This was subject, of course, to the agreement of the Council, to whom it had been thought right to submit the question.

M. SEYDOUX said that, in regard to parcel post, he saw no objection, as the parcel post was a means of sending goods. This was consistent with the cessation of the Blockade and the resumption of commerce. But the money order service involved financial questions which he was not competent to judge.



MR. WATERLOW said that only small sums were involved, and the service would be revived subject to the proviso that no clause in the Peace Treaty was violated.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not wish to ask the Council to accept anything that was not clearly understood. He suggested that M. Seydoux should examine the question with the French financial experts and that the question be brought up again on the following day.

BARON MAKINO drew attention to the languages enumerated in paragraph 4 (d) of the Note read by M. Seydoux. He would like that "Japanese" be added to this list, unless there were objections to this course.

(No objection was raised, and this was agreed to.)

(It was then decided that the whole question, together with the subsidiary question of parcel post and money orders, raised by the British Delegation should be put on the Agenda for the following day.)

(The proposals of the Special Committee were modified in two respects, and were provisionally approved, as follows:—

"4. The public will be notified as soon as possible that postal and telegraphic relations with non-occupied Germany will be re-opened under the following conditions:—

- a) Commercial "and private" correspondence can be sent "closed".
- b) The above-mentioned correspondence can be registered.
- c) Telegrams should be written *en clair* and only in the following languages: French, English, Italian, German "or Japanese."
- d) Each administration will later publish the conditions under which telephone service will be re-started.")

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that in this connection he wished to inform his colleagues that the process of demobilisation forced him to withdraw 45,000 men from the French *Armée D'Orient*. He was not able therefore to undertake the conquest of Hungary, as only three *Brigades mixtes* would be left.

Blockade of  
Hungary

M. TITTONI observed that the Anti-Bolshevik Government at Szeged expected to conquer Hungary if supplied with arms and Munitions.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Anti-Bolshevik Governments had made similar statements before, but had never been successful.

M. SEYDOUX said that the Blockade of Hungary was a special case. Allied posts had been situated all round the circumference of Austria. Since peace had been made with Germany, the blockade along the Bavarian frontier had been raised, but it was maintained

on the other frontiers. The blockade had been exercised by Inter-Allied agency. He had lately heard, however, that the American Government wished to recall its personnel. He also pointed out that the British Government had never sent any personnel with the exception of a single representative at Vienna. The work was disagreeable and unpopular, and it would be shared by France and Italy. It was evidently desirable that all the Allied and Associated Powers should play their part in this. Before addressing an urgent request to the British and American Delegations, the Blockade Committee had taken into consideration the stipulations which were to be required from the Austrian Delegates to the effect that Austria should undertake to maintain the blockade against Hungary (see Appendix "A").

The Committee had therefore prepared the following Note:—

[Translation <sup>2</sup>]

JULY 21, 1919.

“QUESTION OF THE BLOCKADE OF HUNGARY

The Committee of the East considers it necessary to submit to the Supreme Council of Heads of Governments the question of the blockade of Hungary, the maintenance of which was decided upon by the latter on June 26 last.<sup>3</sup>

At the time when they sign the treaty of peace, the Austrian delegates should sign a declaration in the following sense:

‘Except in case of a contrary request presented by the Associated Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, the Government of Austria shall continue effectively to prohibit the importation, the exportation and the transit of all merchandise between Austria and Hungary, and to maintain these prohibitions until the moment of the formal acceptance by the Hungarian Government of the peace conditions which shall be proposed to it by the Associated Governments.’

It seems to result from this declaration that, after the signature of the peace treaty, the Austrian Government alone shall have the responsibility of taking measures to maintain the blockade of Hungary on its border.

However, if the measures taken are not effective, the arms, munitions, and other materials of war still to be found in Austria in large quantities could pass into Hungary during the interval allowed by the treaty of peace for the delivery of this material to the Allies.

Under these conditions, the Committee on the Blockade of the East wishes to know:

1. Whether the Austrian Government should be, from the signature by its delegates of the declaration presented above, placed in sole charge of maintaining the closure of the Hungarian border. In this case, the Allied military posts maintained on this border should be withdrawn from the date of the signature;

2. If, on the contrary, the Austrian Government should be assisted in its task by Inter-Allied cooperation, it is important to know whether the Allied military posts on the border should be maintained:

- a. either until the coming into force of the treaty,
- b. or until the expiration of the interval provided for the delivery of arms and munitions,
- c. or until the conclusion of peace with Hungary.

<sup>2</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>3</sup> CF-93, minute 8, vol. vi, p. 701.

An immediate decision is necessary because the American delegate at Vienna has announced the intention of his Government to withdraw at the end of the present month its agents from the service of the Hungarian border, and the British Government has not yet sent its agents. At present the military posts on the Hungarian border are for the most part occupied by American personnel."

In his opinion the best proposal was that Inter-Allied assistance be given to Austria. This would be welcomed by the Austrian Government, and the French Minister at Vienna had strongly supported the plan. The Austrian Government was weak, and if it was desired that the blockade should be maintained effectually against Hungary, it was desirable to reinforce the Austrian Government by Allied assistance.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how many men would be required to fulfil this plan.

M. SEYDOUX said that two officers and five or six men from each Nation would be enough.

There remained the question of the time for which this blockade should be maintained. Probably, he thought, it would have to be maintained until the conclusion of peace with Hungary.

M. PICHON said that the period might be shortened if General Boehm succeeded.

MR. WHITE said that he understood that the American Government maintained three posts, but had since ordered their withdrawal.

M. SEYDOUX replied that this was so.

MR. BALFOUR said that Austria had been required to undertake the maintenance of the blockade against Hungary. He quite agreed that Austria must be assisted in doing so. If the Allies desired the blockade to be effective, it was manifest that they must assist in maintaining it. He thought that all the Allies should participate, and he undertook to try and induce the British Government to take their part.

MR. WHITE said that he would do likewise.

MR. BALFOUR said that as to the time at which the blockade could cease, it might be decided to raise it as soon as Hungary showed signs of good conduct, and sent Delegates to negotiate Peace. This point, however, need not be settled at present, and might be allowed to depend on events.

(It was then decided that the Blockade of Hungary should be maintained until the Council should decide otherwise, and that the participation of the Four Powers should be arranged for to assist the Austrian Government in maintaining it.)

6. M. SEYDOUX read a note of the Supreme Economic Council (see Appendix "B").



Question of Im-  
ports Into Serbia

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that in theory at least there was no blockade at Fiume. In practice, however, there was. The Italian Government, without justification, continually stopped trains.

M. TITTONI said that the question of transit was quite distinct. He had already sent a full explanation to M. Clemenceau, but no decision had yet been taken.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French base at Fiume had been hampered many times in its operations.

M. TITTONI said that pending a final solution, orders had been given by him, that all trains should proceed without interference.

M. BERTHELOT said that a telegram had been received to the effect that the food situation in Serbia was very serious in consequence of the stoppage of goods from Fiume. Men, women and children had been dying of hunger whilst stores were accumulating in the port.

M. TITTONI said that he had sent telegraphic orders two days previously for the free passage of trains.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Tittoni whether he guaranteed that his orders would be carried out.

M. TITTONI replied that he did. He requested, however, that the situation be regulated speedily. As far as he knew, the goods in question were not landed on the quays in Fiume at all. They went by train and the railroad was open.

M. BERTHELOT said that, according to information he had received, the railroads were blocked with traffic. In consequence, disembarkation of goods at Fiume was asked for.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether M. Tittoni recognised that the Serbians had a right to expedite goods through Fiume.

M. TITTONI said that it was not a question of transit through Fiume, but a question of establishing Serbian bases there. This would prejudice the question of Fiume and he was not prepared to accede to this.

M. BERTHELOT said that they would be satisfied if they obtained free passage either through the French base at Fiume, or through the Italian commissariat.

MR. BALFOUR asked when the Council might have information that this was being carried out.

M. TITTONI said that he would give telegraphic orders that goods destined for Serbia through the port of Fiume should proceed immediately, and that the revictualling of Jugo-Slavia in food, clothes, petroleum and other goods at present waiting at Fiume, should not be hampered by the interruption of communication, as the forwarding of these goods was of vital importance for the army and population of Jugo-Slavia.

M. TITTONI agreed to the use by the Serbians of Fiume as a port of transit, provided the French base or the Italian commissariat be used exclusively. The choice of either should be left with the Serbians.

Note was taken of M. Tittoni's declaration regarding the orders given by him two days previously for the resumption of transit by land.

M. TITTONI urged that a solution of this question be reached as early as possible.

[7.] (General Mance and Mr. Hudson entered the room.)

M. BERTHELOT read and explained the note attached in Appendix C.

Clauses for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria on Ports, Waterways and Railways

(It was agreed that there was no objection to the nomination of a French Member to the Commission.)

M. TITTONI said that he would express his view later.

MR. HUDSON said that final action on paragraph 24 should, he thought, be postponed until the settlement of the territorial question. He therefore asked that the question of the insertion of clauses regarding Ports, Waterways and Railways be deferred until the territorial solution had been arrived at.

MR. BALFOUR said there was force in this proposal, but he would like to know when a decision on the territorial question could be expected. The Bulgarians had already arrived.

MR. WHITE said he had received a communication from President Wilson and therefore was able to discuss the question of Western Thrace. He would be ready to do so on the following day. In this connection, he wished to communicate the following document:—

“Regarding the events mentioned in the report of the British, French and Japanese members of the Central Bulgarian [*Territorial?*] Committee with respect to the alleged desire of the Mussulmans of Western Thrace that this territory be ceded by Bulgaria to Greece, the United States Chargé d’Affaires at Sofia, under date of the 24th instant, reports that the petition was prepared by one Mussulman deputy, who drew it up without the authority or knowledge of the other persons whose names were signed thereto. The Deputy in question has fled from Bulgaria and is believed to be in Italy or in Turkey. All the other Mussulman Deputies made an official denial before Parliament and also stated in a letter to the Prime Minister that they had not signed the petition and added that their views were entirely opposed to the sentiments expressed therein. In the opinion of the Chargé d’Affaires, the Mussulman population of Western Thrace, if forced to choose between Greek and Bulgarian rule, would greatly prefer here, as well as elsewhere, the latter, in spite of the fact that the Greeks have spent large sums in this district for purposes of propaganda. The Chargé d’Affaires concludes by saying that, in his opinion, an impartial investigation or a plebiscite would prove the foregoing beyond any question of doubt.”

Mr. White, continuing, said that the belief that the Mohammedan population of Western Thrace desired union with Greece had had considerable weight with the American Members of the Commission dealing with Greek Affairs. If this belief was as ill-founded as his later news implied, the situation was considerably modified.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. White whether he was able to obtain the official denial of the Mohammedan Deputies referred to in the Note.

Mr. WHITE said he would try to do so.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Venizelos must be heard on this subject, and he proposed, with Mr. White's consent, to send him a copy of this Note.

(It was then agreed that M. Venizelos be invited to attend the Council at 5 p. m. on the following day, when the question of Western Thrace would be discussed.

It was further decided to postpone until the following meeting the discussion of the Clauses relating to Ports, Waterways and Railways, for settlement in conjunction with the territorial questions affecting Bulgaria.)

The Meeting then adjourned.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, July 28, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-16

M-250

*Note From Superior Blockade Council for Council of Heads of States* <sup>4</sup>

#### PROPOSED AGREEMENT BY AUSTRIA REGARDING TRADE WITH HUNGARY AND GERMANY

In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Economic Council at its meeting of June 2, 1919, the Superior Blockade Council recommended to the Council of the Heads of States that when the Financial and Reparation Clauses are delivered to the Austrian Delegates, they be informed that they are required to agree to the following stipulations, which should be signed and delivered in the form of a separate note from the Austrian Delegates:—

"1. The Government of Austria will, unless otherwise requested by the Associated Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, continue effectively to prohibit the importation, exportation and transit of all articles between Austria and Hungary and to maintain such prohibition up to the time of the formal acceptance by the Government of Hungary of such terms of peace as shall be proposed by the Associated Governments.

---

<sup>4</sup>The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Except for President Wilson, no head of a state served on this Council at any time. After the departure of President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George this Council was known as the Council of Heads of Delegations,



The Government of Austria will, unless otherwise requested by the Associated Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, continue effectively to prohibit the importation, exportation and transit of all articles between Austria and Germany and to maintain such prohibition up to the time of the formal acceptance by the Government of Germany of the terms of peace proposed by the Associated Governments”.

PARIS, June 7, 1919.

---

Appendix B to HD-16

[*Note of the Supreme Economic Council*<sup>5</sup>]

[Translation<sup>6</sup>]

PARIS, July 21, 1919.

In a letter dated July 1, M. Nikola Pachitch, in the name of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, brought to the attention of the President of the Peace Conference the obstruction of the port of Gravosa, which alone at the present time could serve for imports into the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, this obstruction rendering the revictualing of the Kingdom very difficult. The delegation of the said Kingdom therefore requested that the Conference be kind enough to order that imports be likewise authorized through the port of Fiume.

Exportation  
to Serbia

The question was submitted to the Supreme Economic Council, which considered it at its session of July 10.

M. Volpi, a delegate of the Italian Government, let it be known that imports for the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes could be effectuated not only through Gravosa, but also through Salonika, Cattaro, and the Dalmatian ports, that moreover there was no blockade of the port of Fiume, and that the revictualing of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes could be carried on through this port, either by way of the French naval base, or by that of the Italian District (*Intendance*).

M. Volpi added that his Government, while being desirous of giving every facility to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes for this transit, could not resign itself to the organization at Fiume of a special naval or commercial base by the said Kingdom.

The Supreme Economic Council could only bring this information to the attention of the Peace Conference for use in replying to M. Pachitch or for any other action which it should decide upon.

---

<sup>5</sup> Note apparently transmitted by the French representative on the Supreme Economic Council (Seydoux).

<sup>6</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

## Appendix C to HD-16

*[Note from the French Delegation]*[Translation <sup>7</sup>]

PARIS, July 24, 1919.

In anticipation of the attribution to Greece of Bulgarian Thrace, which would cut off Bulgaria from the Aegean Sea, the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways proposed the insertion in the treaty with Bulgaria of a clause whose essential provisions are as follows:

Access of Bulgaria  
to Cavalla or  
Dédéagatch

1. Greece shall lease to Bulgaria for fifty years a free zone situated either in the port of Cavalla or in that of Dédéagatch, at the choice of Bulgaria.
2. The latter shall enjoy therein special facilities for transit.
3. A convention, subject to revision every ten years, shall lay down the conditions of this cession and the manner of its utilization.
4. If the port chosen is Cavalla, a railroad shall be constructed and operated by Greece to connect this port with the Bulgarian border.

Questions arising under paragraphs 3 and 4 would be, in case of disagreement between Greece and Bulgaria, submitted for decision to a commission composed of a Bulgarian, a Greek, and a British delegate.

The Commission on Ports, in making this proposal, has adopted only a technical point of view, and has not envisaged certain considerations of a political character which are very important for the proper functioning of the organization thus created. The role of this organization is essentially to balance and arbitrate. In having only one great Power participate therein, one runs the risk of exposing oneself to protests either from the Greeks or from the Bulgarians who after the decisions have been rendered, will attribute them to the attitude and to the political interests of this great Power.

The French Delegation considers therefore that in order to give to the commission, which should function at Cavalla or Dédéagatch, the desired authority, it would be fitting to have several great Powers participate.

It considers that Great Britain and France, since both are Powers guaranteeing Greece, are naturally designated for this mission, and that their intervention will, in addition, be welcomed by the Bulgarians themselves as a guarantee of impartiality.

---

<sup>7</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, July 28, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. H. White.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour,  
O. M., M. P.

*Secretary*

Mr. H. Norman.  
Sir Ian Malcolm,  
K. C. M. G.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.  
M. Pichon.

*Secretaries*

M. Berthelot.  
M. de St. Quentin.

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.  
M. Vannutelli.

**JAPAN**

Baron Makino.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Capt. Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Lt. Commander Bell.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Capt. Majnoni.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. At this moment M. Tardieu entered the room.

M. TARDIEU stated that the question of setting up the Committee for co-ordinating the clauses of the Peace Treaty with Germany had been submitted to the Committee for supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty, by the American representative. After three meetings, the Committee had adopted a plan which was set out in Annex "A".

**Appointment of  
Committee to Co-  
ordinate Clauses  
of German Peace  
Treaty**

MR. BALFOUR stated that the proposal was to the effect that a Committee should be set up in Paris to supervise the execution of the Peace Treaty, and to co-ordinate its provisions. Would not there then be some confusion between this new Committee and the League of Nations? There would be a Permanent Committee at Geneva and another Permanent Committee at Paris; this might lead to disputes.

M. TARDIEU replied that Mr. Balfour's question had been answered in Paragraph 1 of the Report. The manner in which the functions



of the Committee had been limited was clearly expressed; and there was therefore no risk of overlapping. In addition to this, paragraph 5 of the Report stated that the Allied and Associated Governments would determine what the relations between the two bodies in question should be.

MR. BALFOUR replied that he was entirely satisfied; but that he would like to raise another, not very important question. Did the Council see any objection to the members of the Paris Committee being ambassadors.

M. TARDIEU replied that paragraph 2 of the Report answered the question. It had been thought that there was nothing to prevent ambassadors being appointed as representatives to the Committee, but, on the other hand there was no need specially to recommend that ambassadors should be appointed.

(It was agreed that the Report of the Committee for supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty, with regard to setting up a Coordinating Committee to deal with questions of interpretation and execution should be adopted.)

2. M. Leygues<sup>1</sup> and the Naval experts entered the room.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the Naval experts had met to discuss the question, without being able to come to an agreement except on one point, which was, that, before they could deal with their side of the matter, a decision with regard to their general policy in the matter must be taken by the Governments concerned.

Disposal of the  
German and Aus-  
tro-Hungarian  
Fleets

ADMIRAL RONARC'H stated that the admirals had met several times without coming to an agreement and that their remarks on the differences of opinion between the Admiralties of the countries concerned could be seen in the Report submitted to the Conference (see Annex B).

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he did not see how the question of whether the vessels should be destroyed, sunk, or distributed, could again be raised. It had already been discussed by the Council of Four,<sup>2</sup> and, finally, in reply to the French request, it had been decided that the vessels should be distributed; and that each recipient country should put the vessels allotted to it to what use it chose. There could be no doubt on the question, because, when the Scapa Flow incident occurred, Mr. Lloyd George had expressed his regret for what had happened, in view of the fact that France was to receive a certain number of the vessels sunk. He had again renewed his promise, and had given a list of vessels that might finally be given to France by way of compensation. The Scapa Flow incident had added itself to

<sup>1</sup> Georges Leygues, French Minister of the Navy.

<sup>2</sup> IC-176 E, minute 2, vol. v, p. 238, and CF-91, minute 2, vol. vi, p. 656.

the question of disposal. The German vessels had been placed under the guard of the British Admiralty. He did not wish to be critical; but simply to draw attention to the fact, that a report on the whole question had been promised to the Supreme Council, and that the report in question had not yet been tendered. He had intended, at the time, to send a French Admiral over, but, since Mr. Lloyd George had not received the suggestion favourably, he had not insisted. The responsibility rested with the British Admiralty, and it was therefore necessary that a report should be submitted to the Council, in order that responsibility for the affair might be determined. The German Admiral was going to be tried by a British court martial; but it should not be forgotten that the Admiral in question was at the time Commander-in-Chief of the German Fleet; and that he had admitted to having given orders to sink it. The German Government was therefore clearly responsible, and the Allies had a right to demand reparation. Mr. Lloyd George had stated that reparation would be given, but, after enquiring, he had not appeared to think this possible. An argument had been brought forward, to the effect that the provisions of the Armistice did not establish sufficient control over the German vessels; Mr. Lloyd George had further recalled Marshal Foch's opinion against surrendering these vessels. Before discussing the question of distributing the German fleet, it was necessary to know where the fleet in question actually was: one portion was at the bottom of the sea in Scapa Flow, another, smaller, portion was possibly afloat in the same locality; finally, there were vessels in German ports. How could the Admirals have given any other reply? They could only do what they had done, and draw attention to the fact that no political decision had been taken. This was the essence of the question, and before pursuing the discussion further, he wished to know the opinion of his colleagues.

MR. BALFOUR stated that the remarks of the President of the Council raised three points. Firstly, he had alluded to a declaration of Mr. Lloyd George in favour of distributing the Fleet.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the question had been twice discussed, and that finally, President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George had acceded to French wishes by accepting the principle that the Fleet should be distributed.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Council of Four had agreed that the distribution should be made between the Allied Powers, but that he was not aware of the exact basis of this distribution. He asked whether it had been decided, for example, to make an equal division of all surface vessels of the same class, or whether compensations in another form were to accompany the distribution.

M. TITTONI stated, that, inasmuch as the principle of distribution had been determined upon, it was necessary to know the manner in which it was to be carried out.

M. CLEMENCEAU answered that the principle of distribution had alone been discussed, and not the details of this distribution.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the matters included in the minutes of April 25th represented a definite decision taken by France.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that he was quite ready to re-discuss the question for the fourth or fifth time. He wished to draw attention, however, to the fact, that, as Mr. Lloyd George had proposed to hand over to the French a certain number of vessels whose names were given, this in itself proved his admission of the principle of distribution had [*sic*].

BARON MAKINO stated that he could remember this statement.

MR. BALFOUR stated that it was very important to know what had been decided upon by the Council of Four, in order that the question should not continually recur. He did not think, that, as a matter of principle, it was advisable to re-open matters already discussed and decided upon by that body.

M. CLEMENCEAU answered that he could not entirely accept Mr. Balfour's statement of principle. It was contradicted by the fact that a decision had been made to occupy the Rhine territory for fifteen years. Notwithstanding this, six days before the Treaty had been signed, Mr. Lloyd George had re-opened the question and it had been re-discussed. He was nevertheless in agreement with Mr. Balfour. It was necessary to see exactly what had been said and to consult the minutes drawn up by the secretariat. In addition to this, the report promised on the Scapa Flow incident should be forthcoming.

MR. BALFOUR stated that he saw no objection to a report being made.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the British Admiralty was not of that opinion.

MR. WHITE stated that the question was new to him, and that it was necessary for him to examine carefully the minutes of proceedings, in order that he might know what President Wilson had thought.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that they were therefore in agreement on the two points previously raised by him.

M. TITTONI stated that the principle of distribution was agreed upon; but the manner in which it was to be carried out had yet to be decided.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the last point had never been discussed; and that Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson had only agreed to the principle. He further drew attention to the fact that he had raised the question of German responsibility.



MR. BALFOUR stated that he did not doubt that such a responsibility existed, but even if established, what advantages would accrue?

(It was agreed that the secretariat should examine the minutes of proceedings in order to report on all that had been said in the Council of Four with regard to the distribution of the German Fleet. It was further decided that Mr. Balfour should ask the British Government for the report on the Scapa Flow incident).

M. Leygues and the Naval Advisers then left the room.

3. M. TARDIEU read Article 65 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, which read as follows:—

Nomination of a  
Director for the  
Port of Kehl

“Within a period of three weeks after the coming into force of the present Treaty, the port of Strasburg and the port of Kehl shall be constituted, for a period of seven years, a single unit from the point of view of exploitation.

The administration of this single unit will be carried on by a manager named by the Central Rhine Commission, which shall also have power to remove him.

This manager shall be of French nationality . . .

Pending appointment of the first manager by the Central Rhine Commission, a provisional manager, who shall be of French nationality may be appointed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, subject to the foregoing provisions . . .”

He pointed out that the French Delegation requested the Supreme Council to appoint the temporary Director provided for under the above Article, and that the Delegation had proposed to the Council the name of M. Detousse, *Ingénieur des Ponts et chaussées*.

MR. WHITE pointed out that under the terms of the Treaty, the Allied Governments themselves were called upon to ratify the appointment.

(It was decided that the nomination of M. Detousse as Temporary Director of the port of Kehl, and of the port of Strasburg, should be submitted by each respective Delegation to their Governments for approval.)

4. M. TARDIEU stated that the Jugo-Slav Delegation had addressed several Notes to the Council on the subject of their claims to certain territories.

Report of the  
Commission of  
Roumanian and  
Jugo-Slav Affairs  
Regarding the De-  
mands of the  
Jugo-Slavs in the  
Banat

MR. BALFOUR stated, that before pursuing this discussion, he wished to remark that he preferred not to take up the Jugo-Slav claims, during such time as the Serbians refused to respect the decisions taken by the Council with regard to Klagenfurt.

M. TARDIEU remarked that as the claims were rejected in the proposed replies, these letters were in line with Mr. Balfour's remarks.

M. TITTONI said that he considered it useless to discuss the question, as the Council's decisions were not being respected.

M. TARDIEU answered that the proposals themselves might be considered, because they did not grant the Serbians claims.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the entire discussion was put aside by Mr. Balfour's remarks, with whom the Council agreed.

M. TARDIEU stated that since the questions could not be further discussed, despite the fact that the claims put forward had been rejected, the Council would presumably be less inclined to discuss points upon which concessions had been made. There remained a question of Ada-Kalessi Island which did not concern Jugo-Slavia. In a telegram dated 11th July<sup>3</sup> General Franchet d'Esperey had reported that the Roumanians and Jugo-Slavs both laid claim to Ada-Kalessi Island, which lay in the Danube opposite Orsova, and which, after being left to Turkey by virtue of the Berlin Treaty of 1878,<sup>4</sup> had been occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1908. In view of the fact that the Ada-Kalessi Island had been occupied by Austria-Hungary the Committee, proposed that it should be given to Roumania, which country had received the Austro-Hungarian territories of Transylvania adjacent to the Danube. The Committee required that the stipulations of Article 52 of the Berlin Treaty, with regard to the prohibition of Military works on the Island should be upheld.

(It was agreed that the Ada-Kalessi Island should be granted to Roumania, and that the clauses of Article 52 of the Berlin Treaty, as detailed above, should be upheld.)

It was further decided that M. Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, should inform the Jugo-Slav Delegation, that, in view of the Serbian refusal to recognise decisions of the Supreme Council with regard to Klagenfurt, it was impossible to proceed further with the latest claims presented by their Delegation.)

5. M. TARDIEU stated that the Secretary-General had informed Marshal Foch of the decision taken by the Council on the 16th July,<sup>5</sup>

Inter-Allied  
Forces for the  
Plebiscite Zone in  
Schleswig

to the effect that French troops should not be sent to Schleswig, since the means of their transport were not yet ready. Marshal Foch had now reported that the decision in question arose out of a misunderstanding.

The French battalion for Schleswig had been formed, and was now ready to start at four days' notice. Marshal Foch further reported that he had informed the British Admiralty to the above effect.

MR. BALFOUR said that the decision that French troops should not participate had been taken, simply because it had been wrongly supposed that they were not ready. Since this was not the case it would be advantageous if the French flag were represented.

<sup>3</sup> Annex I to appendix G to HD-21, p. 473.

<sup>4</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 895.

<sup>5</sup> HD-8, minute 3 (b), p. 160.

(It was decided that the French battalion now ready should participate in the military occupation of Schleswig; and that the British Admiralty should give Marshal Foch the four days' notice in advance which was to precede the despatch of the battalion.)

6. MR. WHITE stated that an Austrian Note with regard to the minority clauses of the Peace Treaty had been presented. He suggested that it should be transmitted to the Committee on New States for report.

Austrian Proposals With Regard to the Clauses in the Peace Treaty on the Subject of Minorities

MR. BALFOUR said he believed that certain clauses on the subject of minorities had already been sent to another Committee. Would it not be preferable to submit the Austrian proposals to this latter Committee in order to avoid confusion?

M. BERTHELOT stated that the question of minorities should have been the exclusive object of study of the Minorities Committee. Other questions, involving problems of finance and transportation, had however been submitted to it.

M. CLEMENCEAU drew attention to the fact that the note accompanying the presentation of the Austrian Peace Treaty states clearly, that, as the text of the Treaty represented decisions finally arrived at, it would not be possible to reply to notes that had been received in the past, or would be received in the future, from the Austrian Delegation. It therefore seemed impossible to discuss the question raised by Mr. White.

(It was decided that the Austrian proposals with regard to minorities should not be examined by the Council, in view of the letter accompanying the presentation of the Peace Treaty, wherein it was stated that no further replies would be given to Austrian notes.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 28 July, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-17

[Translation <sup>a</sup>]

COMMITTEE ON THE EXECUTION  
OF THE CLAUSES OF THE TREATY

PARIS, July 23, 1919.

#### *Note for the Supreme Council*

The Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty has been presented by the American representative on this Committee

---

<sup>a</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



with a draft proposal for the creation of a Committee to be entrusted, after the coming into force of the treaty with Germany, with the coordination of questions concerning the interpretation and execution of the clauses of this treaty.

The Committee devoted three sessions to the examination of this draft proposal, and the following text was finally adopted unanimously.

#### DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

1. The questions concerning the interpretation and the execution of the treaty with Germany—with the exception of those confided by it either to the League of Nations, or to the Commissions on Reparations, on Military, Naval and Air Control, and on the Left Bank of the Rhine or to other permanent organs of the same nature—should be studied and followed up by a special committee whose seat shall be at Paris, but which could, if it judged opportune because of the nature of certain questions, sit also at other capitals.

2. Each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall make known as soon as possible the name of the delegate, diplomatic or other, authorized to represent it in the Committee. The delegates may be assisted by technical advisers chosen according to the nature of the questions to be considered.

3. The Committee shall have for its mission to furnish to the governments to whom shall belong the right of decision, common and coordinated bases of information and interpretation, as well as to make to them in case of need all proposals relating to the object defined in paragraph 1.

4. The relations of the Committee with the governments and with the commissions sent to the field in execution of the treaty will be regulated as follows:

*a.* The commissions in the field shall furnish directly to the Committee a regular report of all current questions of execution decided by them and by the local German authorities or others with whom they shall be in relation;

*b.* When the said current matters of execution, without raising questions of principle, shall give rise to disagreement in the field, the members of the Committee will be authorized by their respective governments to send instructions directly to the Commissions, and to send copies of these instructions directly to the Allied and Associated Governments and also at the same time to the representatives of the said Governments at Berlin;

*c.* When questions of principle shall arise, the Committee, after an examination in common, shall propose solutions to the governments who shall notify the commissions in the field as well as the diplomatic representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments at Berlin of the decisions and measures of execution. Copies of these decisions shall be sent to the Committee for its information.

5. The Allied and Associated Governments shall determine, in due time, the relations which should exist between the Committee and the Secretariat General of the League of Nations, in order that all measures for the execution of the treaty shall conform to the principles and ideals which are at the basis of the League.

6. When and as the other treaties are signed, an organization, to be composed eventually of the same persons, could be entrusted with overseeing their execution under the same conditions.

---

Appendix B to HD-17

*Joint Note by the Admirals for the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers*

The Admirals met this morning to consider the three questions on which the Council desire their advice, viz:—

The disposal of—

- (1) the German surface warships, both those remaining at Scapa and the additional ships to be surrendered under Article 185 of the Peace Treaty;
- (2) the warships of the late Austro-Hungarian navy, including submarines;
- (3) the surrendered German submarines.

2. After reviewing the discussions which have taken place and the reports which they have made from time to time on the above points in connection with the preparation of the Naval Clauses for the Treaties of Peace, the Admirals were unanimously of opinion that they could offer no further advice or formulate any recommendations until they were in possession of the decision of the Council on the point of principle involved, which is a political one, viz:—

(a) Are these vessels to be—

- (1) sunk, or
- (2) broken up, or
- (3) distributed without restriction as to their ultimate disposal?

(b) If they are to be distributed—

- (1) is the distribution to be confined to the Allied and Associated Powers whose navies have taken a prominent part in the war; or
- (2) are the smaller of the Allied Powers who possess navies and new States with maritime frontiers to participate? Claims have been made by Belgium, Brazil, China and Portugal, and also by Finland, Poland, and Yugo-Slavia.

On receipt of the Council's decision, plans to give effect to it can be formulated.

3. Briefly stated, the Naval recommendations are as follows:—

#### SURFACE SHIPS

United States . . . . .	To be sunk or broken up, with a preference for sinking.
British Empire . . . . .	To be broken up.
Italy . . . . .	To be broken up; but if an exception is made and vessels are allotted to any of the Allied Powers, as part of its fleet, the Italian navy should receive its due proportion.
Japan . . . . .	To be sunk or broken up; with the same reservation as made in the case of Italy.
France . . . . .	Opposed to both sinking and breaking up; considers the vessels should be distributed among the Allied and Associated Powers.

#### SUBMARINES

United States	}	Unanimous in recommending that all the submarines, submarine salvage vessels and docks be broken up.
British Empire		
Italy		
Japan		
France . . . . .		Opposed to breaking up; considers the submarines should be distributed among the Allied and Associated Powers.

The situation as regards the German submarines was fully explained in the Admirals' report of 7 May, a copy of which is attached for convenience of reference.

For

.....	The United States of America
.....	The British Empire
.....	France
.....	Italy
.....	Japan

PARIS, 27 June, 1919.

[Enclosure]

#### DISPOSAL OF GERMAN SUBMARINES (I. C. 176 E<sup>o</sup>)

The Admirals of the Allied and Associated Powers in Paris have read the Notes of the Meeting of the First Delegates of the Peace Conference held at President Wilson's residence on 25 April and have given further consideration to the question of the disposal of the German submarines.

2. The Admirals representing the United States of America, the British Empire, Italy and Japan are unanimous in recommending

<sup>o</sup> Vol. v, p. 235.



that all the submarines, submarine salvage vessels and docks surrendered by Germany, be broken up.

A draft formula for an agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers themselves, to give effect to this recommendation, is attached (Annex A.). It differs but little from the paragraph on the subject embodied in the first draft of the Naval Clauses submitted to the Supreme Council on 7 February<sup>10</sup> and nothing has occurred in the meantime to cause the four Admirals to modify their views.

Whatever be the future as regards submarine warfare, they see no necessity for increasing submarine armaments by distributing the German submarines at a moment when the menace of the German fleet has been removed and a general reduction of armaments is desired.

They are further of opinion that the destruction of all German submarines is called for on moral grounds, as a mark of the repugnance felt by the rest of the world to the manner in which Germany used her submarines in the war.

3. Admiral de Bon does not agree with the views expressed above and has prepared an alternative formula (Annex B.). In his opinion, the two questions, viz., the destruction of the submarines and the future of submarine warfare, cannot be separated.

4. A statement showing numerically the present position as regards the German submarines is also attached (Annex C.)

(Signed by)

For

Admiral Benson

United States of America

Rear-Admiral Hope

British Empire

Vice-Admiral de Bon

France

Rear-Admiral Grassi

Italy

Rear-Admiral Takeshita

Japan

PARIS, 7 May, 1919.

27 June, 1919.

NOTE: Annex B. is not attached as the formula embodied in it is not in agreement with the present Naval view of France, viz., that *all* the submarines should be distributed amongst the Allied and Associated Powers.

<sup>10</sup> Appendix D to BC-26, vol. III, p. 938.

## Annex A

## DISPOSAL OF GERMAN SUBMARINES

*Agreement Between the Five Allied and Associated Powers*

(Draft Proposed by the Admirals Representing the United States of America, British Empire, Italy and Japan)

All the German submarines, submarine salvage vessels and docks for submarines, surrendered to the Allies shall be broken up.

The breaking-up of the German submarines appropriated for propaganda purposes in the countries of the Allied and Associated Powers shall be commenced not later than 31st October, 1919, which date shall be extended to 31 December, 1919, in the case of those allotted to Japan.

The breaking-up of the remainder now in the ports of Great Britain and France, or en route thereto, shall be commenced forthwith.

Articles, machinery and material arising from the breaking-up of these vessels may not be used except for purely industrial or commercial purposes. They may not be sold or disposed of to foreign countries.

The proceeds of the breaking-up of these vessels shall be divided among the Allied and Associated Powers on a scale to be subsequently settled.

## Annex C

## SURRENDERED GERMAN SUBMARINES

(Omitting those in the Black Sea)

6 MAY 1919.

(Subject to verification as to the numbers in the various categories.)

In or on passage to Allied ports of	Incomplete thro' lack of engines, &c. or sunk on passage	Serviceable		
		Operated at sea during the war	Took no part in the war	Total
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
Great Britain.....	19	16	14	49
France.....	17	21	8	46
United States.....		4	2	6
Italy .....		4	6	10
Japan.....		3	4	7
Total .....	36	48	34	118
Sold and being broken up in England .....				54
				172

ALLIED SUBMARINE LOSSES DURING THE WAR

Country	Number lost	Percentage of total allied losses
Great Britain.....	55	71. 5
France.....	14	18
Italy .....	8	10. 5
United States.....		
Japan .....		
Other Allies .....		
Total.....	77	100. 0



**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, July 29, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.<sup>1</sup>**

**PRESENT**

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. H. White. (later)—Hon. F. L. Polk.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	M. Pichon. (later)—M. Clemenceau.
<i>Secretary</i> Mr. L. Harrison.	<i>Secretaries</i> Mr. H. Norman. Sir Ian Malcolm.	<i>Secretaries</i> M. Berthelot. M. de St. Quentin.
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Scialoja.	M. Matsui.
	<i>Secretary</i> M. Paterno.	<i>Secretary</i> M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . .	Capt. Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier
ITALY . . . . .	Lt-Col. A. Jones.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. BERTHELOT referring to the decision taken on the previous day (H. D. 17, Para. 6<sup>2</sup>), said that he understood the decision to refer to Austrian notes despatched before the final Treaty had been handed to the Austrian Delegation. It would clearly be necessary to reply to any Austrian notes despatched since then. He proposed, therefore, that the note regarding minorities be examined by the Committee on new States.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought the same principle might be adopted in dealing with the Austrian notes as had been adopted regarding the notes sent by the German Delegation. In the latter case there had been a Committee to survey the whole of the replies. He would, therefore, propose that M. Dutasta be asked to arrange for a similar machinery in order that the whole of the replies be co-ordinated.

<sup>1</sup> These notes have been corrected in accordance with an errata sheet filed under 763.72119/6232.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 362.

(These proposals were accepted.)

NOTE:—The Resolution referred to was as follows:—

(It was agreed that a Committee should be appointed for the purpose of editing the reply to the German Note. The Secretary-General was requested to arrange for this Committee to meet with the least possible delay, and to communicate to it the various portions of the reply as they were approved.)

2. M. PICHON said that the Austrians had asked for an extension of one week beyond the period of 10 days allowed them to present their observations regarding the Treaty. They justified their request by reference to the change of Foreign Minister which had lately occurred. He thought the demand could not be resisted, and asked his colleagues if they agreed with him.

Note From Austrian Delegation Asking for Extension of Time Allowed for Reply

(It was agreed that the period of ten days allowed to the Austrian Delegation to present observations on the Treaty handed to them should be extended by one week and that this should be communicated to them by the Secretariat-General.)

3. (M. Loucheur, M. Seydoux and Mr. Waterlow entered the room.)

M. SEYDOUX said that on the previous day the question of the resumption of the parcels post and of the money order service had been raised by the British Delegation. He had raised no comment on the resumption of the parcels post, but he had asked for time to consult the Ministry of Finance regarding the money order service. He had consulted the Ministry of Finance and found that the question had already been considered. On the 26th June the French Postal Service had been addressed by the Ministry of Finance which took the view that the instability of the mark made it undesirable to resume any money order intercourse with Germany. He found that the same opinion still prevailed. From this he concluded that the objection of the French Finance Ministry was a technical one and was not concerned with any political consideration. If the British Government therefore felt that there was no technical objection from the British point of view, there seemed no reason to object to the resumption of money order interchanges between Great Britain and Germany. The British Government, as far as France was concerned, was, he thought, free to act as it wished. The French Government, however, did not for the time propose to restore the money order service.

Re-establishment of Postal Communications With Germany

M. PICHON said that the only objection would be that the Allies would not be acting identically, but as the question was not a political one the matter was not of great importance.

(It was agreed that there was no objection to the resumption by Great Britain of parcels post and money order interchange with Germany in accordance with the proposal of the British Delegation (Appendix A).

It was further agreed that the proposals of the Special Committee as modified on the previous day (H. D. 16, Para. 4<sup>3</sup>) should be accepted.

(For these proposals see Appendix B.)

4. The Council had before it the proposal made by M. Tittoni on the previous day (H. D. 16, Para. 2<sup>4</sup>).

Creation of Inter-  
Allied Organisa-  
tion for the Distri-  
bution of Raw  
Material

M. LOUCHEUR said that M. Tittoni's proposal really amounted to the perpetuation of the Supreme Economic Council. The very functions he wished exercised were those hitherto exercised by the Council with the help of the Wheat Executive, the Interallied Maritime Transport Council, and similar organisations. The problem before the Government [*Council?*] was therefore merely restated in other terms. As the Council knew, the French and Italian Delegations favoured the continuance of the Supreme Economic Council. Great Britain latterly had taken the same view. Only the American Delegation disagreed, and had wired to Washington for instructions. On the following Friday and Saturday there was to be a meeting of the Council in London. Everything depended on the instructions that might be received from the Governments. Without them the members could take no action.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had prepared a draft resolution to the following effect:—

"That the problems arising out of the present difficulties of providing food, coal and raw materials to the Allied Powers be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council for examination and report."

He had expressed his resolution in these terms in order not to bind the Supreme Economic Council in any way. M. Tittoni's proposal appeared to dictate the conclusion in some manner.

M. LOUCHEUR observed that neither resolution offered a solution of the question. All that could be done was to postpone it unless instructions were received for the Supreme Economic Council to continue its functions. In regard to the primary necessity of finding coal for Italy, he wished to inform the Council that he had had a conversation with M. Tittoni. There was information that between the dates of August 5th and September 5th, Germany would furnish one million three hundred and fifty thousand tons of coal. This coal was intended for French uses according to agreement. France, however, had agreed, in order to assist Italy, to despatch out of this one hundred and seventy-

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 345.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 343.



five thousand tons to the latter country. This would save the situation. In addition to this, in spite of considerable shortage in France, he had given an order for the despatch from the Saar Basin to Italy of one thousand two hundred tons daily. He hoped that Great Britain would also help to ease the situation and he expected to have a conversation with Sir Auckland Geddes <sup>5</sup> at the end of the week.

(It was then resolved that the problems arising out of the present difficulties of providing food, coal and raw materials to the Allied Powers be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council for examination and report.)

5. (At this moment Mr. Hudson, Mr. J. F. Dulles, M. Fiori,<sup>6</sup> and Major Greig entered the room.)

MR. LOUCHEUR said that on the previous day he had asked that the Expert Commission for the distribution of Rolling Stock in Europe should work in harmony with the Reparations Commission. This had apparently been interpreted by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways, as meaning that the Expert Commission should work under the orders of the Reparations Commission.

This was not what he meant to convey. It was clearly necessary that the work of the Expert Commission should be co-ordinated with that of the Reparations Commission. He therefore, proposed that the following Note, prepared by the British Delegation, be accepted:—

“The Presidents of the Main Expert Commissions on the distribution of rolling-stock, will work in close touch with the Reparations Commission in order that the latter may take the necessary measures for effecting financial adjustments resulting (a) from the transfer or liquidation of the above rolling-stock, craft and installations and (b) from such other decisions within the competence of the above Expert Commissions as may affect the Reparations Commission. No final decision will be communicated to the States affected without the previous concurrence of the Reparations Commission.”

He would like to add that, should there be disagreement between the Expert Commission and the Reparations Commission, the disagreement should be referred to the co-ordinating Committee, the setting up of which had been agreed to on the previous day.

MR. BALFOUR said that two quite different considerations had to be reconciled. It was obvious that the rolling stock of Europe, as being a financial asset, should not escape the grasp of the Reparation Commission, but it was clearly important that for the economic

<sup>5</sup> President of the Board of Trade of Great Britain.

<sup>6</sup> Dr. Manley O. Hudson, United States representative, Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways; John Foster Dulles, United States representative, Commission on the Reparation of Damage; and F. Fiori, Italian representative, Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways.

reconstruction of Europe, so essential an instrument of reconstruction should be employed to the best purpose. Without this, work on Mines, Farms, Factories etc., would be wasted. From this point of view, there was no more important resource than rolling stock for the economic revival of Europe. This resource must be husbanded by the Experts. It was therefore necessary to reconcile these two important objects.

MR. HUDSON said that the Commission of Experts which was to deal with the distribution of rolling stock was, according to the Treaty, entirely independent. It could not be subjected to the Reparations Commission. Should it be so subjected the Germans would have cause for complaint that the Treaty was not being observed. He quite agreed that it should work in harmony with the Reparations Commission, but if it were unable to take any decision without the concurrence of the Reparations Commission, the object for which it was created would be defeated. It was essential that it should be able to take independent decisions and have them executed speedily; should it have to wait for the previous sanction of the Reparations Commission it could not do its work.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the experts might be allowed to make provisional allotments of the railway stock, subject to sanction by the Reparations Commission. He disputed that the experts under the Treaty had any right to dispose finally of such material. The Reparations Commission, it had been stipulated, could intervene in all matters touching the disposal of material. He quite agreed that every day lost was a serious thing for the economic fate of Europe, but he could not admit that any of the material resources of the enemy countries could be disposed of irrespective of the Reparations Commission.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood M. Loucheur to agree to a temporary allotment of railway stock by the experts. They were bound, however, to inform the Reparations Commission of what they were doing. Their action would then be considered in its financial aspect, and the result of the action would be considered by the two Commissions together.

M. LOUCHEUR pointed out that according to the Treaty, only the Reparations Commission could receive material in discharge of the reparations debt. No transfer of material could, therefore, be made without the knowledge and concurrence of the Reparations Commission. He could not therefore admit the complete independence of the experts.

MR. HUDSON maintained that the experts should be entirely free to make a distribution of the railway stock according to the technical necessities of the case. It was the role of the Reparations Com-

mission to consider the financial consequences of the action of the Experts.

M. LOUCHEUR quoted Articles 19 and 20 of Annex II of the Treaty. He pointed out that the Reparations Commission did not propose to make the allocation of the rolling stock, but should the experts make such an allocation that Germany was not able to restore her economic life in such a manner as to pay reparations at all, it was clear that the Reparations Commission had a right to intervene. In his view a mistake had been made in drawing up the Treaty, and the Experts should have been placed under the Reparations Commission. Without this there would inevitably be constant conflict of authority. However the Treaty had been signed and so he proposed that the experts should make a distribution, that they should inform the Reparations Commission, and that in case of disagreement the matter should be referred through the co-ordinating Committee to the Governments.

MR. WHITE said that he saw no objection to this course.

MR. DULLES said that as the American representative on the Reparations Commission he sympathised with M. Loucheur. Should the Reparations Commission think it necessary to order a supply of coal from one country to another its intentions might be defeated, if the experts had allocated rolling stock in such a way that coal could not be moved.

MR. HUDSON said that he thought the subjection of the experts to the Reparations Commission a violation of the Treaty.

M. LOUCHEUR said that what he proposed was no violation of the Treaty, but a matter of internal arrangement among the Allies.

MR. BALFOUR said that the last sentence of the proposal under consideration seemed to imply that final decisions could be taken but not communicated to the Governments concerned. This appeared to be an absurd situation. He thought that the experts could make provisional allocation, but that no communication of their allotment as final should be made till the Reparations Commission had sanctioned it.

MR. HUDSON pointed out that the experts could only decide how the rolling stock should be distributed. They would be bound to utilise the Governments in order to have their plans carried out. For instance, should they decide that a proportion of German rolling stock was required in Denmark, they would be bound to inform the German and Danish Governments in order that they could execute the proposals. It was impossible to wait for the sanction of the Reparations Commission.

MR. BALFOUR said that a test question would be, should the Technical Committee desire to send 500 wagons to Czecho-Slovakia, were they entitled to do so without the consent of the Reparations Commission.



M. LOUCHEUR said that the answer in the case of experts would be yes, and in his own case it would be no. The experts, for instance, might lose sight of the necessity of transporting coal. If the Council of Five were in existence reference could be made to it, but, if it were not in existence, chaos would ensue. He thought it absurd that experts should act irrespective of orders. They should receive instructions from the Governments. The Clauses of the Treaty operated as against Germany, not as against the Allies among themselves. The various parts of the machinery employed for the execution of the Treaty must work together, otherwise there would be complete disorder. He therefore asked that definite instructions be given to the experts, so that they should not work independently of the Reparations Commission.

Mr. HUDSON said that M. Loucheur had stated the issue very clearly. Poland, for instance, had been attributed certain territory which had been German. The accepted theory was that a certain amount of rolling stock went with this territory, in order to make its economic life possible. It might, in the opinion of the Reparations Commission, be necessary to allot Poland some rolling stock by way of payment in the Reparations account. Restitution was no business of the experts, but, after the Reparations Commission had done what it thought fit, it might appear to the experts that Poland required more rolling stock. The experts would then take a decision for the sole purpose of employing the rolling stock available to the best general advantage. According to M. Loucheur, Reparations questions came in at this point. This, he submitted, was widening the sphere of the Reparations Commission unduly. The Expert Committee, in his view, ought to be able to say that for technical reasons, rolling stock was required at such and such a place. M. Loucheur's view falsified the intentions of Article 371. Was this Article to be applied in its obvious interpretation, or was its application to be made subject to the political situation of Europe as a whole? For instance, was Poland to be deprived of necessary rolling stock because the Reparations Commission decided to pay Belgium in coal?

M. LOUCHEUR said that he thought the clauses drawn up by the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways had entirely left financial considerations out of account. He did not say that the Expert Commission should not allocate rolling stock, but that this allocation should be provisional. The value of the rolling stock thus assigned, must be determined by the Reparations Commission. If, for instance, Poland could not pay for the rolling stock allotted her, was she to receive it for nothing? This would entirely stultify the work of the Reparations Commission. What he asked for was co-ordination. It was regrettable that better liaison had not been maintained by the various Commissions which had framed different

portions of the Treaty. As the Treaty itself did not provide for co-ordination, arrangements must be made for co-ordination in its execution.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought perhaps the following proposal would reconcile the two points of view:

"The immediate distribution of rolling stock shall be made on the authority of the Expert Committee; but no such distribution shall be final until the financial aspects of the question have been considered and approved by the Committee of Reparation."

(This proposal was accepted provisionally subject to further examination by the Experts present of the Reparations Commission and of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways.)

MR. HUDSON asked that subject to this, the nomination of the experts should be made in accordance with proposal annexed. (See Appendix "C".)

(With the addition of a French member in the Principal Commission, Para. 1(a), the proposals contained in the Report—Appendix "C"—were accepted.)

(M. Loucheur, Mr. Hudson, Mr. Dulles and M. Fiori withdrew.)

(At this point Mr. Polk entered the room.)

(M. Clementel, M. Alphand, M. Nogara and Mr. Hutchinson<sup>8</sup> entered the room.)

6. M. CLEMENTEL said that the draft Clauses now before the Council had been unanimously agreed to. (Appendix "D".) He explained the various clauses in which alterations had been made since the last edition. Some discussion arose concerning Article 29.

MR. WHITE asked whether the Smaller Powers might not claim equal rights with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in respect to the "most favoured nation" treatment.

M. CLEMENTEL explained that this provision had been inserted at the request of the Japanese Delegates.

MR. BALFOUR asked why it was proposed to re-impose Consular Courts on Bulgaria.

M. CLEMENTEL said that it was merely a case of re-stating pre-existing rights.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had not been aware of any right of Consular jurisdiction in Bulgaria, but, in any case, he would have thought it more in keeping with the times to abolish or curtail such a right rather than to re-assert or extend it.

Economic Clauses  
for Insertion in  
the Treaty of  
Peace With Bul-  
garia

<sup>8</sup> Etienne Clémentel, French representative and president, Economic Commission; Charles Alphand, French representative, Section on Permanent Commercial Relations, Economic Commission; B. Nogara, Italian representative, Financial Commission; and H. J. Hutchinson, British secretary, Economic Commission.

MR. WHITE said that the United States did not wish to claim extra-territorial rights in Bulgaria.

M. PICHON said that the French Government were negotiating just before the outbreak of war for the abolition of the capitulations in Bulgaria.

M. CLEMENTEL pointed out that the formula employed was permissive. Special conventions might be entered into by each of the Allied and Associated Powers with Bulgaria. There was nothing to compel them to do so. The sentence regarding "most favoured nation" treatment had been added at the request of Japan.

MR. BALFOUR observed that things were not left just as they had been before the war, as the United States and Japan were added to the list of Powers entitled to negotiate with Bulgaria regarding special rights which they had not possessed before the war.

M. PICHON observed that they need not avail themselves of this right. France had rights which had not been put into practice. Just before the outbreak of the war, negotiations were going on for the abolition of those theoretical rights. The object of the Article was therefore quite a restricted one, namely, to enable France to resume these negotiations.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that it was odd that an Article with so restricted an object, contrived to add two Powers to the list.

M. MATSUI said that he understood that there was in practice, no consular jurisdiction in Bulgaria. Japan, however, had been for a long time urging her right to exercise such jurisdiction in Turkey. Japan would therefore seem to be weakening her position unless this sentence were inserted in the Article. If none of the Powers chose to exercise their rights under the capitulations, Japan would do nothing; should the Powers wish to do so, Japan desired to be in the same position as the rest. Nothing very substantial was being asked for, and he thought that any exercise of the right was improbable. In view of the negotiations with Turkey, however, the Japanese Delegation had thought it desirable to have this sentence inserted.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought it was strange to insist in a Treaty on a right which no one wished to exercise, and which no one approved. With this comment, however, he would be content, and would not oppose the acceptance of the Article.

The Economic Clauses as drafted (see Appendix "D") were then adopted for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

It was further decided to communicate these Clauses in the same manner as the other Clauses, through the President of the Committee, to the Smaller Powers concerned.

(M. Clemenceau and M. Tardieu entered the room.)



7. MR. BALFOUR read the following telegram. He thought this amounted to a refusal on the part of General Pilsudski to obey the orders of the Council:—  
 (M. Clementel, M. Alphan and M. Nogara withdrew.)

Line of Demarcation Between Polish and Lithuanian Forces

TELEGRAM FROM SIR P. WYNDHAM,<sup>9</sup> WARSAW TO MR. BALFOUR

July 25th, 1919.

"On July 24th I saw General Pilsudski as instructed by you in your telegram of July 23rd.

Upon my raising the question of the Polish troops being withdrawn to the line of demarcation General Pilsudski said that this was a responsibility which he would not take as the immediate result would be the outbreak of disturbances, possibly leading to regular warfare. He declared that he would resign Office and leave Poland for Lithuania if we insisted on the Polish troops being withdrawn, and showed absolute determination on this point.

The internal situation is now so difficult that, as it seems to me, General Pilsudski would gladly avail himself of any opportunity to resign which might be afforded to him by foreign pressure in opposition to a cause which is popular in Poland. The political consequences will be serious if he carries out his threat."

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the telegram was dated July 25th and that the decision of the Council had been taken on the 26th.<sup>10</sup>

8. It was decided that no answer need be made to Herr Von Bethmann-Hollweg's letter regarding his personal responsibility for the outbreak of war.<sup>11</sup>

Reply to Herr Von Bethmann-Hollweg

9. (At this point M. Venizelos and the Members of the Commission on Greek Affairs, entered the Room.)

Hearing of M. Venizelos Regarding Frontiers of Bulgaria

M. CLEMENCEAU, addressing M. Venizelos said that the Council thought that he would probably have something to say regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria.

M. VENIZELOS said that he would have something to say on the subject, but before dealing with that, he would like to give an explanation regarding the document produced by Mr. White at a previous meeting (see H. D. 16. para. 7<sup>12</sup>). This document had been communicated to him by the Chairman and the Council would understand that he was considerably upset by it. It was implied that he had made use of a forged document to influence the Conference. He had never stated that the Mussulmans of Western Thrace desired to join Greece. Should they be given the choice, it was obvious that they would be inclined to choose the Allies of Turkey rather than the

<sup>9</sup> Sir Percy Wyndham, British Commissioner at Warsaw.

<sup>10</sup> HD-15, minute 1, p. 315.

<sup>11</sup> Appendix I to CF-99, vol. VI, p. 756.

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, p. 352.

enemies of Turkey. What he had suggested was that Allied Officers should consult the Mohammedan Deputies without the knowledge either of Bulgaria or Turkey. He then read a letter addressed to him by 8 Mussulman Deputies of Western Thrace (Appendix "E"). This petition he had sent to M. Cambon, but he had never attempted to represent the Mussulmans of Thrace as desiring a union with Greece.

M. Venizelos then read a series of observations he had prepared on this subject (see Appendix "F"). He added that he had made complaint to the Government at Washington regarding the imputation made against him by the American Delegation.

MR. WHITE said that the document had been communicated to M. Venizelos confidentially. M. Venizelos had therefore no right to make any communication to Washington on the subject.

M. VENIZELOS said that the document had been communicated to him by the Chairman of the Council, and he thought he had a right to defend himself vis-à-vis the American Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought M. Venizelos would have done better to reserve his justification for the Council.

M. VENIZELOS said that he would withdraw his complaint at Washington.

M. VENIZELOS said that in Thrace as claimed by him for Greece there were more than five times as many Greeks as Bulgarians. There were, in addition, a large number of Greeks in Constantinople and in the districts surrounding it. To these he made no claim and he argued that this reinforced his claim to the other parts of Thrace. Against the ethnographical argument which entirely favoured Greece an economic argument was alleged in favour of Bulgaria. He recognised that free access to the sea was one of the principles of the Conference. Whenever interests were opposed which could not be reconciled, it was necessary to decide which deserved the greater respect. The principle of nationality should take precedence over economic considerations. Bulgaria had excellent ports on the Black Sea. An outlet on the Aegean Sea was not a matter of primary necessity since the opening of the Straits would convert the Black Sea into an open sea. The inclusion of Greek populations in Greece was however a vital interest. Bulgaria could have commercial access to the Aegean either at Dédagatch or, if this port were regarded unsuitable, at Cavalla. Similar rights might be guaranteed to Bulgaria as had been guaranteed to other land-locked states. Four states, each of them larger than Bulgaria, namely Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, Hungary and Poland had been left by the Conference without direct access to the sea. Why should a similar arrangement not be enough for Bulgaria? Poland had not been given Dantzig, in order that the nationality of the intervening populations should be respected.

It had been alleged that the arrangement he proposed served Bulgarian purposes well enough in peace, but would not suit them in war. He thought this argument operated in his favour. There would be no chance for Bulgaria to establish a submarine base on the Aegean. Bulgaria was a continental power. Greece was very largely an island power. Should Bulgaria have complete control over a port in the Aegean, she could intercept the movements of Greek troops by means of submarines. He knew that strategic arguments were not in favour at the Conference but he only used this as a secondary argument and in reply to an objection. It was needless to attempt to satisfy Bulgaria. Nothing but Hegemony in the Balkans would satisfy her. She would undoubtedly attempt to upset the settlement made by the Conference. The only hope for peace in the Balkans was to set up her neighbours as ethnic units each individually too big to be attacked. It had also been said that the Greeks had left Western Thrace. This was true. They had been driven out by the Bulgarians and had for five years been refugees in Macedonia and Greece. M. Venizelos then read copious extracts from a work entitled "*Rapports et Enquêtes de la Commission Interalliée sur les violations du droit des Gens commises en Macédoine orientale par les armées Bulgares*". He added that the American Red Cross Society which had worked in Eastern Macedonia thoroughly corroborated the report of the Interallied Commission. He argued that it was undesirable to entrust to the rule of a nation which could behave in the manner illustrated by these extracts, any foreign population whatsoever.

(M. Venizelos then withdrew.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 29 July, 1919.

---

#### Appendix "A" to HD-18

M-392

#### *[Note From the British Delegation]*

#### RESUMPTION OF PARCEL POST AND MONEY ORDER SERVICES WITH GERMANY

These two services between the United Kingdom and Germany were, before the war, governed by special agreements between H. M. Government and the German Government, and not by the general international postal agreements. Under Article 289 of the Peace Treaty each of the Allied or Associated Powers is, within a period of six months from the coming into force of the Treaty, to notify to Germany the bilateral Treaties or Conventions which it is desired to revive with Germany. As regard the two agreements covering par-



cel post and money order services with Germany, H. M. Government propose, *in advance of the coming into force of the Peace Treaty*, to take steps at once, through the channel of the British and German post offices, for the resumption of these services. In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, they wish the Supreme Council to be informed of this proposal, although the agreements in question were not general international agreements. They presume that the Council will raise no objection. The Treaty Revision Committee have recommended the reviving of the two Treaties in question when the Peace Treaty permits.

---

Appendix "B" to HD-18

[*Report of the Special Committee Charged by the Supreme Economic Council To Study the Question of the Re-establishment of Postal Relations With Germany*]

The Special Committee charged by the Supreme Economic Council to study the question of the re-establishment of postal relations with Germany, has unanimously taken the following decisions which are submitted for the approval of the Supreme Council of the Heads of Governments.

1. The post Offices of the Allied and Associated Countries are authorised to enter into direct relations with the German Post Office for the immediate re-establishment of postal relations both for ordinary and registered post, and for samples and parcels.

2. The question of transport of postal matter by Germany will be examined by the German Delegation at Versailles together with the Allied and Associated Delegates.

3. The telegraph offices of the Allied and Associated Countries are authorised to enter into direct relations with the German telegraphic office for the provisional re-establishment of telegraphic and telephonic communication.

4. The public will be notified as soon as possible that postal and telegraphic relations with non-occupied Germany will be reopened under the following conditions:—

- (a) Commercial "and private" correspondence can be sent "closed".
- (b) The above-mentioned correspondence can be registered.
- (c) Telegrams should be written *en clair* and only in the following languages: French, English, Italian, German "or Japanese".
- (d) Each administration will later publish the conditions under which telephone service will be re-started.

5. The postal and telegraphic control services will be notified of the above decisions so that they may take any necessary measures.

6. In submitting the above propositions to the Supreme Council of the Heads of Governments, the special Committee recommends that the resolution of the Communications Section concerning the immediate re-establishment of international railway services with Germany may be adopted, in order to render the lifting of the Blockade effective, and that this resolution be passed for action to the Governments concerned.

---

### Appendix C to HD-18

[Translation <sup>13</sup>]

#### COMMISSION ON THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF PORTS, WATERWAYS, AND RAILWAYS

PARIS, July 19, 1919.

From: The President of the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways.

To: The President of the Allied Supreme Council.

The Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways at its meeting of July 17, decided to propose to the Allied Supreme Council that the commissions of experts provided for in articles 371 and 372 of the treaty with Germany, as well as in the corresponding articles of the treaties with the other enemy powers, be constituted as soon as possible after the coming into force of each of these treaties and in the following manner:

### I. GERMANY

#### (A) PRINCIPAL COMMISSION

1 American delegate, President	1 Czecho-Slovak delegate
1 Belgian delegate	1 Danish delegate
1 Polish delegate	1 German delegate

(This Commission shall have only advisory powers and shall be exclusively designed to afford liaison among the various special commissions.)

#### (B) SPECIAL COMMISSIONS

##### (1) *Special Belgian Commission*

1 American delegate (President of the principal commission), President
1 Belgian delegate
1 German delegate

---

<sup>13</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

*(2) Special Polish Commission*

- 1 American delegate (President of the principal commission),  
President
- 1 Polish delegate
- 1 German delegate

*(3) Special Czecho-Slovak Commission*

- 1 American delegate (President of the principal commission),  
President
- 1 Czecho-Slovak delegate
- 1 German delegate

*(4) Special Danish Commission*

- 1 American delegate (President of the principal commission),  
President
- 1 Danish delegate
- 1 German delegate

## II. BULGARIA

## (A) PRINCIPAL COMMISSION

- |                                |                      |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1 Japanese delegate, President | 1 Yugo-Slav delegate |
| 1 Greek delegate               | 1 Bulgarian delegate |

(This Commission shall have only advisory powers and shall be exclusively designed to afford liaison among the various special commissions.)

## (B) SPECIAL COMMISSIONS

*(1) Special Greek Commission*

- 1 Japanese delegate (President of the principal commission),  
President
- 1 Greek delegate
- 1 Bulgarian delegate

*(2) Special Yugo-Slav Commission*

- 1 Japanese delegate (President of the principal commission),  
President
- 1 Yugo-Slav delegate
- 1 Bulgarian delegate

## III. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

## (A) PLENARY COMMISSION

- |                               |                      |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1 British delegate, President | 1 Roumanian delegate |
| 1 Italian delegate            | 1 Polish delegate    |
| 1 Yugo-Slav delegate          | 1 Austrian delegate  |
| 1 Czecho-Slovak delegate      | 1 Hungarian delegate |

(This Commission shall decide all questions of interest to more than two states. Its decisions shall be adopted by a three-fourths majority of the members present. Failing by this majority, the President shall decide.)



## (B) SUB-COMMISSIONS

Sub-commissions of three members, composed of one representative of the state ceding rolling stock and one representative of the recipient state, with the President of the Plenary Commission as President, shall be organized to settle questions interesting only two states, as well as to carry out in each particular case the decisions made by the Plenary Commission.

The Commission for Austria-Hungary shall be established at the time of the coming into force of the treaty with Austria. Pending the coming into force of the treaty with Hungary, it shall act validly in the absence of the Hungarian delegate.

The Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways brings to the attention of the Allied Supreme Council how important it is that the Presidents of the above-mentioned commissions be officially appointed immediately by their respective governments, and be able to confer as soon as possible at Paris on the conditions for the work of their missions.

President:  
CRESPI

---

Appendix D to HD-18

## ECONOMIC COMMISSION

JULY 28, 1919.

## TREATY OF PEACE WITH BULGARIA.—ECONOMIC CLAUSES

(NOTE.—In this edition there have been included modifications in the following clauses, agreed upon by the Representatives on the Economic Commission of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at a meeting on the 28th July, 1919, and shown in footnotes to the appropriate Articles:—

1. Amendment to Article 29, proposed by the Japanese Delegation.
2. Amendment to Article 31, relating to liquidations in transferred territories.
3. A new Article, relating to concessions, in place of Article 35.)

The Clauses proposed by the Economic Commission for the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria are based to a very large extent on the Treaties with Germany and Austria, and the following statement indicates which articles can be derived from the corresponding articles in those Treaties by substituting the words "Bulgaria" or "Bulgarian" for the corresponding terms, and by making the necessary changes in the dates mentioned, e. g., the date of entry into the war (20th September, 1915), date of the Armistice (30th September, 1918), &c.

The text of the articles in the German and Austrian Treaties, on which the Economic Commission based their articles for Bulgaria, is the text as originally presented to the Germans and Austrians respec-

tively. Since then modifications have been made in the German Treaty, and it is assumed that these should be embodied in the clauses for Bulgaria. If further modifications are made in the Austrian Treaty, the question of embodying them likewise will need consideration.

JULY 7, 1919.

## SECTION I.—COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

### CHAPTER I.—*Customs Regulations, Duties and Restrictions*

#### *Article 1-4.*

Same as Articles 264-267 in German Treaty.

#### *Article A.\**

Same as Article 323 of German Treaty.

#### *Article 5.*

During the first twelve months after the coming into force of the present Treaty, the duties imposed by Bulgaria on imports from Allied and Associated States shall not be higher than the most favourable duties which were applied to imports into Bulgaria on the 31st July, 1914.

### CHAPTER II.—*Shipping*

#### *Article B.\**

Same as Article 327 of German Treaty.

#### *Article 6.*

Same as Article 271 of German Treaty.

#### *Article 7.*

Same as Article 273 of German Treaty.

### CHAPTER III.—*Unfair Competition*

#### *Articles 8 and 9.*

Same as Articles 274 and 275 of German Treaty.

### CHAPTER IV.—*Treatment of Nationals of Allied and Associated Powers*

#### *Article 10.*

Same as Article 276 of the Treaty with Germany, with the modification indicated below of paragraph (c) :—

“Bulgaria undertakes:—

“(c.) Not to subject the nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, their property, rights or interests, including companies and

\*Presumably, this Article will, as in the German Treaty, appear in the Bulgarian Treaty, in the Part relating to Ports, Waterways and Railways. It is to be subject to the provisions as to revision embodied in Article 378 of the German Treaty. [Footnote in the original.]

associations in which they are interested, to any charge, tax, or impost, direct or indirect, other or higher than those which are or may be imposed on her own nationals or their property, rights or interests, *or on the nationals of any more-favoured nation or their property, rights or interests.*"

*Articles 11-13.*

Same as Articles 277-9 of the Treaty with Germany.

CHAPTER V.—*General Articles*

*Article 14.*

The obligations imposed on Bulgaria by Chapter I and by Article 8 of Chapter II above shall . . . (as in Article 280 of the Treaty with Germany).

*Article 15.*

Same as Article 281 of Treaty with Germany.

SECTION II.—TREATIES

*Article 16.* (Article 282 of German Treaty.)

From the coming into force of the present Treaty, and subject to the provisions thereof, the multilateral Treaties, Conventions and Agreements of an economic or technical character enumerated below and in the subsequent articles, shall alone be applied as between Bulgaria and those of the Allied and Associated Powers party thereto:—

1. Convention of the 11th October, 1909, regarding the International Circulation of Motor-cars.<sup>14</sup>

2. Agreement of the 15th May, 1886, regarding the sealing of railway trucks subject to Customs Inspection,<sup>15</sup> and Protocol of the 18th May, 1907.<sup>16</sup>

3. Agreement of the 15th May, 1886, regarding the technical standardisation of Railways.<sup>17</sup>

4. Convention of the 5th July, 1890, regarding the publication of Customs Tariffs and the organisation of an International Union for the publication of Customs Tariffs.<sup>18</sup>

5. Convention of the 20th May, 1875, regarding the unification and improvement of the Metric System.<sup>19</sup>

6. Convention of the 29th November, 1906, regarding the unification of pharmacopœial formulæ for Potent Drugs.<sup>20</sup>

7. Convention of the 7th June, 1905, regarding the creation of an International Agricultural Institute at Rome.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CII, p. 64.

<sup>15</sup> G. Fr. de Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités et autres actes relatifs aux rapports de droit international*, 2 sér., tome XXII, p. 42.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 3 sér., tome II, p. 878.

<sup>17</sup> Luigi Palma, *Nuova Raccolta dei Trattati e delle Convenzioni in Vigore fra il Regno d'Italia ed i Governi Esteri* (1881-1890), vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 783; see also Germany, *Reichs-Gesetzblatt*, 1887, p. 111.

<sup>18</sup> Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776-1909, vol. II, p. 1996.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1924.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2209.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2140.



8. Arrangement of the 9th December, 1907, for the creation of an International Office of Public Hygiene at Paris.<sup>22</sup>

NOTE.—All the Conventions mentioned in Article 282 of the Treaty with Germany to which Bulgaria was not a party are imposed upon her in Article 24 with the exception of the following, which have been omitted, as they do not concern Bulgaria:—

Convention of the 25th April, 1907, as to the Turkish Customs Tariff.<sup>23</sup> (7.)

The three Conventions of 1857,<sup>24</sup> 1861<sup>25</sup> and 1863<sup>26</sup> relating to redemption of toll dues on the Sound, Elbe and Scheldt. (8, 9, and 10.)

Suez Canal Convention of the 29th October, 1888.<sup>27</sup> (11.)

Convention of the 4th February, 1898, regarding the tonnage measurement of vessels for inland navigation.<sup>28</sup> (14.)

Conventions of the 16th and 19th November, 1885, regarding Concert Pitch.<sup>29</sup> (22.)

Convention of the 12th June, 1912 [1902], relating to the guardianship of Minors.<sup>30</sup> (26.)

*Article 17.*

Same as Article 283 of Treaty with Germany.

*Article 18.*

Same as Article 284 of Treaty with Germany.

*Article 19 (new).*

The Convention of the 29th November, 1901, between Roumania and Bulgaria, concerning fishing in the waters of the Danube,<sup>31</sup> is again brought into force from the date of the ratification of the present Treaty of Peace, and cannot be denounced for a period of five years unless it is previously revised by the mutual consent of the contracting States.

*Article C.†*

Same as Article 366 of Treaty with Germany.

*Article 20 (new).*

Bulgaria undertakes, within twelve months of the coming into force of this Treaty:—

1. To adhere, in the prescribed form, to the International Convention of Paris of the 20th March, 1883,<sup>32</sup> for the protection of industrial property, revised at Washington on the 2nd June, 1911,<sup>33</sup> and the Inter-

<sup>22</sup> Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776–1909, vol. II, p. 2214.

<sup>23</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. C, p. 575.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. XLVII, p. 24.

<sup>25</sup> Lewis Hertslet, *Commercial Treaties* (London, 1864), vol. XI, p. 355.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1097.

<sup>27</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXIX, p. 18.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. XC, p. 303.

<sup>29</sup> Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3 sér., tome XI, p. 245.

<sup>30</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XCV, p. 421.

<sup>31</sup> Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2 sér., tome XXXIII, p. 277.

† Presumably, this Article will, as in the German Treaty, appear in the Bulgarian Treaty in the Part relating to Ports, Waterways and Railways. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>32</sup> Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776–1909, vol. II, p. 1935.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 1910–1923, vol. III, p. 2953.

national Convention of Berne of the 9th September, 1886,<sup>34</sup> for the protection of literary and artistic works, revised at Berlin in 1908,<sup>35</sup> and the Act and Protocol of the 20th March, 1914,<sup>36</sup> relating to the protection of literary and artistic works;

2. To recognise and protect by effective legislation in accordance with the principles of the said Conventions the industrial, literary and artistic property of nationals of the Allied and Associated States.

In addition and independently of the obligations already mentioned, Bulgaria undertakes to continue to assure such recognition and such protection to all the industrial, literary and artistic property of the nationals of each of the Allied and Associated States to an extent at least as great as upon the 1st October, 1915, and upon the same conditions.

*Article 21 (new).*

Bulgaria undertakes to adhere to the Treaties, Conventions and Agreements hereunder enumerated, or to ratify them:—

1. Conventions of the 14th March, 1884,<sup>37</sup> 1st December, 1886,<sup>38</sup> and 23rd March, 1887,<sup>39</sup> and Final Protocol of the 7th July, 1887,<sup>40</sup> regarding the Protection of Submarine Cables.

2. Convention of the 31st December, 1913, regarding the unification of Commercial Statistics.<sup>41</sup>

3. Conventions of the 23rd September, 1910, respecting the unification of certain regulations regarding collisions and salvage at sea.<sup>42</sup>

4. Convention of the 21st December, 1904, regarding the exemption of hospital ships from dues and charges in ports.<sup>43</sup>

5. Convention of the 26th September, 1906, for the suppression of nightwork for women.<sup>44</sup>

6. Convention of the 26th September, 1906, for the suppression of the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches.<sup>45</sup>

7. Conventions of the 18th May, 1904,<sup>46</sup> and the 4th May, 1910,<sup>47</sup> regarding the suppression of the White Slave Traffic.

8. Convention of the 4th May, 1910, regarding the suppression of obscene publications.<sup>48</sup>

9. Sanitary Convention of the 3rd December, 1903,<sup>49</sup> and the pre-

<sup>34</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXVII, p. 22.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. CII, p. 619.

<sup>36</sup> Great Britain, *Treaty Series*, 1914, No. 11 (Cd. 7613).

<sup>37</sup> Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776–1909, vol. II, p. 1949.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1956.

<sup>39</sup> Jules De Clercq, *Recueil des traités de la France* (Paris, 1891), vol. 17, p. 295.

<sup>40</sup> Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776–1909, vol. II, p. 1958.

<sup>41</sup> Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3 sér., tome XI, p. 304.

<sup>42</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CIII, p. 434.

<sup>43</sup> Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776–1909, vol. II, p. 2135.

<sup>44</sup> Great Britain, *Treaty Series*, 1910, No. 21 (Cd. 5221).

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 1909, No. 4 (Cd. 4530).

<sup>46</sup> Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776–1909, vol. II, p. 2131.

<sup>47</sup> Great Britain, *Treaty Series*, 1912, No. 20 (Cd. 6326).

<sup>48</sup> *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910–1923, vol. III, p. 2918.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 1776–1909, vol. II, p. 2066.

ceding Conventions signed on the 30th January, 1892,<sup>50</sup> the 15th April, 1893,<sup>51</sup> the 3rd April, 1894,<sup>52</sup> and the 19th March, 1897.<sup>53</sup>

10. Conventions of the 3rd November, 1881,<sup>54</sup> and the 15th April, 1889,<sup>55</sup> regarding precautionary measures against phylloxera.

11. Convention of the 19th March, 1902, regarding the protection of birds useful to agriculture.<sup>56</sup>

*Article 22.*—(Same as Article 289 of German Treaty, in the form proposed in the reply to the Germans and with the omission indicated in the footnote.)

Each of the Allied or Associated Powers, being guided by the general principles or special provisions of the present Treaty, shall notify to Bulgaria the bilateral treaties or conventions which such Allied or Associated Power wishes to revive with Bulgaria.

The notification referred to in the present Article shall be made either directly or through the intermediary of another Power. Receipt thereof shall be acknowledged in writing by Bulgaria. The date of the revival shall be that of the notification.

The Allied and Associated Powers undertake among themselves not to revive with Bulgaria any conventions or treaties which are not in accordance with the terms of the present Treaty.

The notification shall mention any provisions of the said conventions and treaties which, not being in accordance with the terms of the present Treaty, shall not be considered as revived.

In case of any difference of opinion, the League of Nations will be called on to decide.

A period of six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty is allowed to the Allied and Associated Powers within which to make the notification.

Only those bilateral treaties and conventions which have been the subject of such a notification shall be revived between the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria; all the others are and shall remain abrogated.

The above regulations apply to all bilateral treaties or conventions existing between all the Allied and Associated Powers† and Bulgaria, even if the said Allied and Associated Powers have not been in a state of war with Bulgaria.

<sup>50</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXXIV, p. 12.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXV, p. 7.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXVII, p. 78.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXIX, p. 159.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXIII, p. 323.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXI, p. 1311.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. CII, p. 969.

†The words "signatories to the present Treaty," which appear in the German Treaty, are omitted at the request of the Belgian Delegation. [Footnote in the original.]



*Articles 23 and 24.*

Same as Articles 290 and 291 of Treaty with Germany.

*Article 25.*—(Same as Article 292 of German Treaty, with the omission indicated in the footnote.)

Bulgaria recognises that all treaties, conventions or arrangements which she concluded with Russia, or with any State or Government of which the territory previously formed a part of Russia § before the [1st August, 1914],<sup>56a</sup> or after that date until the coming into force of the present Treaty, are and remain abrogated.

*Articles 26–28.*

Same as Articles 293–295 of the Treaty with Germany.

NOTE.—The following articles of the German Treaty have been omitted in the Treaty with Bulgaria:—

Article 285, North Sea Fisheries.

Article 287, Civil Procedure.

Article 288, Samoa.

*Article 29 (new).*||

The immunities and privileges of foreigners, as well as the rights of jurisdiction and of consular protection enjoyed by the Allied and Associated Powers in Bulgaria, by virtue of the Capitulations Usages and Treaties, may form the subject of special conventions between each of the Allied and Associated Powers concerned and Bulgaria.

The Allied and Associated Powers concerned undertake among themselves to propose only such conventions as shall conform to the stipulations of the present Treaty. In case of difference of opinion among them, the League of Nations will be called upon to decide.

## SECTION III.—DEBTS

*Article 30 and Annex thereto.*

Same as Article 296 (and the Annex thereto) of the German Treaty, with the same change as in the Austrian Treaty, namely, the addition to paragraph 3 of Article 296 of the words shown in italics below¶:—

“3. Interest which has accrued during the war to a national of one

§ The words “or with Roumania” are omitted. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>56a</sup> Brackets appear in the original.

|| The following sentence has been accepted by the Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for insertion after the first paragraph of this Article:—“The Principal Allied and Associated Powers will enjoy in Bulgaria in the matters above mentioned most-favoured-nation treatment.” [Footnote in the original.]

¶ It is presumed that the final part of paragraph (d) of Article 296, viz.:—

“In the case of new States the currency in which and the rate of exchange at which debts shall be paid or credited shall be determined by the Reparation Commission provided for in Part VIII (Reparation).”

will be omitted, as there will be no new States in relation to Bulgaria. [Footnote in the original.]

of the Contracting Powers in respect of securities issued *or taken over* by an opposing Power provided that the payment of interest on such securities to the nationals of that Power or to neutrals has not been suspended during the war."

#### SECTION IV.—PROPERTY, RIGHTS AND INTERESTS

##### *Article 31.*

Same as Article 297 of German Treaty, except as here indicated\*\* :—

At the end of paragraph (a) the following provision to be added :

"The Bulgarian Government will revoke all legislative or administrative provisions which it may have made during the war forbidding Companies of Allied and Associated nationality or Companies in which Allied or Associated nationals are interested to enjoy the benefit of concessions or contracts in Bulgaria."

*Paragraph (d)*—"As between the Allied and Associated Powers or their nationals on the one hand, and Bulgaria or her nationals on the other hand, all the exceptional war measures, or measures of transfer, *put into operation by the Allied and Associated Powers*, or acts done or to be done in execution of such measures as defined in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Annex hereto shall be considered as final and binding upon all persons except as regards the reservations laid down in the present Treaty.

*"The same measures and all others affecting the property, rights and interests of nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers—notably, acts of requisition or seizure, wheresoever effected, by the civil or military authorities, the troops, or the population of Bulgaria, or effected in Bulgaria by the civil or military authorities or the troops of the Powers allied with Bulgaria—are declared void, and the Bulgarian Government will take all measures necessary for the restoration of such property, rights and interests."*

##### *Article 32.*

Same as Article 298 of the German Treaty.

---

\*\*Having regard to the modifications since introduced into the German and Austrian Treaties in regard to the right of liquidation in new States and transferred territory, it has been necessary to reconsider the Article on this subject approved by the Economic Commission for inclusion in Section VIII of the present Treaty. The Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have unanimously agreed upon the inclusion in Article 31 of the following paragraph based upon the corresponding provision in Article 297 of the German Treaty (see separate memorandum) :—

"In the case of liquidations effected in new States which are signatories of the present Treaty as Allied and Associated Powers, or in States to which Bulgarian territory is transferred by the present Treaty, or in States which are not entitled to share in the reparation payments to be made by Germany, the proceeds of liquidations effected by such States shall, subject to the rights of the Reparation Commission under the present Treaty, particularly under Articles (235 and 260), be paid direct to the owner. If, on the application of that owner, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided for by Section VI of this Part, or an arbitrator appointed by that Tribunal, is satisfied that the conditions of the sale or measures taken by the Government of the State in question outside its general legislation were unfairly prejudicial to the price obtained, they shall have discretion to award to the owner equitable compensation to be paid by that State." [Footnote in the original.]

*Article 33.*

Diplomatic or Consular claims made before the war by the Representatives or Agents of the Allied and Associated Powers with regard to the private property, rights or interests of nationals of those Powers shall, on the application of the Powers concerned, be submitted to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided for in Section VI.

## ANNEX TO SECTION IV

Same as Annex to Section IV of German Treaty, except for the following alterations in paragraph 1:—

"1. In accordance with the provisions of Article 34, paragraph (*d*), the validity of vesting orders and of orders for the winding-up of businesses or companies, and of any other orders, directions, decisions or instructions of any court or any department of the Government of any of the Allied and Associated Powers made or given, or purporting to be made or given, in pursuance of war legislation with regard to enemy property, rights and interests is confirmed. The interests of all persons shall be regarded as having been effectively dealt with by any order, direction, decision or instruction dealing with property in which they may be interested, whether or not such interests are specifically mentioned in the order, direction, decision, or instruction. No question shall be raised as to the regularity of a transfer of any property, rights or interests dealt with in pursuance of any such order, direction, decision or instruction. Every action taken with regard to any property, business, or company, whether as regards its investigation, sequestration, compulsory administration, use, requisition, supervision, or winding-up, the sale or management of property, rights or interests, the collection or discharge of debts, the payment of costs, charges or expenses, or any other matter whatsoever, in pursuance of orders, directions, decisions, or instructions of any court or of any department of the Government of any of the Allied and Associated Powers, made or given, or purporting to be made or given, in pursuance of war legislation with regard to enemy property, rights or interests, is confirmed. Provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not be held to prejudice the titles to property heretofore acquired in good faith and for value and in accordance with the laws of the country in which the property is situated by nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers." ††

## SECTION V.—CONTRACTS, PRESCRIPTIONS, JUDGMENTS

*Article 34.*

Same as Article 299 of the Treaty with Germany, paragraph (*c*), as to nonapplicability of certain provisions to the United States of

---

†† The following paragraph omitted:—

"The provisions of this paragraph do not apply to such of the above-mentioned measures as have been taken by the German authorities in invaded or occupied territory, nor to such of the above-mentioned measures as have been taken by Germany or the German authorities since the 11th November, 1918, all of which shall be void." [Footnote in the original.]



America, Brazil, and Japan being amended or omitted, in the event of the Treaty not being signed by one or more of those Powers.

*Article 35.††*

Bulgaria is *ipso facto* substituted for the Ottoman Empire as regards the rights, charges and obligations of the latter with regard to concessionaires and persons entitled to rights under contracts in the territories ceded by the Ottoman Empire to Bulgaria, following upon the Balkan wars.

The same rule is applicable in the case of States which acquire Bulgarian territory as a result of the present Treaty.

The substitution will take effect in the case of each State acquiring territory as from the date of the Treaty under which the territory is ceded, and shall not cause any prejudice to the interests of the concessionaire.

Provided that nothing in this Article prejudices the right of any State to which territory is transferred to cancel any concessions, so far as concerns such territories, if the said State considers such cancellation to be desirable in the public interest, on condition that equitable compensation is paid, the amount to be determined, in case of disagreement, by an independent arbitrator.

If the State to which territory is ceded does not avail itself of the right provided in the preceding paragraph, it may enter into negotiations with the persons entitled to rights under concessions and contracts with a view to adapting their provisions to the new legislation or the new conditions of working.

If these negotiations do not lead to any result within six months, the State or the persons concerned may submit the dispute to an independent arbitrator.

*Article 36.*

Concessions, guarantees of receipts, and rights of exploitation in which nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, or Companies or Associations controlled by such nationals, are interested may in case either of abnormal conditions of working or of dispossession be extended on the application of the interested party for a period to be determined by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, which shall take account of the period of dispossession or of abnormal conditions of working.

All arrangements approved or agreements come to before the entry

---

†† In place of this Article, the following new Article has been agreed upon by the Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers :—

"The private rights referred to in the Treaties of Constantinople (1913), Athens (1913), and Stamboul (1914) shall not be affected by transferences of territory made under the present Treaty. Private rights in all territories transferred by or to Bulgaria under the present Treaty shall equally be respected under the same conditions.

"In case of disagreement in regard to the application of this Article, the difference shall be submitted to an arbitrator nominated by the Council of the League of Nations." [Footnote in the original.]

of Bulgaria into the war between the Bulgarian Authorities and companies or associations controlled by nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers are confirmed. Nevertheless, periods of time, prices and conditions therein laid down may be revised having regard to the new economic conditions. In case of disagreement the decision shall rest with the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.

*Article 37.*

Any company incorporated in accordance with some law other than that of Bulgaria owning property, rights or interests in Bulgaria, which is now or shall hereafter be controlled by nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, shall have the right, within five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, to transfer its property, rights and interests to another company incorporated in accordance with Bulgarian law or the law of one of the Allied and Associated Powers whose nationals control it; and the company to which the property is transferred shall continue to enjoy the same rights and privileges which the other company enjoyed under the laws of Bulgaria and the terms of this Treaty. This company shall not be subjected to any special tax on account of this transfer.

*Articles 38-41.*

Same as Articles 300-3 of the Treaty with Germany, with the same modification as in the Austrian Treaty, viz., the substitution of the following text for the second paragraph of Article 302 of the German Treaty:—

“If a judgment *or measure of execution* in respect of any dispute which may have arisen has been given during the war by an Austrian *judicial authority* against a national of an Allied or Associated State *or a company or association in which one of such nationals was interested*, in a case in which either such national *or such company or association* was not able to make his defence, the Allied and Associated national who has suffered prejudice thereby shall be entitled to recover compensation, to be fixed by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided for in Section VI.”

ANNEX TO SECTION V

Same as Annex to Section V of the Treaty with Germany, with the following modifications in the paragraphs specified:—

*Paragraph 2.*

“The following classes of contracts are excepted from dissolution by Article 37 and, without prejudice to the rights contained in Article 34 (b) of Section IV, remain in force subject to the application of domestic laws, orders or regulations made during the war by the Allied and Associated Powers, and subject to the terms of the contracts:

“*(e.)* Contracts between individuals or companies and States, provinces, municipalities, or other similar juridical persons charged with

administrative functions and concessions granted by States, provinces, municipalities or other similar juridical persons charged with administrative functions, *including contracts and concessions concluded or accorded by the Turkish Government in the territories ceded by the Turkish Empire to Bulgaria before the coming into force of the present Treaty.*"

*Paragraph 4.*

The following clause is omitted:—

"(c.) The closure of contracts relating to cotton 'futures,' which were closed as on the 31st July, 1914, under the decision of the Liverpool Cotton Association, is also confirmed."

SECTION VI.—MIXED ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL

Same as Section VI of the Treaty with Germany.

SECTION VII.—INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

*Articles 44 and 45.*

Same as Articles 306 and 307 of German Treaty.

*Articles 46 and 47.*

Same as Articles 309 and 310 of German Treaty, with omission of the last paragraph in each (which excludes the United States from the Articles), if the United States do not sign the Treaty.

*Article 48.*

Same as Article 311 of German Treaty.

NOTE.—Article 308 of the German Treaty, relating to rights of priority under the Industrial Property Convention, is omitted, as Bulgaria was not a party to the Convention.

SECTION VIII.—SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO TRANSFERRED TERRITORY

Same as Section VIII. of the Austrian Treaty, subject to the modifications indicated below in Article 49 (the definition Article) and consequential changes in the rest of the text §§:—

*Article 49.*

"Of the individuals and juridical persons previously nationals of *Bulgaria*, those who acquire *ipso facto* under the present Treaty the nationality of an Allied or Associated Power are designated in the provisions which follow by the expression '*former Bulgarian nationals*'; the remainder are designated by the expression '*Bulgarian nationals*.'"

---

§§ It has since been unanimously agreed between the Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers that Article 51 (liquidation of Bulgarian property in transferred territories) should be omitted in view of the inclusion in the paragraph for insertion in Article 31, given in the third footnote on p. 5, of the words "States to which Bulgarian territory is transferred by the present Treaty." [Footnote in the original; reference is to the footnote on p. 391.]



## Appendix E to HD-18

[*The Mohammedan Deputies of Western Thrace to the President of the Council of Ministers of Greece (Venizelos)*]

[Translation <sup>67</sup>]

SOFIA, December 31, 1918.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY MR. ELEUTHERIOS VENIZELOS,  
*President of the Council of Ministers  
of Greece, etc. etc.*

EXCELLENCY: The undersigned, Mohammedan Turks, deputies from Western Thrace in the Bulgarian Parliament, although probably holding views different from yours regarding the political future of Western Thrace, firmly convinced of your liberalism, address you to inform you of the following facts and to beg you, if only for humanitarian reasons, to intervene on our behalf in the sense that we are indicating to you.

We have already sent a letter on this subject to the chief of the Greek Mission in Sofia, Colonel Mazarakis. Now we proceed to inform you that we have just sent a letter to General d'Esperey, commander in chief of the Allied armies, which reads as follows:

"SOFIA, December 31, 1918.

"My dear General: The undersigned Mohammedan Turks, deputies from Western Thrace in the Bulgarian Parliament, consequently qualified to represent this region, after being thoroughly convinced that it is quite impossible for our compatriots remaining there to live under the Bulgarian Government in view of the complete lack of tolerance that the Bulgarians have exhibited, and that they still exhibit toward us, as toward those among their subjects who are not of Bulgarian ancestry, because of the frequent annoyances and abuses unworthy of a civilized nation which they commit, and in harmony with all our fellow countrymen of Western Thrace, have the honor to request an audience with General Chrétien, commander of the Allied occupation troops in Bulgaria.

"Our object is to explain to him that all the region included between the Mesta, the Maritza, the sea, and approximately the old Turco-Bulgarian boundary of 1912, divided in two prefectures: that of Gumul Djina (District of Gumuldjina, Isketche, Egridere, Dari-Dere, Pachmakli, Aki-Chelembi, Kirdja-Ali, Kochi-Kavac, Ortakeui, Sofoulou, Fere, Dedeagatch) and that of Kara-Agatch-Odrin (District of Kara-Agatch, Moustapha-Pacha, Svilen-Grad, and Dimotika) is inhabited by a compact mass of Mohammedan Turks, a minority of Greeks and a few Bulgarians.

"We would like, in addition, in the name of this overwhelming majority to beg of him kindly to protect us so that those of our fellow countrymen of Western Thrace who have emigrated to Turkey can freely return to their homes, so that the Bulgarian vexations and abuses in Thrace against our unhappy compatriots may be brought to

<sup>67</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

an end, and so that a measure may be adopted at the Peace Conference in our favor,—considering that without guarantees our life would be impossible under Bulgarian domination.”

*“Not having been received as yet by General Chrétien, we have taken the liberty in a report, of which a copy is enclosed, to set forth the situation in Western Thrace with accurate statistics in support of it, which we have sent to him, and we reserve the right to request of him his intervention for the actual protection of our compatriots in Thrace.*

*“Unhappily, the Bulgarian vexations and abuses go on increasing and multiplying every day against our compatriots; an underlying irritation against the Bulgarians is being felt in Thrace; and it would not be improbable that it break forth one day or other against its oppressors.*

*“We have, more than once, interpellated the Bulgarian ministers in the Sobranje<sup>58</sup> on the subject of their impossible administration of Western Thrace, but the Government does not intend to give any satisfaction. It has even reached the point of wishing to demolish the only Turkish Mosque to be found in Sofia—which shows how tolerant it is.*

*“My dear General, at a time when the World War, carried on for the immortal principles of equality and justice, has just ended, at a time when the Peace Conference is about to establish in a permanent form these eternal principles, it would not be just to allow us to suffer under the hardest and most unpitying yoke that one can imagine,—under the Bulgarian yoke.*

*“While waiting for the measures which will be taken by the Peace Conference on this subject, and which, we hope, will be of such a kind as to free us, by no matter what means, from the Bulgarians, during the whole duration of the armistice, we urgently beg of you, my dear General, to take military measures, even of a provisional character, to ameliorate our condition, which is intolerable.*

*“The occupation of Western Thrace by Allied troops would put an end to our misfortunes, and prevent all disturbances which, as we have just explained, are to be feared. It would be desirable that Greek troops take part in this occupation, considering that the Greeks in Thrace are subjected to the same vexations as we are, that the Greeks have always taken a liberal attitude toward us, that they are a nation with which we can very easily agree, and that they could, while protecting their compatriots, protect us, who find ourselves in the same situation, against the abuses and vexations of the Bulgarians.”*

Excellency, as we have indicated in this letter, it would be desirable, from our point of view, that, in the future, Western Thrace be liberated in every way from the Bulgarian yoke, which is intolerable.

But, while awaiting the solution which will be adopted regarding this subject by the Peace Conference, we urgently beg of you, Excellency, in the name of all of our oppressed co-nationals to do everything that you possibly can in favor of the occupation which we have requested in our letter addressed to General d’Esperey.

---

<sup>58</sup> The Bulgarian national assembly or parliament.

Kindly accept, Excellency, the assurances of our most profound respect.

MEHMET DJELAL  
ISMAIL HAKKI  
CALIM NOURI  
TEVFIK

EDHEM ROUHI  
H. CAFET  
HACHIM  
KEMAL

---

Appendix F to HD-18

[Translation <sup>59</sup>]

*Observations [by the Head of the Greek Delegation (Venizelos)] on the Note Dated July 24 <sup>60</sup> From the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Sofia*

1. A petition, bearing the signature of the Mohammedan deputies from Western Thrace in the Bulgarian Sobranye, is alleged to have been presented to the Conference requesting the cession of this province by Bulgaria to Greece. Most of these deputies are alleged to have entered an official denial that they had either signed or had knowledge of this petition.

This denial had no *raison d'être*, since the petition to which it referred had never existed.

The denial would not in any manner count against the letter dated December 31, 1918,<sup>61</sup> which these same deputies sent to General Franchet d'Esperey and to M. Venizelos with the purpose of affirming that the Mohammedans of Western Thrace could no longer live under "the hard and unpytting Bulgarian yoke" and to solicit, while awaiting deliverance therefrom "by no matter what means", the occupation of their country by Allied and Greek troops. This letter, bearing the signatures of eight Mohammedan deputies from Western Thrace, reached M. Venizelos on February 19, 1919 and was communicated by him the next day, February 20, to His Excellency M. Jules Cambon, President of the Commission of the Conference charged with the examination of Greek affairs. General Franchet d'Esperey, on his part, delivered to the French Government the same letter addressed to him.

2. The Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Sofia considers that if the Mohammedan population of Western Thrace had to choose between the Greek and Bulgarian regimes, they would much prefer the latter.

This opinion is in flagrant contradiction with that of the deputies who signed the letter of December 31, who would seem to be better judges in the matter. In this letter, in which they declared their

---

<sup>59</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>60</sup> See p. 352.

<sup>61</sup> *Supra*.



desire to see Western Thrace "liberated in every way from the Bulgarian yoke, which is intolerable", they have at the same time declared that "the Greeks have always taken a liberal attitude" towards them, and that they constitute a nation with which they could very easily agree.

This twofold feeling is very old among the Mohammedans. Those who live under Greek sovereignty have always declared themselves very well satisfied with their lot. In a study by M. Franchet d'Esperey in the *Revue du Monde Musulman*, 1911, p. 87 and following, one finds the positive and irrefutable proof of this. It is entirely otherwise with the Mohammedans in Bulgaria, and more especially with those in Western Thrace. Their deputies in the Sobranye have on several occasions protested against the Bulgarian regime and have formulated from the tribune of Parliament the gravest accusations against the Bulgarian civil and military authorities. This was especially the case in the famous interpellations made in the Sobranye on November 11 and December 12, 1917. It was the same in December last. The Mohammedan deputies complained of the demolition of the Mosque of Sofia, and of the oppressive character of the Bulgarian administration. Menaced and terrorized, they could not complete the development of their interpellation. Moreover, not obtaining from the Bulgarian Government the least promise of satisfaction, they resolved to present their grievances to the Allies. On December 18, 1918, they sent a report to General Chrétien, Commander of Allied Troops at Sofia. They described the Bulgarian oppression in Thrace, solicited the return to their homes of thousands of Mohammedans arbitrarily removed by the Bulgarian authorities, and claim for Mohammedans the right of determining their lot.

Not having succeeded in obtaining from General Chrétien either a reply or an audience, they decided to present their case to General Franchet d'Esperey. They sent him the letter of December 31 which they sent at the same time to M. Venizelos, informing him that, while probably having views different from theirs on the subject of the political future of Western Thrace, their conviction of his liberalism induced them to beg of him, if only for humanitarian reasons to intervene on their behalf and to support the request for the military occupation of their country addressed to General Franchet d'Esperey.

3. All of these events, taking place in Sofia itself, necessarily came to the attention of the Bulgarian Government which was naturally moved by them. The latter did not hesitate to adopt, one after another, strong methods to stop the scandal and its disastrous effects: the Mohammedan deputies were closely watched, ferreted out, threatened, terrorized. The President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs, invited them to furnish an explanation of the memorandum

sent to General Franchet d'Esperey. It is understood that the deputies, thus called upon to exonerate themselves, had to reply in an evasive manner, confining themselves to saying that they had above everything wished to emphasize their preferences for Turkey. The intervention of the Government was a sufficient notice to them that sojourn in Sofia was not free from inconveniences, and most of the deputies hastened to leave. Some of them took refuge in Constantinople.

Meanwhile the news of the letter of December 31 spread outside Conference circles, and was not long in being distorted to the point of attributing to the Mohammedan deputies of Western Thrace, instead of the desire to free their country from the Bulgarian yoke, that of seeing it reunited with Greece. The story, thus altered, deserved a denial. The deputies in refuge in Constantinople, no doubt obliged to take account of the point of view of the Ottoman Government, did not fail to make the denial. On June 20, last, the Turkish journal, *Ikdam*, appearing in Constantinople, published the text of a telegram addressed to the President of the Conference and to the Plenipotentiaries of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers by four Mohammedan deputies to the Sobranye: Kemal, Hachim, Housni, and Hadji-Chafep, of whom the two first named were among the signatories of the letter of December 31. According to the *Ikdam*, this telegram read as follows:

"We, the undersigned, deputies of Thrace in the Bulgarian Sobranye, issue a denial of the story published in the Greek press that we had submitted a memorandum demanding the annexation of Thrace to Greece, and declare that if, as this paper pretends, such a memorandum was presented by M. Venizelos to the Council of Five, it is absolutely apocryphal, because, not only have we not submitted such a memorandum, but we had neither mandate nor right to do so. We beg of you to have the truth established by your High Commissioners in Constantinople, either by means of an investigation or by questioning us, since we are now present in Constantinople; and we entreat you in the name of the peace and tranquility of men to take our request under consideration."

It is very possible that this denial, which should have delighted the Bulgarian Government, was republished and repeated in Sofia.

It is evidently to this same denial, thus made public in Sofia, that the note of the United States Chargé d'Affaires makes allusion.

But it is manifest that it cannot be applied to the letter of December 31 which still retains its force as much against Bulgaria as in favor of Greece.

4. The Chargé d'Affaires of the United States did not restrain himself from giving an entirely personal interpretation of the feelings of the Thracian Mohammedans. He stated as a fact that the Greeks

spent in this region large sums of money for propaganda. That is a gratuitous accusation against which the Greek Government hastened to make a most vigorous protest to the Secretary of State in Washington.

5. The Chargé d'Affaires of the United States considers that the interpretation given by him of the feelings of the Mohammedans of Thrace would without a doubt be confirmed by an impartial inquiry or by a plebiscite.

Such a consultation had been desirable and possible several months ago. M. Venizelos, himself had made the suggestion for it before the Supreme Council of the Conference, in its session of February 3,<sup>62</sup> in order to learn the preferences of the Mohammedan population between the present Bulgarian regime and the Greek administration which would be substituted for it. Replying to a question from Mr. Lloyd George on the method of such a consultation, M. Venizelos proposed that an Allied general officer be charged with the duty of seeing the Thracian deputies in the Sobranye in order to ask their opinion on this subject. But he had taken care to recommend that they proceed with the greatest discretion, for it was evident that if the project for this consultation came to their knowledge in time, the Bulgarian and Turkish Governments would not fail to take every step to influence or intimidate the interested parties whose opinion, ceasing to be free, would from that time on be deprived of all value.

The danger pointed out at that time has come to pass: the two Governments have had time to act and to take their precautions. An impartial consultation is henceforth practically impossible.

But it is, at the same time, perfectly useless, for the preferences between the Bulgarian and Greek regimes, which it is a question of determining, have already been freely and clearly manifested by the legitimate and authorized representatives of the Mohammedans of Thrace in their letter of December 31.

The Bulgarian Government could not by any maneuver weaken the value of this document which formulates in crushing terms the irrevocable condemnation of its domination in Thrace.

---

<sup>62</sup> BC-21, minute 8, vol. III, p. 859.



Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, July 30, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF

Hon. H. White.  
Hon. F. L. Polk.  
*Secretary*  
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.  
*Secretaries*  
Mr. H. Norman.  
Sir Ian Malcolm.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.  
M. Pichon.  
*Secretaries*  
M. Dutasta.  
M. Berthelot.  
M. de St. Quentin.

ITALY

M. Scialoja.  
*Secretary*  
M. Paterno.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.  
*Secretary*  
M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . . Capt. Chapin.  
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . Comdr. Bell.  
FRANCE . . . . . Capt. A. Portier.  
ITALY . . . . . Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

*Interpreter*—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he wished the question to be adjourned until the following day. The Greeks were engaged in discussions with the Italian Delegation and, in addition to this, M. Tardieu was required in the Chamber of Deputies. The question was therefore adjourned.

2. MR. BALFOUR asked whether this question could be discussed without a settlement of the frontier question.

Clauses for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria on Ports, Waterways and Railways

M. BERTHELOT admitted that the clauses dealing with Ports, Waterways and Railways were dependent on the settlement of the Cavalla frontier line.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it would not be possible to accept all the Articles with the exception of Article 24 which was dependent on the frontier settlement.

(It was agreed that the draft clauses for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria (Appendix A) dealing with the question of

Ports, Waterways and Railways should be accepted with the exception of Article 24.)

3. M. FROMAGEOT stated that the Commission on New States had submitted draft clauses on the subject of the rights of minorities for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria (see Appendix B). The Articles had been drawn up on the basis of those which were to be inserted in the Austrian Treaty, with the exception of those dealing with the guarantees of the League of Nations. These latter were based upon similar provisions in the Polish and other treaties. In addition, the Committee had added Articles Nos. 3 and 4 which were not in the Austrian Treaty. These laid down obligations on Bulgaria to grant rights of Bulgarian citizenship to persons living continuously in Bulgaria, despite the fact that they came of foreign parents. The Drafting Committee thought that, though Articles 3 and 4 ought to be inserted in Peace Treaties with New States, whose legislation was as yet unknown, or in the Peace Treaties with old States, which did not give sufficient guarantees on the subject, they were none the less superfluous in the case of Bulgaria, since the legislation of that country on the point in question was in conformity with that of the most advanced European States. It had therefore been thought, that the two articles should be omitted from the text, which was otherwise analogous to that prepared by the Committee on New States. In addition to this, the latter Committee had left out a clause, by virtue of which the Bulgarians would be obliged to raise no obstacle against Bulgarian subjects, at present living in territories granted to other countries, opting as to their citizenship. The text prepared by the Drafting Committee differed from the one drawn up by the Committee on New States, in that Articles 3 and 4 had been omitted, and an article dealing with the right of option inserted.

MR. BALFOUR stated, that as Bulgaria was an old State, and as its legislation was satisfactory on the point in question, there was no use in compelling it to modify its statute book.

M. SCIALOJA stated that it had been reported to him, that the Committee had not taken up its work, owing to the fact that it was not sure that it was competent to deal with the question. It should also be noted, that the disposal of Thrace affected a portion of the work of this Committee.

MR. HUDSON stated that the Committee had been of opinion that articles 3 and 4 were necessary in Roumania's case in order that the Jews might be protected. In the 1878 Treaty<sup>1</sup> the same rights had not [*sic*] been granted to the Jewish population as had been given

<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 895.

to other citizens.<sup>2</sup> The question was, whether the article should be enforced in Bulgaria's case.

MR. BALFOUR remarked, that since the clauses had been adopted for such countries as Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania, he saw no reason against their being put into the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

M. FROMAGEOT said, that, in the Peace Treaty with Austria, although clauses had been inserted to protect minorities, no provision had been made for special nationalities, since the legislation of the country seemed a sufficient guarantee. The clauses were therefore only applicable to countries whose legislation was unsatisfactory and to others whose future legislation could not be foreseen. Bulgaria had dealt with the question of nationality in a satisfactory manner in the past. Was it necessary, therefore, to insert the clause? The Council had to decide whether, in spite of her previous legislation, Bulgaria was to be classified definitely in one of the two categories.

MR. BALFOUR said that the discussion might be indefinitely prolonged. Roumania was an old State, and had the obligations contained in the disputed articles imposed on her. He did not mind whether they were put into the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria; but, if a vote were called for, he would prefer that Bulgaria should be treated like Roumania and not like Austria.

(It was therefore decided that the political clauses dealing with the protection of minorities, as drafted by the Committee on New States, should be accepted.)

It was further decided, that a clause granting the right of option to Bulgarian citizens living in territories that had changed their sovereignties, should be inserted in the Peace Treaty.)

The Drafting Committee was directed to draw up the clause, and to insert it in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

4. M. BERTHELOT stated that Marshal Foch had submitted a letter dated 28th July to the President of the Peace Conference on the subject of the attitude of General Von der Goltz, in particular and of the Germans in general in the Baltic Provinces. (See Appendix "C".) The Marshal had enclosed in his letter a copy of the correspondence exchanged on the subject with the German Government, together with

German Attitude  
in the Baltic  
Provinces

<sup>2</sup> Article XLIV of the Treaty of 1878 reads as follows:

"In Roumania the difference of religious creeds and confessions shall not be alleged against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employments, functions, and honors, or the exercise of the various professions and industries in any locality whatsoever.

The freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship shall be assured to all persons belonging to the Roumanian State, as well as to foreigners, and no hindrance shall be offered either to the hierarchical organization of the different communions, or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs.

The subjects and citizens of all the Powers, traders or others, shall be treated in Roumania, without distinction of creed, on a footing of perfect equality."



a letter from the British Delegation covering a report from General Gough (See Appendix "C"). In submitting his report Marshal Foch was asking for precise instructions from the Council whether the proposals of the British General, which were supported by Marshal Foch, were acceptable.

It was decided to inform Marshal Foch that General Gough's conclusions as submitted in Marshal Foch's letter of the 28th July were acceptable.

Marshal Foch was directed to take all measures necessary for putting the proposals in question into effect.

5. At this point the Naval experts entered the room.

M. BERTHELOT, at the request of the President and on behalf of Secretariat, read out extracts from the texts of I. C. "A" 176-E.<sup>3</sup> and C. F. 90 [91].<sup>4</sup> He drew attention to the fact that the texts of Sir Maurice Hankey and M. Mantoux were virtually in agreement.

MR. BALFOUR said that from quotations made in previous Minutes it was evident that M. Clemenceau had accurately remembered the discussion of 25th June. It nevertheless seemed that, previous to the Scapa Flow incident, the Council of Four had been uncertain as to the ultimate action to be taken with German vessels. The French evidently had desired that they should be distributed. The Italians and Japanese did not appear to have been of the same opinion. The Scapa Flow incident had then occurred. He did not think that it was anybody's fault, but the incident was none the less regrettable. Without attaching blame to the Admiralty it was none the less a fact that the German fleet had been sunk in British waters by its own crews. Mr. Lloyd George had evidently spoken with great feeling, and had renounced in favour of France the British share in any compensation obtainable, at the discussions that had followed the incident. On the extracts now before the Council M. Clemenceau based his views which were (1) that no destruction of enemy vessels should take place, (2) that England renounced all claims to vessels which would have fallen to her share but for the Scapa Flow incident. He was entirely in agreement with the second point and thought that England's renunciation must be admitted. Two important points, however, remained undecided:—

- (1) How are enemy ships to be disposed of?
- (2) If division amongst the Allies be decided upon in what proportion shall it be made?

He did not think that Mr. Lloyd George's remarks could be regarded

<sup>3</sup> Minute 2, vol. v, p. 238.

<sup>4</sup> Minute 2, vol. vi, p. 656.

as a statement of a considered policy for the reason that when he made it he defined only the French position and made no mention of Italy, Japan or America.

Even admitting Britain's claim to be lost, the questions he had put forward remained for decision.

M. SCIALOJA stated that Italy had not been represented at the Conference on the 24th June. It was probable for that reason that Mr. Lloyd George's remarks had not mentioned Italy. On the 28th [25th?] June,<sup>5</sup> the matter had been discussed and referred to the Council of Admirals. Italy's position to-day was the same as that of France.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked in what sense the Admirals had reported.

M. BERTHELOT replied that all the Admirals had differed, since each one upheld the standpoint which he believed to be that of his own country. He added that the statements attributed to President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George were capable of being interpreted in the sense that the principle of distribution had then been admitted. In support of this, he quoted the phrase in which compensation to small Navies had been allowed for, and he also drew attention to the fact that President Wilson spoke in several places of the division of the enemy fleet.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that as the entire matter appeared not to be understood fully by his colleagues, he wished to make a statement as to the exact discussions which had taken place in the Council of Four, and in informal conversations preceding the meetings. Mr. Lloyd George had said to him, on one occasion, that if all countries could be of one opinion, the sinking of the German fleet in the open sea, in the presence of the Allied Navies, would be a magnificent spectacle. He had dissented from this, knowing that the French people would desire to have a certain portion of the enemy fleet.

A similar question had arisen as to the disposal of the enemy submarines, Mr. Lloyd George advocating that they should be sunk as their use had been illegal. President Wilson had in a way assented to this view. He, M. Clemenceau, had refused to agree and maintained that the submarines as well as the surface vessels should be divided, unless all existing submarines were destroyed. It was his conclusion from the discussions that a tacit understanding had been reached between Mr. Lloyd George, President Wilson and himself to the effect that the enemy vessels should be divided, and not destroyed. The Scapa Flow incident had then occurred and Mr. Lloyd George had been particularly upset over it owing to the fact that he had advocated the sinking of the fleet, and its destruction by the Germans had occurred in a British port. The incident would never

---

<sup>5</sup> CF-92, minute 6, vol. VI, p. 671.

have aroused such feeling had any form of destruction been previously decided upon. The very fact that this distribution had been admitted had made the act of voluntary destruction by the Germans more keenly felt. In conclusion, he could only repeat that it had been decided, that the enemy vessels should be divided, and that each ally should take what action it liked with the share allotted to it. He was surprised to hear the Italian claim put forward for the first time. He admitted it, however, but insisted that, if it were maintained, a pool of all enemy vessels should be made and a distribution effected amongst the Allies. He still required a report on the Scapa Flow incident.

**MR. BALFOUR** stated that he had asked for a report from the Admiralty, which had replied, that it had not received any previous request to forward it.

**CAPTAIN FULLER** read a telegram confirming Mr. Balfour's statement.

**M. CLEMENCEAU** stated that the discussion could be proceeded with after the report had been placed before the Council. He pointed out, however, that the question of the disposal of the remainder of the enemy fleet must be settled.

**MR. BALFOUR** asked what was the American point of view on this subject.

**MR. WHITE** answered that he had not been acquainted by President Wilson with the discussions which had been referred to, but he always believed the United States advocated the sinking or destruction of the warships. He added that it was impossible for him to agree to any decision until he had consulted President Wilson by telegram.

**M. BERTHELOT** then pointed out that the minutes of April 25th (I. C. "A" 76 [176]. E.) indicated that President Wilson's views on the disposal of the submarines, and the surface vessels, differed.

**M. CLEMENCEAU** stated that he would agree to submit to President Wilson any proposal which might be put forward, but that he would never agree to the sinking or destruction of the warships.

**MR. BALFOUR** then stated that the quotations from previous minutes of the Council were not sufficient authority for him to act upon; and that he proposed to send a telegram to Mr. Lloyd George asking for further instructions.

**MR. WHITE** and **MR. POLK** said that they would send a telegram in the same terms to President Wilson.

**M. MATSUI** said that he would ask Baron Makino to give him a statement of his impressions of the conversations that had been quoted.

(It was agreed that the discussion should be adjourned until the British and American Representatives should have communicated with their Governments.)



6. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that Mr. White had proposed the following Resolution:—

“In view of the fact, that the Supreme Council has granted an additional delay of one week to the Austrians for submitting their answer to the Conditions of Peace handed to them on July 20th, it is suggested that the Secretary-General be requested to instruct the various committees dealing with Hungarian matters to take up and finish their reports for the Hungarian Treaty.”

Conditions of  
Peace With Hun-  
gary

(The draft Resolution was agreed to.)

7. M. BERTHELOT stated that the Delegation of the Yugo-Slav State had sent a letter dated 28th July to the President of the Peace Conference asking to be heard on the subject of the Financial and Reparation clauses in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria (see Appendix D).

Request of Ser-  
bian Delegation  
To Be Heard by  
the Supreme  
Council on the  
Financial and  
Reparation  
Clauses of the  
Treaty With  
Bulgaria

M. CLEMENCEAU said it seemed difficult to refuse the request.

M. SCIALOJA drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the situation had changed since the letter had been sent. The Serbians had been given audience by the Committee, and had submitted a memorandum. This latter had been examined, and two requests out of the three had been acceded. The requests had been (1) that they should be given cattle to compensate their losses in livestock; (2) that they should have the right to recover movable property carried into Bulgaria; (3) that they should take part in the deliberations of the Inter-Allied Reparation and Finance Committees in Bulgaria. The first two proposals had been granted but the third had been disallowed, since it would have created a precedent. Had it been granted, it would have been difficult to refuse similar requests made by other States, and endless disputes would have arisen.

It was decided that a report of the Economic Commission be awaited regarding the requests of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the subject of livestock, moveable property and representation on the Inter-Allied Committees on Reparation and Finance.

The decision to refuse the request for audience of the above mentioned Delegation was maintained, and the Secretary-General was instructed to notify them to that effect.<sup>6</sup>

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 30 July, 1919.

<sup>6</sup>Corrections have been made in the last two paragraphs of this minute in accordance with an errata sheet filed under 763.72119/6232.

Appendix A to HD-19<sup>7</sup>COMMISSION ON THE INTERNATIONAL RÉGIME  
OF PORTS, WATERWAYS AND RAILWAYS

PARIS, June 21, 1919.

## REPORT

The Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways has been asked by the Secretariat-General of the Peace Conference to forward its Report on Articles to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

In this connection the Commission would point out that the text of the Articles forwarded on the 25th April<sup>8</sup> was drawn up with reference to the enemy Powers as a whole. The Commission had acted on the assumption that the complete text would be inserted in each of the Treaties to be placed before the various enemy belligerent Powers for signature. There are, therefore, no essential changes to be made in these clauses in order to render them suitable for insertion in the Treaty with Bulgaria. The only alterations are the suppression of such of the stipulations as do not concern the signatory enemy Power, and the introduction of the changes corresponding with those which the Supreme Council of the Allies conceded in its reply to the Remarks of the German Delegation.

The Commission, however, has thought it right to insert a new Article (Article 6) laying down the principle of liberty of transit for telegraphic messages and telephonic communications.

Further, at the request of Roumania, a paragraph regarding pre-war facilities in Bulgarian Danube Ports has been added at the end of Article 9.

Finally, the Commission, at the request of the British Empire and Greek Delegations, has drawn up Article 24, according to Bulgaria a commercial outlet on the Aegean Sea if, as the result of territorial alterations, Western Thrace is ceded to Greece.

The Annex to the present Report indicates all these modifications. The Articles on which they are based are those of Part XII (Ports, Waterways and Railways) of the Treaty of Peace presented to the Austrian Delegation on the 2nd June, 1919. For convenience of reference, the complete text of the Articles suggested for the Treaty with Bulgaria is also appended.

CRESPI  
*Chairman*

A. CHARGUÉRAUD  
*Secretary-General*

<sup>7</sup> Printed from file No. 763.72119/6232.

<sup>8</sup> Appendix to IC-176 G, vol. v, p. 266.

## Annex to Report of June 21, 1919

*Draft of Articles To Be Inserted in the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria*

The Articles referred to in this Column are those of the Treaty of Peace presented to the Austrian Delegation on June 2, 1919 (Part XII—Ports, Waterways and Railways).

## Article 1.

At the end of the first paragraph add the words:—“; for this purpose the crossing of territorial waters shall be allowed.”

## Article 2.

No change.

## Article 3.

In the last line of the first paragraph, after the words “or exported” add “by sea.”

## Article 4.

No change.

## Article 5.

Deleted.

## Article 6.

Becomes Article 5—no change.

A new Article (Article 6) is added regarding telegraphic and telephonic transit—for the text, see Appendix hereto.

## Article 7.

No change.

## Article 8.

Delete the last paragraph.

## Article 9.

Add, at the end of this Article, the following paragraph:—

“Bulgaria undertakes to maintain in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers and of their subjects all the facilities enjoyed by them in Bulgarian ports before the war.”

## Articles 10–14.

No change.

## Article 15.

In line 8 alter “Article 44” to “Article 36.”

## Articles 16–19.

No change.

## Article 20.

Delete the words:—“a Conference of ” in the second line; insert the words “at a Conference” after the words “Allied and Associated Powers” in the second line; and after the words “the present Treaty” in the fourth line add “and at which Bulgarian representatives may be present.”

## Articles 21–23.

No change.

## Article 24.

Delete.

## Article 25.

Becomes Article 24. For the text of the Article (Access to the Aegean Sea for Bulgaria) see the Appendix hereto.



- Article 26. Becomes Article 25. Delete the last paragraph.
- Articles 27–31. Become Articles 26–30—no change.
- Article 32. Becomes Article 31. Delete paragraph 2. In paragraph 3 (new paragraph 2) delete the words:—"As regards lines without any special rolling-stock," and "to which those lines belong;" and in the 6th line alter date to "29th September, 1918." Paragraph 4 becomes paragraph 3.
- Articles 33–38. Delete the last sentence of the Article.  
Delete.
- Article 39. Becomes Article 32—no change.
- Article 40. Delete.
- Articles 41 & 42. Become Articles 33 and 34—no change.
- Article 43. Becomes Article 35—in line 1 alter "Articles 1–7, 9, 26, 28 to 30" to "Articles 1–7, 9, 25 and 27–29."
- Article 44. Becomes Article 36—no change.

---

#### Appendix to Annex

### *Clauses To Be Inserted in the Part of the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria Relating to Ports, Waterways and Railways*

#### SECTION I.—GENERAL PROVISIONS

##### Article 1

Bulgaria undertakes to grant freedom of transit through her territories on the routes most convenient for international transit, either by rail, navigable waterway, or canal, to persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails coming from or going to the territories of any of the Allied and Associated Powers (whether contiguous or not); for this purpose the crossing of territorial waters shall be allowed.

Such persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails shall not be subjected to any transit duty or to any undue delays or restrictions, and shall be entitled in Bulgaria to national treatment as regards charges, facilities, and all other matters.

Goods in transit shall be exempt from all customs or other similar duties.

All charges imposed on transport in transit shall be reasonable, having regard to the conditions of the traffic. No charge, facility or restriction shall depend directly or indirectly on the ownership or on

the nationality of any ship or other means of transport on which any part of the through journey has been, or is to be, accomplished.

#### Article 2

Bulgaria undertakes neither to impose nor to maintain any control over transmigration traffic through her territories beyond measures necessary to ensure that passengers are *bonâ fide* in transit; nor to allow any shipping company or any other private body, corporation or person interested in the traffic to take any part whatever in, or to exercise any direct or indirect influence over, any administrative service that may be necessary for this purpose.

#### Article 3

Bulgaria undertakes to make no discrimination or preference, direct or indirect, in the duties, charges, and prohibitions relating to importations into or exportations from her territories, or, subject to the special engagements contained in the present Treaty, in the charges and conditions of transport of goods or persons entering or leaving her territories, based on the frontier crossed; or in the kind, ownership, or flag of the means of transport (including aircraft) employed; or on the original or immediate place of departure of the vessel, wagon, or aircraft or other means of transport employed, or its ultimate or intermediate destination; or on the route of or places of transshipment on the journey; or on whether any port through which the goods are imported or exported is a Bulgarian port or a port belonging to any foreign country; or on whether the goods are imported or exported by sea, by land, or by air.

Bulgaria particularly undertakes not to establish against the ports and vessels of any of the Allied and Associated Powers any surtax or any direct or indirect bounty for export or import by Bulgarian ports or vessels, or by those of another Power—for example, by means of combined tariffs. She further undertakes that persons or goods passing through a port or using a vessel of any of the Allied and Associated Powers shall not be subjected to any formality or delay whatever to which such persons or goods would not be subjected if they passed through a Bulgarian port or a port of any other Power, or used a Bulgarian vessel or a vessel of any other Power.

#### Article 4

All necessary administrative and technical measures shall be taken to shorten, as much as possible, the transmission of goods across the Bulgarian frontiers and to ensure their forwarding and transport from such frontiers, irrespective of whether such goods are coming

from or going to the territories of the Allied and Associated Powers or are in transit from or to those territories, under the same material conditions in such matters as rapidity of carriage and care *en route* as are enjoyed by other goods of the same kind carried on Bulgarian territory under similar conditions of transport.

In particular, the transport of perishable goods shall be promptly and regularly carried out, and the customs formalities shall be effected in such a way as to allow the goods to be carried straight through by trains which make connection.

#### Article 5

The seaports of the Allied and Associated Powers are entitled to all favours and to all reduced tariffs granted on Bulgarian railways or navigable waterways for the benefit of Bulgarian ports or of any port of another Power.

Bulgaria may not refuse to participate in the tariffs or combinations of tariffs intended to secure for ports of any of the Allied and Associated Powers advantages similar to those granted by Bulgaria to her own ports or the ports of any other Power.

#### Article 6

Notwithstanding any contrary provision in existing Conventions, Bulgaria undertakes to grant, on the lines most convenient for international transit, and subject to the tariffs in force, liberty of transit to telegraphic messages and telephone communications to or from any of the Allied and Associated Powers, whether contiguous or not. These messages and communications shall not be submitted to any unnecessary delays or restrictions, and shall be entitled in Bulgaria to national treatment as regards facilities and rapidity of transmission. No charge, facility or restriction shall depend either directly or indirectly on the nationality of the sender or addressee.

### SECTION II.—NAVIGATION

#### CHAPTER 1.—*Freedom of Navigation*

#### Article 7

The nationals of any of the Allied and Associated Powers, as well as their vessels and property, shall enjoy in all Bulgarian ports and on the inland navigation routes of Bulgaria the same treatment in all respects as Bulgarian nationals, vessels and property.

In particular, the vessels of any one of the Allied or Associated Powers shall be entitled to transport goods of any description, and passengers, to or from any ports or places in Bulgarian territory to



which Bulgarian vessels may have access, under conditions which shall not be more onerous than those applied in the case of national vessels; they shall be treated on a footing of equality with national vessels as regards port and harbour facilities and charges of every description, including facilities for stationing, loading and unloading, and duties and charges of tonnage, harbour, pilotage, lighthouse, quarantine, and all analogous duties and charges of whatsoever nature, levied in the name of or for the profit of the Government, public functionaries, private individuals, corporations, or establishments of any kind.

In the event of Bulgaria granting a preferential régime to any of the Allied or Associated Powers or to any other foreign Power, this régime shall be extended immediately and unconditionally to all the Allied and Associated Powers.

There shall be no impediment to the movement of persons or vessels other than those arising from prescriptions concerning customs, police, sanitation, emigration and immigration, and those relating to the import and export of prohibited goods. Such regulations must be reasonable and uniform and must not impede traffic unnecessarily.

## CHAPTER 2.—*Clauses Relating to the Danube*

### (1.)—*General Clauses relating to River Systems declared International*

#### Article 8

The following river is declared international: the Danube from Ulm; together with all navigable parts of this river system which naturally provide more than one State with access to the sea, with or without transshipment from one vessel to another; as well as lateral canals and channels constructed either to duplicate or to improve naturally navigable sections of the specified river system or to connect two naturally navigable sections of the same river.

#### Article 9

On the waterways declared to be international in the preceding Article, the nationals, property and flags of all Powers shall be treated on a footing of perfect equality, no distinction being made to the detriment of the nationals, property or flag of any Power between them and the nationals, property or flag of the riparian State itself or of the most-favoured nation. Nevertheless, Bulgarian vessels shall not be entitled to carry passengers or goods by regular services between the ports of any Allied or Associated Power without special authority from such power.

Bulgaria undertakes to maintain, in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers and of their subjects, all the facilities enjoyed by them in Bulgarian ports before the war.

#### Article 10

When such charges are not precluded by any existing Conventions, charges varying on different sections of a river may be levied on vessels using the navigable channels or their approaches, provided that they are intended solely to cover equitably the cost of maintaining in a navigable condition or of improving the river and its approaches, or to meet expenditure incurred in the interests of navigation. The schedule of such charges shall be calculated on the basis of such expenditure and shall be posted up in the ports. These charges shall be levied in such a manner as to render any detailed examination of cargoes unnecessary, except in cases of suspected fraud or contravention.

#### Article 11

The transit of vessels, passengers and goods on these waterways shall be effected in accordance with the general conditions prescribed for transit in Section I above.

When the two banks of an international river are within the same State, goods in transit may be placed under seal or in the custody of customs agents. When the river forms a frontier, goods and passengers in transit shall be exempt from all customs formalities; the loading and unloading of goods, and the embarkation and disembarkation of passengers, shall only take place in the ports specified by the riparian State.

#### Article 12

No dues of any kind other than those provided for in this Part shall be levied along the course or at the mouth of these rivers.

This provision shall not prevent the fixing by the riparian States of customs, local octroi or consumption duties, or the creation of reasonable and uniform charges levied in the ports, in accordance with public tariffs, for the use of cranes, elevators, quays, warehouses, &c.

#### Article 13

In default of any special organisation for carrying out the works connected with the upkeep and improvement of the international portion of a navigable system, each riparian State shall be bound to take suitable measures to remove any obstacle or danger to navigation and to ensure the maintenance of good conditions of navigation.

If a State neglects to comply with this obligation, any riparian

State, or any State represented on the International Commission, may appeal to the tribunal instituted for this purpose by the League of Nations.

#### Article 14

The same procedure shall be followed in the case of a riparian State undertaking any works of a nature to impede navigation in the international section. The tribunal mentioned in the preceding Article shall be entitled to enforce the suspension or suppression of such works, making due allowance in its decisions for all rights in connection with irrigation, water-power, fisheries, and other national interests, which, with the consent of all the riparian States or of all the States represented on the International Commission, shall be given priority over the requirements of navigation.

Appeal to the tribunal of the League of Nations does not require the suspension of the works.

#### Article 15

The régime set out in Articles 9 to 14 above shall be superseded by one to be laid down in a General Convention drawn up by the Allied and Associated Powers, and approved by the League of Nations, relating to the waterways recognised in such Convention as having an international character. This latter Convention shall apply in particular to the whole or part of the above-mentioned river system of the Danube, and such other parts of that river system as may be covered by a general definition.

Bulgaria undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of Article 36, to adhere to the said General Convention.

#### Article 16

Bulgaria shall cede to the Allied and Associated Powers concerned, within a maximum period of three months from the date on which notification shall be given her, a proportion of the tugs and vessels remaining registered in the ports of the river system referred to in Article 8 after the deduction of those surrendered by way of restitution or reparation. Bulgaria shall in the same way cede material of all kinds necessary to the Allied and Associated Powers concerned for the utilisation of that river system.

The number of the tugs and vessels and the amount of the material so ceded, and their distribution, shall be determined by an arbitrator or arbitrators nominated by the United States of America, due regard being had to the legitimate needs of the parties concerned, and particularly to the shipping traffic during the five years preceding the war.



All craft so ceded shall be provided with their fittings and gear, shall be in a good state of repair and in condition to carry goods, and shall be selected from among those most recently built.

The cessions provided for in the present Article shall entail a credit of which the total amount, settled in a lump sum by the arbitrator or arbitrators, shall not in any case exceed the value of the capital expended in the initial establishment of the material ceded, and shall be set off against the total sums due from Bulgaria; in consequence, the indemnification of proprietors shall be a matter for Bulgaria to deal with.

(2.)—*Special Clauses relating to the Danube*

Article 17

The European Commission of the Danube reassumes the powers it possessed before the war. Nevertheless, as a provisional measure, only representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Roumania shall constitute this Commission.

Article 18

From the point where the competence of the European Commission ceases, the Danube system referred to in Article 8 shall be placed under the administration of an International Commission composed as follows:—

- 2 representatives of German riparian States;
- 1 representative of each other riparian State;
- 1 representative of each non-riparian State represented in the future on the European Commission of the Danube.

If certain of these representatives cannot be appointed at the time of the coming into force of the present Treaty, the decisions of the Commission shall nevertheless be valid.

Article 19

The International Commission provided for in the preceding Article shall meet as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty, and shall undertake provisionally the administration of the river in conformity with the provisions of Articles 9 to 14, until such time as a definitive statute regarding the Danube is concluded by the Powers nominated by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article 20

Bulgaria agrees to accept the régime which shall be laid down for the Danube by the Powers nominated by the Allied and Associated

Powers, at a Conference which shall meet within one year after the coming into force of the present Treaty and at which Bulgarian representatives may be present.

### Article 21

The mandate given by Article 57 of the Treaty of Berlin of 13th July, 1878,<sup>9</sup> to Austria-Hungary, and passed by her to Hungary, to carry out works at the Iron Gates, is abrogated. The Commission entrusted with the administration of this part of the river shall lay down provisions for the settlement of accounts subject to the financial provisions of the present Treaty. Charges which may be necessary shall in no case be levied by Hungary.

### Article 22

Should the Tchecko-Slovak State, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, or Roumania, with the authorisation of or under mandate from the International Commission, undertake maintenance, improvement, weir, or other works on a part of the river system which forms a frontier, these States shall enjoy on the opposite bank, and also on the part of the bed which is outside their territory, all necessary facilities for the survey, execution and maintenance of such works.

### Article 23

Bulgaria shall be obliged to make to the European Commission of the Danube all restitutions, reparations and indemnities for damages inflicted on the Commission during the war.

## SECTION III.—RAILWAYS

### CHAPTER 1.—*Access to the Aegean Sea for Bulgaria*

### Article 24

Greece will accord to Bulgaria free access to the Aegean Sea under the following conditions:—

(i.) Greece will lease to Bulgaria for a period of fifty years an area in one of the two ports, Kavalla or Dedeagatch, the selection being made by Bulgaria within one year of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

This area shall form a free zone, and shall be set apart for the direct transit of goods coming from, going to, or in transit through, Bulgaria.

A special Convention between Greece and Bulgaria will determine the delimitation of this area, its equipment, its exploitation, and,

---

<sup>9</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 895.

in general, all conditions of its use, including the amount of the rental. In default of agreement a decision shall be made by a Commission consisting of one delegate of Greece, one delegate of Bulgaria, and one delegate of Great Britain.

These conditions shall be susceptible of revision every ten years in the same manner.

(ii.) Should the port selected be Kavalla, Greece will construct, maintain and work a railway giving reasonable facilities for traffic between Kavalla and a point on the Bulgarian frontier; in the execution of this stipulation Greece shall be entitled to use sections of existing railways. The above-mentioned point will be chosen by agreement between Greece and Bulgaria; in default of agreement it will be fixed by a Commission composed as the Commission mentioned in paragraph (i) above.

(iii.) Freedom of transit shall be granted to persons, goods, carriages, wagons and mails in transit across Greek territory, including territorial waters between Bulgaria and the port mentioned in paragraph (i) above. Such persons, goods, carriages, wagons and mails shall be treated as regards charges, facilities, restrictions and all other matters as favourably as the persons, goods, carriages, wagons and mails of Greek or of any other more-favoured nationality, origin, starting-point, importation or ownership.

All charges imposed in Greek territory on such traffic in transit between Bulgaria and the above-mentioned port shall be reasonable having regard to the conditions of the traffic.

Through tariffs, involving through tickets or way-bills, shall be established at the request of either Government between Bulgaria and the selected port.

Goods in transit shall be exempt from all customs or other duties.

Freedom of transit will extend to telegraphic and telephonic services, under which head no charges shall be imposed beyond those for services rendered.

## CHAPTER 2.—*Clauses Relating to International Transport*

### Article 25

Goods coming from the territories of the Allied and Associated Powers and going to Bulgaria, or in transit through Bulgaria from or to the territories of the Allied and Associated Powers, shall enjoy on the Bulgarian railways, as regards charges to be collected (rebates and drawbacks being taken into account), facilities, and all other matters, the most favourable treatment applied to goods of the same kind carried on any Bulgarian lines, either in internal traffic, or for export, import or in transit, under similar conditions of transport, for example as regards length of route. The same rule shall be applied, on the request of one or more of the Allied and Associated Powers, to goods specially designated by such Power or Powers coming from Bulgaria and going to their territories.

International tariffs established in accordance with the rates referred to in the preceding paragraph and involving through way-



bills shall be established when one of the Allied and Associated Powers shall require it from Bulgaria.

### Article 26

From the coming into force of the present Treaty the High Contracting Parties shall renew in so far as concerns them and under the reserves indicated in the second paragraph of the present Article the Conventions and arrangements signed at Berne on the 14th October, 1890,<sup>10</sup> the 20th September, 1893,<sup>11</sup> the 16th July, 1895,<sup>12</sup> the 16th June, 1898,<sup>13</sup> and the 19th September, 1906,<sup>14</sup> regarding the transportation of goods by rail.

If within five years from the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty a new Convention for the transportation of passengers, luggage and goods by rail shall have been concluded to replace the Berne Convention of the 14th October, 1890, and the subsequent additions referred to above, this new Convention and the supplementary provisions for international transport by rail which may be based on it shall bind Bulgaria even if she shall have refused to take part in the preparation of the Convention or to subscribe to it. Until a new Convention shall have been concluded, Bulgaria shall conform to the provisions of the Berne Convention and the subsequent additions referred to above and to the current supplementary provisions.

### Article 27

Bulgaria shall be bound to co-operate in the establishment of through ticket services (for passengers and their luggage) which shall be required by any of the Allied and Associated Powers to ensure their communication by rail with each other and with all other countries by transit across the territories of Bulgaria; in particular Bulgaria shall, for this purpose, accept trains and carriages coming from the territories of the Allied and Associated Powers and shall forward them with a speed at least equal to that of her best long-distance trains on the same lines. The rates applicable to such through services shall not in any case be higher than the rates collected on Bulgarian internal services for the same distance, under the same conditions of speed and comfort.

The tariffs applicable under the same conditions of speed and comfort to the transportation of emigrants going to or coming from ports of the Allied and Associated Powers and using the Bulgarian railways shall not be at a higher kilometric rate than the most favour-

---

<sup>10</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXXII, p. 771.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXV, p. 750.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXVII, p. 806.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. XCH, p. 433.

<sup>14</sup> Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3 sér., tome III, p. 920.

able tariffs (drawbacks and rebates being taken into account) enjoyed on the said railways by emigrants going to or coming from any other ports.

#### Article 28

Bulgaria shall not apply specially to such through services or to the transportation of emigrants going to or coming from ports of the Allied and Associated Powers any technical, fiscal or administrative measures, such as measures of customs examination, general police, sanitary police, and control, the result of which would be to impede or delay such services.

#### Article 29

In case of transport partly by rail and partly by internal navigation, with or without through way-bill, the preceding Articles shall apply to the part of the journey performed by rail.

### CHAPTER 3.—*Rolling-Stock*

#### Article 30

Bulgaria undertakes that Bulgarian wagons shall be fitted with apparatus allowing—

(1) of their inclusion in goods trains on the lines of such of the Allied and Associated Powers as are parties to the Berne Convention of the 15th May, 1886,<sup>15</sup> as modified on the 18th May, 1907,<sup>16</sup> without hampering the action of the continuous brake which may be adopted in such countries within ten years of the coming into force of the present Treaty; and

(2) of the inclusion of wagons of such countries in all goods trains on Bulgarian lines.

The rolling-stock of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy on the Bulgarian lines the same treatment as Bulgarian rolling-stock as regards movement, upkeep and repairs.

### CHAPTER 4.—*Cessions of Railway Lines*

#### Article 31

Subject to any special provisions concerning the cession of ports, waterways and railways situated in the territory transferred under the present Treaty, and to the financial conditions relating to the concessionaires and the pensioning of the personnel, the cession of railways will take place under the following conditions:—

1. The works and installations of all the railroads shall be handed over complete and in good condition.

<sup>15</sup> Luigi Palma, *Nuova Raccolta dei Trattati e delle Convenzioni* (1881–1890), vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 783; see also *Reichs-Gesetzblatt*, 1887, p. 111.

<sup>16</sup> Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3 sér., tome II, p. 888.

2. Commissions of experts designated by the Allied and Associated Powers, on which Bulgaria shall be represented, shall fix the proportion of the stock existing on the system to be handed over. These Commissions shall have regard to the amount of the material registered on these lines in the last inventory before the 29th September, 1918, to the length of track (sidings included), and the nature and amount of the traffic. These Commissions shall also specify the locomotives, carriages and wagons to be handed over in each case; they shall decide upon the conditions of their acceptance, and shall make the provisional arrangements necessary to ensure their repair in Bulgarian workshops.

3. Stocks of stores, fittings and plant shall be handed over under the same conditions as the rolling-stock.

#### CHAPTER 5.—*Transitory Provisions*

##### Article 32

Bulgaria shall carry out the instructions given her, in regard to transport, by an authorised body acting on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers—

(1) for the carriage of troops under the provisions of the present Treaty, and of material, ammunition and supplies for army use;

(2) as a temporary measure, for the transportation of supplies for certain regions, as well as for the restoration, as rapidly as possible, of the normal conditions of transport and for the organisation of postal and telegraphic services.

#### SECTION IV.—DISPUTES AND REVISION

##### Article 33

Disputes which may arise between interested States with regard to the interpretation and application of this Part of the present Treaty shall be settled as provided by the League of Nations.

##### Article 34

At any time the League of Nations may recommend the revision of such of the above Articles as relate to a permanent administrative régime.

##### Article 35

The stipulations in Articles 1 to 7, 9, 25 and 27 to 29 shall be subject to revision by the Council of the League of Nations at any time after five years from the coming into force of this Treaty.

Failing such revision, no Allied or Associated Power can claim after the expiration of the above period of five years the benefit of any of the stipulations in the Articles enumerated above on behalf of any portion of its territories in which reciprocity is not accorded in respect of such stipulation. The period of five years during which



reciprocity cannot be demanded may be prolonged by the Council of the League of Nations.

#### SECTION V.—SPECIAL PROVISION

##### Article 36

Without prejudice to the special obligations imposed on her by the present Treaty for the benefit of the Allied and Associated Powers, Bulgaria undertakes to adhere to any General Conventions regarding the international régime of transit, waterways, ports, or railways which may be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers, with the approval of the League of Nations, within five years of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

---

*The President of the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways to the President of the Peace Conference*

On June 21st the Commission of the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways submitted the text of the clauses to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, but since that date the following modifications have been adopted by the Commission:—

*Article 16.* Deleted and replaced by:

“Bulgaria shall cede to the Allied and Associated Powers concerned, within a maximum period of three months from the date on which notification shall be given her, a proportion of the tugs and vessels remaining registered in the ports of the river system referred to in Article 8 after the deduction of those surrendered by way of restitution or reparation. Bulgaria shall in the same way cede material of all kinds necessary to the Allied and Associated Powers concerned for the utilisation of that river system.

The number of the tugs and vessels and the amount of the material so ceded, and their distribution, shall be determined by an arbitrator or arbitrators nominated by the United States of America, due regard being had to the legitimate needs of the parties concerned, and particularly to the shipping traffic during the five years preceding the war.

All craft so ceded shall be provided with their fittings and gear, shall be in a good state of repair and in condition to carry goods and shall be selected from among those most recently built.

Wherever the cessions made under the present Article involve a change of ownership, the arbitrator or arbitrators shall determine the rights of the former owners as they stood on the 15th October, 1918, and the amount of the compensation to be paid to them, and shall also direct the manner in which such payment is to be effected in each case. If the arbitrator or arbitrators find that the whole or part of

this sum will revert directly or indirectly to States from whom reparation is due, they shall decide the sum to be placed under this head to the credit of the said States.

As regards the Danube the arbitrator or arbitrators referred to in this Article will also decide all questions as to the permanent allocation and the conditions thereof, of the vessels whose ownership or nationality is in dispute between States.

Pending final allocation the control of these vessels shall be vested in a Commission consisting of representatives of America, Great Britain, France and Italy, who will be empowered to make provisional arrangements for the working of these vessels in the general interest by any local organisation, or failing such arrangements, by themselves, without prejudice to the final allocation.

As far as possible these provisional arrangements will be on a commercial basis, the net receipts by the Commission for the hire of these vessels being disposed of as directed by the Reparation Commission".

#### *Article 19.*

Add—"The decisions of this International Commission shall be taken by a majority vote. The salaries of the Commissioners shall be fixed and paid by their respective countries.

"As a provisional measure any deficit in the administrative expenses of this International Commission shall be borne equally by the States represented on the Commission.

"In particular this Commission shall regulate the licensing of pilots, charges for pilotage and the administration of the pilot service".

#### *Article 24.*

The Commission of the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways at its meeting on the 24th July reexamined the question of Freedom of Access for Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea, which question had been brought again to its notice by a letter from the Secretary-General of the Conference, dated 10th July.

The Commission did not consider that it ought to alter the composition of the Commission provided for in this Article; as a technical body, it wishes as in the past to avoid being influenced by purely political considerations. In order to indicate more clearly its point of view and the particular scope of its work, a slight addition to the accepted text has been proposed. This addition specifies that the delegates shall all be selected from technical transportation experts. If, however, this amendment does not fulfil the requirements expressed in the Notes which accompany the above mentioned communication, it is the opinion of the Commission that it must rest with the political heads of the Peace Conference to settle this question.

Moreover, the Commission did not consider it incumbent upon itself to include the port of Salonika among those by which Bulgaria is given access to the sea under special conditions. As a matter of fact the Greek Delegation made it clear that Greece had always willingly granted and would still in future always grant Freedom of Transit

through Salonika to Bulgaria as to all other States. On the other hand, Greece considered it impossible (and was supported in this view by the rest of the Commission) to give the same special facilities in present circumstances—when Bulgaria is not connected to this port by a main railway without passing through Serbia—at the already congested port of Salonika both to Serbia, who had had the benefit of such since 1913 and to Bulgaria.

Nevertheless, the Commission, with the full consent of the Greek Delegation, recognised the necessity of assuring to Bulgaria provisional Freedom of Transit for her traffic via the Port of Dedeagatch until such time as the special measures favourable to her which are provided for in Article 24 should be put into execution.

The Commission therefore adopted the following amendments to Article 24:—

*4th paragraph:* After the words: “One delegate of Greece, one delegate of Bulgaria and one delegate of Great Britain” add: “who shall all be selected from technical transportation experts”.

*6th paragraph:* After the words: “importation or ownership” add “in the traffic through the ports situated on the Northern coast of the Aegean Sea”.

At the end of the Article add the following new paragraph: “During the period which may precede the conclusion of the above mentioned Convention and—should the Port of Kavalla be the one selected—until the railway and other facilities provided for above are in working order, Freedom of Transit in the sense defined above shall be granted to all Bulgaria for her traffic through the Port of Dedeagatch”.

#### *Article 31.*

Add at the end of the Article a new paragraph as follows: “The arrangements of all the new frontier stations between Bulgaria and the contiguous Allied and Associated States, as well as the working of the lines between these stations shall be settled by agreements concluded between the railway companies concerned. If the railway companies are unable to come to an agreement the question shall be decided by Commissions of experts constituted as above”.

---

### Appendix B to HD-19

#### CONDITIONS OF PEACE WITH BULGARIA

##### *Political Clauses*

#### PROTECTION OF MINORITIES

#### ARTICLE 1

Bulgaria undertakes that the stipulations contained in all Articles of this Chapter shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that



no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

#### ARTICLE 2

Bulgaria undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Bulgaria without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Bulgaria shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

#### ARTICLE 3

Bulgaria admits and declares to be Bulgarian nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality all persons who are not nationals of any other State, and who are habitually resident within Bulgarian territory at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

#### ARTICLE 4

All persons born in Bulgarian territory who are not born nationals of another State shall *ipso facto* become Bulgarian nationals.

#### ARTICLE 5

All Bulgarian nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Bulgarian national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Bulgarian national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding any establishment by the Bulgarian Government of an official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Bulgarian nationals of non-Bulgarian speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

#### ARTICLE 6

Bulgarian nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Bulgarian nationals. In particular they shall have

an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

#### ARTICLE 7

Bulgaria will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Bulgarian nationals of other than Bulgarian speech are residents adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Bulgarian nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Bulgarian Government from making the teaching of the Bulgarian language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Bulgarian nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budget, for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

#### ARTICLE 8

Bulgaria agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Bulgaria agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Bulgaria further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Bulgarian Government and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Bulgarian Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Perma-

nent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

---

Appendix "C" to HD-19

No. 3581

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, 28 JULY, 1919.

From Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

To The President of the Council and of the Peace Conference.

I have the honour to enclose copies, (1) of my correspondence with the German Government, through the Armistice Commission, on the subject of the withdrawal of the German troops from the Baltic Provinces, (2) of the letter from the British Delegation forwarding a report from General Gough.

The replies of the German Government, and the British report, referred, doubtless, to the interview which General Gough stated that he had had, on the 19th with General Von der Goltz. On the other hand, whilst the German representative considers that the result of the interview must be considered satisfactory to the Entente, General Gough remarks that the claims of General Von der Goltz cannot be admitted, and that the German General, obviously supported by his own Government, is pursuing a policy of subterfuge and intrigue in the Baltic Provinces. General Gough's report therefore concludes:—

that Von der Goltz should be immediately recalled:

that the withdrawal of the German troops should begin without delay, and should be started by sea (the British Admiralty will furnish transport):

that the German authorities should be forced to submit their plan of withdrawal before the 5th August, and to carry it out before the 20th August:

that the Germans should be prevented from establishing depots of war material in Latvia or Lithuania, and that they should be called upon to give all information necessary on the positions of supply depots and munitions stocks hitherto moved by them:

that all fresh German troops should be refused entrance into Latvia.

I support these proposals, and think, especially, that a time limit should be given to German intrigues, by giving them a definite day within which they must withdraw from the Baltic Provinces. I should be much obliged if you will inform me of the decisions taken on this subject, in order that I may give all the necessary instructions to the Armistice Commission, as requested by the British Delegation.

FOCH



[Enclosure 1]

Copy of Telegram

No. 3341

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, 13 July, 1919.

From The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

To General Nudant, President of the C. I. P. A. at Cologne.

Firstly, in conformity with instructions received from the Allied and Associated Governments, General Gough has entered into communication with the German Commander in the Baltic Provinces, in order that all questions arising out of the withdrawal of the German troops from these regions may be settled.

I am informed:—

(a) That the Germans refuse to evacuate Latvia, until such time as German interests shall have been guaranteed.

(b) That they refuse to recognise the Ulmannis Cabinet.

(c) That they refuse to withdraw by sea.

Secondly, this information shows that the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces is deliberately retarded, and that the situation in Latvia is thereby rendered most difficult.

Thirdly, under the above conditions, I beg that you will inform the German Government:—

(a) That the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces must not be delayed longer than may be necessary to obtain the necessary transport.

(b) That the constitution of the Government of Latvia has nothing to do with the question of German withdrawal.

(c) That this withdrawal must be effected as rapidly as possible by sea and by land, since the Naval Armistice Committee has given the necessary authorisation.

(d) That in their withdrawal the German troops must commit no action of destruction, more particularly with regard to telegraph wires.

Fourthly, you must insist that the German Commander shall enter into direct communication with General Gough, with a view to settling all questions arising out of the withdrawal of the German troops.

WEYGAND

[Enclosure 2]

Copy of Telegram

No. 3454

G. H. Q., 20 JULY, 1919.

From The Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies

To General Nudant, President of C. I. P. A., Cologne.

Firstly: The Head of the British Delegation at the Peace Conference informs me, that General von der Goltz has no knowledge of the powers given to General Gough by the Entente.

Secondly: Repeat the instructions contained in my former telegrams to the German Armistice Committee, and order them to give the necessary orders to the German Commander in the Baltic Regions without delay.

FOCH

[Enclosure 3]

A. A. I. No. 4348

DUSSELDORF, 24 July, 1919.

From the Representative of the German Government  
To the President of the C. I. P. A.

In the name of the German Government I have the honour to reply to your letter of the 21st July, No. 1445/G, that the letter of Marshal Foch, dated 20th July,<sup>17</sup> has been virtually replied to by the verbal negotiations entered into by the German chargé d'affaires and General von der Goltz and General Gough. My Government refers to the reply sent to your letter of the 14th July, No. 1414/G. (See my note under to-day's date, AA. I. No. 4340). I have learnt from Berlin that my telegram of 10th July, transmitting your note No. 1389/G has not yet reached the Foreign Office. This explains the fact that no instructions have been given to Count von der Goltz.

WACHENDORF

[Enclosure 4]

A. A. I. No. 4349

DUSSELDORF, 24 July, 1919.

From The German Government Representative  
To The President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Committee.  
Subject: Evacuation of Latvia.

In the name of the German Government I have the honour to reply to your letter of the 14th July No. 1414/G (1), as follows:

The letter of the Marshal on the subject of the evacuation of Latvia, has virtually been answered by the result of the verbal negotiations entered into, at Mitau, between the German chargé d'affaires and Count Goltz on the one part, and General Gough and the other representatives of the Entente on the other part.

With regard to the details of Marshal Foch's letter, I beg to refer to the aforesaid discussions. With regard to the general subject of the letter, I offer the following remarks:

With regard to Paragraph I. After the danger which at present threatens German subjects and German property in Latvia has been withdrawn as a result of General Gough's promises, the evacuation of Latvia will be carried out without delay.

With regard to Paragraph 2. The nature of the Government of Latvia has always been considered by Germany as a matter of internal Latvian politics, in which the German Government cannot interfere.

---

<sup>17</sup> *Supra.*

The formation of a new Cabinet in Latvia has therefore no connection with the question of German withdrawal from Latvia.

With regard to Paragraph 3. The evacuation of Latvia will be carried out as fast as possible. It will probably not be possible to use sea transport for troops in view of the situation at Libau.

With regard to Paragraph 4. Your [*The*] military authorities have been instructed that no damage to Latvian property must be effected during the evacuation.

WACHENDORF

[Enclosure 5]

BRITISH DELEGATION, PARIS, 25 July, 1919.

MY DEAR GENERAL, I enclose herewith, for Marshal Foch's information, a copy of a cipher telegram dated 21st July from General Gough.

I refer it to Marshal Foch, asking him to be so good as to communicate on the subject with the German Armistice Committee; whilst I obtain an undertaking from the British Admiralty that transports for the withdrawal of German troops, as proposed by General Gough, shall be obtained.

Yours sincerely,

W. THWAITES

To General WEYGAND.

[Subenclosure]

*Telegram From General Gough, Reval, to Mr. Balfour*

D. 01.18 JULY 21ST, 1919.

R. 16.00 JULY 21ST, 1919.

#### PART I

H. G., 53 July 20th.

Von der Goltz made following statements and admissions at a meeting on July 19th:—

A. That he had not received instructions to deal with me and that any information given was unofficial.

B. That (?) even if all passenger traffic was stopped on railway lines the evacuation of Latvia would take 74 days.

C. That he had brought fresh troops from Germany recently to guard railway.

D. That Libau was evacuated for military reasons.

E. That he would not evacuate by sea except 600 men from Windau if we arranged tonnage.

F. That as his evacuation depended on how soon rolling stock could be brought from Germany no date would be given for commencement.

G. That as Mitau was an important railway junction and must be held until all of his troops had gone he could not evacuate it at once.

H. That practically all munitions and stores had been evacuated.



J. That his men had been promised to [*sic*] land in Latvia and they considered themselves citizens of Latvia and he could not answer for consequences if those who wished to remain in Latvia were not allowed to do so.

My observations on above are as follows:—

A. That Von der Goltz had been notified to deal direct with me and as further prevarication was useless Von der Goltz wished to satisfy himself as to my attitude on various questions especially with regard to allowing German troops to remain in Latvia.

B. That an evacuation which when it commences will take 74 days is preposterous and is solely intended to keep troops in Latvia until the harvest [*is*] gathered and in hopes that one of his numerous intrigues will afford him the required loophole to interfere.

C. That Von der Goltz has carried out *coup d'états* before and unless quickly removed is in a position to carry out another in Baltic States. That we are dealing with reckless men promised much in Latvia who as recently as June 18th attempted a *coup d'état* against the Esthonians after Von der Goltz had pledged his word that he had no intention of any further advance northwards. See (?) my telegram H.G. 49 of July 10th.

D. That military situation on no front justifies arrival of fresh German troops and therefore there is no valid excuse for such action.

## PART II.

E. That Libau was evacuated because there would have been no possible excuse for not evacuating by sea if Germans had remained. Von der Goltz quitted Libau when ships were promised. (See my telegram H. G. 49 July 10th.)

F. That after many evasions we forced Von der Goltz by reference to War Office cable 79069 June 19th to admit that Windau should have been evacuated already and rather than force a final issue now to promise to allow 600 to go.

G. That Von der Goltz has no intention of surrendering Mitau and giving up control of railways Mitau Windau, Mitau Libau, Mitau Riga, Mitau Jacobstadt. That he is in a position to take advantage of any political crisis which his continued presence in the country is certain to foment and overrun Latvia at any moment. That as long as he remains at Mitau he controls all railways thus paralysing peaceful circulation and restoration of order and if such a state of affairs continues for 3 months grave trouble is to be expected in present excited state of the lately liberated Letts by hatred of their late oppressors.

H. That stores and munitions ready to be used at any moment have been parked in rear. Hasty evacuation being necessary because under Article 109 these would have become forfeit.

J. That Von der Goltz is now in position supported by certain Russian troops equipped and paid by Germans to offer in return for rights of colonization Latvia and Esthonia to restored Russia. To deal with situation I request you to cable German Government in substance as follows:—

1. All German forces in Latvia are to evacuate Latvia by sea.

Evacuation to be assisted and expedited in every possible way by Allied naval and military mission under General Gough.

2. Evacuation of German force will be by barge from Mitau to Dunamunde at mouth of river Dwina north of Riga.

3. Evacuation to be completed by August 20th.

4. Further entrance into Latvia is forbidden to German troops.

5. That unless permission is obtained from Allied Mission removal of any war material from its present position in Latvia or Lithuania is forbidden and that mission should be furnished at once with list of location of all stores and munitions already moved.

6. That in order that I may arrange transport German plan of evacuation as in paragraph 2 is to be submitted to me as Chief of Allied Missions before August 5th.

In conclusion I point out—

A. That to allow Von der Goltz to carry out his present proposals for evacuation will render any peaceful solution in Baltic States impossible for 3 months and before the winter commences to close the ports to our navy.

B. As proposed by me there is no reason why the evacuation should not be completed in 3 weeks and under the eye of the British Navy if necessary. The feared pillage and arson of the undisciplined Germans evacuated by land will be avoided and looting will be impossible.

---

#### Appendix D to HD-19

DELEGATION OF THE KINGDOM  
OF THE SERBS, CROATS, & SLOVENES  
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

No. 589 Point 7b

PARIS, July 28, 1919.

From: Nik. Pachitch

To: President Clemenceau.

The Financial and Reparations Sections of our Delegation received yesterday at noon the respective drafts of the competent Commissions of the Conference for the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, together with the invitation to offer their remarks to-day at 6:00 P.M.

These drafts do not take into account our most justified claims, which has caused a painful surprise to our Delegation.

In consequence, I beg your Excellency to be so kind as to have our Delegation received at one of the Sessions of the Supreme Council with a view to submitting to it our remarks before the final drafting of these texts: this is all the more important because the drafts in question were made in the said Commissions without the collaboration of our technicians.

Please accept, etc.

NIK. PACHITCH

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, July 31, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. H. White  
Hon. F. L. Polk.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

*Secretaries*

Mr. H. Norman.  
Sir Ian Malcolm.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau  
M. Pichon.

*Secretaries*

M. Dutasta.  
M. Berthelot.  
M. de St. Quentin.

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

**JAPAN**

M. Matsui.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . . Capt. Chapin.  
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . Captain Abraham.  
FRANCE . . . . . Captain A. Portier.  
ITALY . . . . . Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

*Interpreter*—Professor P. J. Mantoux

(1) M. TARDIEU explained the report of the Central Committee on territorial questions regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria in the south.

He explained the divergent points of view of the American and Italian Delegations on the one hand and of the British, French and Japanese Delegations on the other (See App. A to H.D. 12<sup>1</sup>). If he were asked to argue his own point of view, he would argue it on three grounds—ethnological, political and moral. If Western Thrace were not given to Greece, 92,000 Greeks would be excluded from the Hellenic Kingdom. As the exclusion of Western Thrace from Greece would be followed by the exclusion of Eastern Thrace another 145,000 Greeks would be denied Greek citizenship. In the whole of Thrace, north and west of the Enos-Midia line there were 237,000 Greeks. In any case 1,835,000 Greeks would remain outside Greek Sovereignty. Unless Thrace were

**Frontiers of  
Bulgaria**

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 242.



made Greek the Treaty which claimed an ethnological basis would leave more than 2 million persons of Greek race subject to non-Greek States. The whole Greek race only numbered 7 millions. This was a paradoxical result of a policy which claimed to be based on nationalities. It also appeared to him to be quite unjust. Greece no doubt would receive a good many things but if Bulgaria obtained free access to the Aegean, obvious difficulties would ensue for the Greeks. Their communications with the Islands and with Asia Minor could very easily be intercepted, especially in time of war. Greece had taken the side of the Allies in the war of her own free will. She had incurred a war debt of 2½ billion francs, borrowed no doubt from the Allies, but most States after all were in a similar condition. She deserved some consideration for the part she had played in the war. It was sometimes said that Western Thrace belonged to Bulgaria in law and in right.

When the Treaty of San Stephano was signed in 1878,<sup>2</sup> it was made according to the wishes of Russia which at that time was entirely pro-Bulgarian. The frontier laid down by that Treaty was almost the same as that proposed by the French, British and Japanese Delegations. Bulgaria had obtained Western Thrace by the Treaty of Bucharest.<sup>3</sup> It was argued that if M. Venizelos raised no claim to it then, he had forfeited any claim to it now. This was not so, for at that time M. Venizelos was ready to do anything to establish the Balkan League. He had failed in this and after him the Allied Powers had also failed. It was clear that the Bulgarians would not be pleased, but nothing would please them save the establishment of Bulgarian authority over 9 million people, only 4 million of whom would be Bulgarian. It was not right to say that Bulgaria would be very harshly treated in this Treaty. Germany, by the terms imposed on her, lost one fifth of her population. Bulgaria, according to the terms proposed would only lose one eighteenth. The other clauses were not very severe. She was asked to pay 2½ billion francs, but on easy terms which could be made even more easy by the Reparations Commission. Moreover her debt to Germany was abolished, a provision which had not been made in favour of any other enemy State. Though she lost access to the Aegean Sea, she still preserved access to the Black Sea and to the Danube and the opening of the Straits would be to her advantage. The restitution clauses were also light. For instance, she was to restore to Greece only 1500 milch cows out of 4500 taken, 2200 horses out of 9000, 1800 oxen out of 19,000 and 6,000 sheep and goats out of 260,000. He saw no particular advantage in offering Bulgaria a premium on aggression, violence and crime. The Bul-

<sup>2</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 866.

<sup>3</sup> Treaty between Bulgaria and Greece, Montenegro, Roumania, and Serbia, July 28/August 10, 1913, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVII, p. 658.

garians had no right to keep the fruits of the robbery committed by them in 1913 and again in 1915 with the help of Turkey, especially if to do this, 300,000 Greeks were to be kept out of Greece and as a final result 34% of the Greek race were to be kept under alien domination.

MR. WHITE said that M. Tardieu had made constant allusion to Eastern Thrace. He understood, however, that Western Thrace was the subject under discussion. The main point was whether or not Bulgaria should have access to the Aegean Sea. Mr. White then made the following statement:—

“In regard to the statement by M. Venizelos before the Supreme Council on July 29th,<sup>4</sup> it need only be said that the statement contained no arguments which the American delegation has not heard repeatedly and weighed carefully, unless exception be made of his references to the telegram of the American Chargé d’Affaires at Sofia and his quotations from the American Red Cross report on Bulgarian atrocities. As for the telegram (which I may remark parenthetically contained no charges of any nature against M. Venizelos or his Government, but merely referred to an active Greek propaganda, and large expenditures of funds in the district, without implication as to the source of either), it must be admitted that M. Venizelos’ suggestion that the eight Mussulman Deputies merely denied that they had asked for Greek sovereignty, but did not repudiate the document upon which he places so much weight, does not carry conviction. Our information is explicit and unequivocal to the effect that they denied fore-knowledge of any such document and declared their signatures thereto to be forgeries. However, we do not care to stress this point, as even were it valid the American Delegation would not give it much weight as a reliable indication of the real sentiments of the mass of the Mohammedan population in Western Thrace. We merely point out that one of the chief arguments presented by the Greek Committee in support of their finding rests on evidence which, to express it mildly, needs verification.

As regards the long reading of citations of Bulgarian atrocities, we fail to see the relation between Bulgarian atrocities committed in one place and the drawing of frontiers in another. If I thought such arguments valid, I might read at length the descriptions of Greek atrocities contained in the well known Carnegie Report,<sup>5</sup> and cite them in support of the American opinion that Western Thrace should not be given to the Greeks. The American opinion, however, rests on no such feeble basis. It is founded on certain facts which are not subject to dispute on certain principles which have guided this

---

<sup>4</sup> HD-18, minute 9, p. 378.

<sup>5</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission To Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington, 1914).

Conference in its labours hitherto, and on one and only one ambition: namely, to contribute loyally and unselfishly to the great end we all have in view:—a just and enduring peace in Europe.

There is here no question of giving territory to Bulgaria. The only question before the Council is: shall we take territory away from Bulgaria and give it to Greece?

It is not denied that Bulgaria had a good and valid title to this territory when she entered the present war. She acquired it not by conquest, but through a peace imposed upon her when she was beaten and helpless. Greece and her Allies, although conquerors, saw the wisdom of according to vanquished Bulgaria an outlet to the Aegean Sea. What was wise in 1913 is doubly wise in 1919, when we are endeavoring, more earnestly than ever before, to prepare a peace which will endure.

If Bulgaria's legal title to Bulgarian Thrace does not admit of discussion, what are the grounds upon which we are asked to deprive her of this territory and hand it over to Greece? Certainly no serious argument for such procedure can be based on ethnic grounds. It is scarcely open to doubt that following the cession of this territory to Bulgaria, and before Bulgaria entered the war, the Bulgarian population outnumbered the Greek population, while Turks constituted, as always, the overwhelming majority. It does not invalidate this fact to argue that many Greeks were atrociously expelled from the region. When we remember that according to M. Venizelos' own figures there were, before the Balkan wars, only 70,000 Greeks in the area as against 60,000 Bulgars, we must admit that, expulsions or no expulsions, the feeble Greek superiority in numbers must inevitably give place to a Bulgar superiority as soon as the territory was ceded to Bulgaria. Greece knew, when she agreed to give Western Thrace to Bulgaria, that with the incoming Bulgarian administration, the development of Bulgarian commercial interests at the ports and elsewhere, and the migration of Bulgarians from new Greek territory into this new Bulgarian territory, the Greek population would most certainly and altogether naturally drop to third place in the proportion of races. In such a case, evidence as to atrocities and expulsions becomes wholly irrelevant. The vital fact remains that in any case the valid occupation of the region by Bulgaria must inevitably have brought about the ethnic preponderance in Bulgaria's favour which actually intervened.

Nor do we believe that there is reliable evidence to show that the Turkish majority of Western Thrace prefers Greek to Bulgar rule. Many of these Turks speak Bulgarian as their native tongue, while comparatively few of them speak Greek. In the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, it is natural to assume that this population would be better off under the government of those who speak their own



language. The evidence to the contrary thus far presented is at least open to suspicion, and is off-set by the declarations of the Chief of the Mohammedan Church in Bulgaria to the effect that his people preferred to be left under Bulgar rule. Assuredly we cannot find in the principle of self-determination any sound argument in favour of annexing Bulgarian Thrace to Greece.

Is it sought to take this territory from Bulgaria and give it to Greece as a punishment for Bulgaria's action in joining our enemies? If this be the pretext for the proposed annexation, we must observe that while the wisdom and the method of administering punishment may be matters for discussion, there can be no doubt of the fact that punitive annexations of territory are in flagrant contradiction with the principles upon which we agreed to make peace in Europe, and with the principles which have hitherto guided the deliberations of this Conference. The honour of the Entente will be gravely compromised if in order to punish an enemy and to pay a friend we take from the one and give to the other territory to which only the present possessor has a valid legal, ethnic and economic title. Never has the American Government approved territorial changes for punitive reasons; and it cannot now adopt a principle of procedure so fraught with danger to the future peace of the world.

The fact that Germany, Austria, and Hungary are being deprived of large tracts of territory does not constitute a reason for taking territory from Bulgaria. In the first place the cases are not analogous, for Germany and Austria Hungary had long been wrongfully annexing territory from their neighbours, whereas Bulgaria has recently been defeated and had stripped from her such territories as her neighbours saw fit to appropriate. In the very nature of events less remained to Bulgaria which can rightfully be taken from her; and the American Delegation has, in fact, agreed to deprive her of small areas at four different places along her frontiers. But far more important is the fact that all territories taken from Germany, Austria and Hungary were taken for valid reasons, and in the interests of justice and future peace. Such reasons do not exist in the case of Western Thrace, and we do not believe that to take this territory from Bulgaria would be in accord with justice or in the interest of a future peace.

On the contrary, we believe that to deprive Bulgaria of Western Thrace is to cut her off from her only direct and convenient territorial access to the Aegean Sea, to inflict upon her a loss of territory which cannot be justified by the principles according to which we stand pledged to execute this peace, will be to render impossible the conciliation of the Balkan peoples, to sow the seeds of future trouble in South-Eastern Europe, and seriously to endanger the edifice of peace we have laboured so long and painfully to construct. It is for this reason that the American Delegation is unable to accept the proposal of the

Greek Committee, and for this reason that its representatives on the Central Territorial Commission have recommended the formula contained in the Report of that Commission as submitted to the Supreme Council."

MR. BALFOUR said that as he took a different view to that expressed by Mr. White, he thought he had better make a statement. He felt that he need not add much to the very clear explanation given by M. Tardieu. He accepted the general proposition that a punitive adjustment of frontiers was wrong. Nevertheless, when other circumstances balanced one another evenly it had been the practice of the Conference to give the benefit of the doubt to friends rather than to foes. If he were forced to appeal to this practice he would do so, but in this case he thought that the theoretical merits lay entirely on the side advocated by M. Tardieu. It was clearly both wrong and inexpedient to allow nations which embarked on aggressive and acquisitive wars to find this practice pay[ing?]. In the whole war there had been no action more cynical and more disastrous than that undertaken by the Bulgarians. Had the Bulgarians not behaved as they had, Turkey would not have entered the war; the disastrous Gallipoli Campaign would not have taken place; the war would have ended years sooner, and needless suffering would have been saved. The most plausible objection raised was that if Western Thrace were taken from Bulgaria a lasting peace in the Balkans would be jeopardised. Bulgaria, if she obtained Southern Dobrudja which he hoped she would, would actually be larger than before the war. Mr. White had avoided any mention of the Greeks in Eastern Thrace. This question, however, was intimately connected with that of Western Thrace. If it was desirable that the Greeks in Eastern Thrace should be included within the limits of Greece, the attribution of Western Thrace to Greece was a means to that end. He had been rather shocked at Mr. White's theory about massacre. Mr. White appeared ready to accept the results of massacres with great equanimity. The American Delegation had been greatly influenced by the theory that every country should have direct access to the sea. He could not believe, however, that it was good policy to allow Bulgaria to retain territory obtained from Turkey as a bribe for declaring war on us. In any case, Dédeagatch was not the only port which could serve Bulgarian ends. The opening of the Straits added greatly to the value of Bulgarian ports on the Black Sea. The value of the opening of the Straits could be inferred from the outcry there would have been in Bulgaria had the Straits been open before the war and had the result of war closed them for Bulgarian traffic. In any case the port of Dédeagatch had never been and would never be a good port. He hoped that the arrangements that were to be made at Salonika or Cavalla would suit Bulgarian purposes far better. For these reasons he supported M. Tardieu. He might also quote the



earlier views of the American Delegation. These views had changed while the views of the other Delegations had not.

M. TARDIEU said that he would like to make a brief reply to some of Mr. White's remarks. It was probable that the real value of the letter written by the Mohammedan Deputies of Western Thrace could never be estimated. At a time when Thrace was not occupied by the Bulgarians these Deputies had written to General Franchet d'Esperey. Since the Bulgars had occupied the country the signatories had felt impelled to recant. It was reasonable to believe that their first mood was more sincere than the second.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that perhaps neither was sincere.

M. TARDIEU said that the argument that because the Turks in Western Thrace spoke Bulgarian, they would prefer a Bulgarian to a Greek Government, was not to be relied on. Experience had disproved this many times. As to the diminution of population as a result of massacres, it could hardly be maintained that this should redound to the advantage of the authors of the massacres. He did not suggest that a punitive territorial arrangement should be made, but he did not think that it was good morality to recompense the Bulgarians for wrong doing. As to the legality of Bulgaria's title to Western Thrace, he would point out that Roumania's title to Southern Dobrudja was equally good, yet the American Delegation wished to restore South Dobrudja to Bulgaria. The same legal argument could not justify the retention of Western Thrace by Bulgaria and the cession to her of Southern Dobrudja. If Bulgaria were given Southern Dobrudja, Eastern and Western Thrace and were only asked to contribute two and a half billion francs, this would amount to an invitation to begin again. As to a lasting peace, when Bulgaria possessed Western Thrace she was not prevented from embarking on an aggressive war. She was not more or less likely to do so after being deprived of it.

M. TITTONI said that the population in Western Thrace was mainly Turkish and Greek. In Eastern Thrace to the south it was Greek and to the North Bulgarian. Assuming, therefore, the Enos-Midia line to be a line beyond which neither Bulgaria nor Greece could extend, he thought that a line dividing Eastern Thrace according to the national distribution of the population would be the most satisfactory.

M. TARDIEU said that in 1913 when the Bulgars possessed Dédéagatch they had wearied all the chancellories of Europe to obtain Cavalla, as they considered Dédéagatch an inadequate harbour. It was unlikely that if left with this port only they would be satisfied.

M. LAROCHE observed that they had gone to war to obtain Cavalla.

M. TITTONI said that if they had had Cavalla they would have made war to obtain Salonika.



M. CLEMENCEAU said that according to M. Tittoni's plan Adrianople would be Bulgarian instead of being either Greek or part of the territory of Constantinople.

M. TITTONI said that Adrianople was on the line of demarcation between the Bulgarian and Greek populations. It might be assigned to either. This was a question for the Experts to decide.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Italian Delegation had ever made this proposal in the Commissions.

M. TITTONI said that the Italians had always supported the American view.

MR. COOLIDGE observed that the railway to Dédéagatch had been snatched from Bulgaria by Turkey after her defeat by the Greeks and Serbs. At that time the Great Powers had protested very strongly, and among them Great Britain.

M. TITTONI corroborated this statement.

MR. WHITE explained that he was not so hard-hearted as Mr. Balfour had made him appear. He thought that the Greeks had withdrawn from Western Thrace rather because they feared massacre, than because they had suffered it. Doubtless the Bulgarians would withdraw from any territory invaded by Greeks as a consequence of similar apprehensions. In the East fluctuations of population commonly had this cause. As to Dédéagatch, he thought it could be converted into a good port. Access to the Mediterranean from a port in the Black Sea was obviously more circuitous and less desirable. He wished to state that at the instance of his colleagues he had communicated with President Wilson and explained the difficulty in which the Council found itself. President Wilson, as a possible way out of the difficulty, had suggested the following:—

“Bulgaria recognises the right of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to transfer to the proposed International State of Constantinople the territory of Bulgarian Thrace as herein defined, and agrees to accept and cooperate in the effectuation of such transfer whenever it is made.”

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if the territory of the future State of Constantinople were increased to this extent, its attribution to any mandatory power would become impossible. There might be agreement if only Constantinople and the Straits were in question, but he saw no chance, if large territories were added.

M. TARDIEU said that Internationalised States had been invented for a definite general advantage. The State of Constantinople was considered desirable in order to safeguard the freedom of the Straits. If a large hinterland, including Thrace, were added to it, the result would be that it would include 760,000 Turks, 650,000 Greeks, and 75,000 Bulgars. On what pretext could a mass of 650,000 Greeks

at the very frontier of Greece be made subject to another State? This would clearly be contrary to the principle of nationality adopted by the Conference. He thought perhaps the experts might attempt to work out M. Tittoni's idea.

M. TITTONI said that his proposal was based entirely on ethnographical considerations.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in his opinion it was impossible to dissociate Eastern and Western Thrace.

MR. WHITE said that he could not decide without further reference to President Wilson.

M. TARDIEU said that the future State of Constantinople could be easily imagined if it were restricted to the Straits, the Sea of Marmora and the populations who made their living by the sea, but if large territories were added to it, and Adrianople and Maritza had to be administered as well, the task would be impossible.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that a very clear and restricted programme must be made for Constantinople, otherwise no mandatory would be found.

M. TARDIEU said that the proposal made by President Wilson showed one concession at least to the opinion of the other Delegations. It denied Bulgaria direct access to the Aegean. He took note of this concession. M. Tittoni's proposal gave Western Thrace to Greece, some of Eastern Thrace to Bulgaria, and the rest to Greece, making both Greece and Bulgaria coterminous with the new State of Constantinople. He thought that it might be possible to work on this thesis, and to obtain some agreement.

MR. POLK asked how many Greeks inhabited the part of Thrace south of the Enos-Midia line.

M. TARDIEU said that there were 420,000 Turks and 408,000 Greeks, and 5,000 Bulgarians.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the Enos-Midia line had been introduced into the discussion not as the final boundary of the State of Constantinople, but as the limit beyond which the recommendations of the Commission on Greek and Bulgarian Affairs should not extend.

M. TITTONI said that the Enos-Midia line had been invented at the London Conference of 1913. Had not the Bulgarians attacked the Greeks and Serbians, this line would have become a final frontier line.

MR. POLK suggested that the discussion be adjourned.

(It was decided to adjourn the discussion on Bulgarian frontier to Saturday, August 2nd, at 3.30. The Experts were requested to consider the suggestion made by M. Tittoni, for an ethnographical partition of Eastern Thrace, and to submit a report in time for the Meeting on Saturday.)

2. GENERAL BELIN read the report of the Military and Naval Representatives (See Appendix "A").

Military and  
Naval Measures  
To Be Taken for  
the Occupation of  
Dantzic and  
Memel

(After some discussion of the implications of Article 101 and 103 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, the following resolution was adopted:—

"Respecting the report of the Military Representatives on the Military and Naval measures to be taken for the occupation of the territories of Dantzic and Memel, it was decided:—

1. To forbid Polish forces from entering the territory of the free city of Dantzic.
2. To compel the evacuation of German forces from this territory.
3. To postpone the question of military forces to occupy the territory.
4. To ask the Commission on Baltic Affairs to examine the question of the occupation of Memel.

It was further decided that during the intermediate period pending the nomination of a High Commissioner by the League of Nations, the Commission provided for in Article 101 of the Treaty, should receive instructions to report to the Council of any measures necessary for the maintenance and order in the territory of the free City of Dantzic.")

3. The Council had before it a request from the Swedish Legation to be heard on the subject of the Aland Islands by the Peace Conference. (See Appendix "B".)

Demand of the  
Swedish Legation  
To Be Heard on the  
Subject of the  
Aland Islands

(After a short discussion it was decided:—

That a favourable answer should be given to the request of the Swedish Legation for a hearing by the Conference regarding the Swedish views on the question of the Aland Islands.)

(The Meeting then adjourned).

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, July 31, 1919.

SWC-430/1

Appendix A to HD-20

*Report on Military & Naval Measures To Be Taken for the Occupation of the Territories of Dantzic & Memel\**

(IN REPLY TO RESOLUTION PASSED AT A MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS HELD AT QUAI D'ORSAY, PARIS, ON WEDNESDAY 18TH JUNE, 1919 AT 3 P. M.<sup>7</sup>)

On the 18th June the Council of Foreign Ministers examined a memorandum from the British Delegation to the Peace Conference

\*The Peace Treaty with Germany stipulates in Articles 99 and 100 that Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and claims to the territories of Dantzic and Memel. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>7</sup> FM-25, minute 2, vol. IV, p. 833.



referring to the military and naval measures to be taken by the Allied and Associated Powers, after the evacuation by the Germans of the territories of Dantzic and Memel, in order to assure the occupation of these territories and the regular working of the system of Government set up under the control of the League of Nations.

The Council of Foreign Ministers decided to submit the military and naval questions raised by this memorandum to a specially constituted Committee composed of:—

- 4 Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council.
- 1 Military Representative of Japan.
- 1 Naval Representative of each of the 5 Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The questions on which the Military and Naval Representatives are to give their opinion to the Council of Foreign Ministers are summed up as follows by the British Memorandum:—

- (1) Should the Polish forces be forbidden to enter the territory of the free city of Dantzic?
- (2) Should the German forces be compelled to evacuate this territory?
- (3) If (1) and (2) are accepted, what military forces shall occupy the territory?
- (4) Conditions for the occupation of Memel.

As far as the first two questions are concerned the Military and Naval Representatives have unanimously agreed that the answer should be in the affirmative.

As regards question 3 the Military and Naval Representatives were in disagreement on the question of principle involved by the despatch of an Inter-Allied Military force to Dantzic.

The American and British Military and Naval Representatives were opposed to the sending of Allied forces for the reasons set forth in Appendix "A".

The French and Italian Representatives, on the contrary, considered that the High Commissioner required an Allied force to assist him to carry out his functions. The reasons for this suggestion, and details in regard to the force proposed, are set forth in Appendix "B".

The Japanese Military and Naval Representatives expressed no opinion in regard to the necessity for a military occupation of Dantzic, and considered that the question should be referred to the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

They were, however, of opinion that the High Commissioner should have at his disposal an armed force of some description to maintain order and to support his authority.

C. SACKVILLE-WEST

*Major General, Chairman of Committee*

VERSAILLES, 24th of June 1919.

## Appendix A to SWC-430

*Memorandum by the American and British Representatives*

In regard to question 3, the American and British Military and Naval Representatives are of opinion that the presence of organised support at Dantzig is essential for the authority of the High Commissioner.

They are, however, of opinion that the despatch of an Inter-Allied Military Force to Dantzig is, for the present, inadvisable.

The reasons for this attitude may be briefly summarized as follows:—

(a) The acceptance by the German and Polish Governments of the conditions laid down in the answers to questions 1 and 2 would give reason to presume that these Governments intended to act in good faith in regard to the future status of the District of Dantzig.

(b) The population of Dantzig is mainly German in character and, if the terms of the Treaty of Peace are loyally accepted by the German Government, it will be in the interest of the German inhabitants of Dantzig to maintain order in their own town and to support the authority of the High Commissioner.

(c) Under the circumstances referred to in (a) and (b), it is considered that the presence of an Inter-Allied Military force in Dantzig would inevitably have an irritating effect on the population, the results of which might be serious internal disorders.

(d) They consider that the authority of the High Commissioner in Dantzig could, for the reasons given above, be efficiently maintained by the employment of locally raised *gendarmérie* or police forces which may require expansion to meet the new situation.

(e) In the event of the High Commissioner being unable to maintain his authority by moral influence backed by local forces, it will no doubt be within the powers of the Allied and Associated States to send sufficient forces to enforce the conditions of the Peace Treaty.

Apart from the question of principle the American and British Military and Naval Representatives are of opinion that the cost of the maintenance of an Inter-Allied force, as also the difficulty of keeping open communications for supplying that force, are factors which should be taken into account, more especially in view of the present lack of shipping for commercial purposes.

Further, even should Inter-Allied military forces be made available for the occupation of the District of Dantzig and be despatched forthwith, an interregnum would be inevitable before their arrival; this would, in all probability, be the most critical period.

In regard to the occupation of Memel, the American and British Military and Naval Representatives are of opinion that, for the reasons already given in regard to Dantzig, there should be at present no Allied military forces of occupation.

## Appendix "B" to SWC-430

*Advisability of Raising an Inter-Allied Force of Occupation for the Territories of Dantzig and Memel*

(Opinion of the French and Italian Military and Naval Representatives)

The French and Italian Military and Naval Representatives are agreed that it is indispensable that the High Commissioner of the League of Nations at Dantzig should have at his disposal, failing Polish or German troops, an armed force sufficient to ensure the maintenance of order and the exercise of his authority.

As the territories of Dantzig and Memel have been ceded by Germany to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, it is the duty of the latter to assume the responsibility of establishing the new Political Regime on an orderly foundation. The military and naval forces of occupation at the disposal of the High Commissioner must, therefore, be inter-Allied.

It is possible in the more or less distant future that circumstances will allow a gradual diminution of the inter-Allied force which may be thought necessary, and even their replacement by a force raised solely by the new Government from the free City and recruited on the spot with a certain proportion of foreign cadres if necessary.

It will be the duty of the League of Nations to make a decision on this point when the proper moment arrives, taking into consideration the general internal condition of the country.

At the present moment, however, the existing local police is wholly German; it cannot therefore provide the necessary guarantee of impartiality; it must be remembered, also, that it will be necessarily partially disorganised, if some of its personnel retain their German nationality, in accordance with the option recognised by Article 106 of the Treaty of Peace.†

Therefore it seems that the necessity of raising an Inter-Allied force, at any rate for the time being, cannot be avoided.

Lastly, it would be necessary for this force to be sent as soon as possible to the territory in question. Germany must, in fact, give up to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over this territory; it therefore follows that German troops must proceed to evacuate immediately and must have finished their evacuation within the 15 days laid down by the Committee for the determination of frontiers.

---

†This option carries with it the obligation that those who avail themselves of it shall remove to Germany within a maximum period of 12 months. [Footnote in the original.]



## EFFECTIVES AND COMPOSITION OF THE INTER-ALLIED FORCE OF OCCUPATION

The French and Italian Military and Naval Representatives are in entire agreement that the presence of both a military and a naval force is necessary.

Ships are indispensable to guarantee the supply of land forces and could give them very useful help in case of trouble.

The presence of a naval force alone would, on the other hand, be ineffective; furthermore, this force would be exposed to real dangers since it would not be able to ensure its own safety, as in the absence of land forces in occupation of the forts, batteries and other harbour defences, it would be exposed to hostile operations.

In determining the strength of the military and naval forces of occupation, the French and Italian Military and Naval Representatives have taken into consideration the following facts:—

(1) The population of the entire territories in question (Dantzic and Memel) may be reckoned at about 600,000, of whom 183,000 are in the city of Dantzic alone.

(2) The territory of Dantzic includes a large harbour and many sea and river establishments which must be protected against any possible attack in case of disorder.

(3) The varied aspirations of the German and Polish populations, who are unlikely at first, at least, to accept the new order gladly, will make the political situation very difficult and unstable. It will therefore be necessary to have a considerable force on the spot for the prevention of any kind of disorder or conflict.

(4) The geographical position of the territories in question which are situated at a distance from the Powers who are called upon to protect them will not lend itself to any rapid reinforcement of the military forces of occupation.

Under these circumstances the Military and Naval Representatives consider that the military force necessary for the occupation of the entire territories of Dantzic and Memel should be about 10,000 men, that is to say, about 1 division.

This division should be placed under the command of a General Officer appointed by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers with a Staff, including officers of the various armies composing the military force of occupation. This force might be detached from the allied forces of occupation in the territory on the left bank of the Rhine.

### FORCE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE TERRITORY OF MEMEL

The French and Italian Military and Naval Representatives are of opinion that the occupation of the territory of Memel could be assured by a Military force of:—

1 regiment of infantry  
and 1 squadron of cavalry

to be detailed from the forces above-mentioned. The Memel detachment should include Representatives from all the Allied contingents. Its Commanding Officer should be appointed by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers.

#### GENERAL REMARKS

Lastly the French and Italian Military and Naval Representatives consider it their duty to call the attention of the Council of Foreign Ministers to the fact that they hold it important that the force of occupation should in any case be Inter-Allied.

They therefore consider that if certain of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers cannot be represented in the force of occupation, it would be preferable to have no such force, both for moral reasons as the solidarity of the Allies must be upheld in all acts of a local Government set up by them, and for material reasons because one or two Powers cannot alone assume the responsibility which they all collectively incur, and later the dangers which may arise therefrom.

---

#### Appendix B to HD-20

*[The Swedish Minister at Paris (Ehrensward) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]*

[Translation <sup>9</sup>]

SWEDISH LEGATION,  
PARIS, July 25, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to bring to the attention of Your Excellency the fact that the population of the Aland Islands, by a formal vote taken at the end of last month, has again by a majority of 96.4 percent of the votes, expressed their sincere desire that their islands be returned to Sweden.

In view of the importance of this new vote and of the question itself, I am taking upon myself the role of interpreter of the desire of the Swedish Delegation to be heard by the Peace Conference in order to explain to it the Swedish point of view regarding the problem of the Aland Islands, before a definitive decision is reached regarding it. This hearing seems to us all the more desirable because an opportunity was not given the Delegation to be heard before the Baltic Commission of the Conference.

Kindly accept [etc.]

EHRENSVÄRD

---

<sup>9</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 1 August, 1919, at 3: 30 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. H. White. Hon. F. L. Polk. <i>Secretary</i> Mr. L. Harrison.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.  <i>Secretaries</i> Mr. H. Norman. Sir Ian Malcolm.	M. Clemenceau. M. Pichon.  <i>Secretaries</i> M. Dutasta. M. Berthelot. M. de St. Quentin.
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Tittoni. <i>Secretary</i> M. Paterno.	M. Matsui. <i>Secretary</i> M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . .	Capt. Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Lt. Commander Bell.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives entered the room.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he had received a communication from Berlin through General Nudant<sup>1</sup> (See Appendix "A"). It was to the effect that the German Government, as a result of the revelations made by Herr Erzberger,<sup>2</sup> had been violently attacked from the Conservative and Independent Socialist Sections. The question most at issue was the surrender of the military officers demanded by the Treaty. Herr Erzberger asked that the provisions to that effect might not immediately be put into force.

M. TITTONI said that as the Allies had representatives in Germany, it would be best to ask their advice.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that at the present moment the situation was not quite clear. The list of German Officers guilty of breaches of

<sup>1</sup> General P. Nudant, French representative and president of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission.

<sup>2</sup> Matthias Erzberger, German Vice Chancellor and Minister of Finance.



the laws of war comprised over 1,000 persons, of whom some were Princes of the Blood. He believed that the list of Naval Officers who were to be surrendered was not yet ready.

MR. BALFOUR replied that the list made out in Great Britain was ready.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the Council must be clear as to the demands that it was going to make. It was dangerous to postpone executing the provisions relating to the surrender of German Officers, if, at the same time, German prisoners were to be repatriated. M. Larnaude<sup>3</sup> had made a report on the question of German Prisoners, and had pointed out that the problem of their repatriation was intimately connected with the surrender of enemy officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war. Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson had themselves recognised, that the two questions emphasised in M. Larnaude's report should be considered together. He thought that it would be improper to return German prisoners if the Germans did not themselves surrender the guilty officers. He proposed that no reply should be given at once. Herr Erzberger's telegram might certainly be based on fact, but, on the other hand it might be intended to promote a hasty decision on the part of the Council. He asked whether the matter might not be referred to a Committee of experts.

MR. BALFOUR said that it was evidently the President's opinion that an answer should not at once be given. At the same time, the Treaty did not, in itself, permit the return of German Prisoners to be much postponed, and, by its very provisions, prevented the Allies from making a delay in their repatriation a political weapon. If the detention of the prisoners was decided upon, it must be put into force before the Treaty received general ratification.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated, in reply to Mr. Balfour's question that the French ratification of the Treaty would probably take place in the first week in September. He suggested that Marshal Foch, who had agents in Germany, should make a report on the subject, and that he should be given the assistance of jurisconsults.

MR. BALFOUR stated that the British agents in Germany would be asked for information, and he supposed that the question to be put to the jurists would be, whether we should be justified in adopting a measure for the detention of German prisoners if the Germans refused to surrender the culpable officers.

M. CLEMENCEAU then said that that was not quite his meaning. He wished to point out that the Germans in their note were asking for a definite favour—the waiving of the stipulations with regard to the surrender of guilty officers. The Allies, if they granted this, might ask for certain military measures to be carried out on the

---

<sup>3</sup> Fernand Larnaude, French representative, Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and Enforcement of Penalties.

part of Germany, to compensate them for granting the German demand.

M. TITTONI pointed out that the Germans did not quite put forward their request as a favour, but were suggesting certain measures to us, on account of the social and political situation in Germany, which menaced the Allies' interests as well as theirs. In these circumstances, would it not be advantageous to obtain further information, and come to a decision when it had been tendered.

M. CLEMENCEAU returned to his original proposal of referring the question to a Committee of juriconsults and military men.

MR. BALFOUR then remarked that such a Committee might say "You have a right to take what measures of security you please". He asked what Marshal Foch thought.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the surrender of guilty officers was not a military question, but a political one.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with Marshal Foch, and said that he would like his opinion as to a suitable military compensation for the favour which would be granted to the Germans by acceding to their request.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether we should not be asking the military men to verify political facts.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not think so, since military men would only be advising on the subject of military compensation.

MR. BALFOUR said that it would be necessary, therefore, to ask our diplomatic representatives for information. In the meantime, the Military Representatives at Versailles should endeavour to find out whether the statements in the German communication were correct, and should further advise the Council as to what military measures on the part of Germany would be adequate compensation to the Allies for acceding to their demand. Whatever questions were put to Versailles, the British War Office must refer the matter to its own military representatives.

M. TITTONI said that the situation would be that each country would refer the matter to whatever agents or bodies it thought capable of making a suitable examination.

MR. POLK agreed with Mr. Balfour and M. Tittoni.

(It was decided:—

(1) That no immediate reply to the German Government's request should be given.

(2) That the Military Representatives at Versailles, in collaboration with Marshal Foch, should investigate the accuracy of the statements contained in the communication of the German Government, and should utilise all available sources of information at their command.

(3) That Marshal Foch should report to the Council on such military compensations as might be demanded from Germany in return for a compliance with their present request.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU circulated two telegrams from Germany (see Appendices B & C) stating (1) that Germany had at present 800,000 men under arms, and (2) that the students in Munich were being armed in violation of the Peace Treaty.

Information From Germany With Regard to the Number of Men Under Arms in That Country and the Arming of Students in Munich

MR. BALFOUR stated, that before proceeding further with the question, he would like to have comprehensive figures comparing the total number of enemy and Allied troops at present in the field. He feared that such figures might be alarming.

M. TITTONI said that as Marshal Foch was going to study the questions put to him under decision No. 1, he would like him to state what force was now required in Germany for the maintenance of order.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the question was answered by the military provisions of the Armistice and of the Peace Treaty. He considered that the significance of the events at Munich lay in the fact, that the Germans wished to show, by what they were doing, that they knew that Allied control over their actions would soon cease.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the communication circulated drew attention to the point.

(It was therefore decided that the two documents circulated should be submitted to Marshal Foch for examination and report.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU read a telegram from General Franchet d'Esperey with regard to the Allied occupation of Thrace (see Appendix D).

Communication From General Franchet d'Esperey, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the East

He remarked that it was obviously necessary to reinforce the Allied troops in Bulgaria although the measure presented practical difficulties.

MR. BALFOUR said that as he understood it the situation was serious and a comparison between the available Allied and Bulgarian forces would be disadvantageous to ourselves. He had received a report that the disarmament of Bulgaria was incomplete, on account of the different way in which demobilisation was carried out in such countries as England and France, and in Bulgaria. In the former case, demobilisation meant that soldiers returned absolutely to their civil occupations, and ceased to appear on the list of any military unit. This was not the case in Bulgaria, where demobilisation meant no more than the reduction of a military unit, from war to peace strength. The Bulgarian Army had comprised ten divisions. Under the Armistice it had been allowed to keep three and had been ordered to demobilise seven. This meant no more than that, Bulgaria now had a powerful military force of three divisions on full war strength, and seven others on a reduced footing.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he thought Mr. Balfour's remarks as a



whole were correct, but he could not guarantee the accuracy of the details.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that General Franchet d'Esperey had been asked to give a detailed report, but that no very clear statement had yet been received from him.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Bulgarian Army had never even obeyed orders it had received from the Allies. It was quite possible that they would have a superior force to that of the Allies, at the time that the Peace Treaty was presented.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he proposed that Marshal Foch should report on the situation, and asked the approximate time necessary for the preparation of such a report.

MARSHAL FOCH said it would require several days, as he would be obliged to refer the matter to General Franchet d'Esperey.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that a certain amount of information was already at hand and that a report on the basis of the information available could be presented to the Supreme Council on the following day.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch should submit on August 2nd a report on the present status of the Bulgarian forces, based upon information at present in his possession.)

(It was further decided that Marshal Foch should make investigations through General Franchet d'Esperey, and submit a full report when these latter had been received.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU circulated a telegram from the Military Representatives at Klagenfurt (see Appendix E).

Telegram From  
the Inter-Allied  
Military Repre-  
sentatives at Kla-  
genfurt Relative  
to the Execution  
of the Decision of  
the Conference

M. BERTHELOT further explained the telegram stating that by the withdrawal of the Austrians and Jugo-Slavs from Klagenfurt a certain quantity of war material had been left behind, under the custody of a few Italian *carabinieri*. In view of the fact that the Supreme Council had asked that an Inter-Allied

guard should be placed in charge of the material in question, it was now requested that it should be constituted, and, until it could be so constituted, two companies of Italian *carabinieri* should be authorized by the Council to form the guard. He pointed out that the value of the property in question was inconsiderable, and suggested that two platoons of Italian *carabinieri* would be quite efficient to ensure the custody of the material.

(It was agreed that the Italian Command should be authorised to furnish two platoons of *carabinieri*, for the purpose of guarding the war material at Klagenfurt.)

5. The Council had before it a communication from Marshal Foch to the following effect:—

“When the Army of Occupation shall have been organised, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies on the Western front, who was in command during the war, will no longer exercise this command.

Organisation of the High Command of the Army of Occupation in Western Germany After the Treaty Comes Into Force

However, it is necessary to maintain a superior Command for the group of Allied forces of occupation, were it only to establish a liaison with the High Commission who should communicate directly with the High Military Command (Art. IV of Memorandum of June 9th<sup>4</sup>), also for regulating all military questions dealing with railway, river, telegraphic, telephonic and postal communications.

France, on account of the number of troops in her army of occupation, should place a General at the head of the Rhine Army. The other Nations will probably not do this.

It is proposed that this General be designated to command the group of Allied occupation forces, as soon as the command of Marshal Foch on the Western front shall have ceased, in other words, at the moment that the Peace Treaty goes into force.”

(The proposals which Marshal Foch’s communication contained were agreed to without discussion.)

#### 6. (a) *Frontier of Prekomurje.*

M. TARDIEU stated that the Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Committee had submitted on July 22nd a Memorandum with regard to two new claims which had been presented by the Delegation of the Yugo-Slav kingdom regarding the northern frontier of that State, (see Appendix F).

Report of the Commission on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs Regarding Further Claims by Yugo-Slavia

(It was decided to adhere to the boundary line in Prekomurje formerly adopted by the Supreme Council which line in general follows the watershed between the Mur and the Raab.)

#### (b) *Baranya*

M. TARDIEU read the Memorandum regarding Baranya, (see Appendix F).

(It was decided to accept the proposal of the Committee with regard to Baranya, and the frontier which had been proposed by it.)

#### 7. (a) *Bacska.*

M. TARDIEU reported on the notes submitted to the Supreme Council by the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs dated 25th July, 1919 (see Appendix G).

Serb-Croat-Slovene Claims

(It was decided to accept the draft proposals of the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs with regard to the Bacska region;

<sup>4</sup> Appendix III to CF-64, vol. vi, p. 393.

and to uphold the frontier line previously laid down, in view of the fact that the ethnographic conditions in the locality would not allow of the aforesaid frontier line being extended to the north. It was further decided to refer the question of laying down regulations of an international kind, with regard to the working of the Deak Canal, at present in Jugo-Slavia, by means of hydraulic installations now in Hungarian territory, to the Committee on Ports, Railways and Waterways.)

(b) *Banat.*

M. TARDIEU drew the attention of the Conference to the Report of the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs on the subject of the Banat.

(It was decided to adopt the proposals contained in the report of the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs with regard to the Banat, as follows:—

(1) Central Banat: The previously adopted frontier is to be upheld, and a notification to that effect sent to persons concerned. The Committee on Ports, Railways and Waterways will take the necessary measures to maintain and to develop, the irrigation canals in the Banat, to the equal advantage of the States to which the Banat is allotted.

(2) Northern Banat: The question is to be adjourned for further study.

8. M. TARDIEU said that the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs had received a note dated July 10th from the Jugo-Slav Delegation, asking that their troops be allowed to occupy the territories granted to Serbia by the Conference, in the region in question. The Committee had submitted a reply dated 26th July (see Appendix H). Since the Council had settled the territorial question in Prekomurye, he proposed that the suggested military occupation should be granted.

(It was decided that the Jugo-Slav State should be authorised to occupy the territory in Prekomurye bounded by the frontier laid down and notified (see para. 6 subsection (a).)

9. M. TARDIEU stated that the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs had given him a report dated 30th July, to which he had nothing to add. (See Annex 1 [to Appendix I].)

Occupation of  
Prekomurye by  
Jugo-Slav Troops

MR. BALFOUR said that the Commission, after its first examination of the question, had decided, that, for ethnographical reasons, the small territorial area under discussion could not be given to the Bukovina. The reasons in question still held good, because the population of the district was more Ruthene than Roumanian in character. In addition to this, Poland had received Eastern Galicia, and laid no claims to the area now being considered.

Roumanian Fron-  
tiers in Bukovina



The desires of the population affected were the real matter for study. He asked what was the reason given by the Committee in support of these proposals. The answer probably was, that it would be advantageous, from a political point of view, to maintain the historical frontiers of Bukovina since that would be a measure which would please the Roumanian Government, and Roumanian public opinion. The Bukovina had never belonged properly to Roumania, and he was not in favour of granting it to that country, until such time as its real attitude towards the Allies had been cleared up. Up to the present time, the wishes and instructions of the Conference had been grossly disregarded by Roumania. That country had never acceded to our demands, and now that a territorial change, violating the principles of nationalities, was proposed in the interests of Roumanian public opinion, he preferred to adjourn the question.

MR. POLK said that he had been told in the morning that the line shown in red on the chart, ran along the bottom of a Valley; and that he did not care for such a solution.

M. TITTONI said that he would like to draw attention to the following point, which was, that the frontier now proposed had been promised to Roumania when she entered the war. For this reason he would uphold it willingly. On the other hand, he recognised the strength of Mr. Balfour's argument, and thought that Roumania should be informed, that it would only receive the territory in question, if it were willing to carry out the wishes of the Allies, and to sign the Treaty. Roumania was now in a state of discontent. The demands of that country in the Banat had been curtailed; and it would be unwise, therefore, to displease it with regard to Bukovina, unless there were important reasons for so doing. That is to say, the proposals of the Committee might be accepted under certain conditions.

M. TARDIEU said that the Bessarabian question had not been settled either. Since the Council could exert pressure, it could be announced that the report of the Committee would be accepted if Roumania satisfied the Council in other ways.

MR. BALFOUR said that there were also numerous negotiations proceeding between Roumania and Hungary, of a kind that did not arise out of the Treaty. It was nevertheless important that these negotiations should be concluded in a manner satisfactory to all. Roumania was not only concerned in signing the Treaty, it was also called upon to manifest its general goodwill.

MR. POLK said that he accepted the proposal in principle; but that he would prefer that the question should again be referred to experts, since a frontier running through the bottom of a Valley seemed to him unsatisfactory.

M. TARDIEU said that the question had been carefully examined by the Committee. The difficulty was that a part of the Bukovina had

already been given to Roumania, and had been occupied by that country. The alternative would be to give it to Poland, who did not demand it.

MR. POLK said that he raised no objection and that he was only insisting on a point of detail.

(It was decided to accept the Report of the Committee on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs, and to grant Bukovina to Roumania, with the exception of the area traversed by the railway line—Zaleszczyki-Kolomea—(see Annex 1 to Appendix I); on the condition that Roumania should show goodwill towards the Allies, with regard to the signature of the Treaty, and to the other questions in which she was concerned.)

10. M. TARDIEU said he wished to draw attention to a question not on the order of the day, but one demanding an early solution; the problem was that of Bessarabia, on which the Council had taken no decision.

Bessarabian  
Question

M. Maklakoff and M. Bratiano had expressed the Russian and Roumanian points of view. After they had been heard, the Council had discussed the matter briefly without coming to a decision.<sup>5</sup> It remained to be known what solution the Council would adopt, for it was difficult to settle the Roumanian question as a whole, and to make that country accept clauses in the Peace Treaty on the subject of minorities, if, at the same time, its frontiers had not been notified to it.

M. PICHON said that the question was particularly important, in that the minorities question would arise in Bessarabia.

M. TARDIEU said that the Committee had been unanimous in their wish to grant Bessarabia to Roumania, but the Council had sent a telegram to Admiral Koltchak,<sup>6</sup> which appeared inconsistent with that decision. In the telegram in question the council had only stated that the Roumanian rights in Bessarabia should be preserved in favour of that country.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was evidently important to be able to inform Roumania what its frontiers exactly were.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether M. Tardieu thought that the Committee would remain of the same opinion if the question were referred back to it for a further report.

M. TARDIEU said that the Committee had been unanimous when it had studied the problem. But they knew that certain Delegations had altered their opinions after the lapse of a few months. The difficult point was the telegram sent to Admiral Koltchak.

M. PICHON said that he did not think that the Council had been inconsistent, since it had not stated to Admiral Koltchak that Bessarabia as a whole would be granted to Roumania.

<sup>5</sup> See FM-29, minute 1, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> Appendix I to CF-37, vol. VI, p. 73.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether M. Pichon thought the telegram to Admiral Koltchak was not binding on the Council.

M. PICHON said that Admiral Koltchak's attention had only been drawn to the fact that the Council upheld Roumanian rights in Bessarabia.

M. TITTONI said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to an important point, which was, that the Committee had justified its proposals by saying that it wished to maintain the administrative and geographical unity of Bessarabia, and that it would give to Roumania, in compensation, a strip of territory in the Dobrudja, which belonged properly to the Bulgarians. By such a measure Roumania would be compensated for the Northern portion of Bessarabia left to Russia.

MR. BALFOUR said he did not think he could admit compensations, which consisted in balancing the cession of groups of human beings, by the cession of others to foreign sovereignties, as a matter of principle.

M. TITTONI remarked that the question had therefore still to be examined.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the problem ought to be solved rapidly, and he proposed to put it on the Agenda for the following day.

MR. BALFOUR said that he ought to call attention to the fact that Roumania was actually protesting strongly against the minority clauses. It would therefore be sufficient to tell that country, that it would not receive the territory now being considered, unless it accepted the minority clauses and signed the Treaty. In addition to this, Roumanian Statesmen did not really deny that the Southern part of the Dobrudja should be granted to Bulgaria. Had Roumania been our enemy during the war she would have been obliged to cede the territory. By the fact that she had been our Ally, she could only be persuaded to accept our solution. Was it therefore possible to say to that country, that it was going to receive a great extension of territory, but only under the condition that it would be willing to consent to the cession of the Dobrudja, which had been seized in 1913, and which, if left in her hands, would be a ceaseless cause of friction. The Roumanians were difficult people to deal with, and M. Bratiano was no exception.

M. TITTONI said that he had heard that a new ministry had been set up in Roumania, and that the President of the High Court had been instructed to form it.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had also heard that, but the Cabinet had not been formed, and the Bessarabian question was so important that he hoped that each one of his colleagues would give it his consideration.

MR. POLK said that the policy of the United States had been to oppose the division of Russia. Admiral Koltchak in his reply, had



protested against his country being divided. He thought that the effect of dividing Russia would have a bad effect in that country, and was therefore of the opinion that it would be better not to settle the question straight away, but to await the return of ordered government in Russia.

M. TITTONI remarked that Russia's point of view had been presented to the Council.

MR. POLK said that the Roumanians opposed any idea of a plebiscite in Bessarabia.

M. TITTONI said that that was so, because the result of a plebiscite would be the establishment of Bolshevism.

MR. BALFOUR said he did not desire to settle the question on that day, but that he would be willing that it should be taken up again in a few days' time, if it were possible to settle it then. He did not, however, believe that it would be. In his opinion, he thought it better not to consider Russia, and to regard our hands as free. He was willing to wait for the formation of the new Roumanian Cabinet in the hope that it would be possible to negotiate with it and to settle outstanding problems.

M. TARDIEU said that it would undoubtedly be better to wait for the formation of the new Government, but even if it were favourable to our point of view, we should have to inform it of our opinions on the Bukovina, Bessarabian and Dobrudja problems. It was not possible to do this at present.

MR. BALFOUR said that if the new Roumanian Government proved satisfactory, it would send a representative to the Conference with whom the Council could negotiate. It would then be possible to tell this new representative that the Council was favourably disposed towards territorial concessions advantageous to Roumania, on the condition that the Roumanians themselves should give evidence of goodwill in the discussion of problems not yet solved.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it should be remembered that the Bulgarian Delegation was now actually waiting for the Conditions of Peace at Neuilly.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Peace Treaty with the Bulgarians could be discussed and settled whilst the present question remained open.

(It was decided to postpone the discussion on Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Dobrudja until the formation of the new Roumanian Government.)

It was further decided that the above questions should be put on the Agenda as soon as the new Government had been formed.)

M. Sergent and M. Cheysson<sup>7</sup> entered the room.

---

<sup>7</sup> French representatives on the Financial Commission.

11. M. Clemenceau left the room and M. Pichon took the Chair.

M. PICHON said that the Council had to examine the amendments brought forward by the Reparations and Finance Committee after hearing the Roumanian, Czecho-Slovak [*Greek?*] and Jugo-Slav Delegations.

**Reparation and Financial Clauses in the Peace Treaty With Bulgaria**

M. SERGENT read the report prepared by the two Committees. (See Appendix J.) He added that the Reparations Commission had been presented with a note from the Serbian Delegation. The note in question had been examined and its suggestions adopted partially. On the day in question, however, at two o'clock, a new note, couched in the most violent terms had been received, stating that Jugo-Slavia refused point-blank to accept article 4 in the Reparation Clauses. In the Peace Treaty with Germany the article in question had laid down that Bulgaria should transfer her debt with Germany to the Allies. In article 4 of the Reparation Clauses with Bulgaria that country was called upon to recognise the validity of the transfer of all credits due to the Governments of Germany, of Austria-Hungary and of Turkey, to the Allied and Associated Governments conformably with article 261 of the Peace Treaty with Germany; and to the corresponding articles in the Peace Treaties with Austria-Hungary and Turkey. At the same time, the Allied and Associated Governments had taken these debts into account, when they had considered the sums payable by Bulgaria, and had undertaken not to put forward any further claims under this head. Serbia stated in her note, that, whilst the Allied and Associated Governments might be in a position to forego later claims, they had no right to impose a corresponding renunciation upon Serbia. The note ended in what amounted to a threat to refuse to sign the Peace Treaty. The Reparation Committee had fixed the indemnity payable by Bulgaria at 2 billion francs. 250 million francs due from Bulgaria to Germany had been added to this sum. Since the Committee had taken the debt into account it thought that nothing further could be done.

MR. BALFOUR said that the principle guiding the Council and the Reparations Committee had been that Bulgaria should pay the maximum amount that her resources allowed. It was of little importance, from the Bulgarian point of view that the sum should be paid to any particular Ally, since Serbia would have her share.

M. SERGENT said that the Reparations Committee had first intended to divide the indemnity into two heads. Under the first head, would have been reparations amounting to 2 billion francs, and, under the second, 250 million francs owed by Bulgaria to Germany. This would have avoided giving the impression of renouncing the debt due to the Allies by Germany. It seemed that Serbia had not taken this simple calculation into account.

M. PICHON said that the Reparations Committee, being now informed of the issue, could submit a report, which should be waited for.

MR. POLK said that Serbia was dissatisfied on another point, which was the amount of livestock to be delivered to her by Bulgaria. Was it possible to know what extra amount, under this head, had been granted to the Serbians?

M. SERGENT said that the original figures had been doubled except in the case of the oxen. Serbia was actually going to receive 6,000 milch cows 5,000 horses and mares, 1,000 mules, 4,000 yoke oxen and 12,000 sheep. Notwithstanding this, the Serbian demand amounted to ten times that figure.

M. BERTHELOT said that in spite of the figures having been doubled, Serbia was only going to receive one tenth part of that which had been taken from her by the Bulgarians.

(It was decided to accept the Reparation Clauses, with the exception of article 4, dealing with the transfer of credits, and of article 6, dealing with the delivery of live-stock.)

M. Sergent and M. Cheysson then left the room and Generals Duval, Groves and [Rear Admiral] Orsini entered.<sup>8</sup>

12. GENERAL DUVAL said that he had to submit a report, dated 30th July, on the subject of the distribution of aeronautic material delivered by the enemy Governments (see Appendix K).

Distribution of  
Aeronautic  
Material

MR. BALFOUR said that the Note brought forward two questions:—

(1) What principle was to govern the distribution of war material—a difficult question which had already raised considerable controversy.

(2) How was this material to be dealt with when distributed between the Allied and Associated Powers.

The Committee proposed that the material in question should become the property of whatever Government it was given to, so long as this latter should undertake not to alienate it. He proposed to adjourn the first question and to accept the second principle enunciated.

M. TITTONI said that he accepted Mr. Balfour's proposal, but asked that the first question should be referred to Versailles, in order that the settlement should be made conformable to the general principles guiding the general distribution of war material, in general.

(This proposal was adopted.)

(It was therefore decided:—

To request the Military Representatives at Versailles to submit a proposal regarding the principles to govern the distribution of all

<sup>8</sup> Respectively French, American, and Italian representatives on the Aeronautical Commission.



aeronautical war material turned over by the Central Powers in accordance with the Peace Treaty.

It was further decided that the Inter-Allied Commission of Control should be charged with the details of the distribution to be made in accordance with the principles established above. It was further decided that once this material had been allotted to and accepted by any one of the Allied and Associated Powers, it should become the property of such Government, which latter should agree not to alienate the material in question by any form of transfer.)

The Delivery of  
Arms and Muni-  
tions to Czecho-  
Slovakia

13. M. TITTONI presented the President with a report from the Italian Delegation on the subject of the delivery of arms and munitions to Czecho-Slovakia by Austria. (See H.D. 13, paragraph 11.)<sup>8a</sup> The report is contained in Annex "L".

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, August 1, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-21

[Translation <sup>9</sup>]

#### *Telegram—General Nudant to Marshal Foch*

AUGUST 1, 1919.

I hereby inform you that I have just received from General Dupont<sup>10</sup> a report which Erzberger asked Von Hockhammern, President of the Wako<sup>11</sup> in Berlin to transmit to me.

The text of this report is as follows:

"The German Government is at the present moment being very vigorously attacked: it is running afoul of the hostility of the parties of the right, whom the recent revelations have deeply displeased, in addition to that of the independent socialist fractions.

The Government can only maintain itself by leaning on the military element and the former officers' corps.

The Entente, demanding the delivery of numerous generals and officers, will weaken our position and withdraw from us our support. The Government will be overthrown and the country given over to communism.

In order to ward off this danger, as serious for the Entente as for us, we request that you postpone the execution of the delivery clause."

---

<sup>8a</sup> *Ante*, p. 263.

<sup>9</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>10</sup> Gen. Charles Joseph Dupont, head of the French Military Mission at Berlin.

<sup>11</sup> Abbreviation for Die Deutsche Waffenstillstandskommission (German Armistice Commission).

## Appendix B to HD-21

[Translation <sup>12</sup>]GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMY  
NO. 2, OFFICE A*Note on the German Army*

PARIS, July 31, 1919.

Numerous indications, coming, in general, from good sources, indicate that the effectives of the German Army amount, at the present time, to 800,000 men\* (minimum figure).

These 800,000 men are divided among the following formations:

The *Reichswehr*,

The volunteer corps existing outside of the *Reichswehr*,

The remaining units of the former Army,

Those which it is necessary in reality to add, the *Einwohnerwehren*, *Bürgerwehren*, and *Sicherheitwehren*,—theoretically police troops, and practically, reserves in disguise.

The *Reichswehr* should include, according to the Imperial law of March 6, 1919,<sup>13</sup> 18 brigades of which 6 should be heavy, consisting of 12,000 men each, and 12 light, consisting of 7,200 men each. However, from the first of April, the Ministry of War has decided upon the creation of 28 brigades (18 heavy, 10 light).†

Under date of May 16, an official document ‡ indicated 31 brigades, a second § dated May 21 gave the figure 38 (22 heavy brigades, 16 light), and a third || announced on June 15 the existence of 40 brigades (23 heavy, 17 light). Further, there has just recently been identified a 42nd Brigade,¶ which makes the number of units of the *Reichswehr* correspond within two units with the number of former divisions in peace time (42 in place of 44, making a deduction of 3 corps for the Army of Alsace-Lorraine).

<sup>12</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

\*1 million Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, May 22 (agent apparently reliable)

Intelligence Service Aix-la-Chapelle, June 25 (officer attached to the Ministry of Marine)

Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, July 1, 1,500,000 men (Intelligence includes reserves)

Declaration from Foerster (Berne, July 19—Intelligence Service, Strasbourg, May 21)

Intelligence Service, Mayence, July 7 (reliable source)

800,000 Intelligence Service, July 26 (declarations by German officers)

[Footnote in the original.]

<sup>13</sup> *Reichs-Gesetzblatt*, 1919, No. 57, p. 295.

† Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, June 27. [Footnote in the original.]

‡ Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, July 22. [Footnote in the original.]

§ Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, July 16. [Footnote in the original.]

|| Intelligence Service, Mayence, July 5. [Footnote in the original.]

¶ Intelligence Service, Strasbourg, July 22. [Footnote in the original.]

By itself, then, the *Reichswehr* should include more than 400,000 men.

There should be added to this effective force, another of 400,000 men belonging to certain volunteer corps, to the *Einwohnerwehren*, and to formations of the old Army not yet broken up. It is quite difficult to give figures for each of these categories, but the total forces which they actually represent at the present time is established, and the following facts are certain:

1. The volunteer corps should be put into the *Reichswehr* or be disbanded. Nevertheless, there are in existence some of them which have an independent existence side by side with the *Reichswehr*—a certain number of these corps are maintained by special subsidies (Pan-German League and Heavy Industry).

2. The *Einwohnerwehren* are only a disguised reserve. In order to throw one off the scent, they come under the Minister of the Interior; but they are armed, drilled, and constitute a vast centralized organization.\*\*

3. The units of the old Army should have been disbanded without delay by the fifth of last June.†† However, although this dissolution is fairly advanced, it is not completed, and numerous units of the old Army are still to be found, reduced in strength, to be sure, but constituting nuclei capable of being strengthened in case of need.

The Germans maintain, then, very important effective forces. The question of cadres and the question of matériel also are of interest to them.

We know, indeed, that:

1. They can make available, under the pressure of the peace treaty, a great number of officers (16,000 are spoken of) by means of a bill introduced in the National Assembly and therefore public, while on the other hand they can recruit officers among the students ‡‡ in accordance with a secret instruction by the Minister of War.§§

During the past two months, they have reinforced the gendarmery; then decreed that it constituted “a non-military force.” || || An increase in the number of firemen is also being considered. ¶ ¶

2. As regards matériel, measures are being taken to the end that the artillery armament of the brigades of the *Reichswehr* may be full, in good condition, and “absolutely fit to be used in the field.”\*

Postal aviation is being developed, which will permit having airplanes for a double purpose.

The German Army tends, therefore, to resume its former strength.

---

\*\*See special study Intelligence Service fortnightly No. 2, Bureau No. 1, August. [Footnote in the original.]

††Circular of the Ministry of War, April. [Footnote in the original.]

‡‡See note No. 2. Bureau, July 28. [Footnote in the original.]

§§ Instruction of July 14 (Intelligence Service, Strasbourg, July 23) [Footnote in the original.]

|| || Decree of July 2 (Intelligence Service, Strasbourg, July 26). The effective force of the gendarmery increased in 1919 from 240 officers, 9,395 men to 318 officers, 14,537 men. [Footnote in the original.]

¶¶Intelligence Service, Aix-la-Chapelle, July 26. [Footnote in the original.]

\*Note, Ministry of War, June 18. [Footnote in the original.]



It is undergoing methodical training which tends to place it again entirely in the hands of its chiefs.

Perhaps a more serious matter is that the old spirit which had disappeared for a while, is tending to revive. The Government encourages it for Noske,<sup>14</sup> who tolerated "The National League of German Officers" of reactionary tendencies, brought himself, only on the day when he found himself faced with the "Republican League of German Officers" to declare it to be inadmissible that "associations with political tendencies install themselves in the Army."

It may be concluded from the foregoing that Germany does not seem to have the intention of complying with the peace terms in the matter of the military clauses relating to effectives. Cunningly she puts on, perhaps, the appearance of complying. Moreover, she carefully selects her effectives in such a manner as to keep, in case of need, those who are best, around which reserves of all kinds could be grouped.† In an underhanded way, she will forge the instrument of a revenge of which the officers are already talking.‡

In brief, "camouflage" and bad faith are expressions which summarize the situation. Years ago, after 1806, Scharnhorst recommended the creation of militia forces, "capable of being expanded quietly," and, in 1811, Hardenberg wrote: "Today the essential thing is the preservation of existence. In the changing play of circumstances, there can turn out to be remedies which we do not dream of."

But the example of 1806 is there to warn us; "history is a perpetual beginning again."

---

#### Appendix C to HD-21

[Translation <sup>15</sup>]

#### NATIONAL DEFENSE RECRUITING AT THE ACADEMIC UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH

*Translation of a Document of the "Reichswehr Akademische Werbe-stelle München Universität" Furnished by Professor Foerster to a Very Good Agent*

MUNICH, July 14, 1919.

To the Professors, Officials, and Assistants.

The Academic Recruiting Office (*Akademische Werbestelle*) is en-

---

<sup>14</sup> Gustav Noske, German Minister of Defense.

† "The military authorities systematically deceive the Entente regarding effectives" writes Professor Foerster. "Information supplied to various Allied Military Missions is intentionally erroneous." [Footnote in the original.]

‡ "There are still military men who seem not to be aware of the conditions of the Peace Treaty", declares the *Freiheit* after an inquiry at the recruiting offices, "and who think even less of fulfilling them." [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>15</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Secret Enlist-  
ments in  
Bavaria

deavoring to obtain, as far as possible, the participation of all persons belonging to higher institutions of learning in the national defense; it will thus contribute greatly toward the maintenance of order in Munich.

It has not been possible to create a military unit recruited exclusively from the university body, because, on the one hand, this project is rendered unrealizable by the clauses of the peace treaty, and on the other hand, it is not desired to encourage the idea, which is unjust but nevertheless widely held, that the spirit of caste reigns in the higher institutions of learning.

There are two possible ways in which the professors, officials, and assistants can participate in the national defense:

1. Men who have completed their military classes can have themselves enrolled, without it being necessary to hold them to a period of service. When they are called to the colors, they will serve in the infantry or artillery. But in order to put them beforehand into direct contact with the corps of the troops to which they will be attached, they shall be placed in a company or a battery which will be indicated to them verbally. They will have, then, every facility to act with these units and to fix the dates on which they could, once a week, receive training (especially in marksmanship).

2. Special courses, meeting bi-weekly, have been organized for men who have not performed military service and for those who have not completed their terms of service or who need to complete their military education.

Men who take these courses receive very elementary military instruction. They are taught to fire a gun, carbine, and revolver and to use hand-grenades.

These courses, which are held only in the morning, are scheduled so as not to conflict with the University courses; it is for this reason that they are now held only on the two days in the week when there are no classes.

It is probable that a third course will be organized, which will begin at a date to be decided upon in agreement with those who enroll. The participation of professors in appreciable numbers has already had a very good influence on the students, who, in the presence of such a fine example, naturally do not wish to be outdistanced.

Consequently, whoever enlists not only brings his own cooperation to the service of the cause, but also aids us to recruit other forces in numbers and of a value which are really appreciable.

For this reason, it is fervently to be wished that no one abstain who is in a position to serve the national cause in any manner whatever.

It is necessary, on the other hand, for the Academic Recruiting Office to take into account the participation of the professors, officials, and assistants in other similar organisations (such as the *Einwohnerwehren*, *Ostwehren*, etc.)

On these grounds, we earnestly implore you to signify, as soon as possible, to the Academic Recruiting Office (Room 116 at the University), whether you are already participating in the national defense or in a similar organization, or whether it is your intention to take advantage of one of the possibilities indicated above for participating therein.

In the latter case, we beg you to be kind enough to enroll yourselves on the lists which are kept in Room 114 at the University.

Considering the interest of the question, a prompt response is desired.

The clauses of the peace treaty require, as you know, the severing as far as possible, of all ties between the higher institutions of learning and the Army.

However, it will be some time before the agencies of the Entente entrusted with enforcement, direct their attention to the execution of the relevant clause of the peace treaty.

(Note by Intelligence Service Agent—The original document is sent to General Headquarters: it is to be noted that the individual copies are numbered.)

It appears from an examination of this circular that the Bavarian University actually puts pressure on the professors and students with a view to increasing Germany's military force, in a disguised form and profiting by the momentary absence of Entente enforcement agencies.)

---

#### Appendix D to HD-21

[Translation <sup>16</sup>]

*General Franchet d'Esperey to the Minister of War*

PARIS, July 30, 1919.

The decision of the Inter-Allied Supreme Council <sup>17</sup> which you communicated to me on June 10 provided for the participation of British and Italian troops in the occupation of Bulgaria.

I decided to form for the occupation of Bulgarian Thrace a detachment composed of two French battalions, of one Italian battalion of the 62nd Regiment of Infantry stationed at Adrianople and designated by the Italian command, and of an English detachment.

The Italian General Headquarters advises me that the question of what effectives are to be maintained in Turkey by Italy is being submitted to the Peace Conference by the delegation of this Power, and

---

<sup>16</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>17</sup> See appendix IV to CF-71, vol. VI, p. 498.



that there is no occasion in the meanwhile to withdraw the battalion from Adrianople.

On the other hand, the British command has not yet made known the effective force of the detachment to be furnished by the British Army.

Under these conditions, the French troops are going to be alone in bearing the burden and the responsibility of the occupation of Bulgaria at the time of the treaty of peace.

---

#### Appendix E to HD-21

#### *Telegram From the Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Klagenfurt*

Translation

JULY 29, 1919.

The Serbo-Croat-Slovene and Austrian Delegates signed, on July 28 at 16 o'clock, the convention regulating the evacuation of zone B of the Klagenfurt basin by the Serbo-Croat-Slovene troops.

The line of demarcation fixed by the Supreme Council on June 23<sup>18</sup> will be occupied on July 31 at 17 o'clock by the Serbo-Croat-Slovene posts on one side and the Austrian posts on the other, a neutral zone of 600 meters being maintained between the two parties:

The military representatives are of the opinion that the guarding of the war material left at Klagenfurt can not be safely entrusted to the Austrian *gendarmérie*. They propose therefore that, until the Interallied detachment requested by the telegram of July 25 arrives, this guard be insured by Italian *carabinieri*.

As the Italian detachment now at Klagenfurt to insure the guarding of the city is only half a platoon, it should be reinforced by two platoons.

The Italian Supreme Command, from whom the military representatives have requested this reinforcement, has refused to send it without authorisation from the Supreme Council of the Allies.

The military representatives have the honour to request instructions from the Supreme Council.

---

#### Appendix F to HD-21

[Translation<sup>19</sup>]

#### *Note Addressed to the Supreme Council of the Allies by the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs*

PARIS, July 22, 1919.

The Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs examined,

---

<sup>18</sup> See CF-85, minute 3, vol. VI, p. 628.

<sup>19</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

in its session of July 19, two new claims presented by the delegation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes concerning the northern boundary of this state.

1. In Prekomourie;
2. In the Baranya.

### 1. PREKOMOURIE

In view of the territorial increases accorded to Austria at the expense of Hungary, especially in the St. Gothard region, the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation claims the attribution of the territory included between the northern boundary previously assigned to the Kingdom in this region and the river Raab.

Claim of the  
Serb-Croat-  
Slovene Dele-  
gation

The Commission considers that the proposed modification would result in attaching to the Serb-Croat-Slovene state a region which is, in part, peopled with Slovenes, but whose economic interests are oriented toward the north.

Decision of the  
Commission

It proposes, therefore, the maintenance of the line previously adopted by the Supreme Council, which followed in a general way the line of the watershed between the Mur and the Raab.

### 2. BARANYA

In the definitive statement of claims, presented to the Commission on May 22 [20], the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation renounced its original claims to Somogy, and limited itself to claiming in Baranya, the triangle included between the Drave, the Danube, and a line prolonging toward the Southwest the boundary accorded to the Kingdom in Bacska.

Claim of the Serb-  
Croat-Slovene  
Delegation

Very recently the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation recommended a petition presented by a delegation of distinguished Serbs, Magyars, and Germans of the Baranya. These persons requested that the north-west base of the triangle be moved back in such a way as to include within the Serb-Croat-Slovene territory, the Serbian center of Mohacs and the Mohacs-Siklos railroad.

A. The Commission recognises that the Danube and the Drave constitute very unsatisfactory political boundaries since their thalwegs change position continually and thus cause ever-recurring disputes among the riparian property owners. It admits that this reason justifies in principle the Yugo-Slav claim to the South-Eastern part of Baranya.

Decision of the  
Commission

B. It considers that there is no need to receive the petition from the Baranya notables who seem inspired by circumstances rather than

by the natural affinities of a very mixed population and who tend to deprive Hungary of part of the coal mines of Pécs necessary to the development of that state.

C. The American, British, and French delegations propose a line leaving the Danube to the west of Berog and rejoining the Drave to the southwest of Torjancs, so as to include in the territory of the Serb-Croat-Slovene state the railroads connecting Monoster with Misköszeg and Osjek as well as the villages of Dalyok and Baranyavar. § This line, in their opinion :

(a) would remove for the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes the inconveniences of a river boundary without according to this state any strategic advantage menacing to Hungary;

(b) would assure under satisfactory conditions the economic life of the populations;

(c) would satisfy the national aspirations of the Slavic villages which lean up against the hills situated between Misköszeg and Monoster.

D. The Italian delegation believes that the most equitable boundary from the military point of view between Hungary and Yugo-Slavia in Eastern Baranya would be constituted by the crest of the hills situated between Misköszeg and Monoster. However, in view of the local interests presented by the Yugo-Slavs, it associates itself with the solution presented by the other delegations.

---

#### Annex I

#### *The Boundary Between the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Hungary in the Baranya*

Starting from the point at which the boundary between the Serb-Croat-Slovene state and Hungary in the Bacska crosses the principal arm of the Danube, at about 8 kilometers to the north of point 169 (Misköszeg) and as far as point 93, at about 3 kilometers to the southwest of Baranyavar;

A line to be determined on the ground in a general southwesterly direction leaving to the Serb-Croat-Slovene state the localities of Dalyok, Föherezeglak, and Baranyavar as well as the railroad connecting these two localities and the junction immediately to the north of Baranyavar, and to Hungary the localities of Izabellaföld with its railroad, Udvar, Sarok, and Ivan Darda.

Starting from point 93 and toward the west as far as the secondary arm of the Drave at a point to be selected on the ground near point 90, at about 10 kilometers to the east of Miholjacdolnji:

---

§See Annex I. [Footnote in the original.]



A line to be determined on the ground leaving to Yugo-Slavia the localities of Benge, Löcs, and Torjancz and to Hungary the localities of Illocska, Beremend, and Kassad and crossing the railroad immediately to the south of the station of Beremend.

The secondary arm, then the thalweg of the principal arm of the Drave upstream as far as its confluence with the river Mur.

---

Appendix G to HD-21

[Translation <sup>20</sup>]

*Note Addressed to the Supreme Council of the Allies by the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs*

PARIS, July 25, 1919.

The Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs has examined:

1. The protests presented by the delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, in its letters of July 10 and 16, against the boundaries previously assigned to this state;
2. The new claims presented by the same delegation concerning the Bacska;
3. The question of the Island of Ada-Kalessi.

It has the honor to submit to the Supreme Council its conclusions on these various points, as follows:

BANAT

I. *Southern Banat*

A. Claims of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation:

The Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation claims the region of Bazias chiefly on the following grounds:

- a. Predominance of the Slav over the Roumanian elements in this region;
- b. The rights of dominion which the inhabitants of the Serbian communes in Banat, former soldiers of the 14th frontier regiment, possess over the forests of the Klissoura.

B. Opinion of the Commission:

The Commission recommends the maintenance, in a region where two Allied states only are in controversy, of the boundary previously decided upon by the Commission after a detailed study, and notified to the interested parties by the Supreme Council.

It considers that there could be occasion, after study and verifica-

---

<sup>20</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

tion of the rights of dominion possessed by the communes of Serbian Banat over the forests of Klissoura, to take account of these rights in the indemnity settlements to be arranged between the Serb-Croat-Slovene state and Roumania.

## II. *Central Banat*

### A. Claims of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation:

The Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation requests a rectification of the boundary in the regions of Zsombolya-Modes in such a way:

(a) As to assure direct railroad communications between Nagy-Kikinda and Versecz;

(b) As not to destroy, to the detriment of the Serb-Croat-Slovene state, the unity of the system of hydraulic works on the Aranka, Bega, and Temes Rivers which feed the irrigation canals on the plain of Banat.

### B. The Opinion of the Commission:

The Commission recommends for reasons given above, the maintenance of the boundary previously adopted and notified to the interested parties.

It considers that there is occasion to point out to the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways, the necessity of taking international measures for the purpose of maintaining and developing the system of irrigation canals in the Banat in the equal interest of the various states among which the Banat is divided.

## III. *Northern Banat*

The Commission reserved this question for a more thorough study which will require several more days.

## BACSKA

### A. Claim of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation:

The Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation claims the city and region of Baja on the grounds:

(a) that this city numbers 34,000 Slavs in a population of 89,000;

(b) that Baja has close economic ties with Zombor, a city previously assigned to the Serb-Croat-Slovene state;

(c) that Baja plays an important part in the hydro-technical system of the Bacska. The Francis Deak Canal which serves the northern part of this province, is, in reality fed by the hydraulic installations established at Baja.

### B. Opinion of the Commission:

The Commission recommends the maintenance of the boundary previously adopted, the extension of which toward the north would not be justified by ethnographic conditions in the region of Baja.

It considers that there is occasion to bring to the attention of the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways, the necessity of providing international arrangements to guarantee the satisfactory functioning of the Francis Deak Canal, situated on Serb-Croat-Slovene territory, by means of hydraulic installations left on Hungarian territory.

#### ADA-KALESSI ISLAND

By a telegram dated July 11, General Franchet d'Esperey reported that Roumanians and the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes both claim the island of Ada-Kalessi, situated in the Danube opposite Orsova, left to Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 <sup>22</sup> and occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1908.

The Commission, considering that the island of Ada-Kalessi was occupied by Austria-Hungary, proposes that it be attributed to Roumania, successor to Austria-Hungary in regard to Transylvania which borders on the Danube opposite the island.

It requests that the clauses of Article 52 of the Final Act of Berlin which stipulate for the demilitarization of the island be maintained and, if necessary, confirmed.

---

#### Annex I

*Telegram From General Franchet d'Esperey to the Minister of War*

CONSTANTINOPLE, July 11, 1919.

On March 27 last I refused the Serbs permission, in advance of a decision by the Peace Conference, to occupy the island of Ada-Kalessi, situated in the Danube to the east of Orsova.

The Roumanians also claim this island.

Since the boundary between Serbia and Roumania which you communicated to me does not mention this island, I beg that you be so kind as to acquaint me with the decision of the Peace Conference on this point.

---

#### Appendix H to HD-21

[Translation<sup>23</sup>]

*Note Addressed to the Supreme Council of the Allies by the  
Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs*

PARIS, July 26, 1919.

In a letter addressed on July 10 to the President of the Peace Con-

---

<sup>22</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 895.

<sup>23</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



ference, the Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes denounced the excesses committed by the agents and troops of the Government of the Magyar Soviets in the Prekomourie. It requested authorization for the Serb-Croat-Slovene state to occupy militarily the territories which should have been attributed to it in this region by the Conference.

The Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs, to whom this request was submitted by the Secretary-General of the Conference, has the honor to recommend to the Supreme Council of the Allies:

(1) That the boundary assigned to the Serb-Croat-Slovene state in Prekomourie after an examination of the note presented by the Commission on July 22,<sup>25</sup> be notified to the delegation of that state;

(2) That, in conformity with the precedent established by the decisions of the Supreme Council in regard to Moravia, Transylvania, the basin of Klagenfurt, and the Banat, the military boundary coincide in Prekomourie with the political boundary.

That, consequently, the Serb-Croat-Slovene state be authorized to occupy immediately the territory delimited by the boundary which shall have been notified to it.

---

#### Appendix I to HD-21

[Translation<sup>26</sup>]

*Note Addressed to the Supreme Council of the Allies by the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs Regarding Bukovina*

PARIS, July 30, 1919.

In its report No. 1 of April 6, 1919, the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs, taking into consideration the national aspirations of the Roumanians in Bukovina, the economic ties of this region with Roumania, and the advantage that the Ruthenians of Bukovina would find in associating themselves with the Roumanians, admitted in principle that it would be just to attach Bukovina as a whole to Roumania.

Nevertheless, it did rectify the historic boundaries of Bukovina to the disadvantage of Roumania at two points: at the north, in order to avoid cutting the railroad which connects the two Galician cities of Kolomea and Zaleszczyki, at the west in order to reserve the position of the Ruthenian populations inhabiting in compact masses the basin of Czeremosz.

---

<sup>25</sup> Appendix F to HD-21, p. 468.

<sup>26</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

The Supreme Council has approved these proposals.

Since that date, the territories thus detached from Bukovina, which are actually occupied by Roumanian troops, have not been assigned to any state. On the other hand, Eastern Galicia, which they border upon, has been placed with a guarantee of autonomy, under the supervision of the Polish Republic.

In the presence of this new situation, the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs has submitted its previous conclusions to a new examination.

Considering, on the one hand, that the Polish delegation, far from making any pretension to any part whatever of Bukovina, has instead showed itself disposed to concede to Roumania an extension of territory in this region;

Considering, on the other hand, that there would be a political advantage in giving satisfaction to the Roumanian Government and to Roumanian opinion by respecting as far as possible the historic boundaries of Bukovina;

Considering, however, the necessity of leaving outside of Roumanian territory the Kolomea-Zaleszczyki railroad, necessary to Galician communications;

The Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs has the honor to recommend to the Supreme Council the attachment to Roumania of Bukovina in its entirety, except for the territory traversed by the Zaleszczyki-Kolomea railroad. The line that it proposes for the approval of the Council is described in annex I appended hereto.

#### Annex I

##### *Roumanian Boundary Line in Bukovina*

A line leaving the thalweg of the Dniester at a point about 2 kilometers down stream from Zaleszczyki.

From there toward the southwest to the point of meeting of the administrative boundary between Galicia and Bukovina with the boundary between the districts of Horodenka and Sniatyn at about 11 kilometers to the southeast of Horodenka.

A line to be determined on the ground passing through numbers 317-312 and 239.

From there toward the southwest the old administrative boundary between Galicia and Bukovina to its point of meeting with the old boundary between Hungary and Galicia.

Then following this boundary in the direction northwest to number 1655, etc. . . .

## Appendix J to HD-21

[Translation <sup>28</sup>]REPARATIONS COMMISSION  
FINANCIAL COMMISSION  
SECRETARIAT*Note for the Supreme Council of the Allies*

In execution of the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council on July 26, 1919,<sup>29</sup> the Serbian, Roumanian, and Greek delegations have been notified of the financial and reparations clauses of the Conditions of Peace with Bulgaria.

The Financial Commission and the Reparations Commission have examined carefully the observations presented by the different delegations.

The observations relative to the reparations clauses bear upon three principal points:

(1) Regarding the recovery of objects stolen or carried away from the occupied territories, the Reparation Commission is of the opinion that the observations presented are justified, and it proposes to the Supreme Council to add a new article (article V of the appended draft of July 29 <sup>30</sup>) to the clauses accepted by the Supreme Council on July 26.<sup>31</sup>

(2) Regarding the deliveries of cattle to be imposed on Bulgaria.

The Greek, Roumanian, and Serbian claims amount to almost a million head of cattle.

A new study of Bulgaria's cattle resources has led the Commission to estimate that the demands presented by the three delegations could not be satisfied without ruining the economic life of Bulgaria, which is essentially an agricultural country and which lives principally from its farming and cattle raising.

It considers that the number of heads of cattle to be demanded from Bulgaria should not exceed 80,000, a figure ten times lower than that of the demands presented by the three interested powers.

Consequently, the Commission proposes to modify the figures inserted in the text approved by the Supreme Council on July 26, and to increase the deliveries of cattle (with the exception of bulls) to Greece and to Roumania by 50 percent, and to Serbia by 100 percent.

(3) In regard to the financial clauses, almost all the observations

---

<sup>28</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>29</sup> HD-15, minute 6, p. 324.

<sup>30</sup> This document does not accompany the minutes.

<sup>31</sup> Appendix D to HD-15, p. 330.



formulated relate to article 10 concerning the division of the Bulgarian debt.

The Financial Commission considers that the text adopted by the Supreme Council on July 26 might lend itself to confusion, and it proposes a new text which specifies clearly the obligations of the grantee powers not only with regard to the Bulgarian debt but also regarding the Ottoman debt appertaining to the ceded territory.

The Commission also submits to the Supreme Council a modification of form intended to make clearer the draft of article II concerning public property situated in the ceded territories.

---

Appendix K to HD-21

[Translation <sup>32</sup>]

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,  
PARIS, July 30, 1919.

From: General Duval, Chairman of the Commission on Aerial Conditions.

To: President Clemenceau.

I have the honor to submit to you two requests voted unanimously by the Commission on Aerial Conditions in its meeting of July 26th in order to examine:

1) The conditions under which the war material to be delivered by Germany might be divided among the Allied and Associated Powers.

2) The measures to be taken to avoid creating, in neutral countries or in Allied countries not included in the division, an outlet for German aeronautic industry by the sale, cession or exchange of the material delivered.

The Commission, composed of Delegates of the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and Belgium, requests:

1) That the Supreme Council determine the principles which shall govern the distribution of all the war material delivered by the Central Powers as a result of the application of the conditions of the Peace Treaty, whether it is a question of material to be utilized on land, at sea or in the air, and that the Interallied Commissions of Control be instructed to settle the details of the distribution by applying the principles thus established.

2) That this war material, once allotted to and accepted by the Government of one of the Allied or Associated Powers, become the property of this Government, which shall pledge itself not to allow this material afterward to go beyond the limits of its jurisdiction.

---

<sup>32</sup> The translation is that given in S-H Bulletin No. 607, August 1, 1919 (Paris Peace Conf. 184.611/667).

## Appendix M [L] to HD-21

[Translation <sup>83</sup>]ITALIAN DELEGATION TO THE  
PEACE CONFERENCE  
MILITARY SECTION

JULY 27, 1919.

*Delivery of Arms and Munitions by German-Austria to  
Czecho-Slovakia*

In its Session of July 25th, the Council of Five drafted the telegram (already known and a copy of which is appended) asking for information concerning the delivery to the Czecho-Slovak Army of war material existing in Austria.

On that subject, the following must be noted :

1st—Since the month of May last, the Czecho-Slovak Government has been asking, through M. Allizé, Representative of the French Government in Vienna, for the cession of Austrian arms and munitions, to General Segré, Italian Representative in Vienna, who fully agreed with that request.

2nd—At the same time, the Supreme War Council of Versailles, while specifying the means for placing the Czecho-Slovak Army in a position to resist the Hungarian counter offensive of the first days of June, proposed, in its session of June 7th, that the supplies of this army be increased by the war material of German Austria and that the cession of this material be made, however, through the Italian Armistice Commission in Vienna.

The Council of Four, at its meeting of June 9th, fully approved this proposal of the Versailles Committee.<sup>34</sup>

Soon afterwards, during the month of June, Marshal Foch sent a letter to General Diaz, asking him to instruct General Segré to give orders so that the cession of war material by Austria to Czecho-Slovakia might be facilitated and hastened.

3rd—These instructions were given, and, indeed, on June 25th, the Italian G. H. Q. informed us that the Italian Mission in Vienna had obtained, from the Austro-Hungarian Government, the cession to the Czecho-Slovak Army of 20,000 rifles, 500 machine guns, 50,000 rounds of artillery munitions, a few million cartridges, a cession which is in the course of execution.

Besides, on June 30th, the following material had already been delivered to Czecho-Slovakia :

<sup>83</sup> The translation is that given in S-H Bulletin 648 (Paris Peace Conf. 185.2151/24).

<sup>34</sup> For previous reference to this proposal, see CF-53, vol. VI, p. 254.

## ITALIAN MATERIAL

130	Fiat Machine guns,
1,800	Muskets, 91 Model,
1,105	Revolvers,
3,000	Daggers,
21,728	Rifles, 91 Model,
3,210,000	Cartridges for machine guns,
1,144,800	Cartridges for arms, 91 Model,
200,000	Cartridges for arms, 91 Model, repaired,
200,000	Cartridges with explosive bullets,
108,000	Cartridges for muskets,
30,000	Cartridges for revolvers, 7.65.

## MATERIAL FROM THE FORMER AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT

3	Batteries of 15 c/m (4 pieces each)
4	Batteries of 10 c/m (4 pieces each)
8	Batteries of 8 c/m (4 pieces each)
132	Schwarzlose machine guns,
15,800	Austrian rifles,
31,000	Complete series (Austrian rifles)
17,000	Complete series of trimmings (slings and belts)
6,000	Rounds of 15 c/m
16,000	Rounds of 10 c/m
33,000	Rounds of 8 c/m
10,080,000	Cartridges for Austrian rifles.

[Enclosure]

JULY 25, 1919.

## RESOLUTION

It is decided that, after notification of the President, the text of the following telegram concerning the delivery of arms and munitions to the Czecho-Slovaks shall be sent to the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers in Vienna:

"The Austrian Delegation to the Peace Conference has answered as follows to the communication of the Conference ordering the Austrian Government to deliver its war material: 'All the arms and munitions asked for until now are being delivered to the Royal Italian Armistice Mission in Vienna. This Mission has undertaken to transmit the material in question to the Czecho-Slovak Government, a procedure arrived at with the full cognizance and consent of the Allied and Associated Representatives in Vienna.'

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers asks:

1st—Who gave the consent mentioned in the Austrian answer and in what form was it given;

2nd—If the arms and munitions delivered by the Austrian Government were delivered to the Royal Italian Mission only or to the Representatives of Italy and France;

3rd—For how long has this delivery been taking place.

4th—What are the total amounts of the various categories of material, and what is the proportion already delivered."



Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, August 2, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. F. L. Polk.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	M. Clemenceau. M. Pichon.
<i>Secretary</i> Mr. L. Harrison.	<i>Secretaries</i> Mr. H. Norman. Sir Ian Malcolm.	<i>Secretaries</i> M. Dutasta. M. Berthelot. M. de St. Quentin
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Tittoni.	M. Matsui.
	<i>Secretary</i> M. Paterno.	<i>Secretary</i> M. Kawai.
<i>Joint Secretariat</i>		
AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Capt. Chapin.		
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . Capt. E. Abraham.		
FRANCE . . . . . Capt. A. Portier.		
ITALY . . . . . Lt.-Col. A. Jones.		

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU informed the Council that he had received a wireless message from Lt-Col. Romanelli, commanding the Italian Military Mission at Budapest. This message was addressed to M. Clemenceau.

Situation in Hungary

M. MANTOUX then read the dispatch contained in Appendix "A".  
M. TITTONI said that he thought there was some misunderstanding as to the acceptance of proposals by the Allied Powers. He did not think the Allied Powers had made any proposals, as was suggested in the message. He thought that what was alluded to was the plan explained by General Boehm<sup>1</sup> to the Allied Representative in Vienna. He had himself received a telegram from Vienna, which did not quite agree with the message read out. According to his information, General Boehm and M. Peidl<sup>2</sup> had told the Prince Borghese<sup>3</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> General Wilhelm Boehm, Hungarian Minister at Vienna; Hungarian People's Commissar for War and commander in chief of the Hungarian Red Army, March-July, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> Julius Peidl, Hungarian Socialist leader; Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Hungarian Republic, January.18-March 21, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> Prince Don Felice Borghese, Italian representative at Vienna.

Colonel Cunninghame<sup>4</sup> that if the Roumanians were stopped, they would be able to form a Government more completely representative of public opinion.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether it was General Boehm who had caused the Revolution.

M. TITTONI said that the proposals had been made by General Boehm as representative of the Socialists and of the Labour Party. It was necessary that the Allies should take precautions not to be deceived a second time.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that there was no motive for negotiating a second armistice. There was already one.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was in agreement. He thought the proposals referred to were those contained in the message discussed on the 26th of July. (See H. D. 14, Appendix "A".<sup>5</sup>) He had no objection to these proposals, but what he did object to was that the responsibility for them should be laid upon the Allies. The Council was concerned with the armistice and its observance. It was not concerned with the internal Government of Hungary. No proposals had been made by the Council. That was the first point that should be made clear.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the second point to make clear was that there was already an armistice, and no need of a new one.

MR. BALFOUR said that it was clear that hostilities must stop, but no new contract was required for this. The Roumanians could be told to stop by the Council, and they must obey. The Hungarians must also be told that they were not authorised by the armistice to advance.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that on this subject he wished to ask Marshal Foch a question. Was it not true that the present line of the Roumanians was quite different to the line they held under the armistice?

MARSHAL FOCH said that the line was in fact quite different. It was at the present time the line of the Theiss.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Council about the 13th of June (See C. F. 65, Minute 12 and Appendices<sup>6</sup>), had ordered the Roumanians to go back from the line of the Theiss within their own frontiers. They had not done so. Their excuse had been that as the Hungarians had not disarmed as they were bound to do under the armistice, it was impossible for them to risk giving up a defensible line for one which was strategically far worse. Under the present circumstances, he thought that the Roumanians should be ordered to withdraw to the line originally laid down for them.

M. TITTONI thought that an order of this kind should be deferred.

---

<sup>4</sup> Col. Sir Thomas A. Cunninghame, chief of the British Military Mission at Vienna.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 310.

<sup>6</sup> Vol. VI, p. 399.

He thought for the time being that the Roumanians should be ordered to stop on the positions they now held. If the Hungarians gave evidence of good behaviour, the Roumanians could then be told to withdraw within their own frontiers. If, on the other hand, the Hungarians were again deceiving the Allies, any withdrawal of the Roumanians would be regretted. Should the Hungarians do all that was required of them, it would be easy to order the Roumanians to withdraw, and they would certainly comply.

M. PICHON said that there was another reason in favour of this. When the Roumanians had been assigned the armistice line, they had made it clear that it was indefensible. Nevertheless, they had conformed to it. Then they had been attacked, and, in order to repel attack, they had advanced to the Theiss. It would clearly be unfair to them to order them now to abandon that line. It was the Hungarians who had really violated the essential clauses of the armistice by maintaining a larger army than was allowed to them. The first necessity, therefore, was to force the Hungarians to reduce their forces.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought there was no great difference between his views and those of M. Tittoni and M. Pichon. Historically, however, he thought that M. Pichon was not quite accurate. He did not think that the Roumanian advance to the Theiss had been made as a consequence of attack by the Hungarians. The Roumanians had gone to the Theiss, and the Council had stopped them there. The Council had then ordered them to go back, and they did not do so. They had given no official reason for this, but, privately, M. Bratiano had explained that he must keep a defendable line against the large Hungarian army.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this explanation had also been given officially.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had not been aware of this. In any case, the Hungarians had attacked the Roumanians on the plea that the latter had not observed the armistice. The Hungarians had been defeated, and Bela Kun's Government had fallen. He quite agreed that the Council should avoid making the same mistake as before, but, personally, he would not make it a condition that they should have a humane and orderly Government or any specific kind of Government whatever. This was an interference in their domestic affairs. He would adhere strictly to the armistice, and call on the Hungarians to observe it. It might further be added that if the Government set up in Hungary were such as could be recognised, the Allies would make peace with it speedily.

M. TITTONI said that he thought there was really agreement. He



pointed out that General Boehm at Vienna had not asked for a withdrawal of the Roumanian troops, but for their advance to stop.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council had no cognisance of General Boehm.

MR. POLK asked whether the Council had not made a declaration in any manner tying its hands.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that all that had been done was to make a general declaration to the world (H. D. 15, para. 2<sup>7</sup>)

MR. POLK asked whether the Council was not tied in any other way?

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was not. It appeared to him that the Council was agreed that the understanding alleged in the message, between General Boehm and Prince Borghese was not binding on the Council, and that it was unnecessary to negotiate any new armistice as the old one was still in existence.

M. TITTONI said that though there was no agreement between General Boehm and Prince Borghese, nevertheless, the Allied Agents in Vienna had been instructed to conduct conversations with General Boehm, the result of which had been certain proposals agreed to by General Boehm.

It was then decided to send a telegram (see Appendix "B") in reply to the wireless message received from Lt. Col. Romanelli at Budapesth, dated August 1st.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a question from the Danish Government regarding the cost of the troops of occupation during the plebiscite period in Slesvig. The Danish Government wished to know whether expenses under the head of "Plebiscite Expenses" were to include the maintenance of these troops.

Danish Request  
Regarding Ex-  
penses of Pleb-  
iscite in Slesvig

It was decided to notify the Danish Government in answer to their Note of August 2nd, that the Inter-Allied Military and Naval expenses of occupation during the period of the Plebiscite, should be included in the general expenses of the Plebiscite.

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a request from the Danish Government for the immediate despatch of warships to Flensburg, so that in case of need, order should be maintained by their help in the plebiscite zones of Slesvig.

Danish Request  
for Warships at  
Flensburg

It was decided to notify the Danish Government in answer to their Note of August 2nd, that in the opinion of the Council, the British warship now present in Danish waters, together with a French warship at present on its way there, should suffice to maintain order. The British Admiral Commanding the Naval forces would

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 317.

be able to estimate the situation at Flensburg, and to take necessary measures.

Reference to a Commission of Articles Proposed by the Greek Delegation for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria

4. It was decided to refer to the Commission on Political Clauses the Articles proposed by the Greek Delegation for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria (see Appendix "C").

Strength of the Bulgarian Army

5. (Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives at Versailles entered the room.)

MARSHAL FOCH read a statement regarding the Bulgarian Forces (see Appendix "D").

MR. BALFOUR said that his comment on the conclusion of the statement read by Marshal Foch, was that it would appear that the Allies must make a Peace agreeable to Bulgaria because they were unable to enforce a disagreeable one. He was not very willing to acquiesce in such a conclusion unless it were inevitable.

MARSHAL FOCH said that Bulgaria had nine Divisions. These Divisions were easily convertible to war strength. Against them were very weak Allied Forces. The British force consisted of 40 men—the Italian of one Battalion—the French of two Divisions, which would be reduced by demobilisation to 15,000 men. There were also two thin Roumanian Divisions—one Serbian Brigade & six Greek Divisions. The last represented the bulk of the available forces.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch what he thought of the military value of the Greek Divisions.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he was not prepared to express any opinion.

M. PICHON observed that General Guillaumat<sup>9</sup> had thought well of them.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the troops that General Guillaumat had thought well of, were National Defence troops. Since the check received at Smyrna by the Greek Army, it was not unlikely that the morale of the Greek troops had suffered.

MR. BALFOUR said he would like to enquire whether the Military stores, which, according to a clause of the Armistice, had been deposited under Allied guard within Bulgarian territory, could be seized by the Bulgarian Army should it wish to resist the orders of the Conference?

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the Bulgarian Army could probably seize them.

MR. BALFOUR said it was regrettable that such a provision had been made in the Armistice.

MARSHAL FOCH remarked that when the Armistice was made, better terms could not be obtained.

<sup>9</sup> Gen. Adolphe Guillaumat, commander in chief of the Allied Armies in the East, December 1917 to June 1918.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether a portion of the military material had not been withdrawn outside Bulgarian territory.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the firing mechanism of one-twentieth of the rifles—one-tenth of the machine guns, and one-sixth of the guns, had been removed to Salonika. The remainder was still on Bulgarian soil under Allied guard.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Allied guard would be sufficient to protect these stores against the Bulgarian Army?

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that he thought not, but he suggested that General Baird,<sup>10</sup> who had just come from Bulgaria, should be asked to make a statement on the present condition of affairs there.

MARSHAL FOCH said he thought it would be well to hear General Baird. He thought the Bulgarian Government was not inclined to resist the Conference, but it was possible that the population might rise and gain possession of these stores.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not very much alarmed by the Bulgarian situation. He agreed with Marshal Foch that the Government was unlikely to resist. As to popular risings, he thought they would not be very serious. Popular forces did not count much against regular troops. There were in all 15,000 French troops and 6 Greek Divisions, which should, and must, act. Greece was particularly interested, and her troops would doubtless behave well when acting in a national cause. Moreover, some of the Greek troops in Asia Minor could, if necessary, be recalled. If, however, it were required, Great Britain and Italy would doubtless come to the rescue. Moreover, he did not think that Bulgaria by herself would defy the whole victorious Alliance. Germany had been defeated, and the only quarter to which Bulgaria could look was the Entente. Germany had not dared to defy the Conference, and it was most unlikely that Bulgaria would. He quite agreed, however, that it would be useful to hear General Baird, and, if then thought necessary, to make a communication to the Bulgarian Delegation at Neuilly.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was inclined to agree with M. Clemenceau's estimate of the situation. Unfortunately, Bulgaria was not the only quarter in which the Allies were weak. The American Congress, the British House of Commons and the French Chamber were all anxious to demobilise.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that modern war differed from wars in the past, and the weakness indicated by Mr. Balfour, which came about at the cessation of hostilities, applied to the enemy as well as to ourselves. He himself had apprehended resistance by the Germans to the terms relating to Poland. Germany, however, had acquiesced. He felt sure that Bulgaria would do likewise.

---

<sup>10</sup> Brig. Gen. Alexander W. F. Baird, chief of the British Military Mission to Bulgaria.



(It was decided to request General Baird, through the British delegation, to be present at a meeting of the Council on August 4th, and to make a statement on the present situation in Bulgaria.)

6. GENERAL WEYGAND read a letter from General Nollet <sup>11</sup> and a covering letter from Marshal Foch on the subject of allowances for Allied Officers on the Missions of Control in Berlin (see Appendix "E").

Scale of Pay for  
Officers Attached  
to the Missions of  
Control in Ger-  
many

It was decided to refer to the Military Representatives at Versailles for study and report, the question of allowances for Allied Officers on the Missions of Control in Germany.

7. GENERAL BELIN read the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles (see Appendix "F").

Repatriation of  
Russian Prisoners  
of War Interned  
in Germany

M. TITTONI said that it was important that the prisoners should be repatriated in small groups. One of the reasons for the obstacles raised by Poland, Lithuania and other neighbouring States, was the fear that large batches of Russian prisoners should escape and take to looting.

GENERAL BELIN said that this was a point of detail which the Commission might deal with.

MR. POLK asked whether General Belin could make any estimate of the time that the whole operation would take.

GENERAL BELIN said that General Malcolm <sup>12</sup> thought it should be completed before the end of the year.

MR. POLK said that from the American point of view there was a difficulty. There were about 800 American Officers and men on duty with the American Mission in Germany. Owing to the American demobilisation, no money would be available for the upkeep of this Mission, nor for the supplies of food for the Russian Prisoners of War for the length of time indicated by General Belin. He pointed out that there were originally two million Russian prisoners in Germany, but that this total had now been reduced to 200,000. He suggested that it would be as well to charge the German Government with the care of the remainder.

GENERAL BLISS said that the substance of what he meant to say had already been explained by Mr. Polk. He would recall that it was a report by Mr. Hoover <sup>13</sup> to the effect that the funds available for the upkeep of these Russian Prisoners, had been exhausted which had led to the examination of the subject at Versailles. He and Mr. White had recommended in Washington that the Armies of Occupation on the Rhine should be made responsible for the care of these prisoners,

<sup>11</sup> Of the French Army, president of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.

<sup>12</sup> Maj. Gen. Neill Malcolm, of the British Army, president of the Inter-Allied Commission for the Repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War.

<sup>13</sup> Appendix B to HD-11, p. 230.

but this view had not prevailed. It was now necessary to withdraw all American conscripted men from Europe. In support of this he read the following letter:—

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

AUGUST 2, 1919.

DEAR GENERAL BLISS:

The Commander-in-Chief desires me to request you to use your best efforts with your colleagues to hasten the permission for him to withdraw our officers and troops in Berlin. At the time of the signing of the Peace orders had already been given for the withdrawal of the entire mission numbering approximately 700 persons. At the request of Marshal Foch on the 30th of June, General Pershing agreed to suspend the orders for a few days. On taking the matter up again on his return from London on the 24th of July, Marshal Foch informed him that the matter of the withdrawal of our representation there had been taken out of his hands and was vested in the Commission to Negotiate Peace. With the Conference between you and me, on the subject since that time, you are familiar.

Without assuming to discuss the desirability of the United States maintaining troops in Berlin after Germany has ratified the Peace, in connection with the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war, we have imperative orders from the War Department to get all temporary personnel home by a certain time. It is necessary from that standpoint that the most expeditious action be had and a decision reached at the earliest date possible which will enable General Pershing to withdraw all officers and men now on that mission.

May I ask that you will help us in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

J. G. HARBORD  
*Chief of Staff*

GENERAL TASKER H. BLISS,  
*American Commission to Negotiate Peace,  
Hotel Crillon—Paris.*

He suggested that the only solution was for the Allies to relieve the Americans of their share in this work, or for Germany to take over the whole thing.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not think the scheme elaborated at Versailles very practical. What was proposed was a Commission. A Commission alone could do nothing. The American share alone at present required the services of 700 men. The British Red Cross had, he believed, a considerable personnel, and undertook a considerable share of the work. Their funds were exhausted, and their personnel was being recalled. It was clear that this system could not be continued. A Commission without an Army behind it, could not act as substitute. The Americans could not provide men. Without consulting Experts, he was prepared to say that the British could not supply any. He doubted whether France or Italy could find them. The system would, therefore, break down. There was another objec-

tion. If the old arrangement were patched up, it would appear that the Allies still regarded themselves as responsible. If they undertook the responsibility and failed to carry out their undertakings, they would be discredited. He thought the responsibility should be repudiated. After Peace, it was quite unnecessary for the Allies to continue supporting Russian prisoners taken by the Germans. He noticed that it was suggested that 145,000 Russians should be repatriated by rail. It would be extremely difficult to prevail upon the Poles and Lithuanians to forward them over land. Meanwhile, he wished to ask who should feed them. Another 70,000 or 80,000 were to go by sea. He had the greatest doubt whether shipping could be found for them except at the expense of more vital services. He therefore recommended that the responsibility be thrown on the Germans. It was a responsibility they should have always borne. If the Germans then applied to the Allies for assistance, it would be time to consider what could be done. This policy was clear and freed the Allies from a task which they could not undertake without incurring discredit.

MR. POLK then suggested the following resolution:—

That the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers notify the Government at once that all restrictions heretofore placed on the repatriation of the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, are removed, and that henceforth the responsibility of supporting them must rest with the German Government.

(This proposal was accepted.)

8. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question was whether or not the Baltic Commission should concern itself with the question of access to the Baltic.

Proposed Treaty  
Regarding Access  
to the Baltic

MR. BALFOUR said that access to the Baltic from the North Sea at present depended not on any Treaty, but on immemorial custom. It was now suggested that this custom should be regularised by formal Inter-Allied sanction. This would establish a common régime for all the channels. In the Sound and the Great Belt, traffic, he believed, had never been stopped by the neutrals on their shores. They interfered neither with trading vessels nor with warships. In the Little Belt, however, the Germans had stopped traffic, and had laid mines. They could do so again, and this was not contrary either to the law of nations or to the practice thereof. If the proposals now before the Council (Appendix "G") were accepted, all the channels would be made free for traffic. Whether it was worth while to engage in difficult negotiations to obtain this, he did not know.

M. DELLA TORRETTA explained that the Commission had not examined the merits of the question, as it did not know whether it was empowered to examine it at all.



MR. POLK questioned whether it would not be better to send the question to a Special Commission rather than to the Baltic Commission. He understood that the Baltic Commission was not composed of naval men. This appeared to be a naval question.

M. TITTONI suggested that naval experts be attached to the Baltic Commission for the purpose of examining the question.

(It was decided that the report of the British Delegation relative to access to the Baltic Sea be referred to the Baltic Commission, assisted by the naval experts, for examination and report.

The Baltic Commission should be responsible for summoning a joint meeting.)

9. (It was decided to refer the letter of the Roumanian Delegation dated August 2nd—Appendix “H”—proposing an amendment to the Economic Clauses of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty to the Economic Commission, for examination and report.)

Amendment Proposed by Roumanian Delegation for Insertion in the Economic Clauses of the Treaty With Bulgaria

(The meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, August 2, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-22

[*Despatch From the Commander of the Italian Military Mission at Budapest (Romanelli)*]

[Translation <sup>14</sup>]

Radio (no number) from Budapest, August 1, 1919.

To His Excellency Georges Clemenceau, President of the Conference, Paris.

The Hungarian Government of the Soviet Republic (Republic of Councils) has resigned today and been replaced by a Government which has declared its acceptance of proposals of the Allied Powers in the form in which they were agreed to at Vienna on July 25 by Prince Borghese, Minister Plenipotentiary of Italy, and Colonel Cunningham, chief of the British Military Mission at Vienna.

The new Government has just charged the undersigned, in his position as sole representative of the said Powers at Budapest, to deliver to the commanders of the hostile armies a proposal for an armistice, which, while awaiting the decisions which Your Excellency may care to make, I have taken the liberty of transmitting directly to the said commanders, with a view to preventing further bloodshed. The proposals offered are as follows:

1. While awaiting the decisions of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, to suspend as soon as possible all hostilities

---

<sup>14</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

between the Allied Armies and the Hungarian Army;

2. To stop as a consequence all forward movement of the Allied troops;

3. To arrange an armistice with the commander of the Hungarian Army establishing provisional lines of occupation until the President of the Peace Conference has announced his decisions on the subject. The Hungarian Government demands insistently that the armistice line for the Roumanian Army be fixed at the Tisza.

Commander of the Italian Military Mission  
Lieutenant Colonel ROMANELLI

---

#### Appendix B to HD-22

[Translation <sup>15</sup>]

PARIS, August 2, 1919.

From President Clemenceau

To Lieutenant-Colonel Romanelli at Budapest.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your wireless telegram of August 1,<sup>16</sup> announcing the resignation of the Government of the Soviet Republic, and the formation of a new Hungarian Government, and the declarations made by the latter have been brought to the knowledge of the Supreme Council.

The Allied Council is of the opinion that it has no reason for interfering in the domestic politics of the Hungarian Republic and hence cannot take into consideration the proposals suggested by the two members of the Allied Missions at Vienna.

The sole recognized bases for relations between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary are: 1) the armistice of November 13, 1918,<sup>17</sup> whose conditions must be respected by the new Hungarian Government, particularly concerning the demobilization of the army; 2) the notification of the Peace Conference of June 13<sup>18</sup> for the establishment of a line on which the Hungarian troops must be kept in the direction of the Czecho-Slovak and Rumanian frontiers.

The Allied Council will only ask the Rumanian Government to stop its troops in the positions that they now occupy by reason of the aggression on the part of the Hungarian Army, and it will not ask the Rumanians to withdraw until the new Government at Budapest has conformed strictly to the terms of the armistice.

The Allied and Associated Powers are waiting for the new Hungarian Government to prove itself by its acts, and they hope that the

---

<sup>15</sup> The translation is that found under Paris Peace Conf. 185.003/18; revised by the editors.

<sup>16</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>17</sup> The military convention between the Allies and Hungary, signed November 13, 1918, is printed in vol. II, p. 183.

<sup>18</sup> Appendices V(A) and V(B) to CF-65, vol. VI, pp. 411 and 412.

ascendancy of a Government which will carry out its pledges and will represent the Hungarian nation will hasten the moment of the reestablishment of peace and the resumption of regular economic relations.

CLEMENCEAU

---

Appendix C to HD-22

[Translation<sup>19</sup>]

*Articles To Be Inserted in the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria  
Proposed by the Greek Delegation*

The articles inserted in this column are those of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

Art. 32-33-34. Bulgaria recognizes the full sovereignty of Greece over the territories situated to the south of . . . . . and renounces in its favor all rights and title over them.

Art. 35. A commission composed of five members, three of whom shall be appointed by the Principal Allied Powers, one by Greece, and one by Bulgaria, shall be set up fifteen days after the signature of the present treaty to settle on the spot the new boundary line between Greece and Bulgaria.

Decisions shall be taken by a majority vote, and shall be binding on the interested parties.

Art. 36. In the territories thus ceded to Greece, Greek nationality shall be definitively acquired in full right and to the exclusion of Bulgarian nationality, by Bulgarian nationals habitually resident in these territories. Nevertheless, Bulgarian nationals who became resident in the territories after October 5/18, 1912, shall not acquire Greek nationality without a permit from the Greek Government.

Art. 37. Within the two years following the coming into force of the present treaty, Bulgarian nationals over 18 years of age habitually resident in the territories transferred from Bulgarian to Greek sovereignty will be entitled to opt for Bulgarian nationality. Option by a husband will cover his wife, and option by parents or guardians will cover children under 18 years of age. Persons who have exercised the above right to

---

<sup>19</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



opt must within the ensuing twelve months transfer their place of residence to Bulgaria.

They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export or import duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.

They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in the territories acquired by Greece.

Art. 38.

Greece will enter into possession of all goods and properties of the Bulgarian State situated in the ceded territories without having to pay or credit the Bulgarian state under this head. This provision covers all movable and immovable goods of the public or private domain with all rights of whatever nature that belonged to the Bulgarian state or to its administrative subdivisions.

Property of the Crown or private property of the present or former King shall be considered part of the public domain.

Art. 67.

The Greek Government is substituted in all the rights of the Bulgarian state over all the railways which were administered by it and which are actually working or under construction.

The same shall apply to the rights of the Bulgarian state with regard to railway and tramway concessions within the territory ceded to Greece.

This substitution shall not entail any payment on the part of the Greek state to the Bulgarian state.

The frontier railway stations shall be established by a subsequent agreement.

---

#### Appendix D to HD-22

[Translation <sup>20</sup>]

COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, 3D SECTION

No. 3656

AUGUST 2, 1919.

#### *Note on the Condition of the Bulgarian Forces*

#### I—ARMISTICE OF SEPTEMBER 29, 1918 <sup>21</sup>

The Armistice Commission [*convention?*] of September 29 pro-

---

<sup>20</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>21</sup> Vol. II, p. 241.

vided for the immediate demobilization of the Bulgarian Army with the exception of a grouping of all arms including:

3 divisions of infantry of 16 battalions each,  
4 regiments of cavalry.

Two of these divisions should be employed in the defense of the eastern frontier of Bulgaria, the third in guarding the railways.

The matériel belonging to the demobilized units should be grouped at points to be designated by the Allied High Command and then warehoused by the Bulgarian authorities under the control of the Allies.

The convention contains no stipulation concerning the limitation to be maintained on the peace footing. These conditions which now appear to provide only insufficient guarantees, were justified at the time by the advantage to the Allied Armies, proceeding with their operations in Serbia, of delegating to the Bulgarian Army the task of providing their cover facing Turkey and the army of Mackensen.<sup>22</sup>

## II—EXECUTION OF THE ARMISTICE CONDITIONS AND MODIFICATIONS EXPLAINED

The convention has been executed in its entirety by Bulgaria. Following the cessation of hostilities in the Balkans, General d'Esperey even obtained, without any difficulty, the demobilization of the three remaining divisions. All of the Bulgarian Army was thus demobilized.

But, considering that measures were still necessary to render the Bulgarian Army incapable of re-mobilizing quickly and resisting the will of the Allied Powers, General Franchet d'Esperey proposed on May 19 to the President of the Council, the following provisions:\*

Reduction of the Bulgarian Army to 3 infantry divisions of 12 battalions each, having only a police function.

Immediate dissolution of all other units or depots.

Limitation of the total effectives to 25,000 men.

Effective Allied control of all war materials.

These proposals were transmitted to the Peace Conference, and have not been acted upon until the present.

## III—PRESENT SITUATION OF THE BULGARIAN ARMY

Even while remaining within the limits of the Armistice Convention of September 29, which is still in force, the Bulgarian Government none the less possesses today important resources, which it would be easy to expand rapidly, at least in part:

<sup>22</sup> August von Mackensen, commander of the German-Bulgarian Army in the Balkans, 1917-1918.

\* Letter 15.485/2 M/ of May 19. [Footnote in the original.]

On the first of July, its Army included 10 infantry divisions on a peace footing, strongly established with officers and specialists.

The total of the effectives was 83,000 men.

Vast quantities of war materials (arms and munitions) were available † and we could supervise only a very small part of it.‡

The factories in Sofia were prepared to resume a daily production of 70,000 cartridges and to repair the matériel.

Finally, important stocks of powder exist at Sofia and Choumla.

It is proper to observe, however, that the Army lacks horses, trucks, and benzine.

Consequently the complete mobilization of large units could be carried out only with difficulty; but it would be easy rapidly to fill out the ranks again of the infantry regiments and even of units of the other branches of the service.

In addition General Franchet d'Esperey ordered General Chrétien § to require by July 15, a certain number of guarantees including, among others:

Suppression of two divisions, one by July 15, the other by August 1;

Disbanding of the military school at Sofia;

Stopping the filling up again to a full complement in horses of the cavalry and artillery;

Closing the arms repair factory of the Sofia arsenal.

According to the latest report of General Franchet d'Esperey, the Bulgarian Government would undertake to satisfy these conditions, and from the present moment its Army would not include more than 9 divisions on a peace footing of 12 battalions, making a total effective of about 80,000 men.

#### IV— SITUATION OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

Two French divisions of the Army of the Danube are assigned for the occupation of Bulgaria; one of them (the 30th Infantry Division) is en route.

It should be noted, on the other hand, that the 122d French Infantry Division is earmarked to guard the Straits.

Demobilization will have the effect within a month of reducing the combatant effectives of these three infantry divisions to a figure of 15,000 men.

---

† 1515 cannon, 659,000 rifles, 2,378 machine guns, 382 million cartridges, 3½ million shells. [Footnote in the original.]

‡ The number of firing mechanisms removed from the weapons amounted to: 1/20th of the rifles, 1/10th of the machine guns, 1/6th of the cannon. [Footnote in the original.]

§ Letter No. 16.099/2M. of July 1. [Footnote in the original.]



The English and Italian armies of occupation have not yet been designated.

Up to the present, only an English detachment of 40 men and an Italian battalion are provided for.

The Greeks have sent to Smyrna 5 divisions out of 11.

The Roumanians have the greater part of their forces at the Besarabian and Hungarian fronts: only two divisions are in Walachia, in process of mobilization.

The Serbians have made important deductions from their detachments assigned to the supervision of Bulgaria. There remains at the border a force of one brigade.

### V—CONCLUSION

Bulgaria can put in the line quite rapidly numerous and well armed effectives, capable of constituting, not a tactical army, but very strong resistant groupings, capable of resisting by force the execution of the conditions of the treaty of peace.

In order to modify, to its advantage, this dangerous situation, the Entente should demand the immediate dissolution of most of the existing units, and the delivery of the arms and munitions to the Allies.

But this demand could meet with a refusal.

However:

The Great Powers do not have, on the spot, sufficient troops to impose by force the acceptance of such conditions; on the other hand, they do not appear disposed to send additional troops into Bulgaria;

The unengaged Serbian and Roumanian forces are weak or non-existent; those of Greece are half taken up by the campaign in Asia Minor.

The total of these contingents, heterogeneous and divided by interest, moreover, would not be sufficient to break the Bulgarian mass; its intervention would only tend to arouse national sentiment in Bulgaria and aggravate conflicts.

The Bulgarian question will then be definitively settled by the treaty of peace.

But it is quite evident that the dangers which have just been pointed out, could arise, for the same reasons, if the Entente harshly imposes on Bulgaria conditions of peace which outrage her national sentiment.

It is important to bear this consideration in mind at the moment when the demobilization of its armies deprives the Entente of the means of having its decisions respected.

## Appendix E to HD-22

[Translation <sup>24</sup>]

COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES  
GENERAL STAFF, 1ST SECTION  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

No. 3597

July 26 [28<sup>th</sup>], 1919.

From: Marshal Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies.

To: The President of the Council, President of the Peace Conference.

I have the honor to forward you herewith a letter from General Nollet, relative to the indemnities to be allowed to French officers who shall belong to the Commission of control of the military clauses.

I am of the opinion that it is necessary to insure to the French officers, during their stay in Berlin, a situation which, while removing any pre-occupation of a financial nature for them and their families, will permit them to have sufficient prestige with the Germans.

But, it seems that all the Allied officers who are to belong to the various Commissions of control should, from this point of view, be placed on an equal footing.

Furthermore, it must be observed that, the payment of the indemnities being incumbent upon the German Government, it seems that the fixation of them should be made by the Allied Governments.

If you share this point of view, I ask you to kindly entrust the study of this question to a Commission composed of the representatives of the various governments concerned.

I take the liberty of calling your attention to the urgent need of a decision, because of the difficulty in recruiting the officers who are to belong to the Commissions of control which are to be formed, so long as the material situation to be offered to them has not been determined.

F. FOCH

Annex to Appendix E to HD-22

[Translation <sup>24</sup>]

JULY 28, 1919.

From: General Nollet, President of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.

To: Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

I have the honor to submit for your consideration a plan for the pay and remuneration to be allotted to the Members of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission.

---

<sup>24</sup> The translation is that found under Paris Peace Conf. 185.116401/1.

The Officers and Enlisted Men of the Commission will receive in the first place the pay and allowances which they received at their last station. In that way no modification will be introduced in their family situation.

Besides their pay and allowances, a monthly lump allowance, paid in advance and to count from the day the Mission leaves Paris until its return to Paris, will be allotted to the Officers and Enlisted Men.

This remuneration is figured on the basis of the indemnities at the present time allotted to the Dupont Mission, with a slight increase as proposed by the Controller of the Army, Gaillard, at the present time on a Mission in Berlin. Furthermore, it has seemed preferable that the indemnity be stated in marks, based on the present rate of 0.40 centimes. In determining the rate, a full account was taken of the fluctuations of the mark exchange, which will result from a resumption of international commerce and importations by Germany.

Finally, the indemnity was liberally figured in order to assure the prestige of the members of the French Mission in their contact with the German population and their foreign colleagues, and also to permit the selection of an indispensable elite. The living conditions of the Mission in Berlin, in a hostile center, cannot be compared to those of the Missions in Prague and Warsaw and should, consequently, be ameliorated by a satisfactory material situation.

As a result, the indemnities, imposed according to the conditions of the Peace Treaty, to be paid from the German budget, should be established as follows:

*A—Officers:*

Brigadier Generals . . . . .	12,000 marks
Colonels and Lieut. Colonels . . . . .	9,000 "
Majors . . . . .	7,000 "
Subaltern Officers . . . . .	6,000 "

The Heads of Service to receive, besides, as a function indemnity:

General Officers (Not Heads of Mission) . . . . .	2,500 marks
Colonels (Chiefs of Staff) . . . . .	2,500 "
Colonels and Lieut. Colonels . . . . .	2,000 "
Majors . . . . .	1,800 "

Office expenses to be reimbursed upon the presentation of certified bills.

Travelling expenses to be handled in the same way. Officers to receive in advance, the amount of which would be fixed according to itinerary, the necessary funds.

Family expenses of travel to be reimbursed, based on the expenses of the trip both ways.

An indemnity of 2,000 francs for the purchase of clothes to be advanced before departure.



*B—Enlisted Men:*

Resident Interpreters . . . . .	4,000	marks
Non-Commissioned Officers . . . . .	2,500	"
Enlisted Men . . . . .	2,000	"

The travelling expenses of the Enlisted Men to be looked after by the President of the Commission, who would reimburse all certified bills presented. A necessary sum should be advanced for these expenses before the departure, the amount of which should be determined by the itinerary.

*C—General, President of the Commission:*

It is as yet difficult to judge the character of the functions which will devolve upon the General, President of the Commission. It will depend upon the nature of the relations that he will be instructed to assume with the German military authorities.

In the present state of affairs, based upon the indemnities now allowed to the Brigadier General, Chief of the Mission at Berlin, by taking into account the advice of Controller Gaillard, the monthly indemnity of the General, President of the Commission, should be 15,000 marks, plus 5,000 francs.

*D—General Observations:*

The billeting of the members of the Commission is to be provided for by the German Government, and should be arranged for by it.

Campaign allowances to be accorded to the Commission during their sojourn in Germany.

It should be understood that in case the German Government allots indemnities greater than those cited above to the Representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments, the excess should also be extended to the French Officers and Enlisted Men in the Commission.

NOLLET

---

Appendix F to HD-22

SWC-448

*Report on the Means of Repatriation of Russian Prisoners Now in Germany and Maintained at the Cost of the Allies*

25.7.1919.

By a Resolution, dated July 18, 1919,<sup>25</sup> the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers directed the Military Representatives on the Supreme War Council at Versailles:—

“To study, in conjunction with the Naval Experts the means of repatriating the Russian Prisoners of War, maintained at the cost of the Allies, in Germany.”

---

<sup>25</sup> HD-11, minute 6, p. 208.

## 1. GENERAL SITUATION

*(i) Approximate number of prisoners of war to be repatriated*

The number of Russian prisoners of war interned in Germany amounted at the end of April last to 250,000 men (statement of the General presiding over the Commission charged with the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war, 14th May, 1919). After eliminating some 50,000 prisoners who did not wish to return to their homes (principle accepted by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers) and some 8,000 Letts and Esthonians already in process of repatriation by German coasting vessels, the total number remaining to be repatriated amounts to about 190,000–200,000.

*(ii) Advantages of Repatriation*

(a) The reduction to a minimum of the time during which the Russian prisoners of war interned in Germany will remain a source of expense to the Allied and Associated Powers.

(b) The dispatch, though only to a small extent, of reinforcements to the Anti-Bolshevist armies.

(c) The removal from Germany of Bolshevik propagandists, whom the Germans would certainly not hesitate to employ in neighbouring countries where they might wish to create trouble.

*(iii) The Disadvantages of Repatriation*

(a) The repatriation of Russian prisoners of war would undoubtedly favour recruiting for the Red Armies.

(b) This repatriation could not take place without a large use of maritime transport, and in consequence would cause, for a considerable length of time, a diminution in the tonnage at present available for the revictualling of the Allied countries.

## 2. GENERAL CONDITIONS OF REPATRIATION

It seems essential to lay down, as a preliminary condition, the necessity for some form of selection, the object of which would be to segregate those prisoners of war that are not suspected of Bolshevik tendencies, in order, firstly, that they should not be exposed to harsh reprisals, and secondly, to allow of their being drafted into the Anti-Bolshevist forces on different fronts, either as reinforcements to existing units, or as new organizations.\*

It would also be of importance to consider the transport of this class of prisoners of war into the zones, where, if they could not be

---

\*NOTE: In this connection consideration should be given to the complete revictualling of any such reinforcement, or new organisations, as might be formed, and the dispatch of Missions to regulate their absorption. This would have to be provided by the Allied and Associated Powers. [Footnote in the original.]

employed in the reconquest of their own country, they could at any rate be screened from all such nationalist rivalries as might diminish their fighting value, or bring about local conflicts.

Lastly, the departure of these contingents ought to be studied and worked out in such a way as to ensure their eventual concentration as near as possible to that portion of the front where they would be called upon to serve.

In this connection it would seem useful to indicate the various directions that repatriation would follow, on the basis of an approximate number of 200,000 Russian prisoners of war still interned in Germany:—

Great Russians	100,000	By rail.
Lithuanians	15,400	“ “
Letts	5,300	“ “
Esthonians	500	By sea—Danzig to Reval.
North Russians	10,000	} By sea from Stettin to Archangel.
W. Siberians	17,000	
Ukrainians	40,000	By sea to Odessa.
Georgians	2,200	By sea—Hambourg to Batum
Cossacks	1,400	By sea to Novorossiisk.
E. Siberians	5,000	By sea to Vladivostock.
Tartars	2,200	By sea to (?)
Armenians	1,000	“ “ “ “

### 3. CONCLUSIONS

It would seem that the different operations involved in the proposed repatriation cannot be prepared, nor carried out, except under the direction of an organization that is in close touch with the present situation of Russian prisoners of war in Germany, and having at its disposal, every means of studying on the spot the physical possibilities for concentration, embarkation, and transport, and every facility for dealing with these questions—

With the “Allied Maritime Transport Executive Council” so far as tonnage is concerned.

With the competent Authorities in so far as the use of railways is concerned.

The Inter-Allied Commission at Berlin, charged with the care of Russian prisoners of war, transformed into an International Commission of Control by the addition of German Representatives and eventually of Representatives of all the other interested countries, will be in a position to provide most of the essential conditions required. It should, however, first of all be accredited to the Allied Maritime Transport Executive Council and to the Governments interested, and be given the necessary powers to deal with every question regarding the proposed transport with the means placed at their disposal by the Allied and Associated Governments.



*In view of these considerations the military and naval representatives are of opinion:—*

(1) That the Inter-Allied Commission at Berlin, charged with the repatriation of the Russian prisoners of war should be made into an International Commission by the addition of German Delegates; and eventually of Polish, Lithuanian and other Delegates, as may be considered necessary.

(2) That this Commission should be directed to study, prepare and ensure, with the least possible delay, the repatriation of the Russian prisoners of war at present maintained at the cost of the Allies in Germany with this reservation, that they conform their action to the guiding principles of the Allied and Associated Governments (principles set forth above in paragraphs 2 & 3).

(3) That on its constitution, this International Commission should be accredited by the Allied and Associated Powers to the interested Governments, as well as to the Allied Maritime Transport Executive Council at London.

<i>Military Representative, French Section, Supreme War Council.</i>	<i>Major-General, Military Representative, British Section, Supreme War Council.</i>	<i>Military Representative, Italian Section, Supreme War Council.</i>	<i>Military Representative, American Section, Supreme War Council.</i>
--	--	---	--

<i>Naval Representative.</i>	<i>Naval Representative.</i>	<i>Naval Representative.</i>	<i>Naval Representative.</i>
------------------------------	------------------------------	------------------------------	------------------------------

Given at Versailles on the 25th July, 1919.

Certified to be a true copy of the original document.

T. F. POWELL, Captain.  
*Secretary, British Section  
 Supreme War Council*

VERSAILLES, 25 July, 1919.

---

#### Appendix "G" to HD-22

*[Note From the British Representative on the Commission on Baltic Affairs (Howard) to the Secretary-General (Dutasta)]*

JUNE 20, 1919.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: The attention of the Commission on Baltic Affairs has been drawn to the question of the entrances to the Baltic which has not, so far as the Commission is aware, hitherto been considered by the Allied and Associated Powers. A Memorandum on the subject, prepared by the British Delegation as a basis of discussion, is enclosed in order to make clear the nature of the points involved.

The Commission are uncertain whether the subject is one which properly enters within the competence of the Commission, but as it

does not appear to have been dealt with so far by any other Commission, and is obviously a matter of considerable importance, I am desired by the Commission on Baltic Affairs to enquire whether, in the view of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Commission should take this question into consideration in consultation with the naval experts, and submit recommendations on the subject.

I have [etc.]

ESME HOWARD

[Enclosure—Memorandum]

### THE ENTRANCES TO THE BALTIC

1. (a) By a Treaty of 14th March 1857,<sup>20</sup> Denmark undertook to abstain from levying dues on vessels passing through the Belts and Sounds, but this extends to mercantile vessels alone, and the treaty has little, if any, bearing on the position of warships.

It appears that there is a traditional general right of transit through the Belts and Sounds for men-of-war. Denmark and Sweden recognise this as they have in practice abstained when neutral from closing the passage of the sound to belligerent men-of-war. There is, however, no international written instrument embodying this right of passage.

(b) The geographical position of Germany enables her to control the passage of the Little Belt, and to a lesser extent the Great Belt.

NOTE. It is to avoid this that the Peace Terms to Germany include the dismantling of all German fortifications commanding the Little Belts and also those on the east coast of Schleswig-Holstein (Art. 195, Treaty of Peace with Germany—Naval Clauses).

(c) It is desirable that a Treaty should be arranged whereby the countries adjoining should undertake, when neutral, to keep open within their respective jurisdictions all the Belts and Channels connecting the North Sea and Baltic south of lat. 58° N. and west of long. 16° E. of Greenwich for passage of all merchant ships and warships, belligerent or otherwise, and further that a safe channel through these passages be guaranteed for all commercial traffic.

2. It is considered that the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia should be considered at the same time as the above, i. e.

(i) The fortifications of the Aland Islands should be dismantled and there should be a prohibition against their re-erection.

(ii) The Gulf of Bothnia should be declared an open sea, and the channels leading from the Baltic to the Gulf of Bothnia should be kept open, in time of peace or when the adjoining countries are neutral, for the passage of all merchant vessels and warships, whether belligerent or otherwise.

BRITISH DELEGATION, 13 June, 1919.

<sup>20</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XLVII, p. 24.

## Appendix H to HD-22

[Translation <sup>27</sup>]

PARIS, August 2, 1919.

The Roumanian Delegation to the Peace Conference.  
[To] the Secretary General of the Economic Commission.

MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL: On July 30th, last, Mr. Herbette <sup>28</sup> telephoned to the Roumanian delegation requesting that it communicate urgently to the Secretariat of the Economic Commission and to the Drafting Committee inquiring whether the words "as well as with Roumania" which were suppressed, at our request in the Sub-Commission on Treaties, in article 27 of the draft of economic clauses with Bulgaria (corresponding to article 292 of the treaty with Germany) should remain suppressed or be reintroduced in order to put this text in accord with the financial clauses concerning Bulgaria as they were modified on July 29 last.

In our letter of July 31, we requested the retention of the words "as well as with Roumania," having in view only the Treaty of Bucharest of 1918,<sup>29</sup> which we have always considered as null and of no effect. But we made this reply without having under our eyes the definitive text of the economic clauses with Bulgaria, which, moreover, we are not yet acquainted with even today.

In order to avoid all confusion, we propose the following draft of the article in question:

"Bulgaria recognizes as being and remaining abrogated all the treaties, conventions, or agreements that she has concluded with Russia or with any other state or government whose territory previously constituted a part of Russia before the 1st of August, 1914, or since that date up until the coming into force of the present treaty, as well as the Treaty of Bucharest and all the conventions annexed to this treaty that she concluded with Roumania in 1918.

or: as well as with Roumania since the date of August 15, 1916."

The Delegation of Roumania never intended and does not intend to renounce the Treaty of Peace of Bucharest concluded with Bulgaria in 1913.<sup>30</sup>

Kindly accept [etc.]

The Delegate of the Roumanian  
Government on the Economic Com-  
mission of the Peace Conference:

PANGRATI

<sup>27</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>28</sup> Maurice Herbette, French representative, Section on Economic Treaties, Economic Commission.

<sup>29</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 771.

<sup>30</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVII, p. 658.



**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, August 4, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk.

*Secretary*

M. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

*Secretaries*

Mr. H. Norman.  
Sir Ian Malcolm.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.  
M. Pichon.

*Secretaries*

M. Dutasta.  
M. Berthelot.  
M. de St. Quentin.

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

**JAPAN**

M. Matsui.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Capt. P. Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY. . . . .	Lt. Col. A. Jones.

*Interpreter*—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. (Marshal Foch, General Weygand, Mr. Hoover and Mr. Waterlow entered the room.)

**MR. HOOVER** said that the situation had changed since he last attended the Council. The Roumanians were now entering Budapest. What he proposed was a relaxation of the Blockade, the opening of the Danube and the supply of foodstuffs to Hungary from the Banat. He thought action should be taken without delay. The new Government though very radical, represented the Trade Unions. He thought Trade Unionism was an instrument that should be used to upset Bolshevism. If this were a correct estimate the present Hungarian Government should be encouraged, as a very important reaction, even on Russia, might result. A member of the Food Administration in Vienna held the opinion that the new Government might take in a certain number of peasants. This might lead to a really representative Government.

**MR. BALFOUR** asked whether Mr. Hoover had read the telegram sent

by the Council.<sup>1</sup> He thought the conclusion of that telegram contained a policy very similar to that Mr. Hoover recommended.

MR. HOOVER said he had read the telegram. The only thing that it did not mention was relaxation of the Blockade, the opening of the Danube and the supply of food from the Banat. He thought these measures represented the practical application of the policy outlined in the telegram, and that instructions to that effect should be given at once. As long as the Council was able to threaten a reimposition of the Blockade, it would be able to control the situation. A week or two of relaxation would not give the Hungarian Government such economic strength as to make it independent. If the Government by then had not shown itself satisfactory by fulfilling all the conditions of the Armistice, by demobilizing and by doing what the Council wished, the Blockade could be reimposed. If, on the other hand, action were not taken at once the opportunity would be lost.

MR. BALFOUR said he thought that the Council should both re-open the Danube and declare that it would close it again if it so wished.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had no objection to raise.

M. TITTONI agreed but he thought that it should be made clear that the Hungarians must conform to the Armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Mr. Hoover should furnish a draft.

MR. HOOVER then suggested a draft, which after some amendments suggested by M. Tittoni, was adopted in the following form:—

“It is agreed that instructions should be sent to the representatives of the various Allied Governments at Vienna and to the Blockade Commission in that area and to the Danube River Commission and to General Franchet d’Esperey that the Blockade on Hungary shall be lifted at once and that the Danube shall be opened and shall remain opened so long as the present Hungarian Government gives practical evidence of its intention to comply promptly with the conditions of the Armistice.”

Mr. Hoover continuing said that there was a surplus of food in the Banat. The Council had tried to supply Vienna from this surplus. The Serbians, however, had stopped the exit of the supplies. The Banat was now the only source from which Budapest could be fed. One of the reasons for the obstacles raised was that German agents were offering bigger prices for the food than could be afforded by the Allies. The result of all this was that the relief of Vienna and Budapest was jeopardised. He asked whether the Council would be ready to address a request to the Government of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes not to hamper the export of food stuffs from the Banat.

MR. BALFOUR said that Mr. Hoover put the blame in one sentence on the Serbian Government for the stoppage of relief from the Banat,

---

<sup>1</sup> Appendix B to HD-22, p. 490.

and in another said that the reason was that German Agents outbid everyone else. If the latter were the case, he could not understand why the Serbian Government was to blame. No Government could make a merchant sell cheap if he could sell dear.

MR. HOOVER said that the explanation was a very long story. The Economic Council had negotiated the cession of an iron bridge to the Serbians in exchange for food stuffs. The Serbian Government had put an embargo on all food exports from the Banat. By means of this, the Serbian Government entirely controlled the direction taken by food exports. The intervention of the Germans had only complicated the question. The main element, however, remained the control of the Serbian Government. There were in the Banat 500,000 or 600,000 tons of food; the only source of supply from which Vienna and Budapest could be fed. He had prepared a draft to be addressed to the Serbian Government which might perhaps be too strong, but which might form the basis of the re-draft. He then read the following draft:—

“The Council is informed by the Supreme Economic Council and by its various Allied representatives that there is a very considerable surplus of foodstuffs now lying in the Banat and surrounding counties and that with the impending favourable harvest in Greater Serbia there is now no reason for the reservation of these supplies from general distribution through Central Europe. The continuation of provisioning of Vienna is absolutely dependent upon the free shipment of these supplies to that city and the recent over-turn of Government in Budapest makes it of prime interest to the Allies and to all hope of stability in Central Europe that the City of Budapest should be given every facility for the purchase and export of foodstuffs from these counties.

Therefore, the Council wishes to urge upon the Serbian Government in the strongest terms that not only will the greatest contribution be made by Serbia towards the re-establishment of order and stability in the countries adjacent to her borders, but that the dictates of humanity demand that no obstruction of any character shall be placed in the way of food exports from the Banat to the surrounding counties and that, in fact, the Serbian Government is requested to join with the Allies and through their various agencies in promoting the export and distribution of these supplies. The Council hopes for an early and favourable reply to this representation, the importance of which it cannot over-emphasize, and it trusts that the Serbian Government will realise that unless the Allies can receive co-operation in the labors they have undertaken for the restoration of stability in Central Europe that it is impossible that the Allied Governments should continue the economic support which they have given and expect to continue giving to the Greater Serbian Government.”

M. CLEMENCEAU said that before pursuing this question any further, he wished to inform his colleagues of two communications he had received—the first from Lt. Col. Romanelli (Appendix “A”) and the second from the new Hungarian Government (Appendix “B”).



Under these conditions, M. Clemenceau said that he approved Mr. Hoover's policy.

M. PICHON said that he thought it was overstepping the mark to threaten Serbia. The measures taken by the Serbian Government had been in accordance with the views of the Council at the time. The Government had acted in good faith. The Serbs were now to be asked to adopt another policy. This was not a sufficient reason for addressing any threats to them.

MR. HOOVER said that he did not agree that the Serbian Government had acted in good faith. In respect of Vienna, the Serbian Government had refused to supply certain goods which had already been paid for. He agreed, however, that it might be as well not to threaten the Serbians.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that a re-draft of Mr. Hoover's proposal should be made. He asked M. Berthelot to make a draft.

MR. POLK said that the latest news received was to the effect that the Roumanian advance guard had reached Budapest and that the Trade Union Government feared an occupation of the City by the Roumanians and a further invasion by the Czecho-Slovaks. These fears would doubtless rouse nationalist feelings. At two o'clock the news was that 600 Roumanian cavalymen were to the west of Budapest, where they had cut all communications with Vienna. Looting was said to have begun in the suburbs. To avoid worse trouble the Hungarians suggested that an inter-allied police force should be sent immediately to Budapest.

MR. BALFOUR asked what the Council could do to enforce good behaviour on the Romanians.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he did not know.

M. TITTONI said that the Roumanians had been invited to go to Budapest together with the Serbs and the Czecho-Slovaks. All they had done was to go there by themselves.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as the Council could neither blame the Roumanians nor praise them, it was perhaps best to say nothing.

M. TITTONI said that he advocated sending an Allied Mission.

MR. POLK said that he agreed to this. He also thought it was essential that the Roumanians should withdraw from Budapest.

MR. BALFOUR said that if the Roumanians insisted on going forward and occupying Budapest the result would be the fall of the present Government in Hungary and an outbreak of nationalist feeling. He could not see what the Roumanians could gain either for themselves or for the common cause by persisting in their present course. Their only excuse previously for not withdrawing was that they feared an attack by the Hungarians, this they had no reason to fear now. The Hungarians had said that they would observe the Armistice; the Council was therefore bound to give them an opportunity of prov-

ing that they meant what they said. It was not giving them a fair chance to send Roumanians to plunder the suburbs of Budapest.

MARSHAL FOCH said that an inter-Allied character could be given to the occupation of Budapest either by sending allied regiments as suggested by the Hungarian Government, or by sending Missions of Allied Officers. The former, under the circumstances, it was not easy to realize. On the other hand it was possible that the Roumanian Government might wish to settle the whole situation by itself.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Roumanian Government would then be solving the Council's problems; if so the Council would settle theirs without them.

MR. POLK said that the Roumanians had not shown all the respect for the Conference that was desirable. They were not likely to treat the Hungarians in accordance with the laws of war. If the Council allowed Budapest to be looted, the effect on Russia would be instantaneous. The whole effect of the overthrow of Bela Kun would be lost. Any occupation of the city was dangerous. He asked whether the Roumanians could not be required to remain outside.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Roumanian army was not under the command of General Franchet d'Esperey.

MARSHAL FOCH said that it was not.

M. PICHON said that he had sent a telegram on the previous night to the French Minister at Bukarest, requesting him to ask the Roumanian Government to stop the advance of Roumanian troops immediately on the positions then occupied. He had further asked the French Minister to inform him of the result of his *démarche*.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the first thing that must be done was to disarm Hungary. The only guarantee of disarmament was the occupation of the country. This occupation must be effected with the available troops.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whose the available troops were.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that they were Roumanian or Czech troops.

M. TITTONI said that the worst possible results would be obtained by sending Czech troops into Hungary. The Hungarians detested the Czechs even more than the Roumanians. He thought an Allied Mission, if sent at once, could judge on the spot what measures should be taken and would be able to exercise sufficient moral influence to have them carried out.

MR. POLK said that the occupation of Budapest would make it impossible for the Hungarians to surrender their arms. National feeling would prohibit this unless the Hungarians could rely on Allied protection. An Allied Officer (not American) had heard a Roumanian General say that he expected to plunder Budapest. If this were to happen the Allies would be responsible should they take no steps to protest against the entry of the Roumanians.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he would agree to M. Tittoni's suggestion that a Mission composed of Allied Generals with an escort of one company from each Power should be sent to Budapest. This Mission could take charge of affairs and reduce the Roumanian occupation to the strict minimum necessary. The President of the Mission could be chosen by the Great Powers.

MR. POLK agreed that this was desirable. He thought action should be taken at once. In addition to this the Roumanians should be warned that no abuses would be tolerated. He had already that morning sent word to the Roumanian Delegation in Paris that if any incident occurred in Budapest likely to rouse American public opinion against them, the consequence must be that the Roumanian Government could not rely on any further help from America in the future. He asked whether the Allied military Mission would have control over the Roumanian army.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it would only have a moral influence over it.

M. TITTONI said that the Mission should have the right to tell the Roumanians to withdraw if this appeared necessary.

M. PICHON said that the sending of the Mission re-established the situation existing before the establishment of the Bela Kun Government. There had then been a military Mission in charge of the execution of the Armistice.

MR. POLK said he thought it would be necessary to obtain from the Roumanian Government an agreement to accept the decisions of the Mission. The Mission would have no authority unless the Governments concerned were notified.

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed to the despatch of a Mission provided it were endowed with all the authority the Conference could confer. Further, he thought that the American member might be empowered to make the economic threat mentioned by Mr. Polk. He suggested sending for M. Misu<sup>2</sup> and requesting him to telegraph to Bukarest that any excesses committed in Budapest during this needless occupation would have the most disastrous results. The Hungarian Government having promised to accept the Armistice it was for the Conference to see that it did so. He would suggest, like Mr. Polk, that the Roumanians should occupy high ground outside Budapest, and stop there. He would like to ask Marshal Foch whether if they did so, they would safely control the situation.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that there was a hill in Budapest but that all the surrounding country was flat plain.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether an army in the vicinity could be itself safe and also able to control the situation.

---

<sup>2</sup> Nicolas Misu, Roumanian plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.



MARSHAL FOCH said that it depended on the size of the army.

MR. POLK asked whether the Allies could not make the same sort of economic threat as he had made on behalf of the United States. He further observed that it would be difficult for the moment to promise an American company as escort. He would however endeavour to find the men.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not think that he could promise any British troops. Admiral Troubridge,<sup>3</sup> however, had suggested going up the Danube with a Monitor.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Mission must have written instructions. These instructions he hoped Mr. Balfour would draft as regards their political side. Marshal Foch might then add the military instructions. At the same time a telegram could be sent to Bukarest, stating that the Council considered the Roumanians responsible for any disturbances that might take place in Budapest and that unless they conformed to the wishes of the Conference the economic consequences to themselves would be to their detriment.

M. PICHON said that he thought it was undesirable to threaten the Roumanians. Even though they were not obeying orders they were helping the Allied cause. They did not deserve to be treated like enemies.

M. TITTONI agreed. It was possible he thought, that the withdrawal of the Roumanians might not be desired by the Mission. He thought they should be informed that a Mission was being sent under the authority of the Conference and that the Conference expected the Roumanian Government to order their Generals to obey the instructions given by this Mission.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if Mr. Balfour would make a draft at once.

M. PICHON said that the same communication should be made to the Czecho-Slovak and Serbian Governments. They would be pleased at receiving it and re-assured that Roumania was not to be allowed undue expansion.

MR. POLK said he had no objection. The American Delegation would like to go further and say that the Conference would hold the Roumanians responsible for any untoward incidents that might take place. On this condition he was ready to waive the economic threat.

(After some further discussion a draft prepared by Mr. Balfour to be addressed to the Roumanian Government and one prepared by M. Berthelot to be addressed to the Serbian Government were accepted (see Annex C and D).

(It was also agreed that the telegram addressed to the Roumanian Government should be communicated to the Serbian and Czecho-Slovak Governments.)

---

<sup>3</sup>Admiral Sir Ernest C. T. Troubridge, British Admiral commanding on the Danube.

(It was decided to proceed at once to the nomination of a Mission of Allied Generals to be sent to Budapest accompanied by a small escort of Allied troops.)

(It was agreed that written instructions should be given them to be prepared by Mr. Balfour and Marshal Foch.)

(Mr. Hoover withdrew and Count Wrangel, Count Ehrensvärd and Capt. Akerblom entered the room.)

COUNT EHRENSVÄRD then read a document (Appendix E).

M. CLEMENCEAU thanked the Swedish Representatives who then withdrew.

(It was then resolved at Mr. Polk's suggestion that the question of the Swedish claims to the Aaland Islands as embodied in the declaration read by Count Ehrensvärd, be referred to the Baltic Commission for examination and report.)

3. (The Military Representatives, General Baird, Colonel Mougin and Colonel Georges entered the room.)

GENERAL BAIRD said that it was doubtless the intention of the Great Powers to make a lasting peace in the Balkans. He assumed that was their first intention. The punishment of Bulgaria was their second purpose. It was therefore necessary so [*sic*] to punish Bulgaria so as not to jeopardise a lasting peace. The most contentious questions in the Balkans were territorial questions. As regards Bulgaria there were two such questions which might be said to be analogous to that [of] Alsace Lorraine. There was even possibly a third in Thrace. It was the question of Macedonia and the question of the Dobruja that had brought Bulgaria into the war against the Allies. Proof of this could be found in the fact that while the Bulgarian attitude was still undecided, the Allies had urged the Serbians and Roumanians to make concessions in these very areas in order that the Bulgarians should be inclined to take the Allied side. What held at that time probably held now. If the Powers took no heed in this they would have to face the consequences. The Roumanians had taken the Dobruja for strategic reasons, and also to penalise the Bulgarians. Their strategic reason need not prevail. The Bulgarian forces at the present time could be reduced to any extent desired, and it could also be laid down that no Bulgarian troops should be sent beyond a line from Varna to Ruschuk. The Roumanians freely admitted that the Southern Dobruja was Bulgarian in population; but no Roumanian statesman would offer to return it, lest he be reproached for alienating his country's possessions. It was therefore necessary to exert pressure on the Roumanians, if a lasting bone of contention was to be removed. It would be easier for the Roumanians to yield to Allied injunctions

Hearing of  
Swedish Point of  
View on the  
Subject of the  
Aaland Islands

Hearing of  
General Baird on  
Situation in  
Bulgaria

than to offer the country themselves. Macedonia had been taken by the Serbians in 1913 because they were in effective occupation; secondly on grounds of compensation, seeing that they had not obtained access to the Adriatic; thirdly to maintain a balance of power.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether Serbia had not claimed the country on the ground that it was peopled by populations of Serbian blood.

GENERAL BAIRD replied that in 1912 Serbia had admitted the country was not Serbian. Only one portion of it known as the "contested area" had been reserved for arbitration by the Czar of Russia. If the main purpose was to establish peace and not to punish Bulgaria, some other solution of the Macedonian problem must be found. No one could expect that Bulgaria after the war should be rewarded by an accession of territory. Macedonia was neither Greek nor Serbian, it was Bulgarian. Nevertheless it did not desire to be, and need not be placed under Bulgarian Government. The situation was now very different from that in 1912. Serbia had obtained her compensation towards the west, and there was no fear that Bulgaria would now become the most powerful military state in the Balkans. Very much the same might be said about the Greek claims to Thrace. In the opinion of all the Allied Officers in Sofia, there would be a repetition of the Smyrna episodes if Bulgarian Thrace were given to Greece. The population was principally Pomak, and the next most important element in it was Bulgar. He heard from General Bridges<sup>4</sup> that General Franchet d'Esperey was opposed to the cession of Thrace to Greece. General Milne was also opposed to it as well as all the Allied Generals. The Greeks would not be able to administer the country. In addition, some of the Pomaks had appealed to General Franchet d'Esperey not to be put under the Greeks. He thought that should the Dobrudja be returned to Bulgaria, the Roumanians would never go to war to get it back, because the Roumanian people would feel no enthusiasm on the subject. He thought the same applied to Macedonia and Thrace. Neither the Serbs nor the Greeks would willingly wage a war to regain those areas. On the other hand the Bulgarians would go to war whole-heartedly to regain them if they were taken from them. As to the present situation, he thought a wrong impression prevailed in Paris that Bulgaria had been turbulent since the armistice. Bulgaria complied with every demand made. Her army had been reduced below the figures required by the armistice. The armistice allowed an army of 4,000 officers and 80,000 other ranks. The Bulgarian army really numbered 3,500 officers and 55,000

---

<sup>4</sup> Lt. Gen. Sir George Tom Bridges, head of the British Mission with the Allied Armies of the East.



other ranks. There were 8 infantry divisions instead of 10, and in each of them one class was serving instead of two. Bulgaria had attempted to do nothing against the interests of the Allies. Moreover, the Allies had no troops, and, if a national rising were provoked, it would be impossible to stop it. There would, moreover, be no Bulgarian Government to appeal to.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Marshal Foch whether the armistice enabled Bulgaria to maintain 10 divisions.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Bulgarians had not been asked to reduce the number of their divisions, but to keep only 3 of them mobilised.

GENERAL BAIRD said the Bulgarians had not even kept 3 mobilised. He observed that the Bulgarians could be very heavily fined in money, cattle and corn. Moreover, the Allies could administer and develop certain state resources such as railways and mines, and thus obtain what they required without touching territory and incurring the permanent hostility of the Bulgarians and a readiness on their part to take the side of any possible enemy of the Entente. He suggested that the same kind of peace as the British Government had made with the Boers should be made with the Bulgarians. It would be better to have the Bulgarians on our side next time than against us.

MR. BALFOUR said that it might comfort General Baird to know that inside the Conference there had never been any idea of subordinating everything to a desire to punish the Bulgarians.

M. CLEMENCEAU thanked General Baird, who then withdrew.

M. CLEMENCEAU then asked Colonel Mougin to give an account of the present military situation of Bulgaria.

COLONEL MOUGIN said that the clauses of the armistice had been carried out by the Bulgarians as regards the number of their troops. It might be possible, with tact, to induce the Bulgarians to disarm still further. This would be advantageous, seeing that if they disliked the treaty, they would only find weak Allied forces opposed to them. The bulk of the available Allied force would be French. It might not be numerous enough to cope with the situation. It would certainly not be adequate should a popular rising occur. It must be remembered that in these parts every man had a rifle, and since the war a great many had machine guns. The question then was whether the Greeks could be depended on. He thought not. Of their 11 divisions, 5 were in Smyrna. Their policy in that region was such that they would require a large number of troops to enforce it. Of the remainder, the bulk must be kept in Macedonia, which was not Greek, but either Bulgarian or Mohammedan. Thrace also, if

Greece should have it, could only be held by force. Unless the Allies supplied the force, Greece would have to do so. It followed that Greek troops could not be relied on to cope with the Bulgarians should they rise. This would not lighten the task of the French troops, which would also have to cope with difficulties of transport. The troops at General Franchet d'Esperey's disposal might, if he were warned in time, be able to keep the railways, the stores of ammunition, and the arsenals, but it must also be borne in mind that the Turks would take sides in favour of the Bulgarians as a consequence of what had happened in Smyrna. They were now less anti-Bulgarian than anti-Greek. In a word, throughout Thrace the majority was Mussulman. The Turkish peasants might be armed by the Bulgarians, and all would make common cause against the Greeks. His personal opinion was that the Allies were in a fair way to making permanent enemies of the Turks, who lately had been friendly.

MR. BALFOUR asked what Colonel Mougin had meant by tactful methods of reducing Bulgarian armaments.

COLONEL MOUGIN said that he thought that the methods might be left to General Franchet d'Esperey. All the Council need do was to tell him what was desired.

(Colonel Mougin then withdrew).

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not sure that the discussion could be pursued with advantage. In any case, it must be understood that French troops would not fight alone against the Bulgarians in the interests of Greece. The Greeks had gone to Smyrna, with the result known. They would also have trouble in Macedonia. They courted further trouble by claiming Thrace. He was quite prepared to give them Thrace, but not to meet the trouble for them.

M. TITTONI said that the Italian battalion was there for the purpose of bringing about peace, not for war.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the same applied to the 15,000 French troops.

MARSHAL FOCH said that whatever form the treaty took, it was unlikely to be entirely to the taste of the Bulgarians. The question then arose: what could the Allies do? There were a few French troops under General Franchet d'Esperey. In front of them was the Bulgarian army and its store of arms. General Franchet d'Esperey might perhaps prevail on the Bulgarians to yield some of these arms. That would be so much to the good, but it must be done at once, because the process of demobilization would reduce his troops to a negligible quantity in a month. He therefore proposed to tell General Franchet d'Esperey to get possession of the Bulgarian guns. The Allies would

be more able to cope with the situation when the treaty was signed. At that time only the small states—Greece and Serbia, and, possibly, Roumania, would be able to furnish the police force. They would only be able to secure the execution of the Treaty if the Bulgarians had been disarmed before-hand. He therefore concluded that General Franchet d'Esperey should be ordered to disarm the Bulgarians as far as possible.

MR. POLK asked whether the Allies were entitled under the armistice to give him this order.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that no such order could be given to the Bulgarians. They might or might not comply with General Franchet d'Esperey's request. He was inclined to ask Marshal Foch to do as he suggested under the reservation that the use of the French divisions remained at the disposal of the French Government.

MARSHAL FOCH read a draft telegram he proposed to send to General Franchet d'Esperey.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that it be made quite clear to General Franchet d'Esperey that he must obtain his results by diplomacy, and not by giving orders to the Bulgarians, who were entitled under the armistice to disregard them.

MR. BALFOUR thought it most unlikely that the Bulgarians would agree, but, if the Military Authorities thought there was some hope, he was quite ready to try.

(After some further discussion, the telegram annexed as Appendix "F" was adopted, subject to final consideration at the next Meeting.)

M. TITTONI suggested the holding of a plebiscite in Thrace.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that as the population was predominantly Mussulman, the result would be a foregone conclusion.

M. PICHON suggested the country should be given to the League of Nations.

4. The following nominations were made:—

Appointment  
of Allied  
Commissioners  
for Negotiation  
Between the Ger-  
man and Polish  
Governments

For France . . . . .	General Dupont.
For Great Britain . . . .	General Malcolm.
For Italy . . . . .	General Bencivenga.

(The Meeting then adjourned).

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, August 5, 1919.



## Appendix A to HD-23

*[Message From the Commander of the Italian Military Mission at Budapest (Romanelli)]*

[Translation<sup>6</sup>]

No. IW 136

Radio from BUDAPEST, 3/8 6 H.10M.

To His Excellency Clemenceau, President of the Paris Peace Conference.

In acknowledging receipt of your telegram<sup>6</sup> I have the honor to inform you that the new Hungarian Government is quite ready to fulfill, within the briefest delay possible, the conditions of the Armistice. To this end, considering the interior difficulties arising out of the crisis recently surmounted, the government officially requests me to ask the aid of the Allied and Associated Powers in fulfilling the terms of the Armistice by sending one regiment of troops of each of the Entente nations without it appearing to be an intervention, but rather a step to permit the free manifestation of the will of the country.

Lieutenant Colonel ROMANELLI

---

Appendix B to HD-23

*[Telegram From the Hungarian Provisional Government]*

[Translation<sup>7</sup>]

AUGUST 3, 1919—11:45 p. m.

Official Telegram

NAGY KIKINDA, August 3, 1919, 3:40 p. m.

General of the Army of Hungary to the Minister of War, Paris.

No. 22

Priority—Operations—Very urgent—No. 1527/2 NK

DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BUDAPEST

TO THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE:

The Entente Powers have sent us an ultimatum; they demand that the government based on the principle of the soviets be replaced by another government. It is on this condition that they consent to enter upon peace negotiations. The Government of the Republic of

---

<sup>6</sup> The translation of the text of this telegram is that quoted in the telegram of August 7, 1919, from the American Mission at Paris to the Secretary of State (Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/23).

<sup>6</sup> Appendix B to HD-22, p. 490.

<sup>7</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Socialist Councils of Hungary realized that, at the present time, a tenacious resistance against the Entente Powers would lead only to bloodshed. It is therefore [apparent omission] of its functions authorized by the Central Council of Workers. A new government formed of the chiefs of the armed and disciplined Syndicates of Hungary has taken over the provisional government of the country. This new Government rests upon the strength of the conscious and organized workers; its object is to maintain order and to enter into negotiations with the Entente. We have no reason to lose courage; we still hold the Tisza front firmly. In the interior we still have need of a disciplined perseverance. The new Government likes to believe that the organized workers will not tolerate further any abuses either on the part of counter-revolutionaries or on the part of pillagers. It wishes absolutely to protect the people of Hungary against the spectre and the ravages of the white terror and destruction of the populace. Knowing that the masses of the workers stand in serried ranks behind it, the Government appeals to the people of Hungary to await events with discipline and to give absolute obedience to the orders of the Government. Everyone should remain in his place; the Workers' Councils and other authorities should rigorously carry out their duties. The Government will strike with all its power those who disturb order or discipline. It has confided the maintenance of order and discipline to the Minister of War, Joseph Aubrich.

Those who refused to obey the orders of the new Government will find themselves in opposition to the will of the organized workers. Only order and discipline can save the people of Hungary from destruction.

BUDAPEST, August 1, 1919.

---

Appendix "C" to HD-23

*Telegram To Be Sent to the Roumanian Government*

The Conference have received assurances from the New Government of Hungary that they are prepared to disarm in accordance with the terms of the Armistice and are anxious to work in harmony with the Allied and Associated Powers. Under these circumstances the Conference have resolved to send a Mission of Allied Generals to Budapest to see that these promises are fulfilled. The Roumanian Government are requested to give orders to the General Commanding their troops in Hungary to conform to the policy laid by the Mission which represents the Conference and will act by its authority.

The Conference do not conceal from the Roumanian Government their great anxiety lest some untoward incident in Budapest or else-

where in Hungary, should mar the success of the Roumanian Army. Any such incident might destroy the prospects of a speedy peace in Central Europe; cause infinite sufferings to its population; and indefinitely postpone the hopes of its Economic reconstruction. Those whose unconsidered action was the occasion of so great a calamity would not easily be forgiven and could no longer count on the goodwill of the Peoples of the Entente, whose assistance and co-operation are so necessary, if the disasters which have overtaken European civilisation are to be speedily remedied.

---

Appendix D to HD-23

[*Telegram Addressed to the French Minister in Belgrade*]

[Translation<sup>8</sup>]

AUGUST 4, 1919.

I request you to make the following communication to the Serbian Government, in behalf of the President of the Peace Conference:

"The Supreme Council is informed of the presence in the Banat of considerable quantities of food in excess of the requirements of Serbia, and of the embargo put by the Serbian authorities on the export of this excess food.

By reason of the vital necessity represented by the food supply of the city of Vienna and the formation at Budapest, in the place of the Communist Government, of a socialist Government, which declared itself ready to carry out the conditions of the armistice and to act in the direction of the decision of the Allies, the Supreme Council is of the opinion that it is a humanitarian duty for the Serb Government to raise the embargo.

It requests it formally to give the necessary orders to have the hundreds of thousands of tons immobilized in the Banat distributed, in agreement with the technical agents of the Allies to insure the life and the food supply of the inhabitants of Vienna and Budapest."

---

Appendix E to HD-23

[*Swedish Declaration on the Question of the Aland Islands*]

[Translation<sup>9</sup>]

SWEDISH LEGATION,  
PARIS, August 1, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT, GENTLEMEN: Called by the Peace Conference to set forth before it the Swedish point of view on the subject of the question

---

<sup>8</sup> The translation is that found under Paris Peace Conf. 180.03502/16.

<sup>9</sup> The translation is that found under Paris Peace Conf. 860D.014/56.



of the Aland Islands, the Delegation has the honor to make the following observations.

As you know, gentlemen, the inhabitants of the Aland Islands have expressed by a plebiscite, on two occasions, their ardent desire for the union of their islands to their former native land. They are joined to Sweden by bonds of race, language, sentiments and by an uninterrupted historical association which only ended about 100 years ago.

The Swedish Government had hopes that the Finnish Government, which in the claim of independence for Finland based itself upon the sacred right of peoples to self-determination, would also respect the principle in what concerned the will of the Alanders, spontaneously and unanimously manifested, to unite with their mother country. To this end it opened negotiations at Helsingfors aiming to have the question of the future status of the Aland Islands submitted to a plebiscite taken in the Islands under the necessary guarantees and with decisive force for Sweden as well as for Finland.

These negotiations have, until now, had no result. For this reason the Swedish Government has felt obligated to appeal to the high jurisdiction of the Peace Conference to settle a question which has its origin directly in the war and which, in its opinion, should be solved at the same time as the pacification of the remainder of our continent. If, in comparison to the other grave questions which occupy the Conference, it is of secondary interest, it is, nevertheless, of the greatest importance for the tranquillity of the north of Europe and for equilibrium in the Baltic Basin.

Before taking up the political side of the question, we shall give a few brief statements of a geographic and historic order concerning these islands.

The Aland Archipelago is situated in the Baltic Sea between the Swedish and Finnish coasts. The most important part of the archipelago is formed by the principal island, "Firm Land of Aland" as the inhabitants call it in addition to which there are two islands of a certain importance. As for the rest, the archipelago is composed of innumerable islands, isles and reefs, situated between the principal island and the "Skiftet" which separates them from the Finnish archipelago of Abo.

The principal island is about 40 kms. distant from the Swedish coast, whereas it is about 80 kms. removed from the Finnish coast. The distance from Stockholm is about 65 kms., as a crow flies.

The principal island, where about four-fifths of the total population reside, is unquestionably situated much nearer to Sweden. On the other hand, the Finns like to assert that, geographically, the archipelago is to be considered as a prolongation of the Finnish continent. It may be remarked that there is, to the south, an open passage between

Finland and the Aland Islands, about 30 kms. in width, called "The Skiftet". This passage, since the most remote times, has formed the frontier between Sweden and the Finnish provinces. We must add that to the north the Skiftet narrows until, for a limited distance, it is reduced to from 5 to 10 kms. in width. The isles and rocks located along this course which are marked on the map are, in general, inhabited [*uninhabited*].

Economically, the islands have always had much closer relations with Sweden; the explanation of this is that navigation is much easier with Sweden than with the Finnish coast, barred as it is by innumerable islands and reefs.

The total number of inhabitants of the Aland Islands is approximately 25,000, of which only 21,000 reside on the islands, the others being absent for different reasons. The principal occupations of the inhabitants are agriculture, fishing and navigation.

Since time immemorial, Aland has belonged to Sweden. The first inhabitants of the archipelago were Swedes as archaeological excavations point out as do also the names of all the localities. Long before the conquest of Finland by the Swedes, the Aland formed part of Sweden.

In fact, it was only during the twelfth century that the Swedes commenced to make conquests in the country today known under the generic name of Finland and, little by little, all this country was conquered, colonized and christianized by Sweden. As is known, Finland is today inhabited, among a population of about 3,300,000, by 340,000 of Swedish descendants [*descent*], race and language. The majority of the Swedes inhabit the coast, concentrated especially in two different parts: one to the north of the Gulf of Bothnia, the other in the province of Nyland, north of the Gulf of Finland. On the other hand, the Finnish coasts opposite the Aland Islands are, to a large extent, inhabited by the Finns.

The Finns, in general, have attached great importance to the fact that during the Swedish domination, which lasted until 1809, the Aland was administered in common with the Finnish provinces belonging to the Crown of Sweden, and have wished to see there a proof of the intimate relations existing between Finland and the Aland Islands. The facts, however, are as follows:

During the whole Swedish domination, Finland was only a generic term to distinguish the possessions bounded by the gulfs of Finland and of Bothnia. Finland enjoyed no autonomy and had no independent popular representation. It was represented, like the other Swedish provinces, in the Swedish Riksdag. It was administered in the same way as the other Swedish possessions.

In fact, Finland as a political conception never existed prior to 1809, the period in which Emperor Alexander I, in order to facilitate

the union of Finland to the Russian Empire, granted it broad autonomy.

A glance at the map will be sufficient to explain why the Åland Islands were placed under the administration of the Governor residing at Åbo (in Finland). The fact of this administrative arrangement in no way implies a proof that, historically, Åland belonged to Finland. It was reasons of a practical nature especially which dictated the administrative regime adopted. The provincial governors had at that time, among their attributions, the duty of making frequent voyages of inspection in their provinces; as the Governor of Åbo was often called to Stockholm by the Central Government, it was easy for him, and entirely natural, that in going to Stockholm or in returning, he should inspect the islands situated along his course, whereas the governors residing in Sweden would have been obliged to undertake a special trip for this purpose, at a time when voyages were rather difficult.

Since 1634, the year when an administrative regime in the modern sense of the word, was for the first time introduced in Sweden, until 1808, the Åland was always administered by the Government of Åbo, but in spite of this, in certain connections, the Åland was always considered as a special province, and its fiscal administration was always controlled directly from Stockholm.

We should like to draw the attention of the Conference to the fact that, in spite of the administrative union of the Åland with Finland, the Swedish and foreign geographical maps, of the 17th and 18th centuries and as late as 1799, make a distinction between Sweden and the Åland, on one hand, and Finland on the other. The Åland is almost always shown under the same color as Sweden, Finland under a different one.

The Åland Islands shared the lot of the Finnish provinces when, by the Treaty of 1809,<sup>10</sup> Sweden was obliged to cede to Russia certain Finnish governments, as well as the Åland Islands. It was in vain that the Swedish Delegates insisted upon the fact that the Åland had never been anything other than a Swedish province and that the loss of Finland should not entail that of the archipelago. The Russian commissioners replied: "We are not concerned with the old Swedish frontiers, but with the new Russian frontiers."

To sum up, we should like to establish the following facts in the historical part of our exposé: the Åland has always belonged to Sweden. Finland was conquered by the Swedes in former times; the fact that the Åland was, in general, administered by a governor residing in Finland, is of no importance, since Finland had no special situation in the Kingdom of Sweden. On the contrary, the idea was

---

<sup>10</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. I, p. 338.



always maintained that the Aland formed a part of Sweden itself, which by the cession of the Islands in 1809 underwent a painful amputation.

From the point of view of the Swedish Royal Government, the historical part is, however, of secondary importance. The main interest is concentrated around the desire of the Aland inhabitants. They should possess the same rights of self-determination as all other civilized peoples.

Immediately after the first Russian revolution, in March 1917, and even before Finland, as a result of the Bolshevist revolution of the same year, had separated itself from the Russian Empire by proclaiming its independence, a movement had arisen in the Aland Islands with a view to preparing the way for their union to Sweden. As early as August 20, 1917, the delegates of the different communes composing the Aland Islands assembled and thus formed a representation of the entire archipelago. (These delegates being assured that public opinion was decidedly in favor of the reunion of the islands with Sweden.) The Assembly resolved to bring to the knowledge of the King and of the Swedish Riksdag, by a delegation elected for this purpose, the ardent desire of the Alanders to see their islands united with Sweden. A committee of Alanders was formed to organize a sort of referendum which was to show the popular will. In this first plebiscite, every man and woman over 21 years of age and residing in the Islands, took part. For climatic reasons and because of the severity of the winter, three communes consisting of very distant islands were unable to take part in this referendum. The plebiscite which took place in the month of December 1917 had the result that over 7,000 persons signed a petition to the King and to the people of Sweden. This figure of 7,000 represents a practically unanimous vote. The three communes which had not been able to take part in the first referendum, later organized a separate plebiscite, the result of which was identical with the popular plebiscite in the other parts of the archipelago.

It may be remarked that this movement was absolutely spontaneous. At this period, considering the state of war in which the Russian Empire still found itself, means of communication between the Aland Islands and Sweden were almost completely interrupted. The movement which took place in the Islands came almost as a surprise for Sweden. It must be recalled, moreover, that it was just at the moment when Finland, taking its lot in its own hands and going on the principle of nationalities, separated itself from the Russian Empire, that the Aland Islands asserted the same principle in order to demand, not their independence, but their union to Sweden.

In order to once more manifest how strong was their desire to be united with Sweden, the inhabitants of Aland organized on June 20 of this year, a second plebiscite which resulted in 9,733 persons, that is 96.4% of the population, requesting union with Sweden.

We believe, gentlemen, that the case which we have the honor to present before you is unique among all the territorial questions which you have to decide, in the sense that you have before you a wish expressed by a people in a manner as unanimous as it is spontaneous.

On what can the Finnish Government base its refusal to recognize the value of the Aland manifestation?

Many times, and especially in its note of June 6, 1919, to the Swedish Government, the Finnish Government has sought to attribute the unrest felt by the Alanders, and which undoubtedly existed, to the last phase of the world war.

During the war, a number of Russian troops were stationed in Aland; by their unbridled violence and their immoderate demands—this description is taken textually from the Finnish note—they made the Alanders feel heavily the burden of the war. We do not know whether the Russians committed excesses prior to the month of August 1917, the date when the separatist movement of the Alanders was born. At this time and until the moment when the Bolshevik revolution was approaching, the Russian troops in Aland were still well disciplined. But, in any event, the Aland population, by the second plebiscite which was taken with the well defined purpose of serving as a reply to the Finnish note of June 6, 1919, showed well that it was not for fortuitous reasons or under the impulse of the moment, but by a deeply founded desire in the popular soul that the Alanders claimed their right to return to the bosom of the mother country.

The Finnish Government also asserted another reason to oppose the desires of the Alanders. As is known, Finland is a state of mixed population, the great majority of which is of Finnish race and approximately 10% of Swedish race. The Alanders are now contested the right of deciding their lot separately from their co-nationals living on the Finnish continent. At the same time, it is maintained that the Alanders have full rights to make use of their Swedish language and that they do not suffer the lot of so many other nationalities which live under an odious oppression.

We take the liberty of opposing the following points to this method of reasoning:

In the first place, Aland undoubtedly forms a geographic unit inhabited by a people of exclusively Swedish race, who maintain economic relations with Sweden rather than with Finland. As

we have just remarked, the remainder of the Swedish population in Finland is scattered over the Finnish continent. It would be difficult to mark clearly and impartially the boundaries between the two races. (Each attempt to this end would give rise to contests.) Furthermore, the economic interests of the inhabitants of the continent are closely connected with the lot of Finland itself. No reasonable person could think of dividing continental Finland according to its ethnographic elements.

Then, as we have just said, Aland has always been inhabited by a Swedish population, whereas the Swedes inhabiting the Finnish continent, at least the great majority of them, are descendants of the Swedish colonists adopted by their new country. It is very natural that the Alanders, in spite of a separation of over a century should have kept their Swedish mentality and aspirations intact. We ask the Peace Conference whether the circumstance that there is in Finland a population speaking the same language as the Alanders, but, very naturally joined to Finland by bonds which do not exist for the Alanders, should have an influence upon the right of the latter to dispose of their lot.

Until now we have only spoken of the desire of the Alanders, sustained by the Swedish Government for self-determination, as well as the opposition raised by the Finnish Government. This might cause the belief that it is only a question concerning the two governments, Swedish and Finnish, that is at stake. This would be a great error. It is a question, in fact, of a European problem. Europe, moreover, has already recognized it. By the Treaty of Paris of 1856,<sup>11</sup> Russia was forbidden the right of fortifying the Aland Islands, given their great strategic importance. This treaty conforms but little to the new situation in the Baltic Sea provoked by the events of the war. There is imperative need of replacing it by another arrangement serving the same purpose; the Baltic Commission recognized this in proposing to neutralize the Islands under the guarantee of the League of Nations. But, according to the opinion of the King's Government, the question of the neutralization of the Islands and that of sovereignty cannot be advantageously separated. It must be remembered that the great war gave rise directly to this latter question. Without the war, the Finns could not have proclaimed their independence, nor the Alanders their desire to be united with Sweden. Consequently, the Peace Conference, which seems to be called to decide all international questions having their origin in the war, must also take up this one. The question arose naturally, it cannot be abandoned without a solution.

However, it would appear that the Baltic Commission has found

---

<sup>11</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XLVI, p. 23.



an objection to the immediate solution of the question in the fact that it also pertains to Russia and that it would be desirable to settle it with the aid of this Power. If it were only a question of a delay of short duration, the question might perhaps be postponed, without too much harm. But, as it appears possible that a rather long period of time will have to elapse before the reconstruction of Russia is an accomplished fact, the King's Government feels obliged to call the attention of the Peace Conference to the serious inconveniences which would result from the adjournment "in infinitum" of the question of the Aland Islands. These inconveniences would be especially serious if the Conference were to place the solution in the hands of the League of Nations. This decision would, no doubt, occasion very great delay. It must not be lost sight of that this question has remained in suspense for two years and that, despite the calm and collected attitude observed until now by the inhabitants, the possibility of an aggravation of the situation must be counted upon in the event of a decision too long postponed.

It is difficult to conceive that the question of the sovereignty of the Aland Islands can form a question of vital interest for Russia. The Government of Admiral Koltchak, which *de facto* has recognized the independence of Finland can scarcely claim sovereignty over the Aland Islands, which, once Finland is independent, will have no direct relation with the Russian Empire.

The Delegation does not think that there can be any serious objections on the part of those who have or will have the right to speak in the name of Russia, against a plebiscite, the object of which would be, first, to settle the question of the Aland Islands between Sweden and Finland.

As for the neutralization of the Islands, it is evident that Russia, in its capacity as a Baltic power, has great interests to safeguard in these parts. Since the Islands form an excellent naval base, their possession, in any hands in which they might be, might furnish reason for serious fears on the part of the other Baltic Powers, or at least become the subject of considerable inconveniences. Now, the Swedish Government does not want to oppose their neutralization under sufficient guarantee. Thus, would be removed all the objections which might be made by its neighbors against the transfer of the sovereignty over these islands to the Crown of Sweden. On the other hand, the King's Government must bring out the primordial interests which Sweden possesses in the Aland question, in view of the proximity of these islands to the Swedish capital. We have already mentioned that the distance between Stockholm and the islands is only 65 kms. No other Baltic Power has an interest equal to that of Sweden in connection with their military importance.

It seems certain that the task of supervising the strict observance of the neutrality of the islands would fall upon Sweden. Following, for over a century, a policy of unchangeable neutrality, which has become traditional with it, we believe that it is better adapted than any power to whom this role might be entrusted.

The Delegation hopes, by these observations, to have presented the facts necessary to serve as a basis for the solution of the question.

In ending our exposé, Mr. President and Gentlemen, permit us to express our sincere gratitude to the Conference for having given us this opportunity of developing the Swedish point of view before it.

PARIS, August 4, 1919.

---

#### Appendix F to HD-23

[Translation <sup>12</sup>]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES  
GENERAL STAFF, 3RD SECTION  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

Draft

Code Telegram

August 4, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies

To: The General Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army of the Orient, at Constantinople

*First:* From recent information that you have furnished, we gather that Bulgaria has at her disposition, under the control of the Allies, a very important quantity of war material, notably in guns, machine guns, rifles, artillery and infantry ammunition.

She would, therefore, if she remobilized, be able to form, if not a mobile army, at least very solid groups of resistance, capable of opposing by force the carrying out of the conditions of the Peace Treaty.

*Second:* Under these conditions, and to do away with this dangerous possibility, it is absolutely necessary to profit without delay by the present condition of our strength to obtain from Bulgaria military conditions that will make it impossible for her to take up arms again, if it came to that.

There is no question of an order to be imposed on Bulgaria, by invoking the armistice conditions already executed by her, but of obtaining conditions motivated by the present state of affairs.

*Third:* Following out this idea, the measures to be taken should aim at:

a) The immediate surrender to the Allies, and the deposit outside of Bulgarian territory, of the rifles, machine guns and breech

---

<sup>12</sup> The translation is that found under Paris Peace Conf. 180.03502/16.

blocks of guns, which are now in the various depots of material or which have been liberated by the dissolution of the units mentioned in Paragraph (0) [*sic*] above;

*b*) Cessation of the manufacture of all war material, seizure of the arsenals and control of the product of private metallurgic factories and establishments;

*c*) Reduction of the mobilized Bulgarian forces to the units sufficient to maintain order;

*d*) Limitation of the maximum effective to be maintained under arms as consequence of the reduction above mentioned;

*e*) Dissolution, in a time limit to be fixed, of all the other units, depots and mobilizing centers.

These measures are enumerated in the order of their importance.

*Fourth:* I beg you to declare immediately your opinion on the possibilities and time limits of the execution of the measures above mentioned. Please indicate, moreover, any supplementary propositions you may have to make on this subject yourself.



**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, August 5, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

*Secretaries*

Mr. H. Norman.  
Sir George Clerk.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.  
M. Pichon.

*Secretaries*

M. Dutasta.  
M. Berthelot.  
M. de St. Quentin.

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

**JAPAN**

M. Matsui.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Captain P. Chapin.  
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . Captain E. Abraham.  
FRANCE . . . . . Captain A. Portier.  
ITALY . . . . . Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

*Interpreter*—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Instructions to  
General Franchet  
d'Esperey Regarding  
Disarmament  
of Bulgarians

1. The Draft Telegram Annexed as Appendix "F" to the Minutes of the preceding Meeting, H. D. 23,<sup>1</sup> was finally adopted. Marshal Foch was requested to forward this telegram.

Situation in  
Hungary

2. Mr. Hoover, M. Seydoux, Mr. J. F. Dulles and M. Loucheur entered the room.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Polk if he had any news of Budapest.

MR. POLK read the following telegram:—

"Hoover, American Relief, Paris. August 5th, 1919.

"Last night there were 15 or 20 people killed in Budapest which I have definitely verified. It absolutely necessary that the Roumanians be taken out of this situation as rapidly as possible and pending their departure General Gorton<sup>2</sup> should act for the rest of the Commission. I was sure that these conflicts would take place. They also demand hostages and threaten definitely to kill 5 persons

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>2</sup> Brig. Gen. Reginald Gorton, head of the British Military Mission and member of the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest.

for each one who is injured in Budapest, naturally after their starting the killing further difficulties are apt to occur. The railroads are all tied up with machine-guns on the bridges. The Police Force has been dispossessed and whole city in absolute military control. This condition cannot continue and the movement to re-organise Hungary succeed. Gregory<sup>3</sup>”

MR. HOOVER said that half an hour before the meeting he had received a message for M. Clemenceau, from Lt-Colonel Romanelli:—

“Budapest, August 4th, 1919.

“I have the honour to inform you that I communicated your orders to the High Command of the Roumanian Army but the Roumanian troops have advanced in spite of this and continue to come. At the present time they have occupied the city of Budapest, have cut communications, taken hostages and made prisoner one member of the new Government. The Serbians also are advancing from the South and pillaging. The situation makes it impossible for the new Government to explain itself.”

M. CLEMENCEAU said that under the circumstances it might be desirable to send a more threatening message than the one sent on the previous day.

MR. POLK said that the orders referred to in Colonel Romanelli's telegram were probably those sent on the previous Sunday.

M. TITTONI said that the moral of this was that the Military Commission should reach Budapest as soon as possible.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if all the members had been nominated.

MR. POLK said that the American member had not yet been nominated, but informed the Council that General Bandholtz was appointed.

The Commission was composed as follows:—

For the United States of America . . . . .	General Bandholtz.
For Great Britain . . . . .	General Gorton.
For France . . . . .	General Graziani.
For Italy . . . . .	General Mombelli.

At this point Marshal Foch and General Weygand entered the room.

Instructions  
to Military  
Commission at  
Budapest

MR. BALFOUR read the following draft instructions for the Interallied Commission to Budapest:—

“The Mission are desired:—

- (1) To enter into communication with the Hungarian Government with a view of securing the observance of the Armistice.
- (2) To report on the present position of this question, and its probable developments.

<sup>3</sup> Capt. Thomas T. C. Gregory, member of the American Relief Administration at Vienna.

- (3) To enter into communication with the Roumanian Generals in order to prevent any action by the successful army which, by rousing nationalist sentiment in Hungary, or otherwise, may perpetuate the unhappy condition of that country and delay the conclusion of peace.

It may be of assistance to the Mission to remind them:—

(a) That the frontiers of Hungary having been already determined by the Conference, and communicated to all the Governments immediately concerned, it is the policy of the Conference to remove without any unnecessary delay all foreign troops from the country. The Roumanians, it should be noted, have promised to withdraw their Armies as soon as the disarmament of the Hungarians has been accomplished according to the terms of the Armistice.

(b) That orders have been given to terminate the blockade of Hungary and to further the immediate importation of necessaries.

(c) That the maintenance of this new condition of things must depend on the behaviour of the Hungarian Government to the Allied and Associated Powers, and

(d) That while those Powers have not the slightest desire to interfere with the Hungarian people in their choice of a Government, they can only have dealings with one which can be trusted loyally to carry out its international obligation."

MARSHAL FOCH said that he agreed to these instructions, but would like to add to them certain more definite instructions regarding the Armistice. The Hungarians must have no more than six divisions. They must be made to deliver war material, not only Hungarian war material, but the war material left by General Mackensen's Army. He therefore suggested the following draft instructions:—

"The Mission of Allied Generals sent to Budapest in the name of the Supreme Council is to be entrusted with the duty:—

(1) of supervising the execution of the military armistice signed on 30th [13th] November, 1918,<sup>4</sup> between the Allied Command and the Hungarian Government and in addition of the following measures:—

(a) The establishment of the maximum number of effectives under arms, in each branch of the Hungarian Army, with the sole purpose of insuring the maintenance of internal order.

(b) The disarmament of all demobilised units and the dispersal of Depots or Centres of mobilisation.

(c) Delivery to the Allies of arms, munitions and war material in excess of material necessary for the units maintained, including material having belonged to General Mackensen's Army.

(d) In concert with the Allied Staffs, to regulate the distribution of this material among the Allied Powers concerned, in pro-

<sup>4</sup> Vol. II, p. 183.



portion to the military contribution made by each, and in consideration of the present war situation.

(e) Immediate stoppage of production in the arsenals or industrial establishments producing war material.

(2) The Mission will further:—

(a) Determine according to present circumstances the strength and distribution of Roumanian and Serbian troops which it may be necessary to maintain on Hungarian territory to ensure order and the execution of the Armistice.

(b) Arrange with the Roumanian and Serbian Commands for the withdrawal of any superfluous troops.”

MR. BALFOUR said that he wished to ask two questions regarding this proposal. Firstly, had the Allies any right to make the terms of the Armistice more onerous? In the Armistice, there had been no question of demobilising six divisions. He thought, perhaps this might be justified on the ground that Hungary had, in the interval, made war. Secondly, he agreed that the evacuation of Hungarian territory should be gradual and under control. Unfortunately Marshal Foch was not Commander-in-Chief of the Roumanian Army. He was afraid that four Generals escorted by two Companies of Interallied troops would not be able to control the Roumanian Army.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the violation of the Armistice gave the Allies a right to enhance the terms.

MR. BALFOUR observed that he felt uneasy in that not only were the Armistice terms made more onerous, but the increased severity of the terms was coupled with orders given to the Command of the Roumanian Army. It was probable that the first part would be carried out by the Hungarians. Could he be assured that the second part would be carried out by the Roumanians? If not, the Conference would incur great discredit. It might be argued that because the Hungarians had made war, they deserved severer terms, but it must be admitted that they had made war against people who had invaded their territory in spite of the orders of the Conference.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he admitted his proposals exceeded the terms of the Armistice. The Armistice, however, had been made a year ago. At that time it had been necessary to leave the Hungarians a certain force on a war footing, in order that Hungary should be defended against the Germans, who were then still in the field. The situation was now quite different. It was quite unnecessary for Hungary to maintain any forces on a war footing. The Hungarian Army should be demobilised. As to the Roumanians, he thought that, if properly addressed, they would do as they were told.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Roumanian Military Adviser to the Peace Delegation, Colonel Dimitresco, had called on him to say that the Roumanian Army considered itself in Hungary as the man-

datory of the Conference. It wished to carry out Marshal Foch's orders. In other words, he asked for instructions from Marshal Foch, although he was not in command of the Roumanian Army. He added that the Roumanian Commander in the field had been instructed to send direct reports to Marshal Foch.

M. PICHON said that the Roumanians had not actually disobeyed the Conference. They had been given a certain frontier which they had declared they could not defend. While this was being discussed, the Hungarians had attacked them. In self-protection they had advanced beyond the line fixed for them.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had no wish to make a case against the Roumanians, but he thought that M. Pichon's statement was too favourable to them. On the 14th June, the Roumanians had been ordered to retire by a certain date.<sup>5</sup> They had not done so, and they had not given any explanation.

MR. POLK added that in February last they had flatly refused to obey the orders of the Conference.<sup>6</sup>

M. TITTONI said that he had the greatest confidence in the moral authority of the four Generals who would go to Budapest. He believed that neither the Roumanians nor the Serbians would disobey them. To reinforce their action, he suggested that a diplomatic *démarche* be made at Belgrade and Bukarest.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the instructions drafted by Mr. Balfour and Marshal Foch should be welded in one, and that M. Tittoni should prepare a dispatch to be sent to the Roumanians and the Serbians.

MR. POLK said that he wished to enquire whether an alteration of the Armistice terms would not put the Council in contradiction with itself, seeing that on August 2nd the Council had addressed the Hungarian Government,<sup>7</sup> and taken its stand on the Armistice as it originally stood.

MARSHAL FOCH said that it was absolutely necessary to obtain demobilisation in Hungary at the present time. A year ago, this had not been desired. The situation had entirely changed since then.

MR. POLK said that whatever the reasons might be, and however good they might be, the Council was committed by what it had said three days before.

MR. BALFOUR said that Marshal Foch wished to reduce the Hungarian forces below the figures stated in the Armistice. He wished

<sup>5</sup> Apparently a reference to the telegram sent to Roumania, dated June 13, 1919. See appendices V (A) and V (D) to CF-65, vol. vi, pp. 411 and 413.

<sup>6</sup> Apparently a reference to the advance of the Roumanian forces beyond the limits of the neutral zone between Hungarian and Roumanian troops in Transylvania. See BC-40 and 41, vol. iv, pp. 145 and 172; and CF-53, 54, and 56, vol. vi, pp. 254, 260, and 281.

<sup>7</sup> HD-22, minute 1, and appendix B thereto, pp. 480, 490.

to draw attention to the fact that the Armistice conferred on the Allies a right to occupy such places as they wished in Hungarian territory, in order to establish peace. Would it not be possible to offer the Hungarians the choice either to reduce at once to the allotment which was to be made to them in the Peace Treaty, in which case no occupation by Allied troops would be required, or to submit to occupation by Roumanians.

MARSHAL FOCH said that if the Hungarians were offered two solutions, they would propose a third. This would lead to endless argument. He suggested that the military Mission be instructed to obtain such reduction as they could.

MR. POLK said that he did not object to any attempt the Mission might make by persuasive methods, but he thought the Council should not contradict itself and order the Generals to violate the Armistice.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that the instructions he had drawn up were addressed not to the Hungarians, but to the Allied Generals.

MR. POLK observed that if the Roumanians were asked to occupy Hungary in the name of the Conference, they would be entitled to demand the cost of occupation, presumably out of the available resources of Hungary.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that for the time being the Roumanians were asking for nothing. Nor was it Marshal Foch's idea to employ Roumanians as agents of the Conference. He asked Marshal Foch if he required a Company of French troops.

MARSHAL FOCH replied in the affirmative.

M. TITTONI said that he would supply a Company of Italian troops.

MR. BALFOUR said that Admiral Troubridge and a monitor would be available from the British side.

M. TITTONI then proposed a draft telegram to the Roumanian and Serbian Governments.

(After some discussion, this telegram was agreed to in the form given in Appendix "A".)

It was agreed that this telegram should be communicated *in toto* to the Roumanian and Serbian Governments and the first part of it to the Hungarian Government by M. Pichon.

It was further decided that the instructions contained in Appendix "B" should be given to the Allied Military Mission to Budapest.

Marshal Foch was asked to transmit these instructions to each of the four Generals nominated.)

3. MR. HOOVER made the following statement:—

"I desire to again raise to the Council the Coal situation in Europe.

The Coal  
Situation in  
Europe

Under the direction of the Supreme Council and the Supreme Economic Council, my Administration undertook the promotion of production and so far as



possible to control the distribution of coal during the Armistice in Central and Eastern Europe. A considerable staff has been employed upon this labour and numerous agreements and undertakings entered upon, involving the old States of Austria, the Balkans, Poland and to some extent Germany. While the result could not be ideal they have at least served to maintain sufficient supplies for the transportation of municipal and domestic services necessary to maintain life. With the ending of the Armistice (and this authority) and with the super-imposition of the Reparation Commission over a considerable part of this problem, the supervision which we have exerted must necessarily cease.

Colonel A. G. Goodyear and Colonel W. G. Atwood, of our staff have compiled a summary (See Appendix "C") of the 1913 production and consumption of the principal countries in Europe (excluding Russia and the Balkan States) and have also conducted a careful inquiry into the probable production during the year 1919, based upon the experience of the first six months of the year. The net result shows that from a production of about 679,500,000 tons in the principal countries in Europe (except Russia) the production in these States has fallen to a rate of about 443,000,000 tons per annum. Of the 1913 production above mentioned about 614,000,000 tons were consumed in these States (i. e. outside the Balkan States and export markets foreign to Europe). In other words, the production has fallen approximately 236,500,000 tons, or down to 65% of normal production. The consumption cannot be decreased in this ratio (35%) upon certain vital consumers, such as transportation and municipal and other essential services, so that a shortage for manufacture and household use must be on a far greater ratio. Beyond this, the very natural tendency of productive countries to reserve a larger degree of their normal consumption will and does result in an under-supply to the non-producing countries far below a 35% reduction. Furthermore, the summer accumulation against winter use has not been in progress and therefore the hardships of the coming winter are even further increased.

It seems almost unnecessary to repeat the causes of this diminished production but they may be again summarised as due to certain specific causes which in fact are much the same in all productive industries.

To a minor degree, compared with the whole, there has been a loss of equipment and skill, due to the war; there has been a retardation of advance exploitation during the war; there has been a relaxation of effort as a reflex from the physical exhaustion of large sections of the population through privations and the mental and physical strain of the war; there is a shortage of railway rolling stock for prompt movement from the mines; there has been an unsettlement of political destiny of a number of coalfields by the peace terms; and, above all, the proper and insistent demand of labour for higher standards of living in the general unbalance of economic conditions has been manifested in repeated strikes and other deterrents to production. Unfortunately European labour at many points has become infected with the theory that the limitation of effort below physical necessity and the obstruction of labour-saving devices will increase their own comfort and improve their conditions. In turn, the reactions from undue

profits earned by proprietors during the war has brought a shock to the theory of private ownership, which has discouraged further investment and consequently a renewed opening of new areas which the maintenance of production demands. All these causes are operating to varying degree in different localities but their summation is shortage of production below the living necessity of the population of Europe.

With the arrival of a harvest and thus the solution of immediate food pressure, the problem of coal now comes to the front as the greatest menace to the stability and life in Europe. It is a problem domestic to Europe and incapable of solution from the United States. Disregarding all other questions, an additional load of 1,000,000 tons per month on American ports would indeed be a large tax in the face of the trebling of the United States food exports above pre-war normal. Furthermore, even such a tonnage would entail a tax on the world's shipping that cannot but affect freight rates generally. With a shortage in production of 20,000,000 tons per month a contribution of even double this amount from the United States would be but little help.

The solution of the problem demands, *first*, increased production and *second*, organisation of distribution.

It would perhaps contribute to the first problem if the coal miners and coal owners of all Europe could be brought to a realisation that the fate of European civilisation now rests in their hands to a degree equal to—if not greater than—in the hands of providers of food supplies during the next year.

The solution of the *second* problem—distribution—is vital if the non-producing States are not to collapse and in its conduct it should be possible to force the maximum production in those States who are partially supplied.

I urgently recommend that some form of coal control should be set up in Europe with view to the stimulation of production and to secure a distribution that will maintain the essential services upon which economic and political stability must rest. The problem cannot be solved for any one European country alone but the energies of all must be enlisted and the position of all must be considered. It is purely a domestic problem for Europe."

He therefore proposed the following Resolution:—

“That the Supreme Council should invite the British, French, Italian, Belgian, Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments each to nominate one member to a European Coal Commission to be immediately set up to undertake the co-ordination of the production, distribution and transportation of coal throughout Europe. The Reparation Commission, the Teschen Commission, the Plebiscite Commission for Silesia, and the different Commissions charged with matters of transport by sea, railroad and canal, should all be instructed to co-operate with this Coal Commission and to assist the work of the Coal Commission to the full extent of their powers”.

MR. LOUCHEUR agreed with Mr. Hoover except in one particular. He considered that the United States should be represented upon the proposed Commission.



MR. HOOVER stated that American representation had been omitted because it was felt that this matter was a domestic problem of Europe. Furthermore, the United States was faced with a crisis at home. At the best, the United States could only ship to Europe about 500,000 tons in a year, by reason of Port troubles and lack of shipping. As production of coal in Europe had declined 25% [35%?] this assistance was negligible. Under the authority of the Council he had been concerned with the coal production in Central and Eastern Europe, but the Reparation Commission set up under the Treaty was now taking charge of the mines, and his own work was therefore coming to an end.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was not quite sure that he understood what Mr. Hoover meant by saying that the coal crisis was a European domestic problem. As the British representative, he might in the same way say that the problems of continental Europe were domestic problems in which Great Britain was not concerned. In reality, all countries of the world were inter-dependent, and their mutual interests in one another's condition had never been better understood than by Mr. Hoover himself. Therefore, he did not quite follow Mr. Hoover's reasoning in excluding America from representation on the Commission. He had no doubt, however, that the Port and Shipping difficulties mentioned by Mr. Hoover made it difficult for America to do all she would wish to do to help Europe. One portion of the Resolution proposed by Mr. Hoover appeared to him a little obscure. He alluded to the passage in which it was said that the Commission should "undertake the co-ordination of the production, distribution and transportation of coal throughout Europe". Did this mean that the Commission would take charge for instance, of the Belgium coalfields and the coalfields of Northern France? Would it attempt to regulate the conditions of production in England? As was well known to the Council, it was difficult to obtain coal from English coalfields even to keep British industries going. In what manner could the proposed Commission intervene in the internal affairs of the various countries?

MR. HOOVER said that the question of the sovereignty of Commissions of this kind had always proved an insuperable difficulty. In practice, it had always been agreed that such Commissions had no authority. No Government could give a right, even to its representative, to dispose of its national resources. The Commissions therefore, confined themselves to giving advice as to ways and means, and the best methods of co-ordination. For instance, Germany was in a position to produce more coal than was required of her for indemnity purposes and for home consumption. Italy had offered a supply of skilled workmen; by offering a bonus on production, a



surplus could be obtained for the benefit of the world at large. In Silesia, on the other hand, the production of coal had diminished 50% by reason of the political situation in that area. The Relief Commission which had formerly controlled the production of coal in Silesia had been superseded by the Plebiscite Commission; the resulting situation had had a detrimental effect on the output. In Teschen for similar reasons the production of coal had also diminished. The political situation there had re-acted on the mines. Czecho-Slovakia produced an excess of brown coal. This coal was useless for transportation purposes but was employed in certain industries which by reason of the political situation could not obtain it, and were now using black coal. An exchange of this brown coal for black coal could be suggested as a means of obtaining a more profitable distribution. In fact, the Commission could suggest many ways of co-ordination which the ordinary play of political affairs impeded.

MR. LOUCHEUR suggested that if an American Member could not be appointed to the Commission, Mr. Hoover's Agents should at least be allowed to continue their work in Poland and Czecho-Slovakia.

MR. HOOVER said that he thought perhaps a solution could be found if he were allowed time for consultation with Mr. Polk.

M. TITTONI suggested that Mr. Hoover might at least continue his activities for the first six months of the operations of the Commission.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was in entire agreement.

MR. POLK asked that the question should be left open for a decision between himself, Mr. Hoover and Mr. Loucheur.

It was then resolved:—

“That the Supreme Council should invite the British, French, Italian, Belgian, Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments each to nominate one member to a European Coal Commission to be immediately set up to undertake the co-ordination of the production, distribution and transportation of coal throughout Europe. The Reparation Commission, the Teschen Commission, the Plebiscite Commission for Silesia, and different Commissions charged with matters of transport by sea, railroad and canal, should all be instructed to co-operate with this Coal Commission and to assist the work of the Coal Commission to the full extent of their powers.”

It was further decided that Mr. Polk, Mr. Hoover and M. Loucheur should confer regarding American representation on this Commission.

4. MR. BALFOUR said that he wished to introduce a subject not on the Agenda. He did so with all due apologies. He would remind the Council that at the same time as the Treaty with Austria, the Treaty with Czecho-Slovakia must be signed. The latter had not yet been passed by the Conference. Seeing that the Austrian Delegation had been in St.

Germain since May, he thought the Conference should be ready to deal with their final reply as soon as it came.

(It was agreed that the question of the Treaty with Czecho-Slovakia, together with that of the Treaty with Roumania should be placed on the Agenda for the following day.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that after hearing General Baird and Colonel Mougin, he had come to the conclusion that it would be desirable to hear M. Venizelos regarding some of the problems raised. He had taken the liberty of asking M. Venizelos to address the Council, and he had also summoned M. Tardieu. He had done this without consulting his colleagues, and hoped they would forgive him.

Situation in  
Bulgaria

(At this stage M. Venizelos, M. Tardieu, and a number of experts on Bulgarian Affairs entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he wished to have a conversation with M. Venizelos about Thrace and Asia Minor. The troops of the Great Powers were being demobilised very rapidly. It would therefore be impossible for any of the Great Powers to undertake a new campaign. The situation in Asia Minor, according to his information, was not good, and as M. Venizelos knew, a Commission of Enquiry had been sent. The Turks appeared to be greatly incensed against the Greeks. The situation in Bulgaria, on the other hand, caused anxiety also. The Bulgarians had demobilised in accordance with the terms of the Armistice, but they still had a respectable force under arms. In Thrace, even should the Bulgarian Government not interfere, there might be popular risings against the Greeks, should the country be given to them. What had taken place in Asia Minor had produced the effect of making the Turk and Bulgarian in Thrace feel a common interest antagonistic to Greece. France had, in the Balkans, 15,000 men, but he must warn M. Venizelos that the French Government had no intention of embarking those troops in a campaign. They were needed at home, and he wished to recall them as soon as possible. All the Powers were in the same case. The evidence led to the conclusion that if the Peace terms offered to Bulgaria were not to her taste, the resulting situation might be very serious. Greece, at the present moment, had five divisions in Asia Minor.

M. VENIZELOS said that there were four Greek divisions in Asia Minor; owing to the improvement of the situation there, a fifth division, which had been forming, had been withdrawn to Macedonia.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had not been made aware of any improvement in the situation in Asia Minor. On the contrary, he had heard that the situation there had re-acted unfavourably in Constantinople. The Allies had somewhat ingenuously undertaken to disarm the Bulgarians beyond the stipulations of the Armistice. They would doubtless understand that this intention of disarming them was a prelude

to something not to their advantage. They would probably decline to be disarmed. The question he personally wished to ask M. Venizelos was this:—Could the Greeks undertake to defend themselves on two fronts—in Thrace and in Asia Minor—without any assistance from the Allies?

M. VENIZELOS said that before replying to this question, he would like to speak a few words regarding the Greek Army in Asia Minor. He begged the Council to reserve its opinion on this subject. The Turks had made a great outcry, which had perhaps been too much attended to in certain quarters. No doubt excesses had taken place but there were extenuating circumstances. The troops had been attacked in the streets by people firing at them out of windows and from roofs. He did not attempt to exonerate the massacre of prisoners, but he would assure the Council that after investigation, it would be found that these were very rare and isolated instances. He need not remind the Council that the Greek troops which had fought in Macedonia and Russia side by side with the troops of the Great Powers had borne themselves well. Greek troops had been accused of excesses at Menemen. In all seventeen people had been killed and twenty wounded. Trouble had arisen there because a tired Greek Battalion withdrawing from Bergama had been attacked as it entered the town with sloped arms. Regarding what had been alleged at Aidin, he begged leave to read a telegram received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek forces. (See Appendix D.) As to the effect of these events on the feelings of the Turkish population in Thrace, he thought it would be a mistake to attribute much importance to it. On July 29th, he had received a telegram from Kavalla, conveying the appeal of a number of Thracian Mohammedans for liberation from Bulgaria. (See Appendix E.)

As to M. Clemenceau's question, whether Greece could undertake simultaneous action in Asia Minor and in Thrace, he was bound to answer in the negative, but he hoped that simultaneous action would not be required. The local situation in Asia Minor had improved, and he expected to reduce the Greek forces there by one division. Latterly, one Greek division from Bessarabia had been brought back to Greece, which it had been intended originally to send to Asia Minor. It might be possible therefore to leave only three divisions in Asia Minor, though doubtless it might be necessary to restrict the area occupied. This was all the easier as, in consequence of the agreement with Italy, there was nothing to fear on the side of Aidin, and only two roads of access to Smyrna needed guarding. This left eight divisions for use on the Greek front in Europe. He fully understood that the Great Powers could not undertake to enforce the Peace for him. He fully understood that Greece must help herself in this respect. Two things were possible. Bulgaria would sign the Treaty,



or would refuse to. If she signed it, he thought she would also execute it and withdraw her troops from Thrace. The occupation of Thrace under these conditions would be an easy operation. All measures would be taken to avoid resistance by the population, and damage to property. He would like to suggest that the best means of obtaining these results would be to send British and French officers to advance in front of the troops. If Bulgaria refused to sign the Peace, he thought that not Greece alone, but Greece and Serbia, and perhaps also Roumania would be together in forcing Bulgaria to comply. He had heard it said that the Southern Dobrudja was to be restored to Bulgaria. Should this not be the case, and should Bulgaria attempt to resist the Treaty, he was confident that Roumania would help Greece and Serbia, though she was not definitely pledged to do so. He thought it would be of advantage to let the Bulgarians understand that if they did not accept the Treaty offered to them, they would have to be coerced by their neighbours, who would compensate themselves at her expense and eventually impose upon them much harder terms. For instance the Dobrudja would not be left to them. He thought this would make the Bulgarians think twice before resisting. There would be against the Bulgarians the overwhelming force of eight Greek divisions, two Serbian divisions, (at least two Serbian divisions could reasonably be expected) and five or six Roumanian divisions. Should the last not act, the eight Greek and two Serbian divisions, by prompt intervention, could easily take Sofia and dictate Peace.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Venizelos what he thought about the Turkish population in Thrace. The information he had received was that these Turks were in league with the Bulgarians against Greece.

M. VENIZELOS said that if it was only the Thracian population that gave trouble, eight divisions was an ample force to cope with the situation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not entirely re-assured. M. Venizelos answered his question by saying that though he could not conduct a simultaneous campaign in Asia Minor and in Thrace, he hoped the Turks would be good enough not to attack him in both places at once.

M. VENIZELOS said he had understood M. Clemenceau to ask whether Greece could fight Bulgaria and Turkey at the same time. This, Greece could not do, but she was not afraid of local risings in the population. Before concluding his remarks, he would like to draw the attention of the Council to a curious historical fact. It had often been alleged that the shape of Greece towards the East was such as to render her Eastern frontier untenable.

He showed by the help of an atlas the persistence throughout the

centuries of a territorial distribution of the Hellenic world very similar to the territorial claims of the Greek Delegation.

(The work quoted was "The Bulgarians and their historical ethnographical and political frontiers, 679-1917". Preface by Dr. Rizoff, published in Berlin, 1917.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that a suggestion had been made by M. Venizelos which he would not accept. If he was unable to send French troops, he was equally unable to send French officers to risk their lives in Thrace.

M. PICHON said that M. Venizelos had only considered the hypothesis of resistance by Bulgaria to the Treaty. In that case the Serbians and Roumanians were excepted to make common cause with Greece. But was it not possible that Bulgaria would acquiesce in all the clauses concerning Roumania and Serbia, in order to detach them from Greece and in order to be able to cope with Greece alone?

M. VENIZELOS said that as to Serbia, he felt certain of her co-operation. He had stood by Serbia at the risk of civil war in his own country, and he had no doubt of Serbia's loyalty. There was, moreover, a Treaty between Greece and Serbia. There was none with Roumania and he admitted that Roumanian co-operation was less certain. He did not, however, think that Bulgaria would abandon the Dobrudja without contest.

(M. Venizelos then withdrew.)

M. TARDIEU then explained that the Commission had attempted to work on the lines suggested by M. Tittoni, but that no agreement had been reached up to the present.

(Certain alternative suggestions were made and the question was deferred for discussion at a later date.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 5 August, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-24

[Translation <sup>8</sup>]

#### *Telegram To Be Sent to the Hungarian, Serbian and Roumanian Governments*

AUGUST 5, 1919.

1. The Supreme Council of the Peace Conference has decided to send to Budapest a Mission consisting of four generals: American, French, English and Italian.

*a.* To enter into communication with the Hungarian Government

---

<sup>8</sup> Translation is that found under Paris Peace Conf. 180.03502/17.

in order to assure the execution of the armistice with the modifications which, in common accord, they consider necessary.

b. To enter into communication with the Commanders of the (Roumanian) (Serbian) Armies in order to guarantee the occupied countries against all cruelty, in accordance with the instructions of the Conference, and to give them such instructions as they believe advisable with a view to the effective occupation of these armies and the withdrawal within their respective frontiers of forces in excess of actual needs.

(This first part only will be sent to the Hungarian Government.)

2. The Conference requests the (Serbian) (Roumanian) Government to transmit immediately to the Commanders of their armies the order to conform to the instructions of the Mission of four generals who represent the Conference.

---

#### Appendix B to HD-24

[Translation <sup>a</sup>]

#### *Instructions to the Interallied Mission at Budapest*

*It will be the object of the Mission:*

1st: To get into communication with the Hungarian Government with a view to insuring the observation of the armistice and rendering the disarming effective.

To this end it will be obliged:

a) To fix the maximum number of effectives of the Hungarian army to be maintained under arms, with the sole object of insuring order in the interior;

b) To proceed to the disarming of all the demobilized units and to the dissolution of the depots or mobilizing centers;

c) To insure the surrender to the Allies of the arms, munitions and war material in excess of the material necessary for the units kept under arms; to include the material coming from the Mackensen Army;

d) To regulate, in accord with the Allied commands, the distribution of this various material among the Allied Powers interested, taking into account the military effort furnished by each, and the present war situation;

e) To stop immediately the production of the arsenals and the war manufactories;

2nd. To make a report on the present condition of this matter and its probable outcome;

3rd. To establish liaison with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Rumanian and Serbian armies, in order:

---

<sup>a</sup> Translation is that found under Paris Peace Conf. 180.03502/17.



a) To prevent on the part of the victorious armies all measures which would tend to excite the national sentiment in Hungary or which in any way might prolong the troubled situation in this country and retard the conclusion of peace.

b) To determine according to the situation of the moment the effectives and the emplacements of the Rumanian and Serbian troops that it will be necessary to maintain on Hungarian soil to guarantee order and the execution of the armistice.

c) To regulate with the Rumanian and Serbian commands the withdrawal of the excess Rumanian and Serbian troops.

*The Mission is informed, for its further instructions:*

1. That the frontiers of Hungary having been defined already by the Conference and communicated directly to all the Governments concerned, it is the policy of the Conference to withdraw all foreign troops from this country, avoiding all unnecessary delay. It must be noted that the Rumanians have promised to withdraw their armies as soon as the disarming of the Hungarians is accomplished, and in accord with the armistice terms.

2. That orders have been given to raise the blockade against Hungary and to proceed to the immediate importation of the food stuffs of the most urgent nature.

3. That the maintenance of these new conditions will depend on the conduct of the Hungarian Government toward the Allied and Associated Powers.

4. That these Powers have not the least desire to interfere in the interior affairs of the Hungarian nation concerning the choice of their Government, but that at the same time they cannot treat with any Government which they cannot trust to carry out fairly its international obligations.

---

#### Appendix C to HD-24

#### *[Production and Consumption of Coal in the Principal Countries of Europe for the Year 1913]*

In the figures below the following omissions and assumptions have been made on account of there being no information available:

Russia and Hungary are not considered.

Spanish production has so increased since 1913 that local needs can be provided for.

Bulgaria, Roumania, Turkey, Greece and Greater Serbia are also omitted from the statistics.

The 1913 coal production and consumption in the other countries

of Europe, based as nearly as possible on the boundary lines established by the Peace Treaties, was as follows:

	<i>Production</i>	<i>Consumption</i>
Austria	2, 250, 000	12, 000, 000
Belgium	23, 000, 000	26, 000, 000
Czecho-Slovakia *	32, 000, 000	24, 500, 000
Denmark		3, 785, 000
France †	58, 000, 000	79, 000, 000
Germany ‡	262, 000, 000	228, 500, 000
Great Britain	292, 000, 000	192, 000, 000
Holland	1, 900, 000	6, 305, 000
Italy		11, 000, 000
Luxembourg		3, 800, 000
Norway		2, 284, 000
Poland	8, 000, 000	15, 500, 000
Sweden		6, 195, 000
Switzerland		3, 500, 000
	<hr/> 679, 150, 000	<hr/> 614, 369, 000

The coal producing countries listed below are now producing at about the following annual rate, this second column being the percentage of 1913 production listed;

	<i>Production</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Austria	1, 600, 000	71
Belgium	19, 000, 000	83
Czecho-Slovakia	25, 000, 000	78
France	23, 000, 000	40
Germany	180, 000, 000	69
Great Britain	183, 000, 000	62
Poland	6, 000, 000	68
Other States in previous tables	5, 400, 000	Uncertain
	<hr/> 443, 000, 000	<hr/> 65

#### Appendix D to HD-24

[*The Commander of the Greek Army in Smyrna (Paraskevopoulos)*  
to the President of the Greek Council of Ministers (Venizelos)]

[Translation <sup>10</sup>]

SMYRNA, August 2, 1919.

HIS EXCELLENCY M. VENIZELÓS: An extended inquiry into the events at Aidin leads to the conclusion that the reports which had been communicated on the alleged massacres are deprived of foundation.

\* including Ostrau-Karwin (Teschen) [Footnote in the original.]

† including Saar [Footnote in the original.]

‡ including Upper Silesia [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>10</sup> The French text is a translation, apparently from the Greek. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

During the battles which lasted two days in the town of Aidin, two men and a woman, all Mohammedans were killed entirely by accident. Thousands of rifle shots having been fired, it is natural that these three persons should have been hit.

Immediately after the departure of our army from this sector, the Turks gave themselves up to frightful massacres of Christians. Photographs of hundreds of victims have been taken by our service, mostly women and children whose bodies were mutilated. Up to the present six hundred corpses have been found; the total number of victims is estimated at more than two thousand.

After the reoccupation of the town, thanks to the measures which have been adopted, no acts of reprisal on our part have occurred. It follows from this, that the responsibility for events falls entirely upon the Turks.

I have had occasion to establish definitely in several instances that uncontrolled rumors were spread by subordinate officials after having been exaggerated or even created out of whole cloth.

GENERAL PARASKEVOPOULOS

---

#### Appendix E to HD-24

[*Appeal of Thracian Mohammedans for Liberation From Bulgaria*]

[Translation <sup>11</sup>—Telegram]

SSS CAVALLA 574—257—29—23 H.—VMLTE.

We, refugee Mohammedans of Thrace, who, fleeing from Bulgarian atrocities, have found asylum and our safety in Greece, learned with joy overflowing that the Conference, issuing a sublime decree of justice, decided upon the liberation of Thrace from the odious Bulgarian thralldom, and that we could soon reintegrate our country in order to live happily upon the Hellenic coasts with our co-religionists with whom the Mohammedans of Thrace have always been in excellent relations, and to prosper under the perfect regime of liberty and justice of the Hellenes. Our compatriots anxiously await the termination of the evils that they have endured and continue to endure under the Bulgarian Government and stoutly hope that Bulgaria, whose barbarity exceeds all bounds, will be limited to its borders as they were before the Balkan war, and that it will no longer have under its domination territories to which it is a complete stranger. Assuring your excellence that the liberating troops of Greece will be greeted everywhere in our country with real enthusiasm, we beg you to accept our entire devotion in the name of the Mohammedans of Eastern

---

<sup>11</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



Thrace: The native Committee Sandjak Gumuldjina Sherif Ismail Mehmet Youssouf Ralisin Moustafa Cadir Bakir Mehmet Ibrahim, Committee Caza Kanthie [*Xanthe?*] Youssouf Moula Hassan Moustafa Rassin Mestan Hassan Houssein Imbrahim, Committee Caza Cabrider [*Egridere?*] Imam Halil Hadji Mesiam Imane Souleimann Ibrahim Ahmet, Committee Caza D-ridale [*Daridere?*] Hafouz Houssein Ali Ahtet Houssein Sali, Native Committee Sandjak Dedéagato [*Dedeagach?*] Eteoglou Osman Deistan Ahmet Bouroundjik Ahmet, Committee Caza Demotica Schalli Salim B[illegible] Ibrahim Hassan Houssein, Committee Caza Ortacu [*Ortakoi?*] Djater Sahli Tatar Bekir, Committee Caza Kirbdjali Hedja Taik Moustafa Ramadan Ali Malil Fechat Schaban.

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, August 6, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

*Secretaries*

Mr. H. Norman.  
Sir George Clerk.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.  
M. Pichon.

*Secretaries*

M. Dutasta.  
M. Berthelot.  
M. de St. Quentin.

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

**JAPAN**

M. Matsui.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . . .	Capt. Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Major Caccia.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lt. Col. A. Jones.

*Interpreter*—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. At the suggestion of Mr. Balfour (see Annex "A") it was agreed to modify the text of the decision taken by the Conference on the 1st August, 1919, (H. D. 21, Item I<sup>1</sup>), and to request Marshal Foch to submit a report on the military measures necessary in order to oblige the German Government to surrender the persons guilty of breaches of the Laws of War.

Surrender of  
Officers Guilty of  
Breaches of the  
Laws of War

(It was agreed that no compensations should be demanded from the German Government. The revised text of the decision taken by the Conference on the 1st August, 1919, would therefore read as follows:—

It was decided—

(1) That no immediate reply to the German Government's request should be given.

(2) That the Military Representatives at Versailles in collaboration with Marshal Foch should investigate the accuracy of the statements contained in the communication of the German Government, and

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 449.

should utilise all available sources of information at their command.

(3) That Marshal Foch should report to the Council on the military measures that might be enforced in order to oblige the German Government to comply with the Clauses of the treaty relating to the surrender to the Allies of officers guilty of breaches of Laws of War.)

2. MR. POLK said that before the questions on the Agenda paper came under discussion, he wished to communicate to the Supreme Council the latest information received from Budapest.

Situation in  
Hungary

(Mr. Polk then distributed copies of the documents included in Annex "B".)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that from the telegram sent on the 5th August by Mr. J. A. Logan,<sup>2</sup> it would appear that the Roumanians had proposed an armistice to the Hungarian Government. He did not think that the Hungarians [*Roumanians?*] had been authorised by the Allied and Associated Powers to take such action.

M. TIRTONI thought that the Roumanian Government had merely put forward certain proposals.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Roumanian Government regarded itself as absolutely independent, and had acted and put forward its conditions as if the Allied and Associated Governments did not exist. Technically, Roumania was quite independent since Marshal Foch had not been placed in command of the Roumanian troops. Roumania had quarrelled with the Allies: M. Bratiano had left Paris thoroughly discontented, and he was now acting as the head of one independent State dealing with another equally independent State.

MR. POLK informed the Conference that he had that morning had a long conversation with Mr. Misu, shortly after the receipt of the documents he had just distributed. He had communicated the contents of those documents to Mr. Misu and had explained to him that Roumania's action amounted to an attempt to conclude a separate peace. He (Mr. Polk) had pointed out that he did not consider it right that the Roumanians should obtain the delivery of the war material referred to in the document under consideration. Mr. Misu had replied that the measures taken were dictated by military necessity. He further stated that Roumania had not been treated with justice in regard to the matter of reparations. He maintained that the Belgians, whose territory had similarly been invaded, had been permitted to appoint a representative on the Commission of Reparations and had thereby been able to look after their interests. On the other hand, Roumania had not been permitted to appoint a representative on that Commission.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that Mr. Misu should be invited to attend in order to discuss the question under reference. Mr. Misu was a

<sup>2</sup> Col. James A. Logan, Jr., member of the American Relief Administration at Paris.



very sensible man with whom it might be possible to arrive at an agreement.

M. CLEMENCEAU saw no objection to Mr. Misu being heard by the Council.

MR. POLK thought it would be preferable for Mr. Balfour in the first place to have a private conversation with Mr. Misu. He thought that procedure would yield better results.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that talking alone gave opportunities for the excuse of a certain flexibility of conversation that could not be got in a formal conference. On the other hand he thought a greater impression would be produced by an interview with the Council as a whole. He proposed, therefore, that Mr. Misu should be received in that room. Otherwise, that M. Clemenceau be authorised to speak on behalf of the Conference.

M. TITTONI enquired whether it would be possible for the Generals forming part of the Allied Mission to Budapest to start at once.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that a telegram should at once be sent to the Roumanian Government stating that the Council did not recognise the right of Roumania to conclude an Armistice. Should the Roumanians fail to accept those instructions, the situation would become exceedingly grave.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the Armistice proposed by the Roumanians would in addition deprive the Commission on Reparations of material and property which belonged to the whole of the Allies.

MR. POLK added that Mr. Hoover had also drawn attention to the fact that by withdrawing 50% of the rolling stock from Hungary, the Roumanians would thereby render the distribution of supplies impossible.

(Marshal Foch, General Bliss, General Weygand, General Belin and Col. Georges entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Supreme Council had decided that the four Generals should forthwith be sent to Budapest. He enquired what measures Marshal Foch had taken to give effect to that resolution.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that the four Generals who were to form part of the Military Mission to Budapest were scattered, consequently the following measures had been taken—General Graziani, being under the orders of General Franchet d'Esperey, a telegram had been transmitted to him through General Franchet d'Esperey together with copies of instructions. General Franchet d'Esperey had also been asked to forward copies of these documents to General Mombelli who was said to be at Sofia.

M. TITTONI, intervening, said that General Mombelli was now actually in Turin. He would therefore himself send him copies of the instructions. General Montpelli [*Mombelli?*] had, as a matter of

fact, already been warned and would be ready to start within six hours after receipt of orders to that effect.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he had forwarded to General Bliss the instructions intended for General Bandholtz, the American Representative. In regard to the British General, he believed him to be at Pressbourg, and he had consequently asked General Sackville-West to forward the necessary instructions. He had, however, just learnt that General Gorton had already reached Budapest. It would therefore be necessary to forward his instructions to that town.

MR. POLK wished to call attention to a certain matter connected with the instructions to be issued to the four Generals. Yesterday M. Tittoni had proposed an amendment in order that the Generals might fully realise that the instructions given them should be carried out in agreement with the Hungarian Government: that is to say, the required results were to be obtained rather by persuasion than by the issue of orders. The text of the telegram which he had received that morning from General Weygand did not appear to contain that amendment. He proposed, therefore, that the words "in agreement with the Hungarian Government", should be inserted in paras. (b) and (d).

GENERAL WEYGAND thought that the first paragraph of the instruction fully met Mr. Polk's view, since it was therein clearly stated that the mission should place itself in communication with the Hungarian Government in order to obtain certain concessions which were detailed in paragraphs which followed. He thought that sentence clearly indicated that an agreement should be reached between the mission and the Hungarian Government.

MR. POLK agreed that his objection had been fully met.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Council should proceed to draft the text of a telegram to be sent to the Roumanian Government, stating that the Allied and Associated Governments would not admit her right to conclude an independent armistice with Hungary; that such an armistice would not receive recognition, particularly as it was intended to take away large quantities of material, the joint property of all the Allies and not of Roumania alone.

MR. BALFOUR said he had prepared a draft telegram.

(After a short discussion, the following draft telegram was approved:—

"Supreme Council have learnt that Roumanian Military Authorities at Buda-Pesth have imposed Armistice on Hungarian Government, to be accepted at a few hours' notice. Terms of this armistice render it impossible for Hungarian Government to fulfil armistice concluded with Allied Powers on November 13th.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, terms

<sup>3</sup> The reference may be either to the armistice with Austria-Hungary, signed at Villa Giusti on November 3, 1918 (vol. II, p. 175), or to the military convention between the Allies and Hungary, signed at Belgrade on November 13, 1918 (vol. II, p. 183).

in themselves pay no regard to rights of reparation of other Allies. Supreme Council desire formally to record their refusal to recognise right of Roumanian Commander-in-Chief to impose any armistice without authority of Allied and Associated Powers.”)

(At this stage M. Misu and M. Vaida-Voevod entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council had invited M. Misu and M. Vaida-Voevod to attend in order to consider the situation in Hungary, which was very grave. The Roumanians had seized Budapest.

M. MISU, intervening, said that he had received no official communication on the subject.

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, said that information which left no doubt on the matter had been received from various sources. Furthermore, the Supreme Council had learnt that the Roumanians had proposed an armistice to the Hungarian Government.

M. MISU said he had received no information on that subject, with the exception of the telegram which Mr. Polk had shown him that morning.

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, said that the Supreme Council had just decided to send a telegram to the Roumanian Government.

(M. Clemenceau then read the telegram above quoted.)

M. MISU said he would forward a copy of the telegram to his Government, laying stress on the view expressed by the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Allied and Associated Powers had given many proofs of goodwill to Roumania. M. Bratiano had not always received these in the spirit in which they had been meant. The situation to-day, however, was very grave, and he was authorised to say that the Supreme Council were determined that the Armistice of Versailles<sup>4</sup> should be respected and executed everywhere.

M. MISU drew attention to the fact that the situation had entirely altered in consequence of the last attack made by the Hungarians.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the relative position of the Entente and Roumania had in no way altered.

M. MISU, continuing, said that Mr. Polk had that morning communicated to him a list of the material which had been demanded by the terms of the alleged armistice. He wished to point out that the Roumanians demanded the delivery of this material solely in the general interest. This material was being taken over solely with the view of disarming Hungary, since it was essential to disarm her as rapidly as possible. The measures so taken would not, however, in any way prejudice the eventual distribution between the Allies of the material so obtained.

---

<sup>4</sup>The reference may be either to the armistice with Austria-Hungary, signed at Villa Giusti on November 3, 1918 (vol. II, p. 175), or to the military convention between the Allies and Hungary, signed at Belgrade on November 13, 1918 (vol. II, p. 183).



M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to read to the Roumanian Delegation a copy of the instructions which had been sent to the Allied Generals who were proceeding to Budapest.

M. MISTU said he had received the text of the telegram that morning, and had already telegraphed the same to his Government. On the other hand, the Council should not lose sight of the fact that Roumania had been treated unjustly by the Commission on Reparations from which she had been excluded. Roumania had consequently not obtained the authority to seek out the material which had been looted from her territory by her various enemies.

M. VAIDA added that the Roumanians had merely claimed the return of their own property.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired how the Roumanians could pick out their own personal goods from the mass of material in question?

M. VAIDA pointed out that the Roumanian rolling stock had been taken by the Bolsheviks with the result that at the present moment Roumania only possessed some 50 locomotives. On the other hand, Roumania had been obliged to incur serious expense in order to maintain the army at a time when their Allies had already begun to demobilise. Mackensen, during the course of his retreat, had carried off a large quantity of material, which had subsequently fallen into the hands of the Magyars. The Roumanian Delegation had on several occasions requested the Conference to return this material, but no answer had ever been vouchsafed. It was essential that the material in question should be returned with as little delay as possible; otherwise the marks and signs, which would enable the Roumanians to recognise their property, would disappear. Should this material at once pass into the possession of the Roumanians, he thought it would be quite as safe as if it remained with the Magyars, and should it subsequently be proved that the engines, which would be used to revictual his unhappy country, in reality belonged to any particular one of the Allies, the Roumanians would be ready to surrender them without a murmur. The Council would undoubtedly agree that the material in the hands of the Roumanians would be a safer guarantee than if left in the hands of the Magyars.

M. CLEMENCEAU feared he had explained himself badly. The exact question that he wished to place before the Delegates was the following. The Council would not permit Roumania to conclude an Armistice which would in any way hinder the Hungarian Government from executing the terms of the Armistice which she had already concluded with the Allies. For some months past the Principal Allied and Associated Governments had endeavoured to enforce the execution of that Armistice. It had been agreed to enforce that Armistice, and even if possible to enlarge its scope by agreement,

in order to obtain a more complete disarmament. The Roumanians had now seized Buda-Pest. Nevertheless, the conditions of the Armistice concluded with the Entente would have to be fulfilled. The Allied and Associated Governments intended shortly to make peace with Hungary, and they could not allow the action of Roumania to retard the conclusion of peace. With that object in view, the Generals had been sent to Buda Pest.

M. MISU said that he would transmit the wishes of the Conference to his Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that these were not the wishes, but the final decisions of the Conference. Furthermore, the Council wished to know as soon as possible what action Roumania intended to take in the matter. In regard to the material, he wished to point out that the Allied and Associated Governments had no desire to deprive Roumania of that portion of the material to which she was entitled: but the whole must enter into the common pool. That was the principle which Roumania was required to accept.

M. MISU pointed out that it was a matter of urgency that the Inter-Allied Commission should proceed to Buda Pest with as little delay as possible. The Commission would then be in a position to obtain particulars, and to give the necessary instructions.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the view that the situation at present in Hungary was so confused that it would be necessary, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, that all questions should be settled directly between the Conference and the Roumanian Government.

MR. BALFOUR said that he could add very little to what had been said by M. Clemenceau. It was quite clear that Roumania had been cruelly treated both by Germany and by Hungary. Without doubt, she would never recover all that she had lost, since an act of spoliation necessarily involved an act of destruction, and it would be impossible to get back material which had been destroyed. Roumania would doubtless find herself in the same situation as Serbia, Belgium and France. It was equally true to say that the Magyars had taken from the Roumanians the greater part of their rolling stock, but the fact that rolling stock constituted the material which Europe most urgently required in order to reconstitute her economic life should not be lost sight of. Consequently, in spite of her rights, Roumania should realise that in the general interest this material must be distributed in an equitable manner for the benefit of all parties.

In regard to the proposed Armistice he wished to invite attention to the following paragraph which the Roumanian Government desired to impose on Hungary, namely:—

“The factories existing in Hungary which may have served for the manufacture of arms and munitions of all kinds must be demol-

ished to the benefit of Roumania. This operation shall be carried out by Roumanian specialists with the help of Hungarian Officers”.

He need hardly point out that in Hungary, as in all Allied countries, every factory and every workshop had been utilised for the production of war material. Consequently, the whole of the Hungarian factories would have to be handed over to Roumania. Such a solution was impossible for Hungary, and he thought that it would be equally unacceptable to the Allied and Associated Governments, since it contravened the principles which had hitherto guided the Conference in their labours.

MR. VAIDA said that the opportunities of presenting their case to the Conference which had hitherto been offered to the Roumanian Delegation had been so few and far between that he could not allow the present opportunity of making a statement to escape. He wished to impress upon the Conference the fact that the Magyars had never complied with the conditions of the Armistice of the 13th November, 1918. The Entente had for many months past struggled against the situation so created, and had on frequent occasions issued instructions which the Roumanian Government had always accepted whatever might have been the consequences entailed. On the other hand, the Allied and Associated Powers had never been able to compel the Hungarians to accede to their wishes. Finally, the Hungarians had attacked Roumania thereby annulling the Armistice. In spite of the Armistice, the Hungarians had treated the Roumanians as enemies and compelled the latter to take military measures to defend themselves.

He wished on this occasion to beg the Conference to make certain alterations in the terms of the existing Armistice. He would ask the Conference to add to the instructions to be issued to the Generals a clause to the effect that the Armistice of the 13th November having been broken no longer existed, and that it must be replaced by a new Armistice to be imposed in Budapest by the representatives of the Entente. Many of the clauses of the Armistice of November, 1918, could no longer be carried out: others had no further value. Yesterday, the Hungarians were the enemies of Roumania, to-day they were conquered, and Roumania in the future desired that they should become her friends. He begged the Conference therefore, to reconsider the text of the telegram which it was proposed to send to the Roumanian Government and to modify it so as to add a sentence which would prove to his Government that it could still count on the same goodwill as the Conference had extended to himself personally. Every telegram issued by the Conference was invariably at once published in the newspapers of Vienna and Budapest. Consequently, it was essential that the message should not be open to the interpreta-



tion that the Conference desired to blame Roumania when a word of encouragement would cause hopes to arise, which would lead more easily to the desired goal.

M. CLEMENCEAU promised that this request would receive the favourable consideration of the Conference.

MR. MISU added that the Roumanian Delegation merely asked for some sign of goodwill.

(Mr. Misu and Mr. Vaida-Voevod then withdrew.)

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the view that the remarks made by the Roumanian representatives were just, and that a sentence should be added to the draft telegram to give effect to their wishes.

M. TITTONI pointed out that Mr. Vaida-Voevod had also declared that the Hungarians had no further claim to the maintenance of the first Armistice, and that the four Allied Generals should be charged with the duty of dictating new conditions.

(After a short discussion it was decided to insert in the telegram above quoted the following sentence:—

“Fully recognising the just claims of Roumania and her devotion to the common cause”.)

(It was agreed:—

(1) To transmit the following telegram with all due urgency to the Roumanian Government through the French Chargé d’Affaires at Bukarest:—

“The Supreme Council had [*have?*] learnt that the Roumanian Military Authorities at Budapest have imposed Armistice on Hungarian Government to be accepted at a few hours notice. The terms of this Armistice render it impossible for Hungarian Government to fulfil Armistice concluded with Allied and Associated Powers on November 13, 1919. Moreover, the terms in themselves paid no regard to rights of reparation of other Allies. The Supreme Council whilst fully recognising the just claims of Roumania and her devotion to the common cause, desired formally to record their refusal to recognise the right of Roumania’s Commander-in-Chief to impose any Armistice without authority of the Allied and Associated Powers.”

(2) To forward instructions to the four Generals, members of the Military Mission to Budapest, to proceed thither without delay.

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to communicate to the Conference, for information, the following telegram dated Constantinople, 4th August, 1919:—

Results of the  
Decision of the  
Conference in  
Regard to Smyrna

“The High Commissioners of Great Britain, France and Italy on the 3rd August, 1919, transmitted to the Turkish Government, the decisions of the Supreme Council in regard to the delimitation of the Greek and Italian zones of

occupation<sup>5</sup> and in regard to the creation of a Commission of Enquiry into the events which have taken place in consequence of the occupation of Smyrna.<sup>6</sup>

"The Grand Vizier received this communication with great satisfaction and declared that the Conference had thereby increased by 50 per cent, the authority of the Government.

"An official communiqué dated on the 4th August ends as follows:—"Without doubt the humanitarian decision of the Peace Conference will fill everyone with gratitude."

4. M. CLEMENCEAU read the following telegram, dated 5th August, 1919, which he had received from the French Ambassador in Washington, in reply to the request made by the Conference to the American Government on the subject of the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia:—

Repatriation of  
Czecho-Slovaks  
in Siberia

"The American Government possesses no tonnage which could serve for the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovaks, and does not believe that any other country is in a position to supply tonnage for that purpose. In view of the fact that the matter relates to the repatriation of people who would no longer fight, it enquires whether it would not be possible to send these people to the Black Sea passing through the region occupied by General Denikin.

The American Government is considering at the same time the repatriation which must soon take place of the 200,000 German-Austro prisoners still in Siberia."

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, said that the Conference were faced with a cruel situation. The Military Experts at Versailles, to whom the question had been referred, had reached the conclusion that the Czecho-Slovaks could only be repatriated by the sea route. To the demand for tonnage made to the American Government, the reply was that no tonnage was available, and that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovaks could only be made by the land route. The Conference felt obliged, therefore, as a last resort, to turn to the Japanese Government to whom the question had already been submitted.

M. MATSUI said that during the course of the Meeting at which this question of repatriation had first been discussed, the view had been expressed that the Czecho-Slovaks should be withdrawn from the Trans-Siberian railway and placed on the right of Koltchak's army, in order to reinforce the latter. It had then been suggested that the Japanese Government should furnish military contingents in order to relieve the Czecho-Slovaks along the Transiberian Railway. Later, the situation had altered, and it had been found that the Czecho-Slovaks could not be used to reinforce Koltchak's army since they desired to be repatriated and refused to fight. The situation having thus altered, Baron Makino had telegraphed to the Japanese Gov-

<sup>5</sup> HD-8 and 10, pp. 154 and 191.

<sup>6</sup> HD-11, minute 4, HD-12, minute 5, and HD-13, minute 12, pp. 207, 238, and 264.

ernment for fresh instructions. No reply had yet been received. He did not wish to prejudge the question, but he felt compelled to inform the Conference that he did not think the Japanese Government would be in a position to accept the proposal. He was led to that conclusion by the refusal of his Government to comply with a similar request made by the Roumanian Government, who had asked for tonnage to repatriate the Roumanians at present in Siberia, whose numbers fell far below those of the Czecho-Slovaks. Nevertheless, his Government had been unable to obtain the necessary tonnage.

M. CLEMENCEAU gathered that, under the circumstances, it would apparently be impossible to repatriate the Czecho-Slovaks either by the land or by the sea route. On the other hand, all information went to show that they could not spend the winter in Siberia.

M. TITTONI enquired how the Czecho-Slovaks at present obtained their supplies?

MR. BALFOUR replied that they received their supplies from America via Vladivostock.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired whether the ships which brought these supplies did not return empty, and, if so, whether they could not be used for repatriating the Czecho-Slovaks.

MR. BALFOUR thought that the steamers were not suitable for employment as troopships.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the men would prefer to be repatriated in discomfort rather than not to be repatriated at all.

MARSHAL FOCH expressed the view that the shortest route would be via Vladivostock and Vancouver and thence across the Atlantic to Europe. He enquired whether the ships which came to fetch the American troops could not be used for bringing the Czecho-Slovaks across the Atlantic.

M. CLEMENCEAU urged that some solution should be found.

MR. POLK said that if the Council would adjourn the question for a few days, he would again refer the matter to his Government.

(It was decided that Mr. Polk should telegraph again to the American Government<sup>7</sup> to urge the necessity of supplying the tonnage required for the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovaks, the American proposals to send the men across the territories occupied by General Denikin having been found to be unworkable.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the following telegram dated 3rd August, 1919, had been received from the French Military Attaché at Stockholm:—

Situation in the  
Baltic Provinces:  
Action of General  
von der Goltz

“From information supplied by our Military Mission at Libau, the Germans, far from evacuating Courland, as promised, continue to reinforce them-

<sup>7</sup> Telegram No. 3546, August 7, 1919, 3 p. m., from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 294.



selves by fresh drafts and additional matériel. They at present possess 35,000 men in that region.

Von der Goltz is determined not to leave. He encourages the entry of Russian Bolsheviks, and German Spartacists who have considerable funds at their disposal. He counts on their action to provoke a revolutionary movement which would give him the excuse for intervention.

The situation is extremely critical and will become more so after the 10th August, the date from which the American revictualling must cease except for the children at Riga. Unless the Ulmannis Government receives at once the arms, material and money which the British Mission had caused it to expect, it cannot maintain itself beyond the 15th August, and will be replaced by extreme Socialists. This will bring about a Bolshevik Revolution. The Germans will then intervene as saviours and definitely occupy the country."

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, called on Marshal Foch to express his views on this question.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Conference had decided on the 30th July,<sup>8</sup> to accept the proposals made by General Gough. The telegram giving effect to that decision had only been dispatched by Marshal Foch on the 1st August. The telegram to the French Military Attaché at Stockholm had been dispatched on the 3rd August, and he doubted whether Marshal Foch's telegram which had to be forwarded through General Nudant in Berlin, could have reached General von der Goltz by the 3rd August.

On the other hand, that morning, Marshal Foch had received the following telegram from General Gough:—

"Please thank Marshal Foch for the firm attitude taken by him in regard to von der Goltz. Should the latter carry out the orders now sent him, many of the difficulties will have been overcome. I shall do all that is possible in regard to the Lithuanian Polish question."

He (General Weygand) thought it would be best to await the receipt of later information.

(It was decided to postpone the consideration on this question until the receipt of further information.)

6. MR. MATSUI proposed that the Japanese Delegation should be authorised to appoint a Japanese Officer to form part of the Allied Commission appointed on August 4th, 1919 (H. D. 23)<sup>9</sup> to negotiate between the Polish and German Governments.

(It was agreed that a Japanese Officer should be nominated to represent Japan on the Allied Commission for negotiation between the German and the Polish Governments.)

7. MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY<sup>10</sup> invited attention to the draft of a Treaty

Appointment  
of Allied  
Commissioners  
Negotiating  
Between the Ger-  
man and Polish  
Governments

<sup>8</sup> HD-19, minute 4, p. 404.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, p. 515.

<sup>10</sup> J. W. Headlam-Morley, British representative, Commission on New States.

between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand, and Czecho-Slovakia on the other hand (Annex "C").

Treaty Between  
the Principal  
Allied and  
Associated Powers  
and the Czecho-  
Slovak State

The Commission on New States were anxious that a copy of the Treaty should be communicated to the Czecho-Slovak Delegation, and he had been deputed to obtain the sanction of the Council to this procedure being adopted. The Treaty had been unanimously accepted by the Commission on New States, but it was considered politic that the Czecho-Slovak Delegation should at once have an opportunity of expressing their views.

(It was decided to approve the draft of the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czecho-Slovakia as submitted by the Committee on New States; the draft to be submitted to the Czecho-Slovakian Delegation by the Secretariat-General.)

8. MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the Commission on New States had proposed that the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Roumania (Annex "D") should also forthwith be communicated to the Roumanian Delegation.

Treaty Between  
the Principal  
Allied and  
Associated Powers  
and Roumania

The treaty dealt with matters of very great complexity. The Commission had therefore refrained from entering into direct negotiations with the Roumanian Delegation. It was now considered expedient that the draft Treaty in its final form, should forthwith be communicated to the Roumanian Delegation, with the intimation that though the general principles had been accepted, the Roumanian Government would have the opportunity of making their observations on matters of detail. He pointed out that the same procedure had been followed with advantage in the case of Poland.

MR. POLK enquired whether any reservation had been made by any of the representatives on the Commission.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY replied that the American representative had made a reservation in regard to the clause dealing with navigation on the Dniester.

MR. POLK said that he could only accept the Treaty with the reservation on the question of the Dniester. President Wilson himself was greatly interested in this question.

MR. HUDSON suggested that the clause dealing with the Dniester should not be communicated to the Roumanian Delegation. The Dniester was situated in Russian territory.

MR. POLK stated that for that very reason, the inclusion of this clause might convey the idea to the Roumanians that the Council accepted their claims in Bessarabia.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY maintained that if the Dniester were not

mentioned, great difficulties might subsequently arise. He suggested that in communicating the Treaty to the Roumanian Delegation, a forwarding letter should be sent explaining that certain questions could not be definitely decided until the frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia had been settled.

(It was decided to approve the draft of the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Roumania as submitted by the Committee on New States; the clause concerning the Dniester River to be revised by the Committee to meet the objections of the American Delegation; the draft thus revised to be submitted to the Roumanian Delegation at once by the Secretariat-General.)

9. MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY read the following report submitted to the Council by the Commission on New States:—

Reply to the Note  
of the Austrian  
Delegation on the  
Protection of  
Minorities

“Complying with the direction of the Supreme Council under date of 21st [29th?] July, 1919,<sup>11</sup> the Commission on New States has studied the comments of the Austrians on the clauses concerning the Protection of Minorities, as included in the Conditions of Peace, and the Commission has the honour to submit to the Supreme Council the attached draft of a reply to the Austrian counter-proposals.

“The Commission favours the revision of Articles 79 and 87 of the Conditions of Peace to which the Austrian comment has taken particular exception. This revision would have the effect of bringing the Austrian Treaty into conformity with the Treaty already signed with Poland, and the Treaties to be signed with Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia, Greece, and Bulgaria, in that which concerns the League of Nations enforcement of the guarantees to minorities. The Commission on New States had previously made an informal suggestion that this course should be adopted. The Austrians, in their comment, have stated the objections which the Commission had anticipated. As originally presented to Austria, Articles 79 and 87 are far from clear and are perhaps not altogether consistent. In the opinion of the Commission, the suggested revision will in some points constitute a distinct mitigation of Austria's terms, for the following reasons:—

(1) Whereas the former Article 79 conferred jurisdiction on the League of Nations over all obligations in this part of the Treaty, the revision would limit the jurisdiction of the League of Nations to the provisions regarding racial, religious and linguistic minorities.

(2) Whereas the former draft outlined no definite procedure for the League of Nations and made it possible that appeals might be prosecuted by interested minorities, or even individuals, the revised draft would limit the League of Nations jurisdiction to disputes between States, and would prescribe a definite procedure to be followed. By recognising the jurisdiction of the International Court, the judicial feature of disputes is emphasised

<sup>11</sup> See HD-18, minute 1, p. 369.



and the possibility of political interference to which the Austrians object is greatly diminished.

(3) Whereas the former Article 87 required the consent of the Council of the League of Nations for any modification of those clauses, meaning the unanimous consent of the Council, the revised draft would allow a modification to be made if it received the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

"The Commission on New States is convinced that the suggested revision will more effectively serve the purpose of the Allied and Associated Powers in including these clauses in the Austrian Treaty, at the same time that it more clearly meets the views of the Austrians, as expressed in their counter-proposals."

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY, continuing, said that the Commission on New States had prepared a Draft reply to the Austrian counter-proposals giving effect to the conclusions contained in the report just read (Annex E).

(It was agreed:—

(1) To accept the draft reply to the Austrian Counter-Proposals on the protection of Minorities, submitted by the Commission on New States (Annex E)

(2) To forward the same to the Editing Committee for incorporation in the final and comprehensive reply to the Austrian Counter-Proposals.

10. MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that M. Venizelos had submitted a report (Annex F) dealing with certain difficulties in the Balkans by the encouragement of voluntary emigration.

Proposal by M.  
Venizelos To Deal  
With Certain  
Problems in the  
Balkans by  
Voluntary  
Emigration

M. Venizelos' proposals had been discussed unofficially by the Committee on New States, who considered these to be so good as to justify their extension to all the Balkan States. It had been suggested that an Inter-Allied Commission should be appointed by the

League of Nations to control the proposed emigration. The Commission now sought permission from the Council to discuss the question in the first place with M. Venizelos and subsequently, should an agreement be reached, with the various Balkan States concerned. The Commission on New States had drawn up a report (Annex F) which had already been submitted to the Council.

M. TITTONI said he would accept the proposal provided a strict control were established so that the suggested emigration should not be used by the Governments concerned as measures of expulsion.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY pointed out that the proposal to create a strong Commission of control under the League of Nations had been brought forward with the very object of preventing any such abuses.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the view that since the question had not been placed on the Agenda paper, it should be adjourned for further

consideration at a later date.

(It was agreed to adjourn to a later date the further consideration of the report submitted by the Commission on New States on the proposals submitted by M. Venizelos on the subject of encouragement of voluntary emigration in the Balkan States.)

(Mr. Headlam-Morley then withdrew. Mr. Laroche<sup>12</sup> entered the room.)

11. M. LAROCHE read the note submitted by the Committee on Political Clauses on the subject of the eventual restitution to the

Note From the  
Committee on  
Political Clauses  
on the Eventual  
Restitution to the  
Allies of  
Rolling Stock  
Moved Beyond  
the Armistice  
Frontier in  
Violation of the  
Armistice of  
Villa Giusti

Allies of Rolling Stock moved beyond the Armistice frontier in violation of the Armistice of Villa Giusti<sup>13</sup> (Appendix "G").

(It was agreed to refer the question raised by the Italian Delegation (Appendix "G") to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles for examination and report.)

12. M. LAROCHE read the note submitted by the Committee on Political Clauses respecting the desirability of reconciling the Clauses

Desirability of  
Reconciling the  
Clauses of the  
Treaty of Peace  
With Austria  
With Those of the  
Treaties to Be  
Concluded With  
the Allied States  
Formed Out of the  
Austro-Hungarian  
Monarchy

of the Treaty of Peace with Austria with those of the Treaties to be concluded with the Allied States formed out of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. (Appendix "H".)

(It was agreed to accept the proposals contained in the note above referred to (Appendix "H") and to authorise the Committee on Political Clauses to prepare as soon as possible in conjunction with the Drafting Committee and the Commissions concerned, the new text of the Clauses of the Treaty with Austria therein referred to.)

(M. Laroche then withdrew.)

13. M. DUTASTA read the following Note, dated Paris, July 30th, 1919, addressed by M. Tittoni to the President of the Peace Conference on the subject of the dispatch of war material to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

Reference to the  
Supreme War  
Council at  
Versailles of the  
Dispatch of War  
Material to the  
Serbo-Croat-  
Slovene State

"Confirming declarations made yesterday to the Supreme Council, I have the honour to inform you that the Italian Delegation has telegraphed to the competent authorities in order that necessary steps

be taken to avoid every obstacle to the passage through Italy of French trains transporting merchandise including these the destination of which was Serbia, as well as the military trains agreed upon between France and Italy.

As for the war material destined to Serbia, as I had the honour to ask of you in my note of the 20th instant, as well as at yester-

<sup>12</sup> Jules A. Laroche, French representative, Committee on Political Clauses for Europe.

<sup>13</sup> Armistice of November 3, 1918, between the Allies and Austria-Hungary, vol. II, p. 175.

day's session, I would be infinitely obliged to you if you would be good enough to submit the question as soon as possible to the Inter-Allied Council of Versailles.

Please accept, etc. . . ."

MR. POLK drew attention to the fact that Mr. Lansing had maintained the view that the Allied and Associated Governments had no right to prevent the material going to Serbia; but he, personally, would raise no objection to the question being discussed by the Military Representatives at Versailles.

(It was agreed forthwith to submit the question above referred to, to the Military Representatives, Supreme War Council, Versailles.)

(At this stage General Groves<sup>14</sup> entered the Room.)

14. GENERAL GROVES said that under the Peace Treaty, Germany was forbidden to have any Naval or Military Aviation, and was required to surrender all her service aircraft to the Allied and Associated Powers. The Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control appointed to supervise the carrying out of the Air Clauses would not be able to begin work until after the ratification of the Treaty. Reports received from the British Military Commission at Berlin and from other sources (See Appendix I), showed that Germany was circumventing the Air Clauses by the following means:—

*Note From the Air Commission Asking That Measures May Be Taken to Prevent the Germans From Disposing of Their Air Material*

(1) She had sold and continued to sell her aircraft and aircraft material to various neutrals.

(2) She was adapting her aircraft to commercial use.

(3) She was also negotiating to sell to private companies for the sum of 400,000 marks some 500 aircraft engines captured from the Allies.

With regard to (1), namely, the sale of aircraft to neutrals, that entailed the securing of neutral markets at the expense of the Allies. Those markets would also support the German Aircraft Industry, which was the production of her air power, and also the basis of her commercial aeronautical development, which will be in competition with that of the Allied and Associated Powers. It was therefore suggested that this sale shall be forbidden through the Supreme Council, and that Germany shall be called upon to refund to the Allies the sums which she had already made out of such sales.

With regard to (2), that is, the conversion to commercial use of service types of aircraft, a service type of aircraft could be converted to commercial use by slight structural alterations within 48 hours. Such aircraft could equally well be re-converted to service use within the same period. It was suggested that the German Government shall be informed that the Allies are aware that service types are being con-

<sup>14</sup> Brig. Gen. P. R. C. Groves, British representative, Aeronautical Commission.



verted to commercial use, and that the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control shall be the sole judge as to whether any aircraft is of a service type or otherwise.

With regard to (3), (i. e. the sale of aircraft material captured from the Allies), under the Military Clauses all war material captured from the Allies was to be returned. This material was required by the Allies, particularly the engines.

It was, therefore, suggested that the German Government should be informed that the 500 engines referred to shall be delivered to the Allies at once, at a place to be specified, and all other material of this description shall be handed over to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the fact that the German Government had sold a certain number of captured aircraft engines to private firms re-acted in any way to the detriment of the Allies from a commercial point of view.

GENERAL GROVES replied in the negative. He would point out, however, that the engines in question were in very good order; they had been well looked after; and they were urgently required by the Allies.

(It was agreed to accept the proposals made by General Groves, namely:—

1. That the sale of aircraft and aircraft material to neutral Powers shall be forbidden through the Supreme Command, and that Germany shall be called upon to refund to the Allies the sums which she has already made out of such sales;

2. That the German Government shall be informed that the Allies are aware that service types of aircraft are being converted to commercial use, and that the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control shall be the sole judge as to whether any aircraft is of a service type or otherwise;

3. That the German Government be informed that the 500 engines sold to private companies shall be delivered to the Allies at once at a place to be specified, and all other material of this description shall forthwith be handed over to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control.)

(General Groves withdrew, and Colonel Morgan<sup>15</sup> entered the room.)

15. COLONEL MORGAN pointed out that the situation referred to in M. Pachitch's letter (Annex "J"), on the subject of the immediate liberation of prisoners of war had already been covered by a decision of the Supreme Council taken on May 23rd,<sup>15a</sup> and, if that decision were duly acted upon, no difficulties should arise.

M. TITTONI said that the Supreme Council had on May 23rd passed the following resolution:—

Liberation of  
Prisoners of War  
Formerly Belong-  
ing to the Austro-  
Hungarian Army,  
Now Nationals of  
an Allied or  
Associated State

<sup>15</sup> Lt. Col. John Hartman Morgan, British representative, Commission on Prisoners of War.

<sup>15a</sup> CF-27, minute 1, vol. v, p. 873.

"The Heads of Governments agree that all war prisoners, formerly nationals of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, now subjects of an Allied or an Associated Nation, should be immediately liberated in a measure to conform with transportation possibilities, and where the frontiers of the States shall have been definitely fixed. In any event, they should not be liberated later than the prisoners of war who are subjects of the new Austrian States."

Since that date, the Italian Government had taken every possible step to give effect to that decision, with the result that 80,000 prisoners had been repatriated even though the frontiers of the new States had not yet been definitely fixed. 60,000 prisoners still remained in Italy. The Italian Government had no wish to keep those men: but, owing to want of coal at the present moment, fewer trains were running than in wartime. The immediate repatriation of all prisoners of war no doubt deserved every consideration: but the essential needs of the population must in the first place receive attention. His Government had done, and would continue to do, all in their power to repatriate the prisoners in question at the earliest possible date.

(The Supreme Council took note of M. Tittoni's statement.)

16. COLONEL MORGAN explained that at the present moment there were 112,000 Turkish prisoners of war in Egypt. The safe custody of these men called for the maintenance of a considerable force. The British authorities felt they could not afford the man-power required for the purpose. The British War Office was therefore very anxious to repatriate the prisoners at the earliest possible date in anticipation of the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. The British Government considered that it could not authorise the execution of these measures without first obtaining the approval of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers thereto.

(It was agreed to authorise the British Government to undertake the immediate liberation of the Turkish prisoners of war in Egypt.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, August 7, 1919.

---

#### Appendix "A" to HD-25

[*The British Plenipotentiary (Balfour) to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference (Dutasta)*]

AUGUST 5, 1919.

DEAR MONSIEUR DUTASTA: I notice that, according to our "Procès-Verbal", one of the conclusions arrived at on August 2nd [1st],<sup>16</sup> was

---

<sup>16</sup> HD-21, minute 1, p. 449.

to the effect that Marshal Foch should be directed to consider what Military equivalent could be exacted from the Germans should they fail to carry out that provision of the Treaty which requires them to surrender Officers guilty of crimes against humanity and the laws of war.

This is not in accordance with my own recollection of what passed; but I have spoken to the Secretariat on the subject, and they are so convinced of the accuracy of their report that I am forced to admit that I must have failed clearly to hear what was said by my colleagues.

I do not therefore ask that any alteration should be made in the Minutes, but I should be grateful if you would place on record my dissent from this particular conclusion, which seems to suggest the possibility of comparing the punishment of criminals on the one hand, with some kind of Military advantage on the other;—an idea difficult clearly to grasp.

My own view was that we resolved to ask Marshal Foch to consider by what kind of Military threat we could prevent the German Government evading its Treaty engagements with regard to the surrender of accused Officers,—a quite different proposition.

Perhaps you would be kind enough to add this letter to our records.

A. J. BALFOUR

August 5, 1919.

---

Appendix B to HD-25

[Translation <sup>17</sup>]

PARIS, August 6, 1919.

To Colonel WALLACE <sup>18</sup>

in care of General Tasker H. Bliss,

*Hotel Crillon, Paris.*

MY DEAR COLONEL WALLACE: I am sending you herewith a copy of a telegram that has just been received from Budapest signed by the British General Gorton, by the Italian Colonel Romanelli, and by the American Colonel Causey, giving the text of the ultimatum sent by the Roumanian High Command to the Hungarian authorities yesterday evening at 6 o'clock. This text is somewhat garbled, but I send it to you just as it is, and I shall telegraph you a corrected copy as soon as I have it.

Mr. Hoover would appreciate your bringing this fact, as soon as possible, to the attention of General Bliss.

Kindly believe etc.

A. LOGAN

---

<sup>17</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>18</sup> Lt. Col. William B. Wallace, military and civil secretary to Gen. Tasker H. Bliss.



[Enclosure—Translation <sup>19</sup>]

[Telegram From the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest]

112 x U.

BUDAPEST, August 5, 1919.

Paris

When the Supreme Roumanian Command lays down for acceptance the cessation of hostilities requested by the Hungarian state. Contents of the military convention which will terminate the hostilities between Roumania and Hungary.

A. The Roumanian High Command foregoes the occupation of all of Hungary, if the Hungarian High Command engages:

(1) To deliver:

(a) All war materials of every kind which are still in the possession of the troops and of the Hungarian state.

An exception to this rule is the material which will be judged necessary to the armed forces which Hungary shall have the right to maintain in order to preserve internal order until the ratification of the peace with Roumania.

The effective of these forces shall not in any case exceed the number of 15,000 (fifteen thousand) men, including officers.

Their organization into units as well as their officering, arming, and grouping shall be decided upon later by the Roumanian High Command.

(b) Factories in Hungary for the manufacture of armament and munitions of all categories shall be dismantled to the advantage of Roumania by Roumanian specialists with the cooperation of Hungarian officers.

(c) Equipment of all categories necessary to a strong army of 300,000 soldiers.

(d) Fifty per cent of the rolling stock which, according to the registers, still belongs to the Hungarian state, and of the materials existing in Hungary which are used in the construction, maintenance, and repair of the railways and rolling stock.

(e) 200 (two hundred) touring cars and 400 (four hundred) motor trucks in good operating condition and with all their accessories.

(f) Thirty per cent of the cattle and animals of all kinds which actually exist in Hungary according to the registers. \*

(g) Thirty per cent of all agricultural machines of all kinds actually existing in Hungary. \*

<sup>19</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

\*Destined to be distributed to the Roumanian soldiers who cannot cultivate their land for the two following reasons: (a) They have been kept mobilized to safeguard the safety of the State against those who continually disturb the peace. (b) They have lacked the necessary means because these means had been appropriated by the enemy. [Footnote in the original.]

(h) 20,000 (twenty-thousand) wagonloads of wheat, 10,000 (ten thousand) wagon loads of maize, and 5,000 (five thousand) wagon loads of barley and oats.\*

(i) All floating material of every kind which, belonging to the Roumanian state, to private associations [or companies], and to Roumanian citizens, have been appropriated by the enemy in Roumania, and which are found in Hungarian state.

(j) Fifty per cent of all floating material of all kinds which belong to the Hungarian state.

(k) All Roumanian prisoners and hostages.

(l) All the Roumanian deserters, of every nationality, living as refugees in Hungary at the signature of the present convention.

(2) A. To maintain at the expense of the Hungarian state during all the time that the Roumanian troops shall occupy the regions to the west of Tisza, all the Royal Roumanian forces which are in these regions at the moment of the signature of the present convention.

(3) A. To procure the coal necessary to the traffic in relation to Roumanian military needs in the region to the west of Tisza.

(4) [*sic*] B. The Royal Roumanian Army will not retire to the east of Tisza until the Hungarian High Command shall have satisfied all the conditions imposed in paragraph A.

C. The reception of material and animals of all the categories provided for in paragraph A shall be made by commissions which shall be established. The composition and seat of the commissions, as well as conditions and places for the delivery of materials and animals will be determined later by the Roumanian High Command. The commissions should begin to function not later than 48 hours after the Roumanian High Command shall have officially notified their nomination to the Hungarian Command. Notification may be made for all of the commissions at the same time or for each one separately. The minimum term during which the delivery should be effectuated shall be fixed later by the Roumanian High Command for each category separately in relation with the technical possibilities.

D. A Roumanian mission for the supervision of the execution of this convention shall operate in Budapest. The mission shall function until the ratification of the treaty of peace between Roumania and Hungary by the lawful Hungarian authorities. The mission shall enjoy all the privileges and immunities accorded under extraterritoriality in civilized countries.

E. The present convention should be accepted or rejected as a whole; consequently, counterproposals will not be received. The time limit for reply expires at 10 p. m., August 5, 1919.

F. In case the conditions are not accepted, the Roumanian High Command shall appropriate from Hungary, without regard for pro-

---

\* See footnote on preceding page.

portion, the material and animals which shall be necessary to Roumania in order to replace, at least in part, the grievous gaps created in Roumania by an enemy which during all the period of the occupation and on the occasion of the peace of Budapest had been a stranger to humanitarian feelings.

GENERAL GORTON, English  
LIEUT. COL. ROMANELLI, Italian  
LIEUT. COL. CAUSEY, American

The above conditions were delivered to the Hungarian Ministry at 6 a. m., August 5, and it was allowed only until 10 a. m. to accept them.

The acceptance of these conditions would lead without a doubt to the fall of the Government and the ruin of the country.

GREGORY <sup>20</sup>

---

Appendix C to HD-25

JULY 5, 1919.

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

*Draft of a Treaty*

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY, AND JAPAN,  
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,  
and CZECHO-SLOVAKIA,

On the one hand;

On the other hand;

Whereas the union which formerly existed between the old Kingdom of Bohemia, the Markgraviate of Moravia and Duchy of Silesia on the one hand and the other territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on the other, has definitely ceased to exist, and

Whereas the peoples of Bohemia, of Moravia and of part of Silesia, as well as the peoples of Slovakia have decided of their own free will to unite, and have in fact united in a permanent union for the purpose of forming a single sovereign independent state under the title of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, and

Whereas the Ruthene peoples to the south of the Carpathians have adhered to this union, and

Whereas the Czecho-Slovak Republic in fact exercises sovereignty over the aforesaid territories and has already been recognised as a sovereign independent state by the other High Contracting Parties,

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan on the one hand, confirming their recognition of the

---

<sup>20</sup> Capt. Thomas T. C. Gregory, member of the American Relief Administration at Vienna.



Czecho-Slovak State as a sovereign and independent member of the Family of Nations: within the boundaries which have been or may be determined in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Austria of even date:

Czecho-Slovakia on the other hand desiring to conform its institutions to the principles of liberty and justice, and to give a sure guarantee to all the inhabitants of the territories over which it has assumed sovereignty:

The High Contracting Parties anxious to assure the execution of Article 66 of the said Treaty of Peace with Austria have for this purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to Say:

The President of the United States of America, His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Italy, H. M. the Emperor of Japan, the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

Who after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

## CHAPTER I

### Article 1

Czecho-Slovakia undertakes that the stipulations contained in articles 2 to 8 of this chapter shall be recognised as fundamental laws and that no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action shall [*sic*] prevail over them.

### Article 2

Czecho-Slovakia undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Czecho-Slovakia without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Czecho-Slovakia shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

### Article 3

Czecho-Slovakia admits and declares to be Czecho-Slovak nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality German, Austrian or Hungarian nationals habitually resident at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty in territory which is or may be recognised as forming part of Czecho-Slovakia under the

Treaties with Germany, Austria or Hungary respectively, or under any Treaties which may be concluded for the purpose of completing the present settlement.

Nevertheless, the persons referred to above who are over eighteen years of age will be entitled under the conditions contained in the said Treaties to opt for any other nationality which may be open to them. Option by a husband will cover his wife and option by parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.

Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must, transfer within the succeeding twelve months their place of residence to the State for which they have opted. They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in Czecho-Slovak territory. They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.

#### Article 4

Czecho-Slovakia admits and declares to be Czecho-Slovak nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality persons of German, Austrian or Hungarian nationality who were born in the territory referred to above of parents habitually resident there, even if at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty they are not themselves habitually resident there.

Nevertheless, within two years after the coming into force of the present Treaty, these persons may make a declaration before the competent Czecho-Slovak authorities in the country in which they are resident, stating that they abandon Czecho-Slovak nationality, and they will then cease to be considered as Czecho-Slovak nationals. In this connection a declaration by a husband will cover his wife, and a declaration by parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.

#### Article 5

Czecho-Slovakia undertakes to put no hindrance in the way of the exercise of the right which the persons concerned have, under the Treaties concluded or to be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with Germany, Austria, or Hungary, to choose whether or not they will acquire Czecho-Slovak nationality.

#### Article 6

All persons born in Czecho-Slovak territory who are not born nationals of another State shall *ipso facto* become Czecho-Slovak nationals.

### Article 7

All Czecho-Slovak nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

Difference of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Czecho-Slovak national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Czecho-Slovak national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding any establishment by the Czecho-Slovak Government of an official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Czecho-Slovak nationals of non-Czecho speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

### Article 8

Czecho-Slovak nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Czecho-Slovak nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

### Article 9

Czecho-Slovakia will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Czecho-Slovak nationals of other than Czech speech are residents adequate facilities for ensuring that the instruction shall be given to the children of such Czecho-Slovak nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Czecho-Slovak Government from making the teaching of the Czech language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Czecho-Slovak nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budget, for educational, religious or charitable purposes.



## CHAPTER II

## Article 10

Czecho-Slovakia undertakes to constitute the Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians within frontiers delimited by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as an autonomous unit within the Czecho-Slovak State, and to accord to it the fullest degree of self-government compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak State.

## Article 11

The territory Ruthene south of the Carpathians shall possess a special Diet. This Diet shall have power, of legislation in all linguistic, scholastic and religious questions, in matters of local administration, and in other questions which the laws of the Czecho-Slovak Republic may attribute to it. The Governor of the Ruthene territory shall be appointed by the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and shall be responsible to the Ruthene Diet.

## Article 12

Czecho-Slovakia agrees that officials in the territory Ruthene will be chosen as far as possible from the inhabitants of this territory.

## Article 13

Czecho-Slovakia guarantees to the territory Ruthene equitable representation in the legislative assembly of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, to which Assembly it will send deputies elected according to the constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. These deputies will not, however, have the right of voting in the Czecho-Slovak Diet upon legislative questions of the same kind as those attributed to the Ruthene Diet.

## Article 14

Czecho-Slovakia agrees that the stipulations of chapters I and II so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in the Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Czecho-Slovakia agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Czecho-Slovakia further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Czecho-Slovak Government and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Czecho-Slovak Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

### CHAPTER III

#### Article 15

Each of the principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Czecho-Slovakia on the other shall be at liberty to appoint diplomatic representatives to reside in their respective capitals, as well as Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and Consular agents to reside in the towns and ports of their respective territories.

Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Consular agents, however, shall not enter upon their duties until they have been admitted in the usual manner by Government in the territory of which they are stationed.

Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Consular agents shall enjoy all the facilities, privileges, exemptions, and immunities of every kind which are or shall be granted to consular officers of the most favoured nation.

#### Article 16

Pending the establishment of an import tariff by the Czecho-Slovak Government, goods originating in the Allied or Associated States shall not be subject to any higher duties on importation into Czecho-Slovakia than the most favourable rates of duty applicable to goods of the same kind under the Austro-Hungarian Customs Tariff on July, 1944.

## Article 17

Czecho-Slovakia undertakes to make no treaty, convention or arrangement and to take no other action which will prevent her from joining in any general agreement for the equitable treatment of the commerce of other States that may be concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations within five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Czecho-Slovakia also undertakes to extend to all the Allied and Associated States any favours or privileges in customs matters, which it may grant during the same period of five years to any State with which since August, 1914, the Allies have been at war other than favours or privileges which may be granted under the special Customs arrangements provided for in Article 218 of the Treaty of Peace of even date with Austria.

## Article 18

Pending the conclusion of the general agreement referred to above, Czecho-Slovakia undertakes to treat on the same footing as national vessels or vessels of the most favoured nation the vessels of all the Allied and Associated States which accord similar treatment to Czecho-Slovak vessels.

## Article 19

Pending the conclusion under the auspices of the League of Nations of a general convention to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit Czecho-Slovakia undertakes to accord freedom of transit to persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails in transit to or from any Allied or Associated State over Czecho-Slovak territory, and to treat them at least as favourably as the persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails respectively of Czecho-Slovak or of any other more favoured nationality, origin, importation of ownership, as regards facilities, charges, restrictions, and all other matters.

All charges imposed in Czecho-Slovakia on such traffic in transit shall be reasonable having regard to the conditions of the traffic. Goods in transit shall be exempt from all customs or other duties.

Tariffs for transit traffic across Czecho-Slovakia and tariffs between Czecho-Slovakia and any Allied or Associated Power involving through tickets or waybills shall be established at the request of that Allied or Associated Power.

Freedom of transit will extend to postal, telegraphic and telephonic services.



Provided that no Allied or Associated Power can claim the benefit of these provisions on behalf of any part of its territory in which reciprocal treatment is not accorded in respect of the same subject matter.

If within a period of five years from the coming into force of this Treaty no general convention as aforesaid shall have been concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations, Czecho-Slovakia shall be at liberty at any time thereafter to give twelve months notice to the Secretary General of the League of Nations to terminate the obligations of the present Article.

### Article 20

Czecho-Slovakia undertakes to adhere within twelve months of the coming into force of the present Treaty to the International Conventions specified in Annex I.

Czecho-Slovakia undertakes to adhere to any new Convention, concluded with the approval of the Council of the League of Nations within five years of the coming into force of the present Treaty, to replace any of the International instruments specified in Annex I.

The Czecho-Slovak Government undertakes within twelve months to notify the Secretary-General of the League of Nations whether or not Czecho-Slovakia desires to adhere to either or both of the International Conventions specified in Annex II.

Until Czecho-Slovakia has adhered to the two Conventions last specified in Annex I, she agrees, on condition of reciprocity, to protect by effective measures the industrial, literary and artistic property of nationals of the Allied and Associated States. In the case of any Allied or Associated State not adhering to the said Conventions Czecho-Slovakia agrees to continue to afford such effective protection on the same conditions until the conclusion of a special bi-lateral treaty or agreement for that purpose with such Allied or Associated State.

Pending her adhesion to the other Conventions specified in Annex I, Czecho-Slovakia will secure to the nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers the advantages to which they would be entitled under the said Conventions.

Czecho-Slovakia further agrees, on condition of reciprocity, to recognize and protect all rights in any industrial, literary or artistic property belonging to the nationals of the Allied and Associated States in force, or which, but for the war would have been in force, in any part of her territory. For such purpose she will accord the extensions of time agreed to in Articles 254 and 255 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria.

## Annex I

## POSTAL CONVENTIONS

Conventions and agreements of the Universal Postal Union concluded at Vienna, July 4, 1891.<sup>21</sup>

Conventions and agreements of the Postal Union signed at Washington, June 15, 1897.<sup>22</sup>

Conventions and agreements of the Postal Union signed at Rome, May 26, 1906.<sup>23</sup>

## TELEGRAPHIC AND RADIO-TELEGRAPHIC CONVENTIONS

International Telegraphic Convention signed at St. Petersburg, 10/22 July, 1875.<sup>24</sup>

Regulations and Tariffs drawn up by the International Telegraph Conference signed at Lisbon, June 11, 1908.<sup>25</sup>

International Radio-Telegraphic Convention, July 5, 1912.<sup>26</sup>

## RAILWAY CONVENTIONS

Convention and arrangements signed at Berne on October 14, 1890,<sup>27</sup> September 20, 1893,<sup>28</sup> July 16, 1895,<sup>29</sup> June 16, 1898<sup>30</sup> and September 19, 1906,<sup>31</sup> and the current supplementary provisions made under those Conventions.

Agreement of May 15, 1886<sup>32</sup> regarding the sealing of railway trucks subject to custom inspections, and Protocol of May 15 [18], 1907.<sup>33</sup>

Agreement of May 15, 1886<sup>34</sup> regarding the technical standardisation of railways as modified on May 18, 1907.<sup>35</sup>

## SANITARY CONVENTIONS

Conventions of Paris and Vienna of April 3, 1894,<sup>36</sup> March 19, 1897<sup>37</sup> and December 3, 1903.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>21</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXXIII, p. 513.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXIX, p. 65.

<sup>23</sup> Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1907 (Cd. 3556), vol. xcix, p. 353.

<sup>24</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXVI, p. 19.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. cii, p. 214.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. cv, p. 219.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXII, p. 771.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXV, p. 750.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXVII, p. 806.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. xcii, p. 433.

<sup>31</sup> Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3 sér., tome III, p. 920.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 2 sér., tome xxii, p. 42.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 3 sér., tome II, p. 878.

<sup>34</sup> Luigi Palma, *Nuova Raccolta dei Trattati e delle Convenzioni* (1881-1890), vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 783; see also Germany, *Reichs-Gesetzblatt*, 1887, p. 111.

<sup>35</sup> Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3 sér., tome II, p. 888.

<sup>36</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXXVII, p. 78.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXIX, p. 159.

<sup>38</sup> Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776-1909, vol. II, p. 2066.

## OTHER CONVENTIONS

Convention of September 26, 1906 for the suppression of night work for women.<sup>39</sup>

Convention of 26th September 1906 for the suppression of the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches.<sup>40</sup>

Conventions of May 18, 1904<sup>41</sup> and May 4, 1910<sup>42</sup> regarding the suppression of the White Slave Traffic.

Convention of May 4, 1910, regarding the suppression of obscene publications.<sup>43</sup>

International Convention of Paris March 20, 1883,<sup>44</sup> as revised at Washington in 1911,<sup>45</sup> for the Protection of Industrial Property.

International Convention of Berne of September 9, 1886,<sup>46</sup> revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908,<sup>47</sup> and completed by the additional protocol signed at Berne on March 20, 1914,<sup>48</sup> for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.

## Annex II

Agreement of Madrid of April 14, 1891,<sup>49</sup> for the Prevention of False Indications of Origin on goods, revised at Washington in 1911,<sup>50</sup> and

Agreement of Madrid of April 14, 1891,<sup>51</sup> for the International Registration of Trade Marks, revised at Washington in 1911.<sup>52</sup>

## Article 21

All rights and privileges accorded by the foregoing Articles to the Allied and Associated States shall be accorded equally to all States members of the League of Nations.

The present treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be ratified. It shall come into force at the same time as the Treaty of Peace with Austria.

The deposit of ratifications shall be made at Paris.

Powers of which the seat of the Governments is outside Europe will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative at Paris that their rati-

<sup>39</sup> Great Britain, *Treaty Series*, 1910, No. 21 (Cd. 5221).

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 1909, No. 4 (Cd. 4530).

<sup>41</sup> Malloy, *Treaties*, 1776-1909, vol. II, p. 2131.

<sup>42</sup> Great Britain, *Treaty Series*, 1912, No. 20 (Cd. 6326).

<sup>43</sup> *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910-1923, vol. III, p. 2918.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 1776-1909, vol. II, p. 1935.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 1910-1923, vol. III, p. 2953.

<sup>46</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXVII, p. 22.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. CII, p. 619.

<sup>48</sup> Great Britain, *Treaty Series*, 1914, No. 11 (Cd. 7613).

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 1892, No. 13 [C. 6818].

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 1913, No. 7 (Cd. 6804).

<sup>51</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XCVI, p. 839.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. CVIII, p. 404.



fication has been given; in that case they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

A procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up.

The French Government will transmit to all the Signatory Powers a certified copy of the procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at Versailles, in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the French Republic, and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the Signatory Powers.

---

Appendix D to HD-25

5th edition—July 17, 1919.

ROUMANIA

*Draft of a Treaty*

Between

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY  
AND JAPAN,

Described as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,

On the one hand;

And ROUMANIA,

On the other hand;

Whereas under Treaties to which the principal Allied and Associated Powers are parties large accessions of territory are being and will be made to the Kingdom of Roumania, and

Whereas in the Treaty of Berlin <sup>53</sup> the independence of the Kingdom of Roumania was only recognised subject to certain conditions, and

Whereas the principal Allied and Associated Powers now desire to recognise unconditionally the independence of the Kingdom of Roumania as regards both its former and its new territories, and

Whereas Roumania is desirous of its own free will to give full guarantees of liberty and justice to all inhabitants both of the old Kingdom of Roumania and of the territory added thereto, to whatever race or religion they may belong.

For this purpose the following Representatives of the High Contracting Parties:

The President of the United States of America, His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the

---

<sup>53</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 895.

President of The French Republic, His Majesty the King of Italy, H. M. the Emperor of Japan, His Majesty the King of Roumania.

After having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

The Allied and Associated Powers, signatories to the Treaty of Berlin, of the 13th July 1878, taking into consideration the obligations contracted under the present Treaty by the Roumanian Government, recognize that Roumania is definitely discharged from the conditions attached to the recognition of its independence by Article 44 of the said Treaty of Berlin.

## CHAPTER I

### Article 1

Roumania undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 2 to 8 of this chapter shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no laws, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

### Article 2

Roumania undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Roumania without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Roumania shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order and public morals.

### Article 3

Roumania admits and declares to be Roumanian nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality, all persons habitually resident at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty within the whole territory of Roumania, including the extensions made by the Treaties of Peace with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or any other extensions which may hereafter be made, who are not at that date nationals of any other foreign state except Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

Nevertheless, Austrian, Hungarian and Bulgarian nationals who are over eighteen years of age will be entitled under the conditions contained in the said Treaties to opt for any other nationality which may be open to them. Option by a husband will cover his wife and option by parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.

Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must, except where it is otherwise provided in the Treaty of Peace with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, transfer within the succeeding twelve months, their place of residence to the State for which they have opted. They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in Roumanian territory. They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.

#### Article 4

Roumania admits and declares to be Roumanian nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality persons of Austrian, Hungarian or Bulgarian nationality who were born in the territory ceded to Roumania by the Treaties of Peace with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria of parents habitually resident there, even if at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty they are not themselves habitually resident there.

Nevertheless, within two years after the coming into force of the present Treaty, these persons may make a declaration before the competent Roumanian authorities in the country in which they are resident, stating that they abandon Roumanian nationality, and they will then cease to be considered as Roumanian nationals. In this connection a declaration by a husband will cover his wife, and a declaration by parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.

#### Article 5

Roumania undertakes to put no hindrance in the way of the exercise of the right which the persons concerned have, under the Treaties concluded or to be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with Austria, Hungary or Bulgaria, to choose whether or not they will acquire Roumanian nationality.

#### Article 6

All persons born in Roumanian territory who are not born nationals of another State shall *ipso facto* become Roumanian nationals.

#### Article 7

All Roumanian nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Roumanian national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or



political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Roumanian national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding any establishment by the Roumanian Government of an official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Roumanian nationals of non-Roumanian speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

#### Article 8

Roumanian nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Roumanian nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

#### Article 9

Roumania will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Roumanian nationals of other than Roumanian speech are resident adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Roumanian nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Roumanian Government from making the teaching of the Roumanian language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Roumanian nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budget, for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

#### Article 10

Educational Committees appointed locally by the Jewish communities of Roumania will, subject to the general control of the State, provide for the distribution of the proportional share of public funds allocated to Jewish schools in accordance with Article 9, and for the organisation and management of these schools.

The provisions of Article 9 concerning the use of languages in schools shall apply to these schools.

## Article 11

Jews shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their Sabbath nor shall they be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend courts of law or to perform any legal business on their Sabbath. This provision however shall not exempt Jews from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Roumanian citizens for the necessary purposes of military service, national defence or the preservation of public order.

Roumania declares her intention to refrain from ordering or permitting elections, whether general or local, to be held on a Saturday, nor will registration for electoral or other purposes be compelled to be performed on a Saturday.

## Article 12

Roumania agrees of [*to*] accord to the communities of the Saxons and Czecklers in Transylvania local autonomy in regard of scholastic and religious matters, under the control of the Roumanian State.

## Article 13

Roumania agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Roumania agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Roumania further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Roumanian Government and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Roumanian Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred

to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

## CHAPTER II

### Article 14

Roumania undertakes to make no Treaty, Convention or arrangement and to take no other action which will prevent her from joining in any general Convention for the equitable treatment of the commerce of other States that may be concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations within five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Roumania also undertakes to extend to all the Allied and Associated Powers any favours or privileges in Customs matters, which it may grant during the same period of five years to any State with which since August 1914 the Allied and Associated Powers have been at war or to any State which in virtue of Article 6 of Part X of the Treaty with Austria has special Customs arrangements with such States.

### Article 15

Pending the conclusion of the general convention referred to above, Roumania undertakes to treat on the same footing as national vessels or vessels of the most favoured nation the vessels of all the Allied and Associated Powers which accord similar treatment to Roumanian vessels. As an exception from this provision, the right of Roumania or of any other Allied or Associated Power to confine her maritime coasting trade to national vessels is expressly reserved.

### Article 16

Pending the conclusion under the auspices of the League of Nations of a general convention to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit, Roumania undertakes to accord freedom of transit to persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails in transit to or from any Allied or Associated State over Roumanian territory, including territorial waters, and to treat them at least as favourably as the persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails respectively of Roumanian or of any other more favoured nationality, origin, importation or ownership, as regards facilities, charges, restrictions, and all other matters.

All charges imposed in Roumania on such traffic in transit shall be reasonable having regard to the conditions of the traffic. Goods in transit shall be exempt from all customs or other duties.



Tariffs for transit across Roumania and tariffs between Roumania and any Allied or Associated Power involving through tickets or waybills shall be established at the request of the Allied or Associated Power concerned.

Freedom of transit will extend to postal, telegraphic and telephonic services.

Provided that no Allied or Associated Power can claim the benefit of these provisions on behalf of any part of its territory in which reciprocal treatment is not accorded in respect of the same subject matter.

If within a period of five years from the coming into force of this Treaty no general convention as aforesaid shall have been concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations, Roumania shall be at liberty at any time thereafter to give twelve months notice to the Secretary General of the League of Nations to terminate the obligations of the present Article.

#### Article 17

Pending the conclusion of a general Convention on the international Régime of Waterways, Roumania undertakes to apply to such portions of the River Systems of the Pruth (and Reservation made by the American Delegation of the Dniester) as may lie within, or form the boundary of, her territory, the régime set out in Articles 332-337 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

#### Article 18

All rights and privileges accorded by the foregoing articles to the Allied and Associated Powers shall be accorded equally to all States members of the League of Nations.

The present Treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be ratified. It shall come into force at the same time as the Treaty of Peace with Austria.

The deposit of ratifications shall be made at Paris.

Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative at Paris that their ratification has been given; in that case they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

A procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up.

The French Government will transmit to all the signatory Powers a certified copy of the procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at Versailles, in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the French Republic, and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the Signatory Powers.

---

Appendix E to HD-25

30.7.19.

*Draft Reply to Austrian Counter-Proposals on the Protection of Minorities*

The Allied and Associated Powers have received the comment of Austria on Section VI of Part III of the Conditions of Peace, containing the Articles for the Protection of Minorities. They note that the Austrian Delegation seems to concur with the Allied and Associated Powers in thinking that the provision of these guarantees for racial, linguistic and religious minorities will mean much toward the establishment of harmonious relations among the peoples of Europe. The Austrian comment breathes a spirit which augurs well for Austria's co-operation in the solution of one of the most difficult and complex of European problems.

The amendments suggested by the Austrian Delegation to these clauses have been carefully studied by the Allied and Associated Powers. The chief concern in the Austrian comment is in connection with the two clauses which relate to the enforcement of the guarantees for minorities by the League of Nations. The Austrian Delegation recognises that the fulfilment of these undertakings constitutes a matter of international concern, and it is not at variance with the Allied and Associated Powers in their recognition of the necessity for conferring upon the League of Nations authority and jurisdiction to safeguard and protect the guarantees laid down.

The Austrian Delegation has criticised the wording of Articles 79 and 87, which refer to the League of Nations, and it has called attention to possible doubts which might arise in connection with the application of these Articles.

To a large extent the desires of the Austrian Delegation will be met if these clauses are made to conform to the similar clauses which have already been included in the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland. Such conformity would seem also to meet the Austrian desire that the duties imposed upon the Austrian State should be so far as possible the same as those which are undertaken by other States which may be formed out of the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The Allied and Associated Powers have therefore revised these Articles so as to bring them into line with the clauses which have

been inserted in the Treaty with Poland. As revised, these clauses define more precisely the League of Nations jurisdiction and the procedure by which it is to be exercised. The former reduction was criticised as leaving it open to the League of Nations to intervene in a dispute between the Austrian State and an individual citizen. It is now made clear that the Council of the League of Nations will act only at the instance of a State which is a member of the Council, and that the Permanent Court of International Justice to be established under the League of Nations will have jurisdiction only of disputes between Austria and a State which is a member of the Council of the League of Nations. The conferring of jurisdiction on this Court emphasises the judicial nature of disputes which may arise and fully meets the Austrian desire to restrict the possibility of political interference in her affairs.

This will remove any appearance of a contradiction between former Article 87, which limited the "protection of the League of Nations", to the provisions regarding the "racial, religious and linguistic minorities", and the former Article 79, which conferred jurisdiction over all "obligations contained in the present section".

If any difficulty should arise in the execution of these clauses, their modification will be facilitated by the provision that it may be effected with the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations, and the Allied and Associated Powers now agree not to withhold their assent to any such modification.

## REVISED CLAUSES

## FORMER REDACTION

*Article 79*

Former Article 85 was similar.

Austria undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 80 to 84 shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them.

Austria undertakes to embody the stipulations of Article 79 to 84 in her fundamental laws as a declaration of rights with which a law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere, and over which no law, regulation or official action shall prevail.

(Former Article 79 is included later.)

*Article 80*

No Change.

*Article 81*

No Change.

*Article 82*

No Change.



*Article 83*

Austria will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Austrian nationals of other than German speech are residents adequate facilities for ensuring that the instruction shall be given to the children of such Austrian nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Austrian Government from making the teaching of the German language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Austrian nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budget, for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

*Article 84*

Austria agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They

This Article combines former Articles 83 and 84, which were as follows:—

*Article 83*

Austria will provide in the public educational establishments in town and districts in which a considerable proportion of Austrian nationals of other than German speech are resident adequate facilities for ensuring that instruction shall be given to the children of such Austrian nationals through the medium of their own language.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Austrian nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budget for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

*Article 84*

The above provisions regarding public or private instruction in languages other than German do not preclude the Austrian Government from making the teaching of German obligatory.

*Former Article 79*

Austria undertakes to bring her institutions into conformity with the principles of liberty and justice and to give to all the inhabitants of her territory a sure guarantee. With this object she declares herself to be in agreement with the Allied and Associated

shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The Allied and Associated Powers hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Austria agrees that any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Austria further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Austrian Government and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Austrian Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

*Article 85*

Powers in recognising that the obligations contained in the present section constitute obligations of international concern, over which the League of Nations has jurisdiction.

*Former Article 87*

The provisions contained in this Section regarding the protection of racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall be under the protection of the League of Nations, and the consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification thereof.

Same as former Article 86.

## Appendix F to HD-25

[Translation <sup>64</sup>]*Draft Letter to the Council of Five on the Special Clauses Proposed by M. Venizelos—Prepared by the Committee on New States*

In connection with the investigation of the clauses dealing with Minorities to be inserted in the Treaty with Bulgaria, which was referred to the Committee of New States, the Committee also took into consideration certain proposals which had been made by M. Venizelos, copy of which is attached, drawn up with the object of facilitating emigration between Bulgaria and Greece of Patriarchist Greeks resident in Bulgaria and exarchist Bulgarians resident in Greece. Although these proposals had not been officially referred to them by the Council of Five, the Committee were of opinion that it was necessary for them to take them into consideration in dealing with the whole matter of the protection of minorities in Greece and in Bulgaria.

As a result of their examination they note that certain of the clauses seem rather to be concerned with questions of reparation, and they have therefore confined their observations to those which are more strictly connected with the questions of Minorities. With regard to this matter they further note that certain of these clauses contemplate reciprocal stipulations relating to emigration arising from the right of option and certain others deal with collective property as e. g. with that of communities, churches or convents. The Committee are of opinion that the general idea of these clauses, so far as they relate to individual emigration, is useful and should be adopted; with regard to the second point dealing with collective property, they would limit themselves to the cases in which the population of an entire village should desire to exercise the right to be conferred on them; the examination of these special clauses would have to be considered by the Mixed Commission which it is proposed will deal with the whole question.

The Committee, moreover, consider that the general conception is one which might with advantage be extended to all Balkan countries and that it should not be limited to the inhabitants of territories transferred by the present Peace, but to all inhabitants of any one of the Balkan States who wish to transfer their place of residence to some other Balkan State. If extended in this way it would, they hope, do much to help a permanent settlement of the troubles which have so long affected the Balkans and be a valuable supplement to the clauses dealing with the protecting of minorities. They do not think that

---

<sup>64</sup> The translation is that found under Paris Peace Conf. 185.4134/2.



it is possible to limit it by saying that these clauses shall apply only to those of special nationality or race; the only real criterion on these matters is the feeling of the individuals concerned.

The Committee also agree that it is necessary in order to carry out this idea that the different States concerned should agree to the establishment of a Mixed Commission to superintend the consequent emigration; it will be necessary that the interested States should advance funds from public sources, the administration of which would be entrusted to the Mixed Commission.

As to procedure they consider the identical clauses should be inserted in the sections of the Bulgarian and Turkish Treaties and also in the special treaties which are being drawn up on the rights of minorities for Greece and Serbia. As regards Greece and Serbia, these clauses could not be imposed, but would have to be agreed. They therefore propose at once to communicate first of all with M. Venizelos to ask him whether he would accept the proposed modifications of his proposals, and if he does so, to submit them for their consideration to the Serbian Delegation.

The Committee have therefore drawn up the following heads [*terms*] of agreement which will indicate more clearly the nature of the convention which they would suggest:

#### HEADS OF AGREEMENT

1. Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Turkey agree that they will accord to all citizens within their territories the right to declare their desire to transfer their residence and remove to any one of the other States.

2. This right of option can be exercised at any period within two years of the coming into force of this Treaty.

3. Those who under these clauses exercise this right of option shall have the free right to emigrate into the State which they choose without any form of hindrance or impediment, and to take with them their movable property. The disposal of their immovable property will be controlled by the Commission to be appointed under the following clauses.

4. There shall be established a mixed commission to be appointed by the League of Nations for the purpose of supervising and facilitating the consequent emigration and for dealing with the immovable property of the emigrants.

5. In order to facilitate the work, there shall be appointed sub-Commissions, each of which will deal with the emigration between two countries; each of these sub-Commissions shall consist of three members, one appointed by each of the interested countries, and the other, who shall be Chairman, appointed from among its own members by the Central Commission.

6. The funds necessary for facilitating the emigration shall be advanced by the interested States to the Central Commission. The Central Commission shall make such contributions as may be necessary from these funds to the individuals who exercise the right of option

conferred upon them. They shall also advance to the emigrants the value of the immovable property, the ownership of which shall be transferred to the Commission. The Commission will arrange for the eventual sale.

The Committee therefore venture to ask whether they would be permitted to adopt the procedure indicated, and in particular, to enter into communication with M. Venizelos to ask whether he would agree to the proposed modification of his articles; and further, whether they would be permitted to lay this suggestion before the Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

JULY 28, 1919.

[Enclosure]

*Special Clauses [Proposed by M. Venizelos]*

1. Patriarchist Greeks (recognising the Greek Patriarch as Head of their Church) who are Bulgarian subjects will have the right to emigrate freely into Greece. The Bulgarian Government undertakes to facilitate in every way the emigration of those exercising this right.

Emigrants of more than 18 years of age shall declare their intention of emigrating before the Mixed Commission referred to above or before its representatives. A husband's declaration will cover that of his wife. The declarations of parents or guardians will cover those of children less than 18 years of age.

They may freely carry with them (or have transported) their possessions and household effects of all kinds, as well as those belonging to their communities, churches, convents, schools, hospitals and foundations of every kind, without any export duty being imposed upon them.

2. With regard to their immovable property, whether rural or urban, together with that belonging to their communities, churches, convents, schools, hospitals and foundations of every kind, the Bulgarian Government shall be bound to pay them the value thereof according to the provisions set forth below. The same obligation shall exist with regard to Greek subjects desirous of permanently leaving Bulgaria.

3. Exarchist Bulgarians (recognising the Bulgarian Exarch as head of their Church), who are Greek subjects living in Macedonian territory transferred to Greece in virtue of the Treaty of Bucharest of 28/10th August 1913, shall have the right to emigrate freely into Bulgaria. A husband's declaration shall cover that of his wife. The declarations of parents or guardians shall cover those of children less than 18 years of age.

With regard to the transfer and liquidation of property and

possessions, the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 hereof shall reciprocally apply.

4. The Bulgarian Government undertakes to pay to the Greek Government, for account of those entitled thereto, the value of immovable urban or rural property belonging to Patriarchist Greeks, who took refuge in Greece either before or after the year 1914.

5. The Bulgarian Government also undertakes to pay to the Greek Government, for account of those entitled thereto, the value of all immovable property and possessions of any kind which belonged to individual patriarchist Greeks or to communities, churches, schools, convents, hospitals and other Greek foundations situated in Bulgaria and at various times seized, confiscated, or destroyed by its authorities or nationals, a detailed list of which will be transmitted to it by the Greek Government.

6. Whereas the Bulgarian Government and the Greek Government both undertake not to hinder freedom of emigration, directly or indirectly, emigrants shall under no pretext be prevented from carrying out their intention. And therefore all laws and regulations of any kind existing in the two countries and which might be prejudicial to freedom or emigration shall be considered null and void from the coming into force of the present Treaty. The departure of an emigrant shall not be prevented by any legal proceedings whatsoever, whether civil or penal, on the part of the authorities of either country. In the event of penal proceedings against an emigrant, the authorities of the prosecuting country shall nevertheless hand him over for trial to the country for which he is bound.

It is hereby agreed that no legal proceedings of any kind pending before civil or administrative courts of law, even if concerning the Government (e. g. claims for taxes, contributions, or fines made by the Government or provincial, communal or other authorities) shall prevent an emigrant from leaving the country, his right to appoint an attorney to represent him being reserved.

7. The Bulgarian Government undertakes to hand over to the Greek authorities within 30 days from the coming into force of the present Treaty, all Patriarchist Greeks undergoing sentence in Bulgaria for political offences or offences under common law. Individuals so handed over shall be considered as finally exempt from all prosecution or penalty in Bulgaria.

8. The Bulgarian Government undertakes to capitalise all civil or military pensions acquired in Bulgaria, at the date of the signature of the present Treaty, by Patriarchist Greeks emigrating according to the provisions of Article E, and immediately to pay the value thereof to the banking office (*caisse*) hereinafter provided for.

9. Any law or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, property and possessions situated in Bulgaria and having belonged to



Patriarchist Greeks who emigrated either before or after 1914 shall not be considered as having no owner. The liquidation thereof shall take place in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 hereof.

10. Patriarchist Greeks emigrating into Greece and Exarchist Bulgarians emigrating into Bulgaria in accordance with the provisions of Article 1, shall be exempt from all past or present military obligations and their departure shall not be prevented on that account.

11. Immediately on leaving a country, emigrants shall cease to be nationals thereof.

12. The right to emigrate under conditions similar to those contained in the preceding articles is also granted to Bulgarians who are Greek subjects settled in Bulgaria and profess another Christian creed.

13. From the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, a mixed Commission shall be organised, which shall be responsible for dealing with questions relating to the above-mentioned emigration of Patriarchist Greeks. It shall be composed of three delegates, representing France, Greece and Bulgaria respectively. The seat of the Commission shall be at Philippopolis.

A similar Commission shall be constituted at Salonica, to deal with the above-mentioned emigration of Exarchist Bulgarians.

Each Delegate of either Commission shall have an assessor, who shall be entitled to a consultative vote.

The decisions of each Commission will be taken by a majority of votes and will be put into execution without appeal.

14. Each Commission shall, whenever necessary, establish offices to ensure all necessary measures being taken for the practical organisation of the emigration in the best interests of the emigrants. It shall in particular determine the procedure with regard to the declarations to be made by the emigrants, and the valuation of their immovable property by a fixed Commission of experts, on which the interested parties shall be represented, and the collection of the value thereof. It shall further fix the dates of departure, and in general make all other necessary arrangements.

The Commission constituted in Bulgaria shall further be responsible for effecting a valuation of the immovable property referred to in Articles 4, 5 and 9.

15. The right of emigration in the above conditions shall remain in force during a period of four years. The Commissions shall be entitled to ask the two Governments concerned to extend this period by one year should they deem it necessary. The work of the Commissions shall end three months after the termination of the period of four years referred to above, or of its extension as the case may be.

16. The total value of the immovable property enumerated in

Articles 2 and 3 shall be paid into the banking office provided for in Article 18 by the Government of the country of departure immediately the Commission established there shall have notified it of the result of the valuation. Such payment shall be effected as to one quarter of the currency of the country, or its counter-value in francs, pounds sterling or dollars, and as to three-quarters in short-dated treasury bills in francs gold.

17. The total value of the immovable property referred to in Articles 4, 5 and 9, shall be paid by the Bulgarian Government into the banking office provided for in Article 18. Payment shall be effected in Bulgarian currency or its counter-value in francs, pounds sterling or dollars immediately the Commission established in Bulgaria shall have completed the valuation and notified the Government of its result.

18. Each of the Commissions constituted in conformity with Article 13 shall establish a banking office which shall collect all sums due to the parties entitled thereto under the provisions of Articles 1 and 2. Each banking office shall make advances to the emigrants in the amounts paid in on their account, and will audit all the accounts in collaboration with the Greek and Bulgarian Governments.

19. The Banking Office of the Commission established in Bulgaria shall further collect all sums due to the parties entitled thereto, in conformity with Articles 4, 5 and 9 and 17, and all amounts resulting from the capitalisation of civilian pensions in conformity with Article 8.

20. With a view to facilitating its working, the Banking Office established in Bulgaria shall immediately be supplied with the sum of 5 million leva, and the banking office in Greece with an equivalent amount in drachmas, according to the rate of exchange.

21. The cost of the maintenance and working of the Commission established in Bulgaria and of its various offices shall be borne by the Greek Government. Those of the Commission in Greece, and of its offices, shall be charged to the Bulgarian Government.

---

#### Appendix G to HD-25

*Note to the Supreme Council [From the Commission on Political Clauses in Regard to the Eventual Restitution to the Allies of Rolling Stock Moved Beyond the Armistice Frontier in Violation of the Armistice of Villa Giusti]*

[Translation <sup>55</sup>]

Among the stipulations studied by the Commission on Political Clauses, on the proposal of the Italian delegation, with a view to

---

<sup>55</sup> Translation from the French of note and its enclosures supplied by the editors.

the drafting of a treaty to be concluded among the Allied States which are successors to Austria-Hungary, was included the following draft article:

"All rolling stock which, in violation of the terms of Article 3 of the Armistice of November 3, 1918 (Villa Giusti) shall have been transported beyond the boundary established by the armistice after the negotiations leading to the said armistice, should be returned to the Allies within a period of two months, independently of material which shall be due them under the reparations clauses of Article 311 of the treaty of peace with Austria.

They shall satisfy themselves directly of the quantity and quality of the rolling stock thus delivered with a view to the allocation of the locomotives. The cars and trucks shall be allocated in the ratio of twenty for each locomotive, and shall consist of 1/10th in passenger coaches and 1/25th in freight cars."

The Italian delegation supported its proposal by the fact that the number of cars which should have been delivered to the Allied High Command according to the armistice of November 3, have been retained or transported into the territory of the Yugo-Slav state.

The Commission considered that it was a question, of a sort, of an application of the armistice which could not have a place in the treaty which it was studying, and it declared itself incompetent [to consider it.] Nevertheless, it deemed that it could not omit to submit to the Supreme Council the considerations presented on this subject by the Italian delegation which are formulated in the attached note.

It is for the Supreme Council to decide whether the question raised by the Italian delegation should be decided in the sense suggested by that delegation, or referred for study and continuation either to a military commission competent to examine the questions raised by the execution of the armistice or to the Supreme War Council.

The Commission believes it should add also to the present communication, the observations formulated by the British technical delegate, General Mance, on the subject of the draft article presented by the Italian delegation.

[Enclosure 1]

*Considerations Presented to the Supreme Council by the Italian Delegation*

Article 153 of the treaty of peace with Austria lays down that the provisions of the armistice convention, among others those of paragraph 3, to which the proposed clause refers, remain in force, a fact which authorizes one again to demand the execution of them, even after the signature of peace. Should this application be demanded only with regard to Austria? The Italian delegation thinks it should not; the armistice having been concluded with the representatives of



the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Allies reserve the right to search for the material which shall have been left in place on this side of the armistice line in all the territory belonging to the former Monarchy into which it may have been taken.

Consequently, the new states that have become the assignees of these territories could not avoid this search or the obligation to surrender the material which is found, for any reason whatever, dispersed on their soil.

The proposed clause has, then, no other purpose than to state precisely the import of article 153 of the treaty of peace with Austria, by a completing stipulation to which the states that find themselves in the situation anticipated by the said clause shall be signatories.

If the Supreme Council considers that this completing stipulation is not indispensable and that the interpretation of article 153 could not lead to doubts and misunderstandings, the Italian delegation would be satisfied with a declaration in this sense.

[Enclosure 2]

*British Note on Article 8 of the Draft Clauses on the Reciprocal Relations of the Ceded Territories*

1. The paragraph of article 3 of the armistice of November 3 treating of the return of rolling stock is as follows :

“All the military and railroad equipment of every kind (including coal) which is situated in the interior of these territories shall be left in place and returned to the Allies and to the Americans according to special orders given by the commander in chief of the Armies of the Associated Powers on the various fronts.”

The removal of rolling stock in the course of negotiations leading up to the armistice would not then violate article 3, and the article thus drafted would constitute the imposition of a new obligation upon Austria. This observation applies to the second paragraph of the draft article.

2. It is understood that this article has as its sole purpose to assure the execution of the conditions of the armistice, and it appears then that it should be treated entirely as a question of the armistice. One should point out that in virtue of article 153 of the treaty with Austria, one could have the above article of the armistice respected even after the entrance into force of the treaty of peace.

3. These cars referred to in the armistice should not be confused with the rolling stock which should be delivered under article 310 of the treaty of peace with Austria, for their delivery is confirmed by article 195 of the treaty with Austria.

4. Supposing that every addition to the conditions of the armistice

should be recited, the questions under discussion seem to be the following:

(a) Italy maintains that certain cars which should have been returned under the armistice, have been taken beyond the line established by the armistice. This is a question of fact.

(b) It is pointed out that some of these cars have been taken into present Yugo-Slavia. In this case, the difficulty arises of knowing whether the cars which could still be restored to Italy under the armistice should be surrendered by Austria or by Yugo-Slavia.

---

#### Appendix H to HD-25

*Note to the Supreme Council [From the Commission on Political Clauses in Regard to the Desirability of Reconciling the Clauses of the Treaty of Peace With Austria With Those of the Treaties To Be Concluded With the Allied States Formed Out of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy]*

[Translation <sup>56</sup>]

In conformity with the mission which was confided to it by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers by the resolution dated July 11, 1919,<sup>57</sup> the Commission on the Political Clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Austria has examined "The proposal of M. Sonnino for the application to all of the countries of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy of certain political clauses of the treaty of peace with Austria."

Its labors have led to the elaboration of a draft treaty to be concluded among the Allied states that were formed from the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or that are assignees of territories that belonged to the said Monarchy, with the participation of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

A treaty of this kind, in which only Allied states take part, should necessarily be freely agreed to by all the interested parties. For this reason, the stipulations that it contains could not assume the same character as analogous stipulations which have been drafted for a treaty of peace imposed on Austria, an enemy state.

The draft elaborated by the Commission, and regarding which it is now consulting the interested Allied states, does not, therefore, reproduce textually the articles of the treaty with Austria that bear on subjects of the same kind.

In the opinion of the Commission, it would, nevertheless, be necessary that questions of this kind be settled in accordance with a view of the whole situation in all of the states successor to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including therein the new Austria and the new Hungary.

---

<sup>56</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>57</sup> HD-5, minute 4, p. 101.

Consequently, it would seem expedient as far as possible to put the corresponding clauses of the treaty of peace with Austria (as well as those of the future treaty with Hungary) into harmony with the treaty studied by the Commission.

These contingent modifications of the treaty with Austria would not seem, moreover, to give rise to objections on the part of the Austrian delegation since they do not aggravate the conditions already presented to this delegation.

It is self-evident that it would be necessary, if this contingency is to be realized, that the treaty among the Allied states be drafted and approved by the Supreme Council in sufficient time to permit the modifications which it involves to be included in the conditions which will be definitively submitted to the Austrian delegation in response to the observations which the latter is going to present on the conditions which have been communicated to them.

In this eventuality, the Commission has taken all the steps necessary to be prepared to submit as soon as possible to the Supreme Council a text approved by the interested parties.

Nevertheless, the Commission would like to know, at the present moment, whether the Supreme Council approves its suggestion, and considers that in fact there is occasion to put the clauses of the treaty with Austria, corresponding to those of the projected treaty among the Allied states, into harmony with these latter clauses. In case the Supreme Council would like to give its consent to this view, the Commission, in order to avoid all cause for delay, would take steps to prepare, as soon as possible, in cooperation with the Drafting Committee and the interested commissions, the new text of the clauses of the treaty with Austria which should be thus revised.

---

#### Appendix I to HD-25

PARIS, July 31, 1919.

General Duval, President of the Commission on Aerial Clauses.

To the President of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference.

I have the honour to submit herewith the report addressed to General Groves by the British Military Mission at Berlin.

General Groves, British Delegate of the Commission on Aerial Clauses has asked me to draw the attention of the Supreme Council to this report so that instructions may be given to the Commander-in-Chief to oppose the sale of the motors in question.

This report clearly shows the importance of the facts mentioned and I think it is necessary that this question should be examined without delay.

DUVAL



[Enclosure]

"C"

(D.249-25.7.19)

No. 6599.3.1.

BRITISH MILITARY MISSION,  
BERLIN.General HAKING,  
*Armistice Commission*  
*Cologne.*

I forward herewith a report by Captain T. Breen of this Mission, which is of importance and seems to demand prompt action. Capt. Breen is making further investigations, but looks upon this report as quite reliable. There is no doubt that the Germans will make use of the period before the treaty comes into force to dispose of as much property as possible.

N. MALCOLM  
*Major General,*  
*Chief of British Military Mission*  
*1 Moltkestrasse, Berlin*

[Subenclosure]

"C"

(D.249-25.7.19.)

BRITISH MILITARY MISSION,  
BERLIN, 24 JULY, 1919.

To General MALCOLM

In accordance with Section 3 of part V of the Conditions of Peace (Air Clauses 198 to 202) Germany is restricted in the manufacture of aeroplanes and engines. Accordingly the Government have arranged to close down a series of factories including that at Adlershof, near Johannesthal, Berlin immediately.

This factory employs 4,800 hands, who have been given notice of dismissal the first week in August: shed 404 contained approximately 500 engines captured from Allied Machines many of which were of the most modern type, Rolls-Royce, Hispano-Suiza, [illegible name] Liberty, etc. The workmen of the factory informed me some time ago that a Commission of British Officers had visited Johannesthal in December accompanied by a German Staff Officer, who did not show them the booty hall at Adlershof. A deputation of two workmen informed me yesterday that the motors are now being removed in all haste to a small depot at Kurfurstendamm, Berlin. It would appear that a private firm has purchased the contents of the hall for 400,000 Marks. So far 120 Rolls-Royce engines and Hispano-Suiza engines have been removed and the remainder should be moved in the course of this week. The men at the present moment are being dismissed. They receive three weeks pay in advance.

If the Allied Military Authorities wish to obtain delivery of this material according to Article 202, the powers conferred by Article 210 of Section IV (Interallied Commissions of Control) might be temporarily transferred to an Allied Aviation Commission in order to obviate the secretion of the material in this way by the German authorities, otherwise it will be very difficult to recover material and engines disposed of to private buyers before the ratification of the Treaty.

T. F. BREEN  
*Captain*

---

Appendix J to HD-25

Translation

DELEGATION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE  
SERBS, CROATS, AND SLOVENES

PARIS, July 19, 1919.  
4. rue de Presbourg.

To: The President of the Peace Conference.

For some time rumours have persisted, of various epidemics which are said to have broken out in the prisoner camps in Italy; according to these same rumours, the prisoners are dying in large numbers.

The Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes at Rome, troubled by this news, and anxious about the lot of their compatriots who, as soldiers of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy are in captivity in Italy, drew the attention of the Royal Italian Government to these facts, during the months of February and March last, and begged it to kindly inform them whether these rumours were well-founded. In its reply, addressed to the Legation, the Consulta denied them, almost with indignation. However, this news continued to be propagated more and more and even appeared in the Press.

The Italian newspaper "Epoca" of June 18th, 1919, published that the Italian Ministry of War ordered the concentration of prisoners of war in the villages of Ladispoli and Palo, near Civita-Vecchia, and that it is to be feared, by reason of this concentration, that the diseases existing among the prisoners may spread to the population, especially if it is considered that exanthematous typhus exists among the prisoners to such a degree that in a small camp near Rome, the physician of the camp himself, has succumbed to it. This newspaper states the opinion that it would be better to leave the prisoners in smaller groups, and the epidemic would in this way be easier to combat.

The Italian newspaper "Azanti" of June 19th, 1919, publishes a statement according to which the military authorities were said to have ordered a grouping of all the Austro-Hungarian prisoners of

war, among whom exanthematous typhus prevails, the grouping to be made in certain localities on the sea shore, near Rome. As a result of this fact, it is affirmed in the same issue of the newspaper, a deputation presented itself on the same day before the Governor of Rome, in order to draw his attention to the danger which would result from the installation of these sick prisoners in the vicinity of Rome, and from their concentration on the sea shore, where Italian workmen go during the summer, since the disease might also spread among the population. The Governor requested that a memorandum on this subject be submitted to him, and promised to forward it, especially recommending it to the attention of the military authorities. The "Azanti" continues: "It is known that exanthematous typhus prevails in certain prisoner camps, such as those of Frascati, Capagendi, Bari, where 60 prisoners are dying daily from typhus, and from black smallpox. . . .", and it adds that most of the sick and dead are Jugo-Slavs. The Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes learns from other sure sources, that an epidemic of exanthematous typhus prevails also in the prisoner camps of Southern Italy and that the mortality rate is very high there.

The situation of these prisoners in Italy, soldiers of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, among whom are a large number of co-nationals, makes the delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, very anxious, for if it persists as at present, it is very probable and almost certain that they will perish within a very short length of time.

After having set forth the terrible situation of our compatriots in Italy, I have the honour, Mr. President, knowing the humanitarian sentiments of our Great Allies to draw the attention of Your Excellency to these facts and to beg you to kindly intervene in order that our compatriots who are still treated in Italy as prisoners, be given aid and be saved from certain death. It is absolutely essential to separate the well prisoners from those who are sick, to give the former every hygienic care possible, and to make it possible for them to return home as soon as possible, and to give the greatest care to the sick as well as the needed aid.

The Serbs, Croats and Slovenes have suffered too much during this war for them to be permitted to suffer longer.

Our soldiers, taken prisoners, have perished en masse during the war in the enemy camps in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, and we believe that our enemies should not be left the possibility of defending themselves by invoking the present situation of prisoners of war in Italy, at the moment when they are asked to render an account thereof.

Accept, etc.

For the S. C. S. Delegation  
NIK. PACHITCH



Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, August 7, 1919, at 3: 30 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. F. L. Polk.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	M. Clemenceau. M. Pichon.
<i>Secretary</i> Mr. L. Harrison.	<i>Secretaries</i> Mr. H. Norman. Sir George Clerk.	<i>Secretaries</i> M. Dutasta. M. Berthelot. M. de St. Quentin
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Tittoni.	M. Matsui.
	<i>Secretary</i> M. Paterno.	<i>Secretary</i> M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Capt. Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE. . . . .	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lt-Col. A. Jones.

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. (M. Tardieu, M. Laroche, M. Aubert, Colonel Peel, Colonel Castoldi, Mr. Coolidge, M. Adatci, M. Kato, and M. Shigemitsu entered the room.)

**Situation in Hungary** M. POLK handed to M. Clemenceau a telegram, which M. Clemenceau asked M. Mantoux to read.

(The following telegram was read:—

1. VIENNA, Aug. 7, 1919, 12 noon.  
“Causey will stay Budapest until General Bandholtz arrives and you can phone him easily from Prague, situation in Pest more nasty than ever. You have already been told of changes and situation becoming very acute on account of stoppage of boats on river which were preparing to move this morning in accordance with James<sup>1</sup> plans, also on account of cutting all lines of communication, including blowing up of railroad to Vienna, also manner of military occupation and treatment of inhabitants, their property and supplies. General Gorton, Causey, Romanelli and James went to Roumanian General with written protest against these things, acting under their authority given in the several different ways by the Entente. Roumanian General declined to permit them to read statement, acted very discourteously, and was told so. He declined

<sup>1</sup> Henry James, American representative on the Danube Commission.

to receive communication, stating that it should be sent to Roumanian General Headquarters, which of course is out of reach of communication, even if they knew where it was. He also stated he was acting under orders when he destroyed all communications out of city, which of course cuts off supplies coming in from country, of which there were eighty carloads vegetables in one lot. I plan to go to Buch tonight, meeting you there. I will arrive in time to have conference with General Bernhardt [*Bandholtz?*] there, who I understand leaves tonight. Will you tell him to be looking for me. There is nothing to be done with this situation except to settle whether Roumanians are going to loot this country under one guise or another and if France is going to back them; then to determine whether other members of Entente are going to have a voice in determining the future policy of Central Europe. It is just as difficult, perhaps even more so, to utilise Hungarian equipment of railways and Danube in this situation as it was under Bela Kun. There is no resistance their troops, no necessity for their occupying with the force they have, except for a misguided military policy or a selfish desire on their part which is not in accord with broad principles of reconstruction and future peace of this country and the world.")

MR. POLK said that as he had already informed M. Clemenceau, all supplies to Hungary had been stopped by Mr. Hoover, who did not propose to supply the Roumanian Government with food that was meant for the Hungarians. He also asked that the following telegrams be heard:—

2. "

A. R. A. Received Aug. 7, 1919.

2vn. rb 201

Budapest Aug. 6, 1919.

Supreme Council Paris.

As indicated in telegram sent by me earlier tonight the Archduke Joseph with three members of the new cabinet called on myself and the representatives of the Italian and American Governments to announce the partial selection of his cabinet and to state that he was forming a coalition government in line with the suggestions made by the Supreme Council in Paris.<sup>2</sup> The Archduke is known as the Governor of the State. He was accompanied by Friedrich the Minister President: General Schnetzer Minister of war: General Tanczos Minister of Foreign Affairs: Bleyer Minister of nationalities; Caillery Minister of Health. The other ministry appointments to be made tomorrow to complete the cabinet will consist of two agrarians, one or two of the Szeged party and a social Democrat. The Minister President is a bourgeois. The Minister of War and the Minister of Foreign Affairs are both late Generals in the Austro-Hungarian army. The Minister of Nationalities is a university professor. The Minister of Health a physician. Other details will be wired later. General Gorton, Causey and Gordon [?] just reported from Budapest that Roumanians under the pretext of searching for arms are entering and pillaging a great many different houses in outlying districts as well as in town. The army is living on the country and taking for both animals and men.

GREGORY"

<sup>2</sup> See HD-15, minute 2, p. 317.

3. "

A. R. A. Received August 7, 1919.  
For Action.

Ix rb. 75.

Budapest Aug. 6, 1919.

Supreme Council, Paris.

The Hungarian *Gendarmerie* arrested at sixthirty p.m. today the Social Democratic Government while the latter were holding a sitting at the National Palace. The *coup d'état* was carried out without any disorder. The Archduke Joseph is head of the new Government. General Schnetzer was sent here at ten o'clock tonight to impart this information and to state that policy and other details of new Government will be handed later tonight.

GENERAL GORTON"

4. "

A. R. A. Received Aug. 7, 1919.

Ivn rb 180

Budapest Aug. 7, 1919.

Supreme War Council, Paris.

The Roumanians have informed the Hungarian Government that as the latter have not accepted the terms of their armistice they intend to cross the Danube tomorrow, August seventh. I have ascertained that General Holban<sup>2a</sup> refused to [let?] appear in the press today the publication of M. Clemenceau's telegram of fifth instant to the Hungarian Government.<sup>3</sup> The Roumanians continue to perpetrate acts which are most discreditable to a power associated with the Entente. Harmless individuals are assaulted, food, live stock, agricultural implements, and rolling stock are requisitioned and sent to Roumania and through the purposeless blockade and destruction of railways, Budapest is on the verge of starvation. The latest act of wanton destruction is the demolition of the railway between Budapest and Vienna. Unless instant measures are taken to compel the Roumanians to evacuate Budapest and cease their predatory operations in Hungary, the confidence of the Hungarians in the good will of the Entente will be destroyed.

GENERAL GORTON"

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the view that the Roumanian action could not be tolerated.

MR. POLK said that in the opinion of the American Delegation, interference in the domestic affairs of Hungary would do more to encourage Bolshevism than any event in the last six months. Lenin would point to the example of what had taken place on the downfall of the Soviet Government in Hungary, in order to scare Russia and preserve his own regime. The setting up of a reactionary Government in Hungary in place of a moderate Socialist Government was a very threatening feature in the situation.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Roumanian General committing these follies and wickednesses was the same that had put himself under Marshal Foch's orders.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as the General was not named, it was impossible to know.

MR. POLK said that one of the American Experts on the Economic Commission had prepared a memorandum showing in what way the

<sup>2a</sup> Commanding Roumanian forces occupying city of Budapest.

<sup>3</sup> Appendix A to HD-24, p. 541.



armistice demanded by the Roumanians interfered with the Reparation terms of the Conference. (See Appendix "A".)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that an energetic telegram must be sent to the Roumanian Government.

MR. BALFOUR entirely agreed. He added that the Commission of Generals should be informed of the message sent to Bucharest, and asked to communicate it to the Roumanian Government. If the Roumanians still persisted in going forward, it would be necessary to break off relations, or to do something very serious. He asked whether there was any economic weapon that could be brought to bear on Roumania.

MR. POLK said that Roumania would soon be quite independent of the Allies in this respect for a short time. There was a good harvest about to be reaped, and abundant rolling stock was being stolen from Hungary, but, for the future Roumania would not be able to count on any assistance from the United States.

M. TITTONI said that on the previous day he had heard a rumour that the King of Roumania was to enter Budapest.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the telegram to be sent to Roumania should begin by a brief recital of the various things which had been required of the Roumanian Government by the Conference, and of the omissions by the Roumanian Government to fulfil these requests. This part, he thought, would be easy, as it amounted to a list of requests by the Conference and of disobediences by the Roumanians, but it was harder to discover exactly what threat should be added at the end. No opinion has as yet been expressed in the Council as to how far it was desirable or possible to go.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that it be stated that Roumania had broken the Alliance and must suffer the consequences.

M. PICHON agreed that the Roumanians had proposed an armistice which was not in harmony with the armistice made by the Allies, and that they had set up a reactionary Government which was contrary to Allied policy.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Council would agree to a threat of blockade by sea.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would prefer to threaten Roumania for the time in general terms. He thought that the mere breach of the alliance would frighten her sufficiently.

MR. BALFOUR said that the result of this action should be borne in mind. This would be the first public quarrel in the alliance. It was also taking place in a part of the world where the tension was very great. The fact must be faced that the consequences might be very serious.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the alternative was to submit to the insolent defiance of the Roumanians. He was not prepared to submit to

it. He would rather leave his place in the Council. The Roumanians had always behaved like this, and deserved to be told that if they continued they would be regarded as having broken the alliance. They were in conflict with the Conference, and must suffer for it.

M. TARDIEU enquired whether there really existed any alliance with Roumania. It had been declared at the Peace of Bucharest <sup>4</sup> that the Roumanians had ceased to be Allies.

MR. POLK said that even after this, when they desired to raise a loan in America, the Roumanians had declared themselves to be among the Allies. They could not be Allies only for financial purposes.

M. TARDIEU suggested that the Roumanians be told that they must leave the Conference and suffer all the consequences of ceasing to belong to it. The Conference was a definite thing. The alliance was a vague thing. The Roumanians would be able to estimate advantages and disadvantages more clearly.

MR. BALFOUR then undertook to draft a telegram. He said that what he was about to read should be prefaced by a recital of the various instances in which the Roumanian Government had refused to carry out the policy of the Conference. After some discussion the following draft was accepted as the conclusion of the telegram to be sent to the Roumanian Government:—

“The Conference in the face of these facts is compelled to believe that the Roumanian Government intends to defy the Conference and to sever themselves from the Allied and Associated Powers. If the Conference is mistaken in these views it desires that the Roumanian Government will give it an immediate contradiction not only in words but by acts which will prove to all the world that Roumania accepts and is prepared to carry out in good faith the policy which the Conference has thus laid down”.

(It was also agreed that the telegram should be transmitted to General Gorton at Buda Pesth for communication to his colleagues and to the Roumanian Commander.

The final draft prepared by M. Berthelot is annexed in Appendix “B”.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Tardieu if he had anything new to say about Thrace.

Bulgarian  
Frontiers

M. TARDIEU said he had nothing to add to what he had said the day before.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had had a talk with Mr. Polk. The original proposal of the Committee was strongly objected to by the American Delegation, which was supported by the Italian Delegation. He had himself on the previous day suggested a compromise which

<sup>4</sup> Treaty between Roumania and the Central Powers, signed at Bucharest, May 7, 1918, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 771.

restored to Bulgaria a large population in Western Thrace, but gave the coast to Greece as a line of communication with Eastern Thrace. M. Venizelos had not liked this solution. As an alternative he had proposed that Thrace be made an autonomous State like Ruthenia under Greek sovereignty. This solution did not commend itself very much nor did it meet the American objection which he understood to be that Bulgaria could not now be deprived of access to the Aegean which had been given her before the war by a Treaty. The American Delegation believed that this was bound to lead to war very soon. They said they also thought it was useless to allege that Dedeagatch was an indifferent port not worth a quarrel. Whatever its merits the Bulgarians were attached to it, and it had a sentimental value about which there could be no argument. If peace in the Balkans were to be established, Dedeagatch must be left to Bulgaria. This he understood to be the American view. To meet this view a suggestion had been made that a corridor to the Aegean including Dedeagatch be given to Bulgaria under full sovereignty, the allotment of Thrace, both Eastern and Western, being left very much as the Committee had proposed. It had then been agreed between himself and Mr. Polk that the American and British experts should set to work on this suggestion to see if it could be geographically carried out. They were then to see M. Venizelos without committing either of their Principals or the Conference.

MR. POLK said that one argument had weighed considerably with him. All military authorities said that the cession of Thrace to Greece meant war in the Balkans. They added that of the Balkan States Bulgaria was the best able to wage war. It was therefore imperative to find some compromise which had a chance of lasting at least for a while.

M. TARDIEU said that he was not much in favour of the 'corridor' proposal. In another instance a 'corridor' had been proposed to link Czecho-Slovakia with Yugo-Slavia. This had been rejected by the Council as impracticable, though it would have been a matter of European interest and favourable to two of our Allies, as well as separating Austria from Hungary. As to the military opinion mentioned by Mr. Polk, he did not like to pit himself against the military authorities, but the Conference had been repeatedly told that all the enemy countries would go to war. Germany had not done so. He personally thought it most unlikely that Bulgaria would defy the Conference.

MR. POLK pointed out that in the case of Germany the Allies were in possession of a good argument namely, Marshal Foch and his armies on the Rhine. No similar argument existed in Bulgaria.

M. TARDIEU said that M. Venizelos had declared himself ready to



cope with the situation. In any case he thought, as the corridor would include Dedeagatch, a Greek town, and other towns also Greek, that it should, like Dantzic, be made into the territory of a Free State.

M. TITTONI said that he had previously suggested an alteration of the line in Eastern Thrace; now Mr. Balfour suggested one in Western Thrace. He thought perhaps the two might be combined.

M. TARDIEU said that if Western Thrace were not to be Greek there was no special reason why it should be Bulgarian. The population was Turkish.

MR. POLK observed that the country was at the present time Bulgarian.

M. TARDIEU said that Western Thrace was held by the Bulgarians just as Southern Dobrudja was held by the Roumanians. The American Delegation wished to take Southern Dobrudja from Roumania because it was Bulgarian and to give Bulgaria Western Thrace because it was Turkish.

MR. POLK said that the question was whether Greece had a better claim to the country than Bulgaria. Secondly, if the transfer meant war was it advisable to make it?

M. TARDIEU said he would agree if necessary not to give the country to Greece but he would not agree to give it to Bulgaria.

MR. POLK observed that the American suggestion had been to attribute the country to an international state. This had been scoffed at.

M. TARDIEU said that possibly a working arrangement might be made giving Dedeagatch as a commercial outlet to Bulgaria, under international administration as a free city. An international administrative commission would also control the railway leading to it. Thrace, both Eastern and Western, might be granted autonomous rights, similar to those granted to Ruthenia, under the sovereignty of Greece. It might even be possible to re-enforce the arrangement made for Ruthenia by an international commission. This scheme would take into consideration all the observations made, except that it would not permit direct access of Bulgaria to the Aegean, but he thought Bulgaria could do without this and the Allies had no real interest in furthering this desire. In any case he thought it was more inexpedient to work for the party of Constantine in Greece than to annoy the Bulgarians who, after what they had done, must expect severe treatment.

MR. POLK agreed that it was desirable to uphold M. Venizelos. He had no desire to favour the Bulgarians but it was not always advantageous to give even a good boy all he wanted. In Western Thrace, the figures of the 1914 census showed 100,000 Bulgarians against 30,000 Greeks. It was true that this proportion had been different in

1910 but present figures showed a great preponderance of Bulgarians. The American Delegation was convinced that to give this country to Greece was dangerous and would do no good. In Eastern Thrace, by changing the Enos-Midia line, it might be possible to give Greece a larger Greek population. The Greeks were more numerous towards Constantinople and less numerous towards Adrianople where the Bulgarian population was denser. He urged that 100,000 Bulgarians should not be placed under Greek rule. What had happened in Smyrna would happen again in Western Thrace. M. Venizelos had quoted a number of Bulgarian atrocities. Out of the Carnegie report <sup>5</sup> an equal number of Greek atrocities could be cited. The Turks in Western Thrace spoke Bulgarian and preferred Bulgarian to Greek rule.

M. TARDIEU said that his own experience had satisfied him that the inference from language to political preference was false.

MR. POLK said that this might be so. Nevertheless, there still remained 100,000 Bulgarians as against 30,000 Greeks.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what Mr. Polk thought of the proposal to make Dedeagatch and the corridor a free city.

MR. POLK said that this solution would still give the uplands of Thrace where the Bulgarian population was densest to Greece. The corridor was on the Eastern rim of Western Thrace.

M. TARDIEU said that he saw no possibility of giving to Bulgaria, Greek or Turkish territory. The figures of the 1914 census did not deserve any attention. The reduction of the Greek population had been obtained by wholesale massacre. He could not admit that massacre created title.

MR. POLK said that he had taken care to say that no title arose from massacre. What he had drawn attention to was the actual condition of the population.

M. TARDIEU said that under a Greek or International Government, the Greeks would flock back to the country.

MR. POLK said they would doubtless do so if the Bulgarians allowed them. That was the point. His instructions from President Wilson were very clear that a large Bulgarian population was not to be handed over to Greece.

M. TARDIEU asked whether a commercial outlet for Bulgaria to Dedeagatch through an internationalised territory was consistent with Mr. Polk's instructions.

MR. POLK said that this might be consistent with the instructions. He was not quite certain, as there had been some confusion in the

---

<sup>5</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington, 1914).

cable. What was quite positive was that the transference of a large population in Western Thrace to Greece was not approved.

M. TARDIEU asked whether autonomy similar to that given to the Ruthenians or even reinforced by further guarantees would be accepted by the American Delegation.

MR. POLK said that only international control would be accepted.

M. TARDIEU asked if Mr. Polk would oppose the cession of any part of Western Thrace to Greece.

MR. POLK said his instructions did not amount to this. He would be prepared to accept the compromise suggested by Mr. Balfour. The whole matter might, as Mr. Lansing had suggested, be referred to an International Commission.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the present Council was, in itself, an International Commission. He thought that for the time, being, no further progress could be made in the discussion and suggested that the views of M. Venizelos on the various compromises should be obtained.

M. TARDIEU said that he knew what M. Venizelos' views were. He had seen him since his conversation with Mr. Balfour and Mr. Polk. M. Venizelos was not willing to give up the numerous Greeks of Eastern Thrace merely on account of a few thousand Bulgarians in Western Thrace.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Mr. Polk accepted autonomy for Thrace under Greek sovereignty.

MR. POLK replied in the negative.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not think that the granting or the withholding of Dedeagatch from Bulgaria would put an end to conflict in the Balkans. On one thing he was determined—that no territorial reward should be given to Bulgaria.

(It was decided to adjourn the discussion.)

3. M. TARDIEU said that a small piece of frontier remained unsettled. He alluded to the frontier between Roumania and the Ruthene territory attached to Czecho-Slovakia. The recommendations of the Committee on the Territorial Questions relating to Roumania and Yugo-Slavia were to be found in Report No. 1 of April 6th, 1919.

(W. C. P. 656, Page 4 II—Conclusions, A. Northern

Frontier (a) and (b)).

(It was then decided to accept the frontier between Roumania and the Czecho-Slovak State (Ruthene territory) as drawn by the Committee for the study of Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs in Report No. 1 of April 6th, 1919, and to notify this line to the two Delegations concerned.)

Frontier Between  
Roumania and the  
Czecho-Slovak  
State



4. M. CAMBON said that the Czechs and Poles had not been able to reach a solution on the question of Teschen. M. Paderewski had suggested that the negotiations should be resumed in Paris. M. Benes, who felt that he would not be able to yield, had asked to be heard by the Council. The Council had already had discussions on the question of Teschen, and was doubtless unwilling to hear lengthy statements on the subject again. He therefore suggested that M. Benes and M. Paderewski be heard before a joint meeting of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees. As neither side would yield, it was obviously to the advantage of both to have a solution imposed by the Conference. The joint meeting would then make a short report to the Council.

(It was decided to accept M. Cambon's proposal regarding the reference of the Teschen question to a joint meeting of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees for speedy examination and report.)

(M. Cambon withdrew and Mr. Strachey<sup>7</sup> entered the room.)

5. MR. STRACHEY said that on May 7th the Supreme Council decided that the mandate for German East Africa should be given to Great

Belgian Claims in  
East Africa

Britain.<sup>8</sup> This decision was published. M. Hymans thereupon addressed a protest to M. Clemenceau as he considered that the claims of Belgium to receive a mandate for the portion of the colony occupied by her troops should not have been overlooked. Lord Milner<sup>9</sup> was asked by the Prime Minister to discuss the matter with M. Hymans. M. Hymans delegated M. Orts<sup>10</sup> to represent him, and Lord Milner had meetings with M. Orts and also correspondence during the month of May. On the 1st June Lord Milner informed the Secretary of the British Empire Delegation that he had agreed with M. Orts to join with him in a proposal to the Supreme Council that Belgium should be allowed to retain, under mandate, a certain portion of the territory of German East Africa occupied by her troops. The limits of this territory so retained were marked on a map, a copy of which was submitted by Lord Milner. Lord Milner added: "It is clearly understood that in recommending this solution, which I am personally prepared to support, I have not in any way committed the Supreme Council". The decision to create a special Commission to consider, among other things, the claims of Belgium in German East Africa, was taken on June 26th [27th].<sup>11</sup> The Meeting of that Commission which heard the Belgian claims took place on July 17th, and the above-mentioned

<sup>7</sup> Charles Strachey, British Colonial Office representative at the Peace Conference.

<sup>8</sup> IC-181 G, minute 2, vol. v, p. 507.

<sup>9</sup> British Secretary of State for Colonies.

<sup>10</sup> Belgian Minister at Paris.

<sup>11</sup> CF-96, minute 7, and CF-97, minute 7, vol. vi, pp. 727 and 741.

agreement between Lord Milner and M. Orts was communicated by Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how much of German East Africa would thus pass under Belgian mandate.

MR. STRACHEY replied that it would be about one-twentieth of the Colony and the most thickly populated part of it, containing about 2,500,000 people.

MR. BALFOUR said that he supported the views of Lord Milner. He understood that there were some objections as Belgian administration, owing to its past achievements, did not inspire universal conviction.

MR. STRACHEY said that this point had not been raised by the United States representative. A different point had been raised by him at the meeting of the Mandate Committee (see penultimate paragraph of Report of Committee on Belgian claims in East Africa—Appendix "C").

M. TITTONI said that, in consideration of the great sacrifices made by Belgium during the war, this satisfaction could not be denied her. He was in favour of ratifying the agreements made between the British and Belgian Delegates.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. POLK asked if he might for the time being reserve his vote, as he wished to consult an American Expert who was not present. He would notify the Secretariat later.

(With the reservation that Mr. Polk would inform the Secretariat-General at a later date whether he was able to accept or not, the agreement annexed as Appendix "D" was accepted by the Council.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, August 7, 1919.

---

Appendix "A" to HD-26

AUGUST 7, 1919.

*Memorandum Relative to the Armistice Terms Presented by  
Roumania to Hungary*<sup>12</sup>

The armistice terms go far beyond what is normally included in an armistice and comprise a comprehensive programme for indemnifying Roumania for loss and damage which she has suffered in the war. The indemnification to be required of Hungary is far more drastic than

---

<sup>12</sup> Prepared by John Foster Dulles, United States representative, Commission on Reparation Clauses in the treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

anything which has ever been considered by the Peace Conference and is for the exclusive benefit of Roumania.

The demands of Roumania represent, in my opinion, an act of bad faith on the part of Roumania, which is destructive of the entire principle of reparation adopted by the Peace Conference and consecrated by the Treaty with Germany, which Roumania has signed.

(1) The Treaty with Germany establishes the principle of "solidarity". One global debt is created, made up of the damage done by Germany and its allies, and one common fund is created of payments by Germany and its allies. Out of this common fund each Allied State is to receive a share proportionate to damage suffered, irrespective of which [of] the enemy States caused the damage and irrespective of the Powers from which the reparation fund was made up. This principle was accepted by the greater Powers at the urgent request of the lesser Balkan Powers, particularly Roumania, which urged that it would be unjust that they be relegated to relief from Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, the financial capacity of which was small. Accordingly, the Treaty with Germany makes Germany liable for damage done by Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. Roumania, among the other Allies, is entitled to share pro rata in payments made by Germany. Correspondingly, all the Allies are to share pro rata in reparation payments made by Hungary, etc.

The armistice demand made by Roumania on Hungary is destructive of this fundamental principle which was accepted by the principal Allied Powers at the request and for the benefit of Roumania and other lesser Powers.

(2) The principle is established by the Treaty with Germany (see Reparation Clauses, Annex II, Paragraph 12) that the Reparation Commission is constituted by the several Allied and Associated Governments as the "exclusive agency" of the said Governments for receiving the reparation payments to be made by Germany. While the text of this Treaty applies only to the reparation payments made by Germany, it was always understood that the signatories of this Treaty accepted the general principle of the Allied Powers collecting reparation through a common and exclusive agency. Language similar to that of the German Treaty is contained in the Conditions of Peace presented to Austria, and is to be contained in the reparation clauses with Hungary. The principle is obviously the only sound and orderly one. If every nation is allowed to go about in its own way to collect the indemnity which it thinks is due it, nothing but dispute, recrimination and serious trouble can result. The action of Roumania in formulating and presenting the armistice terms to Hungary is destructive of this principle.



(3) In the Conditions of Peace prepared for Austria it was originally provided that liability for reparation should be imposed upon the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire, including portions of that Empire transferred to Allied States. In deference to urgent protests it was agreed to permit the States acquiring Austro-Hungarian territory to make a modest contribution toward the cost of the war of liberation, which would be accepted in lieu of indemnity. An agreement to this effect has (subject to approval by his Government) been signed by Mr. Antonesco, one of the Roumanian plenipotentiaries. By this agreement Roumania undertakes to make payment, in accordance with a formula which is prescribed, on account of the cost of liberating Austro-Hungarian territory transferred to Roumania. It is further provided that this sum to be paid by Roumania shall be set off against the sums payable to Roumania by way of reparation and "no further payments on account of reparation shall be made until the other States to whom reparation is due shall have received payments on account of a like proportion of their approved claims for reparation." On the faith of this agreement the proposed Conditions of Peace with Austria were modified, so as to relieve transferred portions of Austria-Hungary from payment of indemnity.

The terms of the armistice presented by Roumania to Hungary are in direct violation of the agreement signed by Mr. Antonesco.

J[OHN] F[OSTER] D[ULLES]

---

Appendix B to HD-26

[*The President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau) to the British Representative on the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest (Gorton)*]

[Translation <sup>13</sup>]

Radio

AUGUST 7, 1919.

General GORTON,

*British Mission, Budapest.*

In reply to your telegraphic reports, I am communicating to you the telegram which the Peace Conference addressed today to the Roumanian Government at Bucharest.

I request that you bring it to the attention of your colleagues of the Allied commissions and to the Roumanian general-in-chief.

(Copy of the Telegram to Bucharest.)

G. CLEMENCEAU

---

<sup>13</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Extremely Urgent

AUGUST 7, 1919.

MINISTER OF FRANCE,

*Bucharest.*

I request you to communicate to the Roumanian Government without the slightest delay the following telegram which the Peace Conference addresses to it.

Following upon the downfall of the Bela Kun Government and its replacement by a Socialist government, after the defeat of the Hungarian troops by the Roumanian troops, the Supreme Council on August 5th, sent to Budapest a commission of four Allied generals charged with entering into communication, on one hand, with the Hungarian Government, in order to secure respect of the armistice of November 1918, and, on the other, with the chiefs of the Roumanian and Serbian Armies in order to guarantee the occupied country against all ill-treatment and to settle the conditions of occupation.<sup>14</sup>

These decisions were made known by telegram to the Hungarian Government, to the Roumanian generals and at the same time, to the Roumanian and Serbian Governments.<sup>15</sup>

The Supreme Council, having learned on the 6th of August that the Roumanian military authorities at Budapest wished to impose on the Hungarian Government an armistice in contradiction of the armistice concluded in November with Hungary in the name of the Allied Powers, and in violation of the general rights of the Allies with regard to reparations, advised the Roumanian Government on that same day that it was refusing to recognize the right of the Roumanian generals to conclude an armistice without the authorization of the Allied Powers.<sup>16</sup> At the same time, the Roumanian Government was cautioned against any action contrary to humanity or law which might be committed by the Roumanian troops, and was requested to give to the Roumanian general-in-chief in Hungary the order to comply with the directions of the commission of generals which represents the Conference and acts by delegation of its authority.

The Peace Conference has not yet received any direct reply from the Roumanian Government and is informed that the Roumanian generals refuse to comply with the directions of the Allied generals, oppose the publication of the telegram addressed by the President of the Conference to the Hungarian Government, permit their soldiers to plunder private property, requisition and send to Roumania cattle and rolling stock, subject Budapest to an unnecessary blockade which starves the city, destroy the railroad lines, par-

<sup>14</sup> See HD-23, minute 1, and HD-24, minute 2, pp. 504 and 528.

<sup>15</sup> Appendix A to HD-24, p. 541.

<sup>16</sup> See HD-25, minute 2, and appendix B, pp. 548 and 566.

ticularly the one which runs from Budapest to Vienna, and in short commit a series of acts which amount to violations of the decisions of the Conference, of the rights of the Allied and Associated Powers, and even of the most elementary humanity.

The Supreme Council learns at the same time that the Socialist government in Hungary has been overthrown by a *coup d'état*, its members arrested, and, that it has been replaced by a government at the head of which is the Archduke Joseph.

Confronted by these facts, the Conference is compelled to believe that the Roumanian Government intends to defy the Conference and to sever itself from the Allied and Associated Powers.

If the Conference is mistaken in this respect, it requests the Roumanian Government immediately to contradict this opinion, not by words but by acts which will publicly prove that Roumania accepts and is prepared to carry out in good faith the policy laid down by the Conference.

G. CLEMENCEAU

---

#### Appendix C to HD-26

##### COMMITTEE ON MANDATES

#### *Report of the Committee on Belgian Claims in East Africa*

At its meeting of 17th July, 1919, under the chairmanship of Mr. Henry Simon, French Minister for the Colonies, the Committee on Mandates, in pursuance of the mission entrusted to it by the Supreme InterAllied Council, heard the claims of Belgium to the territories belonging to the former German Colony in East Africa.

The claims in question were expounded, on behalf of the Belgian Delegation, by Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy, who submitted—together with the map annexed thereto and with a note—the appended text of an agreement concluded on 30th May between his Government and the Government of Great Britain. This agreement determines the zones of the former colony of German East Africa in which the two contracting Governments were to exercise an administrative mandate.

The Chairman, after thanking the Belgian representatives, who then withdrew, proceeded to consult the members of the Committee with regard to the memorandum which had just been submitted.

The exchange of views which then took place may be summed up as follows:—

Colonel Amery, on behalf of Great Britain, Baron Makino, on behalf of Japan, and Mr. Henry Simon, on behalf of France, stated that they had no observations to put forward.



Mr. Marconi, on behalf of Italy had no observations to make with regard to the principle, but pointed out that the Supreme InterAllied Council was alone competent to take a decision.

Mr. Beer, on behalf of the U. S. A. made the following observations.

"The territory over which there is a question of giving Belgium a mandate had a population of about 3 million inhabitants out of the 7 millions who formed the population of the former German colony of East Africa. This zone is moreover inhabited by tribes whose position, from the ethnical, political and economic points of view, differs from that of the populations of the Belgian Congo, from which they are moreover geographically isolated. This may cause the Belgian administration difficulties which Mr. Beer, some weeks before the agreement of 30th May, had thought it his duty to point out to President Wilson".

The Committee unanimously decided to transmit to the Supreme InterAllied Council the text of the Anglo-Belgian Agreement of 30th May, 1919, and the documents appended thereto, accompanied by the present report.

SIMON

---

#### Appendix D to HD-26

#### [*Anglo-Belgian Agreement on German East Africa*]

[Translation <sup>17</sup>]

Annex: a map.<sup>18</sup>

PARIS, May 30, 1919.

The undersigned have the honor to submit to the Supreme Council of the Allies the following proposal concerning the assignment of mandates for administering the territories of German East Africa:

Belgium will exercise the mandate for the administration of that portion of German East Africa which stretches westward from the boundary shown in red on the map attached hereto.

Great Britain will exercise the mandate over the portions of the same colony which are not assigned to Belgium.

MILNER

ORTS

*Minister Plenipotentiary of  
H. M. the King of the Belgians*

[Enclosure]

#### *Description of the Boundary Indicated on the Accompanying Map*

From the point where the frontier between the Uganda Protectorate and German East Africa cuts the river Mavumba and in a

---

<sup>17</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>18</sup> The map does not accompany the minutes.

south-easterly direction a straight line to point 1640, about 15 kilometers south-south-west of Mt. Gabiro.

Thence a straight line in a southerly direction to the north shore of Lake Mohazi, where it terminates at the confluence of a river situated about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  kilometers from the confluence of the river Msilala.

If the trace of the railway on the west of the river Kagera from Bugufi to Uganda approaches within 16 kilometers of the line defined above, the boundary will be carried to the west, following a minimum distance of 16 kilometers from this trace, without, however, passing to the west of the straight line joining the terminal point on Lake Mohazi and the top of Mt. Kivisa (2100) situated on the Uganda-German East African frontier about 5 kilometers south-west of the point where the river Mavumba cuts this frontier.

Thence a line south-eastwards to meet the southern shore of Lake Mohazi.

Thence the watershed between the Taruka and the Mkarange and continuing southwards to the north-eastern end of Lake Mugesera.

Thence the median line of this lake and continuing southwards across Lake Ssake to meet the Kagera. Thence the course of the Kagera downstream to meet the western boundary of Bugufi.

Thence this boundary to its junction with the eastern boundary of Urundi.

Thence the eastern and southern boundary of Urundi to Lake Tanganyika.

MILNER

ORTS

*Minister Plenipotentiary  
of H. M. the King of the Belgians*

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, August 8, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. F. L. Polk.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	M. Clemenceau. M. Pichon.
<i>Secretary</i> Mr. L. Harrison.	<i>Secretaries</i> Mr. H. Norman. Sir G. Clerk.	<i>Secretaries</i> M. Dutasta. M. Berthelot. M. de St-Quentin.
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Tittoni.	M. Matsui.
	<i>Secretary</i> M. Paterno.	<i>Secretary</i> M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Captain Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Commander Bell.
FRANCE . . . . .	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lt.-Colonel A. Jones.

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

(Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council were present.)

**Financial Situation in Fiume** M. CLEMENCEAU communicated a letter from the Italian Delegation on this subject to the Council (See Appendix "A").

M. TITTONI asked that the question should be submitted to the Finance Committee for examination and report.

(It was therefore agreed that the letter from the Italian Delegation with regard to the Financial Situation in Fiume should be submitted to the Finance Committee for examination and report.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the Americans had any news from Budapest.

**Situation in Hungary** Mr. POLK communicated a telegram contained in Appendix "B".

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not see that the Council could do anything at present.



MR. BALFOUR, commenting upon the telegram, asked why the Allied and Associated representatives at Vienna had received some, and not all, of the instructions given to the Committee of General Officers.

MR. POLK said that he could only say that the instructions had been sent through Warsaw [to?] General Gorton.

GENERAL SACKVILLE-WEST said that the instructions had been sent on the previous day, in writing, and by telegram. The former would go by courier, but the latter would have to be communicated by the best means that the Allied representatives in Vienna could devise.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the American organisation for telegraphic communication with Central Europe had been employed.

MR. NORMAN replied that an attempt had been made to send the communication by wireless telegraph from the Eiffel Tower.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not think the question was of great importance, so long as every means had been employed for communicating with the Allied and Associated representatives concerned.

M. TITTONI then drew attention to the instructions to the four Generals, dealing with the distribution of war materials to the Allies (See Appendix "B" of H. D. 24<sup>1</sup>).

He thought that the insertion of the phrase in the instructions in question was somewhat premature. He understood, that the Council was to decide finally on the distribution of the total war material taken from the enemy, on the general principle that each Ally was to have a share proportionate to its effort. The question, therefore, still remained to be settled.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not quite understand how the phrase objected to by M. Tittoni had been inserted.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with the principle enunciated by M. Tittoni, and said that he thought a telegram should be sent to the Generals.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he would draft the necessary telegram to the Generals.

(It was decided that General Weygand should send a telegram to the four Generals on the Commission to Budapest, informing them that as the general principle governing the distribution of enemy war material to the Allies had not as yet been decided on by the Council, their functions in the matter should be limited to making such recommendations as they might think fit.)

3. MR. BALFOUR stated that the Austrian Delegation had just sent in a general reply on the subject of the peace terms. The communications in question would be sent to the various Committees for examination, in accordance with the procedure established. Furthermore, each Committee would report separately on the points in the Note with which

Replies to  
Austrian  
Notes

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 542.

it was immediately concerned. The Council, after receiving and considering the replies of these various Committees, would send them to the Co-ordinating Committee for the necessary action. He therefore proposed a modification of the procedure, which would consist in sending the replies of the various Committees to the Co-ordinating Committee first, which latter body, after considering them as a whole, should report to the Council.

CAPTAIN PORTIER informed Mr. Balfour that this procedure had already been adopted.

4. (The Finance Experts entered the Room.)

M. CHEYSSON drew the attention of the Council to the telegram contained in Appendix "C". He said the Council was faced with the alternative of the eventual bankruptcy of the Turkish state, or of partially consenting to the measures which the Ottoman Government were taking.

He thought it would be better to have further information before taking definite measures. Such information would take the form of a general report on the financial position of the Turkish Government. He did not think that it would be proper to allow the Turks to proceed with the sale of state property without further enquiry. He suggested that they should be asked why the sale of their credits and property was so urgent, and what form of realisable property they proposed to sell.

M. TITTONI said that he agreed with M. Cheysson as to the need of a general report upon the financial position of Turkey. He thought, however, that a distinction should be made between

- (1) the private property of the Sultan
- (2) the properties of religious foundations, and
- (3) the State domains.

No. 3 constituted a fund of State property which was a most important guarantee of ultimate reparation. The private property of the Crown could be sold by the Turkish Govt. as it could not be regarded as confiscated property, subjected to the payment of war damages. The properties of religious foundations could not be seized in payment of war damages, and the Turkish Government might, in a similar manner, sell them.

M. CHEYSSON said that in the Peace Treaties with Austria and Germany, the Crown property had been regarded as belonging genuinely to the State, and as being, in consequence, liable to confiscation.

M. TITTONI said that he could not quite agree, as a distinction had been established between the private and public property of the Ruler, the later falling under the jurisdiction of the National Executive.

M. PICHON said that he did not think that distinctions of the kind were applicable to Eastern countries, and that it would be better to adopt a simpler general rule.

Sale of State  
Property by the  
Ottoman  
Government

M. TITTONI said that he only desired that in communicating a general report upon the financial situation in Turkey, the Financial Commission should take into consideration the point that he had raised.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether, under the terms of the Armistice, we were empowered to ask for the exact information required. Could we, for instance, have made a similar request to Germany?

M. CHEYSSON remarked that he thought that until such time as the Peace Treaty should be signed, the Allied and Associated Governments were able to take whatever measures they thought necessary for the preservation of their interests.

MR. POLK said that as it would be a long time before the final peace could be arrived at, with Turkey, and as the existing Armistice was incomplete in certain points, due to its having been drawn up at an early period, would it not be advantageous to draft a more complete and conclusive Armistice, which would enable us to tide over the intervening time?

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought Mr. Polk's suggestion, if put into effect, would be a trifle high-handed.

MR. POLK suggested that the necessary measures might be effected by mutual agreement.

MR. DULLES drew attention to the fact that in the successive Armistices imposed upon Germany, measures had been taken with a view to preserving securities and other properties for the purposes of ultimate reparations.

MR. BALFOUR agreed, but said that these additional terms had only been imposed in exchange for concessions on other points granted by the German Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the necessary measures could only be put into effect by Treaty provisions.

MR. BALFOUR then suggested that it might be best—

1. To refuse to recognise the sales of property now being carried out by the Turkish Government until the final signature of the Peace Treaty. Such a measure would put prospective purchasers on their guard, and

2. After receiving a full report on the financial position of the Ottoman Government, authorisation might be given to proceed with sales of a certain class, in order that the Turkish Empire might be saved from bankruptcy.

(It was therefore decided:—

1. That a communication should be sent to the Ottoman Government through the French High Commissioner at Constantinople, informing it that the Allied and Associated Governments refused, and would refuse to recognise the validity of any sales, effected by such Government, between the signature of the Armistice and the ratification of the Peace Treaty.



2. That the Allied and Associated Governments should reserve to themselves the right to grant special licenses to the Ottoman Government for the sale of such property as the aforesaid Ottoman Government might desire to realise: the conditions of sale, and the property to be realised, being specified, in detail, beforehand, to the Allied and Associated Governments.

3. That the Financial Commission should enquire into, and present, a general report on the financial position of the Ottoman Government, and should examine the question of the sale by that Government of

- (a) Private properties of the Crown.
- (b) Properties belonging to religious foundations.
- (c) State domains.

5. (At this point Colonel Peel entered the Room and M. Cheysson withdrew.)

COLONEL PEEL presented and remarked on the proposals put forward by the Reparations Commission (see Appendix "D").

He drew attention to the observations made by the Delegations of the Greek, Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Governments on the subject of the Reparation Clauses, and to the opinion of the Reparation Commission upon the criticism raised against the articles in the Peace Treaty dealing with reparations by Bulgaria.

Reparation and  
Financial Clauses  
in the Peace Treaty  
With Bulgaria

In conclusion, he drew attention to the calculation made by the American Delegation on the subject of reparations in Balkan countries. The results of this calculation were that the reparations to be paid by Bulgaria were to be regarded as a national payment of Fcs. 600. for each citizen. The total load of debt and obligations upon Serbia, represented a payment of Fcs. 300. per citizen.

Finally, he wished that a modification should be inserted into Article 14, so as to enable the Reparations Commission to collect debts due by Germany to the National Bank of Bulgaria.

(It was agreed:—

(1) To accept the figure of  $2\frac{1}{4}$  milliards of Francs, which the Reparations Commission considered to be the maximum sum payable by Bulgaria.

(2) To accept the findings of the Commission with regard to the debts due by Germany to Bulgaria, and by Bulgaria to Germany, and not to add such credits to the total sum payable by the Bulgarian Government.

(3) To accept the findings of the Reparations Commission on the subject of the cattle and live stock to be delivered by the Bulgarians to the Serbs.

(4) That neither Greece, nor Roumania, nor Jugo-Slavia should be represented on the Interallied Committee for Bulgaria.

(5) That Article 14 of the Financial and Reparation Clauses should be modified in such a manner as to allow the Reparations Commission to collect debts due by Germany to the National Bank of Bulgaria.)

6. MARSHAL FOCH explained his report (see Annexe "E") on the subject of the German Forces in the 10 kilometre and 50 kilometre zones on the right bank of the Rhine.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch's proposals with regard to the German Military forces for maintaining order in the 10 kilometre and the 50 kilometre zones on the right bank of the Rhine should be accepted.)

7. MARSHAL FOCH said that the question to be discussed had been brought forward in his letter of the 6th of August to the President of the Council (see Annexe "F"). His conclusion had been, that the Council ought to take an immediate resolution with regard to the constitution of the Allied Forces, and to the total forces necessary.

Army of Occupation in Upper Silesia and Dantzig Area: (a) Upper Silesia

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Italy should be regarded as consenting to participate in the occupation.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that he understood that Italy would participate, and that contributions to the forces would come from four sources.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question before the Council was whether each Country consented to send a quarter of the total effectives.

MR. BALFOUR said that Great Britain was quite willing to send her share; but that a practical difficulty with regard to the provisioning of the troops called for solution. It would be very difficult for Great Britain to send the necessary provisions to any of its forces stationed in Upper Silesia; On the other hand, such an operation would be relatively easy for France. He therefore proposed that the Head-quarter Staffs should examine the question of distributing the troops. England might take a greater share in any operations affecting the coastal regions, such as Dantzig; whilst France might make a proportionately larger contribution towards operations in such regions as Upper Silesia. The total force would be the same; only the disposal of the troops would be modified.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that a decision had been arrived at, to the effect that the forces of occupation in Upper Silesia should be taken from the Armies in the Rhine territories.<sup>3</sup> The question of transport had not therefore arisen, since troops taken from such sources would probably be sent by land. Since the provisioning of the troops on the left bank of the Rhine was carried out en bloc, the same thing would probably hold good for military forces in Upper Silesia. It was most important that all forces of occupation sent out by the Allies to various parts of Europe should, in every case, comprise a certain number of men from each one of the Allied and Associated Powers. This principle was particularly important in such

<sup>3</sup> HD-12, minute 3, and HD-14, minute 5, pp. 236 and 308.

areas as Dantzig. He did not make any concrete proposal, but considered that the spirit of the Treaty would be violated by failing to make all forces of occupation, composite, Inter-Allied, Units.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he concluded from Mr. Balfour's remark that the British Army would be represented in Upper Silesia.

MR. BALFOUR said the British forces would certainly take part in that occupation.

GENERAL BLISS said that a decision had been arrived at, to the effect that every Army was to be represented on the Rhine. He was of the opinion that the command in any one locality should be homogeneous. The United States would contribute. With regard to the proportion of troops to be furnished by each nation, he reminded the Council that he had been a Member of each Committee that had examined the problem, when the question of the Army of Occupation on the Rhine had been discussed. He had told President Wilson that the figure arrived at for the United States Forces was an absolute minimum. His observations had therefore been accepted and the necessary orders given. He had thought, however, that the American troops were to remain on the Rhine, and were not to be sent into Upper Silesia. It would therefore be necessary for him to ask President Wilson whether the United States contingent for the Rhine should be considered as indivisible, and, if sent elsewhere, whether it should be replaced.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that when the question of the occupation of the Rhine had been discussed, President Wilson's plan of an Inter-Allied occupation had been accepted in spite of his (M. Clemenceau's) opposition. It therefore seemed difficult to admit that President Wilson was in a position to discuss the matter further.

MR. BALFOUR said that he believed General Belin had informed the Council that a Division in Upper Silesia could be of strategical use in the event of the recurrence of active operations on the Western Front.

GENERAL BLISS said that he was sure that President Wilson would make no objection. The only point to be considered was whether the United States force should be regarded as a Unit not capable of division, and whether if it were sent to Upper Silesia, it should be replaced on the Rhine by other troops.

MR. POLK said that the question was one of numbers.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he realised, that, from a practical point of view, it would be better for certain Units in the Armies of Occupation not to be Inter-Allied Forces. From the political point of view, however, it was most important that Occupation Forces should be so constituted; this was more particularly desirable in view of the fact that the Allied soldiers had always worked well together, and that no friction had risen between them.



MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau. It was most advantageous to show everywhere, that the Allies remained associated together in the achievement of certain objects. He did not foresee any difficulty with regard to the troops; but he did anticipate numerous practical difficulties with regard to provisioning. He proposed that Marshal Foch should examine the problem in collaboration with the Headquarter Staffs of the various Governments concerned.

M. TITTONI said that he did not think that the principle of equal contribution had ever been accepted, and that he could not undertake to furnish a quarter of the total effectives in the Division for Upper Silesia, more especially as Italy had no troops on the Rhine.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that although there were no Italian troops on the Rhine, Signor Orlando had none the less accepted the principle of the Forces of Occupation being divided amongst the Allies.

M. TITTONI said that he thought that the American and British Governments had made reservations.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that these Governments had consented to furnish their contingents; the only reservations that they had made, dealt with the subject of the distribution of troops in certain specified sectors.

MARSHAL FOCH asked whether he was to understand that the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, would participate equally in the occupation of Upper Silesia.

M. TITTONI said that he accepted the principle, but made a reservation with regard to the number of effectives to be supplied.

M. CLEMENCEAU answered that the principle of Inter-Allied occupation had been proposed by President Wilson, and accepted by all. It had been completely understood that an equal representation was intended; for, when no such understanding had been arrived at, the question had been raised and decided. This had been the principle arrived at for the Rhine. No statement had ever been made to the effect that unequal contributions would be given by the various Governments to the Army of Occupation in Silesia. Mr. Balfour and Mr. Polk had accepted the general principle, and he asked M. Tittoni to give his consent to it.

M. TITTONI said that the theatre in which the operation was to take place was further away from Italy than it was from other countries.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that such a fact might be an excuse for Italian troops arriving late, but that he insisted on knowing whether M. Tittoni did, or did not, accept the principle that Italy should supply a quarter of the total effectives necessary for the occupation of Upper Silesia.

M. TITTONI said that he accepted the principle.

(It was decided that the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, should each supply a quarter of the total effectives necessary for occupation of Upper Silesia.)

It was further decided that Marshal Foch, in collaboration with the Allied Headquarters Staff should consider what advantage would be derived from each of that [*the*] Allied Governments being represented in the Forces of Occupation in Eastern Europe. Marshal Foch should further consider the disadvantages which might arise from the constitution of composite Inter-Allied Forces, owing to difficulties of provisioning each of these contingents, and from any friction that might occur between the soldiers of the Allied Nations. Finally, Marshal Foch was to submit a report on what he considered would be the most advantageous distribution of the Allied troops.)

MARSHAL FOCH said that the same question arose with regard to Danzig and Memel, which were occupied by Inter-Allied troops. He asked whether the principle of equal contingents

(b) Danzig and  
Memel

had been accepted.

MR. BALFOUR said that the principle was not disputed. What ought to be decided was whether it would not be more practical for each Government to have its forces concentrated in certain sectors, so as to simplify the problem of provisioning. The total number of effectives in each locality would not be altered; he took as an example the occupations of Upper Silesia, and of Danzig, and of Memel. It might be decided that the British contingent in Upper Silesia ought to be replaced by a French contingent of equal strength. In compensation for such an arrangement, France would not have to send any contingent to Danzig. On such a basis, France would only have to send provisions to Upper Silesia, and not to Danzig; whilst Great Britain would only send provisions to Danzig, and not to upper Silesia. He wished the problem, as he had brought it forward, to be studied by Marshal Foch and the Allied Headquarters Staffs.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that the Upper Silesia question had been settled and ought not to be raised afresh. He asked for a decision with regard to Danzig and to Memel.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the articles in the Peace Treaty were different with regard to the two regions. The Inter-Allied occupation of Upper Silesia had been decided upon, but no such decision had been taken with regard to Danzig. The question had been laid before the Supreme Council at Versailles; but the military experts had not been able to agree to the necessity of sending troops of occupation. The French Delegation favoured such a measure; the British and American Delegations opposed it. A decision was very necessary.

M. TITTONI remarked that in a previous discussion it had been decided that German troops should evacuate Dantzic, which should not be occupied by Polish forces; and that the question of sending

Inter-Allied troops into that region should be adjourned.<sup>5</sup> Troops should only be sent into the Danzig region if thought necessary by the members of the Delimitation Committee on the spot.

MR. BALFOUR said that in his opinion only a very few troops would be necessary for Danzig. The Germans, whose propaganda might have been serious, now seemed to be resigned and the situation in this locality had much improved. He did not think that it was therefore very urgent to come to an immediate decision.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the difficulty arose from the fact that officers sent out to the regions in question might at any moment ask for troops. The High Command must keep this in mind in drawing up its general military programme. At the present moment all armies were demobilising. Soldiers were returning to their civil occupations and if the constitution of this contingent were not decided upon it might be impossible to form it when desired.

M. TITTONI said that the troops would only be sent if the officers on particular Commissions and Committee asked for them. Such officers could not even take up their posts until the ratification of the Treaty and this fact gave us time to consider the question.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was therefore decided that Marshal Foch should only examine the question of Upper Silesia.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Danzig question was also important and read out a telegram received that day from General Henrys:<sup>6</sup>

[Translation ']

Warsaw, August 6, 1919.

The Polish Government requests me to intervene with you in order to obtain the dispatch of two Allied battalions to guard the supplies transported from Dunkerque to Dantzig, and to prevent thefts at Dantzig.

I should be grateful to be informed of the intention of the Allies on the subject of the operation of the Polish base at Dantzig. If an Interallied Commission is to be charged with the management of the port and of transportation at Dantzig, I consider that it would be to my advantage to be represented on the Commission for questions of transport which directly concern the forwarding of supplies to Poland.

The question of sending Allied troops to Dantzig and Memel was adjourned.

M. GEORGI then entered the room.

Allied Armies and  
the Clearing Up  
of Battlefields

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Georgi to explain the question of the participation of the armies in the work of clearing up battlefields in the liberated regions.

M. GEORGI explained the text of the letter, dated 30th June, 1919,

<sup>5</sup> HD-20, minute 2, p. 443.

<sup>6</sup> General Paul Henrys, chief of the French Military Mission to Poland.

<sup>7</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



and sent by the Minister of the liberated regions to the President of the Peace Conference (See Appendix G).

MR. BALFOUR said that the question was simply a labour problem.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the position was as follows: after the armistice of the 11th November, 1918, the American army had been split up into two portions. The first portion had moved eastwards towards the Rhine; the other had moved back towards its bases preparatory to re-embarkation. As a result of this, the zone occupied by it at the time of the armistice had been completely evacuated. But the zone in question had not been the theatre of protracted battles; it had therefore been less devastated, and less obstructed by débris, than other portions of the front.

The French troops that had taken over the old American sectors had cleaned up the area and restored order, with the result that the general work of clearance was in a more advanced state in that sector than it was in others. In the British sector, on the other hand, English troops had remained in occupation throughout, since they needed it as a means of communication with their bases. In addition to this, the sector occupied by the British army in November 1918 had been the theatre of long and protracted struggles, in which the artillery of the combatants had deluged the whole area with machine gun fire and projectiles.

Extensive protective fortifications had been set up throughout the area. The result was, that in this zone, the work of reconstruction and clearing was enormous, and was, moreover, very far behind. The British sector ran into Belgian territory; and the Belgians had asked frequently for assistance in restoring order in their war zone. It was in the sector just described that the assistance, and collaboration, of British troops was asked for. At the present moment, General Asser<sup>8</sup> was concerned in sending back to England all men who could possibly be of use. All deteriorated ammunition, and all abandoned German ammunition had been left behind.

M. CLEMENCEAU called attention to the fact, that an agreement had been reached between the Allies, to the effect that each body of troops should be responsible for cleaning up the sector occupied by it at the time of the armistice.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not know it.

M. GEORGI said that the agreement in question was recorded by a letter dated 14th January, 1919, in which Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig undertook to clean up the zone occupied by the British Armies. He had also offered to assist the peasants.

MR. BALFOUR said that the result of the situation was that the more an ally had fought, the longer it would remain behind after

---

<sup>8</sup> Lt. Gen. Sir Joseph John Asser, commander of the British forces in the liberated regions.

the conclusion of hostilities, to clear up the sector occupied by its armies.

M. CLEMENCEAU objected to the form in which the question had been raised. He reminded the Council that it had been France's misfortune to supply the battlefields. He did not lay particular emphasis on this sad privilege, but merely stated it. It had been decided that each combatant should clear up in its own sector. If one of the Allies could not consent to doing this, France would necessarily have to carry it out.

MR. BALFOUR said he had only wished to draw a conclusion, and to note that, as the Americans had not fought for such a long time, and had been engaged in an easier sector, the French had done the work of clearing for them, after they had left. The British troops had been bitterly engaged for four years, and they were now asked to remain behind, for many months, in order to clear up the sectors that they had occupied. The British Government in no way withdrew from the obligations that it had entered into.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that there was no question of obligation. It was simply one of assistance.

MR. BALFOUR said that he fully understood the situation in which France stood. More than that, every Englishman understood it, and all the other Allies as well. All obligations would be carried out.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he only wished the question to be put before the British military men, to see whether help could be given. By doing this, the French would be gratified and assisted.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he wished to make a practical proposal. Would it not be possible to form an Interallied military committee at the Ministry of Liberated Regions, in order to study the question in detail? It would be quite sufficient that each Government should make Mr. Balfour's words the instructions to its representative. This would ensure the problem being examined in a general spirit of good will.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French were not asking for British troops, because the clearing work was being carried out, as far as possible, with German prisoners. Great Britain was asked to help, simply because it had not been possible to carry on the work of clearing in the zones of the British Armies. He asked, therefore, whether it would not be possible for the British Government to employ the German prisoners at present in the British Army zones.

(It was decided to nominate an Interallied Military Commission, which should sit at the Ministry of Liberated Regions, and should study the practical means that might be employed to ensure the co-operation of the Allied Armies in the work of clearing up the munitions, and war materials, left in the liberated regions.

It was further decided that Marshal Foch should collaborate with the Commissariat-Général for the reconstruction of the liberated regions in making nomination to the above Interallied Committee.)

9. (M. Georgi then left the room, and General Nollet entered.)

**GENERAL NOLLET** said that as he was the President of the Interallied Commission of Military Control, he could not speak for the Naval and Aerial Commissions of Control. The Military Commission was divided into three sub-committees:—

Organisation of  
Inter-Allied Com-  
mittees of Control

- (a) The Sub-Committee for Arms and Munitions.
- (b) The Sub-Committee for Effectives and Recruiting.
- (c) The Sub-Committee for Fortifications.

Sub-Committee (a) was at the present moment the most important. There were large numbers of trained men in Germany at the present time. If German arms and munitions were taken away, the value of these trained men would disappear, and security would result. This had been the reason for the provision in the Peace Treaty whereby the time for the reduction of the German forces to an ordinary standard had been limited to three months. The Sub-Committee in question would have to see to it, that all material, in excess of what had been laid down, should be handed over to the Allied and Associated Governments. It would, moreover, actively supervise the production of the numerous factories in Germany to prevent the country from taking up the production of war material in a disguised form. It was evident that this sub-committee ought to have a considerable personnel, and a large number of specialists, in order to be able to act with rapidity. The field of its operations extended over the whole German Army, and all the factories of Germany.

Sub-Committee (b) had a different character. Its immediate functions were obviously most important, but its work in the future would be of far greater consequence. The avowed, and actual, intentions of Germany could only be ascertained with certainty by studying closely the manner in which German mobilisation would be carried out, and by examining the new legislation of that country. The members of this Sub-Committee would have to study German organisation from this point of view, and would have to see how all the questions enumerated affected the general situation. The Sub-Committee might be composed of a smaller, non-specialist, personnel.

Sub-Committee (c) on fortifications would have an easier task. Fortified works could not be disguised. Their position was actually known, and they were largely in the territory that had fallen to France. The remainder were mostly in the Rhine territories, now under French occupation.



The whole Military Commission of Control, as outlined, would be very important. It would have to be constituted by 350 officers, 150 Interpreters, and 800 ordinary soldiers. He thought that the figures given ought to be regarded as the minimum of what was necessary, in view of the large number of problems that would have to be studied locally, and the rapidity with which examinations would have to be effected. After the ratification of the Treaty, it would be necessary to spread a whole network of investigating bodies over Germany. He called upon the Council to examine the figures put forward by him, and to remember that the whole Committee would be an Inter-Allied body, and not a French one.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was entirely in agreement with General Nollet's conclusion with regard to the numerous personnel necessary for carrying out the work of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control. Practical difficulties would, however, arise in points of detail, such as the transporting, provisioning and quartering of the staffs. As British representative, he would like to propose that the three Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should come under Marshal Foch's orders, or else, later on, under the orders of the French General commanding on the Rhine.

(It was decided that Marshal Foch's Headquarter Staff, or the Headquarter Staff of the French Commander on the Rhine, should settle all questions arising out of the transportation into Germany of the Inter-Allied Committees of Control, as well as the questions affecting their quartering and provisioning, when established in that country.)

It was further decided to accept General Nollet's proposals on the subject of the personnel out of which the Inter-Allied Commission of Control should be constituted.)

10. (At this point General Nollet left the room.)

GENERAL SACKVILLE-WEST said that a report had been presented to the Council on the subject of the Military forces, which might be maintained by the various States of Central Europe. The report on Austria had been sent back to be modified. Certain alterations had been put into it, and he asked the

Council whether the articles affecting Hungary were to be remodelled, and brought into conformity with those in the Peace Treaty with Austria as finally modified.

GENERAL BELIN said that the Council had decided on the maximum number of effectives which were to constitute the new Hungarian Army.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council could not reply; since the Hungarian Treaty was not yet complete.

Agreement Between the Military  
Clauses in the  
Peace Treaty  
With Hungary  
and Those in the  
Austrian Peace  
Treaty

GENERAL BELIN said that the Military Representatives had proposed a maximum figure of 40,000 men for Austria. The Supreme Council had lowered the figure to 15,000. The final decision was that an Army of 30,000 men should be allowed. In the case of Hungary the two extreme figures were 45,000 men and 18,000 men respectively. What figure between these two latter was the Council going to decide upon.

M. TITTONI said that if the Austrian Peace Treaty was to be taken as a basis, Hungary ought to be allowed an Army of 35,000 men.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in the present state of the Peace Treaty with Hungary it was difficult to arrive at an exact figure. He did not see that there was any particular need for deciding immediately.

M. TITTONI said that the figure had to go into the Peace Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed that the Military Representatives ought to make the two Treaties agree in such articles as had been definitely settled. It was quite impossible to settle the question in the case of articles not decided upon. Austria had been allowed a large number of effectives in order to conciliate her and to detach her from German influence. His own suggestion had been for an Austrian Army of 15,000 men. It was not possible to settle the Hungarian Army on the basis of the Austrian.

(It was decided that the Military Representatives should co-ordinate the articles in the Peace Treaty with Hungary now definitely decided upon, with the corresponding articles in the Peace Treaty with Austria.)

11. M. CLEMENCEAU asked that the question should be adjourned in order that he might discuss it with Mr. Polk. (It was therefore decided to adjourn the question.)

German Prisoners  
in the Custody  
of the American  
Armies

12. MR. BALFOUR said that it had been the wish of the British Government not to declare a Blockade on Russia, but to concert measures for closing the ports of Baltic Russia to International traffic in which all the Allies could act conjointly.

Blockade of  
Russia

President Wilson had just replied (See Appendix H) to the effect that he could not participate in the Allied policy. It was, therefore, not possible to come to a decision at once, for, whilst regretting the necessity of abandoning the policy suggested, he would not adopt another unacceptable to America. At the present moment commercial transit was not active in the region in question, and, in another three months, ice conditions would make it impossible. All that was necessary was to tide over this short period, and to be ready to reexamine the question if any important change took place.

M. TITTONI remarked that the Blockade of Hungary had only been declared because Bela Kun had not carried out the Armistice condi-

tions. We were now refusing to Blockade Russia despite the fact that Lenin, the head of the Bolshevik Government, had defied the elementary laws of human society. Would not the Allied and Associated Governments be fully justified, in view of this comparison, in declaring a blockade on Russia? He was willing, however, to submit to the opinion of his colleagues.

MR. POLK said that morally he agreed with M. Tittoni. But there was an important legal point, which should not be forgotten. No war had been declared against Russia. He proposed that President Wilson's suggestion should be accepted, and that the Experts should study a means of effecting what was desired by means of mutual co-operation.

MR. BALFOUR accepted Mr. Polk's proposal.

(It was decided that the Experts of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should examine the problem of carrying out, conjointly, measures which should be equivalent to a Blockade of Russian Baltic ports. When the problem had been fully examined a report should be made to the Council.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, August 8, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-27

*[The Italian Plenipotentiary (Tittoni) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]*

[Translation \*]

PARIS, August 7, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Italian Government has just received news of increasing seriousness on the subject of the monetary situation at Fiume.

The public has withdrawn from circulation and has hoarded almost all of the crown pieces which were struck off by the city last April while awaiting the exchange into Italian money; a great many Austro-Hungarian notes, with a counterfeit Fiume stamp, are coming into circulation and the public is compelled to accept them in order to meet the necessities of existence. Trade with foreign countries is excessively difficult on account of the scarcity of money which causes a rise in the price of all commodities and consequently very deep unrest among the people.

---

\* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



The situation is indeed very grave, and might induce very troublesome consequences if the necessary measures should not be taken with the greatest promptness. The National Council of Fiume has made this suggestion: that the Italian Government lend its own government notes and bank-notes to the city of Fiume in the sum required to retire all the crown pieces struck off by the city itself, which would adopt provisionally the Italian currency. The Royal Government would not have any difficulty in accepting this proposal, but it wished that the Allies be informed of it in advance. It is with that object that I venture to have recourse to your kindness and to request you to be so good as to lay this matter before the Conference: and as any delay might be very injurious, I should be grateful to you if you would be good enough to have the question entered in the order of the day for one of the sessions of this week.

Accept [etc.]

TITTONI

His Excellency, M. GEORGES CLEMENCEAU,  
*President of the Peace Conference,*  
*Paris.*

---

#### Appendix B to HD-27

[*The Representative at Vienna of the American Relief Administration (Gregory) to the Director General of Relief (Hoover)*]

Telegram

VIENNA, August 7, 1919.

Hoover, *Paris.*

Number HAM 1099 for Logan. Details continue to arrive from Budapest showing the effect of cutting of communications. Hospitals are without food. Children also in desperate circumstances. Arranging to send down immediate temporary supply from Vienna stocks under convoy of British and Italian and American soldiers. Roumanians continue to conduct their occupation in the most harassing manner and their attitude towards Entente representatives who are there is distinctly hostile and puts us in a humiliating position. The taking away of horses and cattle is going to still further complicate harvest and food situation and no doubt withdrawal of army when ordered will be accompanied by loss of cars, locomotives, horses, cattle and foodstuffs. The political problem and the independent government of Hungary is a comparatively simple proposition but must be based on two propositions, first the immediate withdrawal of Roumanian troops out of the city and back to their frontiers and second, close supervision by the four generals who will soon be there of the conduct of that withdrawal with reference to asportations [*deportations?*] and pillaging. We have not yet received full text of in-

structions given to four generals and do not know extent of their jurisdiction. Please wire that at once. Borghese and Cunningham in full accord and while Allizé<sup>9a</sup> has expressed his personal opinion on withdrawal does not care to officially show any interest on the ground that it is outside his sphere. From certain reliable reports it appears that communist agitators are already endeavouring to influence Roumanian troops in Budapest with success. This still further complicates the problem and accentuates necessity for immediate withdrawal. Only quick communication with Paris from Budapest of course by wireless which is now under Roumanian control. Would suggest hereafter that any messages intended for consideration of any of Entente representatives be sent over our lines as we have direct telephone and telegraph office at Budapest. Please repeat to Italian and British mission.

GREGORY

---

Appendix C to HD-27

[Translation<sup>10</sup>]

*Telegram From the French High Commissioner at Constantinople*

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 1, 1919.

The Ottoman Government, the financial situation of which is very critical, has sold stocks of material belonging in particular to the administration of the Hedjaz railways.

It proposes to offer for sale the properties of the Domain and of the Evkaf.

These alienations raise the question of ascertaining whether the Ottoman Government, during the armistice, has the right to diminish its properties and, in consequence, the common security of the Allies. of it whether they should, or should not, signify to the Ottoman Government from procuring indispensable resources and so to drive it into bankruptcy, or else to allow it to reduce the security upon which the Allies can count for the reparations which are due them.

The High Commissioners of the powers at Constantinople have agreed to submit this question to the Supreme Council and to inquire of it whether they should, or should not, signify to the Ottoman Government a prohibition against alienating its properties.

---

<sup>9a</sup> French representative at Vienna.

<sup>10</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

## Appendix D to HD-27

[Translation <sup>11</sup>]COMMISSION ON REPARATIONS,  
AUGUST 7, 1919.*Note for the Supreme Council*

Observations presented by the delegations of Greece, Roumania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene state on the reparations clauses to be inserted in the conditions of peace with Bulgaria.

The Commission on Reparations has examined the objections presented by the representatives of Greece, Roumania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene state on the clauses of the Bulgarian treaty.

The principal objections are the following:

(1) "The sum demanded from Bulgaria under the head of reparations would not be large enough".

The Commission estimated that 2,250,000,000 francs represented the maximum sum which Bulgaria was in a position to pay. The Commission sees no reason to modify its opinion (Article 1).

(2) "No allowance should be made to Bulgaria for the debt which she contracted with Germany and Austria for loans and war supplies." (Article 4).

The Commission believes that it would be quite illogical, after fixing the maximum that Bulgaria can pay, to add an indeterminate sum, of which the total is, besides, a matter of dispute. The Commission, when determining the total of the debt imposed upon Bulgaria, expressly took into account, not only the claims put forward by Germany and Austria, but also the provisions of article 14 of the financial clauses, by which the obligations of Bulgaria toward these same powers are transferred to the Allies.

(3) "The numbers of live-stock assigned to Greece, Roumania, and Serbia by way of restitution would be insufficient" (Article 7).

The Commission, after having consulted the representatives of the Allies in Bulgaria, has somewhat raised the proposed figures.

The persistent claims of the powers with special interests reveal that they have an inexact understanding of the situation.

These powers appear to believe that the reparations to which they will be entitled by reason of their losses in live-stock, etc., will be limited to what they can get from Bulgaria under the head of restitution. That is not the case; the total of reparation due them undergoes no reduction because of restitutions provided in the treaty; it is apparent, however, that these powers cannot be indemnified twice for the same injury. They will have applied to them from the common

---

<sup>11</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



fund the portion which is legitimately theirs. Their claims are valid as regards all the enemy powers, who are jointly and severally bound to discharge them, and not only as regards Bulgaria.

The system adopted by the Commission on Reparations has consisted in estimating the highest sum which could be paid by Bulgaria; to that end the Commission has taken into consideration all the resources of Bulgaria, including the live-stock. To discharge its obligation, Bulgaria will without doubt, have to export great numbers of live-stock.

The Commission considers that nothing will more surely risk the provocation of trouble in the Balkans than disputes over restitutions of live-stock. Such restitutions degenerate quickly into cattle raids, a costly practice to the inhabitants of the frontier zones. It would be very unpleasant if these raids should seem to be justified by the treaty.

Consequently, the Commission vigorously maintains its point of view on the limitation of restitutions in kind.

(4) "Greece, Roumania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State are not represented on the Interallied Commission for Bulgaria" (Article 9).

A decision by the Supreme Council has already been taken upon this subject and the Commission desires to declare once more that it considers that the article ought to be preserved as it is.

---

#### Appendix E to HD-27

[Translation <sup>12</sup>]

3714 ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, August 4, 1919.

From Marshal Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies.  
To the President of the Council, President of the Peace Conference.

By my letter No. 3401 of July 17, I submitted to you some proposals on the subject of measures to be taken to assure the maintenance of order in the 50 kilometre zone on the right bank of the Rhine.

These proposals had in view, particularly, to permit for a period of not more than three months from the time the treaty goes into force, the maintenance of military forces, as a garrison for security, in the 50 kilometre zone on the right bank of the Rhine, these forces to be subjected to the regime similar to that in force at present for the neutral zone of 10 kilometres.\*

---

<sup>12</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

\* However, the control of the Military Regions of the 50 kilometre zone would belong not to the Command of the Forces of Occupation, as is at present the case for the neutral zone, but to the Commission of Control of the Military Clauses. [Footnote in the original.]

On the subject of the strength of the forces, the maintenance of which in the 50 kilometre zone might be provisionally allowed, I think it my duty to give you the following explanations:

After the armistice the Germans were authorized to maintain in the neutral zone military forces comprising a total of:

10 battalions, and  
10 squadrons.

Subsequently, on account of disturbances, partial reinforcements were granted by the Allied High Command; these reinforcements brought the German forces of the neutral zone up to

15½ battalions with an average effective of . . . . .	500 men
8 squadrons . . . . .	150 men
2 field batteries . . . . .	120 men

These are the German forces at present in the neutral zone.

In order to make sure of the maintenance of order in the 50 kilometre zone, the German Government should be authorized to maintain provisionally in that zone a certain supplement, in addition to the forces mentioned above. But this supplement should be of little strength.

It is only a question, indeed, of holding certain industrial centers, like Essen, or certain large cities, like Frankfort. The number of additional garrisons which is required is, therefore, limited.

Account must be taken, besides, of the fact that the internal situation in Germany is less disturbed than it has been.

Finally, it would be illogical to permit Germany to keep relatively strong forces in the 50 kilometre zone for 3 months, when, during those 3 months, they must reduce their total forces to 200,000 men.

For these reasons I propose to fix the supplementary force to be granted at 4½ battalions and 2 squadrons; that is to say, to authorize for the whole of the 50 kilometre zone, from Holland to Switzerland, the provisional maintenance of:

20 battalions,  
10 squadrons,  
2 batteries.

As a matter of information, the German forces stationed in this 50 kilometre zone in time of peace included:

39 battalions,  
30 squadrons,  
60 batteries.

I request that you will be good enough to advise me as soon as possible of the decision of the Allied Governments upon this question, so that the measures to be taken may be applied as soon as the Treaty of Peace goes into force.

I think I should add that General Michel, Commander of the Belgian army of occupation, and General Fayolle, who have received through the German Command requests looking toward the maintenance of order in the 50 kilometre zone, have both expressed an opinion in agreement with the proposals which I am submitting to you.

Foch

---

Appendix F to HD-27

TROOPS OF OCCUPATION IN UPPER SILESIA AND DANTZIG

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, August 6, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: The President of the Peace Conference.

The military representatives at Versailles have studied, on the invitation of the Allied Supreme Council,<sup>13</sup> the composition of the Allied forces of occupation in the plebiscite zone of upper Silesia, and the effectives to be sent there. On July 10th they unanimously pronounced for one division at a strength of about 13,000 men.

Since, in its session of July 26th,<sup>14</sup> the Supreme Council decided that this force would be taken from the occupation troops of the Rhenish territories. But no decision has as yet been made to determine the contribution of each of the Great Powers toward the constitution of this force.

In the same way, the military representatives at Versailles, increased by a military representative of Japan and a naval representative from the Five Great Powers, have been invited by the Supreme Allied Council to determine the military and naval steps to be taken in the territories of Danzig and Memel.<sup>15</sup> Without its having been possible to reach an agreement on this question, a certain number of them concluded, on June 24, the advisability of employing forces equivalent to one division for the whole of the two territories.

Since, in its session of July 31,<sup>16</sup> the Supreme Council, examining the Danzig question, postponed the examination of the military force which is to occupy this territory.

These two questions remain thus in suspense, and the command may expect to have requested of it to furnish important contingents for Silesia and the Danzig zone. It may also have to furnish troops for the occupation of the Sarre territory, concerning which no decision has yet been made.

---

<sup>13</sup> CF-93, minute 21, vol. VI, p. 703 and HD-12, minute 3, p. 236.

<sup>14</sup> See HD-14, minute 5, p. 308.

<sup>15</sup> FM-25, minute 2, vol. IV, p. 833.

<sup>16</sup> HD-20, minute 2, p. 443.



Now the resources at the disposal of the French command at the present moment are strictly limited. The demobilisation allows it indeed to draw, for the missions in question, only on the 9 divisions made up exclusively of the classes 18 and 19, which are consequently not affected by the demobilisation, and are maintained at a sufficient strength (2000 men per regiment).

Out of these 9 divisions, 6 are designated to form the French army of occupation, 1 has just been dissolved in order to obtain regiments for the guard of German prisoners of war.

There thus remain only the equivalent of two divisions to furnish the French effectives which the Supreme Council may decide to assign either to the Sarre territory, or to Upper Silesia, or to Danzig and Memel.

Consequently, it is indispensable to solve simultaneously and in the shortest possible time these three questions, so that a general plan may be established for the employment of this force of two divisions, with which the chief of the General Staff of the Army has just requested, in addition, the taking of a considerable new contingent to strengthen the P.W.<sup>17</sup> guard, which has become insufficient.

I have the honour, consequently, to request you to be good enough to have these three questions decided without any delay by the Supreme Allied Council: Strength and composition of the forces designated for the occupation of Upper Silesia, as well as the territories of Danzig, and Memel, and finally the Sarre territory.

---

#### Appendix G to HD-27

[Translation<sup>18</sup>]

MINISTRY OF BLOCKADE AND OF THE LIBERATED REGIONS  
COMMISSARIAT GENERAL FOR RESTORATION OF LIBERATED REGIONS

PARIS, June 30, 1919.

From: the Minister of the Liberated Regions.

To: the President of the Peace Conference.

As a consequence of an agreement concluded last January with the marshal, commander in chief of the British forces, it was understood that the English Army would lend its assistance toward the restoration of the liberated regions particularly by undertaking, throughout the zone which it occupied, a search for and a systematic destruction of implements of war of all sorts.

On May 24, contrary to this agreement, General Asser, commander of the British forces stationed in the liberated regions, announced that, in consequence of demobilization, the cooperation of the British

---

<sup>17</sup> Prisoners of war.

<sup>18</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Armies would be limited thereafter to the removal of English munitions in good condition and of valuable stores which could be sold at a profit or be put to further uses.

On June 6, 1919, I requested the marshal, commander in chief of the Allied Armies, to intervene with the British authorities to have them reverse their decision. On June 13 Marshal Foch informed me that General Asser replied directly from the War Office that the same problem arose in the American and Belgian zones as well; that the question was, therefore, quite of a general nature and should be submitted to the Peace Conference.

In consequence of this reply, I called together, on June 26, at the Ministry of the Liberated Regions, a conference in which the representatives of the various interested French Services took part. This conference unanimously passed a resolution with which I associated myself entirely, and which I have the honor to communicate to you herewith.

Among all the questions which the restoration of the liberated regions presents, the destruction and removal of war materials are assuredly the most harassing.

There is no other more urgent and the approaching disappearance [*repatriation?*] of prisoners of war further augments its acuteness.

A. LEBRUN

[Enclosure—Translation <sup>19</sup>]

[*Resolution by a Committee Summoned by the French Minister for the Liberated Regions*]

The Committee summoned by the Minister for the Liberated Regions, for the purpose of studying the question of the collaboration of the Allied Armies in the task of clearing the ground and in the operations concerning the removal and the destruction of munitions in the liberated regions;

WHEREAS:

(1) The accumulation of discharged and undischarged projectiles, and of stores of munitions and all kinds of implements of war, creates a permanent danger to the populations of the liberated regions and a serious obstacle to the resumption of their local life, and has daily caused a great number of accidents, particularly the death of several hundreds of children since November 11;

(2) The clearing away of these implements of war and their destruction calls for considerable labor force, supervised by numerous specialists, which it is impossible to find outside of the armies, and which France cannot furnish by herself alone so as to bring the task to completion within a reasonable period of time.

---

<sup>19</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

## RESOLVES:

(1) That this important question be brought before the Peace Conference;

(2) That the Conference should recognize the principle that the clearing of the ground and, above all, the destruction and removal of munitions in the liberated regions constitutes an obligation for each one of the Allied Armies in the zone which each occupied at the moment of the armistice and that this task cannot be deferred;

(3) That there be constituted at once an Interallied Committee for the immediate realization of this programme.

---

Appendix "H" to HD-27

*Reply of President Wilson to Inquiry of July 27,<sup>19</sup> From the British, French, Italian and Japanese Representatives in the Council of Five, on the Question of a Proposed Blockade of Soviet Russia*

"The President is not unmindful of the serious situation which exists in relation to neutral trade in the Baltic with the Russian ports controlled by the Bolsheviks. He has given careful consideration to the arguments advanced in the message transmitted at the request of Monsieur Clemenceau, and is not unmindful of their force in support of the proposed interruption of commerce with the ports mentioned. However, while he fully understands the reasons for employing war measures to prevent the importation of munitions and food supplies into the portion of Russia now in the hands of the Bolsheviks, he labours under the difficulty of being without constitutional right to prosecute an act of war such as a blockade affecting neutrals unless there has been a declaration of war by the Congress of the United States against the nation so blockaded.

The landing of troops at Archangel and Murmansk was done to protect the property and supplies of the American and Allied Governments until they could be removed. The sending of troops to Siberia was to keep open the railway for the protection of Americans engaged in its operation and to make safe from possible German and Austrian attack the retiring Czecho-Slovaks. The furnishing of supplies to the Russians in Siberia, while indicating a sympathy with the efforts to restore order and safety of life and property, cannot be construed as a belligerent act.

The President is convinced that if proper representations are made to the neutral countries during the war they can be induced to prohibit traffic in arms and munitions with the portions of Russia controlled by the Bolsheviks. The avowed hostility of the Bolsheviks to all Governments and the announced programme of inter-

---

<sup>19</sup> Appendix D to HD-14, p. 312.



national revolution make them as great a menace to the national safety of neutral countries as to Allied countries. For any Government to permit them to increase their power through commercial intercourse with its nationals would be to encourage a movement which is frankly directed against all Governments and would certainly invite the condemnation of all peoples desirous of restoring peace and social order.

The President cannot believe that any Government whose people might be in a position to carry on commerce with the Russian ports referred to would be so indifferent to the opinion of the civilised world as to permit it. The President therefore suggests that the so-called neutral Governments be approached by the Allied and Associated Governments in joint note setting forth the facts of the case and the menace to such countries and to the world of any increase of the Bolshevik power, and requesting the neutral Governments to take immediate steps to prevent trade and commerce with Bolshevik Russia and to give assurance that the policy will be rigorously enforced in conjunction with other Governments which are equally menaced".

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 11 August, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

*Secretaries*

Mr. H. Norman.  
Sir G. Clerk.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.  
M. Pichon.

*Secretaries*

M. Dutasta.  
M. Berthelot.  
M. de St. Quentin

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

**JAPAN**

M. Matsui.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Colonel U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

*Interpreter*—Professor P. J. Mantoux

1. M. CLEMENCEAU asked if any of his colleagues had any news from Hungary.

Situation  
in Hungary

MR. POLK distributed a number of telegrams annexed in Appendix "A".

MR. BALFOUR asked if there were any indication that the Roumanians had received or meant to obey the orders of the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that there was not the slightest sign.

MR. BALFOUR said he thought the silence on the part of the Roumanians was deliberate.

M. PICHON said that he did not think this could be inferred with certainty. The latest news was dated 7th or 8th and by that date the orders of the Council could not have arrived. There was a rumour that the line to Buda Pesth had been cut. He added, that a telegram had been received from the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest dated 10th which was to the effect that he had handed, on the previous day, the telegrams from the Council to the Roumanian Government. None of the news contained in the telegrams distributed by Mr. Polk was subsequent to the 9th.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought that the Roumanian Generals at Buda Pesth must have been made aware of the desires of the Council.

MR. POLK said that according to information given to him by Mr. Buxton the Allied Generals had great difficulty in their dealings with the Roumanian General in avoiding unpleasant incidents. The attitude of the Roumanian General was very insolent.

M. PICHON said he fully admitted that the Roumanians were not behaving well but he suggested that a judgment should not be based on the news received.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought it would be best to wait until the following day.

MR. POLK observed that the way in which the Roumanians treated the Conference might become a pattern not only for other Small States but possibly even for Germany.

M. TITTONI asked what means of communication existed between the Conference and the Roumanian Generals at Buda Pesth.

MR. BALFOUR said he understood the telegraph was in American hands as far as Vienna; communication thence to Buda Pesth was by telephone. If the Roumanians had cut the telephone, communications were severed. He added that he hoped the Allied Ministers at Bucharest were being kept informed of the instructions sent to the Generals at Buda Pesth.

M. TITTONI asked whether communication by wireless could not be maintained.

M. PICHON said that he would enquire from Marshal Foch what other methods could be employed to establish communication.

2. The Council had before it a letter from M. Benes (See Appendix "B").

MR. BALFOUR suggested that a suitable acknowledgment should be sent to M. Benes of his letter and that he should be told that it would receive full consideration.

(It was then decided that M. Benes' letter of August 8th, 1919, regarding Czecho-Slovak Interests in Hungary should be acknowledged and that M. Benes should be assured that due note would be taken of its contents.)

3. The Council had before it the following communication from Colonel Haskell.

Letter From  
Czecho-Slovak  
Delegation Rela-  
tive to the Rou-  
manian Occupa-  
tion of Hungary

"From: Colonel Haskell, High Commissioner for the Entente in Armenia.

To: President Clemenceau, Peace Conference.

Have received official notice from the British Command at Constantinople that all British troops at the present time in the Caucasus have orders to commence complete evacuation on August 15th; an order from London only can prevent this movement.



The Italians officially declare that they will not send troops. This retreat will leave several million dollars worth of relief provisions deposited at Batum, Tiflis, Erivan, etc. without protection and will stop all measures of assistance now operating, without which thousands of Armenian refugees in Russian Armenia are exposed to death from famine. The Armenians are surrounded by enemies and have not enough arms, munitions or energy to protect themselves. Two million of lives are in danger after the retreat of the British troops; anarchy will reign in the Caucasus where all the lives and properties are menaced. The French High Command in the East declares that British troops in the Caucasus are not under his jurisdiction.

In the name of the future of these regions, I ask that the British Government be requested to revoke the evacuation order until the question of the method of occupation shall have been decided. This viewpoint receives the approbation of all the authorities here who understand the situation.

Signed: WILLIAM HASKELL.

*Allied High Commissioner to Armenia."*

MR. BALFOUR said that the situation in Armenia was very serious and very disturbing. Historically what had led to the present position was, as far as he could remember, as follows. British troops had been sent into the country in 1918. In March and April of the current year it had been made clear to the Conference by Mr. Lloyd George that the British troops would be withdrawn. The date for withdrawal had first been the 15th July, but had since been postponed to the 15th August. It was probable that movements had already begun. It had therefore been known to the Conference for a long time that continuance of British occupation could not be expected. It had been understood that Italian troops would replace the British. Italy had accepted this exchange and the relief had been expected. From certain remarks made lately by M. Tittoni, he inferred that Italy regarded the enterprise as too great a burden. What resulted was that British troops were leaving the country, that Italian troops were not coming to replace them and that America was not sending any men.

M. TITTONI said that the question in as far as it concerned Italy, related to Turkish Armenia and not to Russian Armenia, of which Mr. Balfour had spoken. Italy at one time had thought of sending troops to Georgia and Azerbaijan, not to Armenia proper. Georgia demanded complete independence and on this condition raised no objection to occupation by Italian troops. On the other hand, Admiral Koltchak was unwilling to grant the independence of Georgia, though he might be ready to grant autonomy. If Italy had accepted a mandate on the conditions demanded by the Georgians, Italy would have taken upon herself responsibility for safeguarding the independence of Georgia. This, she could not do. In any case the area to be guarded was a large one; the Railway line from Baku to Batum was of very considerable length; some 40,000 men would be required

and, in addition, shipping and supplies would have to be found. The last were to have been lent by Great Britain, though it appeared at the present time that British shipping would not be available. The initial expense would be, he was told, 75 million lire and the annual cost would be as much as 1 billion lire. Italy could not undertake so heavy a burden and the idea had therefore been given up. Nevertheless, he wished again to point out that the question of Georgia was quite distinct from that of Armenia.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the United States could do anything.

MR. POLK said that the United States could do nothing until Congress acted. Troops could not be sent into a country with which the United States were not at war. The question of a mandate for Armenia would be put before Congress by the President.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether President Wilson was aware of the critical condition of Armenia.

MR. POLK replied that he had sent him two strong personal messages on the subject already within the last few days.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the conclusion was that France could do nothing: Italy could do nothing: Great Britain could do nothing and, for the present, America could do nothing. It remained to be seen whether, as the result of this, any Armenians would remain.

(As no Government was prepared to furnish troops for Armenia, the question raised by Colonel Haskell of August 5th, 1919, was left without solution.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU asked his colleagues whether they had read the letter sent by General Dupont to Marshal Foch (Appendix C). For his part he thought that what Erzberger had said was true. All French agents, both civil and military, were of one mind on the subject. He thought, therefore, that General Dupont's conclusion was sound. He had

no intention of giving up the principle of demanding the surrender of culprits, but it might be advisable to confine the demand to a few symbolic persons, for instance, the Kaiser, the assassin of Miss Edith Cavell and the murderer of Captain Fryatt. A demand limited to a small number would probably not be resisted. The suggestion he would make was that each of the members should name one representative to proceed to Berlin and to consult General Dupont as to what was practicable. For himself, he would nominate M. Haguénin, who knew everybody in Berlin and whom he could trust implicitly to form a correct estimate. Probably his colleagues could make equally satisfactory nominations.

MR. BALFOUR said that he considered M. Clemenceau's proposal very worthy of consideration, but before he could give complete assent to it,

he would like to observe first that it represented an abandonment of the Treaty. Secondly, this abandonment was on a point, concerning which English public opinion had been greatly excited at the time of the Election. He thought that scarcely a Member had been returned who had not addressed his constituents on this subject and promised them that the guilty should be punished. He would therefore ask to be allowed to consult Mr. Lloyd George before assenting to M. Clemenceau's proposal.

MR. POLK said that from his point of view, the proposal represented a change in the Treaty.

M. TITTONI said that he quite agreed with General Dupont's proposal. He also concurred in the opinion that it was not advisable to try the Kaiser.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not intend to abandon anything. What he had proposed to do was to execute the Treaty bit by bit. It was desirable to help the present German Government to live on for a few months. He believed that the presentation of the full demand would destroy it. He, himself, had a list of 1,000 names. Doubtless his colleagues had similar lists.

MR. BALFOUR said that M. Clemenceau's plan was doubtless excellent. It consisted not in giving up any of the culprits, but in deferring the demand for some of them. The proposal was therefore different from that made by General Dupont who only proposed to take a few. He did not think, however, that it would comfort the Germans.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Haguenin had a very long conversation with Erzberger who had assured him that this was not a thing to be trifled with. There was no intention on the part of France to abandon the execution of the Treaty. At first, it was suggested that a few prominent culprits should be asked for; the rest could await their fate for a few months.

MR. BALFOUR said there were three possible plans. One was to stick to the Treaty to the letter and ask for all the culprits at once. The second was M. Clemenceau's plan to ask for a few well selected victims at once and to put off the rest. The third, to abandon part of the Treaty entirely and only insist on the surrender of a very few. He thought these three possible plans should be submitted to the various Governments.

(It was decided to postpone discussion on the execution of Articles 227-230 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, pending consultation of their respective Governments by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Polk on General Dupont's proposals.)

(M. Seydoux entered the room.)

5. M. SEYDOUX gave the Council an explanation of the document annexed as Appendix "D".



Note From Supreme Economic Council on the Exchange of Goods Between Countries of Central Europe

MR. BALFOUR asked why, since the Blockade had been raised, it had been necessary to bring this question before the Council at all.

MR. SEYDOUX said he had agreed with Mr. Balfour that there was no particular reason for the intervention of the Council.

(It was decided that the raising of the Blockade had rendered unnecessary any action by the Council regarding the regulation of exchanges of goods between the countries of Central Europe.)

6. M. SEYDOUX read and commented [on] the report of the Sub-Committee of the Supreme Economic Council on Russia, dated 9th July, 1919:—

Note From Supreme Economic Council on the Economic Policy of the Allies in Russia

“With reference to Minute 244 of the Supreme Economic Council, the Sub-Committee on Russia presents the following report:

1. The Committee considers that any discussion of the ultimate economic rehabilitation of Russia is at present purely academic.

2. The Committee considers that economic assistance should at once be given to those areas of Russia now under the jurisdiction of the so-called “Provisional Government of Russia” in conformity with the terms of the telegrams exchanged by the Council of Four and Admiral Koltchak.<sup>1</sup>

3. This assistance should take the form of credits from the various Allied Governments to be expended in purchases and transportation of commodities from the countries furnishing such credits.

4. The Nature of these credits and the commodities to be supplied and their distribution should be determined by a Commission organised for this purpose from the countries supplying the credits and the goods. The Commodities to be furnished should be of such a character as are necessary to rehabilitate transportation and the production of manufactures. Their distribution should be organised in such a manner as to reconstitute commercial life.

5. It appears to the Committee that credits to the amount of £50,000,000 sterling would cover the amount of commodities (exclusive of arms and munitions) that could advantageously be supplied and used within a period of twelve months.”

MR. BALFOUR suggested that consideration of the question be deferred until the discussion of the general policy to be adopted regarding Russia.

(It was decided to defer consideration of the proposals of the Supreme Economic Council regarding the economic reconstitution of Russia until the settlement of the general policy of the Council regarding Russia.)

(At this point M. Seydoux withdrew and members of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council and other experts entered the room.)

<sup>1</sup> Appendix I to CF-37, appendix II to CF-60, and appendix I to CF-62, vol. VI, pp. 73, 321, and 356.

7. CAPTAIN MORIZOT-THIBAUT read the note of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council contained in Appendix "E".

**Participation of the Interested Powers in the Improvement of the Railway From Chambery to Turin**

M. TITTONI said that the question was not a military one but a financial one. The Transportation Council had, he thought strayed beyond its province. The Supreme War Council had agreed that the improvement of this Railway was a matter of common Allied interest, and should be undertaken. All the Transportation Council should have done was to allot the expenses proportionately. It had, as a matter of fact, reached conclusions which modified the original decision of the Supreme War Council, because it had suggested that the participation of the Allies should be limited to meeting the excess cost of labour and material furnished during the war. In so doing, it had exceeded its functions. It suggested that the sharing of the cost should cease at the end of 1918. But the work once begun had to be completed. If all the Allies were responsible for the beginning of the work, they must remain responsible for it up to its completion. Had the Armistice come about immediately after the decision taken by the Supreme War Council, he asked what Powers would have borne the cost. In his opinion all the work carried out on this line had the same inter-allied character. The Council, however, made a distinction between work before January, 1919, and work subsequent to that date. The resolution adopted by the Supreme War Council represented a binding contract. If Italy had not been assured of help, she would not have undertaken the work. Since December 30th, 1918, all that had been done was to complete the work begun during the war.

M. PICHON said that as the question involved large sums and complicated financial considerations, it should be referred to the Financial Commission.

M. TITTONI said that in any case the original contract could not be interfered with or altered in any way.

MR. POLK said that apparently a commitment had been made during the war. He knew nothing about its exact value or the justness of either method of settlement proposed.

(It was then decided to refer to the Financial Commission for consideration and report the Note of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council regarding the division of the cost among the Powers of the improvements to the Railway from Turin to Chambery.

It was also decided to communicate the record of the discussion of the Council as well as other relevant documents to the Financial Commission.)

8. MR. POLK said that he had received a reply from Washington <sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Telegram No. 2776, August 9, 1919, 4 p. m., to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 295.

in which Mr. Lansing stated that it was possible that suitable tonnage might be available from the United States' Army by August 30th, but neither the State Department nor the War Department had any funds of its own which could be used for the purpose in question.

It was roughly estimated that repatriation would cost 250 to 300 dollars per man.

Mr. Polk enquired whether any agreement had been reached as to financing the operation.

M. BERTHELOT said that France had hitherto advanced all the money for the Czecho-Slovaks in Russia and in Siberia. The advances amounted to one milliard a year. Great Britain had furnished arms, munitions, and supplies as an advance. These advances were ultimately to be shared by France, Great Britain and the United States in equal thirds. Application for ships had been made to Japan and the United States. The United States had not made a definite reply but thought it might be difficult to find the ships, while Japan had found enough for about one-third of the force. It was always understood that the cost would be equally divided between Great Britain, France and the United States.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it had never been thought that the Czecho-Slovak State should pay.

M. BERTHELOT replied that it was a matter of course that the Czecho-Slovak would re-pay the whole cost.

MR. POLK asked if a statement might be prepared for him regarding the agreements made.

(It was agreed that M. Berthelot should furnish Mr. Polk with a statement of the agreements reached regarding the payment of the expenses for maintenance, transportation and repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops in Russia and Siberia.)

9. MR. POLK drew attention to the decision of the Council taken on August 6th adopting three proposals by General Groves (See H. D.

25, Minute 14<sup>3</sup>). He thought that the first and third of these proposals exceeded the terms of the Treaty and that the Germans might be justified in refusing to comply with them. He thought it was very necessary to examine the question at once as it was clearly

Proposals To  
Prevent the Ger-  
mans From Dis-  
posing of Aeronau-  
tical Material

undesirable to exceed the Treaty rights of the Council.

(It was decided to ask the Air Commission to re-examine at once the Resolution taken on August 6th regarding the sale of aeronautical material by Germany, with a view to establishing whether the action decided on goes beyond the terms of the Treaty of Peace.)

\* *Ante*, p. 563.



(It was further decided to suspend all action on this Resolution pending receipt of the report.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 11 August, 1919.

---

Appendix "A" to HD-28

*[Telegrams on the Situation in Hungary]*

(i)

BUDAPEST, Aug. 7, 1919—12:35 p. m.

Hoover, *Paris*.

For Atwood.<sup>4</sup> Following letter addressed General Holban Commanding the Roumanian forces occupying the city of Budapest. It has been brought to my attention by the Hungarian Government that traffic of every character has been absolutely suspended on all the railroad lines entering the city of Budapest and that on several of the lines the rails have been broken. This condition of affairs was stated to you this morning by me in a personal interview. I now make formal written confirmation of this interview and in my capacity as President of the Allied Railway Mission under the direction of the Supreme War Council in Paris urge that the repairs to all the railroads be immediately effected and that traffic be immediately resumed on all the railroad lines entering the city of Budapest at least that the transportation of food supplies from the adjacent territory be allowed to move freely to the city. The suspension of railroad transportation has created additional hardship not only by stopping the incoming carloads of foodstuffs but by preventing the citizens of Budapest from travelling to the nearby country for the purchase of individual supplies. Acting in accordance with instructions from the Director General of Allied Relief for Europe Mr. Herbert C. Hoover, I came to Budapest as soon as advice was received of the downfall of the communistic government. It is my province the representative for Relief Transportation of the Supreme War Council to take charge of the transportation lines of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire so far as the movement of Relief supplies is concerned. The co-operation of the Roumanian military command is absolutely essential to the successful prosecution of my mission and I would be very much pleased if you would evidence your co-operation by immediately repairing the railroads and making them fit for normal traffic and by

---

<sup>4</sup> Lt. Col. William G. Atwood, member of the American Relief Administration at Paris.

ordering the immediate resumption of Relief traffic of every description on the railroads in the territory you have entered with your forces. Will you kindly acknowledge receipt of this communication and advise if you will comply with my requests and indicate time when traffic will be resumed. A copy of this letter has been forwarded to the Supreme War Council at Paris through Mr. Herbert C. Hoover Director General of Relief for Europe.

W. B. CAUSEY

*Lieut. Col. Engineers, USA*

*President, Allied Railway Mission*

---

(ii)

BUDAPEST, August 8, 1919—9:00 p. m.

(Received Aug. 8, 1919.)

Hoover and Atwood, *Paris*.

This is the 5th day since the Roumanian forces entered Budapest and all transportation lines are still out of service including the Danube river, although the Roumanians promise that they will open the transportation lines.

The Roumanians continue their advance beyond Budapest. Vast quantities of agricultural machinery of all kinds have been collected for shipment to Roumania. They also continue to confiscate great quantities of live stock. As stated in previous communications the Roumanian Army is practically living on the occupied territory. This will mean ultimate starvation for the Hungarians unless aid is given by the Allied Powers. Military occupation of Hungary by the Roumanians badly hampers their present re-organisation of new Hungarian Government and the functions of the civil are almost entirely interrupted. The Hungarian Government has no organised forces at its disposal to keep order. The only organised force consists of about six hundred of the old *Gendarmerie* in Budapest. Up to this time the Roumanians have allowed only six hundred of the Gendarmes to carry arms. It is absolutely essential if the Government is to function, armed forces must be organised in sufficient numbers to preserve order in the country outside of Budapest as well as in Budapest. At the present time the Roumanians have cut off all means of communication between the central government and outlying districts and even telephone communication has been impossible between the central government offices and other points in the city. There have been many reports of attacks on Jews and others by the so-called white guards with the tacit support of the

Roumanian soldiers, but as a matter of fact there has been very little blood-shed.

In company with Captain Leath, who is to have charge of feeding of the children in Budapest, I called on General Holban, commanding officer of the Roumanians this afternoon and arranged to bring 240 tons of food in from Vienna. General Holban stated that if advised about what time the train would arrive he would restore the tracks for passage of same to Budapest. The food situation in Budapest is worse than it has been any time since the war commenced in 1914. It is worse here now than it was in Vienna in January. With their full knowledge of food situation in Budapest, it would seem that the Roumanians are trying to starve out the population by cutting the city off entirely from all supplies from the surrounding country. The carrying off of farm animals, farm machinery and food supplies of every character would seem evidence the Roumanians have the same intentions towards the country in general as towards Budapest. General Gorton, Col. Romanelli and myself have been holding sessions daily and nightly and have made vigorous protests to the Roumanian Commander about cutting the city off from supplies and about various other outrages that have been committed and have endeavoured to represent what we believe to be the attitude of at least three of the allied powers; there is no French representative here. It is my belief that if permitted to properly function, the new government would soon complete its organisation along the lines laid down from Paris and demonstrate a firm hold of the situation.

Unless the food blockade is raised at once supplies brought into this city, hunger and privation may produce great excesses. I would urge in the name of humanity that the representative powers in Paris take such steps as will ensure an immediate raising of the blockade placed by the Roumanians and that the blockade so far as the food is concerned be raised in every other direction.

W. B. CAUSEY  
*Lt. Col. Engrs. USA*  
*Pr. Inter-allied Ry. Miss.*

---

(iii)

BUDAPEST, Aug. 8, 19—2:22 p. m.  
(Received August 8, 1919.)

To Col. Twiss, British Mission, Hotel Astoria, Paris.

Can you tell me whether it is the intention of Entente to cause withdrawal of Roumanian army from Budapest and if so how far.



Impossible for new Government to function if they are allowed no troops or police to keep order and food supply is hampered by destruction or military control of railways and by removal of food and animals for army of occupation. Roumanian army is carrying off large quantities of agricultural machinery and other property not necessary for military purposes and referred to in Reparation and economic clauses of treaties. I have had no reply of any sort from Hotel Astoria to my telegrams.

GENERAL GORTON

---

(iv)

[Translation <sup>5</sup>]

Telegram transmitted by  
the American Telegraphic Service

BUDAPEST, August 8, 1919—5 p. m.

MR. CLEMENCEAU

*President of the Peace Conference, Paris.*

In conformity with the public opinion of the country, the provisional government, recruited partly from the previous government of Kun, was asked to resign; whereupon, the government yesterday handed in its resignation and a new provisional government has been formed. In my capacity as Governor, and by request of the new provisional government, I have taken the power into my hands. I have named and instructed the government. It is with great enthusiasm that the population of the capital of Budapest has witnessed the downfall of the Bolshevist regime of terror, and my conviction is that the people of the whole country will regard it in the same way. Our most urgent task at the moment is to make ready for and to convoke the National Assembly as soon as possible in order that upon a constitutional basis it may then make a definitive decision on the form of the state. Until that time our program is the complete crushing of Bolshevism which was transplanted into the country by means of the terror, the execution of the terms of the armistice, the restoration of order in the deranged affairs of state, the guaranteeing of productive labor, the preparation of data for the discussion of peace; and to that end we shall strive for closer relations with the Allied and Associated Governments.

We request your friendly support and, in the interest of the success of our efforts, the recognition of our government.

THE ARCHDUKE JOSEPH  
*Marshal*

---

<sup>5</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

(v)

BUDAPEST, Aug. 9, 1919—6 p. m.  
(Received August 10, 1919.)

HON. A. J. BALFOUR.

*Astoria, Paris.*

G. 7. Ninth dispositions of Roumanian Army of Transylvania on 8th August as follows. Army Hq. Törökszentmiklós. General Holban's group Hq. Budapest includes 1st and 2nd Chasseur divisions with one regiment of Chasseur de Montagne and armoured cars at Budapest, 7th Division at Hatvan, and 2nd Cavalry Divisions at Gyöngyös with detachments along Czecho-Slovak frontier. General Mosious group Hq. Czegléd includes 1st and 6th divisions at Kecseke-mét and one brigade dismounted of 1st Cavalry at Nagy Körös. Other troops are 2nd division at Jászó Ladány 16th Division at Kiskörös 18th Division at Mezötur 21st Division at Gyoma 20th Division at Debreczen. According to General Holban all that is left of Red Hungarian Army are bands of disorganised troops in area Kisber, Mór, Plattenzee. I shall obtain further information from Hungarian War Minister. The relations between Roumanians and Hungarians are greatly improved in consequence of following measures taken by General Holban. Firstly establishment of bureau where representations of government and Roumanian army work together and are in close liaison, secondly, employment of Hungarian police working in pairs with Roumanian soldiers. Movement in Budapest is unrestricted except to leave city for west when pass is required. General Holban has given Commander Freeman full hand in working Danube Commission except for examination of persons wishing to cross from left to right bank of river.

GENERAL GORTON,  
Budapest

---

#### Appendix B to HD-28

[*The Czecho-Slovak Plenipotentiary (Benes) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*]

[Translation \*]

PARIS, August 8, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have just received a copy of the despatch which the Conference was pleased to send to the Roumanian Government

---

\* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

on the subject of the occupation of Hungary by Roumanian forces. Having received some alarming reports from Prague, and having seen the despatch of the Conference addressed to the Government at Bucharest, I take the liberty to draw the attention of the Conference to the following facts:

During the invasion by the Magyar Red Army into the territory of Slovakia, it devastated the country, pillaged the villages, and carried away either their means of conveyance, or their live-stock, or finally the considerable stocks of provisions of all kinds.

The Peace Conference, in a note addressed to Bela Kun, recognized the right of the Czecho-Slovak Government to reparations for these injuries, and declared that the Magyars will be held responsible.

The Czecho-Slovak Government has several times indicated to the Conference its intention to participate in a military intervention in Hungary. I have addressed several letters to the Conference setting forth the Czecho-Slovak point of view, while constantly emphasizing, however, that although desiring intervention in Hungary, I refuse to undertake it without the approval, or at least without the permission of the Conference. In the outcome, and after having respected the decisions of the Conference, the Czecho-Slovak Government finds itself in a very difficult position, for at Prague there are apprehensions that the present events in Hungary are of a kind to deprive us of every compensation due us.

I take the liberty of stating further, Mr. President, that decisions were taken some time ago by the Conference on the subject of the distribution of the rolling-stock of former Austria-Hungary whenever the liquidation of that equipment is made by the competent commission. Even in this question our interests might be injured by the present events. Inasmuch as by my very explicit personal interventions at Prague, the Czecho-Slovak Government has been careful to stand upon the strict ground of law in regard to the decisions of the Conference, I take the liberty of calling the attention of the Supreme Council to this fact, while expressing our reservations on the subject of what is now taking place in Hungary, and of whatever touches the question of our reparations.

In the name of our Government, I take the liberty of expressing our firm hope that the fact of having followed the decisions of the Conference will not be injurious to our interests, whether material or moral.

Accept [etc.]

EDWARD BENES



## Annex C to HD-28

[Translation <sup>1</sup>]

FRENCH MILITARY MISSION AT BERLIN

BERLIN, August 4, 1919.

*Note for Marshal Foch on the Subject of the Surrender of Criminals to the Entente (Articles 227 to 230 of the Treaty)*

My opinion is that the Erzberger argument is well founded.

The surrender of the criminals will bring on the governmental crisis which he predicts. At first, disturbances; then a Haase government with members from among the most communistic of the independents; revolt by the great majority of the troops; then communism, if not anarchy.

If we do not wish for disorder, it is necessary to compromise.

What is culpable is the German doctrine of war: The more ferocious a war, the shorter it will be. Whence comes this sophism that the maximum humanity resides in the maximum cruelty.

The suffering will be terrible, but being brief and localized, the sum of the misfortunes will be less in a short war of that kind than in a very long war carried on more mildly.

Experience has disposed of this barbarous theory.

The responsible persons are its promoters. Although as a matter of fact, it is the whole German people which accepted with enthusiasm this thesis suited to its mentality.

If one wishes to fix the responsibility, it is the Emperor who ought to be punished. Given the German autocratic system, it is the Emperor alone who necessarily occupies the chief place in the sphere of military affairs. The generals are only his agents. Moltke, Falkenhayn, Hindenburg, and Ludendorf are lost in him.

Let us place ourselves, as far as possible, in the German mentality in order to pass judgment, or rather it is this mentality which we intend to chastise. Let us smite it at the top.

I say, the Emperor alone. If it be insisted upon, let us add Tirpitz. No doubt he simply carried the military principles over into maritime warfare. But it was an innovation, introduced on his initiative. He has, in strictness, a personal and direct responsibility.

Let us add besides: the commanders of submarines who torpedoed hospital ships; the commandants of prison camps conspicuous for excessive severity; the commandants of halting places who were personally guilty of murders and of thefts; the judges of Miss Cavell and of Captain Fryatt.

---

<sup>1</sup>Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Since they have not found judges at home, let us exact their surrender.

The Emperor, then, and perhaps Tirpitz and some subordinates who carried out directly decisions taken upon their own responsibility.

That is the most that we could get from a government. Further, it is necessary to exercise great care lest the Emperor return to Germany. Our right to exact his surrender would remain the same, but difficulties in exercising it would present themselves as in the case of the generals.

The argument that the Government is failing to keep its word in not carrying out a surrender provided for in the treaty which it has signed has no force.

It does not, in fact, say: "I refuse." It says to you: "I cannot", "I shall vanish, whether of my own accord or carried away by revolution, and you will not find a regular government which could give you satisfaction." At best it will say, "I have promised, I shall try to fulfill, but without hope."

Whatever is decided, it is important to specify what will be exacted.

Rumors, spread in Berlin by the Americans, have spoken of 3,500 names, among which are all the generals of repute. Everyone feels threatened. Because of human cowardice, as soon as any conjectures are given out the movement of resistance will be confined to the circle of friends of the appointed victims, the less numerous according as the victims are less highly placed.

The Emperor is absent. The protests will be theoretical. The Government will declare itself powerless. The resistance cannot consolidate itself at any particular point.

Tirpitz is a sailor. He is, moreover, the man against whom the people bear the greatest grudge for having got them implicated, and especially for not having succeeded. They will be seen giving him up like a scape goat, without very much effective resistance. The others are small fry.

Let this list be published. Perhaps it would be possible not to fix the date of surrender, or to put it off until a little later, if there is any wish to weigh the effect produced, to witness the outbreak of protest, its culmination and extinction, while leaving the possibility of fresh negotiations.

For it goes without saying that our lenity will call for compensations: complete reparations for offenses committed against us; facilities for our commissions of control, to whom the slightest resistance would be punished by the order for surrender of all or part of the hostages on the list; execution, with good grace, of the Polish territorial clauses.

This list will be the scarecrow which will take the place of the Marshal's sword put back into its scabbard at the peace.

DUPONT

## Appendix D to HD-28

[Translation<sup>a</sup>]

## SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

*Extract From the Minutes of the Session of July 17, 1919*

## EXCHANGE OF GOODS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL EUROPE

The Council notes a telegram from the Allied Missions of Railways and of Supply at Warsaw, dated July 13 (doc. 248) on the subject of reestablishing and regulating the exchange of goods, such as potatoes and coal, between Poland on one side and Germany, German Austria, and Czecho-Slovakia on the other.

It has been decided:

(a) To submit for the approval of the Supreme Council the proposals made by the Allied Missions of Railways and of Supply.

(b) To leave full liberty to the Italian Government to name, if it so desires, a representative on the committees which will be formed at points of transit with the object of supervising the execution of the regulations governing traffic.

---

Appendix E to HD-28

M-451

## INTER-ALLIED TRANSPORTATION COUNCIL

*Note Relating to the Works for Improving the Chambéry-Turin Line*

By the Collective Notes No. 19 of 15th March 1918 and No. 22 of 18th April 1918, the Supreme War Council requested the Inter-Allied Transportation Council to study the question of transportation between France and Italy and vice versa, and the means to increase the capacity for strategic movements between the two countries. The Inter-Allied Transportation Council decided that the number of trains moved via Modane was limited on the one hand by the congestion in the station of Modane and on the other hand by the insufficient working of the section Modane-Bussoleno, and suggested that an Inter-Allied Commission should be sent to study on the spot the methods to remedy quickly these defects and to increase the capacity of the line.

---

<sup>a</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



On the 28th June 1918 the report of the Sub-Committee, adopted by the Inter-Allied Transportation Council, was submitted for the approval of the Supreme War Council.

This report recommended the necessity of carrying out with as little delay as possible certain works both on the French and Italian sections of the line.

The enlarging of the Station of Modane and of the stations of Salbertrand and Bussoleno; the extension of the triage [*sic*] at St. Jean du Maurienne and supplementary installations for traction purposes; the doubling of the overhead electric cable from Modane to Bussoleno; doubling of the line Bussoleno to Ponte Dora and from Salbertrand to Pont de la Dora. Installation of new block-posts on the whole length of the line, etc.

By collective note No 33 of the 5th July 1918<sup>9</sup> the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council adopted the decisions of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council and declared that:—

“Given the great and ever increasing strategic importance of the Modane line and the necessity of increasing its carrying capacity as a counter-balance to the greater facilities of transport between the fronts, which the enemy possesses to-day, it is urgent that all the measures proposed by the Inter-Allied Transportation Council be approved, put into execution and completed with the least possible delay.

“For reasons indicated in the report of the said Council and the explanatory memorandum annexed, the work in question should be of a frankly inter-allied character, and should therefore be carried out by the joint contribution of means and labour by all the Allies acting as one.

“The proportion of this contribution as regards both means and labour should be studied by the Inter-Allied Transportation Council in consultation with the competent authorities (and subject to the recommendations of the Permanent Military Representatives) should be given final endorsement by the Governments concerned.”

After studying the question, the Representatives of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council agreed upon the subject of the provision of labour and the contribution of the Allied Nations in the supply of raw and manufactured material. The work was undertaken and was carried on until the intense cold of the season caused the work to be suspended.

In view of the extreme urgency of the works of improvement on the Modane line, as recognised by the Supreme War Council, the question of the allocation of the expense involved had not been agreed upon before the works were actually commenced, especially

---

<sup>9</sup> *Post*, p. 666.

the material supplied to Italy which was furnished without prejudice to the financial adjustment.

The settlement of the principle of Allied participation in the expenses for these works (participation of which the principle had been specially mentioned by the Supreme War Council in Note 33, para. 2) which had been placed before the Inter-Allied Transportation Council had been postponed until the French and Italian Representatives were in a position to furnish an exact statement of expenses incurred for the carrying out of these works on the French and Italian sections of the line.

The French and Italian Representatives presented their accounts to the Inter-Allied Transportation Council on 27th June, 1919, and the following points were discussed :

1. Would the Allies agree to participate in the expenses of the total programme of works on the Chambéry-Turin line, without limitation as to date?

2. If the answer to the above question were in the negative would the Allies agree to participate in the cost of the works carried out up to a date to be agreed upon, say, June 30th, 1919, or December 31st, 1918, for example?

3. Being given that the works carried out comprised a certain economic value, should the participation of the Allies be in the total expenses or in the supplementary expenses resulting from the works having been carried out during war time (Difference in the prices of 1913 and 1918) ?

4. In what proportion should the participation of each Ally in the expenses be fixed ?

Following this discussion the Inter-Allied Transportation Council, not having been able to arrive at a decision on the common ground, decided to forward the following resolution to the Supreme War Council :

“Collective Note No. 33 of the Permanent Military Representatives on the Supreme War Council in respect of the improvements on the Chambéry-Turin line, stated :

‘For reasons indicated in the report of the said Council and the explanatory memorandum annexed, the work in question should be of a frankly Inter-Allied character and should therefore be carried out by the joint contribution of means and labour by all the Allies acting as one.’

“By reason of the permanent value of the improvements of this line from an economic point of view, the Inter-Allied Transportation Council is of opinion that the inter-allied financial assistance should only be applied on the one hand to the difference between the cost of these works in war conditions and the cost of such works in the pre-war period, and on the other hand to such works executed until the 1st January, 1919. Subsequent to that date the French and Italian

Governments would bear the entire cost of the works which in their judgment it would be policy to continue.

"By the ordering of the immediate execution of these works in a period during which the cost of labour and raw materials had reached a very high figure, supplementary expenditure was in consequence imposed upon the French and Italian Services, and the Inter-Allied Transportation Council proposes that such expenditure should be distributed as follows:—

One-fourth to the American Army  
One-fourth to the British Army

the remaining half to be divided between France and Italy in proportion to the works actually undertaken by each of the two Nations.

"The cost of the material supplied to Italy by the United States of America, Great Britain and France shall be deducted from the expenses borne by each of these Powers.

"The Inter-Allied Transportation Council makes a reservation in respect of the acceptance of the figures submitted by the Italian and French Railway Construction Services until they have been submitted to the experts of the four Allied Governments."

G. MAYER, *Lt.-Col.*  
*British Representative*

GENERAL MCCOY  
*American Representative*

General Levi, as Italian Representative, cannot accept the above proposal. He wishes to stand by the literal interpretation and spirit of the Collective Note No. 33 and the explanatory memorandum annexed, which it is desirable should bear the interpretation that all the Allies shall participate in the total expenditure which has been necessary for the works on the Modane line up to date.

These works were in effect only undertaken on the understanding that this assistance would be guaranteed. General Levi asks in consequence that the question be decided by the Supreme War Council.

LEVI, *General*  
*Italian Representative*

The French Representative considers that the participation of Great Britain and America as embodied in the above resolution constitutes the minimum. If the Supreme War Council decides that the two Allied Nations should participate in a higher proportion, he asks that France should receive an equally favourable treatment as Italy.

LE HENAFF, *Colonel*  
*French Representative*



## APPROXIMATE VALUATION OF EXPENSES

		Cost in 1915	Cost in 1918	Difference
Expenses of work completed up to 1st Jany 1919.	Work carried out by French on French section.	696, 000 fres.	1, 766, 000 fres.	1, 070, 000 fres.
	Work of electrification of line at Modane carried out by Italian Authorities. Amount to be paid by France to Italy.	755, 000 lire	2, 487, 000 lire	1, 732, 000 lire
	Work carried out by Italian Authorities on Italian Section.	2, 880, 406 lire	9, 306, 946 lire	6, 516, 540 lire
Expenses of work completed on 1st July, 1919.	Work carried out by French on French Section.	696, 000 fres.	1, 766, 000 fres.	1, 070, 000 fres.
	Work of electrification of line at Modane carried out by Italian Authorities. Amount to be paid by France to Italy.	815, 000 lire	2, 649, 500 lire	1, 834, 500 lire
	Work carried out by Italian Authorities on Italian Section.	3, 680, 000 lire	11, 530, 500 lire	7, 850, 500 lire
Expenses for completion of whole programme of work.	Work on French Section.	752, 000 fres.	1, 965, 000 fres.	1, 213, 000 fres.
	Work of electrification of line at Modane. Amount to be paid by France to Italy.	1, 209, 000 lire	3, 814, 000 lire	2, 605, 000 lire
	Work on the Italian Section.	4, 335, 000 lire	13, 534, 000 lire	9, 199, 000 lire

[Translation <sup>10</sup>]

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL  
THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

VERSAILLES, July 5, 1918.

*Collective Note No. 33*

WORKS TO BE CARRIED OUT AND MEASURES OF URGENCY TO BE TAKEN  
TO INCREASE THE CAPACITY OF THE MODANE LINE IN RELATION TO  
STRATEGIC NECESSITIES

The Permanent Military Representatives of the Supreme War  
Council.

<sup>10</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

*Referring to:*

Their collective note No. 19, of March 15, 1918,

Their collective note No. 22, of April 18, 1918.

*And after examination*

Of the report by the Interallied Transportation Committee concerning the works to be carried out and the measures to be taken on the Modane line to increase its capacity;

Of the explanatory memorandum annexed to the same report;<sup>11</sup>

*Consider that:*

In view of the constantly growing importance of the Modane line in relation to strategy, and considering the necessity of increasing the ease and rapidity of transporting troops from one front to the other, in order to redress the balance, now in favor of the enemy, all the works and all the measures proposed by the Interallied Transportation Committee should be approved and put into execution immediately.

By reason of the considerations contained in the report by the Committee named above and in the attached explanatory memorandum, the works in question ought to have a clearly interallied character, and their execution ought, therefore, to be guaranteed with the assistance of all the Allies without distinction.

The proportion in which this assistance will be lent should be the object of study by the Interallied Transportation Committee, together with the various interested authorities, and then receive final ratification by the Allied Governments upon advice of the Permanent Military Representatives.

All steps relating to this matter should be taken with the greatest dispatch; likewise, it would be very desirable to have this note approved as soon as possible by the Allied Governments.

*Military Representative of  
the French Section of the  
C. S. G.*

*Military Representative of  
the Italian Section of the  
C. S. G.*

BELIN

ROBINANT

*Military Representative of  
the British Section of the  
C. S. G.*

*Military Representative of  
the American Section of the  
C. S. G.*

SACKVILLE-WEST

TASKER BLISS

---

<sup>11</sup> *Infra.*

[Translation <sup>12</sup>]

VERSAILLES, July 5, 1918.

## EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

(Annexed to the Report of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council)

The problem of increasing the means of transport between France and Italy has already been the subject of study by the Permanent Military Representatives, and the various measures which have been recognized as necessary to attain that end, are already, in great part, being carried out.

The complete realization of these measures will of itself constitute a very important achievement, since it will enable the capacity of strategic transport between France and Italy to be almost doubled in case of need and during a limited period.

Nevertheless, the problem cannot yet be considered as completely solved.

Studies recently completed by the Interallied Transportation Council have demonstrated that the Central Empires are in a position to carry out, with an ease and speed far greater than that of the Allies, important movements of troops from one end to the other of the western front. With the object of remedying as far as possible this strategic inferiority, the Interallied Transportation Committee, after studying afresh the question of the capacity of the Modane line has recognized the possibility of increasing that capacity still further.

This question being at present of the highest importance, it is necessary that it be examined and decided with the least delay.

The present capacity of the Modane line is about 20<sup>1</sup> trains a day both ways, and it should be remembered that in going from Italy to France the trains are necessarily limited in their tonnage (about half that of an ordinary military train) because of difficulties in traction which have existed up until now.

Among the causes which limit the capacity of the Modane line, the following should be borne in mind:

(1) The excessive length of halts by trains in the station at Modane in consequence of the inspection of carriages, switching, and customs operations.

(2) The length of certain block signal sections which does not permit a greater number of trains to be moved along the most difficult sections of the line.

(3) The insufficient number and length of sidings in several stations on the line.

(4) The number and type of electric locomotives at present available.

(5) The total supply of electrical energy now available.

---

<sup>12</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



(6) The necessity of using a third locomotive from Modane to Km. 6.5 and the consequent limitation on speed over that stretch.

The recent studies (Annexes to the present memorandum)<sup>13</sup> which have been conducted by the Interallied Transportation Committee, with the assistance of the Franco-Italian military, railway, and customs authorities, have shown the possibility of increasing the capacity of the line at first up to 36 complete trains a day, and later up to 42 trains, by adopting the following measures:

(1) The regular use of two locomotives on all trains without distinction, to avoid cutting the trains in half.

(2) Increase in the number of locomotives available on the electrified section, and adoption of measures for their normal use in double draft.

(3) Urgent works to permit the movement of a larger number of trains on the single track section by reducing the length of certain signal block sections.

(4) Necessary works to increase the capacity of the installations in several stations, among others Bussoleno, Salbertrand, and first of all Modane.

(5) Measures designed to reduce the length of halts at Modane for the inspection of carriages and the operations of the customs.

(6) Agreements to be taken for making up trains adapted to the new requirements of double-traction.

(7) The setting up of a single body of control and direction for the line from Turin to Chambery by means of representatives of the two interested railway administrations.

Once the opportunity is recognized of enlarging the capacity of the Modane line by the foregoing means, it should be noted that France as well as Italy will be unable in the present situation to divert the necessary labor and materials for completing the works.

It will be necessary therefore that a clearly interallied character and interest in these works be recognized and that they be undertaken with the most liberal assistance of all the Allies. It is necessary therefore that all these works be approved and carried out within the briefest time, with the cooperation of all the Allies, with priority over all other works in order to attain the proposed object.

---

<sup>13</sup> Not found in Department's files.

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, 12 August, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J.  
Balfour.

*Secretaries*

Mr. H. Norman.  
Mr. P. Kerr.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.  
M. Pichon.

*Secretaries*

M. Dutasta.  
M. Berthelot.  
M. de St. Quentin.

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

**JAPAN**

M. Matsui.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF.....	Capt. Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE.....	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE.....	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY.....	Lt. Col. A. Jones.

*Interpreter*—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

**1. On Mr. Balfour's proposal it was agreed:—**

**Instructions to  
Committees Pre-  
paring Clauses for  
Treaty With Hun-  
gary**

That all the Committees engaged in the preparation of clauses for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary except those which have already forwarded their recommendations to the Secretariat General for submission to the Supreme Council. should do so forthwith.

**2. M. CLEMENCEAU** said that the French Chargé d'Affaires in Vienna stated that General Graziani would be in Budapest on the 12th August.

**Situation  
in Hungary**

**M. TITTONI** said that he had no news.

**MR. POLK** said that General Bandholtz had arrived in Budapest on the previous day.

**M. PICHON** drew attention to a Note prepared by General Weygand regarding the means of communication with Budapest (see Appendix "A").

(Note was taken of the statement of General Weygand regarding means of communication with Budapest.)

3. (M. Tardieu, M. Aubert, Mr. Nicolson, Col. Castoldi, Prof. Coolidge and M. Adatei were present during the following discussion.)

M. TARDIEU said that he could not offer the Council any agreed solution of the problem; the margin of disagreement, however, had been reduced. He would briefly recall various phases which the question had passed through. The first phase was the blue line suggested by the Commission on Greek Affairs. This line had been rejected in the Committee on Bulgarian frontiers by the American Delegation. A compromise had been sought by means of mutual concession. The initial demand of the American Delegation had been to leave Western Thrace to Bulgaria with the 1915 frontier. The British, French and Japanese Delegations had disagreed.

After a variety of views had been proposed, the American Delegation suggested that Eastern and Western Thrace should be attached to the International State of Constantinople. This had not been accepted by the other Delegations. Then, M. Tittoni had proposed an ethnographical line intended to give more Greeks to Greece and more Bulgarians to Bulgaria. A solution had been sought in this direction giving both Bulgaria and Greece a frontier with the International State. No success had been achieved. The line suggested took Greece up to Lule Burgas leaving the northern part of Eastern Thrace to Bulgaria. The American Delegation had objected that this left Bulgaria no exit on the Aegean. Then it had been suggested that the South Western part of Western Thrace should be given to Greece and that an International State with an outlet at Dedeagatch should be created with control over the railway from Dedeagatch to Adrianople. Eastern Thrace would then be attributed to Greece up to a line from the Gulf of Xeros to Midia. To this the American Delegation had objected that the Western part of Western Thrace was not economically connected with the rest. The International State would therefore be economically unsound. The American counter-proposal was that North Western Thrace should be given to Bulgaria whilst the International State should be limited by a line 10 kilometres east of the Maritza including Adrianople. Disagreement was therefore limited; for it was admitted by all that the best solution was some form of international control over Dedeagatch and the railway. The French, British and Japanese Delegations wished to extend this International State West and North, maintaining on the East the 1915 frontier. The Americans wished to extend it to the East 10 kilometres from the Maritza and including Adrianople while ceding North West Thrace to Bulgaria.

Frontiers of Bulgaria in Thrace



M. TITTONI said that a very slight concession would now produce agreement. A free State might be formed with a capital at Adrianople.

M. TARDIEU said that there were in Adrianople 26,000 Turks, 23,000 Greeks and a few Bulgarians.

MR. BALFOUR said that Adrianople was a Turkish Town in a Greek area. He saw considerable advantages in giving it to the free State as it was a Holy City for the Mohammedans.

M. TARDIEU said that his private opinion was that an International Commission at Dedeagatch with complete control over the railway would be quite enough to ensure all the guarantees required by Bulgaria.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in any case he would not agree to any territorial reward to Bulgaria. He thought that no International State would live long and that all the personal solutions suggested promised new wars.

After considerable further discussion it appeared that the principal alternatives before the Council were:—

1. The separation of Eastern and Western Thrace by an International State under the League of Nations, or
2. The mere control of Dedeagatch and the railway to it from Adrianople by an International Commission.

To the former scheme were attached the following proposals:—

(a) In Western Thrace Greece to obtain at least the districts of Xanthi and Gümüldjina, with a frontier sufficient to protect the coastal railway.

(b) That the Port of Dedeagatch, the town of Adrianople and an area covering the railway connecting these two should be constituted into an autonomous State under the League of Nations.

(c) That with the exclusion of Adrianople, the whole of Eastern Thrace, as comprised between the existing Turco-Bulgarian frontier, and a line drawn from the Gulf of Xeros to South of Midia, should be given to Greece.

MR. POLK stated that he was committed to the plan of an international state. But he was willing that M. Venizelos should try and persuade President Wilson to accept the second plan. If President Wilson accepted, Mr. Polk would be willing to be overruled.

(It was then agreed that Mr. Polk should confer with M. Venizelos, explain both solutions to him, and submit them to President Wilson. Mr. Polk would inform M. Venizelos that he was at liberty to send himself any message he desired to President Wilson.)

4. The Council had before it a communication from M. Jules Cambon. (See Appendix B.)

MR. BALFOUR said that the Allied and Associated Powers might

insist on addressing the State of Austria as the Republic of Austria and in using that designation in the Treaty of Peace. More than this he thought could not be done. Should the people of Austria choose to call themselves citizens of German Austria it did not seem possible to compel them to do otherwise.

Recognition of  
the "Republic of  
Austria", Under  
That Title Only

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he entirely agreed.

(It was decided to maintain the expression "Republic of Austria" in dealings with the Austrian Peace Delegation and in the Treaty of Peace.)

5. The note of the Commission on Political Clauses was read and accepted (see Appendix C).

(It was decided in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission on Political Clauses—

Clauses for Inser-  
tion in the Treaty  
of Peace With  
Bulgaria Proposed  
by the Greek Dele-  
gation

(1) to send for redraft to the Drafting Committee Articles 32, 33, 34, 35 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

(2) to send Articles 36 & 37 to the Central Territorial Commission with a request that it should consult on this subject the Commission on New States.

(3) to send to the Financial Commission Articles 38 and 67. The last should also be examined by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways.)

6. The Council had before it the following resolution—

Clauses on Re-  
sponsibilities in  
Treaty With Hun-  
gary

The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties, having been invited, in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Council dated July 30, 1919,<sup>1</sup> to hasten the conclusion of its report relating to the Treaty with Hungary, and taking into account the fact that its liberty of decision is restricted by the solutions already reached as regards penalties in the Treaty with Germany as well as the Conditions of Peace with Austria and with Bulgaria, is of the opinion that the Articles relating to penalties to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary probably cannot differ from the solutions already adopted with regard to the other enemy Powers.

July 31—August 5, 1919.

(The resolution proposed by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties in respect to the Treaty of Peace with Hungary was accepted.)

(The Meeting then adjourned for an informal discussion on the situation in the Adriatic.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, August 12, 1919.

<sup>1</sup> HD-19, minute 6, p. 408.

## Appendix A to HD-29

*[Note From General Weygand Regarding the Means of Communication With Budapest]*

C. IN C. ALLIED ARMIES  
GENERAL STAFF, 3RD SECTION

Translation

11 August, 1919.

## NOTE

The contingency may be foreseen of the Roumanians seizing all postal and other means of communication in Hungary, thus rendering uncertain all electrical communications between the Allies and the Mission of General Officers in Budapest.

Should this possibility be realised, one of the following means of liaison (set forth in order of preference) would have to be chosen, viz:—

1. *Paris*. H. Q. of French Army in Hungary at Nagy Kikinda, by W/T or telegraph  
From Nagy Kikinda to Budapest by aeroplane\* distance of 230 kilometres
2. *Paris*. General Hallier at Vienna by W/T or telegraph  
From Vienna to Budapest by motor† distance of about 250 kilometres
3. *Paris*. General Pellé at Prague by W/T or telegraph General Pellé to Mittelhauser group (at Léva Czech front) by telegraph  
Mittelhauser group at Budapest by aeroplane‡ distance of 100 kilometres

(See sketch herewith.)<sup>1a</sup>

WEYGAND

## Appendix B to HD-29

M-452

*[Note From M. Jules Cambon Concerning the Title of the State of Austria]*

[Translation<sup>2</sup>]

AUGUST 12, 1919.

## NOTE

On May 29, 1919, M. Jules Cambon, chairman of the Committee for Verification of the Powers of the Conference, under instructions

\*The French Army in Hungary has 2 air squadrons, one being a scouting squadron. [Footnote in the original.]

†On 7th August, General Hallier telegraphed for authorisation to assure this liaison. He must therefore have already taken steps in the matter. [Footnote in the original.]

‡The Czech Army has 6 air squadrons. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>1a</sup> The sketch does not accompany the minutes.

<sup>2</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



of the Supreme Council, addressed the following letter to Chancellor Renner:

“Paris, May 29, 1919.

“Mr. Chairman:

“I have the honor to return herewith to Your Excellency the full powers which you were so good as to deliver to me on May 19, last, and on the subject of which I have received instructions to address to you the following notification:

“The Allied and Associated Powers have decided to recognize the new republic under the denomination of ‘Republic of Austria.’ They declare, therefore, that they accept the full powers delivered on May 19 as authorizing the delegates bearing them to carry on negotiations in the name of the Republic of Austria.

(Signed) J. Cambon

“To His Excellency M. Renner,  
Chairman of the Delegation  
of the Republic of Austria.”

The Austrian delegation has not paid any attention, however, to this notification. All the communications which it has addressed to the President of the Peace Conference since that date have been made in the name of the “Delegation of German Austria.” Such is in particular letter No. 914 which forms the covering note of the “observations presented by the German Austrian delegation upon the conditions of peace, as a whole, with German Austria.” The counter draft of a treaty, which appears as annex II to this covering note, never fails, even when it reproduces textually certain articles of the conditions, to have the word “Autriche” followed by the word “Allemande,” the latter word being printed in italics to underline the intent.

There is reason, apparently, to consider whether the Allied and Associated Powers ought not to make unmistakable to the Austrian delegation their intention to recognize the “Republic of Austria”, under that title and to the exclusion of any other.

---

#### Appendix C to HD-29

#### Translation

#### *Note for the Supreme Council [From the Commission on Political Clauses]*

In conformity with the resolution of the Supreme Council dated 2nd August, 1919,<sup>3</sup> the Commission on Political Clauses proceeded to examine the clauses proposed by the Greek Delegation for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

---

<sup>3</sup> See HD-22, minute 4, and appendix C, pp. 484, 491.

These clauses contained a certain number of provisions drafted in the form of articles, numbered 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 67.

With regard to Articles 32, 33, 34, and 35 which are formal clauses used in the other Treaties, the Commission thought it would be well to refer them to the Drafting Committee which would insert them in the Treaty with Bulgaria, should the latter include territorial concessions in favour of Greece.

Examination of Articles 36 and 37, relative to the acquisition of Greek nationality by Bulgarian nationals living in territories ceded to Greece has emphasized the importance of the study of such a complex question, affecting populations of composite nature in countries where protection cannot be as efficacious as in Western States, by the Central Territorial Commission, which is specially qualified for such study since it has examined the question of the frontiers of Bulgaria. The Central Commission would nevertheless do well to get into touch with the Commission on New States which is dealing with a scheme relative to exchanges of population between the Balkan States by means of voluntary emigration.

Article 38, relative to the free cession to Greece of possessions of the Bulgarian State situated within ceded territories should apparently be referred to the Financial Commission which has dealt with questions of that kind.

The same applies to Article 67 relative to railway lines within ceded territory; the Financial Commission would nevertheless do well to consult the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways with regard to this Article by reason of its last paragraph.

To sum up:—

The Commission on Political Clauses has the honour to propose to the Supreme Council:—

(1) that Articles 32, 33, 34 and 35, which are purely formal clauses, should be referred to the Drafting Committee;

(2) that Articles 36 and 37 should be referred to the Central Territorial Commission, with a suggestion that it would be well to consult on this subject the Committee on New States;

(3) that Articles 38 and 67 should be referred to the Financial Commission. The latter Article should also be examined by the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways.

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 13 August, 1919, at 3 : 30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

*Secretaries*

Mr. H. Norman.  
Sir G. Clerk.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.  
M. Pichon.

*Secretaries*

M. Dutasta.  
M. Berthelot.  
M. de St. Quentin.

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

**JAPAN**

M. Matsui.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Colonel U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Captain E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	M. de Percin.
ITALY . . . . .	Lt.-Col. A. Jones.

*Interpreter*—M. Meyer.

The following also attended :

General Weygand  
General Sackville-West.  
M. Shigemitsu.

**1. The following telegrams were before the Meeting :—**

Situation  
in Hungary

“Budapest Aug. 12, 1919  
Supreme Council Peace Conference, Paris.

At the meeting today August 12th the Roumanian plenipotentiary several times stated that the Roumanian Government cannot accept orders from the Commission of Inter-Allied generals but can only enter into agreements with them for the solution of the difficulties which may come under discussion. The three generals namely American, British and Italian, who compose the commission at present (General Graziani arrived this evening but has not yet been interviewed) are of unanimous opinion that the instruction received from the Supreme Council at Paris should be interpreted as orders which the commission should give to the Roumanian army in Hungary and which the latter is obliged to carry out in order that the required solution may be arrived at (for example paragraph one sub-paragraph



C and E and paragraph three sub-paragraph B<sup>1</sup>). The commission urgently requests a prompt reply whether its interpretation of the instructions is correct and if it can act accordingly that is to say that it can refuse to continue discussion with the Roumanian plenipotentiary if the latter insists in his refusal to accept the instructions as orders.

Inter-Allied Mission."

"Budapest Aug. 12, 1919.

Supreme Council Peace Conference, Paris.

The Interallied Military Mission had a full day's session this date during which a conference was had with M. Constantin Diamandy, the Roumanian plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference. M. Diamandy stated he was authorised to transact business with the Mission. He was furnished a part copy in French of the instructions to the Mission and asked whether or not his Government would abide by same. He replied he could not give an answer without first conferring with General Mardarescu, who is expected any moment to arrive and assume command of the Roumanian forces. He stated that the Roumanian Government was deeply hurt at press notices to the effect that the succession of the Archduke Joseph's Government was in any way due to Roumanian influence.

It was represented to him that the food situation was serious and that famine and riots would result in case this situation was not alleviated. The Commission while disassociating itself from all responsibility for the present deplorable condition in Budapest, suggested that he immediately arrange to prevent the requisitioning by Roumanians for supplies within a prescribed zone surrounding the city of Budapest and that the Roumanians remove no more rolling stock. He stated that he would give the matter his immediate attention and became very angry when it was intimated that the Roumanian Government might be considered as responsible for any famine or suffering in Budapest under present conditions.

He was asked to state what portions of the Mission's instructions the Roumanian Government could immediately accept and became angry, stating that Roumania was not a conquered nation, that it was coordinate with the other Allies and that he would receive orders from nobody except from his Government. He finally subsided. The Mission then insisted [upon] the urgency of the case but he would not commit himself as to when he would give an answer but stated he would confer with General Mardarescu and they may see the Commission tomorrow August 13th. He was asked if the Roumanian Government had within the past day or so delivered another ultimatum to Hungary and replied in effect that he was sure it had not, because such paper would naturally and properly have been presented by him, and he is ignorant of existence of an ultimatum, the Archduke yesterday and today gave Commission details of a plot intended evidently to demoralise his Government. He stated that the three Hungarian liaison officers attached to Holban's headquarters had dictated to them a document by a Monsieur Ardeli, formerly Ambassador from Roumania during Tisza Government. The document contained the following terms amongst others. The Banat is claimed by the Roumanians, Bekesaka must belong to Roumania. Roumania has six

---

<sup>1</sup> Appendix B to HD-24, p. 542.

hundred thousand men under arms. The military power of Entente is nil and they have labour difficulties. Various other inducements are offered if there is a Hungarian-Roumanian union against Slav danger. If terms not accepted Roumanians will sweep Hungary like Mackensen and leave it to its destiny. This document after being signed by one of the liaison officers but not by Ardeli, was presented to Prime Minister. Today the three officers again presented themselves to Government and informed it that if terms were not immediately accepted Roumanians would leave the country, taking with it the Government, sweep it bare and stir up labour troubles. The above is Archduke story, he was much agitated on these occasions and appealed to Commission for advice. The first ultimatum, as he termed it, is in our possession signed by one of the liaison officers who, the Archduke states, has been with him throughout the war. The plot is obviously childish but it succeeded in frightening the Government. We have told the Archduke to take no notice.

Inter-Allied Military Mission."

MR. BALFOUR observed that the first telegram asked for precise instructions on a definite point. The Inter-Allied Mission wished to know whether it was authorised to give orders to the Roumanian Army in Hungary. Technically he supposed that the Allied Generals in Budapest had no authority to give orders to the Roumanian Commander in the manner in which a superior officer gave orders to a junior officer, but that the Commission of Generals were entitled to deliver to the Roumanian Commander the views of the Allied and Associated Powers merely as a message from the Conference. The Generals could say that they conveyed these views to the Roumanian command, indicating that the Roumanian Government, should it mean to remain within the Alliance, would doubtless give the requisite orders to carry out the intentions of the Conference. Should the Roumanian Government decline to do so, it would shoulder the consequences of breaking the Alliance. It was obvious, in that case, that the Conference would have no further authority over Roumania once she had left the Alliance.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the Allied Generals were wrong in holding conversation with the Government of the Archduke Joseph. This Government was a reactionary Government and the public of the Entente countries would not allow any backing of such a Government. There were therefore two questions. One was the question to which Mr. Balfour had given, in his opinion, the right answer, namely, could the Allied Generals in Budapest give orders to the Roumanian Army? The second was whether they should have relations with the present reactionary Hungarian Government? He thought the answer in this case was in the negative.

MR. POLK said that there was no evidence that the Generals had, on their own initiative, sought out the Archduke's Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the telegrams indicated that the Generals were holding conversations with that Government.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that in the instructions sent to the Generals they were asked to get into touch with the Hungarian Government (see H. D. 27, Minute 2<sup>2</sup>).

MR. POLK observed that there was a difference between obtaining information from a Government and having relations with it implying its recognition. The Generals must obviously take steps to obtain information. He agreed that the Generals should take no action likely to commit the Allied and Associated Powers; but to prohibit their communicating with the *de facto* Government in Budapest would be to tie their hands.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the Conference must be careful to avoid the appearance of backing a reactionary Hungarian Government against the Roumanians.

MR. POLK observed that the Roumanians had established this government.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether M. Clemenceau was aware of the report to this effect.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that according to the telegram M. Diamandy denied it.

MR. POLK said that a warning might be sent to the Generals that they must avoid committing the Conference, but the question arose, who was to carry out the terms of the Armistice? Was the Conference to wait for another government to be formed?

M. CLEMENCEAU said that at all events the Conference should have the minimum of relations with the present Government.

M. TITTONI said that this minimum should be at least enough to ensure the execution of the Armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the following dilemma then arose. The Conference would tell the present Government to carry out the original Armistice but the Roumanians had another Armistice competing with the former; thus the Conference would be standing behind the Hungarian Government as against the Roumanians.

M. TITTONI said that it was, of course, understood that the Roumanian Armistice gave way to the previous one.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the present Government in Hungary might not last; if so the Conference would be backing an ephemeral administration against the Roumanians. This would make things too easy for the Roumanians.

MR. BALFOUR then proposed a draft of instructions to be sent to the Allied Commission in Budapest.

After some discussion the draft was finally adopted in the following form:—

---

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 620.



"We quite recognise that you cannot avoid having relations with any *de facto* government holding power in Budapest. You will however bear in mind that according to our information the Government of the Archduke Joseph has as yet little authority and has not so far been accepted by the country. We are most desirous of dealing directly with any genuine Hungarian Government in order to settle terms of peace and resume normal economic relations. But we must not be committed to any administration which has not authority to speak for the Hungarian people. While it will therefore be your duty to listen to anything the Government has to say, you must remember that it has not yet been accepted by those for whom it professes to speak."

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Berthelot had had an interview with M. Antonescu. The latter had received a personal telegram from M. Bratiano.

M. BERTHELOT said that the telegram alluded to was not the official answer of the Roumanian Government. This was to be sent to M. Misu who would communicate it to the Conference. What M. Antonescu had been told in the telegram was that the Roumanians had in no manner assisted in the establishment of the re-actionary Government of Archduke Joseph. As to the requisitions imposed on Hungary, they were regarded as legitimate as they did not exceed what the Hungarians had taken in Roumania in cattle and railway material. In other words, the Roumanians were merely recouping themselves for their losses.

MR. BALFOUR said that as M. Clemenceau would not be present on the following day, he wished to ask him whether he would authorise his colleagues to reply to the Roumanian Government on this point should its official communication be of the same nature as that made to M. Antonescu.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Antonescu had told him that the Roumanian generals had made a mistake in requesting from the Hungarians a fixed percentage of their cattle, railway stock, etc., but he thought they were right in requiring from the Hungarians an equivalent for what the Hungarians had taken from the Roumanians.

MR. BALFOUR said that it would be necessary to make the Roumanians understand that they were in the wrong in doing this.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that France had lost hundreds of thousands of heads of cattle. France had only recuperated from Germany 94,000. France had submitted to the decisions of the Conference. The victory of the Allies had found Roumania bound by the Peace of Bukarest, in other words at the feet of Germany. As a result of the victory of the Allies, Roumania was doubling her territory. She now wished to lay her hands on goods which belonged to the Alliance as a whole. If France and Italy had behaved like this, there could

have been no peace. France and Italy had obtained far less than their demands and far less than they had lost.

MR. POLK said that this was the first open defiance of the authority of the Conference. The Council was on its trial. Should this defiance be tolerated, it would form a bad example for other small Powers and ultimately for Germany. He was authorized to say for President Wilson that if the Roumanians continued in their present course, he would not look favourably on any of their claims. He added that he had information that the Roumanians were taking steps to hold elections in Bessarabia although the disposal of the province had not yet been settled.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether M. Clemenceau would authorise the Council, if the Roumanian official answer proved to be what was anticipated, to tell the Roumanian Government that its action could not be tolerated and that if the Roumanians wished to remain in the Alliance, they must alter their policy.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the expression "tolerated" too stiff. He would prefer to say "accepted".

MR. BALFOUR asked in what manner pressure could be exercised over the Roumanians.

MR. POLK asked whether Roumania would not obtain Transylvania in virtue of the Treaty with Hungary. He also added that the partition of the Banat was not satisfactory to the Serbians.

M. TITTONI observed that the misconduct of the Roumanians was no adequate reason for rewarding the Serbs. He wished to make reservations on this matter.

(It was decided that on the receipt of the formal answer of the Roumanian Government, action should be taken in accordance with the above discussion, even in M. Clemenceau's absence.

After a short discussion, it was decided to send a further dispatch to the Allied generals at Budapest and to communicate this dispatch to the Roumanian Government at Bukarest. The following is the text of the dispatch:—

"The Commission of Allied Generals is invested with the authority conferred on it by the Supreme Council. It is not qualified from a military point of view to give direct orders to the Roumanian generals but it is qualified to communicate to them the views of the Allied Powers.

"If the Roumanian Government means not to break away from the Allied Powers, it will give its generals necessary orders to conform to the decisions of the Conference.

"The Conference cannot believe that the Roumanian Government will by refusing to conform to the views of the Allied Powers, take a decision so serious in its consequences.")

The Meeting then adjourned.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 13 August, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 14 August, 1919, at 5 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. F. L. Polk.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	M. Pichon.
<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretaries</i>	<i>Secretaries</i>
Mr. L. Harrison.	Mr. H. Norman.	M. Dutasta.
	Sir George Clerk.	M. Berthelot.
		M. de Saint Quentin.
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Tittoni.	M. Matsui.
	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>
	M. Paterno.	M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF.....	Captain Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE.....	Lt.-Commander Bell.
FRANCE.....	M. de Percin.
ITALY.....	Lt.-Colonel Jones.

Interpreter—M. Meyer.

1. M. PICHON communicated a letter from the Rumanian Minister in Paris (see Annex A), and the Council took note of a further communication from the same source intimating that Mr. Diamandy had been appointed High Commissioner for Rumania at Budapest. He then asked if Mr. Balfour had any observations to make on the Rumanian reply to the Note<sup>1</sup> of the Allied and Associated Powers. (Annex B.)

MR. BALFOUR said that the letter as a whole was satisfactory, since the Rumanian government consented to abide by the decisions of the Entente Powers. With regard to the remainder of the letter, he asked whether it would be profitable to reply to all the controversial points raised. He did, however, think that the Rumanian Government had advanced several arguments, which called for discussion, and possibly a reply. The first of these arguments was that dealing with the supposition on the part of the Rumanian government, that the Armistice

Hungarian Affairs: Rumanian Reply to the Communication of the Allied and Associated Powers

<sup>1</sup> Appendix B to HD-26, p. 615.



of November, 1918, had lapsed, owing to subsequent acts of war initiated by the Hungarian government, and owing to the explicit invitation of the Conference, by virtue of which Rumania was called upon to take military action against Hungary.

M. TITTONI said that he regarded the first argument as a strong one, since the attack of the Hungarian army was a positive violation of the armistice. He regarded the second argument as weak, because, whilst admitting that the Rumanians had been invited to initiate military action against the Hungarians, a similar invitation had been sent to the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugo-Slavs; and no action by any of the parties consulted had followed upon these negotiations.

M. PICHON said that the Rumanians were not in a position to claim that the armistice had lapsed on account of the invitation sent to them by the Allied and Associated Powers for the simple reason that they were invited to enforce it by the communication to which they referred. He agreed with Mr. Balfour, that there was a satisfactory side to the Rumanian reply. He thought, however, that the Rumanians were attempting to take up too isolated an attitude. They spoke of collaborating with the Conference; they were not called upon to do that; but to obey its decisions.

M. TITTONI said that M. Pichon's remark was a matter of nuance, since, if the Rumanians wished to conform with the decisions of the Conference, they would evidently have to collaborate with it.

MR. BALFOUR said that under the circumstances, it would probably be better to make no reference, in our answer, to the ambiguous phrases of the Rumanian note; but to lay emphasis on the satisfactory assurances that it contained. The next point, to which he wished to draw attention, was the protest of the Rumanian Government on the subject of the Conference decision with regard to war material. It was obviously necessary that they should be assured, in a most formal manner, that the war material captured by them belonged to the Allies as a whole. The statement in their note, to the effect that they had not compromised the economic activities of the countries they had invaded, was contradicted by the information submitted to the Conference. It seemed as though the Rumanians assumed, that, because they had been robbed by the Hungarians at an earlier period of the war; and because booty had been carried from their country into the territories that they had now invaded, they had a right to carry away with them, whatever they could seize in order to equalise matters. This argument should be replied to, by showing them that France, Belgium, Serbia and Italy had suffered in the same manner, and would never recover the booty that had been taken from them by the German and Austro-Hungarian armies in the days of their successes.

M. PICHON said that according to the information at the disposal of the Conference, the Rumanians had requisitioned 50% of everything they could lay their hands on; railway rolling stock, live stock, and agricultural implements.

M. BERTHELOT said that when General Mackensen had invaded Roumanian territory, a large amount of the railway material (2000 locomotives) requisitioned by him had remained in Hungarian territory. These engines could not be restored under the armistice because they were of German make and were indistinguishable from the ordinary machines, used normally on the Hungarian railways.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would like to know the opinion of the French Foreign Office, and of his colleagues on the Rumanian protest, to the effect that the Allies had allowed themselves to be swayed by the calumnious accusations of an unscrupulous enemy.

M. PICHON said that we had not received information from such a source, but from our accredited representatives. He further remarked that the Rumanians admitted implicitly the accusations, against which they protested, by trying to justify them on the plea of military necessity.

M. TITTONI suggested that there should be no recriminations; the main point being that the Rumanians should be made to conform to the decisions of the Conference.

M. PICHON said that he agreed with M. Tittoni, but thought that the question of war material must be dealt with in our reply, which, he thought, M. Berthelot might possibly draft.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would draft a reply, and asked whether it should not deal also with the entire disarmament of the Hungarian army, and the withdrawal of the Rumanians behind the Theiss; since these points had been decided upon by the Conference, before sending out instructions to the Mission of Allied Generals to Budapest.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that the Rumanians must be made to retire to their frontier and not only to the Theiss. They had already promised to do so after the disarmament of Hungary.

M. TITTONI remarked that the moment at which the withdrawal of the Rumanians should begin ought to be left to the Generals to decide. Further events in Hungary might make it most desirable to have a strong force of Rumanians present in Budapest, which had been, during the past few months, the scene of Bloodshed and massacre.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that, under the circumstances, it might be best to examine carefully the instructions given to the Generals, and to see whether they were complete in all points. If it should be found that they were not, they could be revised and added to them if necessary.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it had not been decided in these instructions what particular strategic points should be occupied by the Rumanian army.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that the Generals had been left free to decide on the points in Hungarian territory which ought to be occupied by the Rumanians, and what forces should be employed by these latter for this purpose.

M. BERTHELOT then read the draft of the telegram that he had prepared for communication to the Rumanian government. (See Annex C.)

MR. BALFOUR asked whether special mention should not be made of the rule laid down with regard to war booty and requisitions since the rule in question had been accepted by the governments of other Allied countries which had been invaded. He further asked whether these countries should not be mentioned by name.

MR. BERTHELOT [said] that it would, in his opinion, be unwise to mention Allied countries by name in this connection, on account of the Serbian actions in the Banat.

MR. POLK asked whether it was desired that the Rumanian statement with regard to the lapse of the armistice should be allowed to stand.

M. BERTHELOT said that he thought it would be unwise to argue the question closely. There had been two armistices with Hungary. The first had not been very successful, and it had been altered by subsequent decisions of the Conference, since, by its provisions, Hungary was allowed to remain in Slovakia. The second armistice had then been substituted. It was now superseded by a third one, imposed on the Hungarians by the Rumanians. The Conference could not very well re-open the whole discussion on armistices by replying in detail to the Rumanian argument on the subject.

MR. POLK said that the sentence of the Rumanian note stating that the armistice had lapsed owing to an invitation to take military action, communicated to Rumania by the Allied and Associated Governments, could hardly be allowed to stand.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that a general sentence might open the reply, saying that the Conference did not wish to discuss the controversial points in the Rumanian note.

(It was agreed to send a telegram drafted by M. Berthelot (see Annex C) to the Rumanian Government and to the Mission of Allied Generals at Budapest.)

(At this point Mr. Hutchinson <sup>1a</sup> entered the room.)

2. MR. HUTCHINSON reported and commented on the Report of the Economic Commission with regard to the Economic Clauses in the

---

<sup>1a</sup> H. J. Hutchinson, British economic expert.



Peace Treaty with Bulgaria (see Appendix D).

Economic Clauses  
in the Peace  
Treaty

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the modification proposed to Article 25 would entail the acceptance on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments of the clauses in the Peace Treaty of Bucarest of 1913<sup>2</sup> whereby Roumania obtained a certain portion of the Dobrudja.

MR. HUTCHINSON replied that he was unable to answer Mr. Balfour's question as the Economic Commission could not deal with territorial questions.

(It was decided :—

(1) That the proposed modification to Article 25 should be submitted to the Drafting Committee who should inform the Council whether by virtue of the aforesaid modification the Allied and Associated Governments would be bound to recognise as valid the territorial clauses in the Peace Treaty of Bucarest of 1913, more particularly those whereby a certain portion of the Dobruja was ceded to Roumania.

(2) That the proposed modification to Article 36 should be accepted.)

3. The Council took note of a telegram from the High Commissioner at Constantinople (see Appendix E).

Commission of  
Enquiry into the  
Events at Smyrna

M. PICHON said that he believed that it was intended that the Greek Officer should be present at the meetings of the Commission. (See H. D. 12 paragraph 5.<sup>3</sup>)

M. TITTONI remarked that in his opinion the decision only implied that the Greek Officer was to be at the disposal of the Commission without being present at every sitting.

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed with M. Tittoni.

M. TITTONI then accentuated his previous statement by saying that in his opinion the witnesses cited before the Commission would be intimidated by the presence of a Greek Officer.

M. PICHON said that a decision in the same sense as the one previously taken must be made with regard to the Turks.

M. TITTONI then remarked that he did not think that the resolution in H. D. 12, paragraph 5, had been accurately drafted, and pointed out that he had drawn attention to the inaccuracy in question on the following day.

MR. BALFOUR replied that the decision had been communicated to the Greeks and could not now be altered or modified.

M. PICHON then said that the previous decision could be interpreted as excluding the Greek Representative from the deliberations of the Commission. The words of the decision had been that he was

<sup>2</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVII, p. 658.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 238.

to "follow the labours of the Commission". He was therefore in a position which could be compared with that of a foreign Military Attaché who followed the deliberations of the Headquarters Staff to which he was attached, without taking part in them.

(After some further discussion, it was decided that the previous decision of the Council (See H. D. 12, Article 5) should be explained to the High Commissioner at Constantinople in the sense that the Greek Representative should not be present at the meetings of the Commission of Enquiry at Smyrna. All necessary data should be communicated to him, however, and similar facilities should be given to a Turkish Representative, if subsequently appointed.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 14 August, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-31

*[The Roumanian Minister at Paris (Antonescu) to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Pichon)]*

[Translation <sup>4</sup>]

The Roumanian Minister in France has the honor to inform His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs that in a telegram, dated at Bucharest, on August 12, Monsieur Bratiano directs him to deny that the Roumanian Government has favored in any manner the installation of the Archduke Joseph in the Government of Hungary.

The Roumanian Government has no sympathy whatever either for the person of the Archduke Joseph, or for the reactionary ideas which he represents, and in general it does not intend to support any government which should not be approved by the Entente.

Roumanian Legation, Paris.

PARIS, August 14, 1919.

---

#### Appendix B to HD-31

RUMANIAN DELEGATION  
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Translation

PARIS, August 14, 1919.

The Rumanian Delegation has the honour to submit herewith the reply of the Rumanian Government to the communications of the

---

<sup>4</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Peace Conference, presented at Bucarest on August 9, 1919,<sup>5</sup> concerning the situation in Hungary.

To His Excellency the President  
of the Peace Conference.

[Enclosure]

*Reply of the Rumanian Government to the Communications of the  
Peace Conference Presented at Bucharest on August 9, 1919*

The Rumanian Government has been very painfully surprised by the communication received from the Peace Conference. It has deserved neither the reproaches nor the accusations contained in this communication. Rumania could not defy a Conference in whose decisions she is to participate as a result of her co-operation with the Allies in the work of justice which the victory of the Allies assures to the world, as well as the national claims that the Rumanians formulated precisely when they formed the entente with the Allies. Rumania has not changed her territorial claims according to the success of her army, but she does consider that the new military efforts that she has been constrained to make in order to throw back the Hungarian offensive, and the services that she has rendered to civilization by her sacrifices, give her a new title to claim her rights.

The Rumanian Government, at Budapest as elsewhere, intends to work in collaboration with the representatives of the Allied Powers. The Rumanian military command has received orders to collaborate with the military missions at Budapest, in order to fix together the measures necessary to facilitate the possibility of a Hungarian Government, which will assure order in the country and guarantee the security of peace relations on the Rumanian frontier. With this very object in view the Royal Government has instructed its High Commissioner, Monsieur Diamandy, to go to Budapest, where, thanks to the order established by the victory of the Rumanian army, he will be able to meet the representatives of the Allied Powers. Rumania is decided in her intention of acting in accord with the policy that the Conference may henceforth fix in regard to Hungary, as a result of the new order of things established by the intervention of the Rumanian army.

Concerning the attitude of the Rumanian Government and of the Command towards the decisions of the Conference concerning the occupation of Budapest, it is well known that the Rumanian troops were already there when the communication was made to the Royal Government, and that the other four were presented to it simultaneously, and not earlier than the afternoon of the ninth of August.

---

<sup>5</sup> Appendix B to HD-26, p. 615.



Moreover, this occupation, which does not imply the bloodshed that the Conference fears is indispensable if it is desired to bring an end to the state of affairs that has troubled the centre of Europe too long already. Previous events have proved this.

The Rumanian Government could not foresee that the Peace Conference would consider the Armistice of November, 1918, as still existent, after having received from it the invitation to co-operate in a military action against the Hungarian army. Still less could it foresee this attitude after having been the object of a general offensive on the part of this army.

Rumania could not conceive that, after the severe fighting which resulted in the surrender of all the enemy's organized forces to the Rumanian army, she would not have the right to take possession of the war material that the former had used to attack her, without being prevented by the situation created by the previous armistice. As to the other requisitions, they were levied only in proportions that assured, in addition to the needs of the population, large quantities for exportation, and did not compromise economic activity of the country.

Rumania was obliged to take such action as a result of the state of complete exhaustion due to the Hungarian and German invasions and by the fact that it was in these regions,—now occupied by her—that the greater part of the spoils of war taken by the armies of the Central Powers were deposited. It would be difficult to conceive that this right should be denied to Rumania when other Allied armies were able, without any obstacle on the part of the Conference, to completely drain and exhaust occupied territories, which should have been, according to the Peace, turned over not to a former enemy but to an Ally.

The Rumanian Government regrets that the Allies should have taken into consideration the slanderous accusations preferred by an unscrupulous enemy. Far from encouraging pillaging, the Rumanian troops, by their very presence re-established order and checked anarchy and devastation. The presence of the Representatives of the Allied Powers at Budapest is a testimony to such a state of affairs. The Rumanian Command, from the very first days, adopted measures to insure the provisioning of the Hungarian Capital which he had found completely deprived of provisions. Railroad transportation was interrupted only temporarily in the strict interest of military security. Concerning the Governments which have succeeded Bela Kun, they have been neither established, nor replaced nor interfered with by Rumanian troops.

The Rumanian army has proved, in the midst of all the hardships which it has had to sustain, the high spirit with which it is animated and the discipline which reigns, and has never lost sight of the duties

towards humanity and civilization which were incumbent upon it. The reception given to the army by the population in all the occupied territories is a brilliant proof of the equity of their actions. If the Rumanian military accomplishments, thanks to the direction of the operations and to the bravery of the troops, have developed and culminated so rapidly, Rumania has the clear conviction that she has rendered eminent service towards the work of peace which is the object of the Peace Conference.

---

Appendix C to HD-31

[Translation <sup>6</sup>]

*Telegram to the Roumanian Government (Forwarded Through the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest)—Communicated to the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest*

AUGUST 12, 1919.<sup>6a</sup>

The Peace Conference, while not adverting to a certain number of points which would call for rectifications on its part, takes note with satisfaction of the declaration by the Roumanian Government "that it has been decided to act in accord with the policy which the Conference will determine in regard to Hungary."

The Conference interprets this declaration as indicating that Roumania, as a state participating in the Peace Conference, intends to conform to the decisions communicated by the Supreme Council through the Military Mission delegated to Budapest by the Supreme Council.

The directions sent on three occasions by the Conference to the Mission of Allied Generals, and communicated to Bucharest, defined in a detailed and explicit way the policy of the Allied Powers toward Hungary in the present situation (disarmament of the Hungarian troops, maintenance of order with the minimum of foreign troops, provisioning of Hungary, abstention from any meddling in internal politics so long as there is free expression of the national will).

The Supreme Council lays stress on the point that no definitive recovery of military, railway, or agricultural supplies or of live-stock etc. can take place at present.

In accordance with the principles of the Conference accepted by all the Allied states and applied in particular in the treaty with Germany, it is for the whole body of the Allied and Associated Powers alone to determine the reparations to be furnished by Hungary and their distribution among the interested states. Neither the Roumanian Army nor the Roumanian Government is authorized to fix by themselves the por-

---

<sup>6</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>6a</sup> Telegram drafted August 12; transmitted to the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest, August 14. (Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/12a.)

tion which goes to Roumania, the Hungarian properties of every sort being the common security of the Allied Powers.

S. PICHON

---

Appendix D to HD-31

[Translation<sup>1</sup>]

ECONOMIC COMMISSION,  
PARIS, August 12, 1919.

From the Chairman of the Economic Commission of the Peace  
Conference

To the President of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied  
and Associated Powers.

The Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers has referred for examination by the Economic Commission two proposals relative to article 25 and article 36 of the draft treaty with Bulgaria, previously approved.

1. *Article 25.* On the subject of this article, the Roumanian delegation proposed a revision to the effect that the abrogation of past treaties by Bulgaria with Roumania should have regard only to treaties concluded from the date of August 15, 1916, up to the coming into force of the present treaty.

The Economic Commission, admitting the justice of the Roumanian proposal, unanimously suggests for article 25 the following wording:

"Bulgaria recognizes as now and forever abrogated all treaties, conventions, and agreements which it concluded with Russia, or with any state or government whose territory formerly constituted a part of Russia, before August 1, 1914, or since that date and up to the coming into force of the present treaty, as well as those concluded with Roumania since August 15, 1916, and up to the coming into force of the present treaty."

2. *Article 36.* Upon the proposal of the British delegation, the Economic Commission was unanimously in favor of revising the wording of article 36 on a point of detail. Express terms have been introduced into the text in order to make clear that the obligations resulting from this article will be confined to Bulgarian territory as constituted by the present treaty; the new wording unanimously proposed is the following:

"In case of abnormal conditions in the operation of concessions, or in case of their expropriation, the guarantees of receipts and the terms of exploitation which affect the interests of nationals of the Allied or Associated Powers, or the interests of companies or associations

---

<sup>1</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



controlled by those nationals, may be extended, within Bulgarian territory as constituted by the present treaty, on application of the interested party, for a term to be fixed by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, which shall take into account the duration of the period of dispossession or of abnormal conditions in operation.

In the same territory, the various conventions approved or agreements reached, before Bulgaria's entry into the war, between the Bulgarian authorities and companies controlled by Allied financial groups are confirmed; the time limits, prices, and conditions shall be revised, however, having regard to the new economic circumstances. In case of disagreement, the Mixed Tribunal shall decide."

*The Secretary General of the Economic  
Commission of the Peace Conference*  
SERRUYS

---

#### Appendix E to HD-31

##### Translation

#### *Telegram From the French High Commission on Behalf of the Interallied Investigation Commission*

CONSTANTINOPLE, August 11, 1919.

Received on the 13th.

The Investigation Commission of Smyrna is composed as follows:—Admiral Bristol for the United States of America, General Bunoust for France, General Hare for England, General Dallolio for Italy. The Greek Government has designated Colonel Mazurakis to follow the meetings.

It would be well to [be] precise whether or not the Greek Officer can be present at all the sessions. That might have the disadvantage of preventing the Turkish witnesses from making their depositions freely before him. It is probable that the Turks will ask that the Turkish Officer be authorised to be present at the sessions under the same conditions as Colonel Mazurakis.

The first meeting of the Commission will take place to-morrow.

DEFRANCE

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, August 18, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF

Hon. F. L. Polk.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour

*Secretaries*

Mr. H. Norman  
Sir George Clerk

FRANCE

M. Pichon.

*Secretaries*

M. Berthelot  
M. de St. Quentin.

ITALY

M. Tittoni

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . .	Captain Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Captain E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lt. Colonel Jones.

*Interpreter*—M. Demolon.

1. M. PICHON asked whether his colleagues had received any news of Hungary. He assumed that all had seen the telegram from General Bandholtz.

Situation  
in Hungary

(This telegram was read. See Appendix A.)

M. PICHON also mentioned another telegram addressed to M. Clemenceau by the Archduke Joseph. (See Appendix B.)

MR. BALFOUR said that the latter telegram appeared to be satisfactory. The Government undertook to proceed to a general election in a short time, and to remit the negotiation of peace to the national assembly.

M. PICHON said that the phrase used, namely, "on the basis of universal suffrage" was not very precise. It did not necessarily imply that the voting would be direct and secret.

M. TITTONI said that failing this condition there would be no legitimate government.

M. PICHON said that in addition the time limit "as soon as possible"

was very indefinite, and the resignation of the government "when the National Assembly met" might be considerably postponed. He thought that instructions should be given to the representatives of the Allied Governments to arrange that the elections should take place very soon; that they should be based on direct and secret voting, and that the Constituent Assembly should be formed immediately.

MR. POLK asked whether the Allied Representatives had yet made any report on the present Government. He had himself received information from two sources: from Mr. Hoover, and from certain persons who had just returned from Hungary. Both agreed that it was scarcely possible for the Council to recognize the Archduke Joseph. He only remained in power because he controlled the police and the Hungarian army. No labour representative or socialist had joined his Government. The mere fact that he was a Hapsburg had greatly upset the neighbouring small States. Mr. Hoover's conclusion was that this Government should not be recognised, as there could be no proper election while the Archduke Joseph remained in power. Should the Conference refuse to recognise him he would fall, and he could then be replaced by a Coalition Government.

M. PICHON asked whether there was any proof that the Roumanians had supported this Government.

MR. POLK said that they of course denied it. The information received was to the effect that they were present at its formation and could have prevented it. The Archduke Joseph had been put in power by the Hungarian military party.

M. TITTONI said that retrospective considerations were not of much import. The Roumanians denied any complicity in forming the present Government of Hungary, and their mere presence at its formation did not establish complicity. Their presence, however, inasmuch as it contributed to the maintenance of order, also contributed to maintaining any Government in power. The question for the Council was whether this Government should be recognised as a *de facto* government, or whether the Council should say that elections must be held by a government more representative of all parties in the country.

MR. POLK said that he understood no social democrat or labour representative would join a Coalition Government with the Archduke. Recognition of the Archduke's Government would amount to excluding from recognition the real representation of the country. He thought, therefore, that it would be a fatal error to recognise the Archduke's Government. He felt American opinion would be very strongly opposed to it.

MR. TITTONI thought it would be better to consult the Allied Mission in Budapest before coming to a decision. The Mission might



be asked whether, should the Archduke Joseph withdraw, power would be likely to pass without revolution to a Coalition Government. The Mission might also be asked whether, seeing that the Archduke Joseph did not furnish a rallying point for all parties in Hungary, it would not be well to recommend him to resign and yield his place to a Government which might be really representative.

M. PICHON said that there were undoubtedly objections to any Government with a Hapsburg as chief. Such a Government was bound to be a reactionary government. The Conference, however, had said that it would not interfere in Hungarian internal affairs. Nevertheless the Allied Mission in Budapest had inevitably had relations with the Archduke, hence a very delicate situation. If the question suggested by M. Tittoni were to be in the precise form he proposed, the Conference would be open to the charge of interfering in the internal affairs of Hungary. He thought that the representatives should be asked for information on Hungarian conditions. The previous instructions sent to them should be recalled. They should be told not to appear to interfere and above all to do nothing tending to convey any recognition of the present Government which, in the eyes of the Conference, had no legal existence, which did not represent the chief parties in Hungary and especially excluded all democratic elements.

MR. POLK said that he agreed that information was what the Council desired. He drew attention to the fact that the Archduke's government had not been put in power by the Hungarian people, but by a *coup d'état*. It took the place of the Government in whose favour Bela Kun had resigned. If the Archduke knew that the Powers were unfavourable to him he would resign, and a Coalition Government might soon be possible. The representative of the French Government had had an interview with the Archduke, who had said that he would abdicate as soon as a Socialistic Government could be formed. If he had spoken the truth he might resign immediately.

M. PICHON said that it would be necessary for the Council to make up its mind as to what it wanted. Was it prepared in the end to say to the Archduke that he must resign? If the Council was bound by its decisions not to interfere in Hungarian internal politics, it would not be easy to do this. If the Archduke were told that he could not be recognised officially, this would be of little avail, as even without official relations, the Governments were to some extent committed to the intercourse they must have with the administration in power. The Archduke had formed a programme, and had communicated it to the Allied Generals in Budapest. The Generals had received him, and even their silence was construable as a sort of recognition. The question was therefore whether the Council should await the advice

of the Allied representatives in Budapest or not before asking the Archduke to resign.

M. POLK said that he thought it would probably be better to wait. But he reminded the Council that M. Clemenceau had made a strong point in the instructions to the Generals of not recognising this Government because of the bad example this would set to the rest of Europe. If the Generals, therefore, had recognised the Archduke's Government, they had exceeded their mission.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not think that they had done so.

M. TITTONI said that they had been visited by the Archduke. They had received his programme, they had remained silent, they had made no protest. All this amounted almost to a recognition. The question therefore was should the Archduke be asked to retire.

M. POLK observed that there were precedents for official relations with unrecognised Governments. For instance, the Government of Lenin and Trotsky had not been recognised, but agents of the Powers had been in contact with them.

M. PICHON observed that the agents in question, at least as regards France, had not been officials. The telegram alluded to by Mr. Tittoni had not, he thought, contained a programme. It merely contained a communication by the Archduke to the members of his Cabinet.

M. TITTONI said that it was necessary to take into consideration public opinion. Throughout the Allied world it was thought that the Council was in some manner favourable to the Archduke's Government. The papers were engaged in speculations as to whether it was France, Italy or Roumania that backed the Archduke. All Governments would be questioned in their Parliaments. It was therefore important that the Council should take sides openly and that all should appear to be following the same course.

M. PICHON said that the Council had already declared that it would only recognise a Government representing the national will.

MR. BALFOUR then proposed a draft telegram for communication to the Allied Generals in Budapest. (See Appendix C.) He said that he thought the advantages of this telegram were that it would recognise the need of the Allied representatives to work with the people in power. It made it clear that the Conference did not trust these people; that the main reason for this distrust was that the head of the Hungarian Government was a Hapsburg; and that what the Conference desired was to obtain the opinion of the Hungarian people. A National Assembly based upon universal suffrage and direct and secret voting was necessary. It was only on these conditions that peace could be made with a Hungarian Government. He thought this constituted sufficient material for a very strong hint to the present Hungarian Government.

M. PICHON said that it was undesirable to use any sentence which might suggest that the Allies were ready to agree to the restoration of the monarchy in Hungary.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Allies could not oppose a monarchical form of government in Hungary should the Hungarians desire it.

M. TITTONI said that he agreed with M. Pichon, not that he objected to a monarchical form of government, but because in Hungary it would be bound to have a Hapsburg at its head, and because the Hapsburgs were the authors of the war.

(The telegram drafted by Mr. Balfour (see Appendix C) was then adopted.)

2. MR. POLK communicated to his colleagues a telegram from Mr. Hoover regarding the situation in Upper Silesia. (See Appendix D.)

Situation in  
Silesia

M. TITTONI said that the conclusion of the telegram was that a military occupation was necessary. The Council he understood had already decided that there should be a military occupation at Silesia.

M. PICHON pointed out that the occupation could only be carried out after the ratification of the Treaty.

M. TITTONI pointed out that a question affecting the very existence of Central Europe was at stake. If the coal mines of Silesia were destroyed, the life of Europe would be in jeopardy. Even if the Treaty did not give the Conference the right to intervene, he thought that in a case of this kind it would be quite fair to exceed Treaty rights.

M. PICHON said that the military occupation of Silesia before the ratification of the Treaty was a very serious matter. He suggested that General Weygand should be sent for.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought according to the armistice the Allies were entitled to occupy any strategic point they wished in Germany.

M. TITTONI pointed out that it was not necessary to occupy the whole of Silesia. It was, however, of vital interest to save the mines.

MR. POLK read another telegram from Mr. Hoover recommending that representatives of the Coal Commission should proceed at once to Upper Silesia. He thought this might be decided upon without awaiting General Weygand's arrival.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that M. Loucheur, who, he understood, presided over the Coal Commission should be asked to send its representatives to Silesia.

M. TITTONI said that he thought a Commission would not be able, without military assistance, to save the mines.

(At this point General Weygand entered the room.)



GENERAL WEYGAND, after reading the telegrams, said that he had just received from General Henrys similar news to that sent by Mr. Hoover. General Henrys also asked for troops to occupy Upper Silesia. A reply had already been sent to General Henrys to the effect that according to the Treaty the Allies had no right to enter Silesia, but that his request had been communicated to the Conference.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Allies had no rights under the Armistice.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that Silesia was still German territory, and that no article in the Armistice with Germany entitled the Allied Armies to enter into German territory. All that could be done was to anticipate the terms of the Treaty.

M. PICHON thought that all that could be done for the time being was to send the representatives of the Coal Commission.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the German Government, if questioned, would be bound to disavow the promoters of trouble in Upper Silesia. In this case the German Government would probably declare itself unable to control the situation. Should it do this, the Allies would have sufficient reason for offering to assist in controlling it.

M. PICHON said that he understood General Weygand's proposal to be that the German Government should be asked to remedy the condition of affairs in Upper Silesia. If it declared itself unable to do so, the Allies would tender their help.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Allies had not a right to send troops into Germany to occupy strategic points.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that a provision to this effect existed in the Armistice with Austria, but not in the Armistice with Germany.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that according to Mr. Hoover the strikes in Upper Silesia had a political character, and were really fostered by the Germans themselves. If the Allies asked the German Government to suppress the strikes, the Polish party in Upper Silesia would consider itself aggrieved and this policy might amount to sacrificing the Poles to the Germans.

M. TITTONI said that he understood that German troops had not yet evacuated Upper Silesia. In that case the responsibility for ensuring order was theirs.

MR. BALFOUR drew attention to the passage in Mr. Hoover's telegram stating that the Polish miners had been protecting the mines against the Spartacists who appeared to have combined with the German Volunteer Corps in shooting the Poles. Under such circumstances it was difficult to send German Soldiers into the district to restore order without incurring the reproaches of the Poles.

M. TITTONI said that the destruction of the mines must be put a stop to by some means or other. There was really no question of

sending German troops to quell the disorder, as German troops were already there.

M. PICHON said that the Council was faced with a dilemma. The Germans would certainly fall upon the Poles. On the other hand, it was a big responsibility to occupy German territory before the Treaty.

M. TITTONI thought that the destruction of the coal supply in Central Europe was a worse evil.

M. PICHON said that the Military Commission suggested in Mr. Hoover's telegram was not, in his opinion, very likely to have a very great effect.

GENERAL WEYGAND pointed out that such a Mission could only be sent with the consent of the German Government. Should it proceed to Silesia without the consent of the German Government, the latter might refuse to be responsible for its safety.

M. PICHON said that the Allies had really no means of military intervention within the terms of the law.

MR. BALFOUR said that in one sense the Germans had as great an interest in putting a stop to the destruction of the mines as the Allies. German industries depended upon Silesian coal. They would therefore lose as much as Tchecho-Slovakia, Vienna or Italy. He suggested that the Germans might be told that if they declined to help, the Allies would arrange that they should have no coal from Silesia, should the district go to Poland.

M. BERTHELOT observed that Herr Erzberger in a recent speech had drawn attention to the diminishing production of coal in Silesia. He had added that there was reason to anticipate a still further diminution. For this reason he had urged that restrictions be imposed on the consumption of coal in Germany in order that sufficient coal should be left for the winter months. This indicated that the German Government was aware of the situation in Silesia, and had perhaps contributed to bring it about. It was not therefore quite safe to speculate on the good faith of the German Government.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that in negotiating on this matter with Germany, it was reasonable to assume that the German Government acted in good faith, seeing that it could not admit that it was inspiring the destruction of the mines.

M. BERTHELOT said that the German Government would then resort to dilatory tactics. They would say that it was not a case of revolution but a case of strikes, which it was difficult to suppress.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the coal from Silesia was a matter of European interest. Many arguments were at the disposal of the Conference. This coal concerned Austria, Tchecho-Slovakia and other States. The Conference moreover was bound to hand over the

territory to Poland in good condition should it ultimately be assigned to Poland.

M. PICHON said that General Dupont might perhaps be asked to intervene with the German Government and ask it to take the necessary steps to remedy the situation. He suggested that General Weygand should prepare a text of a telegram to General Dupont, and submit it to the Council on the following day.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had been struck by one of the considerations brought forward by General Weygand. The situation should be looked at in its broader aspect. The Silesian coal question affected not merely the comfort, but the very existence of the new states created by the Conference. The question was not one of local strikes and local destruction of property, which, unfortunate though it might be, might well be considered no business of the Conference. It was the consequences elsewhere that mattered. These consequences might perhaps justify the Conference in exceeding the letter both of the Armistice and of the Treaty, and in anticipating the terms of the latter by a few weeks. He thought the policy to which the discussion pointed might be summarised under three heads. First, the representatives of the Coal Commission should be sent to Silesia; second, an appeal should be made to the German Government in the manner suggested by General Weygand, and third, Marshal Foch should be asked to devise plans for combining with the forces of order in the country, in order to protect what was not merely German or Polish property, but a world interest.

M. PICHON said that he understood that the third proposal would only come into play if the two former were insufficient.

(It was then agreed that:—

(a) M. Loucheur be asked to send representatives of the Coal Commission to Upper Silesia without delay, to examine the situation and to report on the means of remedying it.

(b) That the attention of the German Government be called to the condition of affairs in Upper Silesia and to the danger of destruction of the coal mines, and that it be asked to take necessary steps to ensure order. General Weygand was asked to submit at the following meeting, draft instructions to General Dupont, embodying this policy.

(c) To ask Marshal Foch to prepare means of sending forces into Upper Silesia, should the need arise, in order to protect the mines from destruction.)

3. M. TITTONI said he wished to draw attention to a memorandum he had received from the British Delegation, regarding the plan according to which the Conference should work.

Programme of  
Work for the  
Conference

M. PICHON suggested that this question be held over until Thursday, when M. Clemenceau was expected to return.



4. M. TITTONI said that he thought the Council should not separate until the Austrian Treaty had been signed. He asked when this event could be expected.

Functions of the  
Editing Com-  
mittee

CAPTAIN PORTIER said that the first meeting of the Editing Committee was to take place on the following day. The last reports from the various Commissions had only just been received. He thought that the labours of the Editing Committee could, at best, be completed in 48 hours, provided that the Committee confined itself to co-ordinating the answers prepared by the Commissions, and that it did not deal afresh with the various problems.

MR. BALFOUR said that even after the Committee had finished its work, time would be required for printing and correcting proofs.

CAPTAIN PORTIER said that, presumably, the Austrians would be given, as the Germans had been given, 5 days to consider whether they would sign or not.

MR. BALFOUR asked if a time table of the various necessary operations could be prepared by the Secretary-General. He agreed that the Council should not separate until the Austrian Treaty had been signed and the Bulgarian Treaty presented.

M. PICHON said he thought that all were agreed that the Editing Committee should confine its labours to co-ordinating reports of Commissions, except in case any two reports were inconsistent.

MR. POLK said that he would like to see the instructions to the Committee. He thought the Committee should not be too strictly limited, though its main task was certainly to co-ordinate the answers prepared by the Commissions. He understood that some of its members proposed to re-cast the Treaty.

CAPTAIN PORTIER pointed out that the Committee had received no instructions. There was merely a resolution to the effect that a similar organism should be set up to that set up to make the final reply to the Germans.

(It was agreed that the Editing Committee should be instructed to limit its labours to the co-ordination of the various replies prepared by Commissions, except when inconsistencies in these replies required examination of any question on its merits.)

M. TITTONI observed that the Conference had dealt with many important matters. It might fairly be said that it had governed Europe, but it would be severely criticised by public opinion should it separate without having made peace.

5. MR. POLK said he had received a telegram from Sofia to the effect that General Franchet d'Esperey, acting under the authority of the Peace Conference, had ordered the Bulgarian Government to disarm its forces. He asked whether General Franchet d'Esperey had given an order to the Bulgarian Government, or had conveyed a request.

General Franchet  
d'Esperey's Action  
in Bulgaria

The Council had agreed that no orders could be given.<sup>1</sup> He would, therefore, like to know exactly in what manner the General had proceeded, as it appeared that he had obtained the removal to Constantinople of the firing mechanism of all the surplus small arms in Bulgaria. He was also informed that the General had gone to Bulgarian Thrace and told his officers to say that the country would be attributed to Greece, and that the Bulgarians must evacuate it.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he had no information whatever regarding the second point, but he did not think that the information received by Mr. Polk could be accurate. As to the first the measures taken by General Franchet d'Esperey were the result of the telegram sent him from the Conference.<sup>2</sup> He had been told he could not exact anything from the Bulgarians which was not required of them in the armistice. The results he had obtained had been reached by negotiation.

MR. POLK asked whether he could be furnished with a copy of the request addressed by General Franchet d'Esperey to the Bulgarian Government.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that no other instructions had been given to General Franchet d'Esperey except those sent from the Conference. He believed that his negotiations with the Bulgarian Government had been conducted verbally.

MR. POLK said he would like to have a report from General Franchet d'Esperey regarding these negotiations, as well as a copy of any documents that might have passed between him and the Bulgarians.

M. BERTHELOT said that there was a telegram sent by General Franchet d'Esperey to the French War Office, saying that he had gone to Sofia and had obtained his results by negotiation. It might have been pointed out that there were forty-five thousand Bulgarians under arms instead of the twenty-eight thousand to which they were entitled.

MR. POLK asked whether there was any objection to the furnishing of a report.

M. PICHON said he thought the General would have nothing to report.

MR. POLK said that the Bulgarians must be very easy people to manage if so much had been obtained from them even in excess of the terms of the armistice. Marshal Foch had told the Council that the Bulgarians had been very punctilious in executing the armistice.<sup>3</sup> The honour of the Council was therefore engaged and General Franchet d'Esperey had acted as the agent of the Council. He did not

<sup>1</sup> HD-23, minute 3, p. 511, especially pp. 514-515.

<sup>2</sup> Appendix F to HD-23, p. 526.

<sup>3</sup> Appendix D to HD-22, p. 492.

question the way in which the General had acted, but he thought there could be no possible objection to his furnishing a report to the Council.

M. PICHON said that the General had only followed the instructions given him.

M. TITTONI pointed out that the armistice only prescribed the number of divisions the Bulgarians were to keep, not the number of men in each division.

GENERAL WEYGAND agreed that this was so. The armistice had been deficient in this respect. Any request for reductions of the number of men under arms was in excess of the armistice, but this had been obtained by negotiation.

(It was decided: that General Franchet d'Esperey should be asked to furnish a report to the Council on his negotiations with the Bulgarian Government regarding disarmament and the alleged evacuation of Thrace.)

6. GENERAL WEYGAND said that according to a Nauen wireless message the German Government had recalled General von der Goltz.

Recall of General  
von der Goltz

7. M. ST. QUENTIN said that according to the terms of Peace handed to the Austrian Delegation on the 20th July, some districts of Western Hungary had been attributed to Austria. In their note of the 1st August the Austrian Delegation complained that the Hungarian authorities, having obtained information of the intentions of the Conference, were exercising brutal reprisals on the populations of these districts. Cattle and agricultural implements were being removed. The inhabitants were being forcibly enlisted. The Austrian Delegation therefore requested that the Commission to superintend the plebiscite should be sent immediately to Western Hungary. No attention had yet been paid to this request as the Treaty did not provide for a plebiscite. Only the Austrian Delegation asked for one. The Conference had not taken a plebiscite into consideration.

Occupation by  
Austrian Forces  
of German-Speak-  
ing Districts of  
Western Hungary

M. TITTONI asked why the Austrians were asking for a plebiscite in a country which the Conference had attributed to them without one.

M. ST. QUENTIN said the Austrians asked for more territory than the Conference desired to give them. In addition to this the Austrians hoped to create a precedent in order to ask for a plebiscite in Styria for instance, where the Conference had no intention of holding one. On the 9th August the Austrian Delegation had been authorised by the Austrian Government to ask the Conference for authority to



send Austrian police into the affected districts to maintain order until the plebiscite should take place. On the 14th August a letter had been received from the Austrian Delegation saying that the Hungarians threatened to retake Western Hungary by force. The letter further expressed anxiety as to the movements of Roumanian troops. It requested the Conference to forbid both the Hungarians and the Roumanians to enter the area attributed to Austria, and renewed the request for permission to send police into the country. Finally on the 15th August the Delegation informed the Conference that the necessities of the case had forced the Austrian Government to act and to send police and customs officials into Western Hungary up to the frontier line laid down by the Conference. The Delegation hoped that this action would be approved by the Conference. There were therefore two questions for the Council to settle. Would it ratify the *fait accompli* either expressly or by maintaining silence and in that case would it notify the Roumanian and Hungarian Governments?

In reply to a question M. ST. QUENTIN said the Austrians had occupied the whole of the territory assigned to them.

(It was decided that no answer should be sent to the various communications of the Austrian Delegation regarding the occupation of Western Hungary.)

M. TRITTONI observed that this did not imply approval.

8. M. ST. QUENTIN said that a similar instance arose in regard to Prekomurie. The Serb-Croats-Slovene Delegation had asked for permission to occupy the portion of this territory attributed to them.<sup>6</sup> Troops had been got in readiness to occupy the area. The Delegation now asked that the Hungarian Government should be notified of the decision of the Conference, in order that opposition should not arise.

(It was agreed that as the Conference could not deal with any recognised Government in Hungary, notification in the sense desired by the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes could not be made.)

9. M. ST. QUENTIN said that the frontier fixed in Baranya<sup>7</sup> had not been notified to the Serb-Croats-Slovene Delegation. The Delegation persisted in asking for localities beyond the line adopted by the Conference. He suggested that the best means of stopping these requests would be to inform them of the frontier so fixed.

M. TRITTONI asked why the Delegation had not been informed.

M. ST. QUENTIN replied that the general rule of the Council was that no frontiers should be communicated to any Delegation, without an express decision to that effect.

<sup>6</sup> See HD-21, minute 6 (a), p. 454.

<sup>7</sup> See HD-21, minute 6 (b), p. 454.

(It was decided that the Serb-Croate-Slovene Delegation should be informed of the frontier laid down in the Baranya.)

10. The Committee had before it the following note:

The Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty, in its session of August 11th took up the question of the expenses of the Boundary Commission and of the Reparation Commission, as well as the distribution of these expenses. It has been unanimously decided to submit the following resolution to the Council:

Distribution of  
Expenses of the  
Delimitation  
Commissions

“The Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty, having been entrusted with the question of the expenditure of the Boundary Commission and having found no precise indications, in the Treaty with Germany, concerning the distribution of these expenses, except in the case of Schleswig, calls the attention of the Council to the advantage of adopting a general rule for the distribution of these expenditures, as regards the Treaties to be signed with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.”

The various solutions examined in the course of the discussion were the following:

- A. To divide the costs between the Two States concerned (Schleswig case).
- B. Expenditure divided between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.
- C. Expenditure charged to the League of Nations.

MR. POLK said that he thought some difficulty would be experienced in collecting the money from the two contributing States. He thought that it would perhaps be simpler that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should advance the funds and recoup afterwards from the two States concerned.

CAPTAIN PORTIER explained that what was desired was a principle for application in all cases in the future. The Treaty with Germany had only provided for the expenses of holding a Plebiscite, in the case of Schleswig. No such provision had been made for the districts in dispute between Germany and Poland. This omission caused considerable difficulties, and the Committee for the Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty wished to avoid a repetition of this difficulty in future. The question was of some urgency seeing that the treaties with Austria and Bulgaria were approaching the final stage.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the Commission should decide on the incidence of the cost, in accordance with the loss and gain of the two countries concerned. The country gaining territory should pay a contribution proportionate to its gain.

(After some discussion it was agreed that the cost of the Delimitation Commissions should be shared equally between the two States

concerned, and that the cost of Commissions conducting Plebiscites should be allotted in proportion to the gain and loss incurred by the States concerned. The percentages should be fixed by the Commissions in each case.)

11. GENERAL SACKVILLE-WEST explained the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles regarding the allowances to be granted to officers serving on Commissions of Control in Germany. (See Appendix E.) The main conclusions were that officers should continue to receive the ordinary rate of pay of the rank held by them at the time of their appointment. The pay would therefore vary according to the nationality of the officer, but it was considered that allowances for work on Commissions of Control in Germany should be equalised. In order to arrive at a uniform principle, seeing that naval and air officers were concerned as well as army officers, it was suggested that a Committee should be formed of one Military, one Naval and one Air Officer of each Nation, together with a Financial Expert. The Council was asked to ratify this proposal, and to appoint members to the suggested Committee.

(The Report of the Military Representative was accepted, and it was decided to appoint a Committee composed of one Military, one Naval, one Aeronautical member and one Financial Expert for each country represented on the Inter-Allied Commissions of control, to fix under the Chairmanship of General Nollet, the rate of allowances to be granted for service on Commissions of Control in Germany.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, August 19, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-32

*[The United States Representative on the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest (Bandholtz) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]*

[Translation <sup>8</sup>]

Telegram

To His Excellency M. CLÉMENTEAU

*President of the Peace Conference at Paris.*

BUDAPEST, August 15, 1919.

The Commission of Allied Generals received this morning, August 15, the Archduke Joseph, who notified it of the formation of a new

---

<sup>8</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



Coalition Ministry, under the presidency of M. Friedrich. Four ministerial posts remain to be filled. The list will be telegraphed as soon as it is complete and definitive. After having conferred with the Roumanian General Holban and the Hungarian Minister for War accompanied by the Chief of Police at Budapest, the Commission came to a decision on the subject of the Roumanian garrison at Budapest and its reorganization of the Hungarian police, for the purpose of maintaining order in the capital. The Roumanian garrison for Budapest and its vicinity will remain for the moment fixed at a division of infantry, the stationing of which the Commission has slightly modified in order to clear the center of the city as far as possible and the better to assure order in the vicinity among the working men who constitute the most turbulent element. The Hungarian police for the city and its vicinity will be reorganized as soon as possible, and will number an effective force of 6,000 men.

General Holban has promised to discuss this matter immediately with the Hungarian authorities and to keep the Commission informed. The Commission having been advised that the Czechoslovak troops had not yet evacuated the mining region of Salgotarjan, which is in the neutral zone, has this day repeated to the Government at Prague, by telegraph, the invitation to withdraw its troops immediately.

BANDHOLTZ

---

Appendix B to HD-32

[*The Archduke Joseph of Hungary to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*]

[Translation<sup>9</sup>]

Radio from Budapest No. 132 W 261, August 17, 9:15 a. m.:

BUDAPEST, August 16, 1919.

M. GEORGES CLÉMENTEAU,  
*President of the Peace Conference,*  
*Paris.*

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to inform you that the definitive government has been formed in Hungary, the aim of which is to restore internal order, to set as early a day as possible for an election on the basis of universal suffrage, and to conclude peace.

---

<sup>9</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

The members of the Cabinet are:

President of the Council and  
Minister of Commerce *ad interim*,  
Interior.

Foreign Affairs.

Finance.

Justice.

Agriculture

Minister for the Interests  
of Small Tenants.

Worship and Public Education

Public Health.

Minister for National Minorities.

War.

Publicity.

Minister charged with preparing  
the peace negotiations.

Etienne Friedrich, manufac-  
turer.

Baron Sigismond Perengi,  
State official.

Martin Lovahzi, President of  
the Associated Bourgeois  
Parties.

Jean Gruenn, State official.

Georges Balogh, Judge.

Etienne Szabo, agriculturist.

Jean Mayer, farm laborer.

Charles Buszar, School mas-  
ter, Christian Socialist.

André Osillery, physician.

Jacques Bleyer, professor at  
the University of Budapest.

Francois Schnetzer, general.

Etienne Haller, of the Chris-  
tian Socialist Party.

Count Paul Teleki, landowner.

Three other portfolios are reserved for industrial workers, namely: of public welfare, of supply, and of the ministry for industrial interests.

This Government will hand in its resignation upon convocation of the National Assembly.

At the same time, my functions as Chief of the Government will also cease; the National Assembly will have the responsibility of ratifying the peace as well as of fixing the form of the State and of the Constitution.

You are requested to take note of this communication.

ARCHDUKE JOSEPH

---

#### Appendix C to HD-32

[*Telegram Drafted by Mr. Balfour for Communication to the Allied Generals at Budapest*]

Though it is necessary for you to take account of any Ministry which, for the moment, holds the machinery of power, we cannot recognise or make terms of peace with a Government which does not, as far as we can judge, represent the country. The mere fact that the Head of the State is a Hapsburg, diminishes the possibility of feeling confidence in an administration which has, in any case, been established by a *coup d'état* during a foreign occupation. We have,

of course, no wish to intervene in the internal affairs of Hungary, but we do wish to be assured that its Government represents its people. An assembly elected directly by universal suffrage and secret voting seems to us to be a necessary preliminary to any satisfactory arrangement, or any stable peace.

Please report on the political situation.

---

Appendix D to HD-32

*[Telegram to the Commission to Negotiate Peace From Mr. Hoover  
Regarding the Situation in Upper Silesia]*

Received at A. R. A. Aug. 18—1:45

Vienna, Commission to Negotiate Peace Paris.

Number Ham 1158. Complete strikes now in progress in Upper Silesia and appear more political than economical in character and has become so violent as to already result in the destruction of one important coal mine and to threaten the destruction of the entire district. The whole of Central Europe is dependent upon this district for coal and unless all railway transport and municipal service are to totally disappear through these areas this coal district must be gotten back to operation at once. The causes of the trouble are somewhat obscure. Considerable arrest and shooting of Poles were made by Germans stating that they were putting down a Spartacist uprising. There seems to be some genuine Spartacist agitation but the Poles claim that it is entirely manufactured by the Germans and have shown me various documents indicating direct complicity of the Government at Berlin if the documents can be demonstrated authentic. In any event the Polish miners have struck claiming tyranny and persecution of the German Volunteer Corps and the whole district is now idle. Curiously enough the Polish miners have been actually protecting the mines from destruction by the Spartacists. In two or three cases the Spartacists appear to be mixed with the German Volunteer Corps when it comes to shooting up the Poles. Altogether the situation requires immediate attention. There can be no settlement of the question without occupation, as provided for under the Treaty and if the Allies do not occupy the district the repercussion on the coal supply will be terrible to all Europe. In any event another military commission comprising representatives of at least four Governments should be instantly dispatched to the district. The problem is not a question as to who is right or wrong in this disturbance. The fact of the case is that it is a largely political strike and is jeopardising the life of Europe through the stoppage of coal production and it fundamentally



grows out of failure to create allied plebiscite commission to take charge of the district.

HOOVER

---

[Appendix E to HD-32]

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL  
BRITISH SECTION  
SWC-461 (83-MR)

VERSAILLES, 14 August, 1919.

*Report Regarding the Fixing of Allowances To Be Granted to the Officers of the Allied and Associated Powers Sitting on the Military, Naval & Aeronautical Commissions of Control in Germany*

The Peace Conference decided in its Meeting of August 2nd, 1919,<sup>10</sup> to refer to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles for their examination and report, the question of fixing the allowances to be granted "to the officers of the Allied and Associated Powers sitting on the Inter-Allied Military, Naval and Air Commissions of Control in Germany."

The Military Representatives, after considering the question, are unanimously of the opinion:

1. That the proposals as put forth below for the Inter-Allied Military Commissions of Control should be extended so as to cover the Inter-Allied Naval and Aeronautical Commissions of Control.

2. That it is necessary to assure to these officers during their tour of duty in Germany a treatment which would relieve them and their families of all financial care and would allow of their enjoying among the Germans a position fitting to their duties.

3. That although these officers belong to different nationalities but owing to the nature of their work will be in constant relationship both with each other and with the same German authorities, their allowances should be calculated on the same basis as for the officers of equivalent rank of every country represented on the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control.

4. That the Military Representatives are not in a position themselves to fix absolutely the amount of the various allowances to be granted, and that in order to settle this question it is necessary to form as soon as possible a special Commission which will be composed for each country represented on the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control:—

- 1 Military Member.
- 1 Naval Member.
- 1 Aeronautical Member.
- 1 Financial Expert.

---

<sup>10</sup> HD-22, minute 6, p. 486.

The officers chosen to sit on this special Commission shall be appointed by their respective Governments and shall be selected preferably from among those who are to be Members of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control in Germany.

General Nollet shall be President of this special Commission and shall decide on the place and the date of its meeting.

5. Lastly, that the amount of the allowances to be arranged for in these Conditions ought to be a generous one and ought to be chargeable to the first payment to be made by Germany. It is in the general interest to reduce it as far as possible in attaching to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control no more than the absolutely indispensable number of officers.

GA<sup>l</sup>. BELIN

*Military Representative,  
French Section,  
Supreme War Council.*

H. W. STUDD

*Br: General, Military Representative,  
British Section,  
Supreme War Council.*

UGO CAVALLERO

*Military Representative,  
Italian Section,  
Supreme War Council.*

P. D. LOCHRIDGE

*Military Representative,  
American Section,  
Supreme War Council.*

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, August 19, 1919, at 3: 30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

*Secretaries*

Mr. H. Norman.

Sir George Clerk.

**FRANCE**

M. Pichon.

*Secretaries*

M. Berthelot.

M. de St. Quentin.

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

**JAPAN**

M. Matsui.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Colonel U. S. Grant.

BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . . Lieut. Commander Bell.

FRANCE . . . . . Captain A. Portier.

ITALY . . . . . Lt. Colonel Jones.

*Interpreter*—M. Demolon.

1. During the discussion of this question the following were present: General Weygand, Mr. J. F. Dulles, M. Castoldi and Captain Le Vavas seur.

Functions of the  
Editing Committee  
With Regard  
to the Peace  
Treaty With  
Austria

MR. BALFOUR said that he felt compelled to ask the Council to reconsider the decision that it had taken at its previous Meeting. (See H. D. 32, Minute 4.<sup>1</sup>)

Some time before, the question had arisen, as to whether the Co-ordinating Committee should deal direct with all reports, which the various Technical Committees might prepare, on the subject of Austrian Notes; and whether, after dealing with them, they should send a unified report on the subject to the Council. (See H. D. 27, Minute 3.<sup>2</sup>) The decision arrived at had been, that the duties of the Co-ordinating Committee should be modified in that sense. But, in order to effect this, it would be necessary to give the Committee in question greater latitude. M. Pichon and M. Tittoni had, on the other hand, desired to restrict the functions of the

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 702.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 621.



Co-ordinating Committee, and to prevent it from dealing with any questions of principle. The ill consequences of these limitations could now be foreseen. In the case of the German Treaty, all reports of Committees had gone, in the first instance, to the Council of Four, who had examined them almost word for word at a great expenditure of trouble; and had then sent them back to the Co-ordinating Committee, for the preparation of a unified report in which the decisions of the Council of Four were incorporated. He had hoped, by proposing that the Co-ordinating Committee should deal direct with the reports of the Committees, that the present Council might be spared a lot of work. In order to effect this, however, the Co-ordinating Committee must be given greater latitude than the decision arrived at on the previous day permitted. He would like to point out that a great number of replies from the Austrian Delegation had not been submitted to any Committee at all. He would like to know the reason for this; and further wished to be informed to what particular body the questions raised by the Austrian Delegation were being referred. The existing decision would have, as a result, that the Co-ordinating Committee would actually be prevented from considering the Austrian notes. In this case it would be necessary for him, as a representative of Great Britain, to work through all the controversial points raised by the Austrians, in collaboration with his experts, and, after bringing all relevant questions before the notice of the Council, to send back the result to the Co-ordinating Committee. Such a procedure would take a great deal of time, and would be a strain on the temper of the Council. He asked, therefore, whether it would not be better to relax the restrictions imposed by the decision of the previous day, and to allow the Co-ordinating Committee to survey the Austrian notes, and the Austrian Peace Treaty, as a whole, and to report to the Council. He did not think it would be proper to allow it to be said that the Austrian Delegation had never had its case properly heard, or to permit it to be thought, that the immense operation of liquidating the Austrian Empire had been effected without a due consideration of all the problems involved. He therefore hoped that the previous decision might be modified.

M. TITTONI asked whether it was correct to say that the Austrian notes had not been fully examined, or that certain points in them had not been referred to any Committee.

M. PICHON replied that he did not think the statement was correct, and that, in his opinion, every question raised by the Austrian Delegation had been referred to a competent Committee.

MR. BALFOUR replied that this was not the opinion of his experts.

M. BERTHELOT, confirming M. Pichon's previous statement, said that only one question raised by the Austrian Delegation had not been con-

sidered. The question in point was, whether the Austrian State was to be considered as a New State, similar to Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, or Jugo-Slavia, or as an enemy State similar to Germany. The British Delegates had considered that Austria should be regarded as a New State; but the Council had already decided in an opposite sense, and their view had been strongly supported by President Wilson. It was most important that this decision should be upheld, since any withdrawal from the standpoint adopted would involve recasting the Peace Treaty with Austria.

M. TITTONI said that if it were really thought that Austria was not an Enemy State, the Italians would not have fought for over three and a half years, with a loss of over half a million dead, against a mere phantom.

(At this point M. Cambon and members of the Editing Committee entered the room; and M. Pichon laid the question raised by Mr. Balfour before them.)

M. CAMBON said that he did not know of any question raised by the Austrian notes having failed to receive consideration; since the whole duties of the Co-ordinating Committee consisted in dealing with the reports of the Technical Committees, to which the notes in question were referred. The procedure of his Committee had been as follows. He had read a draft covering note to the general reply to be given to the Austrians in which he summarized the remarks and criticisms raised by the Committee to whom the notes had been referred. In his note, he had insisted upon one point which was, that the Council should exercise to the full its rights against Austria, which had been the author of the war, by the fact that it had sent its ultimatum to Serbia; and had, moreover, before any declaration of war, performed belligerent acts against France and Belgium. When he had finished reading his draft covering letter, M. Headlam-Morley had read an alternative covering note, conceived in a totally different sense; and had argued therein, that Austria should be considered as a New State, and not as an Enemy one. But the question so raised had been decided previously in the sense that Austria must be regarded as the direct legitimate heir of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. With regard to all other clauses in the Peace Treaty with Austria, dealing with economic, military and political questions, they had been adequately discussed by the Technical Committees. The one point raised by Mr. Headlam-Morley could not be dealt with in that way, since it was purely political and must be left to the Council to reconsider, if necessary.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY drew attention to the words in the preamble of the Peace Treaty with Austria stating that Austria was to be "recognized as a new and independent State under the name of the Republic of Austria".

M. TITTONI replied that this was only intended to imply that Austria was a New State, insofar as her old frontiers and status had been altered. The question now before the Council was whether it ought to regard the old State of Austria as no longer existing in any form; in which case all possibility of reparation, or of fixing responsibilities, would absolutely disappear.

M. PICHON said that President Wilson had urged that Austria should be regarded as a *new* and an *enemy* state, and the Council of Four had adopted his point of view. If the Peace Treaty with Austria were to be discussed under this new point of view, each separate clause that it contained would have to be reconsidered.

MR. BALFOUR said that the discussion had departed from the lines which he had originally intended for it. M. Tittoni and M. Pichon had explained with much fervour and eloquence that Austria must be regarded as guilty for the outbreak of war, and for a great deal of the suffering inflicted upon France and Italy; they had further shown that she could not be regarded in the same light as Jugo-Slavia or Czecho-Slovakia. He had never wished to dispute this, for it had always been perfectly clear to him, that an absolute distinction existed between the Governments of Vienna and those of the other States formed on the ruins of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. He had wished to draw the attention of the Conference to a new problem, deserving special consideration; the problem in question being, how the present Austrian Government was to be treated with regard to the Peace Treaty presented to it, and to the observations that it was making thereon. If M. Pichon and M. Tittoni thought that the Council should consider every problem raised by the Austrian Delegation, he had no objection to acceding to their wishes. He would, on the other hand, have preferred that the very highly qualified Committee presided over by M. Jules Cambon, should have, in the first place, considered the Austrian replies. If the decision taken on the day before were upheld, he would be obliged to examine the Peace Treaty, and the Austrian notes upon it, word by word, in company with his experts. He thought that it would be unfortunate to compel members of the Council to concentrate their attention on these points of detail, in view of the enormous responsibilities that they were called upon to bear.

M. TITTONI thanked Mr. Balfour for his explanation, and said that the discussion had now been limited to a mere question of procedure. The Committees had examined the Austrian counter proposals, and the Council must now discuss their reports. Mr. Balfour proposed to save time, by an alteration in procedure, which would turn the Co-ordinating Committee into a sort of delegation of the Council. If time would really be saved by this, he would be the first to agree to it, but he did not think that it would have that result. He thought,



on the contrary, that it would introduce a new complication, because whatever the Co-ordination Committee might report, the Council would certainly have to reconsider it. When the questions raised came before the Council, he would certainly reserve to himself full liberty of discussion, in spite of anything the Co-ordinating Committee might have said.

By adopting Mr. Balfour's procedure, three separate discussions would become inevitable:—

(1) The Austrian counter proposals would be discussed in the technical Committees;

(2) The Reports of the technical Committees would be discussed in the Co-ordinating Committee;

(3) The Co-ordinating Committee's Report would be discussed in the Council.

But if the Council were first to consider the Committee's reports, and then send back its decisions to the Co-ordinating Committee, the procedure would be shortened by one set of discussions.

M. CAMBON said that he agreed with M. Tittoni when he said that a fresh complication would be introduced by the adoption of Mr. Balfour's proposal. At the same time M. Tittoni had not shown all the steps through which the discussion of questions raised by the Austrian counter-proposals had to pass. The Co-ordinating Committee had been nominated in order to bring unity into the divergent questions brought before the Council by the counter-proposals of Enemy States. The Committee thought it ought to carry its work through as rapidly as possible, and for this reason, it had asked for assistance from the Drafting Committee on that morning. If it were decided that the functions of the Committee were to be fundamentally altered, it would be necessary for the Committee in question to refer back all questions previously decided to experts and to the Drafting Committee. This would mean a delay of 15 days or more, which would be of no benefit to the Peace Conference. For this reason, it would be best to limit the functions of the Co-ordinating Committee in the manner laid down in the previous decision of the Council. Any member of the Committee, or the Committee as a whole, would always be in a position to draw the attention of the Council to special points worthy of its consideration. A short time previously, the report of the Aeronautic Committee had been under discussion, and it had been noted that the report in question contained certain expressions on the subject of the Austrian Government, not couched in a very diplomatic form. The Co-ordinating Committee, however, had no intention of submitting points of this nature to the Council. The duty of the Committee was obviously to co-ordinate all the questions raised, and submit them to the Council in the form of a single report.

MR. POLK remarked that points on which the Co-ordinating Committee had been unanimous need not further be discussed.

M. PICHON said that when the Peace Treaty with Austria had been drawn up, all questions had been thoroughly examined by competent technical Committees, whose reports were to be placed before the Council of Five, who, after discussion, had sent the reports in question, together with their own decisions to the Drafting Committee. The clauses, as drawn up by the Drafting Committee, by virtue of this procedure had been re-submitted to the Council, who had transmitted them to the Austrian Delegation. The Austrian Delegates then made counter proposals, which were sent to experts, on whose reports decisions were made. The decisions and reports were sent to the Co-ordinating Committee, which re-submitted them to the Council. M. Cambon had therefore accurately described the manner in which the Co-ordinating Committee was intended to work. The Co-ordinating Committee could not be regarded as a Court of Appeal for the Technical Committees, since the members of the Committee were Delegates and not Technical experts. If the Council should decide that the Co-ordinating Committee should make decisions on the reports of the Committees, it would be doing no more than making a non-technical body decide over the Heads of Experts. Everybody wished to make the procedure of the Council as rapid as possible. This would be best effected by keeping the Co-ordinating Committee strictly to its co-ordinating functions. Mr. Balfour's wishes would be fully met by instructing the Co-ordinating Committee to draw special attention to points demanding consideration from the Council.

M. CAMBON said that he thought it important to adhere to the procedure outlined by M. Pichon. If the Co-ordinating Committee were to be called upon to discuss questions of principle, it would of necessity, be obliged to call in experts to assist it. This would indefinitely lengthen both its own labours, and those of the Conference. The consequences of the alternative proposals of M. Pichon and Mr. Balfour had been very clearly exemplified by the questions arising out of Mr. Headlam-Morley's letter and his own. Mr. Headlam-Morley had explained that, if his own letter were adopted, the Peace Treaty with Austria would have to be re-modelled almost in its entirety, whilst, if M. Cambon's draft reply were agreed to, no important changes in the Treaty would be necessary. The Conference had drawn up a Peace Treaty largely on the basis of reports of technical Committees. Doubtless the Treaty in question was open to criticism, but it would be even more so, if it were known that a non-technical committee had been given a power of decision over the reports of experts.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that he believed that it had been stated that he wished to re-draft the whole Treaty with Austria. He wished to deny any such wish on his part most emphatically. It had been

his privilege to be a member of several Committees whose duty it was to consider questions arising out of the Peace Treaty with Austria, and out of the Austrian counter-proposals. It had been his own opinion, and that of his colleagues on the Committees to which he referred, that the Peace Treaty with Austria could not stand in its present form. This was so far accepted that M. Laroche's Committee was largely re-modelling the provisions of the Austrian Treaty. To give one example, the original clauses on the subject of nationalities had been found to be inapplicable. The Austrian objection to the original articles had been supported by his Italian colleagues, and by the Czecho-Slovak delegates. The result was that they were now being re-drafted. This alteration in the original draft Treaty was not made in deference to the opinions of anybody so insignificant as himself, but merely because investigation had shown that the Treaty required recasting. In the case of the Peace Treaty with Germany, the Council of Four had closely studied all problems arising out of the German counter-proposals. The procedure had now been altered, and the replies were being sent, in the first place, to the Co-ordinating Committees, which had, in consequence, been compelled to recognize an alteration in its own functions. In the case in question, the work of considering counter-proposals was much more difficult. The German counter-proposals had raised problems referring to the cessation of a state of war. In the present instance, the Peace Conference was concerned with the liquidation of an entire Empire, and all observations on the problems raised involved a proportionately higher degree of complication. The Co-ordinating Committee was therefore called upon to examine answers to the Austrian Delegation, not only with a view to seeing that they were coherent, but also with the object of relieving the Council of some of its duties. The decision arrived at on the previous day prevented the Committee from duly fulfilling some of the duties that it was called upon to perform.

M. PICHON said that the Co-ordinating Committee was left free to draw the Council's attention to certain important points, but was not allowed to discuss questions of principle.

MR. POLK then submitted a draft proposal.

M. TIRONI then proposed a modification to the draft proposal in the sense that the Co-ordinating Committee should not, as a whole, draw attention to alterations in principle, but that its individual members should be allowed to do so.

(After some further discussion, it was agreed that the Editing Committee should:—

- (1) Co-ordinate the various replies to the Austrians, making only verbal changes, and
- (2) Submit to the Supreme Council Annexes pointing out all ques-



tions where one or more of the representatives of the Co-ordinating Committee thought that changes in substance should be made.)

2. At this point the Experts of the Editing Committee left the room, and the Naval Experts, with M. Seydoux entered.

Blockade of  
Russia

M. SEYDOUX read and commented on the report contained in Appendix "A". He further read a telegram, received from Sweden (see Appendix "B").

MR. DULLES called attention to two points of practical interest: first, as prompt action was necessary, because the Russian ports would be closed in about three months by ice, it was undesirable to undertake anything which would require prolonged negotiations with the neutral States; such as getting their consent to the stopping and searching of their ships by the Allied Navies. Moreover, this was not necessary since, if they agreed not to give clearance papers to ships for Russian ports, any vessels found on their way to such ports would either be without clearance papers, or would have falsified them. Secondly, he noticed that, among the measures suggested, was the establishment of censorship over postal and telegraphic communications. As the United States had no agency for carrying out such a censorship, and no such agency could be re-established without the action of Congress: in asking this of the neutral States, the Allied and Associated Powers would be requesting them to do something which one of them would not be prepared to do.

M. SEYDOUX said that he proposed that in the Note which should be sent to the neutral Powers, they should be asked to refuse clearance papers to vessels proceeding to Bolshevik Russia, passports to individuals with the same destination, and banking facilities for operations of trade. They should further be invited to exercise censorship over mails and telegrams to Russia, as far as it was in their power to do so.

MR. POLK said that Admiral Knapp had drawn attention to the desirability of asking neutral countries to exercise censorship only over their own mails and telegrams.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought it important that all action proposed under the resolution should be taken in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. SEYDOUX then asked what measures should be taken with the Germans.

M. PICHON said that, in his opinion, the German Government should be asked to take measures similar to those that neutral countries were to be invited to carry out.

M. TITTONI said that it should be pointed out to the German Government that the measures proposed were in its own interests. It should be invited to carry them out for this reason, despite the fact

that the provisions of the Peace Treaty gave the Allied and Associated Powers no right of dictating.

(It was decided to send a Note to the German Government and to neutral States in the name of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, asking:—

(a) that clearance papers should be refused to vessels intending to proceed to ports in Bolshevik Russia;

(b) that an equivalent embargo should be placed upon goods intended to be transmitted by land to Russian destination;

(c) that passports should be refused to individuals desirous of traveling to or from Bolshevik Russia;

(d) that banks should be prohibited from dealing with the affairs of, or transacting business with Bolshevik Russia;

(e) that as far as possible, acceptance of mails and telegraphic communications destined for, or coming from, Bolshevik Russia should be refused;

and informing them:

(f) That the Allied and Associated Powers had the intention of putting into force, in their own countries, measures similar to those that Neutral Governments were now invited to adopt;

(g) That ships of the Allied Navies, enforcing the intended embargo on the ports of Bolshevik Russia, would act under the authority of the Allied and Associated Governments.)

3. The resolution submitted to the Supreme Council by the British Delegation (see Annex "C") was adopted.

Liechtenstein and  
Vorarlberg

4. M. PICHON circulated a telegram on the situation in Silesia. (See annex "D".)

Silesia  
MR. POLK drew the attention of the Council to a further telegram received from the United States Minister at Warsaw. (See Annex "E".)

GENERAL WEYGAND read a telegram that he had drafted for communication to General Dupont (see Annex "F") and stated that he wished to make certain remarks upon it. In the first place, he desired to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the negotiations, which it was intended that General Dupont should open, would not compel the German Government in any way. General Dupont was only President of the Armistice Commission at Berlin, and could only deal with the German President of the Armistice Commission. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs had begun to bring the German Armistice Commission under his own orders. It was therefore evident, that the German Government would have opportunities for delay in considering General Dupont's proposals, and would be able to gain time by its procrastinations; it might, therefore, carry out severe measures of repression against the Poles in the meantime. He

asked whether a more speedy method of communication to the German Government could not be devised. The telegrams communicated to the Council showed that they were faced with an insurrection in Silesia. They were, therefore, called upon, not to maintain order in that country but to restore it. The Military Representative of the Supreme War Council at Versailles had decided, previously, that one division would be sufficient for maintaining order in Silesia; but this decision had been on the supposition that the country in question would be in a state of tranquillity. One division would certainly not suffice to maintain order in a populous district of 360,000 inhabitants, in a state of insurrection. The original figure must therefore be revised, and he reminded the Council that one inter-allied division had been raised with difficulty. Allied troops in Silesia must obviously be supported by some Government, and the only Government which would give them the support required, was the Government at Berlin. In order to avoid placing the troops under the orders of the German Government, he had proposed to send the Allied High Commission to Upper Silesia, in anticipation of the actual provisions of the Peace Treaty. The difficulties of maintaining troops in such a country were very great. He proposed, by way of lessening them, to ask the German Government to anticipate the provisions of the Treaty, only with regard to the disturbed parts of Upper Silesia. The Area in question was not great, and consisted only of one-third of the entire plebiscite district.

MR. BALFOUR said that whilst Great Britain had no diplomatic representative at Berlin, he did not know that this was the case of the other Allied Powers.

M. TITTONI answered that the Italians were represented in Berlin by a Civil Commissioner who would not, however, have any diplomatic attributions until the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he proposed that the Germans should be dealt with through their Delegation at Versailles. He had negotiated with the German representatives and had found them fairly reasonable, more particularly Von Lersner.

M. PICHON said that it would be necessary to hand a written note to the German representatives.

M. BERTHELOT said that it was, on the whole, better to negotiate by means of written communications in such cases. Notes were clearer and more concise than conversations. He pointed out, however, that Von Lersner could only be used as a medium of transmission.

M. PICHON then said that he thought it might, after all be better to deal with the Germans through General Dupont.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that General Dupont could exercise no coercion upon the German Government, and negotiations through him would be lengthy. He gave as an example, the length of time necessary to obtain Von der Goltz' recall.



M. PICHON remarked that if it were true that the German Government had promoted the strikes in Upper Silesia, they would obviously show no energy in re-establishing order there.

MR. BALFOUR said that General Weygand had not referred to a suggestion of the previous day, which was that Germany should be threatened with the loss of the coal from Silesian coal fields. If the Government at Berlin could be shown to have stirred up strife, the Allied Governments would be justified in exerting all their efforts to prevent the export of coal to Germany until the requirements of other Allies had been satisfied. Such a measure would be equitable, and possibly effective.

M. TITTONI said that the information submitted to the Council at its present meeting, and on the previous day, had differed in one point. The Council had first been informed that the German Government had incited revolution in Silesia. They were now told that it had provoked insurrections against itself. The Allies should be careful not to allow the German Government the right of conducting repressive measures in the name of the Council.

MR. BALFOUR agreed with M. Tittoni.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Polish Delegation had drawn attention to the same point.

MR. BALFOUR proposed that the Reparation Commission which was now in direct touch with the German Delegation at Versailles, had opened negotiations with the Government at Berlin. He asked whether it would not be possible to employ Mr. Hoover. He enjoyed a special position, which gave him the right to go anywhere in Central Europe. Mr. Hoover, though not an accredited diplomatic officer of any of the Allied and Associated Governments or of the American Delegation, was certainly capable of acting in the name of the Council. Would it not be possible to ask him to go and interview the Government at Berlin and to advise the Council on the result of his conversation.

MR. POLK remarked that Mr. Hoover was now on his way back from Warsaw, and could not be stopped.

M. PICHON suggested that M. Loucheur should be asked to attend the meeting of the Council on the following day.

MR. POLK said that, in consequence of the strike in Upper Silesia, all train services in Austria were to be stopped. The train from Vienna had been held up on the night before.

M. BERTHELOT remarked that information from Polish sources was often exaggerated, and suggested that a delay of 24 hours would not spoil the decision of the Council.

M. PICHON suggested that Paragraph (c) of General Weygand's draft telegram should be omitted. He further suggested that General Dupont should be asked to give the Council an accurate report

of the situation of affairs in Germany, and that he should suggest what measures he thought the Council might suitably take.

M. TITTONI suggested that General Dupont should give what information he could as to the action that the German Government proposed to take.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that General Dupont might be informed, purely for his own information, that the Allied and Associated Governments were considering the possibility of anticipating certain provisions in the Peace Treaty with Germany.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it would be wise to inform General Dupont of all the measures that the Council has proposed to take, and to draw his attention to the dangers that it foresaw from allowing German intervention.

M. PICHON said that he thought it would be wise to do so; providing that information of this sort was purely for General Dupont's personal guidance.

M. TITTONI asked whether General Dupont could be asked to consult with the local strike leaders in the affected districts in Silesia, and whether he could get information from them as to the possibility of a resumption of regular work.

MR. BALFOUR asked Mr. Polk to communicate with Mr. Hoover.

(It was decided:—

(a) that General Weygand should re-draft a telegram to General Dupont, incorporating the wishes of the Council, as expressed in the previous discussion;

(b) that M. Loucheur and Mr. Hoover should attend at the Council after their return.

The Meeting then adjourned.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 19 August, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A [to HD-33]

No. 265.—Commercial W  
M-460

#### *Note Regarding the Measures To Be Taken To Prevent Goods Reaching Bolshevik Russia*

[1.] A meeting of allied naval representatives was held on August 12th to consider the problem of carrying out joint measures which should be equivalent to a blockade of Russian Bolshevik ports. The memorandum, of which copy is enclosed herein, was agreed upon and was submitted this morning to a joint meeting of the allied naval representatives and the Eastern Blockade Committee.

2. The Eastern Blockade Committee approved at this meeting the proposals drawn up by the Naval experts, and agreed upon the following resolutions for submission to the Council of Five:—

(1) The Committee consider it necessary that it should be decided in the first place precisely what measures each of the allied and associated Governments can themselves take to prevent their nationals from resuming commercial relations with Bolshevik Russia through ports in the Baltic, North Sea, or the Black Sea.

(2) These measures should consist, in so far as possible, in (a) the enforcement as regards goods destined for Bolshevik Russia of an embargo (or some equivalent measure) on exports and at frontier stations; (b) instructions to the postal authorities not to transmit wireless or other telegrams to or from Bolshevik Russia; (c) instructions to the postal authorities to refuse to transmit postal correspondence to or from Bolshevik Russia; (d) refusal of passports; (e) imposition on banks of a prohibition against transactions with Bolshevik Russia.

(3) The neutral Governments should be requested to take, in conformity with the measures taken by the Associated Governments, steps similar to those indicated above; and similar measures should also be taken by the German Government.

(4) The measures set out above should be indicated in a joint note to be presented to the neutral Governments by the allied and associated Governments, on the lines proposed by President Wilson.

(5) As soon as an arrangement in the above sense has been concluded with the neutral Governments, instructions should be sent to the naval forces of the allied and associated Governments in the sense indicated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the memorandum drawn up by the naval advisers.

BRITISH DELEGATION, PARIS, 13 August, 1919.

[Enclosure]

*Minutes of a Meeting of Allied Naval Representatives Held at the Ministry of Marine at 2:30 p. m., 12 August, 1919, To Consider the Problem of Carrying out, Conjointly, Measures Which Should Be Equivalent to a Blockade of Russian Baltic Ports*

1. The naval advisers have not been informed that a state of war exists between the allied and associated Powers and Bolshevik Russia.

2. Short of a blockade, a belligerent measure, the naval advisers do not know any legal measure that the ships of the allied and associated Powers can exert to prevent trade with Russia, unless

3. An understanding be arrived at between the allied and associated Powers on the one hand and neutrals on the other, whereby a general embargo is proclaimed in respect of Bolshevik Russian ports, and the ships of the allied and associated Powers be authorized to enforce it. If such a measure is taken, ships and their cargoes will not be



captured, but they will be informed that they cannot enter a Russian port and that they will have no claim for any damages resulting from such action.

4. If the men-of-war of the allied and associated Powers are required to carry out the measures set forth in paragraph 3 above, it is necessary that their rôle should be defined by the allied and associated Governments. The said Governments will also have to emphasize that a ship of an allied or associated Power is representing the allied and associated Powers as a whole.

---

Annex B to HD-33

[*Note From M. Seydoux on a Telegram From the French Naval Attaché at Stockholm*]

[Translation<sup>3</sup>]

I am in receipt of the following telegram from the naval attaché at Stockholm, under date of August 15, received at Paris on August 17 at 9 p.m.

"Swedish steamship *Aeon* which is finishing loading in the harbor will leave immediately Petrograd with goods. Affair is managed by Banks Ashberg Rosch Hort.

"Goods will be paid for in gold and in pelts. Swedish captain declares that to elude vigilance of the patrol boats which cruise before Cronstadt is child's play."

I think I ought to draw your attention to this telegram which might with advantage be brought to the knowledge of the Supreme Council of the Allies at the moment when the Council is about to be called to discuss the report made by the Blockade Council on August 13.

---

Appendix C [to HD-33]

M-471

*Resolution for Submission to the Supreme Council*

That the Central Committee on territorial questions in Europe be instructed to consider the question of Liechtenstein and of Vorarlberg, and the desirability of acceding to the requests which have been made that Vorarlberg should be permitted to join the Swiss

---

<sup>3</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Federation, and that the Committee be also instructed to consider the question whether it is desirable to insert in the Treaty with Austria a clause to the effect that the international status of Austria and the frontiers as defined in the Treaty shall not be altered without the consent, whether of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers or of the League of Nations.

BRITISH DELEGATION, August 19, 1919.

---

Appendix D to HD-33

[Translation <sup>4</sup>]

*Telegram From General Henrys*

WARSAW, August 19, 1919—1:45

The strike movement in Upper Silesia has degenerated into armed insurrection. It has its origin not in the economic situation but in the political situation: discontent of the population, continual vexations and provocations by the German authorities, weariness in awaiting the long-promised intervention by the Entente.

The insurgent workingmen have seized Kattsurtz [*Kattowitz?*], Pless, Bujakow, Jedlin, Cichow [*Chechlau?*], and have disarmed the German troops of the Grenzschutz. Movements by rail have been halted; the situation is grave.

The Polish Government, which has reiterated its orders that none of its troops should cross the frontier, insists upon the dispatch of Entente troops to Silesia.

Since this dispatch of troops may involve some delay, I propose that, in order to check the spread of disturbances and to avoid intervention by German troops which would aggravate the situation, the following temporary dispositions be made: to draw from the Haller Army a detachment of occupation, having at its head a French general and composed of units commanded by French officers. The Polish Government is favorable to this solution.

If it should be adopted, there would be grounds for requesting the German Government to abstain from any further aggression and to give orders that those of its officials who remain in the country bow to the authority of the French officers.

---

<sup>4</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

## Appendix E to HD-33

[*The Minister in Poland (Gibson) to the Commission To Negotiate Peace*]

Misc. 1797

WARSAW.

Rec'd. Aug. 18, 1919—5 p. m.

Ammission, Paris.

For Polk.

Minister Foreign Affairs states two small German detachments attacked Polish lines southeastern part Upper Silesia early this morning. They were thrown back, but the fact that local population rose against them and took over two villages on German side arouses anxiety lest revolt spread and affect Karwin coal region. Not certain therefore that Paris train will be able to leave tonight, will furnish further details later. This is not an unexpected crisis. The situation has been logically developing for a long period during which Paris has been urged to lay down the law definitely to the Germans that they must abide by terms of treaty, or be punished. The population has been dangerously exhorted for some time. The Polish Government has throughout recognized the danger from a Polish point of view of disorders and has sought by any means it could command, or that we could suggest, to keep the population quiet. While any action at this time comes very late, I feel that we ought to neglect no possible remedy. It seems to Barber and me that Goodyear and Logan, or some other officer chosen by you should leave at once for Kattowitz, and full powers be arranged from Paris to deal with emergency as seems best.

GIBSON

*American Minister*


---

 Annex F to HD-33
[Translation <sup>5</sup>]

Code telegram

SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

Draft

GENERAL STAFF, 3RD SECTION.

From Marshal Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies,  
 To General Nudant, President C. I. P. A., Cologne  
 To General Dupont, Chief of the French Military Mission, Berlin.

The Supreme Council of the Allies has been informed that the strike movement, reported in Upper Silesia, has degenerated into armed insurrection, that the insurgents have seized Kattowitz, Pless,

---

<sup>5</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



Bujakow, Jedlin, Cichow [*Chechlau?*] after disarming the German troops of the Grenzschutz; that work in the mines has entirely stopped, as well as movements by railway. This insurrection seems to have been fomented by the Germans, who on their side, arrest and shoot Poles whom they accuse of favoring a Spartacist movement. The whole of Central Europe depends on this region for coal, and it is necessary that order be restored there and that work in the mines be resumed, under penalty of the most serious complications in all regions dependent on it.

The Polish Government, as also the Allied representatives in Poland, see no other course but immediately to occupy the disturbed areas with Allied troops.

But no clause of the armistice justifies this immediate occupation which only the coming into force of the treaty of peace would authorize in a regular manner.

I request that you enter immediately into relations with the German Government in order to let them know:—

a) That these outbreaks, which are about to deprive all the neighboring states of coal, have consequences which go far beyond the region in which they have occurred, and that the Allied Supreme Council cannot disinterest itself in the present coal problem in Europe;

b) That, moreover, the Supreme Council has the right to require that order be maintained in a region which, in consequence of the carrying out of the treaty of peace with Germany, must soon be subjected to a plebiscite;

c) That the Supreme Council, while not calling in question the intentions of the German Government, is justified in believing that if work has not been resumed and order has not been restored, it is because the German Government does not employ sufficient means to that end;

d) That in these circumstances it contemplates the possibility that it may, in agreement with the German Government, anticipate the treaty in the letter and carry it out immediately in the spirit by putting into effect at once the provisions of paragraph 2 of the annex attached to article 88 of the treaty of peace, provisions which are as follows:

The plebiscite area shall be immediately placed under the authority of an international commission of four members to be designated by the United States, France, the British Empire, and Italy. It shall be occupied by troops belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers, and the German Government undertakes to give facilities for the transference of these troops to Upper Silesia.

The international commission referred to above shall enjoy all the powers defined in paragraph 3 of the said annex.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, August 20, 1919, at 3 : 30 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. F. L. Polk.	The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	M. Pichon.
<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretaries</i>	<i>Secretaries</i>
Mr. L. Harrison.	Mr. H. Norman. Sir George Clerk.	M. Berthelot. M. de St. Quentin.
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Tittoni.	M. Matsui.
	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>
	M. Paterno.	M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Captain Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Captain E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lt. Colonel Jones.

Interpreter—M. Demolon

Attachment of  
Turkish Officer to  
Commission of  
Enquiry at  
Smyrna

1. MR. BALFOUR said that he had received a telegram from the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, asking whether, in view of the appointment of a Greek Colonel as a consultative member of the Commission of Enquiry at Smyrna, an Ottoman Colonel might be admitted on the same footing. Mr. Balfour asked whether he was authorised by the Council to reply in the affirmative.

(It was agreed that in view of the resolution taken on August 14th (H. D. 31, Minute 3<sup>1</sup>) Mr. Balfour should reply that similar facilities to those afforded to the Greek representative should be granted to the Turkish representative on the Commission of Enquiry at Smyrna.)

Situation in the  
Baltic States

2. MR. BALFOUR said that the position in the Baltic States was very surprising. He had prepared a summary of the reports received from Reval. He thought it might be of interest to the Council to have this report read.

<sup>1</sup> Ante, p. 687.

The following Report was then read:—

“On August 14th after negotiations in which the French, British and American representatives appear to have taken a prominent part, a North-Western Government for the provinces of Pskoff, Novgorod, and Petrograd was formed. The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs is Lianosov and General Yudenitch is Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief. General Rodzianko as acting Commander of the North-Western Army accepted this Government.

The Government proclaimed its intention of convoking a Congress of Representatives of the people in order to base itself on democratic principles. It was decided to establish the Headquarters of the Government at Reval, the reason being that the majority of its members feared that if they went to Pskoff their lives would be in danger from Balahovich, the former Commander of the Russian North-Western Corps, who might attempt a *coup d'état*.

The Government, which proclaimed itself as ‘a group acting as an independent government in the North-Western provinces as part of a united Russia’ proceeded to make a declaration of which the following were the principal points

(a) that they assumed complete responsibility for deciding all provincial questions;

(b) that they requested financial assistance as well as stores and equipment from the Allied and Associated Governments;

(c) that they requested the immediate help of the Esthonian Government with armed forces to liberate Petrograd as well as the rest of the Petrograd, Pskoff and Novgorod Governments from the Bolsheviks;

(d) that they requested the French, British and American representatives to obtain from their Governments the recognition of complete Esthonian independence;

(e) that they proposed to open negotiations with the Esthonian Government at once in order to obtain an outlet to the sea through Esthonian ports and to regulate commercial relations between the two countries;

(f) that they were informing the Supreme Russian Government of Koltchak of the decisions taken by them and were confident that he would appreciate the necessities of the situation.

As soon as this declaration was issued, the French, British and American representatives at Reval together presented to the Esthonian Government a note from General Gough urging co-operation with the Russian North-Western Government and stating that the Esthonian claim to complete independence would be represented to the Allied and Associated Governments.

The Esthonian Government have returned a formal reply, to the effect that they are unable to co-operate with the Russians as requested until the Allies recognise full Esthonian independence.

General Gough reports that unless this is given at once the collapse of the Russian Army may be expected and it will be impossible to control the situation. He also considers that the new Government should receive immediate support.”



M. BERTHELOT said that the French Government had received similar information. The Esthonian Government did not merely require recognition as an independent Government, but also material assistance in arms and money—the financial aid amounting to 600 millions of francs.

M. TITTONI said that he had read in a newspaper that General Balahovich together with the Bolshevik force which he commanded, had gone over to the Esthonians and had proceeded to Pskoff. This appeared to corroborate the information received by Mr. Balfour.

M. BERTHELOT said that this General had always played an ambiguous part. He could not be seriously trusted by any side.

MR. POLK asked from what source Mr. Balfour had received his news.

MR. BALFOUR said he had received his information on the previous day, after the meeting.

M. PICHON said that he had also received similar news on the previous evening.

MR. BALFOUR said that the most noticeable feature of the news was that the French, British and American representatives seemed for the last week to have been engaged in fostering a *coup d'état* without consulting with their own Governments.

MR. POLK said that there was no American representative in the Baltic authorised to act on behalf of the American Government. There was an American General associated with General Gough, and also an officer employed on relief work. The General had lately been telegraphed to, that he must take no part in local politics. The Allied Missions in the Baltic were composed of representatives who acted independently. They were not subject to the orders of General Gough.

M. PICHON said that he thought the conference had placed General Gough in command of the Allied representatives.

MR. POLK observed that although General Gough was the senior officer, he was not in command.

M. TITTONI said that the Allied representatives might have argued that as the Conference had recognised Admiral Koltchak in order that he might fight the Bolsheviks, they were justified in recognising any other Russian organization with a similar purpose.

M. PICHON suggested that Mr. Balfour should ask General Gough to send supplementary information.

MR. BALFOUR observed that General Gough had discreetly gone on leave. The really practical difficulty was that the Esthonians were, in a manner, putting a pistol at the Head of the Council. If they came to terms with the Bolsheviks, there was no further hope of fighting Bolshevism in that area. They were threatening to do so. In other words, they were attempting methods of blackmail in order to be

recognised and assisted with money and arms. General Gough informed the Council that failing recognition of the Esthonian Government, disaster would inevitably overtake the North-Western Russian Armies.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that the Esthonians had been employing the same tactics for the last six months.

M. BALFOUR said that he thought the Council could do very little. He would enquire, however, what the British Government proposed to do regarding General Gough.

M. TITTONI said that Admiral Koltchak might be asked whether he would recognise the independence of Esthonia. He had already been asked to recognise its autonomy. With this the Esthonians were not satisfied.

M. BERTHELOT said that Admiral Koltchak would never recognise the independence of Esthonia. Admiral Koltchak had, hitherto, refused to recognise the independence of Finland. In any case, the Baltic provinces were necessary to Russia as an outlet to the sea.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the second item on the Agenda, namely, 'Allied Policy in the Baltic States,' was connected with the topic under discussion. He had prepared on this subject a proposal which he begged to submit to the Council:—

"The Baltic Commission are requested to submit to the Council a declaration of Allied and Associated policy with regard to the international position of the Baltic States, in the place of the draft declaration considered, but not accepted, by the Council on July 26th.<sup>2</sup>

This declaration should be framed in strict accordance with the relevant portion of the letter addressed by the Conference to Admiral Koltchak on May 27,<sup>3</sup> which, unless and until other arrangements are made, must be regarded as the governing document in all their transactions. The declaration should therefore provide in the first place that, unless an agreement is speedily reached between these States and Russia, a settlement will be made by the Allied and Associated Powers, in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations; and, in the second place that pending such settlement these States shall be recognised as autonomous, and fully competent to enter into relations with the Allied and Associated Governments."

M. BERTHELOT observed that every time the autonomy of the Baltic States was mentioned, these States were exasperated, as they continually asked for independence. He thought it was desirable to try and find a slightly different formula.

MR. BALFOUR said that the expressions used had been borrowed almost textually from the letter addressed by the Conference to Admiral Koltchak.

---

<sup>2</sup> HD-15, minute 8, p. 324.

<sup>3</sup> Appendix I to CF-37, vol. VI, p. 73.

MR. POLK said he understood the draft to be an instruction to the Baltic Commission.

MR. BALFOUR said that this was so. The Baltic Commission was inclined to recognise the independence of the Baltic States. It did not keep in mind the larger policy of the Conference. He thought this draft would remind them of the wider aspect of the question.

MR. POLK said that provided the Baltic Commission was being asked merely to submit a resolution for discussion by the Council, he would agree.

MR. BALFOUR said this was all that was proposed.

(The draft instruction above quoted was then adopted.)

3. GENERAL WEYGAND explained the Report on the evacuation of Latvia by the Germans, prepared by Marshal Foch. (Appendix A.)

He observed that the note was prepared exclusively from a military point of view. As regards General von der Goltz, the German Government had replied that they could not admit the right of the Conference to demand the recall of the General. Nevertheless there was news that he was at Mittau, on his way to Berlin. It was not yet clear whether he had been recalled or whether he was on his way to consult the German Government. As to the evacuation of the German troops by sea, he thought the German allegations were wrong. The operation was really possible and could only be settled locally by General Gough. As to evacuation by land, the German reasons were equally bad. The British, as far as he knew, had never promised to furnish engines. This question also could be settled locally. As to removal of material by the Germans, the Allied and Associated Powers had authority under the Armistice to forbid it. The conclusion was that of the five things asked for, only one, namely, the stoppage of reinforcements, had been agreed to by the German Government, although the Poles said that the agreement was not being fulfilled. As to the recall of General von der Goltz, the situation was not clear. As regards the remaining three, the Allies had a right to enforce their demands and General Gough was in a position to obtain satisfaction.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Allies had any right to make one particular German evacuate Latvia before any other.

GENERAL WEYGAND admitted that the Allies had no right to make a special case. However, General von der Goltz was undoubtedly the source of all the trouble, and he was every now and then disavowed by the German Government. In any case, the interpretation of his movements was not clear, and the matter remained in suspense.

M. PICHON said that according to the French representative at Helsingfors, General von der Goltz had certainly gone to Berlin.

(The conclusions of Marshal Foch's Note, (Appendix A) were adopted and it was decided that General Gough should be asked by

Evacuation of  
Latvia by the  
Germans



Marshal Foch to obtain the execution of the demands contained therein, with the exception of the recall of General von der Goltz, pending further information regarding that officer.)

4. M. PICHON said that he had obtained confirmation of the news communicated on the previous day regarding Silesia. He caused to be read a report of a speech by Chancellor Bauer before the German National Assembly. (See Appendix B.) In addition to the German version, he had received from M. Zamoiski<sup>4</sup> the Polish version. (See Appendix C.) M. Zamoiski was of the opinion that unless the Allies intervened with troops, the situation would go from bad to worse. M. Pichon had told him that intervention in German territory was a very serious step, and that the Council had asked for further information. He had also told him that the Germans were to be informed that unless they could control the situation it might be necessary to intervene.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had received a telegram from Sir Percy Wyndham,<sup>5</sup> of which the following was the most significant passage:—

“Polish Foreign Office informed me this morning position considered very serious, and Government is afraid German regular army will invade Poland, and time has come when it will be impossible to resist the popular demand for intervention by Polish troops. Immediate outbreaks expected in Warsaw if this is not done. Deputation from Upper Silesia has arrived at Warsaw to bring pressure on Polish Government to above effect. Matters appear to be serious, and situation would be eased if Polish Government could be informed that the Allied Powers are bringing pressure to bear on German authorities.”

He proposed, subject to the approval of the Council, to send the following reply:—

“Evidently Germans have both the right and the duty of maintaining order in Upper Silesia until Treaty is ratified. In these circumstances the Poles would be breaking the Treaty if they send troops into the disturbed area except on German invitation.

We shall endeavour without delay to send Allied representatives to the disturbed area, who will report to the Council, and may be able to act as a moderating influence on the spot.

If we can by negotiation hasten the date at which the Inter-Allied Commission take charge of the plebiscite area, we will do so.

The interest both of Poland and of all Central Europe urgently requires that work should at once be resumed in the mines; that order should be maintained; and that the Polish population should be patient during the very few weeks which still separate them from the date of the German evacuation.

You should inform your Allied colleagues of this telegram, which has been sent after discussion at Supreme Council.”

<sup>4</sup> Count Maurzey Zamoiski, Polish Minister at Paris.

<sup>5</sup> British Commissioner at Warsaw.

This reply contained two practical proposals. The first to send representatives to Upper Silesia. Representatives of the Coal Commission were already being sent. It might be possible to attach a civilian mission not specifically concerned with coal. The second was that the Conference would attempt to negotiate with Germany, in order to hasten the date at which the Allied Commissioners should take charge of the plebiscite zone. In this connection it might be remembered that the German Government had forwarded a demand from the inhabitants of Danzig that the date of the separation of the town from the German State should be hastened. If the Germans favoured this in Danzig, they might be willing to show a similar spirit in regard to Upper Silesia. (The German note referred to was Note No. 5 of the 16th August. W. C. P. 1246.)

M. PICHON said that he sympathised with the proposals suggested by Mr. Balfour, but he must point out that it would be meeting the desires of the Poles. It would appear that the Polish workmen had brought about the strikes in Upper Silesia, with the purpose of rendering Allied intervention necessary.

MR. POLK said that he had learnt from Mr. Hoover that he was conducting negotiations with the German Government regarding the coal supply. It might be possible to take advantage of this to ask Mr. Hoover to bring the situation of the Silesian coalfields to the notice of the German Government.

(It was agreed that the Coal Commission might urge the German Government to agree to an early holding of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia as a means of improving the coal supply for the coming winter.

It was further agreed that Mr. Balfour should send the telegram to Sir Percy Wyndham above quoted. The telegram drafted by General Weygand and sent to General Dupont in accordance with the decision of the previous day (H. D. 33, Minute 4<sup>7</sup>), was approved. (See Appendix D.)

5. GENERAL BELIN explained the revised Naval, Military and Air Clauses prepared by the Military Representatives at Versailles. (See Appendix E.) He stated that the only matter on which there was no definite conclusion was the number of men Hungary was to be allowed to keep under arms. The Military Representatives had attempted to act in accordance with the instructions of the Council, given on the 8th August, 1919. (See H. D. 27, Min. 10.<sup>8</sup>) Various figures had been suggested, the two extreme figures being 45,000 and 18,000 men. The Military Representatives had suggested 35,000 as a

Military, Naval  
and Air Clauses  
for Insertion in  
the Treaty of  
Peace With Hun-  
gary

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 721.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, p. 633.

compromise, and this was the only matter in which the clauses now proposed differed from the clauses inserted in the Treaty with Austria.

M. PICHON said that on the matter of the number of men to be kept under arms in Hungary, he must reserve his decision pending the return of M. Clemenceau. With this exception he was prepared to accept the clauses drafted by the Military Representatives.

(Subject to the French reservation regarding the number of men to be maintained under arms in Hungary, the Articles proposed by the Military Representatives at Versailles, (see Appendix E) were accepted.)

6. The Council had before them draft replies to the German Delegation, prepared by the Committee for the Organization of the Reparations Commission, regarding:—

Replies to the  
German Delegation

(a) Calculation of damages in the territories devastated by the war.

(b) Restitution of topographical plans of the mines of Costeplatz.

(The proposed replies, (see Appendices F. and G.) were accepted.)

7. M. PICHON said that on the previous day he and Mr. Polk had had a conversation regarding the demand of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation to be heard on the subject of the reparations due from Bulgaria. They had both agreed that it was desirable to accede to their request. (See Appendix H.)

Demand of Serbo-Croat Slovene Delegation To Be Heard on the Subject of the Financial & Reparations Clauses in the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria

M. TITTONI said that he sympathised with the request, but he thought the objection was that it created a precedent. There was no doubt that interested parties should always be heard before a decision affecting them was taken. But in this case the matter had been fully discussed and all the Serbian arguments had been heard. It was needless to have these arguments repeated, and unless the Serbians had anything new to allege, it was an undesirable precedent, tending to call into question decisions of the Council already made.

MR. POLK said that the Serbian delegates thought that they would be discredited at home, if they failed to obtain a hearing from the so-called Supreme Council. He quite agreed that it was undesirable to hear a restatement of old arguments, but he did not wish the delegates to return to their country with a sense of humiliation. He thought that they might be required, in accordance with Mr. Tittoni's proposal, to confine themselves in their arguments to any errors or omissions there might be in the Treaty.

M. PICHON said that he supported Mr. Polk's views. Apart from the desire to show courtesy to the Serbians, he thought it was advisable to avoid incidents similar to those which had taken place



previously. Before the Treaty was communicated to the Bulgarians it would be necessary to communicate it to a plenary session of the Conference. On a previous occasion M. Bratiano had caused a disagreeable incident at a Plenary Session.<sup>9</sup> By pacifying the Serbian Delegation before hand, it might be possible to avoid a repetition of a similar incident.

MR. BALFOUR said that he found himself in a difficulty. He understood Mr. Polk's views and sympathised with them, but he did not know what had taken place in the previous stages of the discussion regarding reparation due to Serbia. He believed that the Serbians would demand the restitution of a larger number of cattle, cows, pigs, etc., than was allowed to them. But all nations had similar claims to make, and they could rarely be satisfied. If the Serbians were to be heard, the Roumanians would demand a hearing. The Roumanian case against Hungary at the present time, was based on a claim for restitution of what had been stolen from Roumania. The Allies, however, were saying to the Roumanians that they could not recoup their losses, and that they must take their share with the rest of the Allies. The Portuguese too had a sense of grievance and would, if they heard of this, repeat their demand for representation on the Reparations Commission. It would take up a good deal of the time of the Conference to hear a restatement of the claims of all the aggrieved nations. If the Serbians could be confined to a statement of the points on which in their opinion the Commissions had gone wrong he would be content, but he was afraid that it would be difficult to restrict them sufficiently.

MR. TITTONI said that a compromise appeared possible. M. Pichon on behalf of the Conference might be deputed to listen to all the Serbians might have to say.

M. PICHON said that he thanked Mr. Tittoni, but felt that the Serbians would not be satisfied. He had already heard them and knew what they had to say. He did not think that anything they could bring forward would alter the decision greatly in their favour. If they were refused a hearing, however, he thought that a curt answer should not be sent them, but that a reply should be made giving in full the reasons for the point of view adopted by the Conference. In substance the Serbian complaint fell under two headings. (a) Insufficient restitution of cattle; (b) Exclusion from membership of the Reparations Commission in Bulgaria.

M. BERTHELOT said that Serbia was an agricultural country and could not revive without regaining her cattle. France and Italy had been partially invaded, and partially despoiled of cattle; Serbia had been entirely overrun and entirely despoiled.

(At this point Col. Peel entered the room.)

---

<sup>9</sup> Plenary Session of May 31, 1919, vol. III, p. 394.

MR. BALFOUR explained the above discussion to Col. Peel.

COL. PEEL said that if the Serbians were allowed to present their case, the Greeks and Roumanians would ask to do likewise. A similar situation would arise with regard to Hungary. He quite agreed that the Serbians had suffered extreme hardship, but it was not the Serbians who were presenting this claim, but the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State. Two-thirds of this new state had been our enemies in the war, and probably contained quantities of cattle, some of them looted from the Allied countries. What the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation wanted was far more than could possibly be granted. They wanted the Treaty with Bulgaria to be on the lines of the Treaty with Germany. He could see no objection, however, to the hearing of the Delegation if they had anything new to say, which they had not previously urged.

(It was agreed that M. Pichon should reply to the request of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation to the effect that their request could not be accepted for the various reasons given in the above discussion. If, however, the Delegation had any new facts or arguments to bring forward, the Council would be pleased to receive them, and then to decide whether or not a hearing was desirable.)

8. MR. POLK said that he had received the following telegram:—

**Situation in Hungary** “In the Sessions of August 18, the Commission heard Admiral Horthy, Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Forces. He gave information as to the resources on which he counts in organising these forces. They seemed to consist chiefly of officers. He thinks that the Roumanians are influenced by the Bolsheviks. He thinks that the workmen have still many concealed arms. He calls attention to the considerable requisitions effected by the Roumanians. The Commission summons for the 19th the General commanding the Roumanian forces or his representative. He will indicate the measures that he has taken, with a view to respecting the indications of the verbal note of August 16. He will make it known whether these measures are being carried out, especially concerning requisitions.

Interallied Military Commission.”

In this connection he had a proposal to make, which he would not ask the Council to accept at once, but which he would ask his colleagues to consider (see Appendix I).

9. MR. POLK said that the American officer in touch with the Austrian Delegation informed him that the Delegation when it received the final answer of the Conference, proposed to take the terms back to Vienna to submit them to the Austrian Assembly. It was further said that in all probability should no alterations be made in the territorial frontiers laid down for Austria, and especially should a plebiscite in Styria be denied, Dr. Renner would not be authorised

**Intentions of Austrian Delegation**

by the Assembly to sign the peace. He would be forced to resign and a change of Government would result.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 20 August, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-34

##### Translation

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES  
GENERAL STAFF, 3RD SECTION  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

August 18, 1919.

From: The Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

To: President Clemenceau.

Subject: The evacuation of Latvia by the Germans.

In its telegram of June 18 (Document No 1) <sup>10</sup> the Supreme Council requested the German Government to begin as soon as possible the evacuation of all territories which had before the war formed part of the former Russian Empire, according to the stipulations of Article XII of the Armistice of November 11, 1918.

Later, General Gough was charged in the name of the Entente with arranging with the regional German authorities the conditions of this evacuation and with insuring the control of it.

On July 21 this general reported <sup>11</sup> the impossibility of arriving at an understanding with General von der Goltz, whose policy of intrigue and evasion tended only to retarding to the maximum the execution of the measures of evacuation, and to finishing the seizure of Latvia by the Germans.

To remedy this situation, General Gough proposed:

- a) the immediate recall of General von der Goltz,
- b) the carrying out of the evacuation by sea,
- c) the completion of the transportation by August 30,
- d) to forbid the Germans to move any war material in Latvia without previous authorization.
- e) the cessation of all German reinforcements sent into Latvia.

These propositions, accepted by the Supreme Council, were sent to the German Government for execution on August 1 (Document No. 2).

The German Government has replied to this notification in a Note dated August 13 (Document No. 3), in which it discusses and finally rejects, almost in their totality, the decisions of the Supreme Council.

---

<sup>10</sup> The numbered documents referred to throughout this report do not accompany the appendix.

<sup>11</sup> Appendix C to HD-19, enclosure 5, p. 431.



The point of view of the German Government, as well as the remarks it calls for, are set forth herewith:

a) *Recall of General von der Goltz.*

The German Government represents this recall as "an attempt on the power of command of the German military authorities."

It is, in fact, a measure of a special character, and which, as the German Government remarks, can not be exacted by invoking Article XII of the Armistice of November 11.

But this measure is necessary.

General von der Goltz is the soul of the resistance to the decisions of the Entente. It was he that organized the *coup d'état* against the Ulmannis Government, faithful to the cause of the Allies.

Beaten on this ground, he tried to reestablish the situation. All his efforts tend to maintain himself in the country at least till after harvest, in order to send it into Germany, then to install himself definitively in Curland\*.

To this end:

He continues to bring in reinforcements (40,000 men in Curland)†, in spite of the prohibition against sending new contingents into Latvia;

In spite of the orders of his Government, he is incorporating his elements in the Russian Bermont corps, after having acted in the same way in regard to the detachment of Prince Lieven. He even announces that he will favor the passage of entire German formations into the Russian troops at the moment that the evacuation is finished;

He is granting leaves of three years to German soldiers who desire to settle in the country;

At the same time, he is organizing Bolshevik propaganda at Riga, in order to create new pretexts for intervention;

Finally, in his relations with General Gough, he incessantly eludes discussion, and insolently refuses to allow any control on the part of the mandatory of the Allied Powers (Document No. 4, bis).

In short, General von der Goltz is pursuing in Latvia and Curland a very clear policy of German expansion, doubtless with the secret approval of his Government.

While appearing to accept the principle of evacuation, he is managing to reinforce his effectives, to get his hands on the Russian local formations and to insinuate himself into the interior affairs of the country, thus consolidating the situation and the prestige of Germany in Latvia.

---

\*Extract from the report of Colonel Duparquet, dated August 13 (Document No. 4). [Footnote in the original.]

†Note of General Malcolm, transmitted by the C. I. P. A. on August 9, under No. 1590 (Document No. 5); Note of General Dupont, No. 4865 (Document No. 6); telegram from Stockholm of August 13 (Document No. 7); Extract from the Polish S. R. (Document No. 8). [Footnote in the original.]

He personifies clearly the German policy of duplicity.

All the Allied Representatives are of the opinion that his immediate recall is necessary, as a measure of prime importance.

This recall had already been laid down in principle, under certain conditions, by the Allied Powers, as early as May 28 (Document No. 9, telegram 2726 of May 28).

None of these conditions having been fulfilled, the Powers renewed their request on August 1.

They obtained only a dilatory reply.

It is necessary, taking for basis the facts that have been set forth above, to exact categorically that the recall of General von der Goltz be ordered without delay.

*b) Evacuation by Sea.*

This method of evacuation has been demanded by General Gough; General von der Goltz declares it to be impossible. This is a question of modality, which demands only a new examination by the Inter-Allied Mission at Riga, and which must be settled on the ground. What is important, in fact, is that the evacuation be assured, as rapidly as possible by all possible means: maritime or land.

On the subject of this question of the evacuation the German Government, revealing the plan that it has formed for colonizing Latvia, recalls the promise made by the Ulmannis cabinet to grant to German volunteers the right to settle in Latvia; it protests against violation of this promise and declines in advance all responsibility for dangers that may result from it.

The Lettish Government has settled this claim in a letter signed by its minister of Foreign Affairs, Herr Meierevites, addressed to the German Chargé d'Affaires in Latvia (Document No. 10).

There is no necessity therefore to consider this last question.

*c) Plan of Evacuation To Be Submitted Before August 15—Time Limit of Evacuation Fixed From August 15 to 30.*

The German Government declares it impossible to present a detailed plan of evacuation, and to complete the repatriation by August 30, since it does not know the number of locomotives to be put at its disposal, which, it says, have been promised by the English.

Now, no promise of this sort has been made, to my knowledge, by the British Government.

Moreover, this absence of locomotives would be one more reason for carrying out the repatriation by sea, as General Gough demands.

However this may be, this situation in no wise prevents the drawing up of a general plan, fixing the order of urgency for the removal of the various elements.

The development of this plan, as well as the time limits for the carrying out of the repatriation, will be determined as a function of the means, maritime or land, at the disposal of the Germans, as soon as an agreement on the subject of these means shall have been reached between General Gough and the German regional command, as indicated in S b<sup>12</sup> above.

Subject to this condition, the decisions of the Entente are then to be maintained on this point.

*d) Prohibition To Move War Material in Latvia Without Authorization—Obligation To Give Information on the Emplacement of Food and Material Stores.*

The German Government protests against this requirement, which it claims is based on no provision of the Armistice of November 11.

Now, on one hand, Article XIV provides:

“the immediate cessation by the German troops of all requisition, seizure, or compulsory measure with a view to procuring resources destined for Germany, in Rumania or Russia within their limits of August 1, 1914”.

On the other hand, numerous sources of information (see especially Document No. 11, letter No. 2725 of May 28) have already revealed that the Germans, in the course of the evacuation, were carrying out of the Baltic countries important resources, notably railway material, and were proceeding to the destruction and removal of electric installations and communications.

If the Germans have the right, in the present circumstances, to carry off their war material, it falls within the competency of General Gough, nevertheless, to verify what they send away, to assure himself that no material and no resource are levied on the evacuated countries.

It is under the heading of this verification that the dispositions mentioned in paragraph *d* must be maintained.‡

*e) Prohibition To Send Any Reinforcements Into Latvia.*

The German Government accepts this provision.

Nevertheless it is true that at last news German troops were still being sent to Mitau (see Documents No. 7 and No. 8).

---

<sup>12</sup> Section b.

‡ We might, moreover, with the same object, invoke these clauses of Article 169 of the Peace Treaty which provide “that within two months after the entrance into force of the present treaty German war material coming from abroad, in whatever state it may be in, shall be surrendered to the Allied Governments, who will determine its destination”.

From this provision there is evidently derived the right, on the part of the mandatory of the Allied Powers to take cognizance of the distribution of this material, in order to be able when the time comes, to claim, if necessary, and to control its delivery to the said powers. This is moreover the thesis sustained by General Gough. [Footnote in the original.]



## CONCLUSIONS

From the preceding it results that the provisions covered by paragraphs *b*, *c*, and *d*, above, must be maintained, subject to supplementary instructions to be given to General Gough with a view to settling, in accord with the German regional command, the question of means of transport in effecting the evacuation, and that of the time limits for the execution of it, which depends directly on the first question.

But the essential conditions of a rapid and complete evacuation is still the immediate recall of General von der Goltz.

Experience proves that this measure cannot be obtained by new injunctions transmitted in the usual form, in the name of an armistice already old, and whose provisions cannot be invoked in this particular case.

The recall of General von der Goltz is before all a measure of a political nature. For this reason it necessitates a direct action of the Allied Governments with the German Government.

I have the honor to request that energetic steps be taken to this effect, without delay, and directly by the Supreme Council with the German representatives at Versailles.

---

Annex B to HD-34

[*Note From the French Representative at Berlin (Haguenin)*]

[Translation <sup>11</sup>]

BERLIN, August 19, 1919—5:50 p. m.

The pan-German newspapers represent the situation in Upper Silesia as very grave. Word comes from Kattowitz in the paper *Der Abend* (August 19) that the districts of Kattowitz and Myslowitz remain in the hands of the Government's troops; aside from that the whole district of Kattowitz is in the possession of the insurgents. Yesterday numerous conflicts took place in the region of Rosdzin, Schoppinitz, Janow, Gieschewald with bands armed with machine guns and well supplied with ammunition; these latter have in places succeeded in dispersing the troops of the Reichswehr. It was necessary to bring up strong reinforcements from Kattowitz and from [Myslowitz?]. This afternoon Chancellor Bauer made the following statement before the National Assembly on the subject of the situation in Upper Silesia:

"In opposition to the efforts of the Governments which were trying to establish neighborly relations between Prussia and Poland, Polish agitators in Upper Silesia have attempted to provoke an armed insur-

---

<sup>11</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

rection. The most alarming news has been spread regarding this matter; I am happy to be able to announce that it is in large measure exaggerated and that the situation is appreciably better than one might have believed at first. The Government has received the following official report. The Commanding General is completely master of the situation in Upper Silesia. The Poles who participated in the movement are defeated or prisoners. Other military measures are being carried out. The only region occupied by the Poles on August 18 was that situated to the northeast of the Bentzen-Kattowitz line. It is the only place where regular Polish troops have passed the frontier. It has been established that the revolt which broke out near Myslowitz is also the work of Polish bands. There are among the Poles nationalist groups who fear that a plebiscite would not turn out to their advantage, and who for that reason wish to create at any cost an accomplished fact. We shall have the duty of opposing such attempts, and of taking such action that Upper Silesia may be able to make its choice freely and impartially. We are pleased to state that the Polish Government is absolutely a stranger to this affair and that the Polish troops have taken no part in it. I believe that this declaration will contribute appreciably toward producing an appeasement in Upper Silesia."

HAGUENIN

---

Annex C to HD-34

[*Statement on the Situation in Silesia by the Polish Minister at Paris  
(Zamoiski)*]

[Translation <sup>14</sup>]

With the object of creating a strong army the Germans are carrying out an energetic mobilization. The Spartacist disorders are intentionally exaggerated to serve as a pretext to the Allies for reinforcing the German Army.

In principle, armies are being made ready which, if an occasion offered, might move against Poland and the Allies while keeping in the background the German Government, whom these armies would ostensibly refuse to obey.

Moreover, in Upper Silesia, according to the express statements of the chief of Section of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government is ready to furnish, for the promotion of action in preparation for the plebiscite in Upper Silesia, a sum of a billion marks. Twenty millions are set aside for the corruption of the Allied officers of the armies of occupation; a special political committee has received from the German Government the sum of 500 million marks to pay out to the voters during the plebiscite.

---

<sup>14</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

The German campaign against the reunion of Upper Silesia with Poland makes use principally of the following points:

- a) Poland must pay off the Russian debt.
- b) Upper Silesia must meet the German debt and also of course the Polish debt.
- c) The Germans would give autonomy to Upper Silesia, Poland would never grant it.
- d) The anti-Semitic organization in Berlin is spreading the idea that in Poland the Jews have the benefit of exceptional laws, and that their influence is greater than that of the Christians.

As regards the state of mind prevailing in the territories subject to the plebiscite, it may be said in general that those Germans who are included among the intellectuals, the employes of private institutions, the landed proprietors, the merchants lean toward the side of Poland.

Finally, it is important to note that troops are being moved from Berlin to the railway stations nearest to Upper Silesia.

---

#### Annex D to HD-34

[Translation <sup>15</sup>]

Code telegram      ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, August 19, 1919.  
 From Marshal Foch, Commander in Chief, Allied Armies  
 To General Dupont, Chief of the French Military Mission in Berlin  
 No. 3972

Following is a telegram addressed to you by Minister for Foreign Affairs:

(1) The Supreme Council of the Allies is informed that the strike movement reported in Upper Silesia, has degenerated into armed insurrection, that the insurgent workingmen have seized Kattowitz, Pless, Bujakow, Jedlin, Cechow [*Chechlaw?*], after having disarmed the German troops of the Grenzschutz; that the work in the mines has completely stopped, as well as movements by rail.

This insurrection seems to imply responsibility on the part of the Germans who are operating against the Poles, arresting and shooting workingmen whom they accuse of supporting a Spartacist movement.

The whole of Central Europe depends upon this region for coal, and it is necessary that order be restored there, and that the work in the mines be resumed, under pain of the most serious complications in all countries dependent on it.

(2) The only means to that end would be the immediate occupation of the disturbed regions by Allied troops, but no clause of the armistice would justify this immediate occupation, which only the coming into force of the treaty of peace would authorize in a regular manner.

---

<sup>15</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



(3) This situation has been considered by the Supreme Council which is of opinion:—

*a)* That the outbreaks in Upper Silesia are going to deprive all the neighboring states of coal, that the Council cannot be indifferent, and that it may be impelled to ask the Polish Government to reduce or even eventually to cut off the shipments of coal intended for delivery to Germany.

*b)* That the maintenance of order in a region which must presently undergo a plebiscite, falls upon Germany, and failing that, in order that it may be directly assured, immediately upon the Allies by anticipation of the treaty.

(4) These advices are given you for your personal information.

(5) The Supreme Council instructs you:—

*a)* To inform it fully on the present situation in Upper Silesia.

*b)* To indicate to it your feeling regarding the practical measures which might be taken without meeting direct opposition from the German Government, perhaps even in accord with it, in order to remedy the situation at once without incurring any danger for the Polish population.

The Supreme Council authorizes you, in making inquiries, to use the information in the present telegram, if you consider it opportune.  
S. Pichon

You are requested to forward reply with utmost despatch.

P. O. /General Staff  
GEORGES

---

#### Appendix E to HD-34

SWC-454 (MR-80)

BRITISH SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, 12. 8. 19.

CONDITIONS OF PEACE (HUNGARY)

*Revised Military, Naval and Air Clauses*

MILITARY, NAVAL AND AIR CLAUSES

In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Hungary undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow.

#### SECTION I—*Military Clauses*

##### CHAPTER I—GENERAL

##### *Article 1*

Within three months of the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Military forces of Hungary shall be demobilised to the extent prescribed hereinafter.

*Article 2*

Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in Hungary. The Hungarian Army shall in future only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment.

## CHAPTER II—EFFECTIVES AND CADRES OF THE HUNGARIAN ARMY

*Article 3*

The total number of military forces in the Hungarian Army shall not exceed 35,000 men, including officers and depot troops.

Subject to the following limitations, the formations composing the Hungarian Army shall be fixed in accordance with the wishes of Hungary:—

(1) The effectives of units must be fixed between the maximum and minimum figures shown in Table IV annexed to this Section.

(2) The proportion of officers, including the personnel of staffs and special services, shall not exceed one twentieth of the total effectives with the colours, and that of non-Commissioned officers shall not exceed one fifteenth of the total effectives with the colours.

(3) The number of machine guns, guns and howitzers shall not exceed per thousand men of the total effectives with the colours those fixed in Table V annexed to this Section.

The Hungarian Army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory of Hungary, and to the control of her frontiers.

*Article 4*

The maximum strength of the Staffs and of all formations which Hungary may be permitted to raise are given in the Tables annexed to this Section; these figures need not be exactly followed, but must not be exceeded.

All other organisations for the command of troops or for preparation for war are forbidden.

*Article 5*

All measures of mobilisation, or appertaining to mobilisation are forbidden.

In no case must formations, administrative services or staffs include supplementary cadres.

The carrying out of any preparatory measures with a view to requisitioning animals or other means of military transport is forbidden.

*Article 6*

The number of gendarmes, customs officers, forest guards, members of the local or municipal police or other like officials may not exceed the number of men employed in a similar capacity in 1913 within the boundaries of Hungary as fixed by the present Treaty.

The number of these officials shall not be increased in the future

except as may be necessary to maintain the same proportion between the number of officials and the total population in the localities or municipalities which employ them.

These officials, as well as officials employed in the railway service, must not be assembled for the purpose of taking part in any military exercises.

#### *Article 7*

Every formation of troops not included in the Tables annexed to this Section is forbidden. Such other formations as may exist in excess of the 35,000 effectives authorised shall be suppressed within the period laid down by Article 1.

### CHAPTER III—RECRUITING AND MILITARY TRAINING

#### *Article 8*

All officers must be regulars (*officiers de carrière*). Officers now serving who are retained in the Army must undertake the obligation to serve in it up to the age of 40 years at least. Officers now serving who do not join the new army will be released from all military obligations; they must not take part in any military exercises, whether theoretical or practical.

Officers newly appointed must undertake to serve on the active list for 20 consecutive years at least.

The number of officers discharged for any reason before the expiration of their term of service must not exceed in any year one twentieth of the total of officers provided for in Article 3. If this proportion is unavoidably exceeded the resulting shortage must not be made good by fresh appointments.

#### *Article 9*

The period of enlistment for non-commissioned officers and privates must be for a total period of not less than 12 consecutive years, including at least 6 years with the colours.

The proportion of men discharged before the expiration of the period of their enlistment for reasons of health or as a result of disciplinary measures or for any other reasons must not in any year exceed one twentieth of the total strength fixed by Article 3. If this proportion is unavoidably exceeded, the resulting shortage must not be made good by fresh enlistments.

### CHAPTER IV—SCHOOLS, EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS, MILITARY CLUBS AND SOCIETIES

#### *Article 10*

The number of students admitted to attend the courses in military schools shall be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled in the cadres of officers. The students and the cadres shall be included in the effectives fixed by Article 3 of the present Section.



Consequently, all military schools not required for this purpose shall be abolished.

*Article 11*

Educational establishments, other than those referred to in Article 10, as well as all sporting and other clubs, must not occupy themselves with any military matters.

CHAPTER V—ARMAMENT, MUNITIONS AND MATERIAL

*Article 12*

On the expiration of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the armament of the Hungarian Army shall not exceed the figures fixed per thousand men in Table V annexed to this Section. Any excess in relation to effectives shall only be used for such replacements as may eventually be necessary.

*Article 13*

The stock of munitions at the disposal of the Hungarian Army shall not exceed the amounts fixed in Table V annexed to this Section.

Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Hungarian Government shall deposit any existing surplus of armament and munitions in such places as shall be notified to it by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

No other stock, depot or reserve of munitions shall be formed.

*Article 14*

The manufacture of arms, munitions and war material shall only be carried on in one single factory, which shall be controlled by and belong to the State, and whose output shall be strictly limited to the manufacture of such arms, munitions and war materials as is necessary for the military forces and armaments referred to in Articles 3, 6, 12 & 13.

Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, all other establishments for the manufacture, preparation, storage or design of arms, munitions or any other war material shall be closed down or converted to purely commercial uses.

Within the same length of time, all arsenals shall also be closed down, except those to be used as depots for the authorised stocks of munitions, and their staffs discharged.

The plant of any establishments or arsenals in excess of the amount required for the manufacture authorised shall be rendered useless or converted to purely commercial purposes in accordance with the decisions of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control referred to in Article 35.

*Article 15*

Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, all arms, munitions and war material, including any kind

of anti-aircraft material, of whatever origin, existing in Hungary in excess of the quantity authorised shall be handed over to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Delivery shall take place at such points in Hungarian territory as may be appointed by the said Powers, who shall also decide on the disposal of such material.

#### *Article 16*

The importation into Hungary of arms, munitions and war material of all kinds is strictly forbidden.

The manufacture for foreign countries and the exportation of arms, munitions and war material shall also be forbidden.

#### *Article 17*

The use of flame throwers, asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all similar liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Hungary.

Material specially intended for the manufacture, storage or use of the said products or devices is equally forbidden.

The manufacture and importation into Hungary of armoured cars, tanks or any similar machines suitable for use in war are equally forbidden.

TABLE 1

COMPOSITION AND MAXIMUM EFFECTIVES OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION

Units	Maximum effectives of each unit		Remarks
	Officers	Men	
Headquarters of an Infantry Division.	25	70	(a) Each Regiment comprises 3 Battalions of Infantry, each Battalion comprises 3 Companies of Infantry and 1 machine-gun Company.
Headquarters of Divisional Infantry.	5	50	
Headquarters of Divisional Artillery.	4	30	
Regiments of Infantry (a) (on the basis of 65 officers and 2,000 men per Regiment).	195	6,000	(b) Each Battalion comprises 1 Headquarters, 2 Pioneer Companies, 1 Bridging Section, 1 Searchlight Section.
Squadron . . . . .	6	160	(c) Each Regiment comprises 1 Headquarters, 3 Groups of Field or Mountain Artillery, comprising 8 batteries, each Battery comprising 4 guns or Howitzers (field or mountain).
Battalion of Trench Artillery (3 Companies).	14	500	
Battalion Pioneers (b) (5 Companies).	14	500	
Regiment Field Artillery (c) .	80	1,200	(d) This detachment comprises:—
Battalion Cyclist (comprising 3 Companies).	18	450	Telephone detachment, 1 Listening Section, 1 carrier pigeon Section.
Signal Detachment (d) . . . .	11	330	
Divisional Medical Corps. . .	28	550	
Divisional Parks and Trains. .	14	940	
Total for an Infantry Division .	414	10,780	

TABLE 2

## COMPOSITION AND MAXIMUM EFFECTIVES FOR A CAVALRY DIVISION

Units	Maximum number authorised	Maximum effectives of each Unit		Remarks
		Officers	Men	
Headquarters of a Cavalry Division.	1	15	50	(a) Each Regiment comprises 4 Squadrons.
Regt. of Cavalry (a) . . . . .	6	30	720	(b) Each group comprises 9 fighting cars
Group of Field Artillery (3 Batteries).	1	30	430	each carrying one gun, 1 machine gun and 1 spare machine gun, 4 communication cars, 2 small lorries for stores, 7 lorries, including 1 repair lorry, 4 motor cars.
Group of Motor machine-guns and armoured cars (b).	1	4	80	
Miscellaneous services. . . . .		30	500	
Total for a Cavalry Division. . . . .		259	5,380	

NOTE:—The large Cavalry Units may include a variable number of regiment and be divided into independent brigades within the limit of the effectives laid down above.

TABLE 3

## COMPOSITION AND MAXIMUM EFFECTIVES FOR A MIXED BRIGADE

Units	Maximum effectives of each unit		Remarks
	Officers	Men	
Headquarters of a Brigade. . . . .	10	50	(a) Each Regiment comprises 3 Battalions of Infantry, each Battalion comprises 3 Companies of Infantry and 1 Machine gun Company.
2 Regiments of Infantry (a). . . . .	130	4,000	
1 Cyclist Battalion . . . . .	18	450	
1 Cavalry Squadron . . . . .	5	100	
1 Group Field Artillery . . . . .	20	400	
1 Trench Mortar Company . . . . .	5	150	
Miscellaneous services . . . . .	10	200	
Total for Mixed Brigade. . . . .	198	5,350	



TABLE 4

MINIMUM EFFECTIVES OF UNITS WHATEVER ORGANIZATION IS ADOPTED IN  
THE ARMY

(Divisions, Mixed Brigades, &c)

Maximum Effectives (for reference)		Units	Minimum Effectives		Remarks
Officers	Men		Officers	Men	
414	10,780	Infantry Division.....	300	8,000	
259	5,380	Cavalry Division.....	180	3,650	
198	5,350	Mixed Brigade.....	140	4,250	
65	2,000	Regiment of Infantry .....	52	1,600	
16	650	Battalion of Infantry .....	12	500	
3	160	Company of Infantry or Machine Guns.	2	120	
18	450	Cyclist Group.....	12	300	
30	720	Regiment of Cavalry.....	20	450	
6	160	Squadron of Cavalry.....	3	100	
80	1,200	Regiment of Field Artillery.....	60	1,000	
4	150	Battery, Field Artillery .....	2	120	
3	150	Company of Trench Mortars....	2	100	
14	500	Battalion of Pioneers .....	8	300	
5	320	Battery of Mountain Artillery...	3	200	

TABLE 5

MAXIMUM AUTHORISED ARMAMENTS AND MUNITION SUPPLIES

Material	Quantity for 1,000 men	Amount of Munitions per arm (rifles, guns, &c.)	Remarks
Rifles or Carbines .....	1,150	500 rounds	Automatic rifles or carbines are counted as light machine guns.
Machine guns; heavy or light..	15	10,000 rounds	
Trench Mortars, light.....	.....	1,000 rounds	
Trench Mortars, medium.....	2	500 rounds	
Guns or howitzers (field or mountain).	3	1,000 rounds	

NOTE:—No heavy gun, i. e. of a calibre greater than 105 mm. is authorised with the exception of the normal armament of fortified places.

SECTION II—*Naval Clauses**Article 18*

From the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty all Austro-Hungarian warships, submarines included, are declared to be finally surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

All the monitors, torpedo boats and armed vessels of the Danube Flotilla will be surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Hungary will, however, be allowed to maintain for the Danube River Police Service patrol launches, which will be selected by the Commission provided by Article 43 of the present Treaty.

*Article 19*

The Austro-Hungarian auxiliary cruisers and fleet auxiliaries enumerated below will be disarmed and treated as merchant ships:

Bosnia.	Nixe.
Gablonz.	Gigante.
Carolina.	Dalmat.
Africa.	Persia.
Tirol.	Prince Hohenlohe.
Argentina.	Gastein.
Lussin.	Helouan.
Teodo.	Graf Wurmbrand.
Pelikan.	Elizabet.
Herkules.	Melcavich.
Pola.	Baron Call.
Najade.	Gaea.
Pluto.	Cyclop.
President Wilson (Ex- Kaiser Franz Joseph).	Vesta.
Trieste.	Nymphe.
Baron Bruck.	Buffel.

*Article 20*

All warships, including submarines, now under construction in ports which belong or previously belonged to Austria Hungary shall be broken up.

The work of breaking up these vessels will be commenced as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty.

*Article 21*

Articles, machinery and material arising from the breaking-up of Austro-Hungarian warships of all kinds, whether surface vessels or submarines, may not be used except for purely industrial or commercial purposes.

They may not be sold or disposed of to foreign countries.

*Article 22*

The construction or acquisition of any submarine, even for commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in Hungary.

*Article 23*

All arms, ammunition and other naval war material, including mines and torpedoes, which belonged to Austria-Hungary at the date of the signature of the Armistice of November 3, 1918,<sup>16</sup> are declared to be finally surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Hungary will only be held responsible for the delivery (Articles 18 and 23), the disarmament (Article 19), the demolition (Article 20) as well as the disposal (Article 19) and the use (Article 21) of the objects mentioned in the preceding Articles, as far as these remain in Hungarian territory.

*Article 24*

During the three months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Hungarian high-power wireless telegraphy station at Budapest shall not be used for the transmission of messages concerning naval, military or political questions of interest to Hungary, or any State which has been allied to Austria-Hungary in the war, without the assent of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. This station may be used for commercial purposes, but only under the supervision of the said Powers, who will decide the wave-length to be used.

During the same period Hungary shall not build any more high-power wireless telegraphy stations in her own territory or that of Austria, Germany, Bulgaria or Turkey.

*SECTION III—Air Clauses**Article 25*

The Armed forces of Hungary must not include any military or naval air forces. No dirigibles shall be kept.

*Article 26*

Within two months from the coming into force of the Present Treaty, the personnel of the air forces on the rolls of the Hungarian land and sea forces shall be demobilised.

*Article 27*

Until the complete evacuation of Hungarian territory by the Allied and Associated troops the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in Hungary freedom of passage through the air, freedom of transit and of landing.

*Article 28*

During the six months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the manufacture, importation and exportation of aircraft,

---

<sup>16</sup> Vol. II, p. 175.



parts of aircraft, engines for aircraft, and parts of engines for aircraft shall be forbidden in all Hungarian territory.

*Article 29*

On the coming into force of the present Treaty, all military and naval aeronautical material must be delivered by Hungary and at her expense to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Delivery must be effected at such places as the Governments of the said Powers may select, and must be completed within three months.

In particular, this material will include all items under the following heads which are or have been in use or were designed for warlike purposes:—

Complete aeroplanes and seaplanes, as well as those being manufactured, repaired or assembled.

Dirigibles able to take the air, being manufactured, repaired or assembled.

Plant for the manufacture of hydrogen.

Dirigible sheds and shelters of every kind for aircraft.

Pending their delivery, dirigibles will, at the expense of Hungary, be maintained inflated with hydrogen; the plant for the manufacture of hydrogen, as well as the sheds for dirigibles, may at the discretion of the said Powers, be left to Hungary until the time when the dirigibles are handed over.

Engines for aircraft.

Nacelles and fuselages.

Armament (guns, machine guns, light machine guns, bomb-dropping apparatus, torpedo apparatus, synchronisation apparatus, aiming apparatus).

Munitions (cartridges, shells, bombs loaded or unloaded, stocks of explosives or of material for their manufacture).

Instruments for use on aircraft.

Wireless apparatus and photographic or cinematograph apparatus for use on aircraft.

Component parts of any of the items under the preceding heads.

The material referred to above shall not be removed without special permission from the said Governments.

SECTION IV—*Inter-Allied Commissions of Control*

*Article 30*

All the Military, Naval and Air Clauses contained in the present Treaty for the execution of which a time limit is prescribed shall be executed by Hungary under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions specially appointed for this purpose by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The above-mentioned Commissions will represent the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in dealing with the Hungarian Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses. They will communicate to the Hungarian authorities the decisions which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have reserved the right to take or which the execution of the said Clauses may necessitate.

*Article 31*

The Inter-Allied Commissions of Control may establish their organisations at Budapest and shall be entitled, as often as they think desirable, to proceed to any point whatever in Hungarian territory, or to send a sub-commission or to authorise one or more of their members to go, to any such point.

*Article 32*

The Hungarian Government must furnish to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control all such information and documents as the latter may deem necessary to ensure the execution of their mission, and all means (both in personnel and in material) which the above-mentioned Commissions may need to ensure the complete execution of the Military, Naval or Air Clauses.

The Hungarian Government must attach a qualified representative to each Inter-Allied Commission of Control with the duty of receiving from the latter any communications which it may have to address to the Hungarian Government and furnishing it with, or of procuring, all information or documents demanded.

*Article 33*

The upkeep and cost of the Commissions of Control and the expense involved by their work shall be borne by Hungary.

*Article 34*

It will be the special duty of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control to receive from the Hungarian Government the notifications relating to the location of the stocks and depots of munitions, the armament of the fortified works, and the location of the works or factories for the production of arms, munitions and war material and their operations.

It will take delivery of the arms, munitions, war material and plant intended for war construction, will select the points where such delivery is to be effected, and will supervise the works of destruction, and rendering things useless, or of transformation of material, which are to be carried out in accordance with the present Treaty.

*Article 35*

It will be the special duty of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of

Control to proceed to the building yards and to supervise the breaking up of the ships which are under construction there, to take delivery of arms, munitions and naval war material, and to supervise the destruction and breaking-up provided for.

The Hungarian Government must furnish to the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and documents as the Commission may deem necessary to ensure the complete execution of the Naval Clauses, in particular the designs of the warships, the composition of their armaments, the details and models of the guns, munitions, torpedoes, mines, explosives, wireless telegraphic apparatus, and in general everything relating to naval war material, as well as all legislative or administrative documents or regulations.

#### *Article 36*

It will be the special duty of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control to make an inventory of the aeronautical material which is actually in the possession of the Hungarian Government, to inspect aeroplane, balloon and motor manufactories, and factories producing arms, munitions and explosives capable of being used by aircraft, to visit all aerodromes, sheds, landing grounds, parks and depots which are now in Hungarian territory, and to authorise where necessary a removal of material and to take delivery of such material.

The Hungarian Government must furnish to the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and legislative, administrative or other documents which the Commission may consider necessary to ensure the complete execution of the air clauses, and, in particular, a list of the personnel belonging to all the air services of Hungary and of the existing material, as well as of that in process of manufacture or on order, and a list of all establishments working for aviation, of their positions, and of all sheds and landing grounds.

### SECTION V—*General Articles*

#### *Article 37*

After the expiration of a period of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Hungarian laws must have been modified and shall be maintained by the Hungarian Government in conformity with this part of the present Treaty.

Within the same period all the administrative or other measures relating to the execution of this Part must have been taken by the Hungarian Government.

#### *Article 38*

The following portions of the Armistice of November 3, 1918: paragraphs 2, 3, of Chapter I (Military Clauses), paragraphs 2, 3, 6



of Chapter I of the annexed Protocol (Military Clauses), remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the above stipulations.

*Article 39*

Hungary undertakes, from the coming into force of the present Treaty, not to accredit nor to send to any foreign country any military, naval or air mission, nor to allow any such mission to leave her territory; Hungary further agrees to take the necessary measures to prevent Hungarian nationals from leaving her territory to enlist in the Army, Navy or Air service of any foreign Power, or to be attached to such Army, Navy or Air service for the purpose of assisting in the military, naval or air training thereof, or generally for the purpose of giving military naval or air instruction in any foreign country.

The Allied and Associated Powers undertake, so far as they are concerned, that from the coming into force of the present Treaty they will not enrol in nor attach to their armies or naval or air forces any Hungarian national for the purpose of assisting in the military training of such armies or naval or air forces, or otherwise employ any such Hungarian national as military, naval, or aeronautic instructor.

The present provision does not, however, affect the right of France to recruit for the Foreign Legion in accordance with French military laws and regulations.

*Article 40*

So long as the present Treaty remains in force, Hungary undertakes to submit to any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority vote, may consider necessary.

AERIAL NAVIGATION

*Article 41*

The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall have full liberty of passage and landing over and in the territory of Hungary and shall enjoy the same privileges as Hungarian aircraft, particularly in case of distress.

*Article 42*

The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall, while in transit to any foreign country whatever, enjoy the right of flying over the territory of Hungary without landing, subject always to any regulations which may be made by Hungary, and which shall be applicable equally to the aircraft of Hungary and to those of the Allied and Associated countries.

*Article 43*

All aerodromes in Hungary open to national public traffic shall be open for the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers, and in any such aerodrome such aircraft shall be treated on a footing of equality with Hungarian aircraft as regards charges of every description including charges for landing and accommodation.

*Article 44*

Subject to the present provisions, the rights of passage, transit and landing, provided for in Articles 41, 42 and 43 are subject to the observance of such regulations as Hungary may consider it necessary to enact, but such regulations shall be applied without distinction to Hungarian aircraft and to those of the Allied and Associated countries.

*Article 45*

Certificates of nationality, airworthiness, or competency and licenses, issued or recognised as valid by any of the Allied or Associated Powers, shall be recognised in Hungary as valid and as equivalent to the certificates and licenses issued by Hungary.

*Article 46*

As regards internal commercial air traffic, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in Hungary most favoured nation treatment.

*Article 47*

Hungary undertakes to enforce the necessary measures to ensure that all Hungarian aircraft flying over her territory shall comply with the Rules as to lights and signals, Rules of the Air and Rules for Air Traffic on and in the neighbourhood of aerodromes, which have been laid down in the Convention relative to Aerial Navigation concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers.<sup>17</sup>

*Article 48*

The obligations imposed by the preceding provisions shall remain in force until January 1, 1923, unless before that date Hungary shall have been admitted into the League of Nations or shall have been authorised by consent of the Allied and Associated Powers to adhere to the Convention relative to Aerial Navigation concluded between those Powers.

---

<sup>17</sup> *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910–1923, vol. III, p. 3768.

## Appendix F to HD-34

*Proposed Reply to German Note With Respect to Estimation of War Damages in the Devastated Regions*

PARIS, 1919.

From: President Clemenceau.

To: Baron von Lersner.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of August 2, concerning the ascertaining of damage in the territories devastated by the war.

You offer to communicate to the French and Belgian Governments all the documents and information that the German Government possesses on the subject of these damages, and notably concerning "field" requisitions and requisitions "For the interior", as well as to transmit the studies made by it on the subject. You ask, in order to complete the work, the restoration, even temporary, of archives left by the German armies in their retreat. Finally, you propose a discussion, a verification and an examination in common and from opposite sides, between the representatives of the German Government and the representatives of the French and Belgian Governments, with a view to ascertaining the amount of damage, to collecting the material and to fixing the amount to be paid.

We take note of the offer made by the German Delegation and we are disposed to receive all the information that it is ready to communicate to us; the Allied and Associated Governments can only consider with satisfaction anything that will facilitate and accelerate the execution of the Peace Treaty. In the same spirit they will be happy to receive the same documentation on the subject of the damage caused in the zones of operations other than France and Belgium notably Italy and Serbia.

Concerning the archives whose temporary restoration is requested, it would be well for the German Delegation, since it is the one to make the demand, to communicate the list of services and archives in question. No decision can be reached in the matter till this is done. Finally, the Allied and Associated Governments must indicate at once, in the clearest manner, that there can be no question of discussion, verification and examination, in common and from different sides, on the ascertaining of the amount of damage and the fixing of the sum to be paid; they pledged themselves to this neither in the reply that they made of June 16<sup>18</sup> to the remarks of the German Delegation on the Peace Conditions, nor in the additional Protocol of June 28 to the Treaty of Versailles. On the contrary, in the aforesaid reply

---

<sup>18</sup> Vol. VI, pp. 926, 962.



of June 16, they laid down the absolute conditions that "the categories of damages and the reparation clauses will be accepted by the German authorities as being outside of all discussion". Now, the Peace Treaty signed by Germany provides expressly, in paragraph 10 of Annex II to the reparation clauses, that "the Commission will study the claims and will give the German Government a fair right to be heard, *without its being able to tax [take?] any part whatever in the decisions.*"

I will add, in closing, that the Allied and Associated Governments are ready to examine the propositions that you announce in your letter, concerning the restoration of the devastated regions.

Moreover, in confirmation of their reply of June 16, 1919, they will give Germany, in good time the necessary facilities to furnish a serious basis for the offers to be presented by her; without waiting for the Treaty to come into force, it is possible now to give the first facilities in certain sectors. Verbal indications will be given on this subject.

---

#### Appendix G to HD-34

#### *[Proposed Reply to the German Note With Respect to] The Restitution of the Topographical Plans of the Costoplatz Mine*

From: President Clemenceau.

To: Lersner, German Delegation.

I have the honor to inform you that during its Session of August 12, 1919, the Committee on Organization and [of] the Commission on Reparations, examined a request from the Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom in France, relative to the topographical plans of the Costoplatz mine. These plans are supposed to be in the hands of two officers of the German army, Messrs. Winter and Kramer, belonging to a Company of Sappers who exploited the mine during the occupation. The Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom in France requests their Restitution.

The Committee requests you to kindly make the necessary investigations immediately and inform them of the result.

Accept, etc.

---

LEGATION OF THE SERB,  
CROAT & SLOVENE KINGDOM  
IN FRANCE

At the time of the evacuation of Serbia, German troops took the topographical plans of a coal mine, belonging to Mr. George Wenfert, located at Costoplatz on the Danube (Pojarevatz Department in Serbia) with them. These plans at the present time are in possession of two lieutenants of the German army, Winter and Kramer, attached

to the company of Sappers who had exploited the said mine during the occupation.

By order of its Government, the Legation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom has the honor to request the Minister of Foreign Affairs to kindly have a search instigated, by the intermediary of the French military authorities in Germany, in order to locate the German officers above mentioned and recover the documents appropriated by them. The Royal Legation has the honor to remark that, without these documents, all exploitation of the Costoplatz mine is impossible, which, under the present circumstances constitutes a great injury to our national industry.

PARIS, April 8, 1919.

To the MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

*Quai d'Orsay.*

---

Annex H to HD-34

[*The Serb-Croat-Slovene Plenipotentiary (Pachitch) to the President ad Interim of the Peace Conference (Pichon)*]

[Translation <sup>20</sup>]

DELEGATION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE  
SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES  
AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

No. 3.222

PARIS, August 17, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: In continuation of my letters addressed to His Excellency Monsieur G. Clémenceau on July 28 and August 7, I am earnestly pressing upon Your Excellency the necessity of an oral statement to the Supreme Council by our delegation regarding the draft of a treaty of peace with Bulgaria, before it receives definitive form.

Our country being, for every sort of reason, more interested than any other in the conclusion of this treaty, I forbear to dwell more fully on the reasonable grounds for this request.

In order to make easier the task of the Supreme Council, I take the liberty of sending you enclosed an *aide-mémoire*, containing the principal points to which our delegation wishes more particularly to draw the attention of the Conference, and I indulge the hope that our great Allies will be inclined to reserve for it a friendly and benevolent reception.

Accept [etc.]

N. P. PACHITCH

---

<sup>20</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

[Enclosure]

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

RESERVATION BY THE DELEGATION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS,  
AND SLOVENES ON THE DRAFT OF A TREATY OF PEACE WITH BULGARIA

The armistice with Bulgaria having been concluded without the assistance of our military and civil authorities, none of the Serbian interests was guaranteed (as was done for the other Allied Powers in similar conventions with the enemy).

The principal provisions contained in the draft treaty of peace with Bulgaria have been decided upon without the collaboration of our delegation, and our most vital and just interests are threatened by the solutions proposed by the commissions.

In order to prevent the injustices which may result, it is necessary to reconsider at least the points which are herein presented as briefly as possible.

## (1)

In spite of the fact that Serbia has found herself at war with Bulgaria for the third time since Bulgaria's liberation from the Ottoman yoke, and that on the last two occasions Bulgaria treacherously attacked Serbia (the Allies as well, the last time), we have asked from Bulgaria only a rectification of frontiers, a rectification which is imposed as an absolute necessity in consequence of the experience of these recent years, an experience for which our allies have with us paid dearly.

Not only does the Territorial Commission grant us no more than an insignificant part of the territories which we claim, but even for the part granted, the intention would be to impose upon us burdens not justified by the usage of international law. We are obliged, therefore, to insist upon the necessity of an acknowledgment of our territorial claims.

In its first draft, the Commission on Reparations did not recognize our right to the recovery of property stolen or removed from our territory, a refusal contrary to what was stipulated in behalf of the other Allies as against Germany (armistice of January 16,<sup>21</sup> art. VI; treaty of peace art. 238), as against Austria (art. 180), contrary also to moral and legal principles as old as the world. The Commission on Reparations reversed this decision after a lively protest on our part, but on that occasion too it stopped half-way, since in recognizing the substantial basis of our right, it recognized it only in principle, and no more than in principle; inasmuch as, contrary to what was laid down in the treaty with Germany in favor

---

<sup>21</sup> Convention prolonging the armistice with Germany, signed January 16, 1919, vol. II, p. 11.



of the other Allies, and contrary also to universal law, the Commission imposed on us the obligation of proving that our stolen properties "are to be found in Bulgarian territory." We do not at all consider ourselves as going beyond the limits of an elementary and incontestable right in asking here for the application, pure and simple, of the same provisions as were prescribed (and with how many reasons) in the treaty with Germany and in the armistice convention of January 16, 1919.

(2)

*An equivalent restitution in kind*, as guaranteed in the other treaties, is especially desirable in the one to be imposed on Bulgaria.

Having invaded our territories at the beginning of hostilities, Bulgaria lived off the occupied territories during the whole time of the war. Not only did it conserve its own stocks of cattle but perhaps it may even have augmented them by the thefts and raids committed on our soil. If it is intended to maintain the conditions proposed by the Commission, Bulgaria would be the only country which would emerge enriched from this war, as may be seen from the following:—

a) Before its entry into the war, Bulgaria carried on trade of all sorts with Germany and Austria-Hungary on one side, and with Turkey on the other, especially trade in contraband of war;

b) The Bulgarian civil and military authorities practiced in Serbia (in two-thirds of our territory) a regime of systematic pillage and of organized robberies, as has been substantiated by an Inter-allied Commission;

c) According to the most moderate estimates, the Bulgarians have taken from us 600,000 head of cattle, 100,000 horses, and 2,500,000 sheep and ewes (not to mention what the Germans and Austro-Hungarians took). If these figures be added to those of the official Bulgarian statistics on Bulgarian livestock in 1910 (that is, before the expansion of 1913), which totalled 2,000,000 cattle, 600,000 horses and mules, and more than 10,000,000 sheep and ewes, it will then be seen what wealth Bulgaria possesses in these things alone.

We lay claim, however, by way of an immediate advance, to only 18% of the livestock which was carried off and to only 4% of the present Bulgarian stock. What the Reparations Commission has granted us up to the present would be more than laughable if it were not sad, and especially when account is taken of the fact that with us draft animals represent farm equipment and that in this war we have lost 53% of the men mobilized, a loss which represents more than half of the labor in Serbia.

With very good reason, assurances on this score, were given in the treaty with Germany, for deliveries to France of 233,500 head, and to Belgium of 137,400 head of heavy and light domestic animals. We

are eminently a farming and stock-raising country. Here too we are not asking a favor; we are claiming equity and an application of identical principles.

(3)

The 2,250,000,000 francs, representing the total of damages for which reparation is due from Bulgaria, are far below its capacity to pay. But by a simple majority of votes in the Commission (in contrast to the principle of unanimity applied to Germany and Austria), it may be released from a portion (perhaps considerable) of this sum, very moderate though it is. And yet, the Serbian, Greek, and Roumanian experts have proved that Bulgaria could pay much more. What is still more astonishing, the Commission on Finance has discharged Bulgaria of its debts to Germany, thus awarding it benefits of more than four billions, according to the figure given by the German newspapers. Our loyalty refuses to believe that the Supreme Council could approve this proposal which would stand as the most shocking act of this war and which would put upon the same footing both Belgium (faithful and martyred) and Bulgaria (felon and traitor) while leaving Serbia a debtor for all its obligations, although they were contracted under compulsion of circumstances and for the purpose of carrying on the fight to the last man at the side of the Allies.

(4)

We do not believe that we are departing from reality in affirming that our country is the one most concerned in the execution of the provisions of the treaty with Bulgaria, as it relates to reparations. Nevertheless, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes is not represented on the Commission created for this purpose and in session at Sofia.

Apart from these special provisions, the execution of the treaty with Bulgaria ought to be guaranteed by appropriate means, by the same stipulations as for Germany, a precaution which calls for a temporary occupation of Bulgarian territory. Moreover, as Monsieur Clémenceau has so judiciously declared: "military occupation constitutes for the Allied and Associated Powers one of the essential guarantees; it cannot therefore, be debated." It is incomprehensible that Bulgarian disloyalty and treachery could be so quickly forgotten that Bulgarian good faith would be relied upon. The powers who are neighbors of Bulgaria, and who are consequently the most interested in the observance by Bulgaria of its signed engagements, have suffered too much in the most recent past from Bulgar falseness and megalomania to risk being duped by such illusions. The adequate guarantees for a prompt and legal execution of the treaty are more imperatively required in this case than in any other whatever.

## Appendix I to HD-34

M-477

*Proposed Communication From the President of the Peace Conference  
to the Commission of Generals at Budapest*

In the event that you are not satisfied that the Rumanians have ceased the seizure of Hungarian grain, live stock, rolling stock, boats and other material, you are authorized to address to the Rumanian authorities with whom you are in contact a communication substantially as follows:

"The conditions of peace with Austria as originally drafted provided that all portions of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including that part proposed to be transferred to Rumania, would be liable to pay by way of reparation a sum to be fixed by the Reparation Commission. In deference to the urgent representations of the Rumanian Peace Delegation, the principal Allied and Associated Powers consented to renounce their right to secure indemnification from enemy resources and population to be transferred to Rumania upon Rumania agreeing to make a moderate fixed contribution toward the cost of liberating enemy territory to be transferred to her. An agreement relative to the payment of cost of liberation <sup>22</sup> was, on June 27, 1919 signed by Mr. Antonesco, Rumanian Plenipotentiary, subject to the approval of his Government. In reliance of this agreement, the conditions of peace with Austria were modified so that no reparation liability will attach to enemy territory proposed to be transferred to Rumania.

"The agreement signed by Mr. Antonesco provides, among other things, that Rumania's contribution toward the costs of liberation will be discharged by offsetting the sum against the first reparation payments which Rumania would otherwise receive on account of damage suffered by her, and 'no further payments on account of reparation shall be made until the other States to which reparation is due shall have received payments on account of a like proportion of their approved claims for reparation'.

"The action of Rumania in seizing enemy property by way of reparation, prior to other States having received payment on account of their approved claims, is in contravention of the terms of the agreement of June 27th, and cannot be construed as other than a repudiation by Rumania of the agreement of June 27th. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers accordingly reserve full liberty of action with respect to imposing a liability for reparation upon enemy territory proposed to be transferred to Rumania, and these Powers now have under consideration the matter and form for the exercise of their rights in this respect."

---

<sup>22</sup> For draft text of agreement, see appendix I to HD-37, p. 830.



**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, August 21, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

*Secretaries*

Mr. H. Norman.  
Sir George Clerk.

**FRANCE**

M. Pichon.

*Secretaries*

M. Dutasta.  
M. Berthelot.  
M. de St. Quentin.

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

**JAPAN**

M. Matsui.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Colonel U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Captain E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lieut. Colonel Jones.

The following also attended:—

Mr. Hoover.

General Weygand.

Major General The Hon. C.  
Sackville-West, C. M. G.

*Interpreter*—M. Meyer.

1. MR. POLK asked that the letter he had addressed to M. Clemenceau (See Appendix "A") be referred for examination and report to the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission.

Roumanian Requi-  
sitions in Hun-  
gary

(This was agreed to.)

2. MR. POLK said that he now begged to withdraw the reservation he had made on August 7th, regarding the Anglo-Belgian Agreement on the Belgian sphere in the ex-German Colony of East Africa. (See H. D. 26, Minute 5.<sup>1</sup>)

Anglo-Belgian  
Agreement Re-  
garding Mandate  
in East Africa

3. MR. HOOVER said that he had just returned from a trip of investigation into various economic questions. The main discovery of his

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 612.

Coal Situation in  
Central Europe  
and Position in  
Upper Silesia

trip had been the critical situation as to coal in Central Europe. There were three coal-fields, from which the entire supply for this section of Europe was drawn: first, the one in Upper Silesia, now affected by the strikes: one in Teschen, under dispute between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles; and one in Poland. The total output from these three fields was 5 to 6 million tons a month, and they constituted the very heart of Central Europe. Unless their production was kept up, it would be impossible to maintain the transportation and municipal services in Central Europe. The Upper Silesian coal-mines had practically stopped production on account of the strikes. One mine had been entirely destroyed. It would be only a matter of days before the remainder would be disabled beyond repair for several months. There were many versions as to the cause for the situation. There appeared to be four parties to the quarrel: first, the Polish workmen; second, the German Grenzschutz troops, who were in a high state of emotional nationalism; third the Spartacists; fourth, the German coal-owners and perhaps the German Government itself. The causes appeared to be not economic, but political. The Polish authorities had shown him documents which, if they could be authenticated, would prove that the Germans had tried to stir up the Spartacists to make trouble, and that the German troops had actually attempted to drive out the Polish workmen. The Germans said, on the contrary, that the Polish workmen and the Spartacists had conspired together to foment the trouble, and that they were forced to restore order. One of the strange results of this state of affairs was that in one case some Polish workmen were guarding their mines to save them from destruction. In his own opinion, the only possible remedy was an occupation by Allied troops. No Commission could bring about a reconciliation between the contending parties. Colonel Goodyear, who had been in charge of coal distribution, had been sent there, and was trying to get the parties to come to some agreement together, but he was convinced that it would be impossible to do so. Mr. Hoover himself had had a discussion with Mr. Markenson, a German who had been a member of the Armistice Commission on the Eastern Front. He was very disturbed, and from his statement he had gathered that the German Government were not fully in control of the Grenzschutz troops, whom they were trying to replace by regular troops. This same German had said that the German Government was most anxious, as it necessarily ought to be, to restore order, but, of course, one could never tell what power the Berlin Government exercised over the various military bodies in the East. Undoubtedly, the German owners were in desperate fear of the destruction of their property, and would welcome any method of re-establishing order.

There were contradictory currents even amongst the Germans themselves, and it was his opinion that the racial animosities had reached such a point that nothing could stop the strife but a military occupation. He realised, of course, that this was not legally possible until after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, but the intentions of the German Government might here be put to the test, and he thought that the German Government would probably agree to anticipate the action proposed by the Treaty, and, of course, the Poles were asking that this be done. He believed that this would be the attitude of the German Government, because of the desire Mr. Markenson and his colleagues had expressed to get Allied troops all along the Eastern front, between the Poles and the German volunteer troops, and because the difficulty of controlling the latter made them fear a general conflagration.

He had had a meeting with the Trades Union Leaders of the Teschen district, and there also found the Trades Unions divided along the lines of nationality. The Polish leaders confessed that they would not help to increase production until they knew to whom the mines would fall, and they would not work for the Czechs. There was here also much political sentiment. He had asked whether strikes would be used to influence the plebiscite, and was answered that undoubtedly they would be. This information he considered as of interest, both as affecting the political situation in the Teschen district, and also by analogy furnishing a clue to the situation in Upper Silesia.

There was a political question—that of restoring order; and there was also the economic question of stimulating production and getting the output from the mines necessary for the maintenance of the ordinary life of central Europe. From the last point of view, the three districts were one and the selfish interests of any one nation must be entirely set aside for the general good of that section of the continent. At present the feeling of the Czechs towards the Austrians was such as to make it hopeless to ask them to keep coal shipments going to Austria, although the Austrian transportation, which was dependent on that coal supply, was absolutely essential to the Czechs themselves, and the same sort of feelings existed everywhere. He thought it necessary that the Coal Commission should appoint a sub-Committee to control all three Districts with the authority of the Peace Conference. He suggested that this be done at once, and he would like to see the Coal Committee enter upon its duties with the prestige that would be given it by the assurance that it would constitute the Plebiscite Commission as soon as it became possible to appoint that body. He thought it possible to select men competent for both, and he thought that it would only be possible for the Coal Committee to perform its duties if invested with the double authority,



only this double authority could solve either question.

M. PICHON asked Mr. Hoover at what time he had visited Upper Silesia.

MR. HOOVER replied that he had not visited Upper Silesia, but had interviewed people coming from there at a place on the Railway outside the mining area.

M. PICHON said that he had asked this question because he had just received news that the situation in Upper Silesia had improved.

MR. HOOVER said that on his side he had telegrams from Warsaw, informing him that there was continuous fighting along the whole of the German-Polish frontiers.

M. TITTONI said he thought the improvement in any case must be precarious. He was disposed to agree to the proposals made by Mr. Hoover.

M. PICHON said that there was a telegram from General Dupont which confirmed most of what Mr. Hoover had said. (See Appendix "B".)

MR. HOOVER said that he was in possession of a proclamation of the socialist party, calling upon the Poles to expel the Germans from the mines. There was, therefore, a mixture of Spartacist, and Nationalist feeling which was very confusing.

MR. POLK said that he had received a telegram from the American Minister in Warsaw, stating that the Polish Government had refrained from intervening in Silesia in spite of the excitement of the Country over the situation, because they were afraid that such action would prejudice their case in the eyes of the Conference.

MR. BALFOUR said that Mr. Hoover's proposals were very similar to those adopted by the Conference in its previous meetings.<sup>2</sup> The Council had thought it might be possible to ask Germany to allow an anticipated exercise of the Treaty. Mr. Hoover added the hope and expectation that the German Government would consent. The means by which the Council had hoped to obtain the acquiescence of the German Government was the Coal Commission.

MR. HOOVER said that he would suggest that the Coal Commission be strengthened by a German member and even by a Czech and a Polish member.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether Mr. Hoover did not think that these members might obstruct business.

MR. HOOVER said that they might perhaps be disposed to do so, but that they could be controlled by the Great Powers. There had previously been a Coal Commission with a Czech, Polish and German member, (together with a British and American representative,)

---

<sup>2</sup> HD-32, minute 2, and HD-34, minute 4, pp. 698 and 735.

which had worked quite successfully before the signature of the Treaty.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was very favourably inclined to Mr. Hoover's proposals, but with regard to the suggestion that the Coal Committee should also conduct the administration in the plebiscite zone, he would like to ask a few questions. The Plebiscite Commission could not be precisely the Committee suggested by Mr. Hoover; it was hardly possible to have a plebiscite area in which Poland was interested, controlled by a Czech and a German Commissioner. The Coal Committee, moreover, not only had to carry out diplomatic negotiations with Germany, to superintend the production of coal in disturbed parts of Upper Silesia and Teschen, but it was also asked to control a plebiscite area, two-thirds of which was agricultural, and not coal producing at all. In order to carry out its various duties, not only would it have to move over large areas, possess an intimate knowledge of coal production, considerable acquaintance with other industrial conditions, but it must also be endowed with political experience, tact and knowledge of the conditions of all the neighbouring countries. Such universal competence might perhaps be difficult to find concentrated in one set of individuals.

MR. HOOVER said that what he meant to suggest was that the four Principal Allied representatives on the Coal Committee should ultimately become the administrators of the plebiscite area, in order that they should begin from the first with additional prestige.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Coal Committee would be composed of technical experts rather than of administrators and men of political experience.

MR. HOOVER said that he was not entirely of this opinion. The technical side of the Committee's work was comparatively simple; the distribution of the output of the mines was well established; the mine-owners were well acquainted with the quantities sent to the various consuming areas. The Committee would have chiefly to adjudicate among the rival claimants. Their functions would be, therefore, rather administrative than technical. He adhered to the belief that a merely technical committee would be of little use. There was already one, and its influence was not great.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would ask one more question. It had struck him previously that, should the German Government make difficulties, it might be threatened by being told that should the coal-fields be attributed to Poland, the Allied Powers would exercise their influence to see that Germany was last served in the distribution of coal from these mines. He asked Mr. Hoover whether he thought this form of pressure could be employed.

MR. HOOVER said that he thought it was possible. The method he was suggesting was not a logical one. It would be more reasonable,

first to establish the administrative Commission, and under it a Coal Committee. He was reversing the process, and suggesting that the Coal Committee should be endowed in anticipation with the prestige of the administrative body.

MR. BALFOUR said that this method appeared to him to be very ingenious.

M. PICHON said that he agreed that the method was ingenious, but he thought that there was some danger in confusing the two functions. It was possible that the Coal Committee might at a future date, assist the Plebiscite Commission. He thought it inadvisable to state at the present time that coal experts would become the future administrators of the country. This could not be done legally at present. Moreover, he did not think that the Germans would agree. They did not accept the Treaty in a very willing spirit. A demand of this kind would raise difficulties. The Council might make up its own mind that the Coal Committee, if, as it was hoped, it gained authority in the country, should later on assist the Plebiscite Commission. He did not think that this could be openly declared.

MR. HOOVER said that his feeling was that a Coal Committee, as such, would be helpless. It could only use arguments derived from the general coal situation in Europe. He pointed out that the Council was considering the prospect of military occupation. Should this take place, the only administrative organ possible would be the Plebiscite Commission.

M. TITTONI said that the essential thing was to find out whether the German Government would acquiesce. Should it do so, there would be no difficulty, and the Coal Committee could, as Mr. Hoover suggested, obtain political power. The principal thing was to approach the German Government without delay.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that if Allied troops were sent into Upper Silesia, it would be absolutely necessary to establish a high civil authority to ensure a *modus vivendi*. It appeared to him that this authority could not be the Coal Committee, whose functions extended to other areas than Upper Silesia. It must undoubtedly be the Commission provided for in the Annexe to Section 8 of the Treaty. This Commission was doubtless that which had been called the Plebiscite Commission in the discussion. It was really a Commission to govern the country under the authority of the Allied and Associated Powers, pending the completion of the plebiscite.

MR. HOOVER then suggested that the Coal Committee be sent as a Coal Committee, but that, as many Governments as might find it possible to do so, should appoint to it members who would subsequently serve on the Administrative Commission. Further, if the German Government should agree, no delay would occur in selecting new representatives.



M. PICHON said that the whole question was whether the German Government would agree to the exercise of the right which only accrued 15 days after the ratification of the Treaty.

M. TITTONI urged that the question be put to the German Government immediately. A reply could perhaps be obtained within two days.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Conference had no regular diplomatic civil agent in touch with the German Government. He therefore suggested that Mr. Hoover should go to Berlin on behalf of the Council to negotiate on this matter. Mr. Hoover was so identified with the economic interests of Europe that no more suitable representative could be found for such a mission. His work had been outside the political arena so he had a better hope of success than anyone else.

M. PICHON said that he agreed.

MR. POLK suggested that Mr. Hoover be given an opportunity of consulting his French and British colleagues on the Coal Commission.

M. TITTONI suggested that in any case it should be explained to the German Government that the Allies had no political object in these negotiations. They were only animated by anxiety for the economic revival of Europe.

M. PICHON proposed certain draft instructions for Mr. Hoover (see Appendix "C").

(These instructions were approved in principle and it was agreed that Mr. Hoover, after consultation with his colleagues on the Coal Commission, should report on the following day whether he was able to undertake the mission and whether any alteration of the draft instructions appeared desirable.)

4. MR. POLK asked that Mr. Hoover be heard on the situation in Hungary.

#### Situation in Hungary

MR. HOOVER said that the staff of the Relief Organisation had been in Budapest and other parts of Hungary during the past ten days; that facts which had come to their personal attention might be of interest to the Council. Up to 10 a.m. on the previous Monday the Roumanians were still requisitioning food all over the country and in Budapest they were taking supplies even from the Children's Hospital. Trains carrying the requisitioned supplies were passing out of the country as fast as possible, although in one place some had accumulated because the Roumanians were awaiting the repair of a bridge before the trains could continue on their way. None of the members of the Relief Organisation believed for a moment that the Roumanians intended to accede to the desires of the Council. He was not concerned with the morality of their actions but with the practical effects. Two of his officials, Captains in the American Army, had themselves seen the

Roumanians take sixteen waggon loads of supplies from the Children's Hospital and eleven deaths had resulted therefrom within twenty-four hours, for there was no way of replacing these supplies. He did not think that any action by the Roumanians could be secured unless the Military Mission were instructed to send agents to frontier points to stop the Roumanians from shipping out any more of the requisitioned material until its disposal could be decided by the Council. In his own opinion the supplies requisitioned should be turned back to Budapest to feed the population of that city. He would like to call attention to another point which threw a sidelight on the situation. While the *coup d'état*, by which the Archduke Joseph's Government had been installed was not entirely a Roumanian affair, nevertheless Roumanian troops had surrounded the meeting place of the Ministry and had turned their machine guns on the building in which they were. This event had had an immediate repercussion throughout Poland and Eastern Europe and the Bolsheviks were making much of it and claiming that the Alliance was trying to re-establish reactionary government in its worst form and this had done more to re-habilitate the Bolshevik cause than anything that had happened for a long time. The social democrats had refused to have anything to do with the new Government and Garami, the leader of this group, thought that if things were allowed to continue as they were, the old reactionary party would be well established in ten days and the Allied and Associated Powers would have to be prepared to see the House of Hapsburg begin to re-establish itself throughout all its former dominions. He could only suggest that the Council should instruct its representatives in Budapest to call the Archduke before them and say that his Government could never be accepted or recognised. Such action might induce the Archduke to step aside and invite the social democrats to form a coalition government.

M. PICHON said that the Council had already taken a decision of a similar character. The telegram sent on the 18th August<sup>3</sup> embodied this policy. In it the Council had said all that it could possibly say consistently with its declared policy of non-interference in the internal politics of Hungary. The Council could not take the responsibility of deliberately upsetting a Government in order to set up another.

MR. BALFOUR said that the only further step that could be taken would be to make the telegram more public, by asking the Generals in Budapest to make it widely known that Peace would never be signed with a Government not representing the people.

MR. HOOVER said that if the Hungarian people went to the Poles [*polls*] with only a choice between Bolshevism and a Hapsburg, the

<sup>3</sup> Appendix C to HD-32, p. 709.

result of the elections might be in favour of the latter. This would be a paradoxical and disastrous result of a consultation of the people. Eastern Europe was past the blandishments of polite suggestion. Human life in those parts had declined in value to an extent not realised in Paris. Very energetic action was required. He thought the Generals in Budapest should summon the Archduke and tell him clearly that he would never be recognised, and that he had better resign.

M. TITTONI said that if he felt certain that on the fall of the Archduke a good Government would be set up, he would risk intervening. Before doing so, however, he would like to ask the Generals in Budapest what Government they thought would result from upsetting the Archduke.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought this matter so important that he would like to wait until the following day, when M. Clemenceau would be present at the Council. As to the other proposal of Mr. Hoover, namely, to have the frontier between Hungary and Roumania watched, in order to stop the export of requisitioned material, he thought some decision should be taken.

M. TITTONI said that all instructions sent to the Generals in Budapest should be accompanied by a proviso that they should take action if they thought action suitable; as they were on the spot, they were better able to judge what could be done.

(It was then decided to send the following telegram:—

“The Supreme Council learns that the Roumanian troops of occupation continue to make requisitions of every kind in Hungary, and to send the goods so obtained to Roumania.

The Council begs the Inter-Allied Commission to report on the practical possibility of sending officers to the frontier posts between Hungary and Roumania to prevent the export of goods requisitioned to the detriment of the Allies, and in diminution of their common security.

Should the Commission regard this suggestion as feasible, Supreme Council authorises it to act accordingly.”

The Meeting then adjourned.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 21 August, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-35

[*Mr. Frank L. Polk to the President of the Peace Conference  
(Clemenceau)*]

PARIS, August 20, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. CLEMENCEAU: It is confirmed by telegrams and by eye-witnesses, whose reports I have heard yesterday and today, that



the Roumanian forces in Hungary are continuing the systematic and wholesale seizure of Hungarian assets. This procedure, although attempted to be justified as the securing the due reparation, in reality jeopardises for all nations the securing of adequate reparation for damage, and operates to nullify the Treaty provisions to this end.

The Peace Conference found a situation where the immediately available assets of the enemy were utterly inadequate to afford compensation for the damage which the Allied and Associated Powers have suffered in varying degrees. Under these circumstances it was obvious to all who studied the reparation problem that indemnification could not be left dependent upon such factors as geographical proximity to enemy assets or upon the result of competition between Allied States in possessing themselves of such assets. An orderly scheme of reparation was essential to avoid flagrant injustice and serious discord. Accordingly, the Treaty with Germany established certain fundamental reparation principles, among which are:

(1) The joint and several liability ("solidarity") of the enemy States and a consequent pooling of their assets in the common interest of all powers entitled to reparation. It may be noted that even material received by France under the Armistice of November 11th is to be valued and the value placed in the common pool.

(2) A system of accounting is established so that all of the Allied States will participate in the common fund in proportion to approved claims after taking into account any agreed offsets against these claims.

(3) A central reparation commission is established as an exclusive agency of the Allied and Associated Powers for the collection and distribution of enemy assets by way of reparation.

The action of Roumania contravenes the principle of "solidarity" in that Roumania is appropriating to her exclusive use enemy assets which in reality are the common security of all of the Allies.

The action of Roumania involves a repudiation of the agreed principle of participation in enemy assets, in particular in that Mr. Antonesco, Roumanian Plenipotentiary, on June 27th, agreed, subject to the approval of his Government, that a certain liability of Roumania should be discharged by offsetting the same against the first claims of Roumania to reparation, and that "no further payments on account of reparation shall be made until the other States to whom reparation is due shall have received payments on account of a like proportion of their approved claims for reparation."

The action of Roumania involves a repudiation of the agreed principle that the Reparation Commission should act as an exclusive agency of all of the Allied and Associated Powers in the collection of enemy assets by way of reparation.

Under these circumstances either Roumania must undo wholly and completely what she has done or the scheme of reparation estab-

lished by the Treaty with Germany and draft treaties with other States is wholly destroyed. If Roumania is allowed to retain Hungarian assets, it constitutes public notice to the World, including Germany, that the scheme of reparation established by the Treaty is a paper scheme only, which the Allied and Associated Powers have not the intent or the will to enforce. The collection of reparation will inevitably degenerate into individual and competitive action by the several Allied and Associated Powers, in the course of which injustices will be done and animosities will be created, and in the confusion of which the enemy will either evade, or be incapacitated from, making the maximum of reparation. The Reparation Commission is at once discredited, and it is difficult for me to believe that any Government would desire to be represented on a body, the authority and usefulness of which is so nullified at its very incipency.

I suggest that this important and urgent matter be given serious consideration at an early date, and am bringing copies of this letter to the attention of our colleagues on the Council of the Heads of Delegations.

I am, my dear Mr. Clemenceau,  
Faithfully yours,

FRANK L. POLK

---

Annex B to HD-35

[Translation \*]

*Telegram Received From General Dupont*

The situation in Silesia has become particularly serious, and the blame rests very specially on Commissioner Hoersing and the German administration, who are exasperating the Polish inhabitants. In nothing have the latter been spared in the seven months which the state of siege has lasted. Thefts, pillage, arrests follow each other every day, and the Grenzschutz has a heavy responsibility for them.

The whole mining region is on general strike. For about ten days not a ton of pit-coal has been taken out. The population is obliged to resist with force the brutality of the troops, and the people being, in large majority, Polish, the clashes are serious, with a great number of losses in killed and wounded.

The sole resource for restoring calm is an Interallied military occupation in Upper Silesia. If this decision cannot be obtained speedily, it would be indispensable to charge the Polish troops with the maintenance of order after the withdrawal of the German troops. In that event an Interallied commission would have to be charged

---

\* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

with setting up a mixed Polish and German administration for the factories and mines.

The German Government declares that it does not in the least suspect the Polish Government; popular over-excitement alone is the cause of these disturbances; this opinion is shared by the Poles.

---

[Appendix C to HD-35]

[Translation \*]

AUGUST 21, 1919.

RESOLUTION

*Mission Entrusted to Mr. Hoover by the Council*

Mr. Hoover's mission has for its purpose to obtain from the German Government an anticipation of the treaty:

- (1) For the immediate dispatch to Silesia of the Interallied High Commission of Administration in Silesia;
- (2) For assent to an immediate Interallied occupation of Silesia.

The Supreme Council directs Mr. Hoover to proceed to Berlin, and there to make contact with General Dupont (whom the Supreme Council has already instructed to make inquiries and to approach the German Government on the situation in Silesia).

It should be brought to the attention of the German Government that the Allied Council is not acting on behalf of a political interest in the question, but only for the sake of the most important material interests of Central Europe.

---

\* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, August 22, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. F. L. Polk.	Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	M. Clemenceau. M. Pichon.
<i>Secretary</i> Mr. L. Harrison.	<i>Secretaries</i> Mr. H. Norman. Sir George Clerk	<i>Secretaries</i> M. Dutasta. M. Berthelot. M. de St. Quentin.
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Tittoni.	M. Matsui.
	<i>Secretary</i> M. Paterno.	<i>Secretary</i> M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Captain Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Lieut. Commander Bell.
FRANCE . . . . .	Captain Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lieut. Col. Jones.

Interpreter—M. Meyer.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Hoover to make his statement on the affairs of Silesia.

Affairs in  
Silesia

MR. HOOVER said that he and Mr. Loucheur had interviewed the German delegates at Versailles, and had made an informal suggestion to them. He had told them that if the present situation developed, it would lead the German Government into a very difficult position. In two months time, however, by the provisions of the Treaty, Silesia was to be occupied by Allied troops for the purpose of the plebiscite. He suggested to them that the German Government should, in its own interests, advance the date of the Allied occupation, and invite the Allies to send troops earlier. The German Representatives had received the suggestion favourably, and had stated that a reply from Berlin would be received on the following day. It was, however, to be noted that the German Delegates in question belonged to the Reparation Commission, and had no diplomatic attributions. Their attitude on the point at issue was, therefore, not very important. He had further told

them, that a Sub-Commission, to inquire into the means of increasing the coal output, was shortly to be sent to the Silesian, Teschen, & Dombrova coalfields. If the Germans should prove willing to co-operate with this Sub-Committee, the Allies would doubtless be willing to appoint a German member to it. He thought that his suggestion in this respect might be a fair bait to the German Government.

Col. Goodyear's dispatch was then read. (See Appen. A.)

In conclusion, he thought that the further information received from General Dupont should be placed before the Council.

M. PICHON then circulated a telegram from the French Representative in Berlin. (See Appendix B.)

MR. BALFOUR, commenting upon the telegram, said that he thought the number of Commissions now acting in Germany was very great, and asked which Commission was referred to in para. 2.

MR. POLK asked the same question.

MR. LOUCHEUR replied that the Allied Military Representatives at Berlin must have delegated some of their members with orders to proceed to Silesia, and he thought that the body so formed would be the Commission referred to in the telegram. He suggested that the Allied Representatives at Berlin ought to be informed of the measures which the Council proposed to carry into effect, and that they might know that the Coal Commission was being sent out on Monday. He further suggested that the delegated Commission from the Allied Representatives in Berlin should act in collaboration with the Coal Commission which was shortly to be sent out. In the meantime he strongly recommended that Col. Goodyear should continue to act as a local arbitrator in the interests of the Council.

MR. HOOVER remarked that he felt the Council should know the composition of the Commission which was being sent out by the Allied Representatives in Berlin; and, if an American officer were to be included on this Commission, Col. Goodyear should be designated as the American representative by the Council.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that according to the information at present available there were two Commissions at present acting in Germany. (i) The Inter-Allied Commission which was coming to an end on the following day; and (ii) the sub-ordinate body delegated from No. (i) to act in Silesia. Col. Goodyear ought certainly to be a member of this latter Commission, but the Council did not at the moment know of whom it was composed.

MR. POLK suggested that it might be a group of generals who were endeavoring to arrange matters between the Germans and the Poles.

GENERAL WEYGAND explained that, at the present moment, there was a Committee negotiating between the Germans and the Poles.

(See H. D. 23, Min 4.<sup>1</sup>) General Malcolm, General Dupont, and General Bencivena were assisting this body. The negotiations between the two countries had continued until the events in Silesia had produced such a state of tension, that they could not be proceeded with. General Dupont had wanted, in the first place, to send out a local Committee to Silesia, but the proposal had been opposed by the Poles. The German Government had received the suggestion favourably, and it was probably for this reason that a Delegated Committee had now been sent.

MR. TITTONI remarked that his information did not quite agree with that supplied by General Weygand. He had been told, that, after the rupture of negotiations, a committee had been sent out locally at the request of the Poles. He also thought that the original committee in Berlin had been negotiating on behalf of prisoners of war.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that the Council had sent out a committee to deal with the question of Russian prisoners, and that it was this same committee, which had assumed the conduct of present negotiations, owing to the fact that the various members of the committee had collaborated on many other questions in the past.

M. CLEMENCEAU then read out the decision of H. D. 23, [Minute] 4, and remarked that the Americans had not nominated a member to the Committee created under the resolution, as they were waiting for the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

M. LOUCHEUR said he thought that the Inter-Allied Committee at Berlin must be informed of the present measures taken by the Council. They should be told that a coal committee was leaving on Monday. Col. Goodyear ought, at the same time, to be asked to continue the action that he initiated; whilst on the other hand, the new Coal Commission should be kept fully informed of what Col. Goodyear had done; and be told that he was at present staying at Mährisch Ostrau, and that they should collaborate as closely as possible with him.

MR. POLK said that Mr. Hoover had suggested that Col. Goodyear should be attached to the Delegated Committee sent out to Silesia from Berlin. A telegram should therefore be sent, instructing the Committee (a) to proceed at once to Silesia and (b) to establish relations with Col. Goodyear. At the same time, it was not possible for Col. Goodyear to be an active member of the Delegated Committee prior to the ratification of the Peace Treaty. He would, therefore work as the representative of Mr. Hoover in matters connected with food and coal and would be in touch with the Generals of the Delegated Committee.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 515.



MR. BALFOUR asked what would be the relation between the Delegated Committee and the Coal Commission, both of which were being sent at the same time to the same place.

MR. LOUCHEUR replied that the Coal Committee was a purely technical body, and could be placed under the orders of the Delegated Committee.

MR. HOOVER said that the functions of the Coal Committee would be confined to questions of production and distribution. He did not believe that it could concern itself with questions of politics, and he felt that the work of this body should not be subordinated to a military committee.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that M. Loucheur and Mr. Hoover should draw up draft instructions to the Allied Representatives at Berlin, and should submit the text to the Council.

MR. HOOVER then suggested that General Weygand should assist them.

M. PICHON said that he had received a visit from Mr. Grabsky of the Polish Delegation. He had informed him that he would transmit a copy of the instructions sent by the Allied Generals, to the Polish authorities. He would tell them that he fully agreed with the instructions sent, and would ask that the local Polish authorities should collaborate with the Commissions sent out by the Council.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that a decision had been arrived at on the previous day to attach a German, a Czech, and a Pole to the Coal Committee.

MR. LOUCHEUR then read the draft instructions to be sent to Berlin. (See Appendix C.)

It was decided:—

1. That Colonel Goodyear should be instructed to continue the negotiations that he had initiated in Upper Silesia, pending the arrival of the Coal Committee, and the Committee delegated by the Inter-Allied representatives at Berlin. He was further to place himself in touch with these Bodies on their arrival and to act in close collaboration with them.

2. That the draft telegram to General Dupont (see Annex "C") should be accepted and despatched through Marshal Foch.

2. MR. BALFOUR asked, in connection with the previous resolution, whether the troops, which might have to be despatched to Upper Silesia at very short notice, were now ready.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that it had only been decided that the troops for Upper Silesia should be formed out of four equal Allied contingents (see

Allied Troops for  
the Plebiscite  
Zone in Upper  
Silesia

H. D. 27, Minute 7, and Appendix "F" <sup>2</sup>). On the same day that the de-

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 625 and 641.

cision had been taken, Marshal Foch had been requested to study the method of victualling and the distribution of the troops in Silesia, in collaboration with the military Representatives at Versailles. The Military Representatives had referred the matter to their respective Governments, and had not yet replied. He did not think that the discussions between Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives would be particularly fruitful, since the supposed difficulty of victualling did not exist. Far more complicated problems of the same kind had been solved in the past. There remained, however, the question of the total strength of effectives. On the proposal of the Military Representatives one Division had been considered sufficient. This figure had been arrived at before the appearance of the existing difficulties. When one Division had been decided upon, the military problem consisted only in maintaining order in a tranquil country. At the present moment, the country, which contained Four Million inhabitants, 360,000 of whom were labourers, was in a state of ferment and insurrection. The fact that these insurgents had disarmed troops should not be lost sight of; for it showed they were capable of military action. In his opinion, two Divisions were required under present circumstances. His opinion had been formed without local knowledge, and it would be advisable to ask General Dupont, who was proceeding to Silesia, to report on the matter. In the meantime, however, independently of anything that General Dupont might ultimately say, two Divisions ought to be put into a state of military preparedness.

M. TITTONI said that he had no objection to a simple military occupation of Silesian territory; but that if fighting occurred, parliamentary difficulties might arise in the Allied countries, and the idea that we were carrying out repressive measures might gain ground. The revolution in Silesia had an essentially Polish character. Was it not therefore desirable to obtain a declaration from the Polish Government, telling the local Polish population to receive our troops in a friendly spirit, and assist them as much as possible.

MR. BALFOUR said that the despatch of troops was part of a policy decided upon. All that could be done therefore, was to have the troops in a state of readiness.

M. TITTONI replied that he did not question Mr. Balfour's statement but thought that a proclamation from the Polish Government would be of great help. He had interpreted General Weygand's statement in the sense that severe repressions might occur.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that he did not think the question arose, since the Poles would obviously welcome our assistance against the Germans.

MR. POLK stated that he doubted whether authority existed under the American constitution for the United States to send troops into Silesia for the purpose of quelling a revolution in that country,

since the Treaty with Germany provided only for troops of occupation during the Plebiscite. If the matters under discussion dealt simply with preliminary arrangements for the eventual despatch of troops, he was prepared to agree, but he could not commit himself to the despatch of forces for the purpose of quelling the revolution.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that when one Division had been decided upon for the Army of Occupation, during the Plebiscite in Upper Silesia, it had further been decided, that the Force in question should be drawn from the Army of Occupation on the Rhine.<sup>3</sup> At that time it had been decided to maintain a Force of 150,000 men on the Rhine. Subsequently, however, this figure had been reduced to 114,000 men. Marshal Foch had thought that the troops necessary for Upper Silesia should be formed from the 36,000 men who became available owing to the reduction in the original figure. As an example, France had six Divisions, i. e. 85,000 men, formed for the Army of Occupation in Germany, and one extra Contingent for Silesia. Marshal Foch would like the British Government to get ready, in addition to the mixed brigade detailed for the Rhine, a supplementary contingent which could be drawn upon for Silesia. He also wished that the American Government would provide a force available for Silesia in addition to the 6,800 men which was its share in the Army of Occupation on the Rhine.

MR. BALFOUR said that Field-Marshal Wilson had arrived in Paris and he would like General Weygand to consult with him on the present question.

MR. POLK remarked that General Weygand might also confer with General Pershing.

It was decided:—

1. That Marshal Foch should be requested to make all arrangements necessary for putting two Divisions, which might ultimately be despatched to Upper Silesia on the orders of the Council, in a state of readiness.

2. That General Weygand should consult with Field Marshal Wilson and General Pershing with regard to the furnishing of British and American troops for Upper Silesia from sources other than the Army of Occupation on the Rhine.

3. (At this point M. Serruys, Mr. Headlam-Morley the experts of the Economic Commission, and the Editing Committee entered the room.)

M. SERRUYS read and commented upon the report contained in Appendix D.

(1) *Coal Supply to Austria:*

The question before the Council was, whether the

Report of the Economic Commission With Regard to the Austrian Counter-Proposals

<sup>3</sup> HD-12, minute 3, and HD-14, minute 5, pp. 236 and 308.



supply of coal to Austria from Poland and Tchecho-Slovakia should be guaranteed by a special clause in the Peace Treaty. The opinion of the Italian Delegation had been that it should. The other solution was, that the guarantee should be obtained by clauses in the Peace Treaties with Small States.

M. TITTONI said that he agreed to the guarantee being given in the Treaty with Tchecho-Slovakia; but the Treaty with Poland had already been signed.

M. SERRUYS said that an additional clause might be inserted in the Polish Treaty, but remarked that Italy would obviously obtain more coal from Tchecho-Slovakia than from Poland.

M. TITTONI suggested that the question could be referred to the Coal Committee, which could consult with Economic Commission as to the best method of securing the necessary guarantees; and could advise the Council as to which Treaty it had better be included in. He did not insist on any alteration in the Peace Treaty with Austria.

(It was agreed that the questions of obtaining the necessary guarantees for a coal supply by Czecho-Slovakia, and Poland, to Austria, to the new States created from the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, and to the territories of that Empire ceded to the Allies, should be referred to the Coal Committee and to the Economic Commission jointly. The above Commissions should report to the Council, on the Peace Treaties, in which the clauses ensuring the above guarantees, should be inserted.)

(2) *Articles 225 and 226 of the Peace Treaty With Austria: Subject of Nationalities:*

M. SERRUYS said that the Economic Commission had replied to the Austrian Note with regard to the Nationality Clauses in the Peace Treaty only on the economic aspect of the economic problem. There was another juristic side to it. It was very necessary that the Editing Committee should co-ordinate and unify the replies to the Austrian Note on the subject of nationalities, under the two aspects that they presented.

M. TITTONI said that he did not see the use of discussing an essentially political and juristic question from an economic point of view. The economic side of the question was obviously the less important. In his opinion the Economic Commission, the Committee on Political Clauses, and the Drafting Committee, ought to confer together, and present a single report.

M. SERRUYS said that the Economic Commission had been unanimous in their decision, and he did not see the use under the circumstances, of inviting other bodies to confer with it. It would be

enough to communicate the Report of the Economic Commission to them.

M. TITTONI replied that the Economic Commission had evidently been able to discuss only one side of the question. If the Commission in question had been able to say that it had examined every side of the problem, he would have no reluctance in accepting their conclusion.

M. SERRUYS replied, that the general structure and intentions, of the Peace Treaty with Austria had decided the manner in which the problem was to be solved. He drew attention to the fact, that the Economic Commission had been obliged to deal with questions not purely economic, such as the consular establishments, the repeal of the Delbruck Law, etc. The division between the functions of the Economic Commission, and those of the Political Committee, had been somewhat artificial; and, for this reason, it was necessary to co-ordinate the notes of each.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not see any reason for continuing the discussion. Both the Economic Commission and other bodies were in agreement. It was therefore obvious that they could confer together and sign a complete report to the Council.

(It was decided that the Austrian Counter Proposals on the subject of Articles 225 and 226 (Nationality Clauses) in the peace treaty with Austria, which Counter Proposals also affected Articles 57, 65, and 69 of the aforesaid peace treaty, should be referred to the Economic Commission and the Drafting Committee for examination and report.)

(3) *The Solidarity Between the Old Austro-Hungarian Empire and the New Austrian Republic:*

The Council was called upon to consider the Austrian contention, that there was a complete break of historical continuity, between the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and the new Austrian Republic.

M. SERRUYS in drawing the attention of the Council to the above point, said that almost every clause in the existing Peace Treaty with Austria was dependent upon the standpoint previously adopted by the Council. The Economic Commission, however, could not assume a final decision, without a definite ruling from the Council on the point in question.

MR. BALFOUR said that it was obvious that the previous decision of the Council of Four must be upheld. The new Austrian Republic was in an absolutely different position from the other States, which had arisen out of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The former was an enemy State, and the latter were now friendly and allied Powers. On the other hand, it was in the interests of the Allied and Associated Powers that the financial and economic clauses of the

Peace Treaty with Austria should be framed in such a way, that ruin and bankruptcy should not be forced upon the Austrian Republic. The result of this would be that the Government at Vienna would think that their only hope of salvation lay in joining the German Empire. If any changes were to be made in the Peace Treaty, he thought they ought to be carried out with the above object.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether it was decided that the Austrian contention contained in Letter No. 707 was rejected.

MR. BALFOUR replied in the affirmative but added that he thought some of the objections raised by the Austrian Delegation were valid. For this reason, he reserved to himself the right to propose modifications in the Financial and Economic Clauses when they came up for final discussion.

M. TITTONI said that he wished to make a reservation. Mr. Balfour's proposal, if accepted, would result in a lessening of the total guarantees to be obtained from Austria. If Mr. Balfour proposed a more equitable distribution of guarantees among the States of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, he agreed; but he insisted that the total amount of Reparation due to the Allies should not, on that account, be diminished. For this reason, if Mr. Balfour proposed to lessen the reparation payable by Austria, he would maintain that a corresponding increase should be placed upon the obligations of the other States of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire.

(After some further discussion, it was agreed that the question of the Financial and Economic guarantees should be adjourned until the consideration by the Council of the final reply to the Austrian Note.)

(4) *Economic Clauses in the Peace Treaty With Austria:*

(After some further discussion, it was agreed that the modifications introduced into the Economic Clauses of the Peace Treaty with Austria should be communicated by the Economic Commission to the States concerned, who should report, in writing, through their Delegations, any observations that they had to offer to the Supreme Council by Monday, August 25th.)

(5) *Distribution of Funds Accumulated in Social Insurance Schemes Amongst States Deriving Territory From the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy:*

M. SERRUYS said that in order to ensure a satisfactory solution of the problem, it had been suggested by the Italian Delegation, that the matter should be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the League of Nations, if disagreement arose.



M. TIRRONI said, that, as the Covenant of the League of Nations provided for arbitration in such cases as these, he could [not?] see why special bodies should be called into existence for settling disputes of this nature. If they were called upon to adjudicate in questions arising out of insurance funds, other bodies would be called into existence for other problems, and, in referring the matter to the League of Nations, he considered that the Italian Delegation was doing no more than calling upon that organization to carry out some of its recognised functions.

(It was decided that the following point should be laid before the Drafting Committee for report:—

Since numerous points in the Peace Treaty had to be settled by Conventions between the States concerned, what procedure was to be followed, and what form of arbitration adopted, if one of the States opposed the decisions?

Was the procedure laid down in Article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations adequate and sufficient?)

*Austrian Insurance Companies.* The question before the Council was the retention or rejection of Article 12 in Section 5 of the Peace Treaty with Austria.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had been advised by his expert, that the clause in question had first been proposed by the Belgian Delegation. After some discussion it had been so amended as to become almost inoperative. The British Delegation and the Five Principal Powers thought that it ought to be suppressed. The Belgian Delegation, however, desired its retention, even in its present form.

(After some further discussion it was decided that Article 12 of Section 5 of the Peace Treaty with Austria dealing with the suppression of Insurance Contracts between an Austrian Insurance Company and its nationals, "under conditions which shall protect its nationals from any prejudice", should be suppressed.)

At this point Mr. Serruys, Mr. Headlam-Morley, and the other experts left the room.

4. At this stage Capt. Roper entered the room.

CAPTAIN ROPER reported on the answer to the request of the Supreme Council (see H. D. 25-14<sup>e</sup>) on the subject of the sale and alienation of aeronautical material by the German Government. (See Appendix E.) The Committee on Aerial Clauses had attempted, without arriving at a unanimous agreement, to find a legal argument, whereby the German Government could be forbidden to alienate its aeronautical material. It had, however, been discovered, that in the Brussels Convention,<sup>7</sup> the Germans had agreed not to sell their war material,

Sale of Aeronau-  
tic War Material  
by Germany

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 563.

<sup>7</sup> Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3 sér., tome XI, p. 224.

whilst the aforesaid Convention remained in force. One member of the Committee had thought that the Brussels Convention terminated with the raising of the blockade, and that this had removed the obligations remaining on the German Government. The majority of the Committee, however, thought that the raising of the blockade, being an advantage to the German people, could not destroy the obligations which they had accepted, in order to obtain the advantages which accrued to them under the Brussels Convention. The legal point at issue was whether the Supreme Economic Council had been right in stating that the prohibition on the sale of aeronautical material would remain in force until the end of the armistice, that is to say, until the complete ratification of the Peace Treaty. Another question arose, which was whether the Supreme Economic Council was entitled to decide on such a point. The Supreme Council is the only judge of the matter. An obvious obligation is imposed by the Peace Treaty with Germany, since if the German Government alienated its material before the ratification of the Treaty, they would not be able to make the deliveries called for under that document. This point had been unanimously admitted by the Committee on Aerial Clauses. This might be regarded as a form of moral obligation which the Germans had acknowledged, as far as war material was concerned, in their letter to General Nudant, dated August 6th, 1919. (See Appendix E.)

GENERAL WEYGAND said that General Yudenitch<sup>\*</sup> was at present asking for permission to purchase from Germany Russian war material previously captured by the former power. Czecho-Slovakia was making a similar request to be allowed to purchase war material from Bavaria. He thought that the two questions should be considered con-jointly.

CAPTAIN ROPER suggested that the principle of Allied ownership of war material in the hands of Germany should first be upheld. Thereafter the Allies might grant special authorisations for the sale of such material.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with this proposal, and suggested that, in accordance with the above principle, sales to General Yudenitch and the Czecho-Slovaks might be authorised at once.

M. TRITONI said, that as General Yudenitch's request for financial and material assistance could not be granted, it was incumbent upon the Council to accede to his wishes in this respect.

MR. POLK suggested that the entire question might be referred to the proposed advance Delegations of the Commissions of Control, which were about to proceed into Germany.

---

<sup>\*</sup> Gen. Nicholas N. Yudenitch, commander in chief of the White Russian forces in the Baltic provinces.

ADMIRAL KNAPP said that he had been a member of the Committee on Aerial Clauses, but had entertained certain doubts as to the legal position. His opinion had been that the Brussels Convention had not been binding on Germany after the Convention had lapsed. Morally he had not felt any doubt in the matter. If the majority point of view were to prevail, Germany would be restrained from consummating any future sales to neutrals, and would therefore be obliged to turn over to the Allies any sums which she had realised in the past.

MR. BALFOUR said that as everybody was agreed as to the existence of a moral obligation upon the German Government, he thought it would be best to make a specific demand on Germany, leaving it to her to bring forward such legal objections as might be made. He wished that the draft telegram to be sent to the German Government should be placed before the Council on the following day.

(It was agreed that the Allied and Associated Powers should inform Germany that they maintain the principle that Germany should not alienate its war material, more particularly material of an aeronautical description. At the same time, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, by virtue of their rights of property over this material, should reserve to themselves the right to grant special licenses in certain cases.

It was further decided that, in execution of the above resolution, a special authorisation should be granted to Germany for the sale of material asked for by General Yudenitch, and by the Czechoslovak Government. A draft telegram on the above lines, to be sent to General Nudant, should be prepared by General Weygand and submitted for approval at the next meeting of the Council.)

5. The Council took note of the telegram from the French Minister at Belgrade. (Annex "F".)

M. TITTONI said that he thought explanations should be asked for from Bucharest.

MR. BALFOUR said that whilst agreeing with M. Tittoni, he thought it essential that the Government at Bucharest should be informed that the frontiers laid down by the Supreme Council in the Banat and elsewhere, were final.

(It was decided that M. Pichon should send a telegram to the French Minister at Bucharest in the name of the Supreme Council, asking for further information on the intentions of the Roumanian Government with regard to the Banat. He should also inform the Roumanian Government that the frontiers laid down by the Council in the Banat and elsewhere, were final.)

6. M. CLEMENCEAU asked Mr. Hoover to make a statement with regard to the situation in Hungary.

Roumanian  
Intentions  
in the Banat



Situation  
in Hungary

Mr. HOOVER said that he had little to add to his statement on the previous day. He did not think that it would require much pressure to dispossess the Archduke of the Throne that he had seized.

Mr. BALFOUR proposed that a telegram which he had drafted (see Annex "G") should be despatched.

After some discussion it was agreed that the telegram drafted by Mr. Balfour should be published immediately, and sent to the Mission of Allied Generals at Budapest.

Mr. HOOVER then read a further telegram from Mr. Gregory at Budapest (see Annex "H").

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the telegram in question made it all the more necessary to send off Mr. Balfour's despatch.

7. The Council took note of the letter from Marshal Foch on the subject of the use of the Port of Dantzic and the Kiel Canal (see Annex "I").

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the use of the Port of Dantzic was connected with the Polish question, which was now very acute. Although Marshal Foch was in agreement with the German proposals, he did not think that the discussion could be continued at the present time. The question was therefore adjourned.

8. The Committee took note of Marshal Foch's proposals with regard to the immediate despatch of certain members of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control into Germany (see Annex "j").

Mr. POLK stated that he agreed with Marshal Foch's conclusions but that he was unable to send any American Delegates until the ratification of the Treaty of Peace. He agreed, however, that General Bliss should be kept informed of the action taken by the advanced Delegations.

It was decided that Marshal Foch's proposals with regard to the immediate despatch into Germany of Delegations representing the Commissions of Control, should be accepted; and that the representation of the United States on the aforesaid Delegations should be held in abeyance for the present.

General Weygand was instructed to draft a letter for communication to the German Government informing them of the above proposals.

9. GENERAL WEYGAND reported and commented on the documents contained in Appendix K. He said that the Inter-Allied Transport Committee was independent of the Supreme Economic Council, and was composed of military representatives of each of the Allied Powers. The body in question had urged that the British and American armies using French rolling-stock should pay different rates. The difference in question

Use by the British  
and American  
Armies of Roll-  
ing-Stock Taken  
Over [Surrendered]  
by the Germans Un-  
der the Armistice

should be regulated by the use made of French and Belgian rolling-stock, or of German railway material, delivered under the armistice. The latter had cost nothing.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would like to consult General Mance.

GENERAL WEYGAND, continuing, said that Marshal Foch, when he had dealt with the question, had only divided up the German material surrendered, in such a way that transport should be facilitated. Railway carriages had been given to France and Belgium. Locomotives had been divided up between France and Belgium, and had been assigned to the British and American armies in France. Everybody had agreed to the principle on division. The British and Americans had now surrendered the German engines allotted to them, which had fallen into the hand of France and Belgium for the time only. But when the Peace Conference finally decided the manner in which the railway material was to be divided, every country would pay for its share. There would therefore be no ultimate difference in the nature of the rolling-stock employed, since it would belong to the country in which it was used. For this reason, he could not see that the principle of different rates of payment could be upheld.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Inter-Allied Transport Committee had been aware of General Weygand's standpoint when it had drawn up its report.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he did not know.

The question was then adjourned.

10. (It was decided that the proposal of the Committee supervising the execution of the clauses of the Peace Treaty with Germany (See Appendix L) should be adopted.)

The meeting then adjourned.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 22 August, 1919.

Proposal of the  
Schleswig Com-  
mission Suggest-  
ing Despatch of  
One Member to  
Flensburg

#### Appendix A to HD-36

[*The Representative at Vienna of the American Relief Administration (Gregory) to the Director General of Relief (Hoover)*]

13x go 100

VIENNA, August 21, 1919—7:30 p.m.

A.R.A. Received Aug. 22, 1919.

Hoover, Paris.

Following received over phone from Mährisch Ostrau: "insurrectionists retiring to Poland have taken with them several hundred hostages. Germans have numerous prisoners including a number of Polish soldiers in uniform. Am leaving for Poland and will

attempt to secure immediately return of all hostages. In the meantime have arranged with commanding general for suspension of execution by Germans until tomorrow morning. Hope in meantime to negotiate some arrangement between Germans and Poles. If possible secure authority for me from Entente and Germany to act as arbitrator in present situation until arrival Upper Silesian Commission. Under martial law Germans will doubtless execute many prisoners including Polish soldiers unless arrangements can be made to turn them over to Polish military authorities for discipline. To avoid further clashes hope to arrange this. Goodyear."

GREGORY

---

Appendix B to HD-36

[*Telegram From the French Representative in Berlin (Haguenin)*]

[Translation <sup>o</sup>]

BERLIN, August 21, 1919—5:25 p. m.

Received August 22—12:30 a. m.

The Germans and the Poles have just come to an agreement on the following points:

- (1) The Germans will no longer carry out any executions.
- (2) An Interallied commission will depart tomorrow for Upper Silesia.
- (3) The Polish delegation will leave for Warsaw; it will remain there until the Interallied mission has presented its report.
- (4) Tomorrow at 10 o'clock a final session will take place; at the close of the session the Polish delegation will quit Berlin.

The National Assembly has set up the committee on foreign affairs provided for by article 35 of the constitution. Scheidemann is chairman, Haussmann vice chairman; the Socialists are represented on it by Braun, Franconia, Hildenbrand, Stucklen, and Weiss; the Center by Herschel, Pfeiffer, Tricorn; the Democrats by Schiffer and Von Richtofen; the German Nationals by Graafe and Traub; the German Popular Party by Heinze. The commission charged with the examination of the question of responsibility has also been formed today under the chairmanship of the Democrat Petersen; deputy Spahn of the Center was named vice-chairman. The sessions will be public.

HAGUENIN

---

<sup>o</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



## Appendix C to HD-36

[Translation <sup>10</sup>]*Telegram to General Dupont*

Referring to your telegram No. . . . ,<sup>11</sup> we understand that the commission composed of yourself, General Malcolm, and General Bencivenga is about to proceed to Upper Silesia. The Conference desires that you hasten your journey and that upon arrival you associate Colonel Goodyear with you as the American representative of your commission.

Colonel Goodyear has been the representative of the Supreme Economic Council to arrange for the distribution of coal, and he is now in Upper Silesia at Mährisch-Ostrau.

The American delegation received this morning from Colonel Goodyear the following telegram which indicates what he is at present doing " . . . . "<sup>11</sup>

Our wish is that all questions be taken in hand by the commission as a whole.

At the same time, we are advising Colonel Goodyear of these arrangements and are instructing him to continue his efforts in the sense indicated by him until our [*your?*] arrival.

The Conference considers that everything possible ought to be done by the commission to achieve the restoration of order and it hopes that the personal influence of the members of the commission will be exerted for that purpose. The commission should keep the Conference informed and particularly should telegraph, upon its arrival, what the exact situation is and the plan which it proposes.

For your information we advise that at present, in the light of information received, the Conference considers that the only solution capable of ensuring public security and of ensuring at the same time the production of coal, consists in immediate occupation by Allied troops.

That cannot be done without the assent of Germany until 15 days after the ratification of the treaty. On the other hand, Germany must suffer greatly from actual destruction and from the stoppage of production.

An unofficial suggestion has been made, through the channel of the German delegation at Versailles, that the German Government request an immediate occupation. In accordance with the treaty, such an occupation will, in any case, be inevitable within a few weeks. You are requested to give us your opinion on the number of effectives necessary for this occupation under the present circumstances.

<sup>10</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>11</sup> Omission indicated in the original French.

We are informing you, moreover, that a special and technical commission has been sent by us to Marisch-Ostrau to study the means for increasing the production of coal and its distribution, not only in Upper Silesia, but also in Teschen, Dombrowa, and other neighboring coal-fields. This commission will include not only delegates of the four powers, but also a Czechoslovak delegate and a Polish delegate. We have invited the Germans to cooperate in it by designating a member. This commission will arrive on Thursday. America has designated Colonel Goodyear as its representative.

---

Appendix D to HD-36

[Translation <sup>12</sup>]

ECONOMIC COMMISSION,  
PARIS, August 13, 1919.

From the Chairman of the Economic Commission,  
To the President of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The Special Committee of the representatives on the Economic Commission of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, in transmitting to the Supreme Council the draft which it has prepared for reply to the Austrian notes and proposals, believes that it ought to bring to the attention of the Council the questions enumerated below, which, although they have been the subject of unanimous resolutions by the Special Committee, seem nevertheless either to necessitate the adherence of the powers with limited interests who are not represented on this Committee, or to require on the part of the Committee charged with drawing up the definitive reply to Austria, a certain coordination with the resolutions taken by other commissions of the Conference on related subjects.

(1) The Special Committee acknowledges the justice of some discerning observations by the Austrian delegation on the problem of supplying coal to Austria, and proposes the insertion in the treaty, subject to the assent of the Commission on Reparations of the Peace Conference of a provision forbidding Czechoslovakia and Poland to obstruct the supplying of coal to Austria by means of export duties or any other restrictive measure.

The Supreme Council will no doubt consider that this arrangement ought to be submitted for the approval of the two interested states.

The Special Committee is likewise of the opinion that a similar guarantee should be given for the furnishing of coal by Czechoslovakia and Poland to states which have sprung from the Dual Monarchy, and to Austro-Hungarian territories ceded to any of the Allied and Associated Powers.

---

<sup>12</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

But it considers that it is reserved to the Supreme Council to pronounce upon the question whether this guarantee ought to be inserted in the treaty with Austria by a provision stipulating that paragraphs 1 to 3 of the proposed article for Austria will be applicable to the ceded territories, or whether, on the contrary, an extension of the article imposed upon Austria ought to be the subject of negotiations with Czechoslovakia and Poland, for the purpose of inserting a special article in some other treaty.

(2) In the preamble to some final observations (pages 19 and 20), the Austrian delegation has raised against articles 225 and 226 of the treaty (part X, economic clauses) objections which apply equally to a certain number of articles of a political nature (articles 57, 65, and 69).

To these objections the Special Committee of the Economic Commission has given its reply, insofar as concerns itself; but it would be useful if the committee which will draw up the definitive reply to Austria would proceed, for the discussion of these problems of nationality, to the coordination of data furnished by the Economic Commission with those which it will have collected from the competent territorial and political commissions.

(3) The Special Committee has given a reply, as respects the "treaties" section to the declaration of principle contained in note 707 from the Austrian delegation, according to which the German Austrian Republic, which was formed under exactly the same conditions as was the Czechoslovak state or the original Yugoslav state, could not be bound by the treaties and contractual obligations of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Special Committee, in conformity with the fundamental scheme of the draft treaty as it was decided upon by the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and according to which the Republic of Austria shares in the liabilities of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, does not believe that it can retain in their entirety the Austrian counter proposals regarding the treaties.

In case the Supreme Council should modify its earlier instructions, the Economic Commission would be obliged to take up again the examination of the articles which it has drafted and which are based on the principles previously laid down by the Allied and Associated Powers.

In the present state of things, the Economic Commission felt it could admit only two slight changes in articles 229 and 241.

(4) The Special Committee wishes to point out to the Supreme Council that some of the modifications proposed in the draft of the treaty of peace considerably affect the interests of the new states and the states receiving cessions of territory which formed part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.



If the Supreme Council gives its approval to these modifications, it will no doubt judge it expedient to communicate them immediately to the delegations of the interested states for their information.

(5) A proposal was made by the Italian delegation regarding article 270 (economic clauses), which provides for a division, among the states receiving cessions of territory from the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, of the accumulated reserve funds of the various social insurance organizations, and which stipulates that special arrangements to that end will be concluded among the interested states.

The Italian delegation proposed to the Economic Commission that, in order to ensure the conclusion of these special conventions, a provision be introduced into the article providing that in case of disagreement the difference should be resolved by an arbitrator appointed by the League of Nations.

The Italian proposal would extend this arbitral procedure, not only to matters falling under article 270, but to all articles of the treaty in which there is provision for the conclusion of bilateral conventions between Austria and other states, successors to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Committee was of opinion that so general a proposal was beyond its competence, and it observes, moreover, that as regards article 270, the procedure advocated by the Italian delegation had been recently adopted, since, in virtue, no doubt, of a decision of the Supreme Council, it was stipulated in a provision added to article 270, in the second version of the draft treaty delivered to the Italian delegation on July 19.

While the question has been thus settled for article 270, the Special Committee feels that it ought to give an account of the Italian proposal in view of other applications of which it is susceptible, but on which the Committee refrains from expressing any view.

(6) The assent given by the Special Committee to the Austrian request looking toward the elimination of paragraph 12 in section 5, has drawn from the Belgian delegation, which has no membership in the Committee, a protest which seems to call for a decision by the Supreme Council.

Signature

## Appendix E to HD-36

[Translation <sup>13</sup>]FRENCH REPUBLIC,  
PARIS, August 17, 1919.

From General Duval, Chairman of the Commission on Air Clauses,  
To the President of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference.

I have the honor to submit to you a statement of the opinion of the Commission on Air clauses, which met on Thursday, August 14, 1919, at the request of the Supreme Council, to study afresh the text of the three resolutions taken by the Council on August 6, 1919,<sup>14</sup> on the subject of the sale of aeronautical material by the German Government.

The Commission unanimously agreed:—

A.—That it is necessary to consider as war material:

- (1) All material built before the signing of the armistice;
- (2) All material in the course of construction at the time of that signature;
- (3) All material which has been built since that date, according to plans in use before the armistice.

B.—That it is proper to consider as civil aircraft those which were built after the armistice and according to entirely new designs; but that it is almost certain that there does not exist at this time in Germany any apparatus which would fulfill these conditions or which could be justly called "civil aircraft."

C.—That there is not at present any true difference between so-called civil aircraft and military aircraft; and that it is necessary to regard as military aircraft all aircraft recently transformed into so-called civil aircraft.

D.—That on even stronger grounds it is necessary to consider as "war material" the 500 motors alluded to in the 3d resolution of the Supreme Council on August 6, since these 500 motors were captured by Germany on machines belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers.

The Commission then made a search, among the existing official texts, for the grounds of any legal argument tending to deny to Germany the right to export its aeronautical material:—

(1) In the text of the armistice convention, there exists no provision which would be of use. It provided only for the surrender of a certain quantity of material, the surplus was not considered.

(2) In the treaty of peace, there exists no provision applicable to the period prior to the coming into force of the treaty of peace, that is to say before ratification.

---

<sup>13</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>14</sup> HD-25, minute 14, p. 563.

(3) In the Brussels Convention only there appears a formal prohibition of the exportation of certain materials enumerated in a list contained in a telegram of March 25, 1919, addressed by the Supreme [Economic] Council to the German Government through the Interallied Armistice Commission.

But the Brussels Convention ceased to be operative on July 12, 1919, the date of the raising of the blockade.

What, then, is the rule to be applied between this date of July 12, 1919, and the date on which the treaty of peace will be applicable?

The above-mentioned telegram of the Supreme Economic Council specifies that the exportation of the articles referred to as "war material" will be prohibited for the whole duration of the armistice, a period that would last to the date of the ratification of the treaty of peace. The majority of the members of the Commission on Air Clauses thinks, moreover, that the raising of the blockade would have no power to relieve the Germans of the engagement taken at Brussels to forego any exportation of the specified materials, an engagement which won for them a relaxation of the blockade and an immediate provisioning. The raising of the blockade being an amelioration of their condition and a very great favor, it cannot absolve Germany from obligations previously taken.

Nevertheless, certain members of the Commission on Air Clauses have called in question the competence of the Supreme Economic Council in declaring in its telegram that the prohibition of export would last up to the end of the armistice, that is to say, beyond the duration of the Brussels Convention, in virtue of which the list of prohibitions was drawn up.

The Supreme Council of the Peace Conference alone can judge of the validity of this decision of the Supreme Economic Council, a decision against which the German Government has not raised any protest.

No *legal argument*, then, can be maintained unanimously by the Commission on Air Clauses, but there is a *moral argument* in favor of the prohibition of the export of German aeronautical material, and the Commission on Air Clauses believes unanimously that:

- (1) Aeronautic material constitutes a part of war material.
- (2) War material, since it is reserved, under the terms of the treaty of peace, for delivery by the Germans to the Allied and Associated States, must not be exported before the ratification of the said treaty of peace.
- (3) From which it follows that aeronautic material, even the so-called civil planes, must not be exported.

Moreover, this *moral obligation* has been acknowledged in writing by the German Government itself in a letter dated August 6, 1919,



addressed by the President of the German Armistice Commission to the President of the Interallied Armistice Commission, General Nudant.

Copy of that letter is attached.

[Enclosure—Translation <sup>19</sup>]

A A 11.7207

*The Chairman of the German Armistice Commission to the Chairman of the Interallied Armistice Commission*

Subject: Sale of airplanes.

To the Note of July 20, No. 1441/G

The reply to the note from General Nudant, on the subject of the exportation of airplanes, has not been made because the list of prohibitions forbidding the exportation of particular articles and based upon the government of [*agreement of?*] Brussels had lost meanwhile its reason for existence, in consequence of the raising of the blockade. This list of prohibitions resulted, for the German Government, in the following situation:—

In the list of prohibitions, airplanes are not specifically mentioned. Nevertheless, planes came within the meaning of war material, insofar as it was a question of there being among them military equipment intended to be used for military purposes by a foreign country. There was a distinction to be made, therefore, between military planes, of which the exportation was forbidden, and planes for civil purposes, which were not subject to any prohibition against exportation. The German Government has proceeded rigorously against the exportation of military planes or of parts of such planes as soon as it has learned of any case of the kind. At present, so far as concerns the exportation of planes on the part of Germany, action will be taken according to the terms fixed by the treaty of peace.

As regards the charge made by Marshal Foch in his telegram of June 14, No. 2930, on the subject of the exportation of old military equipment to Scandinavian countries, an investigation could not be made for want of detailed information.

DUSSELDORF, August 6, 1919.

Signed: WILMS

---

Appendix F to HD-36

[*Telegram From the French Minister at Belgrade (Fontenay)*]

[Translation <sup>20</sup>]

BELGRADE, August 20, 1919.

The President of the Council has just brought me disturbing news which the S.C.S. Government is receiving from Bucharest.

---

<sup>20</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

M. Bratiano is continuing his propaganda; he claims the Banat up to Tisza; M. Marghiloman <sup>18</sup> supports him, and declares that it will be taken by the army if necessary, that in any case the Great Powers cannot do anything to stop it. They both refuse to recognize the delimitation which has been made in the Banat. Certain diplomats at Bucharest are anxious and admit that Roumania is on the eve of committing an act of folly.

In Transylvania there are already (?) Roumanian divisions of infantry and two of cavalry. It is believed that they will receive the order to invade the Serbian Banat.

The Serbs are determined to defend themselves, no matter how great their weariness. Will there be a reversal of the effect of the decree demobilizing three territorial classes signed yesterday by the Prince Regent?

The Serbian General Staff believes that it will be obliged to send reinforcements into the Banat.

The S. C. S. Government appeals to the Conference and asks earnestly that it come to a decision which would put an end to the machinations of M. Bratiano, and that it declare formally that the partition of the Banat and its delimitation must be considered as definitive. This is what I have already been saying in my telegrams Nos. 341 and 342, and in my despatch 428. The Conference has assumed a genuine responsibility toward the Serbs in obliging them to evacuate strategic points in the Banat which they had to hand over to the Roumanians, and territories of which the Magyar and Schwabian population would, in case of a conflict, march by the side of the Serbs against the Roumanians.

The S. C. S. Government has received from the Czechs an urgent warning to be on their guard. From Budapest comes the most alarming information of the aggressive intentions of the Roumanians. Along the new frontier in the Banat great nervousness reigns, provoked by the threats of the Roumanians.

This evening the Council of Ministers contemplated the eventuality of a new general mobilization, although yesterday it had caused a first decree of demobilization to be signed.

It is of extreme urgency to speak out firmly.

FONTENAY

---

<sup>18</sup> Alexandre Marghiloman, of Roumania, President of the Council and Minister of the Interior, March 12 to November 9, 1918.

## Appendix G to HD-36

*Telegram Sent by the Supreme Council to the Interallied Mission of Generals at Budapest*

The Allied and Associated Powers have been further considering the information derived from your reports and from other sources as to recent events in Budapest:—their conclusions are as follows:—

They are most anxious to conclude a durable peace with the Hungarian people, but they feel that this cannot be done while the present Hungarian Government is in power. That Government has been brought into existence not by the will of the people but by a *coup d'état* carried out by a small body of police under the protection of a foreign army. It has at its head a member of the House of Hapsburg, whose policy and ambition were largely responsible for the calamities under which the world is suffering, and will long suffer. A peace negotiated by such a Government is not likely to be lasting, nor can the Allied and Associated Governments give it the economic support which Hungary so sorely needs.

If it be replied that the Archduke Joseph is prepared, before approaching the Allied and Associated Governments, to submit his claims to the test of popular election, we must reply that this procedure cannot be satisfactory if the election is carried out under the auspices of an administration which the Archduke himself controls. The difficulties in the way of obtaining, by election, a faithful reflexion of the popular will, are, in the present unhappy state of Hungary, of the most serious kind. They would be overwhelming if the election were carried out under Hapsburg influences. Even if the Assembly elected under such circumstances were really representative, no one would think so. In the interests, therefore, of European Peace the Allied and Associated Governments must insist, that the present claimant to the headship of the Hungarian State should resign, and that a Government in which all parties are represented should appeal to the Hungarian people. The Allied and Associated Powers would be prepared to negotiate with any Government which possessed the confidence of an Assembly so elected. You should have this message published locally.

22.8.19.



## Appendix H to HD-36

[*The Representative at Vienna of the American Relief Administration (Gregory) to the Director General of Relief (Hoover)*]

7x u 224 Rush

VIENNA August 22, 1919.

A.R.A. Received Aug. 22, 1919.

Hoover, Paris.

Ham No 1192 At Conference yesterday afternoon participated in by different parties in Hungary, it was determined to ask the Entente for a statement as to whether the Archduke was *persona grata* or not. In view of the repeated declarations which have been made directly and indirectly to the four generals and to other persons on this subject it would appear either that there is a studied attempt on the part of the Archduke and his man Friday, Friederich, to cause delays during which time the Roumanians continue to heavily propagandize the situation, or second, that the four generals to whom these instructions have been given have not with sufficient force conveyed and interpreted them to the members of the Government. In the meantime Roumanians are working very strongly with certain members of the Government who say that unless entente gives clear answer to their question that it will [be?] best for them to throw their lot with the Roumanians. Naturally this talk is being made by the Archduke and Friederich his prime minister in view of the situation. Can you not arrange to have a direct and final answer given to these people upon this subject which will settle this business once and for all. Can you not do this today.

GREGORY

---

Appendix I to HD-36

[Translation <sup>19</sup>]

THE SUPREMEM COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
GENERAL STAFF, GENERAL BUREAU OF COMMUNICATIONS AND  
SUPPLIES FOR THE ARMIES  
ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

No. 2118/C. R.

August 18, 1919.

*Note for the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers*

In execution of the resolution taken July 21 by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers,<sup>20</sup> Marshal Foch informed the German Government, through the intermediary of the C. I. P. A., of

---

<sup>19</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>20</sup> HD-12, minute 4, p. 237.

the following matters relative to the transportation of war material of all kinds sent to Poland via Danzig.

1. Use of the port of Danzig—furnishing of the necessary rolling-stock for transshipment—effectuation of transportation on sections of the German lines.

2. Use of the Kiel Canal to facilitate effectuation of transportation by sea (letter No. 1309/C. R. of July 28—document No. 1 attached <sup>21</sup>).

By telegram of August 15, transmitted by the general president of the C. I. P. A. (document No. 2 herewith) the German Government pointed out:

1. First of all, that, as appears from its declarations at the time of negotiations on the transportation of the Haller Army, it recognizes no obligation to authorize the passage of material for the Polish Army through Danzig;

2. That, however, it is ready to enter into negotiations on this subject;

3. That it seems to it particularly advisable to make use for this purpose of negotiations now taking place in Berlin with the delegates of the Polish Government and to have the question discussed by the Special Commission for Military Affairs which was set up for the purpose of negotiations of this kind.

On the first point there is no objection to be made to the reservations formulated by the German Government which is fully within its rights. Such rights have, moreover, never been questioned.

On the second point it seems that, as a matter of fact, it is at Berlin, through direct negotiations between representatives of the German and Polish Governments that the question of transportation via Danzig of war material intended for the Polish Armies may be settled under the best conditions.

Accordingly, Marshal Foch suggests that the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers accept the proposals of the German Government, it being understood that General Dupont will receive from the Marshal the necessary instructions most thoroughly to support the requests of the Polish Government in the discussions to be held.

WEYGAND

---

<sup>21</sup> The documents referred to do not accompany the Appendix.

## Appendix J to HD-36

[Translation <sup>22</sup>]

THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,  
GENERAL STAFF,  
ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

No. 3940

AUGUST 17, 1919.

Marshal Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies,  
To the President of the Council, President of the Peace Conference,  
(Secretariat of the Conference)

By letter dated August 11, the German delegation at Versailles requested that, in order to prepare, in accord with the German Government, for the execution of part V of the peace treaty, regarding the military, naval and air clauses, the Allied and Associated Powers should send a qualified commission to Berlin as soon as possible.

The reasons given by Germany—necessity of taking a series of most important financial, legislative and administrative measures as soon as possible; advantage of avoiding from the beginning any divergence in views and of thus guaranteeing itself against any subsequent modification of the measures taken—have indisputable weight.

From the point of view of the Allied and Associated Powers, Marshal Foch has pointed out on several occasions how useful it would be for our Commissions of Control to enter into action immediately upon the coming into effect of the treaty, following a well thought out plan and with the necessary means. The proposal of the German Government is of a kind greatly to facilitate and accelerate the work of these commissions. It thus seems that it ought to be accepted.

On the other hand, considering that the Commissions of Control, which, under the terms of the treaty, represent the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers near the German Government, will have the duty of overseeing the execution of the clauses of part V of the treaty, there would be the most serious disadvantages to having the matters in question discussed by a new commission which would parallel and even supersede others. It is accordingly requested that the Commission to be sent to Berlin shall be a sort of advance guard of the Commissions of Control and be composed of a small number of members of each power having a place on each of the military, naval and air commissions. These members shall be chosen from among the highest ranks, in view of the importance

---

<sup>22</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.



of the decisions which they will have to make or, in important cases, submit to the Supreme Council of the Governments.

Finally, the German delegation speaks of *negotiations*, of measures to be taken *in accord* between the Allied and Associated Governments and the German Government. It seems necessary to make it clear that if the Allied Commission sent to Berlin is to take under serious consideration and to examine with all desirable care the observations and proposals of the German Government in order to arrive at a practical execution of the treaty's clauses, there can be no question of negotiations properly so-called. It has only to regulate the modalities of putting into effect a treaty which is not susceptible of any change.

Therefore, I have the honor to submit to the Supreme Council of the Governments the following resolution:

"For the purpose of preparing with the German Government for the execution of the military, naval and air clauses of the treaty, each Commission of Control will send to Berlin as soon as possible a small delegation composed of the chairman and most important members of that Commission in such manner that each power sharing in the control may be represented thereon.

"The mission of these delegations is to determine, in accord with the German Government, the modalities of executing the clauses of part V of the treaty of peace signed June 28 at Versailles, which are not susceptible of any modification of principle. In cases of continuing divergence of views with the German Government, as likewise in the case of a particularly important decision, these delegations must refer to the Supreme Council of the Governments through the intermediary of Marshal Foch.

"Marshal Foch is instructed to decide on the composition of these delegations and the date of their departure and to apprise the German Government thereof."

For the Major General:

WEYGAND

---

#### Appendix K to HD-36

[Translation <sup>23</sup>]

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,  
FRENCH SECTION

No. 2685/C. S. A.

From General Belin, Permanent French Military Representative  
To the Ambassador of France, Secretary General of the Peace Conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris

I have the honor to send you herewith 15 copies of a resolution dated July 5, 1919, issuing from the Interallied Transportation Committee and relative to the conditions of use, by the British and American

---

<sup>23</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Armies, of rolling-stock surrendered by the Germans after the armistice and assigned to the French and Belgian systems.

After a careful study, the Military Representatives felt that, as the matter in question is of an exclusively financial order, it was beyond their power and that it did not devolve upon them to express an opinion as to the solution to be adopted.

They felt accordingly that their role should be limited to transmitting the resolution of the Transportation Council, unconditionally and without any opinion, to the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers for decision.

GENERAL BELIN

[Enclosure]

INTERALLIED TRANSPORTATION  
COMMITTEE

*Resolution Adopted by the Interallied Transportation Committee at  
Its Session of July 5, 1919*

On the subject of communication No. 3200/D. C. F. C., made by the Marshal commander in chief of the Allied Armies to the Permanent French Military Representative on the Supreme War Council under date of April 16, 1919, in which the following statement occurs:

"The temporary distribution of all the rolling-stock derived from the Germans (locomotives and cars) results from an agreement reached at my general headquarters on November 13, 1918, between the representatives of the American, Belgian, British and French Armies and a representative of the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation.

"This provisional distribution was intended to respond to the needs of the Belgian, French and American Armies during the period of the armistice.

"The definitive distribution of this material must be determined by the Peace Conference, which is informed of the matter."

The English and the Americans accordingly have a right to this equipment for their transportation on the French front but they are not authorized to export them.

Furthermore, the British representative, at a meeting of the Inter-Allied Transportation Committee held in Paris June 13, 1919, spoke "of the vague situation resulting from the ill-defined method of distribution and use of German rolling-stock at the armistice, as a consequence of which the French and Belgian authorities were using the cars surrendered by the Germans, and the English were paying the French and Belgian transportation authorities the full rate for goods traveling on this rolling-stock, which is obviously an error in principle."

"The British authorities propose that all this material surrendered

by Germany be entered in the Government system under conditions analogous to those of English war material. In this way, England would receive rental charges for German cars assigned to it."

The question was again taken to the Marshal commander in chief of the Allied Armies, who made the following reply in his note dated June 20:

"In accordance with the agreements reached November 13, 1918 at my general headquarters by the representatives of the Allied Armies, the rolling-stock (locomotives and cars) surrendered by the Germans was to be used for general transportation by the Allied Armies."

The question was again taken up at the meeting of the Inter-Allied Transportation Committee on June 27, 1919. The French representative stated that the 70,000 German cars temporarily registered with the French systems corresponded:

1. In part, to the cars captured by the Germans at the beginning of the war (47,117 cars).

2. Secondly, in part also to the exceptional wear resulting from extensive transportation effected during the war for all the Allied Armies and the destruction of the material resulting from war operations.

3. Thirdly, in part, to the aid given since the armistice to small Allied Powers, whether it involved material placed entirely at their disposition or material furnished to transport supplies, a large part of which has not been returned.

The French representative accordingly felt that the French systems had with perfect right collected the usual fees for the use of this material.

The Belgian representative concurred in the statements given in paragraphs 1 and 2 above and pointed out that, after having received 80,000 cars, Belgium still has a deficit of 13,980 cars in relation to its pre-war supply.

The British representative, after having heard these explanations and on the basis of the letter from the Marshal commander in chief of the Allied Armies, declared that the matter had not been settled to the satisfaction of his Government.

Accordingly, as the Inter-Allied Transportation Committee has not been able to reach an agreement on this matter, it has the honor to request the Supreme War Council kindly to decide whether the principle adopted by the French and Belgian authorities of charging the usual rate for British and American transport effected with the assistance of German armistice material on the western front is an equitable principle or whether, on the contrary, America and England should not share in the use of this material which, according to Marshal Foch's note, was to be used for transportation by all the Allies on the western front during the armistice period.



## Appendix L to HD-36

[Translation <sup>25</sup>]COMMITTEE ON EXECUTION  
OF THE CLAUSES OF THE TREATY

AUGUST 20, 1919.

*Note for the Supreme Council*

The Committee on Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty has taken cognizance of the request of the International Schleswig Commission now at Copenhagen.

It unanimously proposes:

(a) that a delegate of the International Commission be sent to Flensburg;

(b) that a note be sent to the German delegation to inform it of this decision and to request that the delegate of the Commission be authorized to establish contact with the German authorities throughout the zone subject to plebiscite in order forthwith to prepare the conditions of operation of the International Commission.

The local German authorities would receive instructions in this sense from their Government.

Chairman

---

<sup>25</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 23 August, 1919, at 3: 30 p. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk.

*Secretary*

Mr. L. Harrison.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.

*Secretaries*

Mr. H. Norman.  
Sir Geo. Clerk.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.

*Secretaries*

M. Berthelot.  
M. de St. Quentin

**ITALY**

M. Tittoni.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

**JAPAN**

M. Matsui.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF.....	Col. U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE.....	Lt. Commander Bell.
FRANCE .....	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY.....	Lt. Colonel Jones.

*Interpreter*—M. Meyer.

Field Marshal Sir H. Wilson, Mr. J. F. Dulles, and General Sackville-West, together with M. Loucheur and General Weygand were present.

1. The Council took note of a draft telegram (see Appendix "A"), which it was proposed to send to the Roumanian Government at Bucarest in the name of the Council.

Roumanian Requisitions in Hungary

M. LOUCHEUR said that the telegram in question had been drafted by the Organisations [*Organising?*]

Committee of the Reparations Commission.

(It was decided that the telegram for communication to the Roumanian Government at Bucarest, on the subject of the requisition of war material by the Roumanian Army in Hungary, should be accepted and despatched.)

MR. POLK informed the Council, that, when the Roumanians first showed an inclination to collect in Hungary whatever they thought due to them for reparation, he had asked the Government at Washington to stop the delivery of contracts undertaken between the United

States and Roumania. The Roumanians had expressed indignation at this measure, but he thought it necessary to cut off all supplies to that country. He asked whether it had any other source of supply.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not know of any.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Council had previously decided to supply war material to Roumania, some of which had not yet been delivered.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the supplies not yet sent, ought to be stopped.

MR. BALFOUR said that similar measures could be taken from London.

GENERAL WEYGAND asked whether supplies for which payment had been made should also be stopped.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they should.

M. TITTONI said that the Council of Four had decided on a previous occasion to reduce the armaments of new states.<sup>1</sup> This decision had never been put into effect. The Military Representatives at Versailles ought to have suggested concrete proposals, but had not done so.

GENERAL SACKVILLE-WEST said that a preliminary report<sup>2</sup> had been given and a request made for further information on certain points; when this had been received, a final report could be sent.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he had been the Chairman of the Committee dealing with the question, [and?] he and his colleagues had wished to know what material had been sent to the small States, but the Military Representatives at Versailles wanted to know the total armament under the control of each separate State. This was information that could not be obtained, since the countries concerned would not supply the necessary data. The amount of material delivered by Great Britain, Italy, and other Powers, had been communicated to Versailles, who could now make a report.

M. TITTONI, insisting on his previous point, stated that, despite the wish of the Council that armaments should be limited, so as to avoid future wars, no real effort was being made to impose this decision on the small States. It would appear that every nation was making further warlike preparations, which fact made the early solution of the question important.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that when the question had been discussed, he had made considerable reservations. He had not seen how such restrictions could be imposed upon victorious States by their own Allies.

M. TITTONI remarked that some of the victorious countries appeared to be making ready for war.

---

<sup>1</sup> CF-46, minute 5, vol. VI, p. 182.

<sup>2</sup> Appendix B to CF-27, vol. V, p. 885.



(It was decided that all delivery of war material to Roumania by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should be stopped immediately, and that the prohibition should remain in force until further orders. The aforesaid prohibition was to extend to war material to be delivered under contract, and to war materials for which payment had been made.)

2. The Council took note of a telegram from Colonel Goodyear on the subject of the situation in Silesia. (See Appendix "B".)

**Situation in Silesia** M. LOUCHEUR said that he and Mr. Hoover were going to meet the German Representatives at Versailles, who hoped that a reply from the German Government would be to [on?] hand during the course of the afternoon.

MR. BALFOUR said that it would be unwise to send the telegram, drafted by the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission until we knew whether the German Government would consent to the despatch of troops to Silesia, before the date specified in the Peace Treaty.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that the German Government's consent was only necessary for the despatch of troops, and not for the Coal Committee.

(M. Loucheur and Mr. J. F. Dulles then withdrew.)

3. MR. BALFOUR said that he desired to make an appeal to his colleagues of the Council. Under the provisions of the Peace Treaty, German Prisoners ought to be returned to their own country on ratification. If the Parliaments of Italy, France and of other Allied countries had been able to ratify the Treaty, the prisoners would have been returned by now. He did not wish his colleagues to think that this remark implied any criticism whatsoever upon the parliamentary procedure in Allied countries. He did, however, draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the result of the delay was extremely burdensome. He had been informed by Field Marshal Wilson that there were 220,000 prisoners in English hands, and that the cost of keeping them was £90,000 a day, that is, £1,000,000 in 11 days. There was no military advantage to be gained from the retention of these prisoners. On the contrary, they detained British troops which were needed elsewhere. He hoped, therefore, that the Council might give a "bienveillant" consideration to the point that he laid before them.

**German Prisoners of War in Allied Countries** MR. POLK said that the same question arose for the United States. The Americans had 40,000 prisoners guarded by 10,000 men. The demobilization of the specially raised American Armies was proceeding, and by the 30th September, the dissolution of the American War Forces should be complete. He had asked his legal advisors whether the prisoners in question might be transferred to another Power, and

the answer had been, that, under the provisions of existing Treaties, such a transfer would not be legal. General Pershing had stated that the question was urgent. The total cost of paying the troops guarding the prisoners and of maintaining the prisoners themselves came to about 2,000,000 dollars a month.

FIELD MARSHAL WILSON then said that the total number of troops necessary for the custody of German prisoners was 60,000.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he approached the question from a different standpoint, in that he had 350,000 German prisoners employed in useful work on the devastated regions. He would therefore have preferred that the German prisoners should be transferred to him, so long as they remained under the control of the Government of the captor. He knew nothing of the legal aspect of the question of transfer, but wondered whether some form of contract could not be drawn up. Speaking frankly, he intended to return the German prisoners as late as he possibly could, but he had no intention of doing anything contrary to the provisions of the Peace Treaty. Whilst seeing the force of the British point of view, it did not seem to him possible to return the prisoners before the date stipulated under the Treaty. If, however, it were possible to do so, he wanted to retain the German prisoners in France to the last moment. The French Government had opened a discussion with the Austrian and Polish Governments, with a view to obtaining labour for the devastated regions, and he had reasons for hoping that negotiations would be successful. The German prisoners did not work well, and they were under custody of young soldiers of 19 and 20 years of age, who could not exercise much control over them. On the other hand, he would rather have German prisoners than nobody. He asked on what date the Peace Treaty would be ratified in Allied countries.

MR. BALFOUR replied that he thought Great Britain would ratify on the 10th September.

M. CLEMENCEAU said France would ratify about the 15th September.

M. TITTONI gave the same date.

MR. POLK said that America might ratify later, possibly on about the 1st October.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that it was not necessary for the other Allied Powers to wait for America. The ratification by the British Colonies would be early in September. The Treaty would come fully into force when Great Britain, France and Italy had ratified it.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in accordance with the dates just given, the Treaty would come into force in three weeks' time. He suggested that Field Marshal Wilson should consult with General Weygand. It would, of course, be understood that Great Britain should retain all her rights over the prisoners taken by her Armies. He suggested that some kind of transfer might be found possible.

MR. BALFOUR asked what were the provisions of military law on the point in question.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that he did not know: he only wanted the two Generals to confer and report.

FIELD MARSHAL WILSON said that the question seemed rather to be one for lawyers.

MR. POLK asked that General Pershing should also discuss the matter with Field Marshal Wilson and General Weygand.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Generals should bear in mind that prisoners could not be sent back at once. Such a measure would put France in a most difficult position, since it was evident that she had been devastated, and required work, whilst Great Britain and America had no such special needs.

M. BERTHELOT remarked that a precedent for the transfer of prisoners of war existed in the case of Belgium, which country had allocated seven or eight thousand men to France.

M. TITTONI added that after Serbia had been invaded, and the Austrian prisoners taken by that country delivered to Italy, Italy had made a loan of them to France.

(It was decided that Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, General Pershing and General Weygand [and] General Cavallero should examine conjointly by what means German prisoners in American and British hands, and at present in France, could be transferred to the French Government. The rights of the British and American Governments over the aforesaid prisoners should remain without alteration. A report on the above question should be submitted to the Council.)

4. MR. BALFOUR said that Allied troops had been promised for plebiscite areas in Dantzig, Memel, Upper Silesia, Schleswig, and Klagenfurt. He did not wish in any way to raise the question of the number of troops that each of the Allies was to supply. He wished to take the opportunity of repeating that Great Britain would carry out all engagements that she had entered into. He was only going to raise the question of how the troops should be distributed. He had been told that mixed forces raised difficulties of command and supply. The great harmony which existed between the Allied troops did not overcome the difficulties to which he had drawn attention. Troops were accustomed to be commanded by their own officers. They did not like passing under the orders of foreign Generals. They were, moreover, accustomed to have their own food, and be treated in their own hospitals. In a mixed division, every kind of supply had to come from four separate sources. He would therefore like to see each body of troops in a given locality, homogeneous. It was not

Inter-Allied  
Troops for Plebi-  
scite Areas in  
Eastern Europe



quite possible, for the numbers of troops necessary for different localities varied. He wished, therefore, that the military experts could advise the Council how far some such measure could be put into effect.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he regarded Mr. Balfour's argument as conclusive. There was, however, another, political, side to the question. He did not desire that any military occupation of Poland should take place without the French being represented. The relations between France and Poland were intimate, and he thought it most important that the French Army should go to that country. He considered Mr. Balfour's remarks so forcible, however, that he thought his proposals might be considered at once with regard to Silesia.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that on the previous day, the Council had taken a decision for the despatch of two divisions.<sup>3</sup> He had already been in consultation with General Pershing and Field Marshal Wilson on the subject. The discussion had been based on the understanding that each country should supply one-quarter of the total force.

M. TITTONI suggested that each contingent might be placed under its own command.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the French troops in Asia had been placed under the orders of a British General without the slightest discord arising. He thought, therefore, that General Weygand should continue to examine the question.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought that France should not only be represented in any military occupation of Poland, but that she should be largely represented.

GENERAL WEYGAND, remarking on Mr. Balfour's last statement, said that the decision communicated to him had been that each Allied contingent should be equal.

M. TITTONI said that he had only agreed to equal contributions for one division. He made a reservation on the same principle being applied to the composition of two divisions.

MR. POLK asked if he was right in understanding that the Committee of General Officers would report back their recommendations to the Council for final action.

(It was decided that Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, General Pershing and General Weygand should recommend a distribution among the Allies of the contingents to be furnished for the various plebiscite zones, such as to make each contingent a homogeneous national unit as far as consistent with the political necessity of having all the Allies represented in each region.)

5. GENERAL WEYGAND read the draft of a telegram to be transmitted to the German Government on the sale of aeronautical war

---

<sup>3</sup> HD-36, minute 2, p. 783.

Sale of Aeronautical War Material by Germany

material (see Appendix "C" and H. D. 36, Minute 4<sup>4</sup>).

MR. POLK said that he was ready to accept the draft telegram, subject to his military advisers raising no objection. If any points were raised, he would let General Weygand know in the afternoon so that the transmission should not be delayed.

(It was decided that the draft telegram for transmission to the German Government on the subject of the sale of aeronautical war material should be accepted, subject to notification by Mr. Polk that he had no objection.)

(At this point General Weygand & General Sackville-West left the room.)

6. The Council took note of the report of the Blockade Committee on the subject of the measures to be taken in order to prevent trade with Bolshevik Russia (see Appendix "D").

Blockade of Russia

MR. POLK said that certain points raised by his experts made it necessary for him to withhold his assent from the note for the present. In order to save time, however, he suggested that the note should be referred back to the Blockade Committee, and he would see that the American representative would lay before his colleagues such objections as might be raised, from an American point of view.

(It was decided that the draft note of the Blockade Committee should be referred back to that body for a further consideration of the American standpoint.)

7. The Council took note of a draft declaration prepared by the British Delegation on the subject of the blockade of Hungary.

Modification of Declaration To Be Signed by Austria Undertaking To Maintain the Cessation of Commercial Relations With Hungary

(It was decided that the special declaration for signature by the Austrian Delegation (see Appendix "E") should be accepted.)

8. (At this point, M. Haas, Mr. Tyman, Mr. Headlam-Morley, and M. Adatci entered the room.)

M. HAAS reported and commented upon Appendix "F". He stated that the immediate application of the reciprocity clauses, as requested by Austria, had been refused in the case of the Germans, on the ground that it was not wished that the latter should profit by the devastations committed by its Armies. The Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways thought another reason existed for postponing the application of these articles. The reason was, that the economic position of the New States, previously under the government of Vienna, should be supported in the years immediately following the war. The Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways also considered, that it could not alter clauses involving material changes in the principles of the Peace Treaty.

Clauses Dealing With Ports, Waterways and Railways in the Peace Treaty With Austria

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 789.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Council was surely of the opinion that some kind of economic unity between the States of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire should be encouraged. If this could not be effected, the States in question would be powerless and would become subject to German economic penetration on a more extended scale than had existed before the war. Each State formed out of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy could be given a fair power of bargaining. If the Peace Treaty were presented in its present form, the Austrian Republic would not be in a position to bargain with its neighbours. We had a right to impose this disadvantage upon her, but it was not in our interest. But he certainly considered that it was to the advantage of the Allied Powers, that Austria should not be in a position to bargain with them. He would like to know the views of his colleagues on the subject.

M. TITTONI said that the Council might well consider whether immediate reciprocity could not be extended to Austria and the New States of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. He thought that the second argument brought forward by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways, as to the necessity of stabilizing the economic conditions of the States of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, was a weak one. He did not see how the previous system of centralised government could affect transport problems in the New States. He added, that the transport system, which had previously been centralised at Vienna and Budapest, had worked very well.

MR. POLK said he thought that they might be placing a severe handicap on the Austrian Republic by postponing the application of the reciprocity clauses. The Czecho-Slovak State would find it to their interest to have the restrictions, placed on Austria, removed. Bohemia had been so connected with Austria in the past, that an interference in the commercial exchange between the two States would obviously be a disadvantage to Czecho-Slovakia.

MR. HAAS said that the Committee on Ports and Waterways had made no specific proposal; but had drawn the attention of the Council to the problem. Its opinion coincided with that of Mr. Balfour. If the Council thought that the States concerned were to be regarded as possessing equal rights, reciprocity should be applied immediately. If they were not in that position, it should be withheld for a time.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was in favour of granting immediate reciprocity between Austria and the New States formed out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

M. TITTONI said that he would only agree on the understanding that the reciprocity under discussion should exist between Austria and the New States formed by the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. He further insisted that the reciprocity should apply only to the clauses dealing with Ports, Waterways and Railways.



(It was agreed that the articles dealing with Ports, Waterways and Railways, (Part XII) of the Peace Treaty with Austria, should be amended so as to allow of the immediate application of the reciprocity clauses between Austria and the States formed from the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy by virtue of acquisitions of part of her territory.)

Clauses on Ports,  
Waterways and  
Railways in the  
Peace Treaty  
With Bulgaria

9. (It was decided that the alterations proposed in the Articles of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria dealing with Ports, Railways and Waterways, should be accepted.) (See Appendix G.)

(At this point, Mr. Haas, Mr. Tyman, Mr. Headlam-Morley and Mr. Adatci left the room.)

Reply by the Com-  
munication Sec-  
tion of the Su-  
preme Economic  
Council to the  
Roumanian Note  
Relative to Regu-  
lation of Traffic  
on the Danube

10. MR. POLK asked that the consideration of the proposed draft (See Appendix H), should be postponed to the next meeting.

(This was agreed to.)

Draft Treaties  
Between the Al-  
lied & Associated  
Powers and Po-  
land, Roumania,  
Jugo-Slavia and  
Czecho-Slovakia,  
on the Subject of  
the Cost of Liber-  
ation of the Terri-  
tories in the For-  
mer Austro-Hun-  
garian Monarchy.  
(See Appendix I.)

11.

Agreement Be-  
tween the Allied  
& Associated Pow-  
ers Relative to the  
Contribution Pay-  
able by Italy for  
the Liberation of  
Territories Be-  
longing to the  
Former Austro-  
Hungarian Em-  
pire. (See Appen-  
dix J.)

12.

(It was agreed that the consideration of the above draft agreements should be postponed.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 23 August, 1919.

#### Appendix A to HD-37

[Translation <sup>5</sup>]

#### *Telegram From the President of the Peace Conference to the Roumanian Government at Bucharest*

The Peace Conference has received information, the veracity of which it unfortunately feels it impossible to dispute, indicating

<sup>5</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

that the Roumanian forces in Hungary are continuing systematically to seize and carry off Hungarian property.

In view of the correspondence recently exchanged between the Peace Conference and the Roumanian Government, it is difficult to understand such action on the part of the Roumanian Government except on the hypothesis that the Roumanian Government is unaware of the principles of reparation agreed to.

Yet, by reason of its participation in the labors of the Peace Conference and as one of the signers of the treaty of peace with Germany, the Roumanian Government should not be unaware of the care which the Allied and Associated Powers took in establishing a rational plan of reparation. If the principle that compensation for losses suffered had depended solely upon such factors as the proximity of enemy property or upon the result of competition between Allied States to take possession of such property, flagrant injustices and serious disagreements would have been the inevitable result. Thus the treaty with Germany, to which Roumania is a contracting party, set down certain fundamental principles of reparation and, in particular the following:

1. All the enemy states are jointly and severally liable and to that effect their assets are pooled in the interest of all the powers.

2. A system of accounting is established so that all of the interested states may share in the common fund in proportion to the amount of their approved claims, from which is deducted the amount of approved indemnities.

3. A Central Reparation Commission, which will operate as the exclusive representative of the Allied and Associated Powers, will have the duty of collecting enemy assets and distributing them as reparations.

The action of the Roumanian forces, to which reference has been made above, can only be considered as defection from this plan of joint liability, in the sense that it implies appropriation for its personal use of enemy property which in reality constitutes the common security of all the Allies. The actions mentioned above likewise contravene the accepted principle that the Reparation Commission is to act as the exclusive representative of the Allied and Associated Powers in verifying, for reparations purposes, the amount of enemy property.

In this respect the attitude of Roumania is incompatible with that of a state which desires and hopes to profit by the reparation clauses of the treaty of peace concluded or to be concluded.

Still further, the Government of Roumania cannot be unaware of the fact that M. Antonesco, its plenipotentiary at the Peace Conference, on June 27, accepted subject to the approval of his Government, the principle of a contribution by Roumania to the expenses

of liberating the enemy people and territories which it acquired, this contribution being compensated by offsetting the amount against the first claims of Roumania for reparation.

Nor can the Roumanian Government be unaware of the fact that a stipulation was made at that time that no new payment could be made as reparations until the other states to which reparation is due had received their proportionate share.

It is on the basis of this agreement that the other Allied and Associated Powers agreed not to take advantage of their rights to impose a scale of indemnity based on the considerable resources which Roumania is to acquire from the enemy.

Saving retraction on its part, Roumania's recent acts can only be considered as a renunciation by its Government of the agreement of June 27.<sup>6</sup> Such renunciation would give back to the Allied and Associated Powers their full freedom of action with respect to the imposition of a lien for reparations on all the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which the Government of Roumania may hope to receive.

The other possible consequences of the line of conduct which Roumania seems to have adopted are so serious and would be such a danger to the equitable restoration of Europe that the Allied and Associated Powers would feel themselves compelled, should necessity force them to it, to adopt a much firmer line of conduct in order to avoid these consequences. It is quite evident that, if the principle of reparations were to degenerate into individual appropriation and a competition between the various interested powers, injustice would result therefrom, appetites would be created and, in the confusion produced by these disordered actions, either the enemy "would get away" or it would be impossible to exact of him the maximum of reparations. Nevertheless, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot believe that the Roumanian Government would wish to create such a danger and to force them to cause this danger to disappear. Accordingly the Peace Conference expects the Roumanian Government, immediately and without equivocation, to furnish it with the following declaration:

1. The Roumanian Government recognizes the principle that the property of enemy states constitutes a common security for all the Allied and Associated Powers.

2. It recognizes the Reparations Commission as the exclusive representative in verifying property for reparations purposes, the amount of enemy property.

3. Hungarian assets received by Roumania since the armistice on November 3, 1918, shall be the subject of an itemized inventory on the part of the Roumanian Government which shall be placed at the disposition of the Reparations Commission or the intermediary which

---

<sup>6</sup> For draft text, see appendix I to HD-37, p. 830.



the Peace Conference may designate while awaiting the establishment of the Commission. Roumania will retain the right to dispose only of property which can at this time be identified as former Roumanian property seized by the enemy and shall do this in agreement with the Reparations Commission.

4. All new shipments of Hungarian property into Roumania shall cease immediately unless they are made in agreement with the Peace Conference or its representatives.

5. The Roumanian Government will ratify the agreement of June 27, signed by M. Antonesco and mentioned above.

The Peace Conference authorizes the Allied Generals at Budapest to name the agents who will represent the Peace Conference in all the proceedings which may be envisaged.

---

#### Appendix B to HD-37

*[The President of the Coal Commission for Central Europe (Good-year) to the Director General of Relief (Hoover)]*

MAHRISCH OSTRU Aug. 21, 1919.

lx. u. 200

A.R.A. Received Aug. 22, 1919, 1:04 p. m.

Hoover, Paris.

Conferences this morning and evening with mine owners and military authorities has resulted in agreement by commanding general of district that no more executions will take place until further conference. I agreed to undertake return of prisoners taken into Poland by retiring insurgents and have had meeting with General Commandant Polish front this afternoon. All these prisoners have been sent to Crakow and held there under charge of Haller. I communicated with Haller and he agreed to hold there until further notice from me. I have appointment with Haller tomorrow noon and will arrange with them to return the prisoners with an American officer accompanying them. Polish authorities have directed Haller to follow my directions in these matters. I will have further meeting with the German General Friday afternoon. Will instruct strongly against any action before arrival of Upper Silesian committee. Haller's troops are behaving very well and without their presence here a state of war would have arrived before now. It is of utmost importance that announcement be made of appointment of Upper Silesian Commission at once, this announcement to state when Commission will commence to act and to be published in German and Polish newspapers. If Paris does not act now after all the months delay that have produced so much bitterness between Poles and Germans I can guarantee that there will be another war.

GOODYEAR

## Appendix C to HD-37

[Translation <sup>7</sup>]*Telegram to the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission*

AUGUST 22, 1919.

Please notify the German Armistice Commission for German Government following decision of the Supreme Council of the Allies:

First: Article 169 of the treaty of peace stipulates that all German war material in excess of the amounts which Germany is authorized by the treaty to keep must be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers.

Accordingly, Germany must not sell, transfer or export such war material which is henceforth the property of the Allies.

Second: In particular, it must not sell, transfer or export any aeronautical material (airplanes, motors, spare parts), including motors captured from the Allies and airplanes transformed into so-called civil airplanes which are, in fact, war material.

Third: As an exception, the Allies, in the use of their right of ownership of the material which must be surrendered to them, authorize Germany to transfer:

a) To General Yudenitch: 8 captured Russian cannons, 1,000,000 cartridges for rifles, 50 Russian revolvers, 3 German airplanes, clothing for 1,000 men (material requested by telegram 977/P. G. 2 from C. I. P. A.)

b) To Czechoslovakia: 50,000 Mauser rifles, 10,000 Mauser carbines, about 2,000 machine guns with 10,000 cartridges for each and 100,000 rounds of artillery ammunition for field mortars (material requested by note 1685 from C. I. P. A.), in addition to 500 signal projectors with accessories requested by Czechoslovakia.

---

Appendix D to HD-37[Translation <sup>7</sup>]*Note To Be Sent by the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission to the German Government*

The Allied and Associated Governments have decided to send the attached note to the Governments of neutral states, to invite them to take immediate measures with a view to preventing a resumption of commercial relations with Bolshevik Russia.

The German Government is requested on its part to take similar measures.

---

<sup>7</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

*Note—Blockade of Bolshevik Russia*

AUGUST 21, 1919.

The avowed hostility of the Bolsheviks to all governments and the program of international revolution which they propagate constitute a serious danger for the national security of all powers. Any growth in the strength of the Bolsheviks would increase the danger and would be contrary to the desire of all nations which seek to establish peace and social order.

It is in this spirit that the Allied and Associated Powers, after raising the blockade of Germany, did not authorize their nationals to resume commercial relations with Bolshevik Russia. Such relations, in fact, could take place only through the medium of the heads of the Bolshevik Government who, disposing as they liked of the products and resources which commercial freedom would afford them, would draw therefrom a considerable increase in strength and in the tyranny which they exercise over the Russian peoples.

In these circumstances, the Allied and Associated Governments request the Government to be good enough to take immediate measures to prevent its nationals from engaging in any trade with Bolshevik Russia and to give the assurance that it will strictly carry out this policy in agreement with the Allied and Associated Governments.

The measures in question to be applied by the Allied and Associated Governments from the date of the present note are the following:

- a) Refusal of clearance papers to any vessel departing for Russian ports in the hands of the Bolsheviks or coming from the said ports.
- b) Establishment of a similar measure on all goods intended to be sent either directly or indirectly to Bolshevik Russia.
- c) Denial of passports to all persons going to Bolshevik Russia or coming from it (except on understanding with the Allied and Associated Governments in special cases).
- d) Provisions in order to prevent banks from having business with Bolshevik Russia.
- e) So far as possible, denial by each Government to its own nationals of communication facilities with Bolshevik Russia by mail, telegraph or wireless.

The attention of the . . . . . Government is called to the fact that no proclamation of these measures is necessary and that it is sufficient to advise the administrations and banks concerned regarding them by administrative channels.

It will, of course, be understood that any warship of an Allied or Associated Power charged with the execution of the above measures will act in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers as a group.



## Appendix E to HD-37

M-492

*Note by British Delegation*

While the Government of Bela Kun was still in office in Budapest the Supreme Council decided that a Declaration was to be drawn up for signature by the Austrian Delegation at the same time as the signature of the Austrian Treaty, undertaking to enforce the complete cessation of all commercial relations with Hungary—to maintain in fact a blockade of Hungary.

Now that Bela Kun's Government has fallen it would seem desirable to modify the terms of this Declaration. The following form is suggested:—

## SPECIAL DECLARATION

The Austrian Government will continue, in the absence of a request to the contrary by the Governments of the United States, the British Empire, France and Italy, effectively to prohibit the import, export and transit of all articles between Austria and Hungary, and to maintain such prohibition up to the time of the formal acceptance by the Government of Hungary of the terms of peace proposed by the Allied and Associated Governments.

BRITISH DELEGATION, August 22, 1919.

## Appendix F to HD-37

[Translation <sup>9</sup>]

COMMISSION ON THE INTERNATIONAL RÉGIME OF  
PORTS, WATERWAYS AND RAILWAYS

PARIS, August 13, 1919.

*Report of the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways on the Subject of the Observations of the Austrian Delegation Concerning Part XII of the Conditions of Peace*

The Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways has the honor to forward herewith (Enclosures 1 and 2<sup>10</sup>) a draft reply to the observations of the Austrian delegation and a draft of amendments to the text of the conditions of peace with Austria. The Austrian delegation, while accepting certain unilateral stipulations vis-à-vis powers which have been at war with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, requested, on the other hand, immediate reciprocity with respect to its relations with states which it claims are successors to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on the

<sup>9</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>10</sup> The enclosures do not accompany the file copy of this appendix.

same basis as Austria itself. The Commission did not believe itself competent to examine the advisability of a profound change in this direction of the clauses, as such a problem arises in the same way in connection with a great many economic and financial stipulations of the treaty, its settlement must be reserved to the political authorities of the Peace Conference.

COROMILAS, *Acting Chairman*

---

Appendix G to HD-37

COMMISSION ON THE INTERNATIONAL RÉGIME OF  
PORTS, WATERWAYS AND RAILWAYS

PARIS, August, 1919.

From: The Chairman of the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways.

To: The President of the Peace Conference.

SIR: As an Annex to its report of 21st June, 1919,<sup>11</sup> the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways transmitted certain draft articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

Subsequently, when the proposed amendments in connection with the Conditions of Peace with Austria were being discussed, the Commission inserted in the text of these articles certain alterations and improvements with regard to form.

The Commission is unanimous in considering that it would be most desirable for these alterations to be also introduced in the articles to be inserted in that section of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria which deals with Ports, Waterways and Railways.

A list of the said alterations is sent herewith. The articles referred to in this list are those which were transmitted as an annex to the Report of 21st June, submitted by the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways on the clauses to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

Annex \*

*Amendments to the Articles To Be Inserted in the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria, Proposed by the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways*

*Article 8.* Add a second paragraph worded as follows:—

“It shall be open, by subsequent agreements concluded between the riparian states similarly to declare international any part of the above-mentioned river system which is not included in the general definition.”

*Article 9.* Omit the two last paragraphs.

---

<sup>11</sup> Appendix A to HD-19, p. 409.

\* Corrected version, handed to the French for signature by chairman 17/8/19. [Note on original.]

*Article 9a.* New articles consisting of the two paragraphs from the preceding Article 9.

*Article 16.* Bulgaria shall cede to the Allied & Associated Powers concerned within the maximum period of three months from the date on which notification shall be given her, a proportion of the tugs and vessels remaining registered in the ports of the river system referred to in Article 8, after the deduction of those surrendered by way of restitution or reparation. Bulgaria shall in the same way cede material of all kinds necessary to the Allied and Associated Powers concerned for the utilisation of that river system.

The number of the tugs and vessels and the amount of the material so ceded, and their distribution, shall be determined by an arbitrator or arbitrators nominated by the United States of America, due regard being had to the legitimate needs of the parties concerned, particularly to the shipping traffic during the five years preceding the war.

All craft so ceded shall be provided with their fittings and gear, shall be in a good state of repair, and in condition to carry goods and shall be selected from among those most recently built.

Wherever the cessions made under the present Article involve a change of ownership, the arbitrator or arbitrators shall determine the rights of the former owners as they stood on the 15th October 1918, and the amount of the compensation to be paid to them, and shall also direct the manner in which such payment is to be effected in each case. If the arbitrator or arbitrators find that the whole or part of this sum will revert directly or indirectly to States from whom reparation is due, they shall decide the sum to be placed under this head to the credit of the said States.

As regards the Danube, the arbitrator or arbitrators referred to in this Article will also decide all questions as to the permanent allocation and the conditions thereof, of the vessels whose ownership or nationality is in dispute between States.

Pending final allocation, the control of these vessels shall be vested in a Commission consisting of representatives of America, Great Britain, France and Italy, who will be empowered to make provisional arrangements for the working of these vessels in the general interest by any local organisation, or failing such arrangements, by themselves, without prejudice to the final allocation.

As far as possible, these provisional arrangements will be on a commercial basis, the net receipts by the Commission of the hire of these vessels being disposed of as directed by the Reparation Commission.

*Article 19.* Add: "The decisions of this International Commission shall be taken by a majority vote. The salaries of the Commissioners shall be fixed and paid by their respective countries."

As a provisional measure any deficit in the administrative expense



of this International Commission shall be borne equally by the States represented on the Commission.

In particular, this Commission shall regulate the licensing of pilots, charges for pilotage and the administration of the pilot service.

*Article 35. 1st Para.* Omit the Words: "after five years," and substitute "after three years."

Line 1. Substitute: "stipulations of Articles 1 to 7, 9, 25, and 27 to 29" by "stipulations of Articles 1 to 7, 9a, 25, and 27 to 29."

2nd para. Omit the words: "The period of five years," and substitute "The period of three years."

---

#### Appendix H to HD-37

M-91

#### REGULATION OF TRADE ON THE DANUBE

*Draft Letter From the President of the Conference to M. Bratiano*

(Draft Agreed by Communications Section of Supreme Economic Council)

SIR: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th June on the subject of the Danube which was addressed separately to the Heads of the European States represented on the Supreme Council at Paris.

I regret the delay in sending a reply which has been due partly to the delay in bringing into touch officials to whom the separate letters had been referred, and partly because it was desired to await the decisions resulting from certain proposals which were already under consideration in the sense of the requests made by you.

It is observed that the first part of your letter which is historical deals largely with matters which have been very contentious and cannot be regarded as complete. The questions referred to will doubtless be fully dealt with at the Conference on the Danube referred to in Article 349 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, and it does not appear necessary to consider them further at the present moment. It is sufficient to draw attention to the fact that under Articles 346, 347 and 348 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, a provisional arrangement is arrived at:—

(a) For the reconstitution of the European Commission of the Danube with the powers it possessed before the War, but limited to representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Roumania.

(b) For the constitution of an International Commission to undertake provisionally the administration of the river above the point where the competence of the European Commission ceases until such time as a definitive statute regarding the Danube is concluded by the Conference referred to in Article 349.

The European Commission of the Danube is in effect in existence. Members of the different nations represented on it have been designated and it is understood the question of the necessary credits is receiving the attention of the Governments concerned. As regards the Commission for the provisional administration of the Upper Danube, this is to take effect as soon as possible after the coming into force of the Peace Treaty. As, however, several Enemy States are concerned, it is essential that arrangements should be made for the functioning of this Commission before the Peace Treaties have been concluded with all such Enemy States.

At the present moment the only International regime possible on the Danube is a military one under the Allied Commander-in-Chief, who has the necessary control over the Enemy States in virtue of the conditions of the Armistice and of his powers for the maintenance of order. In order, however, that normal conditions may be resumed on the Danube at the earliest possible moment, notwithstanding the uncertainty as regards frontiers, the contested final ownership of many of the river craft and until recently the maintenance of the Blockade, the Supreme Economic Council arranged for the necessary instructions to be sent to the Allied Commander-in-Chief to give facilities for the re-opening of all river traffic under conditions of equality of treatment underlying the Treaty of Peace. For this reason an Allied Commission under the Presidency of Admiral Troubridge was constituted, one of whose functions was the issue of licences to enable relief and commercial traffic to pass freely along the river, notwithstanding the Blockade. This Commission is further responsible to the High Command for the provisional administration of common services, such as pilotage and the organization of the Iron Gates, some of which were previously carried out by Enemy States.

It will be seen therefore, that the functions of the Commission are vital to the re-establishment of commercial traffic on the Danube during the present period of the military control of the river. It is recognised however, that, in so far as control of the International regulation of the river is concerned, there should be continuity between the present régime and that which will be established under Articles 347 and 348 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. An invitation will, therefore, be sent to the non-enemy riparian States to nominate each a representative to be attached to the provisional Inter-Allied Commission in order to co-operate in working out the regulations for the navigation of the Upper Danube. It is hoped that the riparian States will designate as their representatives their proposed representatives on the Upper Danube Commission referred to in Article 347 of the Treaty with Germany, as in this way it should be possible to transfer to this Commission the functions of regulating

the navigation of the Upper Danube at a considerably earlier date than would have been possible without the transitional arrangement.

It is well known that a complex situation has arisen as regards the ownership of a large number of vessels on the Danube. A final solution of all these cases has been provided for in the Peace Treaty by extending the competence of the arbitrator, to be designated by the United States, to the settlement of all questions of disputed ownership of vessels, the interim period being provided for by the constitution of a special Commission consisting of representatives of America, Great Britain, France and Italy to exercise provisional control over vessels of disputed ownership.

In order to facilitate the circulation of vessels which are at the present moment understood to be retained within national frontiers by the fear of their being claimed and taken possession of by adjacent States, it is proposed to anticipate the formation of the above special Commission by constituting the existing Allied Commission as trustee for all vessels the ownership of which is disputed until such time as the final decision has been given by the American arbitrator under the Treaty of Peace as to the ownership of these vessels. This Commission would arrange for all vessels of undisputed ownership to be returned as quickly as possible to their proper owners and, as regards vessels, the ownership of which involves disputes between two States would have authority to place them at the disposal of the most convenient local administration or if necessary provisionally to operate them in order to assure the unmolested working of such vessels in all parts of the river without in any way prejudicing the decisions of the American arbitrator as to final ownership.

It will be evident from this explanation that all the action taken has been in the interests of that complete freedom of navigation which the Roumanian Government desires to see re-established, and tends to the earliest possible introduction of the régime which has been prescribed in the Treaties of Peace.

---

#### Appendix I to HD-37

*Agreement Between the United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, the British Empire, China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, the Czecho-Slovak State, and Uruguay, With Regard to the Contributions to the Cost of Liberation of the Territories of the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy*

The undersigned, duly authorised by their respective Governments, have agreed on the following provisions.



## ARTICLE 1

Poland, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and the Czecho-Slovak State, as States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is transferred or States arising from the dismemberment of that Monarchy, severally agree to pay, as a contribution towards the expenses of liberating the said territories, sums not exceeding in the aggregate the equivalent of 1,500,000,000 francs gold, the gold franc being taken as of the weight and fineness of gold as enacted by law on January 1, 1914.

## ARTICLE 2

The total amount of the contribution referred to in Article 1 shall be divided between the said States on the basis of the ratio between the average for the three financial years 1911, 1912, and 1913 of the revenues of the territories acquired by them from the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the revenues of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina being excluded from this calculation. The revenues forming the basis for this calculation shall be those adopted by the Reparation Commission, in accordance with Article 199 of Part IX (Financial Clauses) of the Treaty of Peace with Austria as best calculated to represent the financial capacity of the respective territories. Nevertheless, in no case shall the sum paid by the Czecho-Slovak State exceed the sum of 750,000,000 francs. Should the contribution attributable to the Czecho-Slovak State exceed the sum of 750,000,000 francs, the difference between that sum and the sum of 750,000,000 francs shall be in diminution of the agreement sum of 1,500,000,000 francs and shall not be attributable to the other States.

## ARTICLE 3

The amount due as above by each State for liberation, together with the value of the property and possessions of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy transferred to each of them, assessed in accordance with Article 204 of Part IX (Financial Clauses) of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, shall be set off against the approved claims, if any, of these States for reparation.

## ARTICLE 4

If in the case of any of the above States the amount due for liberation and the value of property transferred is in excess of the approved reparation claims, that State shall, within three months of the notifica-

tion to it by the Reparation Commission of the amount, if any, of its approved claims for reparation, issue bonds to the amount of this excess and shall deliver them to such person or body as the Governments of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy may designate.

The above bonds shall be to bearer, principal and interest being payable by the issuing state without deduction for any tax or charge imposed by or under its authority. The bonds shall bear interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum payable half yearly, beginning on January 1, 1926. They shall be repaid in twenty-five equal annual drawings, beginning on January 1, 1931. The issuing State, however, may, at its option, redeem all or part of the bonds issued by it, at par and accrued interest, at any time, provided ninety days' notice of its intention so to do is given to the Governments of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.

#### ARTICLE 5

In the case of those states whose approved claims for reparation are in excess of the amount due for liberation and the value of property transferred, the amount chargeable to these States in accordance with Article 3 shall be reckoned as payments by way of reparation, and no further payments on account of reparation shall be made to them until the other States to which Reparation is due shall have received payments on account of a like proportion of their approved claims for reparation.

Done at . . . . . the . . . day of . . . . . 1919.

---

#### Appendix J to HD-37

*Agreement Between the United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, the British Empire, China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, the Czecho-Slovak State, and Uruguay, With Regard to the Italian Reparation Payments*

The undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have taken note of the declaration made by Italy in Article I of the present Agreement, and have agreed on the subsequent provisions.

#### ARTICLE 1

Italy declares that she has made the greatest sacrifices and borne the heaviest financial burdens in the war waged for the liberation of

Italian territory remaining subject to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for the other lofty aims of the Allied and Associated Powers;

That, in addition, the territories ceded to Italy have sacrificed, as a result of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, a large proportion of their wealth, and that they have already contributed in other ways to the reparation of damages caused by the war in which they have so cruelly suffered;

That, nevertheless, with the object of facilitating an agreement between the States arising from the dismemberment of Austro-Hungary, or acquiring territories of the former Monarchy, as to the contribution to be made by them towards the cost of liberating the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and of reparation, Italy agrees to contribute to these expenses in the manner provided in the present Agreement.

#### ARTICLE 2

Italy, as a State acquiring territories formerly part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, agrees, on account of such acquisition, to be debited against her approved claims for reparation under the Treaties of Peace concluded with Germany, Austria, and the Powers which fought upon their side, with a sum in gold francs (the gold franc being taken as of the weight and fineness of gold as enacted by law on January 1, 1914) to be calculated as set out in Article 3 below.

#### ARTICLE 3

The ratio between the sum to be debited to Italy in accordance with Article 2 and the sum of 1,500,000,000 francs gold (or between such sum and the total amount of the contributions to be made by the Czecho-Slovak State, Poland, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, if this amount is less than 1,500,000,000 francs gold, as provided in the agreement of even date between the High Contracting Parties) shall be the same as the ratio between the average revenues for the three financial years 1911, 1912, 1913 of the territories transferred to Italy and the average revenues for the same years of the whole of the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy transferred, whether to Italy or to the other Powers mentioned above, under the Treaties of Peace with Austria and Hungary. It is understood however that the revenues of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be excluded from this calculation.

The revenues serving as the basis of this calculation shall be those accepted by the Reparation Commission, in accordance with the provisions of Article 199 of Part IX (Financial Clauses) of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, as best representing the financial capacity of the respective territories.



## ARTICLE 4

The sum so calculated, together with the value of the property and possessions of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy transferred to Italy, assessed in accordance with Article 204 of Part IX (Financial Clauses) of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, shall be set off against the approved claims of Italy for reparation. The total of these two sums shall be reckoned as payments by way of reparation, and no further payments shall be made to Italy on account of reparation until the other States to which reparation is due shall have received payments on account of a like proportion of their approved claims for reparation.

Done at . . . . . the . . . . . day of . . . . . 1919.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, August 25, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. F. L. Polk.	Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.	M. Clemenceau. M. Pichon.
<i>Secretary</i> Mr. L. Harrison.	<i>Secretaries</i> Mr. H. Norman. Sir G. Clerk.	<i>Secretaries</i> M. Dutasta. M. Berthelot. M. de Saint-Quentin.

ITALY	JAPAN
M. Tittoni.	M. Matsui.
<i>Secretary</i> M. Paterno.	<i>Secretary</i> M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA . . .	Captain Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Captain E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Captain A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lt-Colonel A. Jones.

Interpreter—M. Meyer.

The following also attended for the items in which they were concerned:—

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	FRANCE
Prof. Coolidge. Mr. Woolsey. Mr. J. F. Dulles.	M. Loucheur. M. Tardieu. M. Jules Cambon. M. Clémentel. M. Sergent. M. Aubert. General Le Rond. General Belin. M. Hermitte. M. Massigli.
BRITISH EMPIRE	ITALY
Field Marshal Sir H. H. Wilson. Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley. Colonel Peel. Mr. Nicolson. Mr. Hutchinson. Colonel Henniker.	Count Vannutelli-Rey. M. Russo. M. Brofferio. General Cavallero. Lt-Colonel Toni.

1. After an exchange of views between M. Clemenceau and M. Tittoni, regarding the report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Fiume Incidents (Appendix "A"),

Report of the  
Commission of In-  
quiry on the Inci-  
dents at Fiume

It was agreed to accept the conclusions of the Commission's Report. The French and Italian Governments undertook to give effect to these

recommendations.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had heard from General Graziani, who had been the last of the Generals to reach Budapest, that his colleagues had already decided that the Chairmanship of the Meetings should be held by each in turn. He had accepted provisionally, but asked for orders, as he was the senior officer. M. Clemenceau thought that for purposes of continuity, it was better to have one Chairman. He would not insist, however.

Chairmanship of  
Interallied Mili-  
tary Mission at  
Budapest

M. TITTONI thought that it was best to let the Generals settle this question among themselves.

MR. BALFOUR said that, although alternating chairmanship was a bad system, it was, perhaps, the best way of avoiding friction.

MR. POLK said that in General Bandholtz' view, rotation was necessary.

(It was agreed that M. Clemenceau should inform General Graziani that the Council saw no objection to the maintenance of the system of rotation in the chairmanship of the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest.)

3. MR. POLK said that he was informed by General Bandholtz that General Graziani had sent a report to the effect that, in the opinion of the Allied Generals, it was necessary to break off relations with the Roumanians. He begged to communicate the following telegram to the Council:—

Situation in  
Hungary

"BUDAPEST—August 24, 1919.

Received 1:20 a. m. August 25.

AMMISSION. Paris.

"The following instances of Roumanian requisitions and seizures are given for your information. August 17, all the typewriters of the Underwood Agency about 20 were seized. August 18—30 car-loads of wool, the property of the Hungarian Wool Trust, were shipped [out] of Budapest. August 18—the Hungarian Minister Hygiene reported the seizure of all their supplies by Roumanian officials. August 21—there was seized car-loads of coal which belong to the Municipal Water Plant of Budapest. August 21—there was seized 110 race horses at the Alge Farm. These were the property of private individuals. August 22—all the machinery of the Hungarian State shops was dismantled, resulting in six thousand men being out of work. August 22—a demand was made on the Minister of Agriculture for topographical charts, instruments, etc, stating that if they were not delivered, same would be taken by force of arms. August 22—the Minister of Foreign Affairs reported that the Roumanians



had requisitioned all of the valuable breeding animals on the three Hungarian State stud farms. On August 23—50 per cent of all the material of the Ganz Danubius Company, Limited, a large building concern, was taken, throwing out of employment over 4,300 persons. August 22—there was being loaded the remaining half of these supplies of the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, the other half having been previously taken about August 10. On August 22 mechanics were being sent around to remove 4,000 telephones from private houses.

"All of the foregoing occurred subsequent to the promise of the Roumanians that they would comply with instructions of the Inter-Allied Mission. Many delicate instruments were thrown into boxes and other receptacles in such a careless manner that they could never be of use to anybody. Many other similar instances occurred during the period indicated. As near as can be now estimated, the Roumanians have seized about 60% of all Hungarian locomotives in good condition, 95% of all passenger equipment and about 5,000 freight cars.

BANDHOLTZ."

MR. POLK added that he had received another communication from General Bandholtz. He said that in his view the time of the Mission had been wasted, and that nothing was to be gained by any further intercourse with the Roumanian authorities. The latter maintained their policy of procrastination and had repeatedly broken their promises. The Roumanians, in his opinion, were making the Council appear ridiculous.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had received a telegram to the effect that the Roumanian plenipotentiaries had brought the Generals in Budapest a note from their Government, stating that they were ready to act in friendly agreement and in accord with the instructions sent by the Council on the 5th August,<sup>1</sup> but not without certain modifications. The security of Roumania and her economic needs were considerations which must modify the instructions. The Roumanian Government meant to move all war material into Roumania on the ground that there would be no force able to compel Hungary to give it up when the Roumanian Army was withdrawn. In addition, Roumania would have to requisition all that her Army required, and 30% besides for her own population. She must also take away the rolling stock, as Germany had only left her sixty engines out of twelve hundred. They also declared that they had a right to take any goods recognised as previously belonging to the Roumanian Government; these goods not counting as a portion of the spoil to be divided among the Allies.

M. Diamandy, questioned as to his attitude, should the Commission refuse to discuss these conditions, had replied that he would be forced to refer to M. Bratiano. Every means of procuring delay was being employed, and in the meantime the despoiling of Hungary continued.

---

<sup>1</sup> Appendix A to HD-24, p. 541.

M. TITTONI said that one thing he could not understand was why the Mission did not make a corporate report to the Conference.

M. PICHON said that one such report had just been received. (See Appendix B.)

M. LOUCHEUR pointed out that what was practically an ultimatum had been sent to the Roumanian Government on the previous Saturday. He suggested that an answer be awaited before any further decision was taken.

MR. POLK said that for the last fortnight the Council had been sending telegrams to Roumania. No attention had been paid to those telegrams. It was intolerable that the Council should be flouted in this way by the Roumanians.

M. TITTONI said that what the Council required was an answer from Bukarest. It could not be satisfied with answers given by Roumanian Generals. Should the Roumanian Government delay its reply, the Allied representatives in Bukarest should demand an explanation.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Council could take any steps short of belligerency to signify their displeasure, should the Roumanian Government unduly delay its reply.

MR. POLK said that at a previous meeting, it had been decided to stop the sending of all supplies to Roumania. He noticed in the minutes that the decision was limited to "war supplies".

MR. BALFOUR said that in referring to the British Government, he had mentioned all supplies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had done likewise, and that the export of all supplies from France had already been stopped.

(It was agreed, with reference to H.D. 37, Minute I,<sup>2</sup> that the export of all supplies to Roumania should be stopped from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, until further orders. It was further decided to send the Roumanian Government, through the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bukarest, a reminder that a reply to telegrams was expected. (See Appendix C.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received information that the British and American Armies on the Rhine were selling horses and cars to the Germans. (See Appendix D.)

Sale of Horses  
and Motors to the  
Germans by the  
American and  
British Troops of  
Occupation

MR. BALFOUR said that he had at once spoken about this matter to Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, who had tried to telephone to Cologne for news. The telephone, however, was not working. As soon as he obtained news, the Council would be informed.

MR. POLK said he had no information whatever but that he undertook to obtain it.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 811.

(It was agreed that the British and American Delegations should give the Council any information available regarding the alleged sales to the Germans by the Armies of Occupation.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU drew attention to a report stating that Admiral Bristol, the American High Commissioner in Constantinople, had presented a threatening memorandum to the Grand Vizier, without previous consultation of the Allied High Commissioners. (See Appendix E.) He did not think that President Wilson would approve of this policy. He drew special attention to the twelfth of the Fourteen Points:

Notification to the Ottoman Government by United States High Commissioner Regarding Armenian Massacres

"The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured, an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees".

All the Allies had adhered to this and the policy could not now be changed. Least of all could one High Commissioner dictate terms to Turkey, with whom his State had not been at war, without consultation with the Associated Powers. As to saving the Armenians, he did not know what could be done. There were no American troops. British troops were employed elsewhere. The French were not allowed by the British to play any part in Asia Minor. The Italians, it was true, had gone to Asia Minor in spite of the British, but they declined to replace the British in the Caucasus. As to the Turks, they were themselves powerless, as they could not control their own troops. He did not see from what quarter the Armenians could expect any assistance.

M. TITTONI said that this was one of the inevitable consequences of delaying Peace with Turkey.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that even when Peace had been made, it was not likely that the Armenians would be better off.

MR. BALFOUR said that this situation was really the consequence of a lack of troops. He understood that the United States were raising a volunteer army. If so, perhaps some of these troops could be employed in Armenia.

MR. POLK said that recruiting for the volunteer army was beginning.

MR. BALFOUR asked M. Clemenceau whether, but for British opposition, he would send French troops to prevent the massacres in Armenia.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would consider the matter.

MR. BALFOUR said that he took note of this declaration.



M. CLEMENCEAU said that he made no undertaking. The French had very few troops in Cilicia, but he would enquire whether they could do anything to save the Armenians. What he had meant to convey was that nothing could be expected from the Americans, who were hampered by their constitution, from the British, who were leaving the Caucasus, from the Italians, who would not go there, or from the French who were not allowed a free hand. The Turks, not being masters in their own house, were equally impotent. The Armenians were therefore no-one's responsibility.

MR. BALFOUR asked M. Clemenceau whether he thought it worth while to ask the French Military Authorities whether they could do anything.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had not come to the Meeting with this idea. As he was pushed, however, he would consent to be pushed. He would make enquiries. Possibly the French Army might be able to do something.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought it would be well worth while to find out.

(It was agreed that the French Government should enquire into the possibility of sending military protection to the Armenians.

It was also agreed that no pressure should be brought on the Sultan by any of the Allied and Associated Powers, acting alone.)

6. M. CAMBON explained the procedure followed by his Committee. He proposed to begin by explaining the covering letter.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that as the covering letter was a result of the various answers on particular questions, it had better be reserved for the end.

M. CAMBON said that the first question to be discussed was that of frontiers. (The covering letter, the various draft replies, and the minority reservations are all contained in Appendix "F".)

On the subject of frontiers, the Austrian objections had been rejected. The only dissentients were the British and American Delegates, who desired to give Gmünd to Austria.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the question was a simple one. The principle of the historic frontier had been adopted for Czecho-Slovakia. By it, the inclusion of a considerable number of Germans in the new State was justified. It was undesirable to deviate from this principle in order to add still more Germans to Czecho-Slovakia. The attribution of Gmünd to Czecho-Slovakia constituted a derogation from the principle of the historic frontier, and still further aggravated the ethnological anomaly. It was justified on grounds of railway communication. He had consulted General Mance, who told him that, on purely technical grounds, it was better to leave

Reply to the Austrian Delegation on the Treaty of Peace

(a) Frontiers

Gmünd in Austria. If this was so, there was no sufficient reason for taking Gmünd out of its natural surroundings. He understood that the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways had never been consulted.

M. TARDIEU said that the question had been studied carefully before, both in Commissions, and in Council. The Czecho-Slovak Delegation had also been heard on the subject. A change now would amount to a third alteration in the decisions of the Council.<sup>3</sup> It was true that the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways had not been consulted, but territorial committees had never consulted that body as such. Each representative consulted his own experts. The case had therefore been judged and re-judged, and the opinion now brought forward by Mr. Headlam-Morley was merely that of an individual expert.

MR. BALFOUR said he recognised that it was a pity to re-open questions which had been settled. Nevertheless, the argument on the merits in this case was very strong. The rule of following the historic frontier was being broken to hand over a purely German population to Czecho-Slovakia. There were already too many Germans in Czecho-Slovakia, even if the historic line were followed. The two or three million Germans already included would certainly be a great perplexity to a new State. Nevertheless, the whole history of Bohemia afforded some justification for preserving the country as a unit. The district of Gmünd had never been Bohemian. The only ground for putting Gmünd within Czecho-Slovakia was economic. He was told that Gmünd was the first big railway junction out of Vienna. The population was incontestably German, and the British railway expert thought that the junction was better in Austria than in Czecho-Slovakia, on purely technical grounds. M. Tardieu had said nothing on the merits except that the Council had twice decided to give Gmünd to the Czechs. If the Council was never to revise its decisions, its task would doubtless be rendered easier. It did not follow, however, that its results would be better.

M. TARDIEU said that he had not only referred to the decision of the Council; he had pointed out that there had been an agreement with the Czecho-Slovak Delegation itself. The attribution of the junction of Gmünd to Czecho-Slovakia had been part of a general arrangement which extended to Pressburg and other places. If this arrangement were changed at the last moment, the Czecho-Slovak Delegation would have reason to complain of bad faith. All the previous decisions had been unanimous. It was therefore a political reason, and, in addition, two essential Bohemian railway lines converged at this point.

---

<sup>3</sup>CF-43, minute 5, vol. VI, p. 131; HD-5, minute 1, *ante*, p. 97.

MR. POLK said that Mr. Lansing and the American experts had felt at the beginning that Gmünd should be Austrian. Nevertheless, in order to obtain agreement, they had yielded to the majority opinion. They still thought, however, that the rule established in favour of the historic frontier should not be broken. For this reason he supported the British view.

M. TITTONI said that there appeared to be good arguments on both sides. He was ready to accept either solution.

M. MATSUI said that the Japanese adhered to the former decision of the Council, and wished to maintain it.

(After a long discussion, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Polk, seeing that Gmünd had been attributed to Czecho-Slovakia as part of a compromise, the other parts of which were not called in question, withdrew the objection raised by the British and the American Delegates.

The answer prepared to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of the frontier between Austria and Czecho-Slovakia was accepted.)

M. CAMBON pointed out that there was a difference of opinion on the subject of Styria. The American, British, Italian and Japanese Delegations thought that the Austrian demand for a plebiscite in the region of Marburg should be accepted. The French Delegation was not of this opinion. It was recognised that Marburg was German, but the surrounding districts were undoubtedly Slovene.

M. TITTONI said that as the neighbouring region was to have a plebiscite, it was easy to extend it to Marburg.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought it would be difficult to refuse the plebiscite.

M. TARDIEU said he had no prejudice against plebiscites, but in this case he thought it was unnecessary. Marburg was certainly German, but in a region peopled by Slovenes. The result of a plebiscite was a foregone conclusion, Marburg would vote German and the country round it would vote Slovene. What could then be done? Was the town to be sacrificed to the country or the country to the town? No frontier line could be obtained as a result of the plebiscite. In Carinthia, on the other hand, a frontier might be obtained. There would therefore be quite needless trouble without any useful result.

(After considerable further discussion, it was decided to accept the Austrian demands and to extend the plebiscite zone in such a manner as to include in it the district of Marburg and Radkersburg.)

M. CAMBON observed that the British and Italian Delegations held a minority view on the subject of the plebiscite zones in Carinthia. They proposed four instead of two plebiscite zones.

(After some discussion, the British and Italian reservations were withdrawn and the reply to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of Carinthia was accepted.

The reply to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of the frontier



between Austria and Hungary and on the frontier between Austria and Italy was likewise accepted.)

(b) Nationality  
Questions

The reply to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of nationality questions was accepted.

(c) Austrian Interests Outside of Europe

The question was adjourned.

The British Delegation withdrew its objections, and the reply prepared to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses was accepted.

(d) Military,  
Naval and Air  
Clauses

The reply drafted to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of prisoners of war was accepted.

(e) Prisoners of War

M. CAMBON pointed out that there were two draft replies on this subject, one prepared by the Commission and the other suggested by the British and Japanese

(f) Penalties

Delegation.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY observed that on the substance, he was in agreement with the majority. He wished to defend the Treaty but he thought that the draft he proposed defended it more accurately. There was a very technical legal point involved.

(It was decided to refer both drafts to the Drafting Committee for co-ordination.)

The draft reply to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of reparations was accepted.

(g) Reparations

(h) Financial  
Clauses

After long discussion, the proposed reply to the Austrian Delegation on the financial clauses was accepted, with the exception of the alternative proposal of the American, British and Japanese Delegation regarding Article 199 which was adjourned until the following day.

7. The agreement annexed in Appendix G was accepted.<sup>4</sup>

Agreement Between the Allies Regarding the Contribution of Poland, Roumania, Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia to the Cost of Liberation of the Territories of the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

8. The agreement annexed in Appendix H was accepted.<sup>5</sup>

Agreement Between the Allies Regarding Italian Contribution Towards Cost of Liberating Territories of Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

<sup>4</sup> Appendix G does not accompany the file copy of the minutes; for the agreement, see appendix I to HD-37, p. 830.

<sup>5</sup> Appendix H does not accompany the file copy of the minutes; for the agreement, see appendix J to HD-37, p. 832.

9. M. TARDIEU proposed that a Committee be charged with the examination of a proposal which had been drafted in the following terms:—

Declaration by  
Austria That All  
Action Tending  
To Overthrow of  
the Austrian State  
as Constituted by  
the Treaty Would  
Be Prohibited

“Austria undertakes not to tolerate on her territory any act whether of propaganda or of any other sort by Austrian subjects or by foreign subjects with a purpose subversive of Austria as an independent State. Acts of this character should be regarded as directed against the security of the State and treated as such. The Austrian Government should interpret on its part this enactment as an undertaking not to compromise or allow to be compromised, directly or indirectly, the independence of the State, particularly in the legislative sphere, by preparatory measures, and in the sphere of public or private instruction by propaganda. No law or regulation or official action of any sort shall conflict with these stipulations. In case there should be any divergence of interpretation between the Austrian Government and one, or several, of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the discrepancy will be referred either to the Council of the League of Nations or, when instituted, brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice. These Bodies will also pass decrees regarding measures desirable to ensure the carrying into effect of their findings and to prevent the recurrence of similar difficulties.”

M. TITTONI said that this was a very serious proposal. It attempted to regulate the internal Constitution of Austria for all time, not on a special point, but through the whole of its extent.

MR. BALFOUR said that he hoped the Council would be very careful before putting into the Treaty, or into a letter having the force of a Treaty, any form of words which would compel the Allied and Associated Powers to impose domestic legislation on Austria, and to maintain police authority over private, as well as public, speech. He thought the proposal was really very repugnant to all that constituted an independent state. He believed, moreover, that if agreed to, it would remain ineffective. The only way to prevent Austria from gravitating towards Germany was to make terms such that she would be content to live apart. Any attempt to prevent an Austrian from saying that he wished to join Germany would, he thought, cover both the Council and the League of Nations with ridicule.

M. TARDIEU said that he was impressed by Mr. Balfour's criticisms regarding the methods suggested. He thought that perhaps the first sentence alone would suffice. The suggestion was a corollary to what had been put into the German Treaty.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought that the omission of the bulk of the document would be an improvement. He observed that the corollary to the provisions of the German Treaty would be to forbid the Austrian Government to do certain things. This might be done without incurring the objections he had previously stated.

M. TARDIEU said that the Austrians were already saying that they had no hope of living apart unless the League of Nations took special care of them. The Council was trying to give the Austrians conditions which might make it possible for them to live independently. What he now suggested was a counterpart to those favours. He believed that Dr. Renner would readily agree, seeing that Herr Bauer had resigned because he could not convert the Government to the contrary view. It would be enough, he thought, if the mere principle were agreed to.

MR. POLK asked whether M. Tardieu suggested that this should be said in the Treaty.

M. TARDIEU said he thought it would be sufficient if agreed to in the covering letter sent with the replies.

MR. POLK thought this was preferable.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought this proposal had better be put into a new form, and suggested that M. Tardieu should propose one.

M. TARDIEU said that he would do so; what he suggested was to say in the covering letter that the Allies were confident that the Austrian Government meant to do what the Allies hoped would be done, and he believed that the Austrian Delegation would give a satisfactory answer.

(It was decided that a sentence to the effect desired should be introduced in the covering letter, and considered on the following day.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 25 August, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-38<sup>6</sup>

##### *Report of the Commission of Enquiry Into the Fiume Incidents*

The work of the Commission instructed by the Supreme Council to make an enquiry into the events which took place at Fiume in the first days of July are summed up in the 20 procès-verbaux annexed to the present report (81 annexed documents).<sup>7</sup>

#### A. THE CAUSES

1. The armistice which marked the end of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and the Allied and Associated Powers of the Entente was signed at Villa Giusti on November 4 [3], 1918.<sup>8</sup> The conditions

---

<sup>6</sup>The text of this appendix does not accompany the file copy of the minutes. The French text of the report is filed under Paris Peace Conf. 181.8201/21; this translation from the French has been supplied by the editors.

<sup>7</sup>Not printed.

<sup>8</sup>Vol. II, p. 175.



had already been studied and fixed at Versailles by the Supreme War Council.

The conditions authorized the occupation of the strategic points judged necessary beyond the line of demarcation that had been established, and prescribed that the local governments which were found already in power in the territories occupied by the Allied forces should continue to exercise their power during the occupation.

2. On November 17, 1918, by virtue of paragraph 4 of the armistice convention signed by General Diaz with the commander in chief of the Austro-Hungarian Armies, the Italian Army entered Fiume, which was considered by the Italian command as a strategic point, and which had previously been occupied, then evacuated, by a Serb battalion of the Interallied Army of the East. Considerable forces (13,000 men still officially present on July 15, in spite of the reduction of effectives resulting from the demobilization) occupied the city and its environs within a radius of 6 or 8 kilometers. French, English and American detachments completed the corps of occupation, which thus became Interallied, under the command of General Grazioli of the Italian Army. (The American battalion left the city in the first days of February, 1919.)

3. While the Italian occupation was being accomplished, the commander of the Interallied Army of the East, thinking it necessary to establish at Fiume a basis for the supply of its troops, gave the order to occupy it.

It is to be noted here:

(a) that no line of demarcation had been fixed at Versailles to separate, in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the territories which might be occupied for strategic reasons by the Army of Italy, from those which might be occupied by the Army of the East;

(b) that the order to occupy Fiume with French and Serb troops, given by the commander of the Armies of the East, engaged only the responsibility of the general that had given it, and not that of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, who were not cognizant of the question.

This was the first cause of the conflicts. The Italian commander at Fiume alleged his right, which was incontestable and based on an international convention. The French commander at Fiume could allege only the orders of his general. The difficulties encountered by the French in establishing their base and the irritation in the relations with the Italian command in lodging their troops there, have no other cause.

It was then that the question was referred by the Governments concerned to Marshal Foch, who proposed to the Supreme War Council that the occupation of Fiume should be Italian, but that a French base should be established there for the supply of the Army of East,

as well as Franco-Serb detachment for the service of this base. The Interallied troops of Italy were to depend on the Italian Army, those of the French base on the Army of the East. In case of conflict, the two commanders in chief were to inform their respective Governments through the intermediary of Marshal Foch. These propositions were approved by the protocol of London.

4. The coexistence of Italian troops and of the French base at Fiume was thus established *de jure*, and the disagreements between the two commands virtually ceased in fact, but new causes for conflict were not long in arising, among which were the following:

a) The fact of the respective dependence of the Italian and French troops of two different commands acting independently of each other led to conflicts of jurisdiction which left ill feeling.

b) The constitution of a French base within the lines of the Interallied army of Italy—a base which, in the opinion of the population and the Italian troops, was supplying the Yugoslavs, among whom were the Slovenes and Croats who had fought against Italy to the last day and whom Italy will consider as enemies until peace is signed—led to a situation which profoundly irritated the Italians.

c) The commander and certain officers of the French base were never willing to recognize the Italian National Council which governs at Fiume as a government *de facto*, if not *de jure*.

It must be added that, in the mixed population of Fiume, there had always been conflicts between the Italians and the Croats, and that the city enjoyed under the Hungarian Government a large autonomy founded on ancient privileges which in general left the administration to the Italians.

d) The nomination of an Italian National Council named without regular elections to replace the Council which had seized, under the presidency of Dr. Lanaz, the administration of the city after the departure of the Hungarian authorities, in the name of the Yugoslav National Council of Zagreb, likewise nominated without elections.

This Italian National Council, whose legitimacy the Croats rightly protested, overstepped its rights by proclaiming annexation to the Kingdom of Italy.

Sustained by the Italian command, it very rapidly took a number of measures destined to place the Allied Governments in the presence of a *fait accompli* which they would have merely to sanction.

In particular, the streets and the squares of the city had their names changed and received Italian names; justice was dispensed in the name of the King of Italy, and the oath was required of the lawyers.

e) The French did not conceal their sympathy for the Yugoslav element; the Italian command, on its side, openly supported the Italian element and its support went so far as to tolerate the constitution of such societies as "Giovine Fiume" (Young Fiume) and "Giovine Italia" (Young Italy) and the formation of a Fiume battalion, which proposed to carry out the annexation, even if it had to use violence. The lax censorship allowed the press to publish articles stirring up revolt and a too indulgent police gave the professional agitators a feeling of immunity.

f) This situation, already very difficult in itself, became more acute still after the Peace of Versailles, when the recognition of Yugoslavia by the Allies of Italy became an accomplished fact and when it was understood that the aspirations of this power over Fiume and a part of Dalmatia had not received satisfaction. The exasperation of Italian public opinion, directed especially against France, brought about the fall of the ministry in Italy and gave rise to a violent press campaign which had its effect in Fiume and which contributed indirectly to the painful events which led to the investigation.

g) Some unimportant acts of the French soldiers, who under the existing circumstances did doubtless offend the Italian population, may also be included among the immediate and occasional causes of the local hostility to the French troops.

h) The Third Italian Army itself also distributed anti-Allied propaganda in the form of bulletins distributed among the troops.

i) The very great preponderance of the Italian troops in the city of Fiume over the troops of the other Allies encouraged the population in its attitude toward the French and the Yugoslavs in the city of Fiume.

j) A considerable display of posters also contributed to excite Italian sentiment.

k) On April 25, the manifesto of President Wilson relative to the fate of Fiume<sup>9</sup> caused a great excitement in the city. A manifestation of several thousand persons took place before the palace of the Governor. The general commanding the corps of occupation, in a speech, declared himself openly in favor of annexation to Italy and recommended calm.

l) On June 17 the General commanding the corps of occupation requested the general commanding the French troops to take the Serbs out of the city; the French general refused.

## B. THE FACTS

5. *June 29.* A group of French soldiers, cheered up by a good meal at the barracks in celebration of the peace, came from the suburb of Susak into the city accompanied by a bugler. The soldiers were rather gay; they were singing and interlarding their songs with cries, among others: "Vive la France", "Vive la Yougo-Slavie" and "A bas l'Italie". This last cry is disputed. That of "Vive la Yougo-Slavie" was considered as a provocation, which was all the more resented by the Italians of Fiume that day when they were greatly excited by the nature of the peace that had just been signed. Happily the affair stopped there, but it contributed to create in the crowd the state of feeling which provoked the incidents of the following days.

6. *July 2.* Two intoxicated French soldiers, coming from Susak, met two girls wearing the Italian cockade on their breasts; one of them tore off one of the cockades; some Italian grenadiers beat them

---

<sup>9</sup> Dated April 23. For text, see Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (Garden City, N. Y., 1922), vol. III, p. 287.



and, with some other people, took them back to the barracks, where the French commander gave them the maximum of imprisonment. In the meanwhile, the news spread like wildfire through the city and all the French who were walking unarmed in groups or alone were violently attacked by a howling mob armed with clubs, in which Italian civilians and soldiers were mingled in a proportion which it has been impossible to determine, as the testimony is contradictory. The alarm was sounded to recall the Italian soldiers to their barracks, while armed pickets and patrols sought to clear the streets, to establish barrages to protect the French barracks and to protect the French by getting them into shelters. They succeeded thus in saving them, but were unable to prevent 9 French officers and 41 soldiers from being wounded, one of them seriously so. The Italian soldiers are reproached with having feebly defended the French, which they were to protect, and even having struck them themselves; some witnesses affirm this, others deny it; it is proved however that this happened in a number of cases and in particular to a French officer and an adjutant whose testimonies leave no doubt.

While these events were going on, a mob of civilians broke into the Croat Club. They broke the mirrors and threw out of the windows some furniture which the crowd broke to pieces. Finally the Italian soldiers went in and put the mob out, but arrested no one.

The attack on the Croat Club was not premeditated and it is all the more surprising since during the occupation there had been no conflict between the Italian and Croat civilians of Fiume and since the Italian soldiers are on the best of terms with the Croats of Susak. This attack, therefore, can be explained only by the excitement of the mob resulting from the causes above mentioned. Order was badly maintained, and the absence of arrests is not explained.

7. *July 5.* A group of six French soldiers were quarreling with some civilians; a Frenchman fired a revolver, then another fired. An Italian officer ran up and in his turn fired a shot at them. A French soldier was struck. The French fled in the direction of their barracks. A crowd, which gathered, grew rapidly and pursued them. During the flight three of them took shelter in an Italian barracks, one disappeared and the other two reached their barracks and gave the call to arms. Rifles and machine guns were fired from the barracks. The Italian officer proceeded across the square which remained empty and parleyed with the French soldiers, who promised to cease firing if the mob went away. They kept their word and ceased firing; an Italian armed picket pushed back the mob, which had taken shelter, and established a barrage, and order was restored. During the pursuit a grenade thrown by a civilian exploded and wounded two Frenchmen; some shots were fired from a house opposite the barracks and from No. 3 rue Parini, where a civilian of

Croat nationality was arrested. A few minutes later the mob found a French patrol from the "Sakalave", surrounded it and insulted it without reason; two armed Italian pickets got the patrol between them and conducted it back to its boat but could not protect it from stones thrown by the mob which was being kept at a distance. A cordon of Italian sailors was formed on the wharf for the protection of the "Sakalave", which was moored there.

It was a Frenchman who fired first, and what followed was the consequence of this, in view of the state of mind of the crowd which was becoming more and more excited. The shots from the barracks occupied by the French soldiers were justified; the French soldiers who were greatly excited themselves and who, believing themselves to be attacked, had a right to defend themselves. The police service was no more satisfactory than on previous occasions, and, as usual, no arrests were made. They might at least have arrested the ones that were insulting the patrol of the "Sakalave", seeing that the *Carabinieri* were there. For the first time the mob threw a grenade and somebody fired from a window.

8. *July 6.* On this day, which was Sunday, three armed French soldiers were coming from Susak, where they had bought some cigarettes and had drunk wine and vermouth; they were crossing the center of the city, contrary to the orders of their chiefs. They were not molested and they molested no one. An Italian patrol and a crowd followed them. Several times shots had been fired in the city. On the quay one of the soldiers left his comrades and joined his post without being molested. The other two reached the top of the Palazzo Adria; one of them turned and fired in the direction of the crowd. The Italian patrol following them hid behind the customs house and fired a few shots at the Frenchmen. No one was struck and the two Frenchmen ran, pursued by the crowd, in which there were quite a number of Italian soldiers; one of them was stopped and disarmed by a civilian, who received a bayonet thrust in the leg; the other was mortally wounded by a revolver shot, it is not known exactly by whom. Several revolver shots were fired by the crowd, in which there were also Italian officers, who, according to the statements of witnesses, were seen to fire. One of them, who was identified, testified; he acknowledged that he fired four times at the soldier at a distance of forty paces; but he added that he had missed him, not having seen him fall.

The participation of some Italian officers in this unequal combat, who should have defended this soldier, is established. Once more to be noted is the absolute inadequacy of the measures taken for the maintenance of public order and the absence of arrests.

This incident was scarcely ended when the crowd started, no one knows why, for the French depots of Porto Barros. There had never

been any trouble in this vicinity, neither provocations nor quarrels; a small garrison of 27 men, partly Annamite soldiers and partly French administrative personnel, were guarding these depots and were cantoned there. Two revolver shots were fired from the mob, fired by civilians at the Annamite sentinel, who fired back. Revolver shots were fired from the windows of houses which faced the Christopher Columbus Quay and Marco Polo Street; other revolver and rifle shots came from across the basin of the inner port, coming from an unknown direction, leaving some marks on the Italian cruisers in the harbor. Just as this fire ceased three companies of Italian sailors, armed and officered, were landed. The company of the "Emmanuele Filiberto" went to the quay where the French destroyers were moored and formed a cordon for their protection; the company from the "Dante" went to the Piazza Dante with orders to keep the people moving and to prevent any assembly gathering. Neither company was attacked and both succeeded in carrying out their orders without hindrance. The third, the company of the "San Marco" received from Commander Acton the definite order to place itself between the mob and the French depots of the base in order to protect them without the use of arms. The company advanced in columns of four and as soon as it passed the drawbridge it heard shots whistle by. It took combat formation. First it deployed and fired a salvo; following this it proceeded to divide into three columns which surrounded the depots and searched them, killing or wounding the few Frenchmen and Annamites who had taken refuge inside. Survivors were taken on board the "Emmanuele Filiberto", where the wounded were cared for. During the short fight, about twenty rifle shots were fired by the French and Annamites, as far as can be judged by the number of cartridge shells found; almost two hundred were fired by the Italian sailors according to the statement of their officers. One French and one Italian civilian were killed near an Italian fishing boat moored at the wharf by revolver shots fired from the crowd of civilians; two Annamites were killed inside the post by the Italian sailors; two others were killed although they were unarmed and had already surrendered, one by a stab in the back and the other by a blow on the head with the butt of a rifle; two grenades were thrown by the mob, one falling into the water and the other exploding, killing an Annamite and wounding an Italian sailor. The mob and the Italian sailors committed barbarous acts, which are verified by numerous witnesses.

It is incomprehensible how such an incident could have taken place and how a few shots fired by a post that thought itself threatened by the mob could have caused the officers of the "San Marco" to lose their heads to the extent of attacking the very post that they were to have defended, and to attack it with a hundred men using arms when they knew that the garrison was very small and that it had not the



the least idea of defending itself, since the sentinel surrendered with four other men at the first summons. It would have been so easy to come to an understanding; bloodshed would have been spared and the civilians, who might have been and who should have been kept at a distance, would not have been able to penetrate within the boundaries of the Porto Barros, where they killed three men with revolver shots and grenades. It is possible that these officers and sailors, who had never fought on land, did not judge the situation with reality, but in accordance with the erroneous suggestions of their over excited imaginations.

They raided several houses, without any result except the arrest of a French officer who had done nothing but watch events out of a window, and of a Croat, a hotel waiter at Susak.

The absence of all penalties is still more incomprehensible than on the previous occasions.

The total French losses on July 6 were 9 killed and 11 wounded, while the Italians had three sailors slightly wounded.

### C. RESPONSIBILITY

9. There is no doubt that the responsibility for the tension in the relations between the Italians of the Kingdom and of Fiume on the one hand and the French on the other is due, not to individuals, but to facts that belong henceforth to history. These are: the recognition of Yugoslavia by the Allies, except Italy; the Peace of Versailles, in which the settlement of all the questions relative to Italy was postponed to an indefinite date; the belief of the Italian nation in a Slavophile and Hellenophile policy on the part of France which, according to this belief, is tending to reconstruct, under the form of a Danubian confederation, its old enemy Austria-Hungary, to bar Italy from the East.

10. This situation *de facto*, which no one could change and which should have been accepted by all, was none the less of a very delicate nature, especially at Fiume where the interests concerned were in immediate contact and where, consequently, a shock was due to take place at any moment. It was absolutely necessary, therefore, that all the authorities who, for any reason whatever, were exercising jurisdiction at Fiume should endeavor, in perfect accord with each other, to remain above the passions exciting the city and to maintain a perfect balance between the parties, trying not to dissatisfy any, since it was impossible to satisfy all. Now this is precisely the opposite of what happened.

11. The Italian National Council, the political authority *de facto*, though disputably *de jure*, overstepped its rights in proclaiming the annexation to the Kingdom of Italy, as if there did not exist at

Paris any Peace Conference to decide these great questions. It then took irritating measures against the Croats who would not recognize it, and tolerated the existence of clubs of young men who were working for the annexation, proclaiming that they would not hesitate to have recourse to violence, if necessary, to obtain it.

12. The Croat National Council at Susak, which no longer had authority, either *de jure* or *de facto*, since the administration was in the hands of a district captain, directly under Zagreb, continued nevertheless to exist in order to issue Croat propaganda.

13. The Italian military authority, in place of confining itself to its military functions devolving upon it by reasons purely strategic, for which it had taken up the occupation of Fiume, openly supported the Italian National Council in its machinations and, in spite of the forces at its disposal, avoided taking measures against the Italian elements of the city, even the most turbulent, and while rigorously censoring the Croat newspapers, allowed the publication of dangerous articles in the Italian journals.

14. The French command and officers were criticised on account of their Jugo-Slav sympathies, either because the Italians refused to associate with them or because the French preferred to go with the Jugo-Slavs. There resulted in the mind of the Italians the belief that the French were with the Jugo-Slavs, against the Italian aspirations, which developed a profound local grudge.

15. Therefore, there is no doubt that the general responsibility of what has just happened belongs to all these authorities, less on account of their functions than because of the manner in which they understood and exercised them.

16. The responsibility for slackness in the police service and the total lack of punishments belongs to the Italian command.

#### D. PROPOSALS

17. Taking into consideration the above, the best means to reestablish order and prevent the renewal of troubles, would be to decide as soon as possible the fate of Fiume, to put an end to that period of waiting which encourages the subversive elements to act in order to obtain the solution they desire.

In the meantime the following measures might be taken:

1. Replace the Italian National Council of Fiume by a government, elected under the control of an Interallied military commission which would guarantee its impartiality.

2. Create an Interallied military commission charged with the supervision and civil administration of the "Corpus separatum" of Fiume and Susak. This commission would be composed of one representative for the United States of America, France, Great Britain, and Italy. It would also control the elections mentioned in the paragraph

above. The chairman should be the American or the British representative.

3. *a)* Change the personnel of the Italian command, and the troops which took part in the recent troubles. Notify the new command that its action must be exclusively military and must not intervene in the civil administration.

*b)* The Italian troops of occupation east of the armistice line should be reduced to one infantry brigade and one squadron of cavalry, only one battalion of this brigade to be quartered in Fiume-Susak. The commanding general of that brigade could reside in Fiume where he would exercise the tactical command of the Interallied forces. No power should have more than one battalion stationed in the city, the military police included.

4. *a)* Relieve the whole battalion of French Colonial Infantry;

*b)* Change the personnel of the French base;

*c)* By reason of the hostility of the Fiume population regarding this base, it is desirable that it should be suppressed as soon as possible.

5. A maximum of two warships per nation should be present at the same time in the harbor, excluding the French and Italian warships with their personnel, which have been in Fiume at any time since the armistice.

6. Until such time as a local military police is formed, create, for the maintenance of order, a police corps, either English or American, one battalion strong, directly under the Interallied military commission provided for in paragraph 2. The chairman of that commission could apply for reinforcements, in case of need, to the commander of the Interallied Corps of Occupation and to the commanders of the Interallied warships.

7. Immediate suppression of the Fiume battalion.

8. Judicial inquiry:

*a)* Into the death of the French soldier Penuisic;

*b)* Into the acts charged against:

The superior officer commanding the leading companies;

The commander of the landing company which attacked the post of Porto Barros;

The officer who broke into the apartment of a French officer without orders in order to arrest him.

The commander of the Italian carabinieri.

9. Reparations of a moral and material nature due to France for the death of her soldiers and the damage caused to the depots of the base should be regulated, according to diplomatic usages, by a direct agreement between the Governments concerned.

10. Nothing to be neglected in order that the perfect entente and comradeship which have always existed outside of Fiume between the French and the Italian Armies, so worthy of each other, may be reestablished in the common interest and thus complete the great work for peace.

11. Immediate and effective action on the part of the Allies in view of furnishing Italy with all she needs to resume her industry and insure her prosperity. This would help a great deal to revive good



feelings and would be, on the part of the Allies, a demonstration of their appreciation of Italy's sacrifices for the common cause.

12. On account of the lack of food, the Commission recommends strongly that Serbia be invited to remove at once the prohibitions on the exportation of food stuffs consigned to Fiume and Dalmatia.

Fiume, August 9, 1919.

---

#### Appendix B to HD-38

[Translation <sup>10</sup>]

*Telegram [From the Inter-Allied Military Mission in Hungary] to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, Paris*

BUDAPEST, August 23, 1919—9 a. m.<sup>11</sup>

No. 181. From Prot[ocol]. Report of meeting afternoon of August 23. Commission communicated to Archduke telegram of August 23 from Supreme Council <sup>11a</sup> together with letter in which he was given two hours' time to make known his decision, informing him that if the decision was not in conformity with the intentions expressed by the Peace Conference, the Commission would be forced to give the document out for publication. At eight o'clock in the evening, President of the Hungarian Council Friedrich informed the Commission by letter that Archduke and present Government are resigning and ask to do everything that seems necessary to them. Commission for all useful purposes believed it well immediately to summon M. Friedrich and remind him that as the Commission had already advised what the Peace Conference believes necessary, it expects the present Government to carry on, as is customary, the despatch of current business until formation of the new government in which all parties are represented. M. Friedrich promised that he hopes to be able to present the list of the new cabinet within a few days.

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION

---

*Telegram to the Inter-Allied Supreme Council, Paris*

BUDAPEST, August 24—8:31 p. m.

Telegram 180 from Prot[ocol]. Report of morning session of August 23.

---

<sup>10</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>11</sup> There is apparently some confusion in the date and time of this telegram and No. 180, *infra*. This telegram could hardly have been sent at the time given. No. 180, on the other hand, is dated August 24, 8:31 p. m., although it covers the morning session of the 23d. It would be more plausible for 180 to be dated August 23, 8:31 p. m., and No. 181, August 24, 9 a. m.

<sup>11a</sup> Appendix G to HD-36, p. 803.

The Commission this morning heard M. Diamandy who, having received instructions from Bucharest, came to set forth the thesis of the Roumanian Government with respect to material. According to these statements, this thesis is to be sustained at the same time in Paris before the Supreme Council.

"Roumania sees its own locomotives and cars in the hands of the Hungarians, while it has none for its own needs.

"The material which the Hungarians took from it cannot be considered as a security belonging to the Allied Powers.

"Furthermore, Count Czernin enumerated before the whole Parliament what has been taken in Roumania. As compensation Roumania considers that it should demand not only what is strictly necessary for the needs of the occupation troops, but also 30% of all the articles in Hungary.

"What would happen if the Roumanians withdrew? What guarantees that the material left by them in Hungary would be restored to them? Who will protect Roumania against the use which could be made of them against it? The delay shown in seizing Hungarian material is to the Hungarian advantage and causes great damage to Roumania.

"It must not be forgotten that Roumania is also threatened on the Russian front.

"A little less rigidity in the Paris decision could facilitate an agreement which, otherwise, would be difficult."

Without enumerating the other arguments presented by M. Diamandy, it is certain that the requisitioning and the shipments into Roumania are being continued.

The Commission will be able to supervise the shipments through commissions of officers, one of which will begin to function tomorrow at Szolnok where the railway bridge is to be rebuilt and the others within a short time at other points.

It is not within the power of the Commission to prevent requisitioning and it can only refer the matter to the Supreme Council. Up to this time, with regard to the Roumanians, the work of the Mission has been practically of no value.

Accordingly, this Mission is of the opinion that it would be useless to continue these conversations with the local Roumanian authorities who follow a policy of procrastination with the obvious intention of taking possession of anything of value which remains in Hungary and who have continually failed to keep their promises.

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION

## Appendix C to HD-38

[Translation <sup>12</sup>]*Telegram From the Supreme Council of the Allies to the Roumanian Government*

(Sent through the intermediary of the Chargé d'Affaires of France at Bucharest)

PARIS, August 25, 1919.

The reports of the Interallied Commission of Generals at Budapest establish that Roumanian military authorities are continuing to empty Hungary of its resources of all kinds, despite the assurances given both by the Roumanian Government and by its representatives in Paris.

The Peace Conference has received this information with the most painful surprise. It awaits with the greatest impatience the reply of the Roumanian Government to the telegram which the Supreme Council addressed to it on the 23rd instant,<sup>13</sup> which definitively confirmed its views already expressed on several occasions, but it must hereupon warn the Roumanian Government that if the conduct of the Roumanian authorities in Hungary does not undergo a complete and immediate change, such attitude will entail the most serious consequences for Roumania.

G. CLEMENCEAU

---

Appendix "D" to HD-38

GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMY  
2° BUREAU A

AUGUST 23, 1919.

## SALE OF MATERIAL BELONGING TO BRITISH AND AMERICAN TROOPS

The newspapers of Cologne continue to publish for the British authorities, announcements of auction sales of automobiles, horses and mules belonging to the army. The Americans also circulate announcements: at Boppard they are proceeding to conduct sales of military material.

Annexed is the original and the translation of an announcement of the *Koelnische Volkszeitung* relative to an auction sale of horses and mules. Other similar announcements, relative to the sale of auto-

---

<sup>12</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

<sup>13</sup> Appendix A to HD-37, p. 819.



mobiles and trucks by the British, recently communicated to the General staff, have been destroyed.

"NOTICE.

Upon the order of the British Army  
Sales at auction of  
250 surplus horses and mules  
Mr. Carl Polhaus  
will sell these animals at public auction  
at Solingen.  
Loup-Garou Sebastian-Schutzenplatz.  
The sale will commence at 9 o'clock.

Payments will be made in cash. Checks will not be accepted. The animals will be delivered without halters; they can be taken away immediately after payment for same. Their transfer into the non-occupied zone is authorized."

---

Appendix "E" to HD-38

*Telegram From the French High Commissioner at Constantinople on the Action of Admiral Bristol in Presenting a Telegram to the Turkish Government Before Consultation With the Inter-Allied High Commission*

Translation

AUGUST 23, 1919.

Admiral Bristol, recently appointed American High Commissioner to Constantinople, remitted a comminatory memorandum to the Grand Vizier on the 22nd instant without having advised the Allied High Commissioners.

The following is a résumé of the note :

"President Wilson notifies the Turkish Government that if immediate measures are not taken to prohibit all violences or massacres on the part of the Turks, Kurds, or other Mussulmans against the Armenians in the Caucasus or elsewhere, the President will withdraw Article 12 from the Peace Conditions<sup>14</sup> (rules concerning the maintenance of Turkish sovereignty). This action would result in the complete dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. If the Turks desire to continue to exercise any sovereignty over any part of the Empire they must show that they not only have the intention, but the authority to prohibit their nationals from engaging in these atrocities: no excuse [of?] being powerless in the matter will be accepted from the Turks."

The Grand Vizier communicated this memorandum to the English and French High Commissioners. He is very uneasy and declares that he has not been authorised to control the necessary forces

---

<sup>14</sup>i. e., No. 12 of the Fourteen Points, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 16.

to maintain order or to obtain the financial resources indispensable for the payment of his soldiers and functionaries; under these conditions he is completely at bay. He could not help remarking that America, a country which has not been at war with Turkey and did not sign the Armistice, gave this imperative notification separately and without participation on the part of the Allied Powers.

---

Appendix F to HD-38

[Translation <sup>15</sup>]

COORDINATING COMMITTEE  
FOR THE REPLY TO AUSTRIA

*Note for the Supreme Council*

AUGUST 25, 1919.

At its session of August 19,<sup>16</sup> the Supreme Council, wishing to reserve to itself the examination of the drafts of the reply to the Austrian note from the point of view of substance, decided that the functions of the Coordinating Committee should be limited to changes in form.

However, the Supreme Council gave instructions that the members of the Committee should submit to it reports on all points in which it appeared to them that changes of substance might be introduced.

In execution of these instructions, the Coordinating Committee has the honor to submit to the Supreme Council:

1. A draft of the covering letter;
2. An attached memorandum containing the drafts prepared by the Commissions in reply to the Austrian counterproposals and coordinated by the Committee;
3. An appendix enumerating the various points to which in the opinion of one or several members of the Committee, the attention of the Supreme Council should be drawn. There is hardly need to add that the authors of these notes had no other intention than to facilitate the task of the Supreme Council in the examination of the drafts of the reply.

J. CAMBON  
*Chairman*

---

<sup>15</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the Translating Bureau of the Department of State.

<sup>16</sup> HD-33, minute 1, p. 713.

*Draft of a Covering Letter to the Chairman of the Austrian  
Delegation of the Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers*

PEACE CONFERENCE  
THE PRESIDENT

To His Excellency M. RENNER,  
*Chairman of the Austrian Delegation,  
Saint-Germain-en-Laye.*

PARIS, August . . ., 1919.

MR. CHAIRMAN: The Allied and Associated Powers have examined with very special attention the observations of the Austrian delegation relative to the conditions of peace.

Enclosed you will find their reply, which contains all the amendments the introduction of which into the treaty has seemed equitable and possible in practice.

The Austrian delegation raised objections of principle against certain clauses of the original draft treaty of peace; it pointed out that they imply, first of all, that Austria is an enemy state and, further that it is heir to the obligations of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Austrian delegation claims that Austria is an entirely new state, born of the dissolution of the Monarchy; created after the armistice, it has not in fact ever been at war with the Allied and Associated Powers, which thus cannot treat it as an enemy; it would not be just to make it, especially, heir to the obligations of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and to make it bear the weight of indemnities and reparations which would certainly have been imposed on the Monarchy if it had still existed.

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot admit this point of view. It must not be forgotten that the war originated in the very severe ultimatum sent from Vienna to Serbia on July 23, 1914, followed by a declaration of war on July 25, in spite of a reply from the Serbian Government which was universally considered conciliatory. Nor must it be forgotten that from the first days of August 1914, Austrian large-caliber artillery pieces bombarded Belgian forts, thus associating the Austrian Government in the violation of that country's neutrality.

It is doubtless true that the prime responsibility for the war rests on the Government of the former Monarchy and that that Government has disappeared; but to stop with such a statement is to give an incomplete picture of the situation. During one whole generation the policy of the Austro-Hungarian state, whether in internal constitutional affairs or in foreign relations, had no other object than to seek the support of the German Empire



in order to fasten the hegemony of German and Magyar elements on the Slav and Latin elements of the Monarchy and to extend it over the independent states of the Balkans. The events of the last six years show the war as a struggle between the Germanic, Slav and Latin elements of eastern Europe. The success of the Central Powers would unquestionably have led to the establishment of a complete and permanent hegemony of German military power, of German political thought, of German intellectual ideas over the greater part of the European continent.

The rupture of the bond which united Austria to Hungary has in no way changed their status as belligerents in the present war; it has doubtless affected the position of the international organism until then recognized by the Powers, but it would be rather difficult to deny that in fact—and the war is a question of fact—the state of war existed. Furthermore, it cannot be said that the establishment of a new government at Vienna was an event to modify the relations of Austria with its enemies. No more than the rupture of a federal bond, does a change in government bring about peace. These are acts of form which do not go to the inwardness of such serious matters. It is in the character of nations that the roots of war lie; so long as they have not come to an agreement to live in peace, governments can be made or unmade, disintegrate or endure: the peoples will nonetheless continue to fight. Thus the Allied and Associated Powers consider that the state of war created by the Monarchy in July 1914 has continued until today and that Austria participated therein and still participates therein. In the eyes of the Allied and Associated Powers Austria is, accordingly, an enemy state.

On the contrary, in the midst of the war and long before the Armistice, the Slavs and Latins of the former Monarchy rallied to the legions of free men under the banners of the great Powers. Their soldiers enrolled in the armies of liberty; they served on various fronts, organized independent units and were recognized as co-belligerents by the Allied and Associated Powers. Their example inspired their fellow-citizens and the long restrained aspirations of their people were given free course in an explosion of national life. They took their place among the other states. It was not of their own will that they made war in the ranks of the soldiers of the Monarchy; they afterwards showed this by uniting with their alleged enemies who admitted them into their alliance.

This dismemberment of the Monarchy did not extinguish its pre-war obligations or the obligations which it contracted in order to make war and the victorious Allied and Associated Powers have had to solve the difficult problem of the liquidation thereof in a spirit of equity and justice. No theory or practice regulating the relations

between states existed which would guide them in this unprecedented situation.

Although Austria (with Hungary) may be the heir of the Monarchy, it would still have to be recognized that, reduced to the condition of a small nation of six million souls, it cannot bear or extinguish the obligations contracted by a great power of about fifty million inhabitants occupying immense territories such as the former Monarchy was before its overthrow.

Understanding these facts, we have inserted in the treaty which accompanies this letter sufficiently elastic provisions relative to the responsibilities of a material order devolving on Austria as to permit it now and in the future to adapt its existence to these new conditions. In addition, certain of these obligations have been divided between the states born of the former Monarchy or enlarged at its expense; thus the liquidation of the great Empire may be effected by taking account of the facts which the present situation implies as well as of that other unforgettable fact, the fact that the Empire brought on the world a train of destruction, misery and horror.

Furthermore, the Allied and Associated Powers recall that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, when requesting an armistice and accepting its clauses without conditions, fully recognized its complete defeat on the field of battle.

Austria is a great enemy state; it inherits the responsibilities which it incurred when it formed part of the former Monarchy; it is on the side of the vanquished in this war. These are the just deductions which served as bases for the study of the Austrian counter-proposals and which constitute the foundation of the peace which the Allied and Associated Powers are to conclude with Austria.

We have not believed that we should revise the territorial clauses, for the reasons given in the reply of the Allies. Here we shall limit ourselves to indicating that while certain geographic or economic considerations of a higher order led us to keep some German populations outside Austria, it is because the establishment of this state of affairs seemed more necessary to the existence of the new states born of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and the interests of other bordering states than the keeping of these populations by the present Austria seem indispensable to it. The solution adopted is, in any case, of a kind to insure the welfare of these German populations, by keeping them under the jurisdiction of the countries with which they have all their commercial and industrial relations and in which they can most easily develop their industries. Such is the case, in particular, for the Germans in Bohemia.

The Allied and Associated Powers are thoroughly convinced that the solutions adopted for tracing the frontiers are indispensable

if it is desired to assure the existence of all the nations born of the former Austria-Hungary, without exposing them all, including the new Austria, to anarchy and to rivalries which could drag them into war.

Noting, further, that the Austrian delegation does not exclude the hope of making arrangements regarding the new geographic distribution of territories, thanks to the happy influence which the League of Nations will be able to exercise over all the nations of the world, the Powers take this occasion to renew to the Austrian delegation the assurance that it is their sincere desire to see Austria soon admitted into the League of Nations.

With respect to the economic and financial clauses indicated with particular emphasis in the delegation's note, the Allied and Associated Powers have endeavored to seek out all possible adjustments.

First of all, they must assure Austria that the Reparation Commission, while carrying out its mission, will prove itself imbued with high humanitarian principles and will show the consideration required by the present critical situation of Austria from the point of view of foodstuffs. Trusting in the loyalty with which Austria will seek to comply with all the stipulations of the treaty, the Allied and Associated Powers will instruct the Commission to see that the indispensable supplies are at no time in danger.

From a financial point of view, the first effort of the Allied and Associated Powers has touched on the question of the sharing of pre-war debts and war debts between Austria and the various states born of the former Empire. They have decided to make important changes in this regard in the provisions originally established and their reply gives the changes in detail. It is not possible for the Powers to go further and to put the new states on the same footing as Austria and Hungary.

In addition to the question of the settlement of debts, several other changes conforming to the desires of the Austrian delegation have been introduced into the treaty.

Further, the Allied and Associated Powers have provided for the insertion in the treaty of certain necessary provisions to bring it into harmony with the agreements which will settle the relations of all the successor states. This is only a question of secondary clauses not affecting the rights of sovereignty of Austria, the insertion of which would constitute a reciprocal advantage for all the parties.

The Government of Austria has on many occasions claimed the right to speak not only in the name of the populations inhabiting the territories over which it has in fact exercised its sovereignty since the dissolution of the Empire, but also in the name of all Ger-



man-speaking populations in the Monarchy. Peace cannot be signed unless it represents only the population of the territories assigned to it and with regard to which it will henceforth be officially recognized as the regular government. The Austrian delegation has many times alluded to the situation of the German-speaking populations in the north of Bohemia. That is a question which in no way concerns it. It is not on the Austrian Government that the duty of representing the desires or watching out for the interests of these populations devolves.

In accordance with this principle, the Conference decided that the state which you represent shall be known under the name of Austria and not under the name of German Austria.

If this latter denomination had been accepted, such decision could have been interpreted as the recognition of a right which does not exist. To speak of a German Austria would imply that another Austria exists which is not German. Now, no other Austria does exist. Austria, Bohemia and Hungary, for long united in a single political system, have separated; each of these countries resumes the status which it formerly had as a separate state.

The modifications which we have just made in the initial draft of the treaty are the last to which it has seemed to us to be susceptible; otherwise, it would not be a peace of justice. But, in concluding, we must recall that the Austrian Government could not expect greater clemency and a more complete absolution from the events which occurred during the recent war.

The Allied and Associated Powers have not expressly replied to all the points raised by the Austrian delegation in the notes transmitted by it. But they wish it clearly understood that the absence of reply on their part does not imply acquiescence in the objections formulated or acquiescence in such interpretations of the text of the treaty to which this absence of reply might give rise.

The wording of the treaty which we send you today, coming after that of July 20 last in which considerable modifications in the initial text of June 2 had already been made, must be accepted or rejected in the same terms in which it is conceived.

Accordingly, the Allied and Associated Powers expect from the Austrian delegation, within five days from the date of the present communication, a declaration informing them that it is ready to sign the treaty as it stands. As soon as this declaration has reached the Allied and Associated Powers, measures will be taken for the immediate signing of the peace at Saint-Germain-en-Laye.

In the absence of such a declaration within the above period, the Armistice concluded November 3, 1918<sup>18</sup> would be considered as hav-

---

<sup>18</sup> Vol. II, p. 175.

ing terminated and the Allied and Associated Powers would take the measures they might consider necessary to impose their conditions.

Please accept, Mr. Chairman, the assurances of my high consideration.

---

*Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Remarks of the Austrian Delegation of the Conditions of Peace*

PART II.—FRONTIERS OF GERMAN-AUSTRIA

Called upon to sanction the spontaneous separation of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Allied and Associated Powers ascertained that the breaking of the centuries-old bonds between the various parts of that state had not been effected everywhere according to the same laws. They believed that they could not assure their work of reconstruction a better guarantee of justice and of permanence than by heeding the lesson of events and holding in each case to the principles which, violated by the Union, have rendered the separation necessary.

It is in this spirit that when the Conference met they studied the future frontiers of the Republic of Austria without neglecting any of the historic, geographic, ethnic, economic and political aspects of the question. They examined with the greatest care the observations which the Austrian delegation presented respecting the frontiers of which it was notified on June 2. They took great consideration thereof in the definitive conditions of peace transmitted on July 20. Thus, the counterproposals formulated in the memorandum of August 6 did not, in their opinion, advance any new argument in the discussion or give the Powers any reason to change the decisions which they had taken with respect to the frontiers of the Republic of Austria as they were described in the conditions of peace.

I.—FRONTIER BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK STATE

In the course of the last one hundred years, the Czech nation was little by little dispossessed of the rights which had been granted it by a long series of formal documents, imperial rescripts or decisions of the sovereign diets. While its independence was restricted by a regime of subordination, its moral integrity had to defend itself against the Germanizing effort which had spread from the territories of German race.

The Czech nation, wounded and menaced, sought justice of the Allied and Associated Powers. The latter wished to reestablish it in the fullness of its rights. That is why they agreed to keep their historic frontiers, so far as possible, for the former Czech provinces of the Crown of Bohemia. They thought that the German-

speaking populations inhabiting the confines of these provinces should remain associated with Czech populations, to collaborate with them in the development of the national unity, for which history has made them jointly responsible.

The Allied and Associated Powers considered that the best guarantee of such national unity would lie in economic unity, of which the imperial and royal administration had not taken account. They accordingly endeavored to assure the Czechoslovak state a complete system of means of communication. In doing this, they were led to go slightly beyond the historic frontier at two points: in the Thaya region, to include within Czechoslovak territory the Lundenburg-Felsberg-Znaim line, which is necessary for the west-east communications of Southern Moravia; in the Gmünd region, to attach to Bohemia the junction of two great lines serving this province over almost their whole length—the line from Prague via Tabor and that from Pilsen via Budweiss.

Thus, while in the course of the second examination which preceded the delivery of the definitive conditions, they made appreciable concessions to Austria and reduced to the strictly necessary the territories assigned to the Czechoslovak state beyond the historic frontier, the Powers did believe and do believe that they must maintain the principle of the double rectification which has been mentioned.

## II.—FRONTIER BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY

The Allied and Associated Powers considered that it was just to attach to Austria the districts of western Hungary which are inhabited by a German mass and the agricultural products of which form an important element in supplying Vienna and other centers.

The line which they established and communicated to the Austrian delegation on July 20 follows the ethnographic border very closely, particularly in the region of Saint Gothard. However, it is behind that line around Presbourg. In this case, the Powers were concerned with guaranteeing the Czechoslovak state access to the sea. Accordingly, they wished that Presbourg, the great market of Moravia, should have its communications with the Adriatic assured through Hungarian territory as well as through Austrian territory.

Accordingly, they left the Csorna-Szentjanos-Hegyeshalom Railroad in Hungarian territory and considered it impossible to cut the railroad in order to accede to the Austrian claim for the Wieselburg district.

Within the frontier thus fixed, the ethnic and national sentiment of the populations too clearly recommend their attachment to Austria for the Allied and Associated Powers to think it necessary to resort



to a plebiscite or, in any case, to share in the organization and supervision of such measure if Austria should proceed to take it.

### III.—FRONTIER BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE

The policy of assimilation pursued by the imperial and royal administration with respect to the Slovene race was one of the principal reasons which prevented moral unity from taking form within the former Monarchy. Bent under the pressure of officials foreign to their race, deprived of schools teaching their language, overwhelmed by the immigration of state employees and workers, the Slovenes nevertheless conserved their national aspirations intact. The Allied and Associated Powers have recognized the right of these Slav populations to share in the destinies of a Slav state.

The application of this principle occurred in different circumstances in Styria and Carinthia.

#### STYRIA

The Allied and Associated Powers considered that the Marburg basin, in its geographic, ethnographic and economic unity, should be attached to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

They hold that this natural region, bounded to the west by the great mass of the Bacher Mountains, has as easy communication with the Slav countries to the south as with the Austrian country to the north and opens out broadly to the east through the valley of the Drave which, up to its confluence with the Danube, never ceases to border Serb-Croat-Slovene territory.

They recognize that certain cities, particularly Marburg, are German in character. But they hold that the Slovene element is clearly dominant in the rural population where the action of the authorities succeeds only with difficulty in creating artificial majorities.

They consider that in spite of the efforts of the former Austrian administration to divert the commercial current of these regions from Hungary, the Marburg market already had close economic relations with Croatia. They believe that these relations will naturally grow stronger following a political attachment to the Serb-Croat-Slovene state, while the bonds created with the north by the attraction of the Austrian capital will weaken.

Under these conditions they are convinced that their solution responds at once to the sentiment and the interest of the majority of the people.

#### CARINTHIA

The Allied and Associated Powers admit the geographic unity of the Klagenfurt Basin and recognize that this region formed to the

south by the barrier of the Karawanken has easy relations with the north.

Further, they distinguish therein a very clear ethnic line of demarcation constituted by the Gurk, the Glan, the Glanfurt, and the Wörthersee, the Slovene element dominating to the east and south of this line, the German element to the west and north.

Finally, they find that the lines of communication constructed inside the basin by a centralizing administration converge on the Klagenfurt market and that, to the present, the economic orientation of this region was directed rather towards the north.

In these circumstances, they wished to leave to the populations all latitude to set their economic interests at the side of their national aspirations and to decide whether or not they wished to maintain their regional unity and, in such case, continue united to Austria, or whether they wished to join the Serb-Croat-Slovene state.

Such is the idea which gave rise to the decision to hold a plebiscite. The Powers sought, in placing the whole basin under the supervision of their representatives, to surround this vote with all the necessary guarantees to allow a free expression of the popular will.

With a view to the plebiscite, they have divided the basin into two zones, following the line of ethnic demarcation. Each of these zones, which will be summoned to give one group vote, includes an almost homogeneous population and if the separation becomes final may reconstitute its economic unity in close liaison with the state whose lot it has decided to follow.

The reasons which led them to arrange the interval between the two votes, against which the Austrian delegation protests, seem convincing. If the first zone should pronounce for attachment to Austria, it would in fact be useless to consult the second, when geographic conditions would make it impossible for it to choose a different destiny.

The Allied and Associated Powers recognize the foundation for the observations of the Austrian delegation regarding the supplying of Klagenfurt with water. They have inserted in the treaty an article guaranteeing this city the water necessary for its use and for the operation of its factories run by electrical energy.

#### IV.—FRONTIER BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND ITALY

The Allied and Associated Powers consider that no change should be made to the frontier laid down between Italy and Austria as presented to the Austrian delegation in the conditions of peace. As appears from the very clear statements made by the President of the Council of Ministers of Italy to the Parliament at Rome,

the Italian Government proposes to adopt a very liberal policy toward its new subjects of the German race with respect to their language, culture and economic interests.

### PART III

#### SECTION II.—REPLY TO THE AUSTRIAN OBSERVATIONS ON NATIONALITY QUESTIONS

With regard to the observations of the Austrian delegation relative to nationality questions, it is to be noted that the treaty has been altered in this respect.

The provisions relative to these questions are now together in a special section. The changes made in the original text take into consideration so far as possible those of the observations of the Austrian delegation which seemed justified with respect to the possible contradiction between certain provisions applying to the transferred territories.

Further, the Austrian delegation pointed out the possibility which would be offered any Austrian subject to escape, through the rights of option, from the legal obligations devolving upon nationals of Austria.

It should be pointed out that the option is granted only on condition that the persons who use it transfer their domicile outside Austrian territory. That is one check placed on attempts which Austrians might make to continue to have the advantage of living in Austria without bearing the burdens resulting therefrom.

In addition, the Austrian delegation itself recognizes that the interested states will not accept requests for option unless they are based upon serious indications making it possible to determine that the applicant has reason to claim the nationality which he requests. To consider as valueless a request based upon community of language or of origin is to dispute all the essential data on which nationality is established. The new states, furthermore, have no interest in increasing the number of those of their nationals who do not belong to their nationality either by race or by true feelings.

Finally, there is no reason to fear that people desirous of escaping the obligations resulting from the treaty which affect Austrian nationals only may avoid them through the option, because the provisions of the treaty, while excluding from these burdens Austrian nationals who have acquired a new nationality, are careful to specify that they must have acquired this nationality *automatically*. The fear set forth in this respect by the Austrian delegation thus rests upon a misunderstanding.

The observations concerning article 86 attribute to the Allied and Associated Powers mental reservations and intentions which they do



not have and which they can not have. It is not plausible that the circumstances brought up by the Austrian delegation should be of a kind to exercise any influence whatever on an individual determination to change his nationality or not to change it; that could happen only in extremely rare cases.

These same considerations remove all value from the objections relative to article 90 which, furthermore, in paragraph II, contains a provision necessary to prevent in advance any possible impediment to the settlement of the legal position of territories which have not been assigned to a specific state.

#### REPLY TO THE AUSTRIAN PROPOSALS RELATIVE TO ARTICLES 46 AND 50

In the "drafts" which follow the observations presented by the Austrian delegation changes are proposed in articles 46 and 50 without any supporting justification being given.

There is no need to touch on article 46. It would not be possible to impose on the Italian Government the obligation of paying the cost of a palace which it has rightfully claimed as having belonged to the former Republic of Venice. The transfer of this palace ought to have been effected at the time when Venice was incorporated in the Kingdom of Italy. Special circumstances, of an exclusively political character, alone prevented this restoration until now.

With respect to article 50, the provision of the last paragraph relative to Lake Raid [*Raibl*] has no other purpose than to guarantee to Italy the full enjoyment of the use of the waters of this lake to the exclusion of any contrary claim, either by Austria or by its nationals. In these circumstances, the proposal of the Austrian delegation for which, in addition, no reason is given, does not seem well founded.

#### PART IV.—AUSTRIAN INTERESTS OUTSIDE EUROPE

The Allied and Associated Powers consider that there is no reason to modify in substance the provisions inserted in part IV of the conditions of peace relative to "Austrian interests outside Europe."

The greater part of the counterproposals presented by the Austrian delegation spring from the principle that Austria should not be considered as one with the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

Now, the Allied and Associated Powers consider that Austria is one of the states which are successors of Austria-Hungary. They further note that Austria does not contemplate refusing this heritage, when it means keeping the diplomatic and consular buildings in Siam (article 108), and in China (article 112); and that Austria does not hesitate to claim it in order to seek to remain in possession of such properties in Morocco (article 96) and in Egypt (article 105) or in order to reserve the possibility of obtaining a share of the indemnity

established in the final protocol signed at Peking on September 7, 1901<sup>19</sup> (article 110).

The Allied and Associated Powers consider that Austria is bound by the treaties and contractual obligations of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. They must ask it formally to renounce, insofar as it is concerned, the rights, titles, and privileges having belonged to that state, and in particular those which resulted from the General Act of Algeciras<sup>20</sup> and from the Franco-German agreement relative to Morocco<sup>21</sup> (article 93), from the system of capitulations in Egypt (article 99) or from the provisions of the final protocol of Peking (article 110). In addition, they cannot guarantee the Austrian representatives in Morocco (article 95), in Egypt (article 102) and in China (article 111) as favorable treatment as that which, in general, will be enjoyed by nationals of the powers which are members of the League of Nations, for they would thereby grant to Austria, before its admission into the League of Nations, the benefit of such admission.

The Allied and Associated Powers have applied a general principle of international law in providing that all goods and property having belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, an enemy state, in Morocco, in Egypt, in Siam, and in China, would be transferred without indemnity to the Government of the Maghzen (article 95), to the Egyptian Government (article 105) to the Siamese Government (article 108), and to the Chinese Government (article 110).

They see no reason to extend to all the countries outside Europe without exception the derogations which, as an unusual measure, they were able to agree to either in European territory or in Siam or China.

With respect to this latter country, they consider that the "quarters" of the detachment of the former Austro-Hungarian Navy is not distinguishable from "barracks", the disposition of which is regulated by article 112 and they could not be likened to diplomatic and consular buildings, as the Austrian delegation would wish.

The Allied and Associated Powers, in the liquidation of movable and immovable property belonging to Austrian nationals in Morocco (article 96), in Egypt (article 105), in Siam (article 108), and in China (article 114), have applied the general provisions provided by section IV of part X of the treaty.

The Allied and Associated Powers would be lacking in that solidarity which exists among them and which they have wished to sanction by a general treaty if in this treaty they provided for the direct understandings which Austria asks to conclude with Siam and China.

<sup>19</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1901, Appendix (Affairs in China), p. 312.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 1906, pt. 2, p. 1495.

<sup>21</sup> Great Britain, Cd. 6010, Morocco, No. 4 (1911): *Franco-German Convention and Exchange of Notes Respecting Morocco, signed at Berlin, November 4, 1911.*

They furthermore consider that Austria has no basis for claiming the advantages which it wishes to secure through these understandings.

On the one hand, the internment of enemy nationals by the Allied and Associated Powers constitutes a security measure which could not give rise to any right of indemnity against these Powers.

Furthermore, the Allied and Associated Powers, having decided that China should be definitively liberated vis-à-vis Austria-Hungary, as well as Germany, from the obligations imposed on it by the final protocol of September 7, 1901, are not disposed to contemplate allowing China to bind itself under a separate treaty to revive these obligations to the advantage of Austria.

#### Annex

#### AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE REPLY

##### *Article 92*

In territory outside its frontiers, as fixed by the present treaty, Austria renounces, so far as it is concerned, all rights, titles and privileges whatever in or with relation to territory outside Europe which belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or to its allies, and all rights, titles and privileges whatever their origin which it held as against the Allied and Associated Powers.

Austria undertakes immediately to recognize and to conform to the measures which may be taken now or in the future by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, in agreement where necessary with third powers, in order to regulate the consequences resulting from the foregoing provision.

##### *Article 108*

Austria, so far as it is concerned, cedes to Siam all its rights over the goods and property in Siam which belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, with the exception of premises used as diplomatic or consular residences or offices as well as the effects and furniture which they contain. These goods and property pass *ipso facto* and without compensation to the Siamese Government.

The goods, property and private rights of Austrian nationals in Siam shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of part X (economic clauses) of the present treaty.

##### *Article 112*

Austria, so far as it is concerned, cedes to China all its rights over the buildings, wharves and pontoons, barracks, forts, arms and munitions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless telegraphy in-



stallations and other public property which belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and which are situated or may remain in the Austro-Hungarian concession at Tientsin or elsewhere in Chinese territory.

It is understood, however, that premises used as diplomatic or consular residences or offices, as well as the effects and furniture contained therein, are not included in the above cession; and, furthermore, that no steps shall be taken by the Chinese Government to dispose of the public and private property belonging to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy situated within the so-called Legation Quarter of Peking without the consent of the diplomatic representatives of the powers which, on the coming into force of the present treaty, remain parties to the final protocol of September 7, 1901.

#### PART V.—MILITARY, NAVAL, AND AIR CLAUSES

By a letter dated August 6, 1919, the Austrian delegation sent the Peace Conference a memorandum of counterproposals relative to the conditions of peace presented by the Allied and Associated Powers.

After a study of these counterproposals, the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers have the honor herein below to make known their decision with respect to the military, naval, and air clauses.

#### MILITARY CLAUSES

1. The modification proposed in article 115 would have the effect of postponing to an indeterminate date the demobilization of Austrian military forces, an operation which, according to the decision of the Allied and Associated Powers, must be completed within a period of three months.

*This modification cannot be accepted.*

2. The modifications proposed in articles 116, 122, and 123 seek to authorize the Austrian state to constitute, both for staffs and troops, a militia in which military instruction could be given to the whole able-bodied population, which would thus constitute the nucleus of an important military force, without, further, ever being in a position to meet the obligations imposed by article 117 of the treaty of peace.

Whatever may be, from the financial point of view, the value of the arguments advanced by the Austrian delegation, the establishment of a military regime resting on obligatory service is absolutely contrary to the principle of the reduction of armaments which the Allied and Associated Powers have felt obliged to impose upon their former enemies as the only means capable of assuring the peace of the world in the future.

*These modifications can accordingly not be accepted.*

3. The modification proposed in article 120 would authorize the Austrian Government to increase at will the number of gendarmes, customs officers, foresters and police officers while maintaining the prohibition against giving them military instruction.

*This modification cannot be allowed.*

4. The modification proposed in articles 127 and 130 and seeking to postpone from three to six months the delivery of arms above the authorized figure, does not seem justified by any material impossibility.

*This modification is not accepted.*

In case, however, some impossibility of this kind should arise, it would devolve upon the Interallied Commission of Control to indicate it and to propose the measures to be taken as a result.

As, furthermore, this material is state property, there is no justification for the value thereof being placed to the credit of the Austrian state in connection with the indemnities to be paid by this state (article 130).

*The proposed addition to article 130 in this sense is accordingly not accepted.*

5. The modification proposed in article 129 seems to have the purpose of safeguarding the interest of Austria's flourishing industry in military and sporting weapons.

With respect to sporting arms and ammunition, as well as explosives intended for use in mines and in other technical works of a purely commercial type, article 129, as drafted in the conditions of peace communicated by the Allied and Associated Powers, does not forbid their manufacture.

With respect to the manufacture of military arms for export, the authorization of which is requested by the Austrian delegation, it could not be permitted without necessitating a close and permanent supervision, which is full of difficulties and which is not envisaged by the Allies.

*The modifications of article 129 requested are accordingly not allowable.*

The Allied and Associated Governments believe that they should, however, specify that the manufacture of sporting arms is not forbidden, on the reservation that any sporting weapon manufactured in Austria and using ball cartridges shall not be of the same caliber as that of military weapons employed in any of the European armies.

Accordingly, the following addition will be inserted between the first and second paragraphs of article 129 of the treaty of peace presented to the Austrian delegation:

*The manufacture of sporting weapons is not forbidden, provided that sporting weapons manufactured in Austria taking ball cartridges*

*shall not be of the same caliber as that of military weapons used in any European Army.*

6. The modification in article 131 requested is, therefore, unnecessary.

#### NAVAL CLAUSES

The addition to article 133 requested (authorization to keep three patrol boats on the Danube) is *granted* provided that the choice of the vessels shall be made by the commission the designation of which is provided for in article 150 of the present treaty.

The addition proposed by the Austrian delegation in its article 138b is *granted* with respect to paragraph 1, on condition that this paragraph be worded as follows:

Austria is held responsible for the delivery (articles 133 and 138), the disarmament (article 134), the demobilization (article 135), as well as the disposal (article 134) or use (article 136) of the objects mentioned in the preceding articles only insofar as these objects remain in its own territory.

The proposed addition to paragraph 2 *cannot be granted* however, as this material is state property. There is no justification for its value being placed to the credit of the Austrian state, in connection with indemnities to be paid by this state.

#### AIR CLAUSES

The observations presented by the Austrian delegation touch on articles 140, 141, 143, and 144 relative to:

1. The abolition of military and naval air forces (article 140);
2. The demobilization of personnel (article 141);
3. The prohibition against manufacturing, importing and exporting (article 143);
4. The surrender of material (article 144).

*a) The abolition of military and naval air forces (article 140).* In deciding on this abolition the great Allied and Associated Powers are inspired only by the desire which appears at the beginning of the treaty of peace, namely, the establishment of a durable, just and firm peace.

Such peace would not be assured if our enemies should keep at their disposal an instrument of aggression as powerful as an air force prepared for war.

It is, accordingly, necessary that the use thereof be forbidden them in the future. That is what has already been decided as regards Germany; there is no reason to make an exception in favor of Austria.

It is indisputable that this prohibition leaves Austria disarmed as against its neighbors, but its admission into the League of Nations,



contemplated within a brief period after the ratification of the treaty of peace, constitutes the best guarantee for it against any aggression.

In these circumstances, the armed forces of Austria will have only to guarantee internal order, the principal duty assigned to them by the treaty of peace. For these police operations an air force is not indispensable.

*b) Demobilization of personnel* (article 141). Specialized aircraft workers (mechanics, electricians, wood-workers, wing makers, copersmiths) have no trouble in finding employment in other industries. These specialists are very much sought after and the offers made them in France and in England are such that the army is powerless to keep them in its ranks, even in the low proportion of its most indispensable needs. Austria must long ago have wondered whether its aeronautic industries—solely military industries by its own admission,—could continue to employ so large a personnel and it ought to have taken measures, through a progressive demobilization, against the disadvantages of an abrupt dismissal of that personnel.

*c) Prohibition against manufacturing, importing and exporting* (article 143). The maintenance of these prohibitions is required on the same basis as that of the provisions laid down in the foregoing articles, to which they are the indispensable complement.

Of what use, indeed, would it be to decree the abolition of a military air force in Austria if, through freedom to manufacture and import, it were allowed the possibility of building up again its destroyed material?

As to the prohibition against exportation, it is justified by the fact that all material now in existence in Austria is war material. As it has become useless to Austria, it could only serve to arm other states, for the commercial use of such material—a use to which it is not adapted—is not to be envisaged.

Furthermore, it is an exaggeration to claim that the above prohibitions are of a kind to hinder the reestablishment of economic life in Austria.

In fact, the development of a civil air force is subject to improvements which could not be expected to be effected within a short period.

The decision of the Supreme Council limiting the period of these prohibitions to six months, in spite of the danger of easy adaptation of any aircraft to military ends, whatever may be the destination of such aircraft,—a danger which the military experts without exception have agreed to recognize—safeguards this development as far as is possible. This decision thus constitutes a minimum guarantee of security without irretrievably compromising the future of the aeronautic industry in Austria in works of peace.

Finally, it cannot be forgotten that Austria was the ally of Germany.

The freedom of production and traffic which it requests, if granted, would offer Germany every facility for evading the special conditions imposed on it, either by concealing its material under the Austrian flag or by placing orders in Austria to renew its war reserves.

d) *Delivery of material* (article 144). Since all the material in Austria is war material, it is logical that it should be surrendered in its entirety.

The damage which will result therefrom to industrial enterprises, great as it may be, is not mortal; in any case, this consideration cannot constitute a check as these industries have until now worked only for war.

With respect to the proposal to disarm the planes, it does not constitute a guarantee which can be taken into consideration, as rearmament could be effected so rapidly as to remove all value from the proposed measure.

Briefly, the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers decide that the clauses of the treaty of peace relative to an Austrian military and naval air force must be kept without modification.

No matter how small the air forces which Austria can put in line, they nevertheless constitute, in the eventuality of an understanding with Germany, a danger against which precautions must be taken.

In any case, all the measures taken to disarm Germany would become entirely illusory if its neighbor continued in a position to furnish it military or industrial assistance in order to help it secretly to reorganize its military [air] fleet. In order for these measures to be really efficacious, it is absolutely necessary to apply the same treatment to the two countries.

The considerations of an economic order which Austria alleges to escape this treatment are not valid, as the clauses imposed upon it are not of the kind to injure its peace industries so seriously as it claims.

#### GENERAL CLAUSES

1. The modifications of article 152 requested seek to postpone until July 1 next the effective date of the stipulations provided in the general clauses of the treaty, the execution of which must be effected within a period of three months according to the text drafted by the Allied and Associated Powers.

*This modification is not accepted.*

2. The modifications proposed in article 153 subordinate to a decision of the Council of the League of Nations the terms of the obligations imposed on Austria in virtue of the said article.

*This modification is not accepted.*

However, the provision of paragraph 4 of chapter 1 (military clauses) of the armistice of November 3, 1918 having been drawn

up with a view to eventualities which the present situation seems to have obviated, there is no further reason for maintaining these provisions.

The text of article 153 will, accordingly, be changed as a result thereof and this article will be drafted as follows:

The following provisions of the armistice of November 3, 1918, namely, paragraphs two and three of chapter I (military clauses), paragraphs two, three and six of chapter I of the annexed protocol (military clauses), remain in force so far as they are not contrary to the above stipulations.

3. The modifications proposed in article 154 restrict to official military, naval or air missions alone the prohibitions against members of Austrian forces going to serve abroad.

*This modification is not adopted.*

#### PART VI.—PRISONERS OF WAR

The modifications proposed by the Austrian delegation affect articles 156 to 165 of the conditions of peace. The Allied and Associated Powers consider that there is no reason for them to change their previous decisions in any respect.

The conditions of peace relative to prisoners of war and interned civilians are based on the principles of humanity which the Allied and Associated Powers have always felt bound in honor to respect and the Powers cannot admit as legitimate the complaints expressed in the Austrian note of July 26 [27?]. The counterproposals of August 6, furthermore, contain nothing to oblige them to change their opinion on this subject.

The Austrian delegation requests that it be specified that article 156 concerns only the repatriation of nationals of the new Austrian Republic and that the provisions of this article cannot be extended to the nationals of the other states born of the dismemberment of the former Monarchy. From a careful reading of the article it is apparent that, in its new wording, it provides exclusively for prisoners of war and interned civilians of the Republic of Austria; accordingly, the fear indicated by the Austrian delegation that Austria might have to bear either the responsibility or the costs of repatriation of prisoners of war and interned civilians who are nationals of the other states born of the dissolution of the Monarchy is without foundation. There is no object to the requested modification.

The Allied and Associated Powers share the desire of the Austrian delegation to see the sufferings of Austrians who are prisoners of war or interned civilians and who are now held in Siberia or Central Asia lightened; they will be happy to do what is within their power to



ease these sufferings and at the same time to appease the inevitable anxiety of the families of the prisoners. But they must point out that this unhappy situation is one of those for which they are not responsible and that, in addition, no regular government exists in Russia with which they can enter into relations for this purpose.

They are nevertheless ready to do everything possible by uniting their own efforts and the assistance which they can furnish to the efforts of the Austrians themselves to effect this repatriation as soon as occasion shall present.

Neither have the other suggestions of the Austrian delegation seemed deserving of reception. No reason exists for applying to the transportation of Austrian prisoners rules different from those applied to transportation of German prisoners; nor does any reason exist to change the stipulations of the conditions of peace concerning prisoners who may be held under arrest by the Allied and Associated Powers. The latter have never contemplated holding prisoners who were guilty of breaches of discipline or of refusal to obey, except as provided in paragraph 2 of article 160. Only common law criminals will be detained, for whom the status of prisoners of war must not constitute a guarantee of immunity; a common law crime is just as punishable when committed in the course of an attempted escape as when committed under any other circumstances.

The Allied and Associated Powers, furthermore, do not see any reason for which they should undertake to receive again into their territories Austrian prisoners who had formerly been domiciled in them and who had to leave them as a result of the state of war. The war, for which the Allied and Associated Powers are not responsible, is a fact the consequences of which will long be felt. Would it be just to eliminate the effects thereof for the benefit of the Austrian prisoners of war alone? As to having a certificate issued by the captor state to prisoners afflicted with infirmities as the result of labor performed in captivity, that is a proposal which it would sometimes be very difficult to put into practice and the usefulness of which has not been shown.

The Austrian delegation, finally, claims reciprocity for the causes relative to the search for the missing and the restoration of articles having belonged to Austrian nationals who were prisoners of war or interned civilians. As they previously replied to the German delegation, the Allied and Associated Governments reply to the Austrian delegation that the restoration to such nationals of their personal property is a legal right which it is their entire intention to respect. Similarly, they have always endeavored to furnish enemy governments with all the information which they possessed concerning missing persons. There is no need of the insertion of special provisions to

impose on them the respect of rights which they have always spontaneously recognized and approved.

#### PART VII.—PENALTIES

No concession can be made to the Republic of Austria on the articles concerning penalties.

The Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to admit that the new states derived from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire are composed of populations having "belonged to various nationalities of the former Monarchy." They consider, however, that there is no authorization for concluding from this fact that the present Austrian state can be assimilated to the said states as regards the responsibilities originating in violations of international law brought, during the course of the present war, against the Austro-Hungarian Army. These "various nationalities" in revolt showed their will to independence by absolutely conclusive indications, such as the formation of legions of volunteers who actively participated in military operations at the side of the Allied and Associated forces.

The deep disapproval which these nationals showed with respect to the motives and methods of war of the Monarchy, by giving their adherence and their help to the claims of the Entente, and their recognition as co-belligerents in the present war is sufficient to justify a difference in treatment between the Republic of Austria and the new states.

From this point of view, at least, the Republic of Austria can only be considered as the constitutive nucleus surviving from the dislocation of the Austrian aggregate.

The objection raised from the alleged inapplicability of international law to war operations between the Armies of the former Monarchy and the insurgents of the various nationalities of the Empire does not bear careful examination. The recognition of the insurgents as belligerents implies a relation governed by international law which is justly affected by the play of circumstances which led to the formation of the new states.

In drafting articles 169 to 172, the Allied and Associated Powers desired to insure, in full justice but firmly, that the hour of punishment would come for those guilty of the acts contrary to the laws and customs of war committed by Austro-Hungarian troops.

They mean to have recognized the freedom of each of them to bring before its military courts the authors of acts of this kind committed against their nationals.

They exclude from this prerogative neither the new states nor, to any degree whatever, the states to which new nationals are attached.

Territorial changes could not create, as regards the victims, a status from which a prospect of immunity for the guilty would spring.

As to claiming that the laws of the Austrian Republic are opposed to the surrender of Austrian nationals to foreign courts, that is an argument which the Allied and Associated Powers cannot admit. In international law it pertains to the powers which are parties to a treaty to put into force the laws necessary for the application of such treaty.

## PART VIII.—REPARATIONS

### I.—GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The Allied and Associated Governments have studied with care the observations presented by the Austrian delegation concerning the responsibility of the Republic of Austria for all the losses and damages suffered by them during the course of the war.

They cannot, however, allow that the Republic of Austria be discharged of all responsibility as the result of the revolution which occurred in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy at the end of the war and as a result of the creation of the new states born of the dismemberment of this Monarchy.

They recognize that the modification which took place in the form of the Austrian Government will make it possible for them more easily to renew friendly relations with Austria.

However, after a thorough study of the question, they feel that they cannot depart from the principle under the terms of which the Republic of Austria must be considered as responsible for the policy and acts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy during the course of the war.

It is no less true that, while considering themselves bound to maintain this principle, the Allied and Associated Governments have never lost sight of the reduction in territory suffered by the new Austria and the financial and economic difficulties which it must inevitably face. They must in this regard point out that the present financial situation of the Republic of Austria is in no way due either to the acts of the Allied and Associated Governments or to their present proposals; it is the consequence of the financial and military policy pursued by the Austro-Hungarian Government over many years.

At the same time, and considering matters from the point of view of the preservation of social peace in Europe, the Allied and Associated Governments take fully into account the point beyond which the new Austria must not be burdened with a heavier load than one the weight of which it is in a condition to bear. That is the preoccupation which they have consistently had in mind in drafting the articles on reparations which appear in the conditions of peace. Thus, article 175 does not specify the total of the amounts to be paid by Austria and, for the purpose of determining it, gives very wide powers to the Reparation Commission.



In paragraph 12*b* of annex II, it is expressly stated that the Reparation Commission will receive instructions to take account of:

1. "The actual economic and financial position of Austrian territory as designated by the present treaty";
2. The diminution of its resources and its capacity for payment resulting from the clauses of the present treaty."

In order to make it more clearly apparent that the Allied and Associated Governments appreciate the difficulties of the present financial situation of Austria, they decided to strike out, at the beginning of article 177, and in annex I [II], paragraph 12*c*, the words "in order to permit the Allied and Associated Powers immediately to undertake the restoration of their economic and industrial life while awaiting the definitive determination of the amount of their claims."

## II.—DETAILED EXAMINATION

The Allied and Associated Governments refer the Austrian delegation, with respect to annex III, to the part of the present note which concerns article 294 of the conditions of peace.

The Allied and Associated Governments consider that the legitimate interests of the Republic of Austria will be safeguarded effectively by the provisions contained in that article; they cannot therefore accept the modification proposed by the Austrian delegation for annex III.

The Allied and Associated Governments examined with particular care the observations of the Austrian delegation with regard to annex IV, relative to surrender of livestock. They are not unaware of the sufferings and misery occasioned in Vienna by the present scarcity of milk and they have already given practical proofs of their sympathy by sending considerable quantities of condensed milk there. But, at the same time, they cannot lose sight of the fact that there is also a serious and alarming scarcity of milk in the Allied countries and that it is directly due, in large measure, to the great number of animals carried off during the course of the war by the Hungarian Government from the occupied parts of Allied territories.

The problem which faces the Allied and Associated Governments thus consists in alleviating the sufferings and misery caused by the want of milk in Allied countries in such a way as to aggravate as little as possible the lot of the Viennese population. Now, according to the opinion of their experts, certain sections far removed from the center of the Austrian Republic are not in a position, because of the topography of the soil and the difficulties of transportation, to assist in supplying Vienna with milk, but they can transfer a limited amount of livestock to Italy, to Serbia and to

Roumania as partial restoration for the much greater quantities which were taken from these same countries during the war. Such a measure will not have the effect of appreciably increasing the scarcity of milk from which Vienna suffers.

Because of these facts and in the presence of the claim, which must be considered a privileged claim, from districts in which the scarcity of milk has been principally occasioned by the depredations committed during the war, the Allied and Associated Governments do not feel that there is any reason to change or eliminate annex IV.

As to annex V, the Austrian delegation proposes that, with respect to the options on timber, iron, and magnesite provided in the conditions of peace, the prices fixed shall be those of the international market and not the prices of the Austrian domestic market.

The observations formulated in this regard by the Austrian delegation appear to rest on an inaccurate interpretation of the said annex.

The intention of the Allied and Associated Powers is not, by this provision, to bring the price of these articles on the domestic market to the level of the price on the international market; they merely desire that the option be granted them to purchase the articles at the prices of the domestic market, and that any advantage resulting from this privilege be considered, as is said at the beginning of the annex, as a partial reparation for the damages caused the Allied and Associated Governments during the war.

Furthermore, this option will be exercised only through the Reparation Commission which, as has been said above, will receive instructions to take into account financial and economic conditions in Austria and which may accordingly take the necessary measures in order that Austria shall not be deprived of the possibility of making purchases abroad and of importing such products as may be essential to its economic existence.

The observations of the Austrian delegation concerning articles 187 and 188 likewise seem to rest, to a certain degree, on an erroneous interpretation. These articles refer expressly to article 180, the special applications of which they constitute. Accordingly, they concern, as does this latter article, such articles as it "will be possible to identify either on territory belonging to Austria or its allies, or on territory remaining in the possession of Austria or its allies until the complete execution of the treaty."

The date of June 1, 1914, which appears in article 188 was inserted there to take account of this circumstance that certain articles were, shortly before the war, taken from the territories ceded in execution of the present treaty apparently in order to withdraw them from the injuries which they might have suffered in the course of hostilities.

This article likewise refers to article 180 and thus applies only in cases in which it would be possible to identify the articles in question on the territories of Austria or of its allies.

With respect to article 189, it seems clear that, generally speaking, the Allied and Associated Governments and the Austrian delegation are in agreement. However, in order that no doubt may exist, they agree to substitute the words "belonging to" for the words "concerning the" in paragraph one.

The Allied and Associated Governments consider that the questions raised by this article are among those which may on the proper occasion be the subject of supplementary conventions between the interested governments. But as the same questions will be regulated by the Reparation Commission, which is bound to give the Austrian Government a fair opportunity to be heard, it does not seem to the Allied and Associated Governments that it is necessary to insert special provisions on this subject in the treaty.\*

The Allied and Associated Powers propose to add to the end of article 190, in order to take into account, to the widest possible degree, the objections formulated by the Austrian delegation, the words "insofar as the articles referred to have not in fact been executed in their entirety, and insofar as the documents and objects in question are situated in the territory of the Republic of Austria or its allies."

With respect to article 191, the Allied and Associated Governments do not consider it advisable either to eliminate the references to Poland and to Czechoslovakia or to increase the number of members of the Committee of Jurists. It will pertain to the Reparation Commission to employ such experts as it considers necessary and the Allied and Associated Governments believe that it is preferable in the interests of everyone to leave the Reparation Commission the greatest freedom of choice in this respect.

They consider that the words "right of the Italian provisions" are sufficiently clear in sense that they cannot give rise to the interpretation which the Austrian delegation fears.

### III.—PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF TEXTS

a) Article 177. Elimination of the words "in order to permit the Allied and Associated Powers immediately to undertake restoration of their industrial and economic life, while awaiting the definitive determination of the amount of their claims."

b) Annex II. Paragraph 12c. Elimination of the words "in order

---

\* In case objects of art should have been seized by the Italian military authorities subsequent to the Armistice of November 3, 1918, and in case it should appear that these same articles do not come within the categories given in section II of part VIII of the draft treaty, the Italian Government declares that it will oppose no obstacle to their restoration being effected. [Footnote in the original.]



to facilitate and carry out the commercial restoration of the economic life of the Allied and Associated countries.”

c) Article 187. Read “article 180” instead of “article 183.” It involves a printing error which does not appear in the English text.

d) Article 189. Substitute for “concerning the administrations” the words “belonging to the administrations.”

e) Article 190. Add to the end of the article the words “insofar as the articles referred to have not in fact been executed in their entirety, and insofar as the documents and objects in question are situated in the territory of the Republic of Austria or its allies.”

And at the beginning of the article eliminate the words “in their entirety.”

On the request of the Belgian Delegation, the text of Annex II is modified as follows:

“I. The triptych of St. Ildephonse by Rubens, from the Abbey of St. Jacques sur Cowdenberg at Brussels, bought in 1777 and removed to Vienna.”

II. “Objects and documents removed for safety from Belgium to Austria in 1794.”

a) b) c). No change.

d) The original manuscript copies of the “carte chorographique” of the Austrian Low Countries drawn up by Lieutenant General Comte Jas de Ferraru [*Ferraris*] between 1770 and 1777 and the documents relating thereto.”

#### PART IX.—FINANCIAL CLAUSES

The Allied and Associated Governments have studied with the greatest care the observations offered by the Austrian delegation on the subject of the financial clauses. They are perfectly aware of the capital importance which these clauses possess for the Austrian Republic and it is in that spirit that they have examined them.

In order to make the general scope of the financial clauses well understood, it is perhaps advisable to recall certain essential principles which governed the Allied and Associated Governments in drawing up the conditions of peace: the Allied and Associated Governments find themselves obliged to consider the Republic of Austria as the successor of the former Austrian Monarchy. The states to which some Austrian territory is transferred or the states born of the dismemberment of Austria are considered, in effect, as among the Allies and the war imposed sacrifices and sufferings on them.

Accordingly, the Allied and Associated Governments cannot admit the possibility of imposing on those states the burden of the war debt of the former Austrian Monarchy, a debt contracted to carry on an unjust aggression and used to the injury of the Allies.

Furthermore, in preparing the financial clauses, the Allied and Associated Governments never lost sight of the extremely complicated financial situation of the Republic of Austria. Their policy in no way tends to bring about bankruptcy and disorder in the finances of the Republic of Austria. On the contrary, it is their sincere desire that the Republic may, as peacefully as possible, again find its financial and economic balance and that it may have entire freedom to follow the new and enlightened policy which is advocated by its representatives, as the Allied and Associated Governments are pleased to recognize. The end sought by these Governments is to alleviate the financial burden of the Republic of Austria to the degree compatible with the essential principles mentioned above. It is with this intention that special provisions were inserted concerning the war debt of the states to which some Austrian territory was transferred or which are born of the dismemberment of Austria, as well as clauses relative to property belonging to the nationals of the Republic of Austria in the said states.

The Allied and Associated Powers have therefore examined with special care the figures relative to the financial situation of the Republic of Austria, as it results from the present treaty. In broad outline, the situation which these figures show was already familiar to these Governments and it had been taken into most careful account by them in drawing up the financial clauses of the treaty.

The counterproposals made by the Austrian delegation were likewise the object of most careful study and every clause was again examined in the light of the Austrian observations. In many cases, however, it was found that the arguments presented in the Austrian note of August 6, 1919, had already been weighed and discussed at length at the time when the treaty was drafted and that the changes now proposed had then been considered unacceptable.

The present reply will not include an individual examination of each of the observations of the Austrian delegation; it will be limited to indicating the points on which it seemed necessary to furnish explanations intended either to obviate a misunderstanding on the part of the Austrian delegation or to show the slight basis for certain of its observations.

Article 193.—The Austrian delegation seems not to have understood the article well in proposing to add after the first paragraph of the present text a paragraph concerning Austrian nationals. Article 193, in fact, considers only the situation of the Austrian state; the situation of Austrian nationals is regulated by the following part of the conditions of peace, that is, by the economic clauses.

The provision inserted in paragraph 2 of the present text (exportation of gold) constitutes a guarantee for the Allied and Associated

Governments and, as such, it seems that it should be maintained. However, it will be permissible for these Governments to authorize exports of gold in such circumstances and in such amounts as may seem to them necessary for the economic life of Austria.

Article 197.—This article does not confer any new right on the Allied and Associated Governments, but stipulates that the charges created by the preceding articles shall not affect Austrian assets and property which are under the jurisdiction of such Governments. Accordingly, the article does not seem to give rise to the objections brought up by the Austrian delegation.

Article 199.—*Pre-War Debt.* a) The Reparation Commission has express instructions to give the representatives of the Republic of Austria fair opportunity to be heard before passing on questions relative to the distribution of the pre-war debt. The Allied and Associated Governments thus see no reason for changing the provisions of this article.

b) Furthermore, it does not seem necessary to regulate in this article or in its annex questions raised by the distribution of the secured debt, since, from the technical point of view, this distribution is less complicated than that of the unsecured debt.

c) The power given the Reparation Commission to modify, as it considers it advisable, the provisions for the conversion of the currencies in which the debts are quoted seems to the Allied and Associated Governments to be a necessary guarantee to assure the holders of securities that the capital of the debt which they hold will be equitably determined.

Section 2. a) With respect to the distribution of the unsecured pre-war debt, the Austrian delegation raises an objection with regard to the basis chosen to evaluate the financial capacity of the respective territories. The intention of the Allied and Associated Governments is that, for the distribution of this debt, account shall be taken so far as possible of the present financial capacity of the respective territories and they consider that their intention is expressed with sufficient precision by the text of article 199 as it is at present drafted. It clearly appears from this article, in fact, that the Reparation Commission will have the duty of selecting the pre-war revenues which will be most suitable for the establishment of a basis of equitable distribution of the debt, while taking into account the changes in present circumstances.

b) The Allied and Associated Powers see no reason to abandon the principle that the Republic of Austria will alone be responsible for pre-war engagements of the former Austrian Government which are not represented by securities; but they are ready to admit that the category of debts to which the Austrian delegation especially draws their attention, such as the annuities due for the purchase of rail-



ways, can in all justice be considered as forming part of the debts represented by securities.

Accordingly, they agree to add the following words after the third paragraph of section 1 of article 199: "For the purposes of the present article there shall be regarded as secured debts, payments due by the former Austrian Government in connection with the purchase of railways or similar property. The distribution of the liability for such payments will be determined by the Reparation Commission in the same manner as in the case of the secured debt."

Article 201.—*War Debts.* For the reasons explained above, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot renounce the general principles which inspired the wording of this article. However, they examined with the greatest care the argument presented by the Austrian delegation and, while studying again and in detail the provisions of the article in question, they sought changes which might be made in the text to satisfy the request of the Austrian delegation without being unfaithful to the general principles. After this new study, they decided to modify the text of article 201 and at the same time to make it more clear by introducing the following provisions therein:

1. To add a new paragraph after the second paragraph:

"The stamping and replacement of a security by a certificate under the provisions of this article shall not imply that the state so stamping and replacing the security thereby assumes or recognizes any obligation in respect to it unless the state in question desires that the stamping and replacing should have this implication."

2. At the end of the present paragraph three instead of the words:

"held within the limits of their respective territories by themselves or by their nationals," to put:

"of which they or their nationals are the real owners."

3. In paragraph four of the present text, instead of the words:

"The liability because of the war debt . . . by the nationals or the Governments of . . .," to put:

"The liability because of the war debt of the former Austrian Government which was prior to the signature of the present treaty in the actual possession of the nationals or the Governments of . . ."

Article 202.—After a new examination of this article, it has been decided to make no change in its present text.

It may, however, be opportune to assure the Austrian delegation once more that the Allied and Associated Governments greatly desire to avoid bankruptcy and disorder in the finances of the Republic of Austria. These Governments do not doubt that in applying the provisions of article 202 the Reparation Commission will do everything in its power to prevent the collapse of Austria and that it will attempt to surmount the immense difficulties inherent in the situation and which cannot fail to arise whatever may be the method employed to settle the various questions raised in this article.

Without doubt a new institution or new institutions will have to be created immediately and substituted for the Bank of Austria-Hungary in order to fill the void caused by the liquidation of that institution, an inevitable consequence of the downfall of the former Empire of Austria-Hungary. No provision of the treaty prevents the Austrian Government from taking measures for this purpose without delay.

Article 207. The Allied and Associated Governments do not wish to permit any contradiction to remain between articles 207 and 261 and they have decided to modify article 207 as follows:

Instead of “. . . and which, having belonged to Austria or its allies, must be transferred by Austria or its allies . . .,” to read:

“. . . and which having belonged to these States, must be ceded by them.”

Article 211. While the Allied and Associated Governments cannot amend this article in the sense proposed by the Austrian delegation, they desire to inform it of their great desire to see the financial problems raised by the dismemberment of the former Empire of Austria settled as soon as possible by understandings among the successor states. They are confident that the Reparation Commission, in applying the provisions provided in this article, will not cease to pursue this aim.

MODIFICATIONS PROPOSED IN THE PRESENT TEXT OF CONDITIONS OF PEACE  
WITH AUSTRIA (PART IX)

a) Article 199. Add after the third paragraph of section I of this article the following words: “For the purposes of the present article there should be regarded as secured debt, payments due by the Austrian Government in connection with the purchase of railways or similar properties. The distribution of the liability for such payments will be determined by the Reparation Commission in the same manner as in the case of secured debts.”

b) Article 201. 1) After the second paragraph add the following: “The stamping and replacement of a security by a certificate under the provisions of this article shall not imply that the state so stamping and replacing a security thereby assumes or recognizes any obligation in respect of it unless the state in question desires that the stamping and replacing should have this implication.

2) At the end of paragraph 3, instead of the words “held within the limits of their respective territories by themselves or by their nationals”, put: “of which they or their nationals are the real possessors.”

3) In the fourth paragraph, instead of the words “the liability because of the war debt . . . by the nationals or the Governments

of . . .” put: “the liability because of the war debt of the former Austrian Government which previous to the signature of the present treaty was in the actual possession of the nationals or the Governments of . . .”

c) Article 207. Instead of “. . . and which, having belonged to Austria or to its allies, must be transferred by Austria or its allies . . .” put “which having belonged to these states must be ceded by them.”

#### PART X.—ECONOMIC CLAUSES

##### I.—CUSTOMS REGULATIONS, DUTIES, AND RESTRICTIONS

The Allied and Associated Powers, after having examined the note of the Austrian delegation dated July 16, are unanimous in declaring that as respects possible arrangements of Austria with the countries born of the Austro-Hungarian Empire or countries which have been ceded territories which made a part thereof, they could not go beyond the concessions to which they agreed in their note of July 8.<sup>23</sup>

They cannot admit as valid the argument invoked by the Austrian delegation according to which Austria would find itself prevented from concluding a special arrangement with Czechoslovakia regarding customs and tariffs because of the fact that it is obligated to grant Czechoslovakia most-favored-nation treatment for three years. Austria will have absolute liberty, aside from unimportant exceptions, to establish its own general tariff and will find itself in a position to grant reductions in this tariff in favor of Czechoslovak trade, if it so desires, against corresponding concessions, without being bound to extend the benefit of such reductions to any other country. A similar provision is applied to Hungary.

There are no stipulations in the treaty preventing any one of the Allied and Associated Powers, including Yugoslavia and Roumania, from granting Austria most-favored-nation treatment immediately. But, except in the special case of coal which will be defined below, the Allied and Associated Powers are not disposed to exceed in the treaty of peace the provisions already communicated to the Austrian delegation, under the terms of which Austria—unless the League of Nations decides otherwise—will be released after three years from the obligations imposed upon it by articles 213, 214, 215, and 216 with respect to any Allied or Associated Power which should not accord it reciprocal treatment.

The Allied and Associated Powers have studied with special care the difficulties relative to supplying the coal necessary to Austria, which are the subject of the notes of July 16 and 27. Although

---

<sup>23</sup> Annex 2 to HD-2, p. 53.



they see no reason to suppose that the Czechoslovak Government will take any measure for the purpose of restricting or regulating Austrian purchases of coal in Czechoslovakia, they are, however, disposed, in order to allay the apprehensions of the Austrian Government, to consent to the insertion in the treaty of an article relative to the supplying of coal to Austria by Czechoslovakia and Poland, worded as follows:

"Czechoslovakia and Poland undertake that for a period of fifteen years they will not impose on the exportation to Austria of the products of coal mines in their territories any export duties or other charges or restrictions on exportation of any kind whatever, different from or more onerous than those imposed on such exportation to any other country.

"Czechoslovakia and Poland further undertake during each of the first three years of that period not to impose any export duty or other restriction on exportation to Austria of coal or lignite up to a reasonable quantity to be fixed, failing agreement between the states concerned, by the Reparation Commission. In fixing this quantity the Reparation Commission shall take into account the quantities of coal and lignite normally supplied the territories of the present Austria by Upper Silesia and the Austrian territories ceded to Czechoslovakia and Poland in execution of the treaty of peace.

"Czechoslovakia and Poland undertake further to take all necessary measures to insure that these products may be available to purchasers in Austria on terms as favorable as those applicable to the sale of the same products in the same situation to purchasers from Czechoslovakia or Poland, in their respective countries or in any other country."

In case of dispute relative to the execution of the interpretation of one of the provisions in the preceding paragraphs of this article, the Reparation Commission will decide.

## II.—UNFAIR COMPETITION

Article 221. The addition to this clause of the words proposed by the Austrian delegation is unacceptable. It is not, indeed, desirable to adopt a formula which can be considered as admitting the possibility of an exception to the general principle that words, marks, names, inscriptions, or signs of any kind which involve false indications of origin must not be employed. Furthermore, there is nothing in the clause which prevents wording on merchandise in the language of the country where the goods are to be sold, provided that the words thus used are not of a kind to give a false indication of origin.

Article 222. With respect to the criticism made of article 222, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot accept the proposed modification. This article is applicable only under the condition of

reciprocity, and it should not be impossible for the Austrian Government to take measures for the application of judicial decisions relative to regional appellations, taken in express conformity with the laws on the subject in the countries which are prepared to grant Austria reciprocal treatment. Such decisions may, in fact, be fully assimilated with the ordinances and regulations mentioned in the Austrian note.

### III.—TREATMENT OF NATIONALS OF THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS

Article 225. The observations formulated by the Austrian delegation on the subject of nationality (observations pages 19 and 20) spring from an erroneous interpretation, at least as regards article 225.

It is to be pointed out that this article is in harmony with the provisions of a certain number of naturalization treaties and that it tends principally to obviate international difficulties which may result from a conflict in national laws on the subject of nationality.

Article 226. In the memorandum attached to its note No. 707 of July 12, the Austrian delegation requests reciprocity with respect to the right reserved to the Allied and Associated Powers by virtue of article 226 of appointing consuls in the cities and ports of Austria. The Allied and Associated Powers are not disposed to grant such reciprocity to Austria. It may however be pointed out that nothing in this article is contrary to bringing into force again, under the terms of article 226, the pre-war consular conventions between certain Allied and Associated Powers and Austria, or to the conclusion of new agreements between Austria and these Powers in connection with the admission of Austrian consular agents to their territory.

### IV.—TREATIES

The Allied and Associated Powers have already expressed their opinion with respect to the claim of the Austrian delegation that Austria should be considered as an entirely new state which, having no bond of solidarity with the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, would not be bound by the contractual obligations which the Dual Monarchy had entered into; they thus do not consider it useful to renew this discussion with respect to the special question of treaties.

Articles 229–242 relative to bringing the treaties into force again impose on Austria, in terms appropriate to its situation, the obligations which are proper to it; these articles must be maintained and it is to be remarked that the Austrian delegation does not oppose them as being unduly severe but opposes them only in view of the principle mentioned above.

However, if the Allied and Associated Powers cannot admit the thesis of principle on which the Austrian delegation supports its counterproposals, they recognize the justice of two points of detail relative to articles 240 [229?] and 241.

Article 229. It is as a result of a material error that the mention of a convention of June 12, 1902,<sup>26</sup> relative to the guardianship of minors disappeared at the end of article 229. It is advisable to replace it as follows:

"23. Convention of June 12, 1902, relative to the guardianship of minors."

Article 241. The limitation requested by the Austrian delegation may be assured by changing the wording as follows:

"From the coming into force of the present treaty Austria undertakes, *so far as it is concerned*, to give the Allied and Associated Powers and their nationals the benefit *ipso facto* of the rights and advantages of any kind which it or the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has guaranteed by treaty, convention, or arrangements to non-belligerent states or their nationals since July 28, 1914, until the coming into force of the present treaty so long as those treaties, conventions, or agreements are in force *for Austria*."

#### GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON SECTIONS III AND IV

The Allied and Associated Powers have studied with the greatest care note No. 661 of the Austrian delegation as well as the subsequent notes relative to the economic clauses and the texts proposed to replace them.

The Austrian delegation's note and the greater part of the observations detailed therein oppose an objection of principle to the continuation of the liquidation of Austro-German assets after the conclusion of peace.

This objection has been acknowledged as justified to a very large measure by the concessions granted in the reply of July 8 to a preceding note.

Under the terms of this reply, the assets of Austrian nationals in territories which formerly were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire will not be subject to the liquidation provided by article 244 of the treaty, as a result of special consideration raised about the properties located in these territories, but the Allied and Associated Powers cannot extend this concession to other properties of Austrian nationals located abroad.

They have, however, no intention of applying the liquidation procedure provided by the treaty to German properties which will come into their territory only in the future.

---

<sup>26</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xcv. p. 421.



The provisions of article 244 (*b*) will be applied only to Austrian properties as they exist at the moment when the treaty of peace comes into effect.

The detailed observations of the Austrian delegation with respect to other points are considered in the remarks below.

#### V.—DEBTS (*Section III*)

Article 243. The Allied and Associated Powers cannot accept the proposal that a period of six years be granted for the collection and payment of debts due by Austrian nationals to Allied creditors.

With respect to the observations of the Austrian delegation relative to the interest on securities issued by the former Austro-Hungarian state, it may be remarked that the article applies only to interest due or to capital payable before and during the war. Accordingly no question arises in this article as to ascertaining whether such interest or such capital may become payable after the conclusion of peace. There is no reason to exclude the interest and capital mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 from the system of the Compensation Office; but in order to specify that, with respect to Austro-Hungarian debts, Austria will be charged, in the application of this system, only the sums referring to the part of the debt for which it is bound in conformity with the other provisions of the treaty, the following words may be added to the end of these paragraphs:

“In the case of interest or capital sums payable in respect to securities issued or taken over by former Austria-Hungary, the amount to be credited and paid by Austria will be the interest or capital in respect only of the debt for which Austria is liable in accordance with the financial clauses of the present Treaty and the principles laid down by the Reparation Commission.”

Article 243. *a*)—*Annex, paragraph 3*—The prohibition against communication between debtors and creditors given in this paragraph envisages only relations tending to the settlement of debts payable through the intermediary of the Compensation Office.

In addition, communications of this kind may always take place through the intermediary of this Office and it does not appear that any modification is necessary for this purpose.

Article 243. *b*) The Allied and Associated Powers agree to eliminate the last sentence of this paragraph which stipulates that debts due by the inhabitants of territories invaded and occupied by the enemy before the armistice will not be guaranteed by the states of which these territories form part. The corresponding sentence at the end of article 14 of the annex is likewise to be eliminated.

Article 243. *d*) The Austrian delegation declares that it cannot understand the fourth paragraph of article 243 (*d*). The Allied

and Associated Powers have decided to change the wording of this paragraph in order to make it more explicit.

The text of the paragraph will be as follows:

"In the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia, newly created powers, the currency of settlement and the rate of exchange at which debts shall be paid or credited shall be determined by the Reparation Commission provided for in part VIII unless they shall have been previously settled by an agreement between the interested states regulating the unsettled questions."

Article 243. *e*) It is not possible to give both the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria the right of opting or not opting the system of the Compensation Office for the result might be that one of the Powers would adopt it and the other would not.

The treaty provided the possibility of applying special rules with respect to the currency and rate of exchange according to whether the system is adopted or not and the adoption of this system by only one part of the Allied or Associated Powers will not impose excessive constraint on Austria. In these circumstances, the proposal of the Austrian delegation of leaving to the Reparation Commission the task of deciding whether the system should be generally applied cannot be accepted.

It may be further pointed out that the period of six months provided by Article 243 (*e*) for the exercise of the right of option was reduced, in the text of the economic clauses given to the Austrian delegation on July 19, to a period of one month from the ratification of the treaty of peace by the interested power.

As a result of this modification, it will no longer be necessary to provide any special provisions to guarantee the payment of enemy debts during the short period in which uncertainty may exist as to whether the system will be adopted.

There is no reason to grant delays in payment once it is known that the system will not be applied between two given countries.

Article 243—*Annex, paragraph 16*.—The reason for the distinction between the Credit or Compensation Office and the Debtor Office is that the proceedings before the courts for obtaining judgment on a disputed debt will, generally speaking, be carried out in the country of the debtor.

That is why, when a matter of this kind is involved, it is not admissible to allow the Debtor Office to bring the dispute before the courts of the country of the creditor.

Article 243—*Annex, paragraph 20*.—The sentence alluded to declares that the court may allow damages and interest to the amount of the costs of the suit and it does not seem that there can be any misunderstanding on the point. This provision is necessary to

avoid the delays and costs which, without it, would be occasioned by appeals made with insufficient basis.

Article 243—*Annex, paragraph 22*.—There are no adequate reasons for modifying the rights of creditors with respect to interest, in cases where they are authorized to receive interest by virtue of contract, law, or custom. The provision which provides for the payment of interest in other cases is reasonable because the debtor had the use of the sum during the war for a longer period than could have been contemplated by the parties.

#### VI.—PROPERTY, RIGHTS AND INTERESTS (*Section IV*)

The Austrian delegation complains that the obligation to pay an indemnity for the damage caused property on account of measures taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government is imposed on Austria alone; but if, as is said, the property of nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers was protected by the former Austro-Hungarian Government and if such nationals were in no way hindered in their business, the amount of the indebtedness cannot come to a very large sum.

The Allied and Associated Powers will make use of the right to liquidate Austrian property in their territory, as circumstances require, but they do not intend to sell personal articles or souvenirs of little value.

Article 244 *f*) and *g*) The Allied and Associated Powers cannot accept the substitution of the words "before the signing of the peace" for the words "before the signing of the armistice" at the end of paragraph *g*.

Article 244 *k*) The ground on which the opposition to this clause is based is not easy to see; the necessity for it comes, in particular, from information gathered by the Allied and Associated Powers as to the methods which it is proposed to apply in Austria to levy taxes on capital, affecting the property of Allied nationals. In order to bring it into harmony with the treaty with Germany, the text of this article has already been modified as follows:

"The amount of all taxes or imposts on capital levied or to be levied by Austria on the property, rights, and interests of nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, from November 3, 1918, until three months after the coming into force of the present treaty or, in the case of property, rights or interests which have been subjected to exceptional measures of war, until restitution in accordance with the provisions of the present treaty, shall be restored to the owners."

Article 244—*Annex, paragraph 1*.—The Allied and Associated Powers are not disposed to recognize in any way the measures taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government in invaded and occupied territories and this paragraph cannot be changed.



Article 244—*Annex, paragraph 4.*—Taking into consideration the complete unity which existed during the war between the powers at war with the Allied and Associated States and, in particular, taking into consideration the negotiations entered into for the division of Allied property seized in occupied territory, the principle of joint responsibility must be maintained, but the Allied and Associated Powers are prepared not to burden the property of Austrian nationals with the obligation of satisfying unpaid debts of nationals of the powers which were formerly allies of Austria-Hungary.

It will be noted that the paragraph has already been changed in accordance herewith.

Article 244—*Annex, paragraph 5.*—The scope of this paragraph seems to have been misunderstood. It applies only in the case of a company incorporated in Austria and controlled by a company incorporated in an Allied or Associated State.

The effect of the paragraph will be to reestablish the rights of trademarks in third countries to the benefit of the person who was virtually [*actually?*] owner thereof before the war and there can be no reasonable objection to such a provision.

Article 244—*Annex, paragraph 8.*—The lack of reciprocity in this provision comes in part from the fact that no indemnity can be claimed by Austrian nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, so that detailed information will not be required. For this reason the Allied and Associated Powers are not prepared to make an engagement to furnish detailed information but they are nevertheless ready to examine favorably any request made after the treaty comes into effect for the purpose of obtaining adequate data as to the amounts realized in the liquidation of Austrian property.

Article 244—*Annex, paragraph 10.*—As is explained above, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot abandon the rights of liquidation contained in article 244 (*b*) to a greater degree than has been indicated and they cannot accept a modification of paragraph 10.

The purpose of this paragraph, as is indicated in the Austrian note, is to allow these liquidations to be effected without needless inconvenience and expense.

Article 244—*Annex, paragraph 12.*—The principle established in this paragraph that assets in cash received must be reimbursed in cash is absolutely justified for all parties and the Allied and Associated Powers see no reason to recognize investments in war loans of sums belonging to enemies. The paragraph applies to the Allied and Associated Powers as well as to Austria and they cannot consent to its modification.

Article 244—*Annex, paragraph 14.*—As in the case of the right to choose the system of the Compensation Office, it is not possible to give both the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria the right of

option as regards the principles formulated for the rate of exchange and of interest.

ADDITIONAL NOTE—In their reply of July 8 to a preceding Austrian note, the Allied and Associated Powers agreed that the property of Austrian nationals located in territories which formerly were a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would not be subject to the liquidation under article 244 of the treaty.

### *Section VIII*

Article 260. The Allied and Associated Powers are disposed to modify the second sentence of this article so as to stipulate that the property, rights, and interests in question will be restored free of any charge or tax on capital which may have been established or increased after November 1, 1918, and that they will not be subject to any tax imposed with respect to any other property or business belonging to the same person, from the moment when such property is removed from Austria or when such business ceases to be carried on there.

In view of the modifications made in the second paragraph of article 266, the text of the second paragraph of article 260 will be changed as follows:

“Cash assets shall be paid for in the currency and at the rate of exchange provided for the case of debts under articles 243 *d*) and 266.”

With regard to the last paragraph of the article, the last words, stipulating that account shall be taken of payments regularly made for the purpose of the trust, seem to have escaped the attention of the Austrian delegation, for these words sufficiently protect operations of this kind regularly effected since July 28, 1914.

Article 262. To meet the objections which the Austrian delegation raises against this article, the Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to substitute the following text for this article and article 263:

“All contracts for the sale of goods from overseas, concluded before January 1, 1917, between nationals of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on the one hand and the administrations of the former Monarchy, of Austria, of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or Austrian nationals on the other hand, shall be annulled except in respect of any debt or other pecuniary obligation arising out of any act done or money paid thereunder. All other contracts between such parties concluded before November 1, 1918, and in force at that date shall be maintained.”

Article 264. No difficulty can result from the suspension of the period of prescription and limitation of rights of prosecution provided by this article; on the contrary, its effect is to prevent all the

difficulties which would not otherwise fail to arise because of the difficulty or impossibility of communication between the parties.

Article 265. In order to meet the objection of the Austrian delegation according to which the obligations to which Austria is asked to conform by this article are not defined, the Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to substitute the following text:

"Austria undertakes not to impede in any way the transfer of property, rights, or interests belonging to a company incorporated in accordance with the laws of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in which Allied or Associated nationals are interested, to a company incorporated in accordance with the laws of any other power, to facilitate all measures necessary for giving effect to such transfer, and to render any assistance which may be required for effecting the restoration to Allied or Associated nationals, or to companies in which they are interested, of their property, rights, and interests, whether in Austria or in transferred territory."

Article 266. The Allied and Associated Powers agree to substitute for article 266 the following provision:

"Section III shall not apply to debts contracted between Austrian nationals and nationals of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

"Subject to the special provisions laid down in article 243 (*d*) for the newly created powers, the debts mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present article shall be paid in the legal currency, at the time of payment, of the state of which the national of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has become a national. The rate of exchange applicable to the said settlement shall be the average rate quoted on the Geneva exchange during the two months preceding November 1, 1918."

Article 270. The observations of the Austrian delegation are based on the hypothesis that the delivery of social insurance or state funds must be effected under a form other than that in which they now exist; such is not the case and it may be pointed out that the article itself provides that the conditions of delivery shall be determined by special conventions to be concluded between the Austrian Government and the governments concerned.

In order to eliminate any ambiguity which might exist on this point, the Allied and Associated Powers declare that the proportion of reserve to be delivered in execution of this article shall be the exact proportion of the funds or debts existing on the date of the armistice. It may, in addition, be observed that a paragraph has been added to the article the provisions of which insure a just and reasonable settlement of the conditions of the transfer.

## VII.—CONTRACTS, PRESCRIPTIONS, AND JUDGMENTS (*Section V*)

Article 246*b*. The question of "the general interest" is one of those questions which must be determined by the Allied and Associated



Governments concerned and a modification of this article with a view to providing an appeal to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal on this subject cannot be admitted.

It may be pointed out that the article provides that compensation may be granted by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to a contracting party who has suffered considerable injury.

Article 246*d*. The intent of the first part of this article is that the rules established by article 246 and the annex thereto do not apply to contracts between the nationals of an Allied and Associated Power, on the one hand, and, on the other, to the inhabitants of a transferred territory who acquired the nationality of an Allied or Associated Power under the terms of the treaty. Contracts between Austrians, on the one hand, and the inhabitants of a transferred territory, on the other, are the subject of article 262.

Article 247*b* and *c* and article 249. The Allied and Associated Powers are not disposed to apply the principle of reciprocity for these articles.

The treaty indicates that in certain cases the Allied and Associated tribunals are competent to settle the disputes, but this power is not given to the Austrian courts and reciprocity cannot be granted with the respect to requests for compensation introduced by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.

#### VIII.—MIXED ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL (*Section VI*)

The proposal to extend the jurisdiction of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal calls for the following reply:

The role of the Tribunal is not merely to pass on the new rights resulting from the treaty, but also to form a new jurisdiction to which certain disputes relative to already existing private rights are referred.

With respect to these rights, the tribunals of the Allied and Associated Powers are already competent and certain of the said Powers find insurmountable difficulties in the way of removing such disputes from such jurisdiction.

According to their system of jurisprudence and in the present circumstances, they see no adequate reasons for withdrawing from their nationals the access to their own courts which the law opens to them.

No new jurisdiction is given to these courts and the Austrian litigants find no prejudice in the fact of the maintenance by these courts of the jurisdiction which they now have.

With respect to the obligations formulated in paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of the annex, the Allied and Associated Powers agree that paragraph 7 shall be modified so as to provide that the Allied and Associated Powers as well as Austria will give the Tribunal all

necessary facilities and data which it may request to carry out its investigations.

It might have been noticed that the text of paragraphs 8 and 9 has already been modified as follows:

Paragraph 8. "The language in which the proceedings shall be conducted shall, unless otherwise agreed, be English, French, Italian, or Japanese as may be determined by the Allied and Associated Powers concerned."

Paragraph 9. "Place and time for the meetings of each Tribunal shall be determined by the president of the Tribunal."

*Insurance Contracts.* The point of view of the Austrian Government according to which provisions relative to insurance contracts contained in articles 246 to 250 and in the annex to section 5 do not apply to contracts between Austrians, on the one hand, and inhabitants of a transferred territory, on the other, is correct; as stated above these contracts are the subject of article 262.

The recommendation of the Austrian delegation represents the terms of the treaty, as respects insurance contracts, as very severe and contrary to the principle of reciprocity. But in fact the only paragraph of the annex which deals with insurance contracts and is not completely reciprocal is paragraph 12.

The objections formulated with regard to this paragraph have been taken into consideration and its elimination is agreed to.

The French text of the paragraph should not be modified. It is clearly apparent from this text that the value in question is the refund value.

There is no justification for a special provision granting long terms of payment for amounts which may be due by Austrian insurance companies to insurance companies in Allied and Associated countries.

Under these conditions the Allied and Associated Powers are not disposed to make any other modifications for the provisions of the treaty relative to insurance contracts.

## IX.—INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (*Section VII*)

With respect to the general observations in the preamble of the Austrian memorandum on industrial property, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot agree that an essential change be made in the articles concerning the industrial property of inhabitants of territories which have separated from Austria. However, in order to guarantee the recognition and the protection of industrial property rights belonging to Austrians in the territories separated from Austria, a new provision has been added to article 269.

*Article 253, paragraphs 2 and 3, and article 257, paragraph 2.* It is not the intention of the Allied and Associated Powers to use without compensation the rights of industrial, literary, or artistic property belonging to Austrian nationals after the coming into effect of the present treaty.

The question raised regarding these articles has already been solved by the insertion of a new provision after paragraph 5 in article 253.

*Article 253, paragraphs 5 and 8.* The fifth paragraph of article 253, which provides that the Allied and Associated Powers will have the right to impose limitations, conditions, or restrictions on rights of industrial property belonging to Austrians, is in no way for the purpose of confiscating such rights. It seeks, on the one hand, to reserve to the Allied or Associated Powers the privilege of restricting industrial, literary, or artistic property when they consider it necessary for the needs of national defense or public interest. This power, which Austria is guaranteed by its domestic legislation, is a general and permanent right which will be applied, if necessary, to industrial, literary, or artistic property which should be acquired before or after the coming into effect of the treaty of peace.

It seeks, on the other hand, to permit the use of industrial, literary, or artistic property on the same basis as other Austrian property, as a security for the fulfillment of Austria's obligations and for the reparation of the damages which it has caused. It is not the intention of the Allied and Associated Powers to use for this purpose industrial, literary, or artistic property which might be acquired after the coming into effect of the present treaty. Only industrial, literary, or artistic property acquired before or during the war may be subjected by the Allied or Associated Powers to the limitations, conditions, and restrictions provided to guarantee an equitable treatment by Austria of the rights of industrial, literary, or artistic property held on Austrian territory by their nationals or to guarantee the complete fulfillment of all the obligations contracted by Austria by virtue of the present treaty.

To define the different treatment in this respect which the Allied and Associated Powers intend to reserve for property acquired before the coming into effect of the treaty and that which may be subsequently acquired, paragraph 5 (e) of Article 253 has already been completed by a new provision.

The power given by paragraph 8 of the article to consider as null and without effect any total or partial transfer and any concession of rights over industrial, literary, or artistic property effected after July 28, 1914, must be maintained; otherwise an Austrian holding a right over industrial property might nominally divest himself of



the legal title to the property in such fashion as to evade the effects of the provisions of this article.

*Article 254, paragraph 2, last sentence.* The observations of the Austrian delegation have been satisfied by the amendment made in article 253, which is the clause providing for the payment of royalties.

#### PART XII.—PORTS, WATERWAYS, AND RAILWAYS

The Allied and Associated Powers have studied with care the detailed observations of the Austrian delegation concerning the clauses of part XII of the conditions of peace. Certain of these observations and criticisms refer to a text of the conditions of peace previous to the last text sent to the Austrian delegation. Others have seemed to proceed merely from errors in interpretation as to the sense of stipulations and as to the intentions of the Allied and Associated Powers. The majority represent less objections of detail regarding the practical application of the clauses than claims of principle of a general and political nature, taken up and transposed one after another, according to the diversity of the technical problems, on the occasion of the study of a great number of the articles. Thus the Allied and Associated Powers do not feel obligated to follow the exposition of the Austrian observations article by article in their reply; they are content to group here, on the principal questions raised, the reasons of fact and of law which justify the maintenance of all the clauses or, in certain cases, modifications which it has been considered just to make.

The principal, and without doubt the most constantly repeated of the protests of the Austrian delegation against the text of the stipulations of the part on ports, waterways and railways of the conditions of peace, concerns the application of the numerous articles on the general system of means of transportation, freedom of transit, transportation by railway, by navigable waters, and telegraph and telephone services, where unilateral obligations are imposed on Austria for a period of five years after the coming into force of the treaty of peace. The Austrian delegation, on the one hand, considers that the text of the article in which this general period of five years is laid down is drafted in such an indefinite way as to permit the Allied and Associated Powers to prolong it at will. On the other hand, while appearing to recognize that the powers which were at war with the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy have the right to exact such types of facilities, the Austrian delegation refuses to admit that the new Allied or Associated States which are successors of the said Austro-Hungarian Monarchy may likewise claim this right. Accordingly, as respects its relations with this last category, it claims the benefit of immediate reciprocity and, in particular, it opposes the special guarantees of a, moreover, indeterminate duration, given to the Czechoslovak Republic over certain railways and certain telegraph lines in Austria.

The Allied and Associated Powers are desirous of giving partial satisfaction on this point to the requests of the Austrian delegation by reducing to three years the period of non-reciprocity. But they recall, however, that the reason for these unilateral obligations affecting the transportation system is not merely, as the Austrian delegation seems to believe, a will to prevent an enemy state from indirectly profiting by immediate resumption of equal competition, from the devastations committed by its armies but also—which particularly affects the relations between Austria and the new Allied and Associated States born of the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy—the necessity of safeguarding during a transitory period the establishment in these new states of the first economic set-up and the reorganization of the transportation system hitherto dominated by the preponderant centralization at Vienna. As to the fear that the period of non-reciprocity may be arbitrarily prolonged by the Allied and Associated Powers, Austria should find all guarantees in the thoroughly reasoned decision of the Council of the League of Nations.

Another series of observations, which reappears under various forms and apropos of various articles in the Austrian delegation's note, concerns the advance acceptance by Austria of future technical conventions and agreements on freedom of transit, the international regime of ports, waterways, and railways, transportation by railroad, the adoption of a continuous brake, the regulations concerning the Danube, conventions to be concluded in the future without the participation or collaboration of Austria, according to articles 293, 298, 305, 309, and 323 of the conditions of peace.

It may be remarked on this subject that, with respect to the drafting of the new convention regarding transportation by railway intended to replace the Berne convention, article 305 expressly provides for possible collaboration of Austria in the new convention, and that, with regard to the future technical agreement relative to the continuous brake, there was never any question of compelling Austria to take part therein and to adopt the system of brake chosen by the Allied and Associated Powers, but only of obliging it to equip the cars with devices making it possible to join them to trains of the Allied and Associated Powers, furnished with the continuous brake, and, reciprocally, to join the cars of such Powers to Austrian trains; the Allied and Associated Powers are in addition quite willing to hear the representatives of Austria at the time of drafting of the technical agreement on the type of continuous brake. Similarly, in its new form, article 298, relative to the final regime of the Danube, stipulates that representatives of Austria may be present at the conference charged with drawing up the regulations. Finally, the general conventions on freedom of transit and the international regime of ports, waterways, and railways will by no means be



issued by the Allied and Associated Powers but will obligate these Powers among themselves and, in order to bind Austria, must receive the approval of the League of Nations. While no possible equitable guarantee has been neglected, it has, on the other hand, seemed inadmissible—as the Allied and Associated Powers have already replied to Germany—to permit an enemy state, for reasons of resentment of a political nature, to prevent, through its opposition in principle, the conclusion of agreements useful for the general welfare.

The Austrian delegation, indeed, does not hesitate to affirm that the Austrian state, defenseless as respects transportation enterprises, assumes the responsibility of executing certain clauses touching, for instance, on equality of treatment and internal navigation fees “only insofar as the application thereof may be carried on by public establishments or establishments over the operation of which the state or some type of public body has the right to exercise its influences,” though in fact the Austrian state, through subsidies or merely through the ownership of the majority of the stock, has entire control over the great internal navigation companies, and though, in any circumstances, it is its duty to take, in the name of its liability to the other contracting powers and in the full exercise of its sovereign rights, all internal legislative or administrative measures suitable to assure the strict execution of the terms of the treaty within the period specified.

The more specific and more concrete remarks of the Austrian delegation on the technical stipulations of construction and transfers of railways and, particularly, concerning the regime of the Danube have, however, allowed the Allied and Associated Powers either to state precisely their point of view, inaccurately understood no doubt, or to correct details in the text, while taking sincere account of the new objections. Article 313, providing for the construction of the new trans-Alpine lines of the Col de Reschen and of the Pas de Predil, had already been modified in the last text of the conditions of peace transmitted to the Austrian delegation; possible financial obligations of Austria had been defined and subordinated to the existence of corresponding receipts.

Similarly, article 311 had received the addition of a new paragraph relative to frontier railroad stations, which seems to respond to certain desiderata of the Austrian note. The last paragraph of article 310, concerning the lines in former Russian Poland transferred to the normal gauge, has been revised and made to conform better with the legal position of these lines during the war. If the rest of article 310, respecting the transfer of railways, has been maintained without change, it is not because the Allied and Associated Powers disapprove in general of the considerations which the Austrian delegation devel-



ops therein. They feel, as does the Austrian delegation, that the distribution of the rolling-stock of the Government railroads of the former Austrian Monarchy between Austria and the Allied and Associated States born of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary or having received territory from the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy must be effected like an actual liquidation and placed under the direction of a commission of experts on which all the interested States shall be represented. But the text of article 310, in the opinion of the Allied and Associated Powers, is entirely in accordance with such interpretation and could only through a misunderstanding have given rise to the objections of the Austrian delegation. Likewise, the Allied and Associated Powers have never sought to compel Austria to repair in its own workshops all the rolling-stock transferred to the other states. They have only wished to guarantee the temporary provisions necessary for immediate repairs of the material until the new states have been able to set up their own autonomous workshops inside their territory.

Articles 283 and 284 have likewise been subject to an error of interpretation on the part of the Austrian delegation. The Allied and Associated Powers by no means proposed to bind Austria, as respects transports from and to river ports which, after transshipment, should not in fact be transports coming from or destined to a maritime port. Thus, taking into account the remark that the Austrian schedule of fees on the Danube is limited almost exclusively to the exchange of goods between the riparian states along this river, they agree to eliminate from the text of articles 283 and 284 the mention of Austrian ports. The combination of the new text of articles 283 and 284 with article 308 suffices in fact to establish that, each time that the transportation shall in fact be from or to any maritime port, such transportation shall be subject to the rules of articles 283 and 284, whether effected or not with transshipment at an Austrian or foreign river port; and that this last is the only case contemplated by the Allied and Associated Powers.

The observations of the Austrian note with respect to the special regime of the various international rivers have been given a similarly careful examination by the Allied and Associated Powers. For the Elbe, the Oder and even the Rhine, the Austrian delegation requests that Austria be represented on the river commissions, alleging on the one hand the economic interests of Austria in the Elbe and the Oder and on the other its position as a riparian state on Lake Constance, as regards the Rhine. The Allied and Associated Powers have not believed that they could accede to the Austrian suggestions on this point. The status of riparian state on Lake Constance can in no way give a right to representation on the Rhine Commission, as the Rhine is not navigable above Basel. Likewise,

with respect to the Elbe and the Oder, the economic interests of Austria are not a sufficient reason for its admission into the commissions.

Doubtless other states than the riparian states form part of the commissions, but not because of their economic interest; rather, as the Allied and Associated Powers have already pointed out in their reply to the observations of the German delegation, in order that disinterested powers may, by their presence on the Commissions, introduce among the divergent interests of riparian states an element of reflection and balance and may represent the principle of free circulation on these rivers. For the Danube, on the contrary, certain specific remarks of the Austrian delegation can be usefully heeded. Article 294 concerning the transfers of vessels and material has been greatly revised with a view to delimiting with greater precision the powers of the arbitrator charged with the distribution and most effective safeguarding of the interests of the vessels' owners. The Allied and Associated Powers take this occasion to declare that the purpose of this article, as well as of the corresponding article of the treaty with Germany, is to assure the best utilization of river vessels in Europe to the benefit of all the riparian states and is by no means to envisage compensation for damages suffered during the war, a question which has been considered in other clauses. The war did considerably decrease the facilities available for river navigation. Territorial readjustments, particularly those which provide the transfer of river ports, may require the redistribution of the vessels remaining, in order that they may be immediately utilized in the general interest. The arbitrator or arbitrators to be designated by the United States have been charged with making a distribution of river vessels such as territorial changes may require.

Just as a transfer of rolling-stock must accompany the transfer of railways when a territory changes hands, so, in the case of a transfer of river ports, must the arbitrator determine what transfer of corresponding material must be made. Without being bound by this consideration, he must take into account the needs of the interested states as well as the river traffic during the five years preceding the war. Like article 294, article 297 providing for meetings of the International Commission for the Upper Danube has been modified and completed. It seemed necessary, in accordance with the requests of the Austrian delegation, to specify the attributions and method of operation of this provisional international Commission which will meet as soon as possible after the treaty comes into effect. In reply to observations concerning the Danube-Oder canal, it is understood that, as soon as this canal has been built by the Czechoslovak state, the regime provided for the Rhine-Danube

canal will be applied to it. Austria will thus receive every guarantee of free circulation on this waterway which seems necessary to it for its economic outlet to the Baltic and North Seas. Finally, a new article assures the maintenance of works for irrigation, canalization, inundation, use of hydraulic power, et cetera, located in the territory of several states.

The Allied and Associated Powers have discussed whether, as the Austrian delegation proposes, it would be advisable to extend the international regime to the whole navigable course of the affluents of the Danube, the Drave, the Save, and the Theiss. For the moment it does not seem to them desirable to extend the international organization beyond what is given in article 286, that is, to internationalize equally a navigable section of a river system which would not naturally serve as access to the sea for more than one state, but they recall that the general convention provided in article 293 may apply internationalization to all or part of a river system which might be included in a new definition stated by such convention. And meanwhile, just as the internationalization of the Elbe has been extended to the Vltava up to Prague, on the express request of the Czechoslovak Republic, they herewith agree, by an amendment to the text of article 286, to give to special agreements concluded among riparian states the power of freely extending the application of the international regime.

The Allied and Associated Powers consider that the putting into practice of the clauses of part XII of the conditions of peace, as thus defined and completed, will prove by actual application their practicability and efficacy for the most rapid possible resumption of free communication in Europe, which the Allied and Associated Powers are particularly desirous, as is the Austrian delegation, of effecting and guaranteeing.

## Annex II

### AMENDMENTS TO THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE WITH AUSTRIA

Article 283. Take out the words "for the benefit of Austrian ports or of any port of another power" and substitute "for the benefit of any port of another power."

Article 284. Take out the words "which it granted to this same port or to the ports of another power" and substitute "which it granted to those of another power."

Article 286. Add a third paragraph reading as follows:

"Any part of the above-mentioned river system which is not included in the general definition may be declared international by an agreement between the riparian states."



Article 287. Take out the last paragraph.

Article 286 bis [287*a*]. New article constituted by the last paragraph of the present article 287.

Article 294. Take out and replace by :

"Austria shall cede to the Allied and Associated Powers concerned, within a maximum period of three months from the date on which notification shall be given it, a proportion of the tugs and vessels remaining registered in the ports of the river systems referred to in article 6 [286] after the deduction of those surrendered by way of restitution or reparation. Austria shall in the same way cede material of all kinds necessary to the Allied and Associated Powers concerned for the utilization of these river systems.

"The number of tugs and boats, and the amount of material so ceded, and their distribution, shall be determined by an arbitrator or arbitrators designated by the United States of America, due regard being had for the legitimate needs of the parties concerned, and particularly for the shipping traffic during the five years preceding the war.

"All craft so ceded shall be provided with their fittings and gear, and shall be in a good state of repair and in condition to carry goods, and shall be selected from among those most recently built.

"Wherever the cessions made under the present article involve a change of ownership, the arbitrator or arbitrators shall determine the rights of the former owners as of October 15, 1919, and the amount of compensation to be paid them and shall also direct the manner in which such payment is to be effected in each case. If the arbitrator or arbitrators find that the whole or part of this sum will revert directly or indirectly to states from which reparation is due, they shall decide the sum to be placed under this head to the credit of the said states.

"As regards the Danube, the arbitrator or arbitrators mentioned above shall also decide all questions as to the permanent allocation of vessels the ownership or nationality of which might cause a dispute among the states and the conditions of such allocation.

"Pending final allocation, the control of these vessels shall be vested in a commission consisting of representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, and Italy. This commission will make provisional arrangements for the working of these vessels in the general interest by any local organization or, failing such arrangements, by itself without prejudice to the final allocation.

"As far as possible these provisional operations will be on a commercial basis and cash received by the commission for the hire of these vessels shall be disposed of as directed by the Reparation Commission."

Article 297. Add "The decisions of this international commission shall be taken by a majority vote. The salaries of the commissioners shall be fixed and paid by their respective countries.

"As a provisional measure, any deficit in the administrative ex-

penses of this international commission shall be borne equally by the states represented on this commission.

"In particular, this commission shall regulate the licensing of pilots, charges for pilotage, and the administration of the pilot service."

Article 302. Instead of the words "in articles 332 to 338 of the treaty of peace concluded at Versailles on June 28, 1919, between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany" read "in articles 287 to 293 of the present treaty."

Article 304. Last paragraph. Instead of the words "without prejudice to the provisions of article 284" read "without prejudice to the provisions of articles 283 and 284."

Article 315. Take out No. 2. As a result No. 3 becomes No. 2.

Article 322. First paragraph. Take out the words "at the expiration of a period of five years" and substitute "at the expiration of a period of three years."

Line two. Take out "Article 287" and replace by "Article 287bis."

Second paragraph. Take out the words "period of five years" and substitute "period of three years".

Article 310. Last paragraph. Take out and substitute: "The provisions of paragraphs three and four above shall be applied to the lines of former Russian Poland converted by the Austria-Hungarian authorities to the normal gauge, such lines being regarded as detached from the Austrian and Hungarian state systems."

#### NEW ARTICLE

Section II. Add: Chapter III, Hydraulic System.

Article 302 bis. In default of any provisions to the contrary, when, as the result of the fixing of a new frontier, the hydraulic system (canalization, inundations, irrigation, drainage, et cetera) in a state is dependent on works executed within the territory of another state, or when use is made on the territory of a state, in virtue of pre-war usage, of water or hydraulic power, the source of which is on the territory of another state, an agreement shall be made between the states concerned to safeguard the interests and rights acquired by each of them.

Failing an agreement, the matter shall be regulated by an arbitrator appointed by the Council of the League of Nations.

#### PART XIII.—LABOR

The Government of German-Austria, while approving in principle the part of the treaty relative to labor, thus expresses one regret:

"In the opinion of the German-Austrian Government, it would be desirable not only to incorporate into the treaty of peace the rules of procedure with a view to developing and organizing legislation on labor insurance, but still more and above all to decree in this same

instrument the essence of the rights and obligations on the subject of social provision."

And after having advanced the reasons in the development of its own legislation it adds that "the spirit on which it is based obviously would require that the treaty on world peace shall put into force, in the field of international law, all provisions proposed and accepted at the International Trade Union Congress at Berne in 1919."

Similar observations had been made by the German delegation and replied to.

It is not possible to solve these multiple and complex questions in the treaty of peace without indefinitely delaying the signature of this treaty. In the second place, it is desirable to discuss them with the assistance of the neutral nations whose legislation shows the same progress. Finally, it is to be pointed out that the permanent international labor organization created by the Peace Conference is set up just in order to approach the whole group of labor problems to be settled and that the field of action assigned to it contains them all.

It hence seems that the observations of the Government of German-Austria do not involve a modification of the treaty of peace. Also it offers no modification to the text of part XIII. All the observations are basically met: that appears from the conclusions in which, in assuming that German-Austria will be represented on the labor organization, the Austrian Government declares itself ready to accept the part of the conditions of peace concerning labor.

---

#### Appendix

#### *Reservations Made by the Delegations*

#### COVERING LETTER

#### BRITISH PROPOSAL

The British delegation proposes that the wording of the covering letter be modified so as to include the following principles:

I.—1. The state of war, which indisputably existed until the armistice, has not in fact ceased so far for the populations of Austria and the fact that a new government has been established has not put an end to it.

2. The Allied and Associated Powers are thus entitled to set for the conclusion of peace such conditions as it seems to them appropriate to impose.

3. By the very fact of signing the peace, these Powers recognize the new government of the Republic of Austria; in doing so they are disposed to recognize also that Austria is a new state which inherits neither the rights nor the obligations of the former Austro-Hun-



garian Monarchy or of the Cisleithan part of that Monarchy, other than the rights and obligations created by the actual text of the treaty.

That text would seem to need modifications in order to make it conform more clearly to these principles.

*Paragraphs 1 and 2 are accepted by the other delegations which consider that they already appear in the letter and they reject the third point.*

II. The British representative makes a reservation of a general order in the first paragraph concerning the frontier question until a definitive decision has been taken by the Supreme Council on the observations presented for this chapter.

Nor can the British representative accept the second paragraph which stipulates that the determination of frontiers entailing the attribution to Italy of the middle Tyrol is indispensable. He is in entire agreement with the decision unanimously taken by the Central Territorial Committee, declaring that, as the decision concerning the middle Tyrol has been taken by the Supreme Council, it pertains to no other organ to explain and justify the reasons on which this decision was based; ignoring these reasons, the British representative cannot associate himself with a declaration stating that the assignment of this territory to Italy was indispensable.

*The American, French, Italian, and Japanese delegations opposed this reservation.*

#### AMERICAN PROPOSAL

The American delegation calls attention to the following observations:

The covering letter to the Austrian delegation adopts the point of view that Austria is, at least to a certain point, the successor to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This is a point of view which it seems has been before examined on several occasions, as is shown by the following extract of a letter sent on August 16 by the Finance Commission to the Secretary General of the Conference:

The Finance Commission considers that it is not competent to modify the instructions which it has received from the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, particularly by the letter sent by M. Clemenceau to Lord Cunliffe on May 12, 1919.

1. The Republic of Austria is the successor of the former Monarchy; it cannot be placed on the same footing as the states to which territories of the former Empire of Austria have been transferred or as the states born of the dismemberment of the Empire; these states form part of the Allied and Associated Powers and the burden of the war debt of the former Austrian Monarchy cannot be imposed upon them . . .

Further, the letter from M. Clemenceau to Lord Cunliffe dated May 12, 1919, said:

Dear Lord Cunliffe:

I am instructed to inform you that the Supreme Council, in its session of Saturday afternoon, May 10,<sup>28</sup> studied your letter of May 8<sup>29</sup> in which you asked whether the newly created states, such as Poland, etc., must assume a part of the Austro-Hungarian war debt.

It has been decided that no portion of the Austro-Hungarian debt would be charged against these states. With respect to reparations, it has been decided that the Commission of which you form part would be requested to take as the basis of its work the principle of participation of all the states which belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in payments due on this account. On such basis, the Commission will have to determine the total amount which can be paid by all the states which formed part of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire; thus it will present proposals as to the part which each state concerned must pay, taking account of its previous obligations and its capacity to pay . . .<sup>30</sup>

We also recall the declaration made by Great Britain and France on March 28, 1918, following the communication in which the Soviet Government of Russia expressed its intention of repudiating the whole Russian public debt. This declaration stated:

No principle is better established than that which demands that a nation be responsible for the acts of its government and that any change of government shall not affect obligations previously contracted.

The obligations of Russia still exist; they bind and will continue to bind the new states or the group of states which represent or will represent Russia.

In spite of the position adopted in the covering letter which is to be handed to the Austrian delegation, as well as the other declarations quoted above, the preamble of the treaty with Austria declares that:

Austria is recognized *as a new and independent state*, under the name of the Republic of Austria.

To the Supreme Council is left the task of deciding whether this sentence of the preamble of the treaty is not in contradiction with the declaration made in the covering letter as well as with the other declarations quoted above.

Furthermore, we point out that the clause of the Treaty declaring that "Austria is recognized as a new and independent state under the name of the Republic of Austria" might lead to errors of interpretation as to the rights and obligations (other than those mentioned in the treaty) of the new Austria, considered as forming part of the states

---

<sup>28</sup> CF-8, minute 5, vol. v, p. 560.

<sup>29</sup> CF-4, minute 6, vol. v, p. 531.

<sup>30</sup> Omission indicated in the original French.

which are heirs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It cannot be foreseen on what points the Allied and Associated Powers will wish to hold Austria responsible as regards the rights and obligations which, from the point of view of international law and justice, devolve upon it by reason of its former position in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy—rights and obligations which do not enter into the present treaty. Furthermore, the neutral states rely on Austria's fulfilling certain obligations and Austria relies on these states recognizing to it certain rights which result from its former position in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It is possible that the new state of Austria considers itself, by reason of its recognition through the treaty, "as a new and independent state" as released, under international law and practice, from all obligations respecting the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or neutral states, obligations which derive from its former bonds with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

It may even, on the basis of this recognition as "a new and independent state" present the argument that it is beginning its existence free from any past, without other obligations than those imposed on it by the treaty of peace. It is pointed out that it would be dangerous and probably embarrassing for the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to permit Austria, in an official document such as the treaty of peace, to take such an attitude.

Accordingly, it is proposed that the clause of the treaty mentioned above be reworded as follows:

1. Austria is recognized as a Republic, under the name of the Republic of Austria,  
or

2. That the clause be entirely eliminated and that the name "Austria" in the enumeration of the "High Contracting Powers" be replaced by that of "Republic of Austria."

## PART II.—FRONTIERS OF AUSTRIA

### A. GMÜND

In considering the determination of the frontier between Czechoslovakia and Austria, it was admitted that in general the present frontier between Bohemia, on the one hand, and Upper and Lower Austria, on the other, should be held to. It is essential to establish these principles in a clear fashion; otherwise it would be difficult to reply to the Austrians when they request that certain frontier regions in Bohemia and Moravia, where a German-speaking population predominates, be authorized to express their wishes as to their future allegiance.

In these circumstances, it is necessary, if we are to discard the historic frontier, for us to be able to justify our decisions.



The draft treaty diverges from the historic frontier at two points; in the neighborhood of Feldsberg, and in the neighborhood of Gmünd. The effect of that is to assign to Czechoslovakia an almost entirely German region which has always been part of the Duchy of Austria. The Commission justifies its decisions in this respect by declaring that these modifications are rendered necessary because of communications. Now it seems that before taking this decision, neither the Czechoslovak Commission nor the Central Territorial Committee consulted the Committee on Ports, Waterways, and Railways. In these circumstances, the British representative consulted the senior British delegate on the Commission on Ports, Waterways, and Railways and asked him whether in his opinion the reason of communications alone justified this modification of frontiers. He received the reply that, for the case of Gmünd, "the arguments drawn from communications would justify the leaving of this territory to Austria."

As to the district of Feldsberg, the railway which cut the former frontier is today of rather small importance. There is a small branch which was cut by the former frontier and it would be rather inconvenient to keep to this former frontier at this point. Now, it seems possible to correct it in such way as to bring the Feldsberg line into Czechoslovakia while making only an insignificant change. And as it is possible for the Czechoslovaks to develop the Feldsberg line in such way as to make it an important lateral line joining the main double line and that from Znaim with the important line from Brünn to Presburg, my opinion is to consent to the change mentioned above unless there are important objections of a political order.

Under these conditions, the British representative cannot admit any change in the frontiers fixed for the Gmünd district based on the communications system and suggests that, as no real justification of this proposed transfer of a purely German territory to Czechoslovakia is to be foreseen, the best method consists in changing the treaty in order to leave this territory to Austria.

*Recommended by the American and British delegations.*

*Rejected by the French, Italian, and Japanese delegations.*

#### B. STYRIA (MARBURG)

*The American, British, Italian, and Japanese delegations* take the liberty of suggesting to the Supreme Council that the decisions taken on the subject of the frontiers of Austria in Styria be re-examined, in view of the observations presented by the Austrian delegation. They consider that satisfaction would be given to the Austrian requests if the zone of plebiscite were extended in such a way as to include the district of Marburg and Radkersburg.

The reasons for this modification are the following: In comparing the Austrian notes and the reply which it is proposed to make to them, it appears that there may be justification for fearing that in the eyes of impartial observers the reasons given for the rejection of Austrian proposals seem to be ill-founded. The Austrians request a plebiscite in the Marburg region. The Allies explain the refusal which they make by declaring that they are convinced that the transfer of this territory to Yugoslavia responds both to the sentiments and the interests of the majority of the population. Now it is certain that this transfer will not respond to the sentiments of an important minority of the population, and it may be doubted whether in their eyes it responds to the interests of the majority. As the advisability of the decision taken has been placed in doubt, it seems that this may be a point on which the interested parties should be consulted, that is, the population of the region. In certain cases of this kind it seems little desirable to proceed to a plebiscite because of the difficulties, expenses, and delay which result therefrom. But in the present case these reasons scarcely exist since, in reality, it is only necessary to extend the Klagenfurt zone submitted to a plebiscite in such way as to include Marburg. No difficulty would thus be caused.

*Rejected by the French delegation.*

#### C. CARINTHIA (KLAGENFURT)

*The British and Italian delegations* take the liberty of suggesting to the Supreme Council that the decisions taken for Carinthia should be re-examined.

For Klagenfurt, the Austrians declare that the rather singular provisions providing for its division into two zones will falsify the result. If a plebiscite is to be taken, it is important that there be no doubt as to the good faith which should govern it. The reasons given for not taking a joint plebiscite obviously cannot be supported because if they were serious they would also have existed for regions in which, under the terms of the treaty of peace with Germany, it was decided to hold a joint plebiscite. It is thus suggested that the request of the Austrians might very well be accepted, that is, that the zone of plebiscite be either divided into four districts or that the plebiscite take place jointly. If one or the other of these two systems is accepted, there can be no excuse for refusal to accept the results.

*Rejected by the American, French, and Japanese delegations.*

#### PART III.—POLITICAL CLAUSES

The Commission on Political Clauses was summoned to discuss with the representatives of the Allied states to which territories of

the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy have been transferred a draft convention which the said Allies would sign. In this draft convention there is an article containing stipulations based on articles 187 to 189 of the draft treaty of peace with Austria.

In the course of this discussion, the Commission was led to insert in the draft convention between the Allied states concerned a stipulation to the effect that these states should communicate among themselves official documents of interest to the administrations of the transferred territories, documents which, while forming part of the archives of one of the transferred territories, would also be of interest to another of these territories. It seemed to the Commission that it would be advantageous both for Austria and the Allied states concerned for a similar provision to be inserted in the treaty with Austria, if possible as an addition to article 189.

Accordingly, the Commission on Political Clauses suggests to the committee charged with coordinating the reply to the Austrian delegation the insertion of the following additional paragraph in the treaty at the appropriate place. This paragraph would be communicated to the Austrian delegation as an addition conceived both in the interest of the Allied states in question and that of Austria:

Subject to reciprocity, Austria will communicate to the Allied and Associated Governments concerning all the archives, registers, plans, property titles, and documents of any kind whatever having relation to questions of a civil, financial, or judicial character in these territories which would be of interest to a public body in one of the territories transferred by the present treaty.

*The Drafting Committee is considering this matter.*

#### PART IV.—AUSTRIAN INTERESTS OUTSIDE EUROPE

Diplomatic and consular buildings in Morocco and in Egypt should not be transferred. The whole question of the ownership of diplomatic and consular buildings belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy should be the subject of a special convention between the states concerned and a clause to this effect should be inserted in the treaty.

*Recommended by the American and British delegations.*

#### PART V.—AIR CLAUSES

##### SECTION III

Article 143 states:

During the six months following the coming into force of the present treaty the manufacture, importation, and exportation of aircraft, parts of aircraft, engines for aircraft, and parts of engines for aircraft shall be forbidden in all Austrian territory.



The Austrian delegation points out, with regard to this clause, that to prohibit the employment of labor in Austria for aircraft construction would have the effect of putting a great many men out of employment, which would increase the social disorganization from which the country suffers.

The draft reply refuses to take this argument into account. First, it is alleged that the workers will have no difficulty in finding other work, in support of which the example of France and England is quoted; secondly, it is asserted that there would be danger of a military kind in allowing Austria to continue to manufacture aeronautic material because it might serve to supply Germany.

Neither of these reasons seems valid. As to the first, the analogy with France and England is likely to lead to error; other special reasons in Austria will render the search for employment very difficult for large industrial populations.

As to the reasons of a military order, it must first of all be pointed out that the clause in question will be applicable only for six months, and if a danger is ever to be feared from the side of Germany, it is quite improbable that it will arise during this period. If such danger should ever arise, it would be later, but then the article in question will have become inoperative. Furthermore, from the point of view of unemployment, it must be pointed out that the article would begin to operate at the beginning of winter, a period in which social disorganization has every chance of reaching its culminating point.

If the clause is maintained, it thus seems necessary to find a better justification for it. From the political point of view, the wording of all these paragraphs seems quite unwise. It must also be pointed out that by virtue of the treaty with Germany (article 201), the importation of aeronautic material is forbidden for the six months during which the clause in question is in effect. It would seem that this should be a sufficient guard against the danger feared that Austria will furnish Germany with this material.

*Recommended by the British and Japanese delegations.*

*Rejected by the American, French, and Italian delegations.*

## PART VII.—RESPONSIBILITIES AND PENALTIES

The proposed reply of the Commission on Responsibilities can be divided into two parts. The first deals with the general question of Austria's moral responsibility in the war and of Austria's relations with the new nationalities. The British and Japanese delegations propose to deal with this question in the covering letter; it does not seem to them opportune to bring up this general question again here, in dealing with it as a simple question of coordination. It is thus proposed that this part of the reply be set aside.

The rest of the reply concerns a question raised by the Austrians in their note No. 914 of August 6.

As Czechoslovakia and Poland are not belligerents, it should be recognized that they have not acquired the right of exacting the surrender of persons accused of violation of the rules of international law in order that they might be charged and, as to Italy, Roumania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene state, this right should be limited to the portions of their present territory and those of their nationals who belonged to the states in question before the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The draft reply refuses to recognize the strong basis of this point and founds its refusal on "the recognition of insurgents as belligerents."

This argument does not seem to correspond with the facts. In Czechoslovakia, for example, there were no insurgents, properly speaking, and it will be difficult to prove that there were insurgents in Poland who were or might have been recognized as belligerents, except the Legionnaires under the orders of General Pilsudski, who fought in the Austrian ranks.

The thesis sustained by the Austrians is just and it should be explained that as the clauses concern only infractions of the laws and customs of war, they obviously do not contemplate acts committed before the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy against nationals of that Monarchy or destruction done on its territory.

Our reply which might be presented to the Austrians, assuming that this point receives the approval of the Supreme Council, has been drawn up and is attached hereto.

*Recommended by the British and Japanese delegations.*

*Rejected by the American, French, and Italian delegations.*

#### DRAFT REPLY TO THE AUSTRIAN NOTE

##### *Sanctions*

The Allied and Associated Powers have examined with great care the arguments contained in the Austrian note of July 12 [10?] stating that articles 169 and 172 concerning sanctions are, in the present form, inapplicable in the conditions which obtained in the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, for the reason that the laws of war are applicable only between belligerents and that the acts against which former Austrian nationals might complain on the part of officers of the Austro-Hungarian forces cannot, accordingly, constitute violations of the laws of war.

The Allied and Associated Powers do not wish here to take up acts committed by a member of the Austro-Hungarian forces against

persons who at that time were likewise part of such forces, or against others who were subjects of the Empire of Austria or of the Kingdom of Hungary, and they agree that the laws and customs of war as set forth in the Convention on the Laws of War on Land (No. 4 of the convention signed at The Hague in 1907)<sup>32</sup> and the rules laid down in that Convention do not apply to these cases.

It is only in the cases in which the laws and customs of war are applicable that the Allied and Associated Powers desire to open proceedings against individuals forming part of the forces of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; and it is to offenses of this kind that the proceedings instituted by them are limited. The individuals who will be surrendered shall be charged under conditions which will offer every guarantee for a just trial. Article 170 specially provides that in every case the accused will be authorized to appoint his own attorney. The situation is, thus, that if any individual finds that he is accused of a crime which does not constitute a violation of the laws of war, because it is an act to which the laws of war are not applicable, he will obviously be subject to acquittal.

The rights guaranteed to the individuals in question are so well defined in this regard that it is but little likely that a request will be made to surrender a specific individual forming part of the former Austro-Hungarian forces for acts to which the laws of war are not applicable. For these reasons, the Allied and Associated Powers do not consider that it is necessary to make a change in these articles. The argument set forth in the same note stating that the domestic laws of the Republic of Austria prevent the surrender of Austrian nationals to be tried by a foreign court is an argument which the Allied and Associated Governments can in no way admit and it is with some surprise that they have noted that it has been used. This is absolutely contrary to the principle which they considered essential, after a thorough study, to impose in all treaties of peace, that is, that the individuals guilty of the atrocities committed in this last war should be tried so as in the future to prevent a renewal of such conduct.

*Recommended by the British and Japanese delegations.*

*Rejected by the American, French, and Italian delegations.*

#### PART VIII.—REPARATIONS

Paragraph 2 of annex IV gives to the Allied and Associated Governments the right to draw up, with the Reparation Commission, lists indicating the material and articles which were seized, consumed, or destroyed by Austria, this being done with a view to their replacement. If, generally speaking, it pertains to the Reparation Commission to determine the periods and the amount of these reparations, there is nevertheless an exception relative to livestock, a part of which must

<sup>32</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204.



be delivered immediately to the Italian, the Serb-Croat-Slovene, and the Roumanian Governments. The Austrian delegation has raised serious objections against this condition. It alleges that it seems scarcely fair to compel Austria to give up valuable foodstuffs at the very time when the Allies themselves consider it necessary to import such articles into Vienna.

The delegations named below beg to suggest that a more thorough study might, in view of the food situation in Austria, consider it desirable to leave it to the Reparation Commission to pass on the question of the delivery of livestock.

In making this recommendation, they were moved by the following reasons:

1. Although it is undeniable that during the war a considerable quantity of livestock was taken from Italy, from Serbia, and from Roumania, it must not be overlooked that the great cessions of Austro-Hungarian territory made to these states will doubtless signify for them the acquisition of large quantities of livestock which have belonged to Austro-Hungary. In this respect, the case is very different from that of Germany, whose territory remains almost intact.

2. In a question of this kind, we cannot allow ourselves to neglect world public opinion now and in the future. Everyone, outside this Conference, will say that at the very moment when the people of Vienna are famishing, at the time when it is necessary to import food and in particular milk, to save the lives of small children, we are compelling Austria to deliver to us a part of its livestock on which its existence depends. Nevertheless, it seems doubtful even to assume—what has not been clearly shown—that a justification of this measure can be found in a comparison between the food situation in Austria and that in the other countries concerned so that the material advantage which it would mean for these states would counterbalance the political and economic disadvantages which would certainly result from maintaining this demand.

It is most unfortunate that certain and conclusive information or accurate statistics cannot be found as a basis for this demand, lacking which the draft reply of the Reparations Commission is not conclusive.

It is not a valid argument to say, as has been said, that there are remote villages in the distant confines of the Republic of Austria, for example in Vorarlberg or Salzkammergut, from which milk cannot be sent to Vienna. The milk produced by the cattle can be transformed into foodstuffs under the form of butter and cheese. Generally speaking, any surrender of the means of food production must tend to impoverish a state as a whole. Furthermore, it seems that the principal regions producing foodstuffs in Austria are among those closest to Vienna, particularly Upper and Lower Austria, Styria, and Carinthia, since the more remote mountainous districts are not able to produce what is necessary for their own population.

*Recommended by the British and Japanese delegations.*

*Rejected by the Italian and French delegations.*

*The American delegation reserves its opinion.*

Supplementing the reasons given by the American delegation in the chapter on ports, waterways, and railways, this delegation draws attention to the interpretative character of the following proposal in the draft reply prepared by the Reparation Commission.

The draft reply contains the following passage on page 3, fourth paragraph:

The intention of the Allied and Associated Governments is not, by this provision, to bring the price of these articles on the domestic market to the level of the international market price; they merely desire that the option be granted them to purchase the articles at the prices of the domestic market, and that any benefit resulting from this privilege be considered, as is said at the beginning of the annex, as a partial reparation for the damages caused the Allied and Associated Governments during the war.

The first paragraph of annex V of article 186 reads:

Austria gives each of the Allied and Associated Governments, as partial reparation, an option on the annual delivery, et cetera . . .

It does not appear that the words *partial reparation* have in this text the sense attributed to them in the draft reply.

It is thus suggested that this last clause be eliminated.

*Recommended by the American delegation.*

*The other delegations reserve their opinions except the Japanese delegation, which rejects this elimination.*

There would thus be reason to omit from the reply the phrase "and that any benefit . . . et cetera . . ."

*Recommended by the American delegation.*

*The other delegations reserve their opinion, except the Japanese delegation, which is opposed thereto.*

## PART IX.—FINANCIAL CLAUSES

### AMERICAN PROPOSAL

#### Pre-War Debts—Article 199—Section 2

The draft reply proposed by the Commission is worded as follows:

"It clearly appears from this article that the Reparation Commission will have the duty of selecting the pre-war revenues which will be most suitable for the establishment of a basis of equitable distribution of the debt, while taking into account the changes in present circumstances.

"The Allied and Associated Governments see no reason to abandon the principle that the Republic of Austria will alone be responsible, et cetera . . ."

As these paragraphs are a paraphrase of article 199 of the treaty, and as they appear to be the interpretation of it, it is proposed that

they follow the text of article 199 more closely so as not to seem to be an interpretation of it.

It is thus suggested that these sentences be worded as follows:

"It clearly appears from this article that the Reparation Commission will have to choose the pre-war revenues which in its opinion will be most suitable to give the just measure of the respective financial capacities of these territories.

"The Allied and Associated Governments see no reason to abandon the position which they have taken, that is . . ."

*This proposal is supported by the American, British, and Japanese delegations.*

*The Italian delegation on the contrary makes a formal reservation.*

#### PART X.—ECONOMIC CLAUSES

I. With respect to customs, there should be a reciprocity between Austria and the other successor states similar to that granted with respect to communication.

*British proposal supported by the American and Japanese delegations.*

*Rejected by the French delegation.*

*Reservation made by the Italian delegation.*

II. A great number of the objections raised by the Austrian delegation against the treaty deal with the fact that the nationals of the new states, such as Czechoslovakia, born of the Austrian Empire, and those of the former Austro-Hungarian territories transferred to existing states, receive in fact certain advantages which are granted to nations which were previously enemies of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It is proposed to consider this view as just. We must distinguish carefully between two things:

1. The termination of the state of war;
2. The liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Austrian Empire.

Even if those who were previously fellow-nationals of the inhabitants of the new Austria have in reality become enemies of Austria insofar as they have been recognized as members of the Alliance, it does not follow that they must obtain under all respects the privileges of the treatment reserved, for instance, to France and England.

It is extremely difficult accurately to determine at this time what the sense and the effects of the treaty are. First of all, a considerable number of modifications have been suggested by the Economic Commission itself and secondly, the Commission on Political Clauses is actively concerned with the consideration of these special problems.

In order to avoid a lengthy memorandum dealing with the great many separate clauses, it may suffice in these circumstances for the Supreme Council to give instructions with the following ends: Not



to include in the treaty any clauses the result of which will be to impose disadvantages on Austrian nationals in the settlement of private debts, contracts, et cetera, existing between them and other former Austro-Hungarian subjects.

To clarify the position adopted, the following proposals are presented:

1. It should be clearly explained that the provisions of sections III, IV, V, VI, and VII, which deal with the relations between enemies, do not apply to the relations between Austrian nationals and persons who were previously nationals of either Austria or Hungary. It seems that this is, indeed, what it is wished to say, but it is in no way thus stated in the treaty and, accordingly, difficulties of interpretation might arise.

2. As a result of the foregoing, it must be clearly defined that in section VIII of the Economic Clauses, only relations between Austrian citizens and former nationals of Austria and Hungary are involved.

Section VIII will thus be revised with care, so as to establish equality between the various factions and not to impose unilateral obligations on Austria.

The Commission on Political Clauses is busy discussing these questions with the other Allied states. It is proposed to declare that the only equitable system is that according to which all agreements made between the Allied and successor states will apply also to Austria. Accordingly, the Austrians should be assured of the advantages of any one of these agreements now under preparation, whether such result be obtained by modifying the Austrian treaty so as to bring it into harmony with the other treaty, or by authorizing Austria to become itself a party to the other treaty. In addition to this, the Commission on Political Clauses is preparing a series of special conventions dealing with subjects which cannot be completed before the Austrian treaty is signed. It is absolutely essential to specify and to determine that Austria must be authorized to be a party in the negotiations which will be undertaken for these separate conventions, under the same conditions as the other successor states.

*British proposal.*

*The other delegations reserve their opinion.*

## PART XII.—PORTS, WATERWAYS, AND RAILWAYS

I. The restriction imposed on Austria by the second paragraph of article 287, which forbids it to share in the regular service on the Danube between the ports of any one of the Allied and Associated Powers without the express authorization of such Power, is very hard if it is considered in the spirit of article 294.

The object of this stipulation is to permit the other states to reserve to themselves a certain part of the traffic on the Danube; they seem

to fear that they cannot secure it, for in reality all the vessels employed in this traffic belong to Viennese companies. On the other hand, if Austria is forced to transfer a certain part of these vessels, it seems quite unnecessary in addition to impose on it the restriction in question.

*Recommended by the British delegation.*

*Rejected by the other delegations.*

II. Article 310 seems to require revision. First of all, it is not correct to speak of the "cession" of ports, waterways, and railways. The present wording seems to imply that railways, ports, and navigable waters belong to Austria and are ceded to the other states. A more correct view seems to be that the railways, et cetera, belong to the territory on which they are located; the territory is not ceded by Austria, but is assigned to these states in the same way that Austrian territory is assigned to Austria.

The article in its present form seems to imply that Austria contracts an obligation to restore the railroads, for instance at Prague, to the Czechoslovak state in their entirety and in good condition. But from the time when the present state of Austria came into being, Austria has never at any time had any power or any authority over these railways, and this obligation cannot be imposed on it. Similarly, paragraph 2 does not seem to have any meaning. A system of railways possessing its own rolling-stock cannot, in fact, be restored by Austria, because any system of railways of this kind must be a system located entirely outside of Austria. The objection made to this paragraph by Austria thus seems just.

*Recommended by the British, Japanese, and Italian delegations.*

*Rejected by the American and French delegations.*

Paragraph 3 should be revised so as to give it a form of reciprocity for it is not impossible that the commissions may have to request the other territories to restore rolling-stock to Austria just as they will have to request Austria to restore rolling-stock to these other territories.

*Recommended by the American, British, and Japanese delegations.*

#### AMERICAN PROPOSAL

The American delegation presents the following observations:

It has been remarked that, in several cases, the draft replies to Austrian notes prepared by the various Commissions contain phrases or passages which paraphrase the text of the treaty and thus accredit certain interpretations of the text without suggesting any modification in the wording. This raises the question of the scope of the reply now in preparation for transmission to the Austrian delegation. Is this reply to be considered as a modification of the terms of the conditions of peace, or as an interpretation, in addition to the changes

actually proposed in the text of the treaty? The American delegation merely wishes to point out that this is an important point for the United States for the reason that if the reply must be regarded as officially modifying the text of the treaty, it becomes an integral part of the convention with Austria and must be presented to the American Senate at the same time as the treaty. It is important that the representatives of the other states at the Conference understand the American position with respect to the reply to the Austrian delegation.

It is to be pointed out that the reasons which influenced the conditions in which the reply to the notes of the German delegation concerning the treaty with Germany was drawn up, no longer exist at the present time. At that time, for political reasons, it was desirable not to make any changes in the text of the treaty, and all the changes which were made were subsequently included in a protocol attached to the treaty. In the present case, a small state whose position is very different from that of Germany is concerned. It would seem, accordingly, that the text of the treaty might be modified where the sense thereof is modified or interpreted in the draft replies of the Commission. If this manner of procedure is adopted, the text of the treaty will be the only document to which the signatories must refer for the interpretation of its contents. A paragraph may be added to the covering letter indicating that this letter and its annexes must not be considered as an official interpretation of the text of the treaty, or as modifying the terms thereof in any way whatsoever.

For the reasons indicated above, the American delegation insists on the following passages relative to the interpretation of the treaty:

On page 6, the present text reads thus:

"Such transportation shall be subject to the rules laid down in articles 283 and 284 whether effected or not with transshipment at an Austrian or foreign river port; and this is the only case contemplated by the Allied and Associated Powers."

It seems that this wording constitutes an interpretation of the treaty and, in order to prevent the American reply from becoming an official interpretation, it is proposed to modify this clause by omitting the words "and this is the only case contemplated by the Allied and Associated Powers."

The present text of the report, page 9, is worded as follows:

"Austria will thus receive over this navigable waterway all the guarantees of free circulation which will seem necessary in connection with its economic access to the Baltic and North Seas."

This clause constitutes for Austria an assurance of guarantees of free circulation over the proposed canal from the Danube to the Oder. It is doubtful that this express assurance will be given by the treaty and it is suggested that it might without disadvantage be eliminated.

*Recommended by the American delegation.*



Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, August 26, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. F. L. Polk.	Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour	M. Pichon.
<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretaries</i>	<i>Secretary</i>
Mr. L. Harrison.	Mr. H. Norman	M. Berthelot.
	Sir G. Clerk	
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Tittoni.	M. Matsui.
	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>
	M. Paterno.	M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA . . .	Captain Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Lieut. Com. Bell.
FRANCE . . . . .	Captain Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lt.-Colonel A. Jones.

*Interpreter*—M. Meyer

The following also attended for the items in which they were concerned:—

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	FRANCE
Mr. Woolsey	M. Loucheur
Mr. J. F. Dulles.	M. Tardieu
Mr. L. Nielsen.	M. Jules Cambon
	M. Clementel
	M. Sergeant
	M. Hermitte
	M. Massigli.
	ITALY
BRITISH EMPIRE	Count Vannutelli-Rey.
Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley	M. Russo
Colonel Peel	M. Brofferio
Mr. Nicolson	M. di Palma
	Col. Castoldi.

1. M. PICHON circulated a telegram from General Dupont (see Appendix "A").

Upper Silesia  
MR. BALFOUR said that he did not understand the delay referred to in the telegram. It stated that General Dupont could not act in the absence of precise instructions. In stating that he could have taken action had instructions

been given to him earlier and with more precision, he was criticising the procedure of the Council in a manner which did not appear justifiable.

MR. POLK said that as the instructions<sup>1</sup> given to the three Generals delegated by the Inter-Allied Commission at Berlin had been drawn up after M. Loucheur and Mr. Hoover had been heard by the Council, he proposed that this new telegram should be referred to them for comment.

M. TITTONI asked whether the Coal Committee had started.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that the Coal Committee had started last night, and that the French representative, at present in Warsaw, would meet them at Ostrau. This fact, however, did not alter the question at issue. The German Delegation had agreed that the Committee of three Generals should be sent. It had also stated that the German Government would not ask for Allied troops, for the occupation of Upper Silesia, for reasons connected with their internal politics. As the news before the Council was at present contradictory and confused, he thought that the previous decision should be maintained, which was, that the Generals should proceed to Silesia and join Colonel Goodyear; after this had been done, they were to forward a report. The Coal Committee, on the other hand, could only deal with the technical problems, connected with the distribution and production of coal: the Silesian problem did not come within its functions. He would consult with Mr. Hoover on the subject of the telegram before the Council.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether General Dupont opposed the Allied policy.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he did not, and re-read the telegram in confirmation of his statement. Von Lersner had said that the German Government agreed to the despatch of the Generals. This was a statement of fact, whereas General Dupont's telegram was only a statement of personal opinion. The German representatives at Versailles might be made to confirm Von Lersner's previous statement.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood that General Dupont was opposed to the measures proposed by the Council.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that General Dupont did not oppose the Council's decision, but only stated that it would cause more excitement than tranquillity.

MR. BALFOUR said that such a statement implied a very severe criticism of the Council's policy.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that a decision had been arrived at to the effect that Generals should be sent, and this decision had been communicated to the Polish Government with a request to make it publicly

<sup>1</sup> Appendix C to HD-36, p. 795.

known. If this decision were reversed, the Government at Warsaw must be immediately informed. Colonel Goodyear had varied his opinion. It appeared to be eminently necessary, that the Council should obtain clear and reliable information upon the situation, which was, at present, confused.

M. TITTONI remarked that in his opinion there were two points calling for the Council's attention. First, the actual intentions of the German Government should be ascertained. Secondly, as General Dupont stated that the presence of the Generals would cause excitement, this point should also be considered.

(It was agreed that the previous decision of the Council, with regard to the despatch of the Allied Generals to Silesia should be up-held, and that M. Loucheur and Mr. Hoover should consult together upon the latest telegram from General Dupont (see Appendix "A") and report on any measures that it called for.)

2. MR. POLK said that he wished to call attention to the Resolution of the previous day (See H. D. 38, Minute 1<sup>2</sup>) with regard to the report of the Commission of Enquiry on the incidents at Fiume. He wished to know whether the report in question had been adopted in principle or in detail. He had understood that only the principles of the report had been accepted by the Council, and that the Council had not agreed, or committed itself, to carry out the details of execution recommended by the Commission, such as the sending of American troops to Fiume. He was unable to agree to the sending of these troops at once, without consulting his Military Advisers, and therefore limited his action in the matter to accepting the report in principle.

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed with Mr. Polk. The report raised two questions. The first dealt with the despatch of troops. According to the Resolution, responsibility for this rested entirely with the French and with the Italians, to the exclusion of Great Britain and the United States. The second question was raised by the wording of Resolution No. 11 in the report, which concerned the general economic policy of the Allies. The sentiments expressed in this Resolution were admirable, since everybody wished to assist the Italians. He thought, however, that they were misplaced in a report of this kind.

M. TITTONI said that before the report had been discussed in the Council, he had had a private exchange of views with M. Clemenceau, and they had agreed to accept, and to take action, on the conclusions of the report affecting their countries. With regard to Resolution 11 of the report, he understood that it had been inserted by the American delegate on the Commission of Enquiry. He took the opportunity of thanking him for the sentiments expressed.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 836.



M. PICHON in support of Mr. Tittoni's remarks, read the resolution of the previous meeting. He noticed, however, that the report of the Commission of Enquiry on incidents at Fiume had involved the despatch of Allied troops, and he had been of the opinion that everybody present had assented.

MR. BALFOUR said that the previous resolution of the Council had been examined by his experts, and that by its wording excluded the despatch of British troops. His objection, therefore, was that, whilst executive action was called for in Fiume, Great Britain and the United States appeared to be excluded from participation in it.

M. PICHON said that he could not regard Great Britain and the United States as being excluded from participation in the executive measures at Fiume. He failed to see how the previous resolution could be interpreted as a separate agreement between France and Italy, since both these countries had merely accepted a report drawn up by the four Inter-Allied Generals.

MR. POLK said that he differed from Mr. Balfour's conclusions. France and Italy had special obligations between themselves in the matter; by recognizing them, they did not disregard the obligations of other Powers, such as Great Britain and the United States.

M. TITTONI agreed with Mr. Polk.

MR. POLK said that the resolution did not imply the existence of a special agreement between France and Italy. Though assenting in principle, he could not accept the details of the report without further consultation with his Government.

MR. BALFOUR said that it would be sufficient to alter the resolution to read:

"It was agreed to accept in principle, the conclusions of the Commission's report.

The French and Italian Governments undertook to give effect to these recommendations, in so far as they were specially concerned."

His second point had been that it was not proper for a Commission of this description to include, in its resolutions, a general recommendation with regard to economic assistance for Italy. The incidents at Fiume were quite independent of such considerations, and the Generals ought not to have raised the question, however natural their desire to assist Italy might be. As long as his protests on the subject were recorded, he would be satisfied.

M. TITTONI remarked that the resolution to which Mr. Balfour had objected had not been brought forward by the Italian representative on the Commission.

MR. POLK said that he accepted the report in principle as a recommendation to be made to the United States' Government.

(It was agreed that the Resolution to Minute 1 of H. D. 38 should be amended so as to read:—

“It was agreed to accept, in principle, the conclusions of the Commission’s Report. The French and Italian Governments undertook to give effect to these recommendations in so far as they were specially concerned.”)

3. At the request of Mr. Polk, CAPTAIN PORTIER, on behalf of the Joint Secretariat, read out Resolutions passed at the previous meeting of the Council (see H. D. 38, Minute 6<sup>3</sup>).

Reply to the Austrian Delegation on the Peace Treaty. (a) Frontiers

The resolution with regard to Gmünd was confirmed.

The Resolution with regard to Marburg and Radkersburg was amended so that Radkersburg should

be deleted.

The Resolution with regard to Carinthia was accepted and confirmed.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that it was important that all answers to the Austrian note should go back to the Editing Committee for final revision and coordination. With regard to

(b) Nationality Questions

nationalities, the question was extremely complicated.

The Drafting Committee had completely revised the Nationality Clauses in the Peace Treaty. The new draft of the Treaty, as amended by them, had not yet been submitted to the Council, but, by virtue of the fact, that, on the previous day, the Council had accepted the principles laid down by the Committee on Political Clauses, the Editing Committee were committed *ipso facto* to the existing draft of the Nationality clauses, as drawn up by the Drafting Committee. The Editing Committee were, however, compelled to introduce a few minor amendments into the replies to the Austrian notes.

M. TIRONI remarked that the Editing Committee should only be free to introduce modifications of form, and not of substance, into the replies to the Austrian note.

(It was agreed that the Resolution taken on the previous day with regard to the Nationality Clauses in the Austrian Treaty, should be accepted, but that the words “subject to such modifications of form as the Editing Committee might introduce, in order to bring them into agreement with the clauses drawn up by the Drafting Committee” should be added.)

The resolution passed on the previous day was accepted and confirmed.

M. LOUCHEUR said that Part IV of the Austrian Treaty had been accepted on the previous day, but that he feared there had been a

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 840.

(c) Austrian Interests Outside Europe

misunderstanding on the point. The Italian Delegation had thought that it applied only to Austrian property in Morocco and Egypt. He thought, however, that it applied to all Austrian property wherever situated.

M. CAMBON said that the title showed that the Austrian Peace Treaty referred only to Austrian property outside of Europe.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that he had withdrawn his reservation quoted in Appendix "F" to H. D. 38.<sup>4</sup> He had, at the same time, pointed out to the Editing Committee that no provision existed in the Treaty, with regard to the Diplomatic buildings in Europe belonging to the Austrian Empire. He did not know what would happen to all these embassies after the final dismemberment of Austro-Hungary, and feared they might be the cause of a great deal of most improper wrangling. Giving an example, he asked whether the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Paris belonged to the present Austrian State. He thought that diplomatic buildings should be held as sacred, and hoped that no exception would be made in the present Treaty to this generally accepted rule. For this reason he had desired that a special Convention should be drawn up between Austria and the new States formed out of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, to settle the point with order and decency.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he could not accept Mr. Headlam-Morley's statement, since there was a most formal stipulation in the Peace Treaty with Austria with regard to the disposal of public buildings belonging to the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. He gave as an example the Palazzo Venezia at Rome, for which special provision had been made, showing clearly that the sacred character attributed to diplomatic buildings by Mr. Headlam-Morley had not been acknowledged. It was the intention of the French Government, to sell the diplomatic buildings of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire situated in French territory.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that he wished to protest most emphatically against the example of the Palazzo Venezia being quoted in this connection. The building in question had been decided to be a Venetian Palace. It had never been thought that, by making special provision with regard to it, the clause which did so would alter the accepted character of diplomatic buildings.

M. PICHON said that the title to Part IV of the Peace Treaty "outside Europe" made it unnecessary to proceed with the consideration of Mr. Headlam-Morley's reservation, and added that he wished to limit the discussion to a consideration of Part IV of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and to exclude such general questions as Mr. Headlam-Morley wished to raise.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 859, 923.



MR. BALFOUR asked why Austrian property outside and inside Europe was to be treated in different ways. He did not know why the similar clauses in the Peace Treaty with Germany could not be followed.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the analogy of the German Peace Treaty was irrelevant. The old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had been dismembered into separate states, each one of which might ask for the embassies of the old Kingdom. Mr. Headlam-Morley had asked that the States affected should make a Convention between themselves. The question then arose, who actually were the States affected. Some of the diplomatic buildings might be regarded as belonging to the Throne of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. As such they could be liquidated, and the proceeds given to the Reparations Commission. He admitted, however, that special Conventions were necessary, but he did not see what would happen if the States concerned could not agree. As a particular example of the difficulties that might be raised, the old Austro-Hungarian Embassy at Constantinople was no longer suitable to the needs, either of Austria or of Hungary or of Czecho-Slovakia. It was evident that, in such a case as this, the Embassy in question ought to be sold and the proceeds placed at the disposal of the Reparations Commission. The old Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Paris belonged to the late Monarch, and the Treaty provided for the sale of property of this class. The Austro-Hungarian diplomatic property in Japan had already been sold. It would possibly be better to leave the States concerned to effect the sale of diplomatic buildings, and, if discord arose to allow the Reparations Commission to adjudicate.

MR. BALFOUR said that he could not offer any opinion. But he failed to understand why Austrian property inside and outside Europe was dealt with under two separate sections. He did not see any distinction, either in law or in fact, between these two classes of property.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he agreed with Mr. Balfour and would ask M. Gout<sup>5</sup> for information on the point. He proposed that the Clauses in Section IV, dealing with Austro-Hungarian property in Morocco and Egypt, should be left untouched. With regard to the diplomatic properties of the old Empire in Europe, by the fact of the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, they fell under the disposal of the Reparations Commission, which would sell them at the best prices obtainable.

(It was decided that the reply to the Austrian Delegation with regard to Part IV of the Peace Treaty (Austrian property outside Europe) should be accepted.)

---

<sup>5</sup> Jean Gout, French representative, Sub-Commission on Political Clauses Relating to Countries Outside of Europe (For the Study of the Observations of the Austrian Delegation on the Conditions of Peace).

(d) Military,  
Naval and Air  
Clauses

M. CAMBON said that he had received a comment from the American Delegation with regard to Article 154 in the Peace Treaty with Austria, on the subject of the enrollment of Austrians in foreign armies. (Appendix "B".)

MR. POLK said that he did not see how the restrictions imposed upon Austria by virtue of Article 154 could possibly be effected, since the Austrian Government had no power to carry them out. He was willing, however, to withdraw the American proposal, but wished to call the attention of the Council to the fact that restrictions of this kind could not, as a rule, be enforced.

M. TITTONI said that, by an elementary principle of jurisprudence, men lost their nationality by enlisting in the armies of a foreign State. Obviously, therefore, the Austrian Government would have no legislative power over Austrian citizens who enrolled themselves in foreign armies. How, therefore, could Article 154 be put into effect?

M. PICHON said that the Article had been drawn up on the basis of a similar provision in the German Peace Treaty.

(After some further discussion, the American proposal was withdrawn. The resolution passed on the previous day with regard to the Military, Naval and Air Clauses in the Peace Treaty with Austria was accepted and upheld.)

(e) Prisoners of War  
(f) Penalties  
(g) Reparations

(The resolutions passed at the meeting on the previous day with regard to Prisoners of War, Penalties and Reparations were accepted and upheld.)

(h) Financial  
Clauses

The Resolution passed at the meeting on the previous day on the subject of Financial Clauses was accepted and upheld.

M. PICHON said that the Council was called upon to consider the draft reply to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of Part X (Economic Clauses) of the Peace Treaty with Austria.

(i) Economic  
Clauses: Part X

(See Appendix "F", H. D. 38.<sup>a</sup>)

M. CLEMENTEL said that Austria had been compelled by the Peace Treaty to extend all customs privileges, granted to the neighbouring States to the Allies. The Austrian Government had protested against this, and had said that they would be in the position of the Palace at Versailles deprived of its domains. They had asked to be able to grant special preferential treatment, in which the other Allies would not be included, to Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary. The Economic Commission had discussed this proposal, and had thought at first, that the special preferential treatment in question ought to be extended, not only to Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, but to all new States formed out of the old Monarchy. M. Crespi, had

<sup>a</sup> *Ante*, pp. 859, 890.

in his turn, protested against this, and had said that such a provision would compel his own country to lay down special inner customs barriers. It had then been proposed to the Commission that the preferential treatment should be extended to all States which had acquired territory from any part of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This proposal would have included in a sort of "zollverein" countries extending from Poland to Italy, and would have established a customs union from Danzig to Sicily. It had occasioned a further protest from Czecho-Slovakia, the Delegates of which country had stated that they could not possibly compete on terms of equality with such a State as Italy, which, by the last proposal, would be included in the Customs Union. After some further discussion the Commission had agreed that the preferential rights should be limited to Austria, to Hungary, and to Czecho-Slovakia; but this proposal affected the Roumanians and the Jugo-Slavs adversely. After very lengthy discussions inside the Commission, with all the States concerned, the last proposal that he had detailed, had been accepted. If it were reversed, it would be necessary for the Economic Commission to take note of the new decision, and to discuss its consequences, which might be very onerous to the new States. The British counter-proposals seemed to him quite inexplicable in view of the fact that Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith<sup>7</sup> had agreed with him, and had helped him to draft the final proposals. Large differences between the Peace Treaty with Austria and that with Germany had been introduced. In the first place, the Customs Union between Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, had been accepted, the result of which would be that the thirty million inhabitants of these countries could transact their business with one another without restrictions. The second great difference was, that Germany would only be in a position to ask for equal treatment in the matter of customs from the Allies after five years, whilst Austria could obtain it in three years.

MR. BALFOUR said that the original proposal had been, that all the customs privileges of the States composing the old Austro-Hungarian Kingdom should be extended to the new States formed out of it; but, as these privileges would be based on the old limits of the States concerned, these latter would have been compelled to set up a political frontier, and another frontier for the purposes of customs. On the other hand, by including in the Customs Union, all countries enriched by acquisition of Austro-Hungarian territory, privileges greater than any ever possessed by the old Austro-Hungarian Empire Kingdom would be granted to them. These two proposals therefore, outlined the question now before the Conference.

---

<sup>7</sup> British representative, Economic Commission.



M. CLEMENTEL said that Mr. Baruch <sup>8</sup> and Mr. Taussig <sup>9</sup> had agreed with the findings of the Economic Commission. If the agreement arrived at were reversed, a vast customs union, extending from Danzig to Sicily would be established. It was absolutely impossible to ask countries to set up customs barriers inside their own frontiers.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Council must choose between limiting the privileges of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and extending them. He would have liked to have seen those privileges maintained as they had existed previously, but he recognized that this was no longer possible. The alternatives before the Council were (1) consenting to a vast extension of Customs Unions between States, or (2) curtailing the former privileges of the dismembered Monarchy. He felt that the compromise arrived at ought to be adhered to. The proposal of establishing an entirely new customs system over half Europe alarmed him.

MR. POLK asked what Austria's position after three years would be in the matter of customs.

M. CLEMENTEL replied that, unless the League of Nations thought that certain countries had not been sufficiently indemnified (Article 24), reciprocity with all countries might be granted to Austria.

(It was decided that the draft reply of the Economic Commission on the subject of the clauses dealing with Customs regulations, duties and restrictions, in the Peace Treaty with Austria, should be accepted.)

MR. BALFOUR said that the Joint Secretariat in drawing up the Minutes of the previous day's proceedings, had acquitted themselves most creditably of an extremely difficult task.

MR. POLK said that the average correctness of the work of the Joint Secretariat had been exceedingly high throughout.

M. TARDIEU said that the resolution with regard to the Plebiscite in Marburg (See H. D. 38, Minute 6 (a) 2<sup>10</sup>) had caused complete disagreement in the Central Territorial Commission.

(j) Plebiscite in  
the Marburg  
Area

Two of the delegates had adopted the Plebiscite line of demarcation proposed by M. Tittoni. The others had disputed it, and had said that it was an artificial line which would give special advantages to the Austrians, and, if adopted, would effect what had been avoided in the Klagenfurt area. The Council must therefore decide whether they wished to uphold the new demarcation line, but he suggested the Central Territorial Commission should be heard on the subject.

M. TITTONI said that he regretted that the Central Territorial Commission had disagreed on the subject of the resolution under discussion.

<sup>8</sup> Bernard M. Baruch, United States representative, Economic Commission.

<sup>9</sup> Frank W. Taussig, United States representative, Sub-Commission on Customs Regulations, Duties, and Restrictions.

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, p. 840.

He had originally proposed the line of the River Drave. He had subsequently been shown a map, marked with a blue line and presented by the British Delegate. He had accepted the new line with the remainder of the Council, and his adherence to it had not been due to any personal opinion of his own.

M. TARDIEU said that the Central Territorial Commission was opposed to taking the Plebiscite, inside the area defined by the blue line on the map, to which M. Tittoni had referred, because, as he had said before, it would give the Austrians an artificial majority.

M. TITTONI said that he did not oppose a hearing being given to the Central Territorial Commission, but he pointed out that the decision of the previous day had been arrived at after due deliberation. The question involved was one of procedure.

M. TARDIEU said that the replies to the Austrian Delegation had not been properly co-ordinated, and confusion had resulted. Since the Plebiscite had been decided on, the area in which it was to be taken must necessarily be laid down. The Central Territorial Commission disagreed on the manner in which the line defined by the resolution of the previous day was to be established.

M. TITTONI repeated that he did not wish to refuse a hearing to the Commission, but thought that the resolution taken on the day previous still held good.

(It was decided that the Central Territorial Commission should be heard at the Council on August 27th, 1919, on the question of the Plebiscite in the Marburg area in Styria.)

4. M. PICHON drew the Council's attention to a clause in the new Constitution of the German Reich; the articles in question dealt with the future relations between Austria and Germany in a manner which violated the provisions of the Peace Treaty.

Violation of the  
Peace Treaty  
With Germany in  
the Constitution  
of the New Ger-  
man State

M. BERTHELOT read the Articles referred to. (Appendix "C".) They showed that the German Government was making provision for the final inclusion of Austria in the new German Reich. This was in flagrant violation of Article 80 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, whereby that country formally recognized the independence of Austria. In addition to this, the articles of the new Constitution gave Austrian citizens the right of immediate representation in the German Reich, although only in an advisory capacity. The matter was rendered more difficult by the fact that the German Parliament was not at present in session, so that the urgent necessity of having this provision in the German Constitution altered, would be subject to delay. The German Constitution had been adopted in a final manner on August 11th. Previous to that date, a provisional vote had been taken, referring indirectly to the point now under discussion.

MR. BALFOUR said that the problem now before the Council showed the extreme inconvenience of having no diplomatic agent at Berlin. Such a representative would have called attention to the article in question long before. The military representatives of the Allies at Berlin, were, of course, not concerned with such points.

M. PICHON said that he thought action was urgently necessary and that the Drafting Committee ought to draw up a formal protest as rapidly as possible.

MR. POLK asked whether the articles in the new German Constitution could be communicated to each separate Delegation for examination and study. He agreed that the matter was extremely serious and that it demanded immediate action.

M. TARDIEU said that, in his opinion, the news now before the Council made it more necessary than ever to uphold the proposal that he had made on the previous day. (See H. D. 38, Minute 9.<sup>11</sup>)

MR. POLK remarked that no great result could be expected from the inclusion of M. Tardieu's proposal in the Austrian Treaty, in view of the fact that Germany had not respected a similar obligation.

(It was decided that the question raised by Article 61 of the new German Constitution voted on the 11th August 1919, in the German National Assembly, on the subject of Austria should be discussed at the next meeting of the Council on the 27th August, together with such consequences as the aforesaid article in the German Constitution might have upon the Peace Treaty with Austria.)

Reply by the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council to the Rumanian Note Relative to Regulation of Traffic on the Danube

5. MR. POLK stated that he had no objection to the draft letter, prepared by the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council, to be sent from the President of the Peace Conference to M. Brătianu. (See H. D. 37, Minute 10, and Appendix "H".<sup>12</sup>)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 26 August, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-39

[Translation <sup>13</sup>]

*General Dupont to Marshal Foch*

BERLIN, August 25—8:35 p. m.

The composition and the head of the Silesia Commission were indicated in a previous telegram which added that I would depart only on your order. The transmission of my telegrams must have trans-

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, p. 844.

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, pp. 819, 828.

<sup>13</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the Translating Bureau of the Department of State.



formed the sense thereof to allow it to be believed that this Commission was made up of generals.

On the 21st I sounded out my colleagues on the subject of making the trip as a unit, but I encountered opposition. It was not possible for me to separate from them without having received a specific order from you. The Poles would like to have me leave alone for this trip which we would have been able to make the 21st but which at present would excite rather than appease. I believe, as my colleagues do, that it would no longer be agreed to by the German Government without a formal order from the Council.

You can do everything on the Rhine but nothing in Prussian Poland until the treaty is ratified.

In the entirely Polish districts of Rybnik, the newspapers indicate a complete resumption of work in the proportion of from 60 to 80 percent.

You assume that Germany is more resigned than she is and the consent of her Government to a military occupation by the Entente, which would have been still possible six weeks ago, must be absolutely excluded.

This occupation no German would dare propose and the Germans will keep hoping until the last that it will not take place. German troops are aroused and very numerous, and would have to be expelled by force in case the Government yields.

---

#### Appendix B to HD-39

[Translation <sup>14</sup>]

#### MILITARY CLAUSES

The American delegation offers the following observations with regard to article 154, which reads as follows:

#### Article 154

"Austria undertakes, from the coming into force of the present treaty, not to accredit or send to any foreign country any military, naval or air mission, nor to allow any such mission to leave her territory; she further agrees to take the necessary measures to prevent Austrian nationals from leaving her territory to enlist in the army, navy, or air service of any foreign power, or to be attached thereto for the purpose of assisting in their training, or generally for the purpose of giving military, naval, or air instruction in a foreign country.

"The Allied and Associated Powers undertake, so far as they are concerned, that from the coming into force of the present treaty they will not enroll in or attach to their armies or naval or air forces any Austrian national for the purpose of assisting in the military training

---

<sup>14</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the Translating Bureau of the Department of State.

[thereof] or generally to employ an Austrian national as military, naval or aeronautic instructor.

“However, the present provision does not affect the right of France to recruit for the Foreign Legion in accordance with French military laws and regulations.”

The Austrian delegation proposes either the elimination of this clause or its limitation to the service of official missions to foreign countries.

The Military Commission rejects this proposal.

It is pointed out that it would be possible to reach a compromise by limiting the period during which this clause of the treaty will be applicable, that is, 10, 15, or 20 years, as a result of which the article would be worded thus:

“Austria further agrees to take the necessary measures, for a period of 10 years from the coming into effect of the present treaty, to prevent Austrian subjects from. . . .”

After the expiration of this period, the military value of all the veterans (officers or ordinary soldiers) of the last war and, generally speaking, the influence of Austria as a military power would render needless the restrictions imposed by article 154. If Austria is admitted into the League of Nations, such restrictions will not only be needless, but probably undesirable. In any case, it is doubtful whether article 154 can be executed effectively by Austria or whether the powers can enforce its execution in its present form.

---

#### Appendix C to HD-39

#### *Extract From the Constitution of the German Empire (Reich)*

##### ARTICLE 60

A Reichsrat is established for the representation of the German lands for legislation and the administration of the Reich.

##### ARTICLE 61

Each land has at least one vote in the Reichsrat. In the case of the greater lands, one vote is assigned to a million inhabitants. An excess which is at least equal to the population of the smallest land is reckoned as a complete million. No land can be represented by more than two-fifths of the total votes.

German Austria, after its junction with the German Reich, receives the right of participation in the Reichsrat with the number of votes corresponding to its population. Till then, the representatives of German Austria have a consultative voice.

The number of votes is fixed anew by the Reichsrat after each general census.

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 27 August, 1919, at 11 a. m.**

**PRESENT**

AMERICA,  
UNITED STATES OF  
Hon. F. L. Polk.

BRITISH EMPIRE  
Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

FRANCE  
M. Clemenceau.  
M. Pichon.

*Secretary*  
Mr. L. Harrison.

*Secretaries*  
Mr. H. Norman.  
Sir G. Clerk.

*Secretaries*  
M. Dutasta.  
M. Berthelot.  
M. de Saint-Quentin.

ITALY  
M. Tittoni.  
*Secretary*  
M. Paterno.

JAPAN  
M. Matsui.  
*Secretary*  
M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Col. U. S. Grant.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . . .	Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE . . . . .	Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY . . . . .	Lt-Colonel A. Jones.

*Interpreter*—M. Meyer.

The following also attended for the items with which they were concerned:—

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
General Tasker H. Bliss.  
Professor Coolidge.  
Professor Johnstone.  
Mr. Woolsey.  
Mr. Nielsen.

FRANCE  
M. Clémentel.  
M. Loucheur.  
M. Jules Cambon.  
General Le Rond.  
M. Aubert.  
M. Hermitte.  
M. Serruys.  
M. Laroche.

BRITISH EMPIRE  
Major General Sir C. J. Sackville-West.  
Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley.  
Mr. H. Nicolson.  
Mr. A. Leeper.

ITALY  
Count Vannutelli-Rey.  
M. d'Ameglio.  
M. di Palma.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the second proposal of the British Delegation aimed at including in the Treaty no clause imposing on



Economic Clauses  
in Treaty With  
Austria  
(Reference H. D.  
39, Minute 3 (i)  
Economic Clauses  
Part X<sup>1</sup>)

Austrian Nationals any disadvantage in the settlement of private debts, contracts, etc., in a word, in the whole sphere of properties, rights and interests. The Economic Commission had first of all worked on the principle that the stipulations in the Austrian Treaty were to be similar to those of the German Treaty.

This principle was subsequently modified very thoroughly. The Commission in Article 261 had provided for the liquidation of Austrian properties under the control of the Reparations Commission in the case of States, heirs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, not participating in reparations. A special Committee composed of Colonel Peel, M. Loucheur, M. Crespi and Mr. Norman Davis, had, on the instructions of the Council, changed these dispositions. The result was that Austrian properties would not be liquidated; in consequence, the Economic Commission, in the draft reply prepared for the Austrian Delegation, had laid down *as far as possible*, that equality and reciprocity should prevail in the settlement of properties, rights and interests between Austrian Nationals and the previous subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The British proposal, however, went much further, and suggested that Austria should have the benefit of all agreements which might hereafter be made between the various States inheriting from the Austrian Empire. So complete an assimilation appeared to him unjustified for the following reasons:—

(a) Austria had taken certain measures contrary to the interests of the territories now transferred, and it was necessary to annul these measures.

(b) The States receiving portions of former Austro-Hungarian territory and the transferred territories themselves had always protested most vigorously against any such assimilation, even in the limited form suggested by the Economic Commission.

(c) Without going so far as complete assimilation, the Economic Commission had given Austria all guarantees required by justice for the liquidation of the past state of things for which she was responsible.

It was merely a question of re-drafting to make it clear that the proposal of the Editing Committee meant:—

1. That Sections 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7, did not apply to transferred territories.

2. That Section 8 applied only to them.

The principle of complete assimilation of Austria to the new States or to the inheriting States was a non-economic matter. It was a political question which could only be decided by the Supreme Council. He thought, moreover, that it would require the assent of the States concerned. The Economic Commission could only discuss this matter with them if instructed to do so by the Council.

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 934.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the proposals referred to applied only in the Economic sphere.

M. CLEMENTEL replied in the affirmative.

MR. BALFOUR said that on the previous day it had been decided that economic advantages should be limited to Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary.

M. CLEMENTEL said that the proposal before the meeting went further. It amounted to this—that any agreement of an economic nature concluded between any of the new States and any other, must *ipso facto* apply to Austria. This would produce an exceptionally privileged situation for Austria. The new States, moreover, had already protested against even the amount of assimilation hitherto accorded to Austria. The Economic Commission could go no further than it had gone. The question in its present stage was a political question which must be determined by the Council. He thought that the proposal of the British Delegation was not economically sound, and he could not, without calling a new meeting of the Economic Commission, accept it on their behalf.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that it appeared to him to be a wrong interpretation of the British proposals that Austria must be held to be party to any Convention between the new States. He had meant to refer only to the negotiations conducted by the Committee on political clauses. These negotiations applied to specific problems. The present situation made it necessary to liquidate certain questions by special pacts. It was for the purpose of these pacts that he pleaded that Austria should be placed on an equal footing with the other States. He thought that M. Laroche, who was Chairman of the Committee, would be able to state the position to the satisfaction of the Council.

M. CLEMENTEL said that from the economic point of view, he was convinced that the Economic Commission had done all that was possible, short of establishing complete assimilation. For instance, in the Treaty with Germany, all pre-war contracts were annulled unless some special public interest demanded the contrary. In the Treaty with Austria, all pre-war contracts were maintained unless some special public interest demanded the contrary. In any case, he thought the change proposed by Mr. Headlam-Morley could not be made without consulting the small States.

M. LAROCHE said that the question had not the scope attributed to it by M. Clementel. It had been agreed on the previous day in the Committee on Political Clauses, not to demand the insertion of any special clause in the Treaty with Austria itself. The Committee would propose to the Council that Austria and Hungary should be asked to adhere to certain Conventions to be negotiated between the New States. There were for instance Conventions necessary to regu-

late the payment of civilian, Military and clerical pensions. These matters could be dealt with outside the Treaty of Peace with Austria.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether M. Clementel maintained any objection to this, and whether he thought it would require reconsultation of the new states.

M. CLEMENTEL thought this proposal would raise no difficulty.

M. LAROCHE said that the new States would inevitably [have?] to be consulted, as they had to be parties to the Conventions suggested.

M. CLEMENTEL said the only thing to which he objected was any assertion of complete assimilation between Austria and the other new States.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood the policy of the Council was to give all that could be given to Austria without any ostentatious declaration, likely to offend Czecho-Slovakia.

(It was decided that it was unnecessary to insert any new Article in the Treaty of Peace with Austria. It would be clearly explained in the answer to the Austrian Delegation that Sections, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Economic Clauses did not apply to the relations between Austrian subjects and the former subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. On the other hand it should be clearly explained that Section 8 of the Economic Clauses only referred to the relations between persons of these two categories.

It was further decided that Austria would be required in the Treaty of Peace to adhere to special Conventions with the new States, now being prepared by the Committee on Political Clauses.)

2. M. LOUCHEUR said that the Austrian Delegation asked that a special clause be inserted in the Treaties with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, requiring these States to supply Austria with the same amount of coal that Austria received from the areas ceded to those States before the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Czecho-Slovakia and Poland were unwilling to acquiesce, because they wished to be able to control the export of coal in such a manner as to exercise pressure on Austria and obtain from her equivalent advantages. For instance, Czecho-Slovakia would require magnesia from Austria. He therefore proposed a series of articles providing for an exchange of raw material between Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Austria, and as an interim measure for the control of these exchanges by the Reparations Commission. (For these Clauses see Appendix "A".)

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the proposals stipulated for absolute quantities. If they did, difficulties might ensue. The quantities should, he thought, be proportional and not absolute, otherwise a State might be bound by the Treaty to furnish the greater part of its production, irrespective of home needs, to its neighbours.

Supply of Coal to  
Austria by  
Czecho-Slovakia  
and Poland



M. LOUCHEUR explained that this difficulty had been foreseen, and was carefully guarded against in the clauses he proposed.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was satisfied with this explanation.

(It was decided that the clauses proposed by M. Loucheur (Appendix A) should be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Austria.)

3. M. TITTONI said that the Treaty provided that certain railways between Austria and Italy should be built by the latter. Projects for these railways had been previously completed by the Austrians. He asked that they be required in the Treaty to supply both plans and estimates to the Italian Government.

Col de Reschen  
and Pas de Predil  
Railway

(It was agreed that an article to this effect should be drafted by M. Tittoni for insertion in the Treaty.)

M. TITTONI offered the draft contained in Appendix B.

4. M. LOUCHEUR said that, in consultation with Mr. Hoover, he had prepared a telegram to be addressed to General Dupont in accordance with the decision taken on the previous day.  
(See H. D. 39, Minute 1.<sup>2</sup>)

Situation in  
Upper Silesia

M. Loucheur read the telegram annexed in Appendix C.

(This draft was accepted.)

5. MR. POLK asked whether the telegram sent on the previous Saturday (H. D. 37, Minute I, Appendix A<sup>3</sup>) could be given to the Press. He added that the smaller Powers had been making enquiries.

Publication of  
Telegram in An-  
swer to Rou-  
manian Govern-  
ment, Despatched  
23rd August, 1919

(It was decided that the telegram accepted for despatch to the Roumanian Government on Saturday, 23rd August, 1919, (H. D. 37, Minute 1, Appendix A), should be published in the Press.)

6. MR. POLK said that the situation was just about as Mr. Balfour had stated at a previous meeting (H. D. 37, Minute 3<sup>4</sup>). M. Clemenceau had suggested that the German prisoners of war in the hands of the American and British Armies should be turned over in some manner to the French Authorities. At the meeting of the Special Committee of General Officers, both Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson and General Pershing had felt that they were not authorised to turn over their prisoners to the French Authorities. They did not consider themselves qualified to decide the legal and political questions involved. The British Government was anxious to return these prisoners to Germany, and their

German Prisoners  
of War

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 927.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 811, 819.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 813.

Secretary of State for War had urged it very strongly. The situation was the same for the Americans. If the repatriation of these prisoners were begun now, three to four months would be necessary to complete it. It was the desire of the American Government to act in this matter in full agreement with the French Government. If repatriation could be begun immediately, he thought it would be most desirable to do so, as these prisoners were a great expense and were accomplishing nothing. Because of the time it would take to complete it, the repatriation would not embarrass the French Government in their desire to retain the prisoners in their hands until after the ratification of the Treaty. He thought that even if the repatriation were started now by the British and American Authorities, it could not be completed before the French would have made all arrangements necessary for the labour they desired.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would like to corroborate the last part of Mr. Polk's statement. On the previous occasion when he had spoken on this matter, he had not realised how slow the process of repatriation would be. It was now August 27th. The Treaty, he thought, would be ratified by three Powers by about the 15th of September. In other words, in less than three weeks. On the 15th September, therefore, repatriation would have to begin in accordance with the terms of the Treaty. Retention of the prisoners during these three weeks would cost the American and British Governments £150,000 a day. The number that could be repatriated was only 2,000 a day overland, and no more could be sent home until shipping could be provided to assist in the process. In the three weeks, therefore, no very considerable diminution of the prisoners held in France would take place. Meanwhile, it was difficult to ask the British and American taxpayers to continue spending so much on practically useless prisoners. He hoped, therefore, that the French Government would accede to the very modest request he had to make. He believed that no detriment would be caused to France thereby.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he made no comment on the internal political reasons which actuated his colleagues. On the question of legal right, he was prepared to bring forward the action of the Belgians, who had handed over prisoners to France. He was bound, however, to acquiesce in what he was asked to do by his British and American colleagues. He confessed that he did it with regret, because the retention of the prisoners represented the only hold the Allies now possessed over Germany. The insertion of the Article in the German Constitution regarding Austria showed how necessary it was to preserve some means of pressure on Germany. There had been an agreement between himself, Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson to use the prisoners as a means of inducing Germany to hand over persons

guilty of breaches of the laws of war.<sup>5</sup> If the British and American Governments had made up their minds, he would ask that a Repatriation Committee should be formed, representing all the Powers, in order that there should be no appearance of dissension on this point. The German Delegation would be told that for reasons of their own, the Allies proposed to begin repatriating prisoners without waiting for the ratification of the Treaty. He would ask Mr. Balfour to explain this in suitable words.

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed it was desirable to keep a hold over Germany. He would point out that the proposal he had made did not diminish this hold in any appreciable degree. As to the proposal just made by M. Clemenceau, he entirely agreed that it was very desirable that all the Powers should appear to be acting in harmony. Unless there were any practical objection, he would welcome the proposal.

MR. POLK said that he also assented to it.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the hold over Germany would ultimately be represented by the prisoners held by the French Army.

M. MATSUI observed that a Commission to deal with prisoners was provided for in the Treaty. He questioned whether it was desirable to set up a new Commission. It might be preferable to set the Commission provided for in the Treaty to work at once.

M. CLEMENCEAU read Article 215. He pointed out that a German member was provided for.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it was absolutely necessary to have a German representative on the Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought perhaps not, as the Treaty was not yet ratified.

M. MATSUI said that a Commission on Prisoners of War already existed. It had, he understood, prepared a provisional scheme for repatriation. Could this Commission be empowered to proceed with the repatriation suggested? Japan, he added, had some prisoners. She had been feeding them for a long time, and was anxious to repatriate them. Repatriation from Japan would be a long process. Japan, therefore, would gladly associate herself with any measures taken to that end.

(It was decided:—

(a) That an Inter-Allied Commission of one military and one civil member from each of the five Powers be set up at once to begin repatriation of German prisoners, starting with prisoners held by the British and American Armies.

(b) That Mr. Balfour should draft a letter to the German Delegation, explaining the reasons for anticipating the Treaty in this matter,

<sup>5</sup> For previous discussions of this subject, see IC-177C, vol. v, p. 337; CF-92, minute 4, and CF-99, minute 5, vol. vi, pp. 670 and 755.



and making it clear that this was a gratuitous act of humanity, and that the execution of the project would depend on the good behaviour of Germany.

(c) That the nominations should be made at the following meeting.)

7. M. TARDIEU read and explained the Report contained in Appendix "D".

Plebiscite  
in Styria

M. TITTONI said that the Council had decided to divide the Klagenfurt area for plebiscite purposes.

He could not see why it should decline to do likewise in Styria. Moreover, the Council had already decided on a plebiscite in this area. (See H. D. 38, Minute 6 (a) <sup>6</sup> and H. D. 39, Minute 3 (a).<sup>7</sup>) Why should this decision be reversed? The land in question was not Italian, and he had no direct interest in its fate. It was of the utmost importance, however, that the Austrians should sign the Treaty. The Austrian Cabinet depended on a majority, in which there were 28 Styrian Deputies. Should these Deputies receive no satisfaction, they might not support the Government in signing the Treaty. This would produce a most perilous situation. He did not know whether M. Clemenceau was ready to occupy Austria with French troops, but he must declare that Italy would find it extremely difficult to do so.

M. TARDIEU said that in analogous cases, the Council had not decided in favour of a plebiscite. There was no strong motive for holding one in Styria. There were in the area, 75,000 Slovenes against 18,000 Germans.

M. TITTONI said that in that case the result need not be feared. In order to upset the decision taken 24 hours earlier, very strong reasons should be alleged. He knew of no such reasons.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood the previous resolution to have been to the effect that a plebiscite should be held in the district of Marburg. The limits of this district had not been settled. The question had been referred to the experts in order that they should examine it and make a report.

M. TITTONI said that the Minutes of the meeting (H. D. 38, Minute 6 (a)) stated that the Austrian demand was accepted, although he had himself proposed the line of the Drave as the limit of the plebiscite area.

MR. POLK said that his understanding was that the line proposed by the Austrian Delegation had been more or less accepted. He had not understood that so large an addition as was proposed by the British and French Members of the Commission was to be made. The question was whether the delimitation of the area was to be influenced by the Austrians or by the Jugo-Slav requests. If the area were made large, the result was a foregone conclusion in favour of the Jugo-Slavs. In

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 840.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 931.

that case, he thought it would be preferable to attribute the territory to the Jugo-Slavs outright.

M. TARDIEU said that the Commission was not in a position to make a unanimous report. It could only place the divergent views of the Delegates before the Council. The line proposed by the Austrians was clearly to the detriment of the Jugo-Slavs. The latter had had good reason to suppose that the country was theirs. If the settlement was now to be altered entirely at the instance of the Austrians, they would reasonably think themselves aggrieved. Four unanimous decisions had been taken. In any case, the Slovenes were treated very hardly by the Treaty. The last decision of the Council would make their case worse. Marburg was the economic and intellectual centre of Southern Styria. It had even been admitted to be so by the previous Austrian administration. In his view, the Jugo-Slav position should be maintained as he regarded it as entirely right.

MR. BALFOUR asked M. Tardieu whether his Committee had enquired whether the area under consideration was economically connected with Marburg, as M. TITTONI denied this.

M. TITTONI gave certain figures about the traffic from Marburg. On the Marburg-Villach line there were 32,373 departures and 32,349 arrivals. On the Marburg-Gratz line there were 30,742 departures and 49,230 arrivals. On the Marburg-Laibach line there were 26,834 departures and 34,462 arrivals. On the Marburg-Agram line there were 1,975 departures and 2,299 arrivals. From those figures it clearly appeared that the traffic of Marburg was towards the north. The southern area was, moreover, divided from it by a mountain range.

M. TARDIEU said these figures were well known to the Committee. They were the result of the deliberate economic policy of the Austrian administration. The natural market of Marburg was to the south. In spite of all their efforts, the Austrians had had to abandon the idea of administering Southern Styria, except from Marburg. The Italians had good reason to know what the methods of the Austrians were, as they had experienced them at Trieste.

M. TITTONI said that the comparison was not quite correct. The Italian population had never been sufficiently represented in the Austrian Parliament to obtain any concessions in its favour. The Slovenes, on the other hand, like the Poles, had been strong enough to produce a balance of parties. They had, therefore, received some consideration.

M. TARDIEU said that he did not wish to question the decision made on the previous day, but he thought it was paying the Austrians an undue compliment to accept their line exactly as they proposed it. The Jugo-Slavs had asked for consultation of the population throughout. This had been refused and the Conference was now asked to im-

pose on them a plebiscite in an area in which they did not expect it, and in a form which would annoy them without reason.

M. TITTONI said that he was willing to extend the plebiscite area to the limits of the judicial district of Marburg, in order to meet the views of the French and British Delegates.

M. TARDIEU said that he thought this would produce very little effect on the position.

M. PICHON observed that the Jugo-Slavs had been in occupation of the area for the last nine months. They could not be evicted without certain trouble.

MR. POLK asked whether this occupation was under the authority of the Conference, or whether the Jugo-Slavs had just taken possession on their own initiative.

M. PICHON said that no formal authorization had been given, but that no protest had been made.

MR. BALFOUR then suggested that in order to reach some decision, the whole notion of a plebiscite should be dropped.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed.

M. TITTONI said that he would prefer to hold a plebiscite in the extended area.

MR. POLK said that he would rather abandon the plebiscite altogether than adopt a compromise which, he thought, would satisfy neither party.

M. TITTONI said his main desire was that the Treaty should be signed, because should the Austrians refuse to sign it, he did not know what the Conference could do.

(After some further discussion, the American, British, French and Japanese Delegations agreed to abandon entirely the idea of a plebiscite in Styria, and to stand by the territorial settlement made in the Treaty handed to the Austrian Delegation.

M. Tittoni reserved his agreement and said that he would communicate his conclusion to the Secretary-General in the course of the afternoon.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 27 August, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-40

[Translation <sup>a</sup>]

#### SUPPLIES OF COAL FOR AUSTRIA

Art. 1. Czechoslovakia and Poland undertake that for a period of 15 years from the coming into force of the present treaty they will

---

<sup>a</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the Translating Bureau of the Department of State.



not impose on the exportation to Austria of the products of coal mines in their territories any export duties or other charges or restrictions on exportation different from or more onerous than those imposed on such exportation to any other country.

Art. 2. Special agreements shall be made between Czechoslovakia and Poland and Austria as to the supply of coal and of raw materials reciprocally.

Art. 3. Pending the conclusion of such agreements, but in any case for at least three years from the coming into force of the present treaty, Czechoslovakia and Poland undertake that no export duty or other restrictions of any kind shall be imposed on the export to Austria of coal or lignite up to a reasonable quantity to be fixed, failing agreement between the states concerned, by the Reparation Commission. In fixing this quantity the Reparation Commission shall take into account all the circumstances, including the quantities both of coal and of lignite supplied before the war to present Austrian territory from Upper Silesia and from the territory of the former Austrian Empire transferred to Czechoslovakia and Poland in accordance with the present treaty, and the quantities now available for export from those countries. Austria shall in return furnish to Czechoslovakia and Poland supplies of the raw materials referred to in article (2) in accordance with the decisions of the Reparation Commission.

Art. 4. Czechoslovakia and Poland further undertake during the same period to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that any such products shall be available for sale to purchasers in Austria on terms as favorable as are applicable to like products sold under similar conditions to purchasers in Czechoslovakia or Poland respectively or in any other country.

Art. 5. In case of disagreement in the execution or interpretation of any of the above provisions the Reparation Commission shall decide.

---

#### Appendix B to HD-40

[Translation<sup>9</sup>]

#### *Draft Article Submitted by M. Tittoni*

Austria shall hand over to Italy gratuitously the surveys, with annexes, for the construction of the following railway lines:

The line from Tarvis to Trieste by Raibl, Plezzo, Caporetto, Canale and Gorizia;

The local line from S. Lucia de Tolmino to Caporetto:

The line from Tarvis to Plezzo (new scheme);

The Reschen line (Landeck-Mals connection).

---

<sup>9</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the Translating Bureau of the Department of State.

## Appendix C to HD-40

[Translation <sup>10</sup>]*The President of the Peace Conference to General Dupont, Berlin*

The Conference has decided that the commission of three generals which Colonel Goodyear is to join as the American representative should go immediately to Upper Silesia there to execute the mission indicated in my telegram 4040. The representatives of the German Government at Versailles were notified concerning this trip several days ago and they have stated that their Government would facilitate it. An accurate account is to be rendered of the situation and measures proposed to us tending to restore calm within the shortest possible period while taking the political situation into account. Please communicate this decision of the Conference to your colleagues and report its execution to me.

CLEMENCEAU

## Appendix D to HD-40

[Translation <sup>10</sup>]*Report of the Commission on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs  
Regarding the Plebiscite in Styria*

## I

*1. On the Matter of the Plebiscite Zone.*

A. The British and French delegations consider that the line proposed by the Austrian delegation is unacceptable as having been drawn artificially by the Austrians with a purely political aim and as destroying the economic unity of the Marburg basin.

They ask, accordingly, for the inclusion of the Pettau and Lüttenberg districts in the Styria plebiscite zone.

They further consider that the Drauburg region which, according to its present administrative boundaries, is attached to Carinthia, should vote with zone A in Carinthia.

B. The American and Italian delegations are willing to accept the line proposed by the Austrian delegation as it is, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council.

At the most, they would agree to taking the administrative boundary of the judicial districts (Gerichtsbezirke) of Marburg and Radkersburg.

---

<sup>10</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the Translating Bureau of the Department of State.

They are opposed to the inclusion of the Pettau and Lüttenberg districts in the Styria plebiscite zone, because such a provision would destroy the balance of the vote in favor of the Yugoslavs and would impose a plebiscite on populations which do not desire one and for whom no one has requested any.

For the same reason, the Italian delegation opposes attaching the Drauburg region to zone A in Carinthia. It further considers that the boundaries of this latter zone, having already been fixed by the Supreme Council, cannot be touched.

## *2. On the Methods of the Plebiscite.*

The four delegations proposed:

A. *Interallied supervision of the plebiscite:* The Interallied Commission for the plebiscite in Carinthia will exercise its supervision in Styria under the same conditions as for zone A of Carinthia.

B. *Occupation and administration of the plebiscite zone:* They will take place under the same conditions as for zone A of Carinthia, that is, occupation by Yugoslav troops and administration according to the general rules of the legislation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene state.

The troops must be limited to the number necessary for the preservation of order, they must be replaced as rapidly as possible by a police force enlisted on the spot.

C. *Voting:* Will take place as a unit for the whole of the zone of Styria.

D. *Date of the plebiscite:* Same day as for zone A of Carinthia; that is, three months after the coming into effect of the treaty.

E. *Right of suffrage:* Will be granted under the same conditions as for the plebiscite in Carinthia.

## II

The British and French delegates consider it their duty respectfully to point out to the Supreme Council that in their opinion whatever may be the limits of the zone which will be applied, the plebiscite has serious disadvantages.

1. The Yugoslav delegation requested a general plebiscite (the Banat, Bacska, Baranya, Prekomourie, Styria, Carinthia, Istria, and Dalmatia). An agreement was reached to limit the plebiscite to Carinthia. It is scarcely fair to put aside the agreement in question, at the request of the Austrians, merely for the Marburg region.

2. From the statistical point of view, except for the city of Marburg, there is a very heavy Slovene majority in the area under consideration (Marburg District without the city, 75,000 Slovenes and 18,000 Germans according to Austrian statistics). Austrian publications dated 1919 recognize that the Austrian line formerly adopted was in conformity with the location of the nationalities.

3. From the economic point of view, there is an evident bond between the Marburg area and all the Yugoslav railways. Artificial measures taken by Austria used to seek to turn this traffic towards the north.



4. The Yugoslavs have occupied this territory [9?] months with the authorization of the Allied and Associated Powers. Contrary to what happened in the case of Klagenfurt, no objection was ever made by the Conference. The Yugoslavs accordingly had the right to consider—and the treaty delivered to Austria confirmed that opinion—that this area was not disputed. The measure taken will thus certainly provoke violent unrest, which will not favor the policy of appeasement which the Conference is pursuing in Central Europe.

5. The Slovenes (1,500,000 souls) are in a bad situation as a result of the treaty. Nearly one-third of this race is placed under foreign domination. 370,000 Yugoslavs (225,000 of whom are Slovenes) are kept in Italian territory. The plebiscite such as is now proposed by the Austrian delegation will aggravate the conditions of the Slovene race and run the risk of making its claims more violent in the countries in which the treaty has included it.

6. The British and French delegations recall that the plebiscite was discarded:

- a. Unanimously by the Commission on Yugoslav Matters.
- b. Unanimously by the Central Territorial Commission on its first examination.
- c. Unanimously by the Supreme Council before the treaty was delivered to the Austrians.
- d. Unanimously by the Central Territorial Commission at the time of the preparation of a reply to Austria.

7. Accordingly, the two delegations consider the plebiscite contemplated to be dangerous.

### III

Countering the observations submitted to the Supreme Council by the British and French delegations, the American and Italian delegations believe that they in turn should point out:

1. The fact that the Yugoslavs requested the plebiscite for the Banat, Bacska, Baranya etc. has nothing to do with the conclusion of the treaty with Austria. When the time comes to discuss the treaties between Yugoslav and the other states, other plebiscites may be proposed if necessary. As to the unrest which it is feared will arise, it already exists (recent happenings at Marburg prove that) under the Yugoslav military system. Actual conditions are certainly not ideal but the disadvantages are all on the side of the Austrians.

2. While not disputing the existence of an absolute majority of Slovenes in the country districts of Marburg and Radkersburg, there is nevertheless sufficient basis for believing that many of these Slav peasants prefer to be again attached to Austria because of the economic interests which closely tie these regions to those of Klagenfurt and Gratz.

3. Three-quarters of the Marburg traffic is in the direction of Austria, as official statistics prove.

4. The decision suggested by four delegations in the Coordinating Committee on replies to the Austrian counterproposals, and subsequently adopted by the Supreme Council, that the Austrian request for plebiscites in the Marburg and Radkersburg districts be granted, cannot be weakened by the anticipation of certain temporary unrest, which in any case is principally provoked by the Yugoslav military occupation, as has been said above.

5. The fact that the Slovene nation is scattered over various geographic regions and even regions with contrary interests (Valleys of the Isonzo, the Save, Drave, etc.) does not justify the necessity of its unity against which three very strong geographic and economic interests are opposed.

6. The decisions against the plebiscite, cited by the British and French delegations, were all previous to the study of the Austrians' counterproposals by the Coordinating Committee on which four delegations suggested the plebiscite, and by the Supreme Council which approved that stipulation.

7. In any case, the plebiscite will give the Slovenes of Marburg and Radkersburg a means of freely expressing their opinion.

**Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, August 28, 1919, at 11 a. m.**

**PRESENT**

**AMERICA**  
**UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk.

*Secretaries*

Mr. L. Harrison.

Colonel U. S. Grant.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

*Secretaries*

Mr. H. Norman.

Sir George Clerk.

**FRANCE**

M. Clemenceau.

M. Pichon.

*Secretaries*

M. Dutasta.

M. Berthelot.

M. de Saint-Quentin.

**ITALY**

M. Scialoja.

*Secretary*

M. Paterno.

**JAPAN**

M. Matsui.

*Secretary*

M. Kawai.

*Joint Secretariat*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA . . . Captain Chapin.

BRITISH EMPIRE . . . Commander Bell.

FRANCE . . . Captain A. Portier.

ITALY . . . Lieut-Colonel Jones.

*Interpreter*—M. Meyer.

The following also attended for the questions with which they were concerned:—

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Mr. Woolsey.

Mr. Nielsen.

**FRANCE**

M. Tardieu.

M. Loucheur.

M. Jules Cambon.

M. Laroche.

M. Tyrman.

**BRITISH EMPIRE**

Major-General Sir C. J. Sackville-West.

Colonel Henniker.

Mr. Leeper.

Mr. Headlam-Morley.

Mr. Hutchinson.

**ITALY**

Count Vannutelli-Rey.

M. d'Ameglio.

M. di Palma.

1. MR. POLK suggested that before proceeding to the order of the day, the resolutions of the previous meeting might be read, and further suggested that this might be made the rule for the future.

Procedure of  
the Council

M. CLEMENCEAU said that such a procedure would waste the Council's time.



MR. BALFOUR agreed with M. Clemenceau.

(After some further discussion, it was agreed, that copies of all resolutions passed by the Council should be laid on the table of each Delegate, on the day following the meeting at which the aforesaid resolutions had been taken; and that, if no objections were raised by the Delegates, the text of the resolutions as submitted, should be considered to have been accepted.)

2. MR. BALFOUR circulated the following draft declaration with regard to the repatriation of German prisoners:—

German Prisoners  
of War in British  
and American  
Hands. (Refer-  
ence H. D. 40,  
Minute 6<sup>1</sup>)

“In order to diminish as rapidly as possible the sufferings caused by the war, the Allied and Associated Powers have determined to anticipate the date of ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, so far as the repatriation of German prisoners is concerned. The process of repatriation will begin immediately, and it will be conducted under the auspices of an Inter-Allied Committee to which will be added a German representative as soon as the Treaty comes into force.

The Allied and Associated Powers desire to make it quite clear that the continuance of this benevolent policy, from which German soldiers will so greatly benefit, must depend on the fulfilment by the German Government and People of all their obligations.”

(The draft declaration prepared by Mr. Balfour was accepted for transmission and publication.)

The following nominations were then made for the Prisoners of War Committee provided for by the resolution taken on August 27th, (see H. D. 40, Minute 6).

British Empire:	Mr. Vansittart. General Bolfield.
America, United States of:	Mr. Dresel. Brig.-Gen. W. D. Connor.
France:	M. Alphand. Colonel Jouvin.
Italy:	Colonel Toni.
Japan:	Mr. Shigemitsu. Colonel Nagai.

3. MR. POLK said that Article 61 of the German Constitution should be referred to the Drafting Committee, who should advise the Council as to the measures which might be taken, since any subsequent action by the Council ought to be taken on the advice of competent lawyers.

The German Con-  
stitution and Vio-  
lation of the  
Peace Treaty.  
(Reference H. D.  
39, Minute 4<sup>2</sup>)

(It was decided that Article 61 of the German Constitution should be sent to the Drafting Committee,

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 945.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 937.

who should examine the extent to which the aforesaid Article violated the terms of the Peace Treaty with Germany, and should advise the Council as to the measures which ought to be taken.)

Reply to the Letter of the Austrian Delegation on the Subject of the Frontiers in Styria

4. (Owing to the illness of M. Tittoni, this question was adjourned to the following day.)

5. M. LAROCHE read an Article for insertion in Part 3 of the Peace Treaty with Austria, on the subject of Special Conventions to be drawn up between Austria and the New States formed out of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. (See Appendix "A".)

Reply to the Austrian Delegation With Regard to Part 3 of the Peace Treaty With Austria. (Political Clauses). See Annex F, H. D. 38<sup>3</sup>

(It was agreed that a new clause on the subject of Special Conventions for Austria and the States formed out of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, on the subject of the rights, privileges and goods of private persons in the aforesaid States, (see Appendix "A"), should be accepted.)

6. M. CAMBON read and commented upon the British and American reservations with regard to the reply to the Austrian Delegation, on the subject of Part 12 of the Peace Treaty with Austria. (See Annex F, H. D. 38.<sup>4</sup>)

Reply to the Notes of the Austrian Delegation With Regard to Part 12 of the Peace Treaty With Austria.—Ports, Waterways and Railways

M. TYRMAN said that the British reservations had been made before Article 322 of the Peace Treaty with Austria had been altered. By a previous decision of the Council, it had been laid down, that immediate reciprocity should be granted in the matter of Ports, Waterways and Railways, to Austria, and other states formed out of the old Monarchy. (See H. D. 37, Minute 8<sup>5</sup>). By virtue of this decision, the British reservation fell to the ground.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY agreed with M. Tyrman, and said that the reservation of the British Delegation had been satisfied.

M. CAMBON explained the reservations of the British, Japanese and Italian Delegations on the subject of Article 310 of the Austrian Peace Treaty.

M. TYRMAN said that the reservation formulated by the British, Japanese and Italian Delegations might be met by altering the expression "cession" of Ports, Waterways and Railways to the "transfer" of Ports, Waterways and Railways throughout. In addition to this, in Part 3 of Article 310 the word "proportion" should be altered to "distribution", and the expression "handed over" should be altered to "be effected".

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 859, 869.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 859, 924.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 817.

(It was decided that Article 310 of the Peace Treaty with Austria should be amended, so as to read:

### Article 310

Subject to any special provisions concerning the transfer of ports, waterways and railways situated in the territories transferred under the present Treaty, and to the financial conditions relating to the concessionnaires and the pensioning of the personnel, the transfer of railways will take place under the following conditions:

(1) The works and installations of all the railroads shall be handed over complete and in good condition.

(2) When a railway system, possessing its own rolling-stock, is handed over in its entirety by Austria to one of the Allied and Associated Powers, such stock shall be handed over complete, in accordance with the last inventory before November 3, 1918, and in a normal state of upkeep.

(3) As regards lines without any special rolling-stock, Commissions of experts designated by the Allied and Associated Powers, on which Austria shall be represented, shall fix the distribution of the stock existing on the system to which these lines belong to be effected. Those Commissions shall have regard to the amount of the material registered on these lines in the last inventory before November 3, 1918, the length of track (sidings included), and the nature and amount of the traffic. These Commissions shall also specify the locomotives, carriages and wagons to be handed over in each case; they shall decide upon the conditions of their acceptance, and shall make the provisional arrangements necessary to ensure their repair in Austrian workshops.

(4) Stocks of stores, fittings and plant shall be handed over under the same conditions as the rolling-stock.

The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall be applied to the lines of former Russian Poland converted by Austria to the Austrian gauge, such lines being regarded as detached from the Austrian system.

M. CAMBON then explained the American reservation with regard to Part XII of the reply to the Austrian Delegation. (See Appendix F., H. D. 38.<sup>6</sup>)

MR. POLK explained that the American proposal did not deal exclusively with the portion of the reply to the Austrians dealing with Ports, Railways and Waterways, but that it was concerned with the interpretative passages which had been introduced throughout the reply. Such passages referred to the Financial Clauses (Part IX), Reparation Clauses (Part VIII), the Waterways, and Railways Clauses (Part XII), and the Report of the Minorities Commission. By virtue of these passages, the Drafting Committee were really giving interpretations to the text of the Peace Treaty, and the fact might be of advantage either to Austria, or to the Allies. Such interpretations were official, and would, as such, become part of the agreement with Austria. If they did, they would have to be submitted to the

---

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 859, 925.



United States Senate, together with the Treaty itself. If they were ratified by the Senate, the United States would be bound. He did not think that the United States should be bound by interpretative passages, unless it were understood that other Powers were bound also. It was therefore necessary either (a) to have it clearly understood that all Powers should be bound by such interpretative passages, or (b) to insert a clause in the reply to the Austrian Delegation, telling them that the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers was not to be taken as in any sense modifying the text of the Treaty.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not think that the Peace Treaty should be drafted in such a manner as to require any interpretation at all.

M. CAMBON said that the interpretative passages referred only to the text of the reply, and not to the Peace Treaty itself.

(It was decided after some further discussion that:—

(1) The reply to the Austrian Delegation should be referred, as a whole, to the Drafting Committee, to co-ordinate it with the terms of the Peace Treaty.

(2) A clause should be inserted in the reply to the Austrian Delegation to the effect that the aforesaid reply was not to be taken as in any sense modifying the text of the Treaty.

7. M. SCIALOJA drew the attention of the Council to a resolution passed by the Labour Committee at its meeting of the 4th June, 1919.

(After some further discussion,

Reply to the Austrian Note on the Subject of the Labour Clauses in the Treaty of Peace With Austria.—Part XIII

It was decided that the resolution passed by the Labour Committee (see Appendix "B") should be referred to the Editing Committee for consideration, and report, to the Council on August 29th.)

M. SCIALOJA said that a further problem on the subject of the labour clauses in the Peace Treaty with Austria, arose, the question being the admission of Austrian labour representatives to the International Congress of Labour.<sup>7</sup>

M. DI PALMA said that the admission of Germany into the International Congress of Labour had only been allowed for after the first Congress at Washington. M. Tittoni desired to place on record, that it was his wish that Austrian representatives should be admitted to the Washington Congress after the ratification of the Treaty. But workmen of various nations were saying that they would not convene a meeting unless all ex-enemy states of the Allied and Associated Powers were represented.

M. PICHON confirmed the last part of M. di Palma's statement. He said, however, that if the admission of Austrian workmen to the International Congress of Labour were allowed, this would, *ipso facto*, involve the admission of German workmen on the same terms. The

<sup>7</sup> Officially known as the International Labor Conference.

International Congress of Labour had originally decided against the admission of German workmen to the First Session at Washington. It had now changed its mind, and was demanding that German representatives should actually be admitted, after the order of business of the Session had been drawn up. This had been done in order to prevent Germany from having any say in the matters to be discussed.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether any previous decision had been taken by the Council.

M. PICHON said that the Council of Four had taken a decision<sup>8</sup> conformable to the resolution first passed on the subject by the Labour Committee.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question ought to be referred to the Labour Committee, who should study the question of the joint admission of German and Austrian labour representatives to the International Congress of Labour.

(It was decided to submit at once to the Labour Committee the proposal of the Italian Delegation, regarding the admission of Austrian Labour Representatives to the Labour Congress to be held at Washington in the following autumn.

The Labour Committee should examine the question, keeping in mind the consequences that might result on the situation of Germany, in this Congress, as already defined. The Committee should make proposals regarding the admission of both countries to the Congress.)

8. M. CAMBON read the covering letter to the reply to the Austrian Delegation. (See Appendix "F", H. D. 38<sup>9</sup>). He drew attention

Covering Letter  
to the Reply to the  
Austrian Delegation

to the fact that the note had been drawn up on the basis of the reports of several separate Committees.

The main object in the reply had been to settle finally the responsibility of the Austrian Government with regard to the war.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Cambon's statement with regard to the character of the covering note was quite evident.

MR. BALFOUR said that the draft reply read by M. Cambon was a most able document. He thought, however, that the procedure followed in the case of the Peace Treaty with Germany might be adopted in the present instance. Mr. Philip Kerr had drafted the covering letter accompanying the reply to the German counter-proposals, and his letter had been very favourably commented upon by the press in all the Allied countries. He suggested that Mr. Kerr should also draft the covering letter to the replies to the Austrian counter-proposals, and submit his draft to the Council on the following day.

M. TARDIEU said that the Reparations Commission, together with

<sup>8</sup> CF-16, minute 14, vol. v, p. 681.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, pp. 859, 860.

M. Loucheur, had, on the previous day, drawn up a note, on the subject of reparations by Austria. He thought that the note in question ought to be embodied in the covering letter to the reply to the Austrian counter-proposals.

(It was decided:—

1. That the note drafted by M. Loucheur and the Reparations Commission should be embodied in the covering letter accompanying the answer to the Austrian counter-proposals;

2. That the draft of the covering letter prepared by the Editing Committee, together with the above note of the Reparations Commission, should be referred to Mr. Philip Kerr for re-draft, and that the new text, as prepared by him, should be submitted at the next Meeting of the Council.)

M. CAMBON then drew attention to the fact that it might be considered necessary to make some allusion in the covering note to the independence of the Austrian State, since Article 61 of the German Constitution appeared to question it.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the whole question would be considered on the following day.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 28 August, 1919.

---

#### Appendix A to HD-41

[Translation <sup>10</sup>]

*Article Agreed To Between the Commission on Political Clauses and the Economic Commission, To Be Inserted in the Treaty With Austria*

Questions concerning the nationals of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, their rights, privileges, and property, which should not be mentioned either in the present treaty of peace or in the treaty which is to regulate certain immediate relations between the Allied states to which Austrian territory has been transferred, or states born of the dismemberment of Austro-Hungary, will be the subject of special conventions between the interested states, including the Republic of Austria; *it being understood that these conventions may in no way be in contradiction with the provisions of the present treaty.*

For this purpose, it is agreed that in the three months after the coming into force of the present treaty, a Conference will be held between the delegates of the interested powers.

---

<sup>10</sup> Translation from the French supplied by the Translating Bureau of the Department of State.



## Appendix "B" to HD-41

IV—RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF ALLIED WORKPEOPLE ADMITTED TO  
ENEMY TERRITORIES AND VICE VERSA*Copy of Resolution Passed by the Labour Committee*

4 JUNE, 1919.

The Labour Committee has the honour to propose to the President of the Peace Conference the insertion in the Peace Treaties to be concluded with the Enemy Powers of the following Clause:—

"Workpeople belonging to one of the Allied and Associated Powers who have been admitted to the territory of . . . . and their families, will possess the rights and privileges granted to workmen nationals by the labour and Social laws of . . . ., and the conditions which regulate them, provided that the said Allied and Associated Power guarantees reciprocal treatment to . . . . workmen admitted to territories, and to their families."

So far as Germany in particular is concerned, the Committee proposes that this clause should be inserted in the Treaty with that Power, in the event of any modifications being incorporated in the text of the conditions of Peace presented to the German Plenipotentiaries.

Present:—MM. G. N. Barnes, (President)  
Shotwell,  
Arthur Fontaine,  
di Palma Castiglione,  
Otchiai,  
Anseele,  
Coppieters.

PARIS, 4.6.19.

For the Committee—

ARTHUR FONTAINE  
*Secretary-General of the Commission  
on International Labour Legislation*



# INDEX <sup>1</sup>

Aaland Islands, Swedish claims, 443, 448, 511, 518-526  
 Ada Kalessi Island, 361, 471, 473  
 Adriatic claims. *See under* Italy.  
 Aerial navigation. *See under* Aviation.  
 Aeronautical commissions of control. *See under* Aviation.  
 Africa, German East, Anglo-Belgian mandate agreement of *May 30*: Ratification by Supreme Council, 612-613, 768; report of Commission on Mandates, 617-618; text, 618-619  
 Armaments. *See* Treaty: Terms: Military *under* Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, and Hungary.  
 Armenia. *See under* Russia and Turkish territories.  
 Armies of occupation, Allied:  
   Bulgaria, 65-66, 84-85, 136-137, 147-148, 398, 399, 452-453, 467-468, 539-540, 541  
   Danzig, 443, 443-448, 628-629, 641-642  
   Eastern Europe, constitution of Allied forces of occupation in, 628  
   Germany. *See* Rhineland: Army.  
   Hungary. *See* Hungary: Political situation: Bela Kun: Allied proposed military intervention.  
   Memel, 443, 443-448, 628-629, 641-642  
   Plebiscite areas, question of representation of all Allied powers, 625-628, 815-816  
   Rhine. *See* Rhineland: Army.  
   Saar Basin, 641, 642  
   Schleswig, military and naval forces, 160-161, 163, 361-362, 483-484  
   Silesia, Upper. *See* Germany: Eastern frontiers: Silesia: Army.  
   Turkish territories. *See* Turkish territories: Allied troops.  
 Armistice. *See under* Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, and Turkey.  
 Asia Minor. *See* Turkish territories: Anatolia.  
 Austria:  
   Armistice of *Nov. 3, 1918*, 67, 111-112, 562, 595-598  
   Arms and munitions deliveries to Czechoslovakia by order of Supreme Council, 175-177, 263-264, 462, 478-480

## Austria—Continued.

  Blockade of Germany and Hungary until formal acceptance of peace terms, proposed Austrian undertaking for, 145, 348-350, 353-354, 817, 825  
   Communism, danger of, 174, 175, 176, 305  
   Food relief, 173-177, 183-187, 299-300, 505-507, 518, 863  
   Frontier dispute with Yugoslavia in Klagenfurt and Carinthia:  
     Evacuation of plebiscite area by Yugoslavia and question of security of captured Austrian war material, 240-241, 252-253, 360-361, 453, 468  
     Interallied military mission, 242, 252-253  
     Italian interference: Assistance to Austrians, 120, 123-125; military clashes, 19, 92-93, 351-352, 354, 562-563  
     Plebiscite: Evacuation of plebiscite area by Yugoslavia and question of security of captured Austrian war material, 240-241, 252-253, 360-361, 453, 468; zones, 842, 867-868, 916, 931  
   German-Austrian political relations:  
     Independence of Austria: Austrian undertaking not to permit compromise of her independence, 727, 844-845; German peace treaty provision for recognition of, violation by new German Constitution, 937-938, 940, 946, 957-958, 962  
     Use of term "Austria" rather than "German Austria", Allied insistence on, 672-673, 674-675, 715-716, 864  
   Italy, relations with Austria:  
     Charges of relations between Austrian and Italian military authorities by Yugoslavia, 120, 123-125  
     Frontiers with Austria, 38, 842-843, 868-869, 912  
     Labor, Italian reservation to peace treaty clause regarding use of labor as reparation, 15  
     Political clauses regarding Italian rights to Palazzo Venezia and Lake Raibl, 870, 932  
     Ports, waterways, and railways, peace treaty clauses regarding Reschen Pass and Predil Pass Railways, 159-160, 945, 951

<sup>1</sup> This is primarily a subject index; no attempt has been made (except in a few instances) to include names of persons. Directories of the various delegations are printed in vol. III, pp. 1-153.



## Austria—Continued.

Jugoslav interests in Klagenfurt. *See* Frontier dispute, *supra*.

Political status (*see also* German-Austrian relations, *supra*), question of status as a new or old state, 715-716, 787-788, 797, 860-862, 870, 911-912, 912-914

Prisoners of war, 49, 50-52, 843, 878-880, 934

Shipping losses, agreement by Austrian Government regarding vessels sunk by their naval forces, 267, 301

Submarines, 364, 365

Treaty of peace with Allied and Associated Powers:

Committees concerning (*see also under* Correspondence, *infra*): Boundary delimitation commission, Austria-Italy, 38; Commission on Political Clauses for Europe, 101, 562, 595-599, 673, 675-676, 962; committee to examine Italian demand for Austro-Hungarian concession at Tientsin, establishment and report, 118-120, 171-173

Correspondence between Allies and Austrian delegation regarding terms of treaty:

Austrian observations on draft treaty presented *June 2*. Jugoslav request for pertinent notes, 40

Committees concerning. *See under* Draft Allied replies: Preparation and General reply: Preparation, *infra*.

Draft Allied replies to first Austrian notes:

Preparation:

Committees for study of Austrian observations (*see also under* General reply: Preparation, *infra*): Establishment, 4; work of, 15, 40, 42-43, 94-96

Discussions and reports, 49

Text, draft, of reply regarding economic clauses, 53-55; regarding League of Nations, 42-43

Further Austrian observations: Receipt of Austrian general reply of *Aug. 6*, 621-622; time limit for presentation, 7, 14, 370

General reply of Allies, *Sept. 2*:

Preparation:

Committee for Coordination of Replies to Austrian Counterpropositions (Editing Commit-

## Austria—Continued.

Treaty of peace, etc.—Continued.

Correspondence, etc.—Continued.

General reply—Continued.

Preparation—Continued.

tee): Establishment, 369-370; work of, 561, 702, 713-720, 785-789, 840-845, 859-926

Committees for study of Austrian observations, work of, 362, 369-370, 560-561, 621-622, 702, 713-720, 785-789, 796-798, 817-819, 825-826

Reservations by the delegations, 911-926

Text, draft, of covering letter and reply, 860-911; of minorities section, 586-589

Credentials, Allied acceptance, 674-675

Delivery of revised treaty to Austrian delegation, *July 20*, arrangements, 37-38

Signature: Intention of Austrian delegates regarding submission of peace terms to Austrian Assembly, 739-740; Italian reservations, 15, 206-207; time limit for acceptance of terms, 702, 864-865

Terms, discussions and draft texts:

Drafting questions: Frontier clauses, alteration of, 15, 37; resolution to apply to Austrian treaty certain modifications made in German peace treaty, 7, 15, 158-159; status of Austria as a new or old state, 715-716, 787-788, 797, 860-862, 870, 911-912, 912-914; use of term "Austria" rather than "German-Austria", 672-673, 674-675, 715-716, 864

Economic clauses. *See* Economic questions: Austrian peace treaty clauses.

Financial clauses. *See* Financial questions: Austrian peace treaty clauses.

Frontier clauses:

Alteration of frontiers defined in peace treaty, resolution concerning, 726-727

Czechoslovakia, 94, 95, 96, 97-100, 840-842, 865-866, 914-915, 931

General, 37, 840-843, 862-863, 865-869, 912, 931

Hungary, 15, 37, 94, 94-95, 97-100, 704-705, 842-843, 866-867

Italy, 38, 842-843, 868-869, 912

## Austria—Continued.

Treaty of peace, etc.—Continued.

Terms—Continued.

Frontier clauses—Continued.

Jugoslavia:

Carinthia and Klagenfurt.

*See* Frontier dispute  
with Jugoslavia, *supra*.Styria (Marburg and Rad-  
kersburg), question of  
plebiscite, 739-740, 842,  
867, 915-916, 931, 936-  
937, 948-950, 952-955, 958Liechtenstein and Switzerland,  
721, 726-727

Interests outside Europe:

China, 117-120, 171-173, 870-  
872, 872-873; question of  
Italian demand for cession  
of concession in Tientsin,  
117-120, 171-173Discussions, general, 117-120,  
171-173, 843, 870-873, 917,  
931-933

Egypt, 870-872, 917, 932-933

Morocco, 870-872, 917, 932-933

Siam, 870-872, 872

Labor clauses, 910-911, 960-961,  
963League of Nations Covenant, 40,  
42-43, 206-207, 863

Military, naval, and air clauses:

Air clauses, 461-462, 477, 875-  
877, 917-918, 934Discussions, general, 843, 873-  
878

General clauses, 877-878

Military clauses, 633-634, 873-  
875, 934, 939-940; coordi-  
nation with corresponding  
clauses in Hungarian peace  
treaty, 633-634Naval clauses, 357-360, 364-365,  
875, 934Penalties, 843, 880-881, 918-920,  
934

Political clauses for Europe:

Application to treaties with  
new states, proposed, 101,  
562, 598-599General provisions: Abstention  
from compromise of Aus-  
trian independence, 727,  
844-845; Austrian recog-  
nition of frontiers of new  
states, 15, 37; delivery of  
archives of transferred  
territory, 916-917; negotia-  
tion of special conventions  
to protect inhabitants of  
transferred territory, 958,  
962Italy (Palazzo Venezia and  
Lake Raibl), 870, 932

## Austria—Continued.

Treaty of peace, etc.—Continued.

Terms—Continued.

Political clauses for Europe—Con.

Minorities, protection of, 158,  
362, 369-370, 560-561, 586-  
589Nationality, 786-787, 797, 843,  
869-870, 931

Ports, waterways, and railways:

Discussions, general, 100-101,  
159-160, 203-205, 344-345,  
382-384, 817-819, 825-826,  
903-910, 924-926, 945, 951,  
958-960International conventions, Aus-  
trian obligation to accept,  
904-905Navigation and river regimes,  
100, 906-910, 924-926, 959-  
960

Railways:

Frontier stations, 100-101,  
905-906Provisions relating to certain  
railways: Construction,  
159-160, 905, 945, 951;  
Czechoslovak operation  
of railway over certain  
Austrian territory, 100;  
reorganization of South  
Austrian Railway, 203-  
205Transfers of railways and  
distribution of rolling  
stock, 344-345, 382, 383-  
384, 905, 905-906, 925Reciprocity clauses concerning  
new states, question of time  
of application, 817-819,  
825-826, 903-904, 958-959Prisoners of war, 49, 50-52, 843,  
878-880, 934Reparation. *See* Reparation:  
Austrian.Austro-Hungarian territories, former  
(*see also* Austria, Hungary, and  
New states), agreements regarding  
the cost of liberation of, 615, 767,  
777, 819, 820-821, 822, 830-834, 843

Aviation:

Aerial navigation:

Convention, international, question  
of U. S. participation, 62-63,  
90-92Peace treaty clauses: Bulgarian,  
278-279; Hungarian, 759-760Aeronautical Commission, reports con-  
cerning German aircraft, and dis-  
cussions thereof, 461-462, 477,  
563-564, 599-601, 653-654, 789-  
791, 799-801

## Aviation—Continued.

Aeronautical commissions of control: Bulgaria, 281; Germany, 65, 76, 77, 82-83, 462, 477, 563, 564; Hungary, 758

Austrian peace treaty military and naval air clauses, Allied draft reply to Austrian observations concerning, 875-877, 917-918, 934

Bulgarian peace treaty: Aerial navigation clauses, 278-279; military and naval air clauses, 258, 277-278, 281

German peace treaty military and naval air clauses. *See* Germany: Treaty: Terms: Military, etc.: Air.

Hungarian peace treaty: Aerial navigation clauses, 759-760; military and naval air clauses, 755-756, 758

Balkan states, proposal for voluntary emigration in, 561-562, 590-595

## Baltic countries:

Allied policy regarding governments of Esthonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, 324-327, 730-734

Blockade or equivalent measures to prevent goods from reaching Soviet Russia, 102, 117, 131-134, 142-145, 634-635, 644-645; U. S. objections, and suggestion by President Wilson, 133-134, 634-635, 644-645

Commission on Baltic Affairs, 48, 324-327, 488-489, 501-502, 511, 733, 734

Financial assistance to Baltic states for payment of troops, question of, 48-49, 239-240, 251

German troops, efforts of Supreme Council to compel withdrawal from Baltic countries in accordance with Armistice provisions, 41, 47-49, 131, 140-142, 303, 404-405, 428-433, 557-558, 704, 734-735, 740-744

Karelian delegation, request for hearing by Conference, 327

Lithuania, frontier dispute with Poland, 88, 303-304, 315-316, 328, 378

Memel. *See* Memel.

Trade with Baltic states, question of, 132

Baltic Sea, proposed negotiation of treaty regarding access to, 488-489, 501-502

Banat: Claims of Yugoslavia and Roumania, 4, 327-328, 360-361, 455, 456, 471-472, 682, 791, 801-802; export of foodstuffs from Banat to Austria-Hungary, Yugoslav refusal to permit and proposed Allied action concerning, 504, 505, 505-507; irriga-

## Banat—Continued.

tion canals, 455, 472, 473; request for hearing before Council by delegation of Swabians from Banat, 327-328

Battlefields in liberated regions, question of participation of Allied armies in clearing up, 629-632, 642-644

Bela Kun. *See under* Hungary: Political situation.

Belgium (*see also* Africa): Commission to delimit frontiers with Germany, Allied nomination, 260-261, 324; Reparation Commission, alternate representation with Japan and Yugoslavia, 2-3; Treaties of 1839, Commission for Revision of, 134-135

Bessarabia, 4-5, 8-14, 456, 457-459, 559-560, 682

Bethmann-Hollweg, von, decision of Supreme Council not to reply to note declaring personal responsibility for the war, 378

Blockade. *See also* Commissions: Blockade *and under* Austria, Baltic countries, Germany, Hungary, *and* Russia.

Bolshevism. *See* Communism.

Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, treaties of 1918, 339, 435, 503

Brussels Convention concerning economic assistance to Germany, 789-790, 791, 800, 801

Bukovina, 4, 455-457, 459, 474-475

## Bulgaria:

Armistice of *Sept. 29, 1918*. *See* Military situation: Enforcement of Armistice, *infra*.

Army of occupation, 65-66, 84-85, 136-137, 147-148, 398, 399, 452-453, 467-468, 484, 485, 539-540, 541

Communism, 152

## Frontiers:

Greece, conflict over Thrace: Access to Aegean for Bulgaria at Cavalla or Dédéagatch, 137, 234, 247-248, 355, 379-380, 438, 439, 440-441, 607-611, 671-672; alleged desire of Mohammedans of West Thrace to unite with Greece, 245-246, 247, 352-353, 378-379, 396-401, 436, 437-438, 440, 539, 545-546; discussions, general, 136-137, 152, 198, 234-235, 243-248, 352-353, 355, 378-380, 396-401, 402, 434-442, 511-513, 514, 515, 538-541, 544-546, 607-611, 671-672, 703, 704; Italian intervention, 136-137, 138, 152, 234; statements by Mr. White and Mr. Balfour, 436-440

Yugoslavia, 243, 511-512, 764

Roumania, 242-243, 439, 440, 511-512, 512, 540, 541, 609, 687

Turkey, 5-6, 14, 441-442, 671



## Bulgaria—Continued.

Italy, relations with: Fraternization of Italian and Bulgarian officers, 152, 192, 201-202; Italian intervention in Greek-Bulgarian dispute, 136-137, 138, 152, 234

Military situation: Enforcement of Armistice terms and disarmament of Bulgaria, 452-453, 484-486, 492-495, 511-515, 526-527, 528, 702-704; occupation of Bulgaria, Allied, 65-66, 84-85, 136-137, 147-148, 398-399, 452-453, 467-468, 484, 485, 494-495, 539-540, 541

Prisoners of war and graves, 263, 294-299

Treaty of peace with Allied and Associated Powers:

Languages, official, 268

Signature: Questions delaying completion of treaty, 233-234; summoning of Bulgarian delegation to Paris to receive peace terms, 59, 89, 136, 459

Terms, discussions and draft texts: Aerial navigation clauses, 278-279  
Economic clauses. *See* Economic questions: Bulgarian peace treaty clauses.

Financial clauses. *See* Financial questions: Bulgarian peace treaty clauses.

Frontiers (*see also* Frontiers, *supra*), 233

Military, naval, and air clauses:

Air clauses, 258, 277-279

Control commissions, 272*n*, 279-281; U. S. reservation, 272*n*

General clauses, 281-282

Military clauses, 258, 268-275; Italian reservation regarding compulsory service, 258, 269, 271

Naval clauses, 258, 276

Text, draft, 268-282

Penalties, 233-234, 258-260, 282-290; U. S. reservation, 289-290

Political clauses: Greece, 484, 491-492, 673, 675-676; minorities, 234, 403-404, 425-428, 561-562, 590-595

Ports, waterways, and railways:

Discussions, general, 234, 344-345, 352-353, 382, 383, 402-403, 409-425, 673, 676, 819, 826-828

Disputes and revision, 422-423

General provisions, 409, 410, 411-413

International conventions, Bulgarian obligation to adhere, 423

Navigation, 413-418, 423-424, 826-828

## Bulgaria—Continued.

Treaty of peace, etc.—Continued.

Terms—Continued.

Ports, etc.—Continued.

Railways: Free access to Aegean Sea for Bulgaria, 234, 352, 355, 402-403, 409, 410, 418-419, 424-425; international transport, 419-421; rolling stock, 344-345, 382, 383, 421; transfers of railway lines, 421-422; transitory, 422-423

Text, draft, 410-425

Prisoners of war and graves, 263, 294-299

Reparation. *See* Reparation: Bulgarian.

Capitulations, Bulgarian peace treaty clauses concerning and Japanese amendment, 323, 330, 376-377, 390

Central Territorial Committee. *See* *under* Commissions.

## China:

Austrian treaty provisions concerning interests in, 117-120, 171-173, 870-872, 872-873; question of Italian demand for cession of concession in Tientsin, 117-120, 171-173

German peace treaty provision for restoration of concessions to China, 118, 171

Churchill, Winston, proposal for repatriation of Czechoslovak troops in Siberia, 63

## Coal question:

Austrian peace treaty provisions for supply of coal to Austria by Czechoslovakia and Poland, 785-786, 796-797, 890-891, 944-945, 950-951

Commissions: Coal Committee (of Supreme Economic Council), work in Upper Silesian coal strikes, 698, 699, 701, 736, 771-774, 813, 822, 928; European Coal Commission, proposed, 267-268, 533-537

Hoover, Herbert, reports, 533-537, 543-544, 710-711

Italy, efforts to obtain coal, 17, 39, 175-176, 267-268, 343-344, 371-372

Silesia, Upper. *See* Germany: Eastern frontiers: Silesia: German-Polish conflict.

Colonies, German (*see also* Africa), supervision of colonial clauses of treaty by Commission on Mandates, 161, 240

Commissions, committees, etc. (*see also* Councils):

Aeronautical commissions of control. *See under* Aviation.

American Commission for Relief in the Near East, 31

## Commissions, etc.—Continued.

Austria, committees concerning. *See* Austria: Treaty of peace: Committees.

Baltic Affairs, Commission on, 48, 324-327, 488-489, 501-502, 511, 733, 734

Blockade committees: Allied Blockade Committee, 102, 113-114, 131, 142-144; Eastern Blockade Committee, 131, 142-144, 724-726

Boundary delimitation commissions (*see also* Treaty: Committees: Boundary *under* Austria and Germany), principle regarding costs of, 706-707

Central Territorial Committee, work on Austrian peace treaty, 726-727, 936-937; on Bulgarian peace treaty, 14, 234-235, 242-248, 673, 676

Coal. *See* Coal: Commissions.

Control commissions:

Bulgaria, 272*n*, 279-281

Germany. *See* Germany: Treaty: Terms: Military, etc.: Control commissions.

Hungary, 756-758

Coordination committees. *See* Treaty: Committees: Coordination *under* Austria and Germany.

Credentials Committee, 672-673, 674-675

Czechoslovak Affairs, Commission on, 117, 257, 612

Danube, commissions regarding: European Commission of the Danube, 417, 828-829; International Commission for the Upper Danube, 417-418, 424, 827-828, 828-830, 907, 909-910; International Military Control for Danube, 829; special commission for provisional control over vessels of disputed ownership, 827, 830

Drafting Committee, work on—

Austrian peace treaty, 15, 37-38, 100, 158, 159-160, 204-205, 562, 917, 931

Bulgarian peace treaty, 268, 403-404, 673, 676, 687

German peace treaty, questions relating to, 93, 101-102, 262, 290-291, 957-958

New states, treaties with, 268, 562

Economic Commission, work on—

Austrian peace treaty, 796-798, 942-943

Bulgarian peace treaty, 328-329, 384-395, 686-687, 692-693

German peace treaty clauses, supervision of execution, 161, 240

Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty of Peace With Germany, Committee on, 1-2, 6, 14, 136, 138,

## Commissions, etc.—Continued.

160-161, 162-170, 240, 260, 261-262, 262, 262-263, 290, 356-357, 362-364, 706-707

Financial Commission, 49, 61, 62, 71-75, 88-89, 239-240, 251, 476-477, 620, 624, 652, 673, 676, 912

Fiume, Commission of Inquiry. *See under* Italy: Fiume.

Greek and Albanian Affairs, Commission on, 6*n*, 14, 244, 245-246, 247

Hungary, military commission of inquiry for. *See* Hungary: Military Mission of Generals.

Labor Legislation, International, Commission on, 960-961, 963

League of Nations, Commission on, 40, 42-43, 86-87

Mandates, Colonial, Commission on, 161, 240, 612-613, 617-618

Military commission to study question of clearing up of battlefields in liberated regions, 631-632, 644

Minorities Committee. *See* New States, *infra*.

New States, Committee on, 101, 158, 234, 362, 369, 403-404, 559, 560-561, 561-562, 590-592, 676

Plebiscite commissions (*see also under* Germany: Treaty: Commissions), principle concerning distribution of costs of, 483, 706-707

Polish Affairs, Commission on, 117, 257, 612

Political clauses for Europe (Austrian treaty), Commission on, 101, 562, 595-599, 673, 675-676, 962

Ports, waterways, and railways. *See* Ports, etc.: Commissions.

Prisoners of war and graves, commissions on. *See under* Prisoners of war.

Reparation. *See* Reparation: Commissions.

Responsibility of the Authors of the War and Enforcement of Penalties, Commission on, 673

Rhine Territory, Committee on: Establishment, 87-88; report, text and discussions, 205-206, 212-229

Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs, Commission on, 5, 62, 75-76, 243, 328, 360-361, 454-457, 471-475, 611, 952-955

Saar, delimitation committee for, 261-262

Silesia, commission to conduct plebiscite in, 135-136, 146, 147, 167, 239, 323, 537, 794, 822

Smyrna, Commission of Inquiry. *See* Turkish territories: Anatolia: Smyrna.

Spitzbergen, Commission on, 39

Supreme Economic Council. *See* Supreme Economic Council.



## Commissions, etc.—Continued.

Tientsin, Commission on, 118-120, 171-173

Transportation Committee, Interallied, 652, 662-669, 792-793, 807-809

Treaties of 1839, Commission for Revision of, 134-135

## Communism:

Austria, 174, 175, 176, 305

Bulgaria, 152

Hungary. *See* Hungary: Political situation: Communism.

Italy, 107

Russian communism, Allied efforts to combat. *See* Russia: Blockade.

## Conferences:

Danube conference, proposed, 828-829  
Labor Conference, International, 960-961

London Conference of 1913, 442

Contracts, prescriptions, and judgments, peace treaty provisions concerning: Austrian, 789, 798, 899-900, 923-924; Bulgarian, 328-329, 392-395, 687, 692-693; Czechoslovakian, 111; new states, 111

Conventions. *See* Treaties, conventions, etc.

## Councils:

Council of Five. *See* Heads of Delegations.

Foreign Ministers, Council of, 101

Heads of Delegations, Council of. *See* Heads of Delegations.

Supreme Economic Council. *See* Supreme Economic Council.

Covenant of League of Nations, 40, 42-43, 206-207, 261-262, 863

Credentials Committee, 672-673, 674-675

Czechoslovakia (*see also* New states):  
Austro-Czechoslovak relations (*see also* Frontiers: Austria, *infra*):

Arms and munitions, Austrian deliveries to Czechoslovakia by order of Supreme Council, 175-177, 263-264, 299-300, 462, 478-480

Austrian peace treaty provisions:  
Special customs agreement, 54-55; supply of coal to Austria by Czechoslovakia, 785-786, 796-797, 890-891, 944-945, 950-951

Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs, 117, 257, 612

## Frontiers with—

Austria, 94, 95, 96, 97-100, 840-842, 865-866, 914-915, 931

## Hungary:

Hungarian evacuation of Czechoslovak territory in accordance with instructions of Supreme Council, 24, 67-69, 106, 107, 114, 115, 120, 125, 126,

## Czechoslovakia—Continued.

## Frontiers with—Continued.

## Hungary—Continued.

127, 129, 139-140; continued threat of Hungarian forces, 182

Withdrawal of Czechs from mining region in neutral zone, Allied request, 708

Poland (Teschen), 116-117, 257, 612  
Roumania, 611

German treaty provision concerning Czechoslovak railways, 159

Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations (*see also* Frontiers: Hungary, *supra*), cooperation of Czechoslovak forces in proposed Allied military intervention in Hungary, 647, 658-659

Repatriation of Czechoslovak troops in Siberia, 63-65, 211-212, 556-557, 652-653

## Treaties:

Agreement between Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, on the Cost of Liberation of the Territories of the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 819, 830-832, 843; draft text, 830-832

Treaty with Allied and Associated Powers: Discussions, general, 101, 537-538, 558-559, 569-579; languages, official, 268; reciprocal relations of territories ceded from former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 101, 109-113; text, draft, 569-579

Danube (*see also* under Commissions):

Austrian peace treaty clauses, 906, 907-908, 924-925; Bulgarian peace treaty clauses, 414-418, 423-424, 826-828; German peace treaty provisions, 828-830; opening of Danube, 20-21, 29, 504, 505, 603, 604, 658; regulation of trade on, 819, 828-830, 938

Danzig. *See* under Germany: Eastern frontiers.

Debts: Austrian peace treaty clauses, 893-894, 894-896, 923-924; Bulgarian peace treaty clauses, 390-391; Russian public debt, Soviet repudiation of, 913

## Denmark:

Commercial relations with Soviet Russia, question of resumption of (*see also* Russia: Blockade), 143, 265

Schleswig, interest in. *See* Germany: Treaty: Terms: Boundaries: Schleswig.



- Diplomatic and consular relations, question of renewal of credentials of German diplomatic agents, 268, 301-302
- Dobrudja, Bulgarian and Roumanian claims, 242-243, 439, 440, 511-512, 512, 540, 541, 609, 687
- Drafting Committee. *See under* Commissions.
- Economic questions:
- Austria:
- Blockade of Germany and Hungary until formal acceptance of peace terms, proposed agreement for, 145, 348-350, 353-354, 817, 825
- Peace treaty clauses, discussions and draft texts:
- Commercial relations: Customs regulations, duties, and restrictions, 54-55, 785-786, 796-797, 890-891, 923, 934-936, 944-945, 950-951; treatment of Allied nationals, 892; unfair competition, 891-892
- Contracts, prescriptions, and judgments, 899-900, 923-924, 942-944
- Debts, 893-896, 923-924, 942-944
- Discussions, general, 49, 53-55, 785-789, 796-798, 863, 890-903, 923-924, 934-936, 941-945, 950-951, 958, 962
- Industrial property, 901-903, 923-924, 942-944
- Mixed arbitral tribunal, 900-901, 923-924, 942-944
- Property, rights, and interests, 893-894, 896-899, 923-924, 942-944
- Special provisions relating to transferred territory, 53-54, 788-789, 797-798, 898-899, 923-924, 942-944, 958, 962
- Treaties, 797, 892-893
- Bulgarian peace treaty clauses:
- Commercial relations, 385-386
- Contracts, prescriptions, and judgments, 328-329, 384, 392-395, 687, 692-693
- Debts, 390-391
- Discussions, general, 234, 323, 328-330, 376-377, 384-395, 489, 503, 686-687, 692-693
- Industrial property, 395
- Mixed arbitral tribunal, 395
- Property, rights, and interests, 384, 391-392
- Special provisions relating to transferred territory, 329, 395
- Text, draft, 385-395
- Treaties, 323, 330, 376-377, 384, 386-390, 489, 503, 687, 692; draft *art.* 29 (privileges and immunities of foreign subjects), 323, 330, 376-377, 384, 390
- Economic questions—Continued.
- Distribution of raw material:
- Coal. *See* Coal question.
- Italian proposal for creation of an interallied organization for, 343-344, 371-372
- Regulation of exchange of goods between countries of Central Europe, suggestion for, 650-651, 662
- Economic Commission. *See under* Commissions.
- German peace treaty clauses, supervision of execution by Economic Commission, 161, 240
- Egypt, Austrian peace treaty clauses concerning, 870-872, 917, 932-933
- Emigration, voluntary, in the Balkans, proposed negotiation of convention for, 561-562, 590-595
- Financial questions (*see also* Reparation):
- Austrian peace treaty clauses, discussions, 843, 863, 865, 885-890, 912-914, 922-923
- Bulgarian peace treaty clauses, 233, 324, 336-341, 408, 433, 460-461, 476-477, 624, 638-639; text, draft, 336-341
- Financial Commission, 49, 61, 62, 71-75, 88-89, 239-240, 251, 476-477, 620, 624, 652, 673, 676, 912
- Hungarian securities, seizure by Bela Kun and warning of Supreme Council against sale abroad, 23, 28, 61-62, 71-75, 88-89
- Plebiscite costs, division between states concerned, 706-707
- Finland:
- Frontier and territorial questions: Claims of Finland and Sweden to Aaland Islands, 443, 448, 511, 518-526; Norwegian frontier, 39; Russian frontier in Karelia, 327
- Military assistance to anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia, question of, 38-39
- Fiume. *See under* Italy.
- Foch, Marshal, Commander of Polish Army, 150-151
- Food relief (*see also under* Austria and Hungary):
- Russian Armenia, 210-211, 231-232
- Turkish Armenia: Food relief, 41, 43, 44; repatriation of Armenian agriculturalists, 40-41, 43-44
- Foreign Ministers, Council of, 101
- Fourteen Points, reference to, 839, 858
- France (*see also* Italy: Anti-French incidents):
- Austrian peace treaty, observations, 912-926
- Devastated regions: Allied assistance in reconstruction of, French desire for, 629-631, 642-643; retention of German prisoners of war for labor in, 631, 813-815

## France—Continued.

Participation in Chambéry-Turin railway improvement, 652, 662-669

Ratification of German peace treaty, question of, 450, 813, 946

Troops in Asia and Europe, questions concerning, 24-25, 64, 65-66, 84, 135, 136, 161, 196, 318-319, 361-362, 436-439, 441-442, 446-448, 467-468, 484, 538, 649, 816, 839-840

Georgia. *See under* Russia.

## Germany:

Armistice. *See* Baltic countries, *infra*.

Army of occupation, Allied. *See* Rhineland: Army.

Austria, relations with. *See* Austria: German-Austrian political relations.

Baltic countries, efforts of Supreme Council to compel withdrawal of German troops in accordance with Armistice provisions, 41, 47-49, 131, 140-142, 303, 404-405, 428-433, 557-558, 704, 734-735, 740-744

Bethmann-Hollweg, von, Allied decision not to reply to note declaring personal responsibility for the war, 378

## Blockade:

Agreement by Austria to prohibit trade with Germany pending formal acceptance of peace terms, 145, 348-350, 353-354

Effect of termination of German blockade on Brussels Convention, 789-790, 791, 800, 801; on unofficial blockade of Russia, 102, 117, 131, 142-145

Resumption of commercial relations with Germany, 345-348, 370-371, 380-382

Termination of, 40, 101-102, 113-114

Colonies (*see also* Africa), supervision by Commission on Mandates of execution of peace treaty clauses concerning, 161, 240

Constitution, new, violation of German peace treaty provision for recognition of Austrian independence, and question of action by Supreme Council, 937-938, 940, 946, 957-958

Diplomatic and consular relations with Allies, credentials of German diplomatic agents, 263, 301-302

## Eastern frontiers:

Commission to Delimit Eastern Frontiers of Germany, 137-138, 150, 161, 165-167, 169-170, 238, 292-293, 323, 629

Correspondence between German delegation and Supreme Council:

## Germany—Continued.

## Eastern frontiers—Continued.

June 25, German note requesting notification to populations east of Germany regarding date of entry into force of peace treaty, text, 108-109; question of reply, 93, 101

July 8, German note requesting entry into negotiations with Poland regarding transfer of territories, text, 291-292

July 16, German note requesting names of Allied commissioners for East Prussia, text, 292-293

July 23, Allied reply to German note of July 8, discussions and text, 262, 292

July 23, Allied reply to German note of July 16, discussions and text, 262-263, 293

Danzig: Allied commissioners, 293; demand for early separation from Germany, 736; military and naval measures to be taken for occupation of Danzig and Memel, question of, 443, 443-448, 628-629, 641-642; protest against removal by Germans of material from factories, 242, 253; temporary administrator for, 169; transport of Allied troops via Danzig, 237, 792, 804-805

Memel: Allied commissioners, question of, 292-293; lack of provision for temporary administrator, 168-169; military and naval measures to be taken for occupation of Danzig and Memel, question of, 443, 443-448, 628-629, 641-642

Poland: Allied military assistance to Poland in event of trouble in area to be ceded by Germany, proposed, 137-138, 149-151, 237-238, 249; armies of occupation, question of, 161, 165, 167, 168; frontier delimitation commission, 137-138, 150, 161, 165-167, 169-170, 238, 292-293, 323, 629; German-Polish negotiations regarding transfer of territory, and assistance of Allied representatives, 262, 291-292, 515, 558, 781-782, 782, 794, 805

Prussia, East: Frontier delimitation commission, 137-138, 150, 161, 165-167, 169-170, 238, 323, 629; plebiscite or administrative commissions, 167-168, 262-263, 292-293

## Germany—Continued.

## Eastern frontiers—Continued.

## Silesia, Upper :

German-Polish conflict over coal mines, Allied efforts to control (*see also* Plebiscite: Army: Proposed advance dispatch, *infra*): Dispatch of Allied military committee from Berlin, 710, 781, 782-783, 794, 795-796, 927-929, 938-939, 945, 952; reports concerning conflict, 322-323, 710, 727-729, 735, 744-746, 768-769, 771, 778-779, 793-794, 822; work of Coal Committee, 698, 699, 701, 736, 771-774, 813, 822, 923

## Plebiscite:

Army of occupation, Allied: Composition and strength, 135-136, 145-147, 167, 236-237, 249, 308-309, 312, 625-628, 641-642, 783-785, 815-816; proposed advance dispatch to Silesia to protect coal mines, 698-701, 710-711, 721-724, 727-729, 735-736, 746-747, 769-770, 773, 778-779, 780, 783-785, 795, 813, 923, 939

Boundary delimitation, 167

Commission, 135-136, 146, 147, 167, 239, 323, 537, 794, 822

Kehl port director, Allied nomination, 360

Postal and telegraph communications, reestablishment of, 345-348, 370-371, 380-382

Prisoners of war (*see also under* Treaty: Terms, *infra*): German responsibility for repatriation of Russian prisoners in Germany, 208-210, 230-231, 486-488, 498-501; retention by France for labor in devastated areas, proposed, 631, 813-815

Rhine. *See* Rhineland.

Sale of horses and motors to Germans by American and British troops of occupation, 838-839, 857-858

Scapa Flow incident, 357-360, 405, 406-407

Submarines, 364, 365-368, 406, 407

Treaty of peace with Allied and Associated Powers:

Commissions concerning (*see also* Commissions *under* Reparation and Rhineland):

Boundary delimitation commissions: Belgo-German boundary, 260-261, 324; Polish-German boundary (Commission to Delimit Eastern Frontiers of Germany), 137-138, 150, 161, 165-167, 169-170,

## Germany—Continued.

## Treaty of peace, etc.—Continued.

## Commissions concerning—Con.

Boundary delimitation commissions—Con.

238, 292-293, 323, 629; Saar Basin, 261-262

Control commissions. *See* Terms: Military, etc.: Interallied commissions of control, *infra*.

Coordinating Committee to deal with interpretation and execution of treaty, proposed establishment, 356-357, 362-364

Economic Commission, supervision of execution of economic clauses, 161, 240

Execution of Clauses of Treaty With Germany, Committee on, 1-2, 6, 14, 136, 138, 160-161, 162-170, 240, 260, 261-262, 262, 263, 356-357, 362-364, 793, 810

Mandates Commission, supervision of execution of colonial clauses, 240

Plebiscite or administrative commissions: Danzig, 293; East Prussia, 167-168, 262-263, 292-293; Schleswig, 161, 162-163, 164, 793, 810; Upper Silesia, 135-136, 146, 147, 167, 239, 323, 794, 822

Repatriation of Prisoners of War, Commission on, 945-948, 957

Rolling stock in enemy countries, commissions of experts for distribution of, 344-345, 372-376, 382-383

Correspondence between German delegation and Supreme Council (*see also under* Rhineland: Convention; *also under* Eastern frontiers, *supra*): Allied proposed note to German delegates regarding estimation of war damages in devastated regions, 737, 761-762; restitution to Yugoslavia of topographical maps of Costoplatz mines, 737, 762-763

Protocol, German ratification of, 66

Ratification by—

Allied powers: Delay in, 813; France, 450, 813, 946; Great Britain, 813, 946; Italy, 813, 946; United States, question of, 261, 323, 813

Germany, 66, 101-102

Terms, discussions concerning:

Boundaries of Germany and political clauses for Europe:

Alsace-Lorraine, appointment of temporary port director for Kehl and Strasbourg, 360



## Germany—Continued.

Treaty of peace, etc.—Continued.

Terms—Continued.

Boundaries, etc.—Continued.

Austrian independence, provision for German recognition of, violation by new German Constitution, 937-938, 940, 946, 957-958, 962

Belgium, 260-261, 324

Danzig. *See under* Eastern frontiers, *supra*.

East Prussia, Allied commissioners for, 161, 167-168, 262-263, 292-293

Memel. *See under* Eastern frontiers, *supra*.

Poland. *See under* Eastern frontiers, *supra*.

Saar Basin, 261-262, 641, 642

Schleswig, plebiscite in: General provisions, 160-161, 162-164, 262, 290-291, 361-362, 483-484, 793, 810; occupation forces for plebiscite area, 161, 163, 361-362, 483-484; plebiscite commission, 161, 162-163, 164, 793, 810; request by Danish Government for Allied warship at Flensburg, 483-484; sale of state property in plebiscite area, notification by Supreme Council, 163, 262, 290-291

Silesia, Upper. *See under* Eastern frontiers, *supra*.

Military, naval, and air clauses:

Air clauses, questions concerning aeronautic material:

Distribution of material among Allies, proposed principles to govern, 461-462, 477

German sales to neutrals, and Allied efforts to prevent, 563-564, 599-601, 653-654, 789-791, 799-801, 816-817, 823; exceptions for Czechoslovakia and for Gen. Yudenitch, 790, 791, 823

Commissions of control, inter-allied: Aeronautical Commission of Control, 65, 76, 77, 82-83, 462, 486, 707, 711-712; dispatch to Germany of advance delegations representing commissions, proposed, 792, 806-807; Military Commission of Control, 65, 76, 77, 78-80, 486, 496-498, 632-633, 639*n*, 707, 711-712; Naval Commission of Control, 65, 76, 77, 80-81, 486, 707, 711-712; organization and pay

## Germany—Continued.

Treaty of peace, etc.—Continued.

Terms—Continued.

Military, naval, etc.—Continued. scales, proposed, 65, 76-83, 486, 496-498, 632-633, 707, 711-712

Military clauses: Arming of Germany in violation of treaty clauses, 452, 463-467; strength of German military force to be maintained in 50-kilometer zone on right bank of Rhine, 625, 639-641

Naval clauses, disposal of German fleet, 357-360, 364-368, 405-408

Penalties, request by German Government for postponement of surrender of military officers as demanded by treaty, because of political situation, 449-451, 462, 547-548, 565-566, 649-650, 660-661

Ports, waterways, and railways: Distribution of rolling stock in enemy countries, commissions of experts for, 344-345, 372-376, 382-383; port of Kehl and Strasbourg, nomination of director for, 360; regulation of traffic on the Danube, provisions regarding, 828-830

Prisoners of war and graves: Interdependence with penalties provisions, 449-451, 946-947; repatriation of German prisoners in Allied custody, 634, 813-815, 945-948, 957

Reparation. *See* Reparation: German.

Rights and interests outside Germany:

China, restoration of German concessions, 118, 171

Colonies (*see also* Africa), supervision of execution of colonial clauses by Commission on Mandates, 161

Graves. *See* Prisoners of war and graves.

Great Britain:

Austrian peace treaty, British observations, 911-927, 941-944

German peace treaty, question of British ratification, 813, 947

Mandates (*see also* Africa), declination of mandate for Syria, 196

Troops in Asia and Europe, questions concerning, 61, 63-64, 66, 85, 135, 136, 148, 161, 196, 309, 317, 445, 467-468, 484, 487, 495, 625, 629-631, 642-643, 648, 649, 792-793, 807-809, 838-839, 840, 857-858, 929-931

## Greece :

Bulgarian peace treaty provisions concerning Greece (*see also* Bulgaria: Frontiers: Greece): Political clauses, 484, 491-492, 673, 675-676; reparation and financial clauses, Greek interests, 324, 332-333, 460-461, 476-477, 638-639, 739

Italy, conflict in Anatolia, 17-18, 33, 34, 35, 121-122, 128, 138-139, 152-153, 154-158, 194-198, 538-539, 540, 555-556

Haskell, W. N., appointment as High Commissioner for Armenia, 28, 43

Heads of Delegations, Council of: Constitution of Council, and finality of decisions, 3; presence of experts at Council meetings, 20; publicity, question of, 15-16; records of proceedings and distribution of minutes, *facing* 1, 41, 86-87, 342-343; rules and procedures, 701-702, 956-957

Hoover, Herbert, reports and recommendations regarding—

Austrian food situation, 173-177, 183-187

Coal situation in Europe, 533-537, 543-544

Hungary, economic situation, 20-23, 29-30, 504-506

Russia: Repatriation of Russian prisoners in Germany, 230-231; Russian Armenia, food relief for, 210-211, 231-232

Turkish territories, Armenia, recommendation for appointment of High Commissioner for, 30-31

## Hungary :

Armistice of Nov. 3, 1918, and military convention of Nov. 13, 1918:

Execution by Hungary, question of, and Allied efforts to compel (*see also* Political situation: Bela Kun: Allied proposed military intervention, *infra*), 481-482, 490-491, 507-509, 516, 517, 529, 530-533, 542-543, 550-555, 680

Roumanian charges of lapse of, 686, 690

Bela Kun. *See under* Political situation, *infra*.

Blockade, 22, 23, 25, 29, 131, 134, 348-350, 353-354, 504, 505, 530, 543, 656, 817, 825

Danube, 20-21, 29, 504, 505, 603, 604, 658

Financial questions, sale of securities by Bela Kun government, 23, 28, 61-62, 71-75, 88-89

Food relief, 20-23, 29-30, 317, 321, 504-506, 518, 604, 636, 654-656, 678, 774-776

## Hungary—Continued.

## Frontier questions :

Austria, 15, 37, 94, 94-95, 97-100, 704-705, 842-843, 866-867

Conflict with Czechoslovakia. *See* Czechoslovakia: Frontiers: Hungary.

Jugoslavia: Backsa, 454-455, 471, 472-473; Baranya, 454, 469-471, 705-706; Prekomurje, 62, 75-76, 454, 455, 468-469, 473-474, 705

Roumania. *See* Roumanian aggression, *infra*.

Military Mission of Generals: Discussions, instructions, and reports, 529-533, 542-543, 549-550, 555, 567-569, 606, 615-617, 621, 636-637, 647, 670, 674, 677-682, 685-686, 694, 695-698, 707-708, 709-710, 739, 767, 776, 792, 803, 804, 836, 836-838, 855-856; nomination and organization, 199-200, 208, 236, 305-306, 310-311, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 517, 528, 529, 836; notifications by Supreme Council to Hungarian, Yugoslav, and Roumanian Governments concerning functions of Military Mission, 510, 517-518, 541-542, 691

## Political situation :

## Bela Kun Communist government :

Allied proposed military intervention to combat spread of communism and to enforce respect for Armistice, 20-28, 29-30, 59-61, 67-71, 103-108, 114-115, 177-183, 187-190, 198-200, 254-257, 304-308, 317-322, 348; question of assistance of Czech, Yugoslav, and Roumanian forces, 24, 25, 27, 60-61, 69-71, 103-108, 177, 187-189, 318-319, 322

Allied refusal to grant recognition or to negotiate: Discussions, 29, 305, 308, 317-322; text of declaration of July 27, 321-322

Efforts of Bela Kun to secure Roumanian withdrawal from Hungary :

Correspondence with Supreme Council: July 11, request by Bela Kun for Roumanian withdrawal, text and discussions, 120-121, 125-127; July 12, Allied reply, text, 121; July 15 (?), renewal by Bela Kun of request for Roumanian withdrawal, text and discussions, 129-131, 139-140; July 21, notification by Bela Kun of contemplated military action against Roumanian

## Hungary—Continued.

## Political situation—Continued.

Bela Kun Communist government—Continued.

Efforts of Bela Kun, etc.—Con.

Correspondence with Supreme Council—Continued.

forces, text and discussions, 236, 248-249

Military operations, unsuccessful, 236, 248-249, 304, 322, 482

Resignation and replacement by Social Democratic government, 482, 489

Securities, seizure of, and Allied warning against attempted sale abroad, 23, 28, 61-62, 71-74, 88-89

Terrorism, 21, 23, 121, 127

Communism (*see also* Bela Kun, *supra*), 605, 637, 657, 739, 775-776

Hapsburg government of Archduke Joseph:

Allied disapproval and question of relations, 679-681, 694-698, 707-708, 709-710, 775-776, 791-792, 803-804

Communications to Supreme Council: *Aug. 8*, request for recognition, text, 657; *Aug. 16*, information concerning composition and aims, text, 708-709

Entry into power after deposition of Social Democratic government, 604-605, 605; Roumanian assistance, alleged, 606, 680, 681, 688, 695, 775

Resignation, 855

Social Democratic government: Establishment and question of Allied support and economic assistance, 236, 254-257, 304-308, 310-311, 320, 322, 480-483, 487-491, 504-511, 516-518; overthrow by Archduke Joseph, 605, 617

Szeged group, 21, 177-178, 348

Roumanian aggression and defiance of Supreme Council:

Allied measures to compel Roumanian respect for authority of Supreme Council:

Concentration of Roumanian forces on Theiss River, 24, 69, 70, 104, 120, 125-127, 129-130, 139-140, 179-182, 188, 199, 236, 248-249, 481-483, 490

Correspondence between Supreme Council and Roumania, texts:

*Aug. 4*, Allied request for cooperation of Roumanian forces with interallied military mission, 517-518

## Hungary—Continued.

Roumanian aggression and defiance of Supreme Council—Continued.

Allied measures to compel Roumanian respect for authority of Supreme Council—Continued.

Correspondence between Supreme Council and Roumania, texts—Continued.

*Aug. 5*, Allied request for observance by Roumanian forces of instructions issued by military mission, 541-542

*Aug. 6*, Allied notification of refusal to recognize proposed Roumanian separate armistice with Hungary, 555

*Aug. 7*, Allied charges of Roumanian intention to defy Council and sever Alliance, 616-617

*Aug. 12*, Allied request for Roumanian instructions to generals in Hungary to conform to decisions of Supreme Council, 682

*Aug. 14*, Roumanian reply to Allied communications, 688-691

*Aug. 14*, Allied reply to Roumanian note of *Aug. 14*, 691-692

*Aug. 23*, Allied protest against looting of Hungary: Publication, 945; text, 819-822

*Aug. 25*, Allied request for reply to protest of *Aug. 23*, 857

Military mission. *See* Military mission, *supra*.

Protests and threats. *See* Correspondence, *supra*.

Stoppage of shipments to Roumania, 811-813, 833, 838

Occupation of Budapest, and attitude of Supreme Council toward Roumanian aggression and looting, 504-511, 517-518, 528-529, 531-533, 541-542, 548-555, 566-569, 603-607, 615-617, 620-621, 636-637, 646-647, 654-659, 670-671, 674, 677-682, 683-686, 688-692, 695, 739, 767, 768, 774-778, 811-813, 819-822, 836-838, 855-857, 945

Requisition of material by Roumania as reparation, 548, 549, 551-555, 567-569, 605-606, 613-615, 616-617, 621, 655-656, 657, 681-682, 684-686, 690, 691-692, 767, 768, 774-778, 811-813, 819-822, 836-838, 855-857, 945

Treaty of peace with Allied and Associated Powers:

Conditions of peace, instructions to committees concerning, 408, 670



## Hungary—Continued.

## Treaty of peace, etc.—Continued.

## Terms, discussions and draft texts:

Aerial navigation, 759-760

Frontiers. *See* Frontier questions, *supra*.

## Military, naval, and air clauses:

Air clauses, 755-756; commissions of control, 756-758; general articles, 758-760; military clauses, 633-634, 736-737, 747-753; naval clauses, 357-360, 364-365, 754-755; text, draft, 747-760

Penalties, 673

## Ports, waterways, and railways:

Railway provisions insuring free circulation for Czechoslovakia, 100; rolling stock, commission of experts for, 383-384

Reparation, question of. *See*

Reparation: Hungarian.

Responsibility clause, 673

## Italy:

Adriatic claims based on Treaty of London (*see also* Fiume, *infra*), 18-19; plebiscite, question of, 19

Anti-French incidents (*see also* Fiume: Commission of Inquiry, *infra*), 32-33, 34, 35, 852

Asia Minor, Italo-Greek conflict in Anatolia and efforts of Supreme Council to control, 17-18, 33, 34, 35, 121-122, 128, 138-139, 152-153, 154-158, 194-198, 538-539, 540, 555-556

Austria (*see also* Austria: Frontier dispute with Jugoslavia: Italian interference), peace treaty provisions concerning Italy: Frontiers, 38, 842-843, 868-869, 912; Italian demand for cession of Austro-Hungarian concession in Tientsin, question of, 117-120, 171-173; Italian reservations, 15, 206-207; political, 870, 932; ports, waterways, and railways, 159-160, 945, 951

Austro-Hungarian territories (former), agreement regarding Italian contribution toward cost of liberation, 819, 832-834, 843; draft text, 832-834

Bulgaria. *See* Bulgaria: Italy, relations with.

Coal, Italian efforts to obtain, 17, 39, 175-176, 267-268, 343-344, 371-372

Communism, 107

## Italy—Continued.

## Fiume:

## Commission of Inquiry into Fiume

Incidents (involving clashes between French, Italian, Yugoslav, and other Allied forces):

Appointment and instructions, 32-37, 47, 56-57, 58-59, 89-90, 238

Report and recommendations, *Aug. 9*: Acceptance in principle by Supreme Council, 836, 929-931; text, 845-855

Financial situation, 620, 635-636

Italo-Jugoslav controversy over disposition of Fiume (*see also* Commission of Inquiry, *supra*):

Italian obstruction of food and other shipments to Jugoslavia, and efforts of Supreme Council to remove, 33, 35-36, 92-93, 121, 351-352, 354, 562-563

Reaction in Italy to postponement of Fiume settlement (*see also* Anti-French incidents, *supra*), 848, 852

Greco-Italian conflict. *See* Asia Minor, *supra*.

Jugoslav-Italian relations (*see also* Fiume, *supra*; *also* Austria: Frontier dispute with Jugoslavia: Italian interference), Italian attitude toward Yugoslav request for repatriation of former Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war in Italy, 564-565, 601-602

Ports, waterways, and railways: Participation of interested powers in improvement of railway from Chambery to Turin, 652, 662-669; Reschen Pass and Predil Pass Railways, Austrian peace treaty clauses regarding, 159-160, 905, 945, 951

Japan: Reparation Commission, alternate representation for Japan in matters relating to Far East and damage at sea, 3; repatriation of Czechoslovak troops from Siberia, inability of Japanese Government to supply tonnage for, 556-557; Siberian Railway, use of Japanese troops for defense of, 64-65, 211-212, 556-557

Jews, protection of, Bulgarian peace treaty political clauses regarding, 403-404

Jugoslavia (*see also* New States):

Austrian peace treaty, decision of Council that Yugoslav delegation should receive copies of Austrian notes concerning Jugoslavia, 40

## Jugoslavia—Continued.

Bulgarian peace treaty, interest of Yugoslav delegation in financial and reparation clauses, 324, 408, 433, 460-461, 476-477, 624, 638-639, 737-739, 763-766

Commission on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs, 5, 62, 75-76, 243, 328, 360-361, 454-457, 471-475, 611, 952-955

## Frontier questions:

Austria. *See* Austria: Treaty: Terms: Frontier: Jugoslavia.

Bulgaria, conflict, 104, 105, 243, 511-512, 764

Hungary. *See* Hungary: Frontiers: Jugoslavia.

Italy. *See* Austria: Frontier dispute with Jugoslavia: Italian interference *and* Italy: Fiume: Italo-Jugoslav controversy.

Roumania. *See* Roumania: Frontiers: Jugoslavia.

Italy, relations with (*see also* Austria: Frontier dispute with Jugoslavia: Italian interference *and* Italy: Fiume: Italo-Jugoslav controversy), Italian attitude toward Yugoslav request for repatriation of former Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war in Italy, 564-565, 601-602

Reparation (*see also* New states: Reparation): Request for restitution by German Government of topographical plans of mines of Costoplatz, 737, 762-763; trade with Austria, exchange of food for steel bridges, 175

## Treaties:

Agreement between Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, Roumania, Jugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, on the Cost of Liberation of the Territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 819, 830-832, 843; draft text, 830-832

Treaty with Allied and Associated Powers, official languages, 268

Karelian delegation, request for hearing by Conference, 327

Kehl and Strasbourg, nomination for director for port, 360

Kiel Canal, 792, 804-805

Klagenfurt. *See* Austria: Frontier dispute with Jugoslavia.

## Labor:

Austrian peace treaty provisions, 910-911, 960-961, 963; Italian reservation regarding use of labor as reparation, 15

## Labor—Continued.

Commission on International Labor Legislation, 960-961, 963

Conference, International, 960-961

Lansing, Robert, views regarding limitation of powers as plenipotentiary, 9

Latvia. *See* Baltic countries.

## League of Nations:

Austrian peace treaty clauses: Admission of Austria to League, question of, 40, 42-43, 865; arbitration by League of disputes arising in reorganization of South Austrian Railway, 203-205; Italian reservation regarding territorial guarantees of League Covenant, 15, 206-207; minorities, protection of, enforcement of guarantees, 560-561, 586-589

Commission on League of Nations, 40, 42-43, 86-87

Covenant of the League, 40, 42-43, 206-207, 863; question of delay in U. S. ratification, 261-262

Permanent Court of International Justice, 42-43, 587, 589

Saar Territory, nomination of delimitation commission, 261-262

Tientsin, suggestion to refer to Health Section of League sanitation problem in former Austro-Hungarian concession, 173

Liechtenstein, 721, 726-727

Lithuania. *See* Baltic countries.

London, Treaty of, 18-19, 122, 155-156

## Mandates:

Commission on Colonial Mandates, 161, 240, 612-613, 617-618

German East Africa. *See* Africa.

Turkish territories, 193, 196, 649

Memel. *See under* Germany: Eastern frontiers.

Military clauses of peace treaties. *See* Treaty of peace: Terms: Military, etc.: Military clauses *under* Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, *and* Hungary.

Minorities (*see also* New states): Austrian peace treaty clauses regarding protection of minorities, 158, 362, 369-370, 560-561, 586-589; Bulgarian peace treaty clauses, 234, 403-404, 425-428, 561-562, 590-595; voluntary emigration in Balkans, proposal by M. Venizelos, 561-562, 590-595

Morocco, Austrian peace treaty clauses concerning, 870-872, 917, 932-933

Nationality clauses of Austrian peace treaty, 786-787, 797, 843, 869-870, 931



- Naval clauses of peace treaties: Austria, 357-360, 364-365, 875, 934; Bulgaria, 258, 276; Germany, 357-360, 364-368, 405-408; Hungary, 357-360, 364-365, 754-755
- Netherlands, Commission for Revision of Treaties of 1839 concerning, 134-135
- New states (*see also* Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, *and* Poland):
- Austrian peace treaty clauses:
    - Economic questions: Coal supply for Austria, insertion of guarantees in treaties with new states, 785-786, 796-797, 944-945; distribution of social insurance funds among states deriving territory from former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 788-789, 798
    - Minorities clauses, proposal for modification to conform with clauses in treaties with new states, 158, 362, 369-370, 560-561, 586-589
    - Political clauses, application to conventions with new states, 101, 562, 598-599, 863-864
    - Ports, waterways, and railways, proposal for immediate application of reciprocity clauses regarding, 817-819, 825-826, 903-904, 958-959
    - Reparation. *See* Reparation, *infra*.
  - Bulgarian peace treaty clauses (*see also* Reparation: Bulgarian, *infra*), 234, 403-404, 425-428, 561-562, 590-595
  - Committee on New States, 101, 158, 234, 362, 369, 403-404, 559, 560-561, 561-562, 590-592, 676
  - Constantinople, new state of, 6*n*, 14, 235, 441-442, 671
  - Prisoners of war formerly belonging to Austro-Hungarian Army, now nationals of new states, question of immediate liberation, 564-565, 601-602
  - Reparation and financial questions:
    - Austro-Hungarian reparation and financial questions (*see also* Treaties: Cost of liberation: New states), 787-789, 797-798, 862, 863, 885-889, 912-913
    - Bulgarian peace treaty provisions, interest of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Roumania, 324, 408, 433, 460-461, 476-477, 638-639, 737-739, 763-766
  - Restitution to Allies of rolling-stock moved beyond Armistice frontier in violation of Armistice of Villa Giusti, proposed, 562, 595-598
  - Treaties:
    - Austrian adherence to special conventions with new states, proposed, 943-944, 958, 962
- New states—Continued.
- Treaties—Continued.
- Cost of liberation of former Austro-Hungarian territories, agreements regarding contributions toward. *See* Treaties: Cost of liberation: New states.
  - General treaties:
    - Application of Austrian political clauses, proposed, 101, 562, 598-599, 863-864
    - Czechoslovakia. *See* Czechoslovakia: Treaties: Treaty with Allied and Associated Powers.
    - Jugoslavia, 268
    - Languages, official, 268
    - Reciprocal relations of ceded territory, draft clauses, 109-113
    - Roumania, 268, 538, 559-560, 579-586; text, draft, 579-586
    - Voluntary emigration in Balkans, proposal by M. Venizelos, 561-562, 590-595
  - Norway, 39-40
  - Occupation, armies of. *See* Armies of occupation.
  - Peace, treaties of. *See under* Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, *and* Turkey.
  - Penalties for breaches of laws of war (*see also* Responsibility; *also* Treaty of peace: Terms: Penalties under Austria, Bulgaria, Germany *and* Hungary):
    - Austrian peace treaty clauses, 843, 880-881, 918-920, 934
    - Bulgarian peace treaty clauses, discussions, recommendations, and draft clauses, 258-260, 282-290; U. S. reservation, 289-290
    - German peace treaty clauses, request by German Government for postponement of surrender of military officers as demanded by peace treaty, because of political situation, 449-451, 462, 547-548, 565-566, 649-650, 660-661
    - Hungarian peace treaty clauses, 673
  - Permanent Court of International Justice, 42-43, 587, 589
  - Plebiscites, proposed (*see also* Commissions: Plebiscite):
    - Adriatic, 19
    - Bessarabia, 8-14, 459
    - Klagenfurt and Carinthia. *See* Austria: Frontier dispute with Yugoslavia: Plebiscite.
    - Principles concerning composition of interallied armies of occupation in plebiscite areas, 625-628, 815-816; distribution of costs, 483, 706-707



## Plebiscites—Continued.

Prussia, East, plebiscite or administrative commission, 167-168, 262-263, 292-293

Schleswig. *See* Germany: Treaty: Terms: Boundaries: Schleswig.

Silesia, Upper. *See* Germany: Eastern frontiers: Silesia: Plebiscite.

Styria (Marburg and Radkersburg), 739-740, 842, 867, 915-916, 931, 936-937, 948-950, 952-955, 958

Thrace, 401, 515

Poland (*see also* New states):

Commission on Polish Affairs, 117, 257, 612

## Frontiers:

Czechoslovakia (Teschen), 116-117, 257, 612

Germany. *See* Germany: Eastern frontiers.

Lithuania, dispute over demarcation line, 88, 303-304, 315-316, 328, 378

Prisoners of war in Allied countries, 170

Transport of troops and war material to Poland, request to German Government for use of port of Danzig and Kiel Canal, 237, 792, 804-805

Treaties: Agreement between Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, on the Cost of Liberation of the Territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 819, 830-832, 843; treaty with Allied and Associated Powers, 158

Polk, Frank L., views on constitutionality of use of U. S. troops in Silesia, 784-785

Ports, waterways, and railways (*see also* Treaty of peace: Terms: Ports *under* Austria, Bulgaria, Germany and Hungary):

Chambery-Turin Railroad, participation of interested powers in improvement of, 652, 662-669

## Commissions:

Commission on International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways, reports and recommendations, discussions and texts: Austrian frontier stations, 100-101; Austrian observations on peace treaty provisions, 817-819, 825-826; Bulgarian peace treaty clauses, 355, 409-425, 673, 676, 826-828; expert commissions for distribution of enemy rolling stock, 344-345, 372-376, 382-384

Expert commissions for distribution of enemy rolling stock, 344-345, 372-376, 382-384

## Ports, etc.—Continued.

## Commissions—Continued.

Transportation Committee, Interallied, 652, 662-669, 792-793, 807-809

Danube. *See* Danube.

Irrigation canals in Banat, necessity for international measures for maintenance of, 455, 472, 473

Railway rolling stock rates paid by British and U. S. Armies in France, 792-793, 807-809

Siberian Railway, question of defense after evacuation of Czechoslovak troops, 63-65, 211-212, 556-557

Portugal, 58

Postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications: Communications with Germany, reestablishment, 345-348, 370-371, 380-382; rupture of communications at Warsaw, 304

Press, 15-16, 49

Prisoners of war and graves (*see also under* Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Poland, Russia, Turkey):

Commissions concerning: Commission on Prisoners of War, reports and recommendations, texts and discussions, 49, 50-52, 263, 294-299; Commission on Repatriation of Prisoners of War, 945-948, 957

Liberation of prisoners of war formerly belonging to Austro-Hungarian Army now nationals of an Allied or Associated State, 564-565, 601-602

Prussia, East. *See under* Germany: Eastern frontiers.

Railways. *See* Ports, waterways, and railways.

Relief. *See* Food relief.

## Reparation:

Austrian reparation: Italian reservation regarding furnishing of labor as means of reparation, 15; peace treaty provisions, 843, 863, 881-885, 920-922, 934; priority of food payments over reparations, 173-177, 183-187, 299-300, 863; war material as reparation, delivery of arms and munitions to Czechoslovakia, 175-177, 263-264, 299-300, 462, 478-480; war material in Klagenfurt, Yugoslav claims to, 240-242, 252-253, 453, 468

Bulgarian reparation, peace treaty provisions and interest of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Roumania, 233, 323-324, 330-335, 408, 433, 435, 460-461, 476-477, 624, 638-639, 737-739, 763-766

## Reparation—Continued.

## Commissions:

Organization of Reparation Commission, Committee for: Appointment and composition, 2-3, 6, 14, 548, 552; work of, 40, 119, 161, 240, 624, 638-639, 737, 762, 764-766, 768, 811

Reparation Commission provided by peace treaties: Duties and powers, 2-3, 174-177, 183-187, 241, 331, 334, 345, 372-376, 548, 549, 552, 624, 738, 764-766, 777-778, 820-822, 863, 881-884; interallied commission at Sofia to facilitate Bulgarian reparation payments, 331-335, 624, 639, 738, 766

Cost of liberation of former Austro-Hungarian territories, agreements regarding. *See under* Treaties.

German reparation: Estimation of war damage in devastated areas, Allied proposed reply to German inquiry regarding, 737, 761-762; German payments to troops in Baltic, suggestion for continuance as part of reparation, 239-240; Norwegian claims, 40; rolling stock, distribution of, 344-345, 372-376

Hungarian reparation payments, effect of—

Roumanian requisitions in Hungary, 548, 549, 551-555, 567-569, 605-606, 613-615, 616-617, 621, 655-656, 657, 681-682, 684-686, 690, 691-692, 767, 768, 774-778, 811-813, 819-822, 836-838, 855-857, 945

Seizure of securities by Bela Kur and proposed sale of, 23, 28, 61-62, 71-74, 88-89

New states. *See* New states: Reparation.

Turkey, sale of state property by Ottoman Government, 622-624, 637

Responsibility for the war and penalties (*see also* Treaty: Terms: Penalties *under* Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, and Hungary), Commission on, 258-260, 282-290, 673, 918

## Rhineland, Allied occupation:

Army of occupation, Allied: Alleged sale of surplus cars and horses to Germans, 838-839, 857-858; organization and strength, 308, 311, 454, 626, 627

Committee on the Rhine Territory: Establishment, 87-88; report, text, and discussions, 205-206, 212-229

Convention regarding military occupation of Rhineland:

Correspondence between German delegation and Supreme Coun-

## Rhineland—Continued.

Convention regarding military occupation of Rhineland—Continued. *cil: June 30*, German request for opening of discussions concerning occupied regions, 2, 6; *July 12*, German notes presenting observations on convention, 218-219; *July 29*, Allied reply to notes of *July 12*, 205-206, 212-218

Ratification by Germany, 66

## Roumania:

Bulgarian peace treaty, Roumanian interests (*see also* Frontiers: Bulgaria, *infra*), reparation and financial clauses, 324, 332-333, 460-461, 476-477, 624, 638-639, 739

Commission on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs, 5, 62, 75-76, 243, 328, 360-361, 454-457, 471-475, 611, 952-955

Danube, Roumanian interest in regulation of trade on, 819, 828-830, 938

## Frontiers:

Bulgaria (Dobrudja), 242-243, 439, 440, 511-512, 512, 540, 541, 609, 687

Czechoslovakia, 611

Hungary. *See* Hungary: Roumanian aggression.

Jugoslavia: Ada Kalessi Island, 361, 471, 473; Banat, 4, 327-328, 360-361, 455, 456, 471-472, 682, 791, 801-802

Poland (Bukovina), 4, 455-457, 459, 474-475, 682

Russia (Bessarabia), 4-5, 8-14, 456, 457-459, 559-560, 682

Hungary, conflict with. *See* Hungary: Roumanian aggression.

## Treaties:

Cost of Liberation of Territories of former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Agreement between Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, Roumania, Jugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, 615, 767, 777, 819, 820-821, 822, 830-832, 843; draft text, 830-832

Treaty with Allied and Associated Powers:

Languages, official, 268

Terms: Discussions, 538, 559-560; text, draft, 579-586

## Russia:

Allied troops in Russia (*see also* Czechoslovak troops, *infra*), 25, 26, 63-64

Armenia, Russian, food relief for, 210-211, 231-232

Blockade: Proposed measures to prevent goods from reaching Soviet Russia, 102, 117, 131-134, 142-145, 265-267, 300-301, 309, 312-



## Russia—Continued.

## Blockade—Continued.

314, 644-645, 720-721, 724-726, 817, 823-824; U. S. objections and views of President Wilson regarding international law questions involved, 133-134, 265-267, 300-301, 309, 312-314, 634-635, 644-645

Czechoslovak troops, question of repatriation, 63-65, 211-212, 556-557, 652-653

Economic policy of Allies toward Russia, report by Supreme Economic Council, 651

Frontier questions: Bessarabia, 4-5, 8-14, 456, 457-459, 559-560, 682; Karelia, 327

Georgia: Independence, proposed, 648-649; interference with Allied relief shipments to Armenia, 210-211, 231-232

## Koltchak government:

Blockade: Effect on military situation, 265-267; proposal for blockade of Black Sea by Koltchak, 132-133, 143

Military situation: Failure of Czechoslovak troops in Siberia to effect juncture with Koltchak forces, 63-65; proposal for participation of Finnish troops in advance on Petrograd, 38-39

Prisoners of war: Austrian, in Siberia, 50-51, 878-879; Russian, in Germany, 208-210, 230-231, 486-488, 498-501

Repudiation of Russian public debt by Soviet government, 913

Siberian Railway, question of protection after evacuation of Czechoslovak troops, 63-65, 211-212, 556-557

Saar Basin: Commission for delimitation of, 261-262; occupation by Allied forces, question of, 641, 642

Sale of horses and motors to Germans by American and British troops of occupation, 838-839, 857-858

Scapa Flow incident, 357-360, 405, 406-407

Schleswig. *See under Germany*: Treaty of peace: Terms: Boundaries.

Serbia and Serb-Croat-Slovene State. *See Yugoslavia*.

Shipping, merchant: Agreement by Austrian Government regarding vessels sunk by their naval forces, 267, 301; Norwegian claims for damage to shipping, 40

Siam, Austrian peace treaty clauses concerning, 870-872, 872

Siberian Railway, question of protection after evacuation of Czechoslovak troops, 63-65, 211-212, 556-557

Silesia. *See under Germany*: Eastern frontiers.

Smyrna, Commission of Inquiry. *See Turkish territories*: Anatolia: Smyrna.

Spitzbergen, Commission on, 39

St. Germain, treaty of. *See Austria*: Treaty of peace.

Styria, 842, 867, 915-916, 931, 936-937, 948-950, 952-955, 958

Submarines, 276, 364-368, 406, 407

Sudbahn (South Austrian) Railway, 203-205

Supreme Councils. *See Councils*.

Supreme Economic Council: Continuance, question of, 343-344, 371-372; economic policy of Allies in Russia, 651; exchange of goods between countries of Central Europe, note regarding, 650-651, 662; reply by Communications Section to Roumanian note regarding regulation of traffic on Danube, 819, 828-830, 938

Swabian delegation, desire for hearing by Conference, 327

## Sweden:

Aaland Islands, interest of Sweden in, 443, 448, 511, 518-526

Commercial relations with Soviet Russia (*see also Russia*: Blockade), 102, 131, 133, 143, 265, 720-721, 726

Switzerland, Vorarlberg question, 720, 726-727

Syria, 196

Telegraph and telephone communications. *See Postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications*.

Teschen, 116-117, 257, 612

Thrace. *See Greece and Yugoslavia under Bulgaria*: Frontiers.

Tientsin, Commission on, 118-120, 171-173

Trade questions: *See Blockade under Austria, Baltic countries, Germany, Hungary, and Russia*.

Transportation Committee, Interallied, 652, 662-669, 792-793, 807-809

Treaties, conventions, etc.:

Aerial navigation convention, 62-63, 90-92

Austrian peace treaty economic clauses concerning treaties, 797, 892-893

Baltic, proposed treaty regarding access to, 488-489, 501-502

Berlin, treaty of 1878, 11, 361

Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, treaties of 1918, 339, 435, 503

Brussels Convention, 789-790, 791, 800, 801

Bucharest, peace treaty of 1913 between Roumania and Bulgaria, 339, 503, 687



## Treaties, etc.—Continued.

- Bulgarian peace treaty economic clauses concerning treaties. *See* Economic questions: Bulgarian peace treaty: Treaties.
- Bulgar-Turkish treaty of 1913, 328, 329, 337, 339
- Convention between Allied and Associated Governments and Poland conferring on Marshal Foch command of Polish armies, 150-151
- Cost of liberation of former Austro-Hungarian territories, agreements regarding contributions toward:
  - Italy—Allies, 819, 832-834, 843; draft text, 832-834
  - New states and Roumania—Allies, 615, 767, 777, 819, 820-821, 822, 830-832, 843; draft text, 830-832
- Emigration, voluntary, in the Balkans, proposed negotiation of convention for, 561-562, 590-595
- Greco-Turkish treaty of 1913, 328, 329
- London, treaty of 1915, 18-19, 122, 155-156
- Minorities treaties:
  - Czechoslovakia. *See* Czechoslovakia: Treaties: Treaty with Allied and Associated Powers.
  - Jugoslavia, 268
  - Poland, 158
  - Roumania. *See* Roumania: Treaties.
- Neuilly, treaty of. *See* Bulgaria: Treaty of peace.
- New states. *See* New states: Treaties.
- Paris, treaty of 1856, 11
- Peace treaties. *See* Treaty of peace under Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, and Turkey.
- Rhineland convention. *See* Rhineland: Convention.
- San Stephano, treaty of, 435
- St. Germain. *See* Austria: Treaty of peace.
- Treaties of 1839, Commission for Revision of, 134-135
- Trianon. *See* Hungary: Treaty of peace.
- Versailles. *See* Germany: Treaty of peace.
- Trianon, treaty of. *See* Hungary: Treaty of peace.
- Turkey (*see also* Turkish territories):
  - Allied policy toward Turkey, telegram from President Wilson regarding, and discussion, 193
  - Armistice of Oct. 30, 1918, question of execution, 198, 202
  - Constantinople, 6*n*, 14, 235, 441-442, 671
  - Frontiers with Bulgaria and Greece, 5-6, 6*n*, 14, 441-442, 671
  - Prisoners of war in Egypt, arrangements for liberation of, 565

## Turkey—Continued.

- Reparation, sale of state property by Ottoman Government, question of, 622-624, 637
- Treaty of peace with Allied and Associated Powers: Postponement of discussions, 193; reparation and other questions, 328-329, 622-624, 637
- Turkish territories:
  - Allied troops (*see also* Anatolia: Italian-Greek conflict, *infra*), 41, 44, 66, 196, 647-649, 839-840
  - Anatolia:
    - Italian-Greek conflict and Allied measures to control, 17-18, 33, 34, 35, 121-122, 128, 138-139, 152-153, 154-158, 194-198, 538-539, 540, 555-556
    - Smyrna, Commission of Inquiry Into Issues of (Greek atrocities against Turks): Appointment and instructions, 207, 239, 264-265; discussions, general, 191-192, 197, 198, 200-201, 202, 207, 238-239, 249-250, 264-265, 539, 544-545, 556, 687-688, 693, 730; Greek and Turkish representatives, question of status, 238-239, 249-250, 687-688, 693, 730; Turkish request for dispatch of commission, text, 200-201; U. S. participation, question of, 207
  - Armenia: Allied troops, 41, 44, 66, 647-649, 839-840; Harbord mission, 43, 44; mandate, question of, 193, 649; notification to Ottoman Government by U. S. High Commissioner in Constantinople regarding Armenian massacres, 839-840, 858-859; relief, 41, 43, 44; repatriation of Armenian agriculturalists, 40-41, 43-44
  - Mandates, question of, 193, 196, 649
  - Syria, Franco-British controversy and British refusal of mandate, 196
- United States (*see also* Wilson):
  - Aerial navigation convention, reservation regarding U. S. adherence, 62-63, 90-92
  - Austrian peace treaty, U. S. observations, 912-926, 939-940, 954-955, 959-960
  - Baltic loan, proposed, U. S. inability to participate, 49
  - Bulgarian questions: Observations on Bulgarian peace treaty provisions, including frontiers, 244, 245-246, 272*n*, 283, 286-287, 289-290, 398-401, 607-611, 671-672; U. S. nonconcern in proposed occupation of Bulgaria, 65, 136, 148*n*, 317

## United States—Continued.

China, attitude of U. S. representative regarding nomination of special committee to examine Italian demands for concessions in Tientsin, 117-120

Commissions, question of participation, 78*n*, 136, 207, 261, 272*n*, 323, 343, 371, 535-536, 537, 782

Czechoslovak troops in Siberia, U. S. inability to supply tonnage for repatriation, 556-557, 653

Hungarian affairs: Assistance in maintaining Hungarian blockade, question of, 348-350; attitude toward interference in Hungarian domestic affairs, 605

Mandates, Turkish, question of acceptance, 193, 649

Ratification of German peace treaty, question of, 261, 323, 813

## Russia:

Bessarabian question, statement of U. S. policy regarding division of Russia, 458-459

Blockade, U. S. objections and views of President Wilson regarding international law involved, 133-134, 265-267, 300-301, 309, 312-314, 634-635, 644-645

Troops in Asia and Europe, questions concerning, 64-65, 161, 181, 182,

## United States—Continued.

198, 211-212, 230, 308, 444-445, 486-487, 510, 626-628, 648-649, 784-785, 792-793, 807-809, 813-814, 838-839, 839-840, 857-858, 929-930, 945-946

Versailles treaty. *See* Germany: Treaty of peace.

Vorarlberg, 721, 726-727

War material, enemy, discussion of principles to govern distribution of, 357-360, 364-368, 405-407, 461-462, 477, 621

Waterways. *See* Ports, waterways, and railways.

Weimar Assembly, 66

Wilson, Woodrow, views of: Armies of occupation, principle of equal inter-allied participation, 626, 627; Austrian status as an old state, 715, 716; Fourteen Points, cited, 839, 858; naval questions, disposal of enemy fleet, 406, 407; Roumania, defiance of authority of Council, 682; Russia, blockade of, 133-134, 265-267, 300-301, 309, 312-314, 634-635, 644-645; Thrace, question of disposal of, 441, 610; Turkey, policy toward, 193

Yugoslavia. *See* Yugoslavia.







## Date Due

[illegible]

TRENT UNIVERSITY



0 1164 0206269 3

JX233 .A3 1919 v.7  
U.S. Dept. of State.  
Foreign relations of the  
United States.

**297949**

DATE

ISSUED TO

**297949**



